We aren’t past the halfway point of this recession
My sense is that we probably aren’t even past the halfway point yet of this recession, the credit losses or the house price deflation. Looking at whether equities may have bottomed or not on an intermediate basis, maybe the recent action to the negative side was an important inflection. In terms of what I do, which is trying to tie the macro into the markets, I have a very tough time believing that we have reached anything close to a fundamental low, either in the S&P 500 or in the long-bond yield, for that matter.
300-point rallies in the Dow happen in bear markets
We’re in a very confusing atmosphere. People didn’t really know what to make of a 300-point rally in the Dow the other day, but my main message was that 300point rallies from the Dow don’t happen in bull markets. In fact, they never happened in the bull market from October ‘02 to October ‘07, but it has happened 6 times in this bear market and happened 12 times in the last bear market. You don’t get moves like that in bull markets. As Rich Bernstein has said time and again, “This is the hallmark of a recession and a hallmark of a bear market.”
How can there be recession with GDP still positive?
We are at a crossroad in the economy. The 2Q GDP numbers recently came in at plus 1.9%. The details of the number left a little to be desired, but it was still a positive number. Turn on CNBC, and everybody says, “How can there possibly be a recession with GDP positive?”
Employment has been down seven months in a row
The very next day we got nonfarm payrolls. It prints down 51,000 and frankly, it doesn’t matter whether it was below or above Wall Street expectations. The bottom line is that employment is down seven months in a row. In 60 years of sifting through the data here, that’s never happened before without the economy being in a classic recession.
GDP is useful but it has its limitations
I think the point that has to be made as an economist talking to a group of portfolio managers or FAs or investors, it is important to convey to clients that there is a lot of noise out there. GDP is useful, but it has its limitations. First, GDP is going to get revised. We thought we had a plus 0.6 in the fourth quarter; all of a sudden, it’s minus 0.2. Twenty percent of GDP is government. So, you really can’t fully concentrate on GDP when a fifth of it is state, local and federal government, unless you’re trading defense stocks.
You’ll miss a lot of action waiting for GDP to go negative
More to the point, if you’re waiting as an investor for GDP to actually turn negative, you’re going to miss a lot of action along the way. I think the best example is to just go back to Japan. They had a real estate bubble that turned bust and they had their own credit contraction back in the early 1990s. Guess what; Japan didn’t post its first back-to-back contraction of real GDP until the second half of 1993. By the time the back-to-back negative that people seem to be waiting for happened, the Nikkei had already plunged 50%, the 10-year JGB yield rallied 300 basis points, and the Bank of Japan had cut the overnight rate 500 basis points, which said a thing or two about the efficacy of using the traditional monetary policy response of cutting interest rates into a credit contraction (as we’re now finding out here in the US).
Dating the recession is a very scientific process
The point is we can’t make the assumption that we’ve avoided a recessionary condition in the economy, just because we have so far managed to avoid back-toback quarters of negative GDP. I’m just telling you as the economist that it is basically irrelevant. The only body that officially makes the call on the broad contours - when the recession started, when it ends, when the expansion starts, when it ends - is the National Bureau of Economic Research, the NBER. It’s a very scientific process. It’s not a gut check or a judgment call.
We should actually be welcoming the recession call
When they make the determination - it’s very interesting, by the way - when they make the announcement that the recession began, when they actually date it for us, traditionally we’re a month away from the recession actually ending. The announcement, in fact, is going to be a rather cathartic event, something we should actually welcome happening, but so far they are still taking their sweet time in making the proclamation.
Four factors used to determine recession
1) Employment
The NBER relies on four different variables. The first is employment. Now I’ve told you before; employment is down seven months in a row. Does employment go in the GDP? The answer is no. Is it correlated? Yes. Does it help grow the business cycle? Of course.
2) Industrial production
The next variable is industrial production. Does that go into GDP? The answer is no. Does it help grow the business cycle? The answer is yes. This is a number that comes from the Fed. The GDP comes from the Commerce Department. It’s a very important variable.
3) Real personal income net government transfers
The next variable, the third one, is real personal income excluding government transfers. This metric is now down four months in a row. Does personal income go into GDP? The answer is no; of course, it doesn’t. GDP is all about spending. Personal income goes into gross domestic income, which is another chart of the national accounts.
4) Real sales activity
The fourth variable and the only variable that actually feeds into GDP is real sales activity in manufacturing, retail and wholesale sectors.
Recession probably started in January
When I take a look at these four key indicators that define the broad contours of the business cycle, they all peaked and began to roll over sometime between October of last year and February of this year. I am convinced that when the NBER does make the final proclamation, it will tell us a that recession officially began in January. Of course, to any market person, this would make perfect sense, because of when the S&P 500 peaked. It did a double top into October, right when it usually does, before a recession begins.
This recession won’t end before mid-2009, in our view
Now I’m just giving you the rearview mirror. What’s most important to you folks is let’s look through the front window and see when this recession is going to end. The tea leaves that I’m reading at this point in time show that this recession is not ending any time before the mid part of 2009, which would mean that, if you’re looking for, not the Mary Ann Bartels intermediate bottoms, but the fundamental bottom, I don’t think you can expect to see it before February or March of next year, if I’m correct on when this recession ends. Historically the S&P 500 troughs four months before the economy actually hits its bottom point.
Profit as a share of GDP was at unheard of levels
The next question, of course, is what levels are we talking about? Again, I’m going to take what I do, which is earnings, and then talk about the appropriate multiple. What is the appropriate multiple at the low in a recession? In terms of earnings, I think that we have to understand where we’re coming from in this cycle. We’re coming from a situation where, because of all the leverage in the system, profits in the share of GDP went into this recession and bear market at 14% of GDP, which is unheard of. That’s never happened before. A lot of the reason why profits soared was because everybody turned to financials. There was this tremendous amount of leverage, and that accounted for half of just about everything in the cycle from GDP growth to employment to profits.
The profits share of GDP, again, as a proxy for margins, is now down to 12%. Think about that for a second. This terrible earnings recession so far has taken the share of profits from 14% down to 12%. The question is, if I’m right on a recession, where does the profit share of GDP go to at a recession trough? Well, consistently it goes to 7%.
We could get below $50 on operating earnings
Even the economists who are predicting a recession are going say, “Playing in a little recession, on average, troughs go down 25%.” The problem this time is that we have to overlay the revenue decline that actually comes from a recession with a much more significant margin, considering the levels from which we headed into this bear market and recession. So when I’m talking about that historically, what’s normal in a recession is that this profit share equals to 7% and we started at 14%, we are talking about a 25% decline in earnings. We can be talking about something closer to 50% peak to trough. The peak is $90 on a full-quarter trailing basis. It’s not beyond the realm of possibilities that we get below $50 in operating earnings. The first call consensus numbers is $105 earnings for next year. I give the odds of that happening at exactly 0.0%.
There is a good chance we test the 2002 lows
Now, I’m not at $50 for next year. We’re at $63 for operating EPS, but that means that the answer is no, I don’t feel that we’re too low on earnings. Usually you slap a historical trough multiple on in a recession. But typically, during a recession coupled with a credit crunch, the multiple bottoms at 12. You’re at a 12 multiple with $63 in earnings and you’re going to ask the question, “Are you talking about the possibility that we can actually test the … 2002 lows?” And the answer is that it is certainly not outside the realm of the possible. I’m not making that forecast, but what I am telling you is that there is a good chance that that could happen.
We are in a secular bear market
With that being respectful to the fact, I believe we’re in a secular bear market. I don’t even think that’s an opinion anymore. I think it’s a stylized fact. If you saw it, Rich Bernstein put out his performance asset mix table. Out of all the asset classes, stocks, cash, bonds, commodities, the only one to have a negative inflation-adjusted return over the past 10 years is the S&P 500. So I think we have to be honest about this. If it’s something like a 1929 and 1955 or 1966, 1982 type of secular bear market, I think this one actually started in 2000, it doesn’t mean that you don’t get cyclical bull markets along the way. We actually had a cyclical bull market in the context of a secular bear market that actually took the S&P to a new high. Of course, as I said before, half of that was unprecedented leverage, the stone process of unwinding.
I think that it is important now to recognize for our clients that we have a cyclical bear market being overlaid into a secular bear market. I think the message that we’re trying to send is that there is a different investing style and strategy for every part of the business cycle. One part of the business cycle is all about adding … data and risk to maximize your turns. Then there are times when it is all about preserving your capital and focusing on income, earnings, stability and dividend growth. I think that’s where we have been, and I firmly believe that’s where we will continue to be, at least over the course of the next 12 months.
Chapter 1 was the end of the res construction bubble
When I look at where we are in this book, and we continue to write chapters in this book and it is a book; this is an epic period. We are living through history. People will be writing about this in the future, no different than they wrote about the 1920s and the 1930s. Chapter one of the book was the end of the residential construction bubble, which I would tag as the first quarter of 2006, when housing started to peak and began to roll over at 2.3 million units. I continue to look back at that, 2.3 million units.
The natural level of demographic demand for housing in this country is annual demand of 1.45 million units. From 2003 until 2007, builders added on average nearly 2 million residential units per year, or 30% more, than the natural demand could absorb, because, of course, we were in a new paradigm. So the builders were building homes and condos as if we had the same demographics as the 1970s when the Boomers were buying their first refrigerator. This is a case of Global Crossing meeting D.R. Horton, and we are paying the price for that, even today.
Chapter two was the end of the home price bubble
Chapter two of the book was the end of the home-price bubble, and I would date that to the first quarter of 2007 when the Case-Shiller Index began to deflate year over year. Now, I want to make this point, and I want to make this point emphatically. Home prices in this country on average rose 20% per year for six years. That has never happened before. When you take a look at home prices in real terms, they’re still more than 30% higher today than they were when this mania morphed into a bubble back in 2001. So to those people who are thinking that we’re only 5% away from the low, I’d say I don’t think so. Make no mistake that there is going to be more deflation in home prices ahead - I think significant deflation - just as Freddie Mac put us on notice yesterday.
Chapter three was the end of the credit cycle
The third chapter was the end of the credit cycle, which, again, I would tag at exactly a year ago. I think the way we have to look at this, and we’re talking about how this affects our ability to navigate the portfolio and manage the macro forecast. This cycle saw the end of a 20-year secular credit expansion that went absolutely parabolic in the last 6 years and accounted for half the growth in just about every segment that’s forecast.
Chapter four was the end of the employment cycle
This is very big stuff and it’s taking on different forms. We have the end of the credit cycle as chapter three. Chapter four was the end of the employment cycle, which I discussed earlier, which started in December of 2007.
Chapter 5 is the first consumer recession since 1990-91
We’re heading into chapter five, and chapter five is the onset of the first consumer recession since 1990-91. I would argue this could end up being very similar to that six-quarter consumer recession that we endured from 1973-75. There are differences, but there are similarities. A lot of people like to compare this to 199091, because of the real estate flavor and the credit crunch, but there is actually a lot more going on that compares it to 1975.
I was around in the 1980s, and I remember that it played out very similarly. What people called resilience and people called contained and people called decoupling were all very pleasant euphemisms for lags. That’s what they are; they’re lags. There are built-in lags. Housing peaked in 1988, rolled over, the credit crunch intensified in 1989 when RTC got into real action. Then 1990 … two years after housing peaked, we had this very surprising consumer recession that caught even the Fed off guard.
The Four Horsemen
I wrote a report late last year titled The Four Horsemen. It was a regretful choice of words, because I kept on fielding questions as to whether or not I was, in fact, calling for the end of the world. I got to a point where my answer was “Just wait; it’s going to get worse than that.” In any event, who are the four horsemen? The four horsemen are credit contraction, deflation of both housing and equities, and that happened in the mid-1970s. Usually you’ll get one or the other. To have both housing and equities deflate on the household balance sheet, we’re talking about $30 trillion of assets. Half the assets on the household balance sheet are compressing dramatically right now. That last happened in the mid-1970s. We got credit contraction. We got deflation on the asset side of the household balance sheet that’s forcing the savings rate higher. We have employment, which I mentioned before.
Of course, food and energy - and, again, not just energy, but energy and food - and food is a bigger deal. Food is 15% of the household budget; energy is 10%. That’s a quarter of the household budget constrained by food and energy. Food is going to come down at a slower rate than energy will, but it’s already too late.
Oil prices are going down because demand is going down
People are saying to me all the time, “Gee, aren’t you going to turn more bullish with oil prices going down?” Well, oil prices are going down, because for the first time in this cycle it took $145 to break the back of the consumer. Quite amazing that it took that long, but it has happened. So we’re seeing true demand destruction in energy at a rate we haven’t seen in almost two decades.
It’s something to get an oil price decline that’s predicated on a new oil supply. I would keep that as a de facto exogenous tax cut; but when you’re getting oil price declines because of recessionary pressures cutting into energy demand, it’s no different than what happened in late 2000. That was the last time we had oil peel off as much as it is right now. I think it would have been a bit of a mistake for the economists at the end of 2000 to say, “Ah-ha, oil is coming down; I’m going to raise my 2001 GDP forecast.” You have to take a look at the reason why oil is going down, and the reason is not because of supply. The reason is because consumer demand is starting to go down. Again, the last time you had food and energy deviating so much from the long-run norm was in the mid-1970s.
Cash flow drain to household sector is $800 billion
When I take a look at the four horsemen and I try to come up with a number, the number I’m trying to come up with is a cash flow number. What is the cash flow drain on the household sector from the four horsemen in the coming year? The answer is $800 billion. So Uncle Sam, give me six more of those tax stimulus plans. That is a huge number. It’s equivalent to 12% of discretionary spending, which, by the way, is exactly the peak-to-trough decline in real consumer cyclical spending back in that 1973 to 1975 recession. The S&P 500 goes down peak to trough not by 20%, but more like 40%.
Three markers to turn us bullish
In terms of what are some of the markers that I’m weighing down to turn more bullish? I think this is very important. I look at not so much where am I going to be wrong, but looking at what are the things that will turn me more positive? There are three markers that I have laid down. The first marker is the personal savings rate. I have to see the personal savings rate go back to the pre-bubbles, normalized levels, which was 8%. I’m not talking about the Jurassic period here. I’m talking about where we were in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, before the last two bubbles. That’s why I said plural.
We had a tech stock bubble followed very quickly by a housing bubble. This had tremendous implications for perceived net worth and perceived future asset growth of the household sector. It had monumental impact on how people spent their after-tax income. That’s why we got to a point last year where briefly the savings rate got to negative for the first time since the 1920s. There was a belief system that we could retire on our assets, and now these assets are deflating and people’s expectations of how they’re going to retire is going to force that savings rate higher. That’s going to be very disinflationary, by the way.
I think it’s important to note that, in 2002, as the tech sector was deflating, Greenspan and Bernanke decided that it was a good idea to re-slate the housing stock as an antidote to the deflation in the tech capital stock. This is almost a piece of Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein; we built the monster, now we have to tear it down. I don’t know what else is left. We’ve had an equity bubble followed by a housing bubble, followed by a credit bubble. I don’t think there are any more rabbits in the hat to create the next bubble, unless that bubble is going to be in Treasuries, and maybe that is, in fact, going to happen. It’s pretty clear that the Fed is going to be concentrating a lot more in the future on non-traditional measures to ease monetary conditions, and not just cutting the Fed fund rate. Part of that may be reflating by expanding its balance sheet, which means that it’s not just talk. The Fed is actually going to add to its balance sheet, and that’s exactly what happened.
1) Need to see the savings rate go to eight percent
With the Bank of Japan and the operations they conducted back in the 1990s, this is just stuff to consider for the future. Let me just say that a savings rate of 8% would leave me feeling very good about the fact that we would have gone to a level of pent-up demand that would help us embark on the next bull market and economic expansion. That’s going to take quite a bit of time. This is a process. This a process we’re talking, even after the recession ends, that’s going to be an elongated recovery, as there was in the early 1990s, after that asset cycle. Remember, the recession might have ended in November 2001, but that did not give you a “get out of jail free” card as an equity investor, and certainly the recovery was a good two years away, even if the recession technically ended at the end of 2001. I’m talking about the markers that will turn me bullish for the next cycle. An eight percent savings rate, to me, would be a very critical launching pad.
2) Months supply below eight months
What else? Well, I doubt that anything is really going to bottom, including the financials, until we’re convinced that house prices have hit bottom. For that we have to look at the inventory to sales ratio, and there are different measures. There is the new inventory, which is a 10-month supply. There’s the resale; that’s 11-month supply. When I take a look at the Census Bureau data, which includes total vacant units for sale, single-family, condo, it’s more like 17-month supply. We need to include everything, including foreclosed properties. I have to see that number sliced in half. I have to see it down below eight months supply before I’ll be convinced home prices don’t bottom, at least the second derivatives start to turn positive. I have to see that metric at the eight-month supply. I’m keeping a very close eye on it. That will make me feel a lot more comfortable with turning bullish for the next cycle.
3) Interest coverage ratio has to come down to 10.5%
The third and last marker comes down to the household balance sheet. What I’m referring to here is interest coverage in the household sector. We have a record debt-income ratio, but that’s a stop-to-flow concept. I’m talking about interest coverage, how much are principal and interest payments from the record debt absorbing out of household income? It is 14.1%. It’s at a near-record high. We have never been in a recession with this metric at this level. So, that means there are too many things that are levels we’ve never seen before. The whole thing about economic bottling is you run the rest of it based on the past, and there are so many things that we’re entering into this thing that I’ve never seen before.
There is, I’d have to admit, a wide dispersion around the forecast I am providing. What I am really trying to do is put things into a certain perspective. What I know, being an economist, is that in some sense you’re a glorified historian. So when I take a look at the chart of interest coverage in the household sector, what do I see? I see that after the recession of the early 1980s, this interest coverage ratio got down to 10.5% by 1982 and, voila, that was the touch-off point for a multi-year bull market and economic expansion.
Then we had the recession of the early 1990s, and what do you know? In 1992, interest coverage went down to 10.5% again. That was the launching pad for a multi-year bull market and economic expansion. We’re 14.1% in this metric today. I know this historical record tells me that there is something about a 10.5% ratio that is a very cathartic event. The problem is that to get there from here would require the elimination of $2 trillion of household debt. So, maybe when NYU’s Nouriel Roubini talks about that the total losses could be up to $2 trillion, maybe he’s not talking through a paper bag.
Frugality is going to set in
As far as I know, there are only two ways to eliminate debt. You either walk away from it, which people obviously are doing, which is why we got these write-downs and these foreclosures, or you pay it down. I think people with a FICO score that they are concerned about are going to pay that down. That means that the savings rate is going to be forced higher. This, again, is going to be very, very disinflationary. It means that fashions are going to change. It means frugality is going to set in. We’re going to be living in smaller houses, driving smaller cars and living more frugally. It’s not going to be the end of the world; it’s going to be a necessary process to truly embark on getting the balance sheets down to more comfortable levels so that we can actually embark on the next cycle.
Intense deleveraging in the banking sector
The whole thing about being an economist is that you’re being requested to model behavior. What I found recently was three signs of significant changes in behavior. We obviously know of at least one investment bank that is taking aggressive action to sell assets and to deleverage. That’s going to force a lot of action in other parts of the industry. What we’re talking about here is intensified deleveraging in the banking sector.
Inventories cut by $62 billion despite tax stimulus
What else did we see? Well, those GDP numbers were just fascinating when you dig through them. Think about it for a second. How did businesses respond to the biggest tax stimulus of all time? They cut their inventory by $62 billion. Can you fathom that? Instead of boosting production as a result of the stimulus, they just allowed the stimulus to absorb past production. We already know that the inventory component went down another five points based on the July ISM number, so this inventory liquidation process is continuing.
Savings rate boosted despite stimulus too
Alan Greenspan cut his teeth on inventory investment cycles. So banks are deleveraging, and companies are liquidating inventories. How did households respond to the biggest tax stimulus of all time? They boosted their savings rate from 0.3% in the first quarter to 2.6% in the second quarter, which is only the third steepest increase in the savings rate in any given quarter in the past 55 years. Now you probably didn’t read that in the front page of The Wall Street Journal, but I find that to be a very relevant statistic.
So we have financial sector deleveraging. We have business sector inventory liquidation overlaid with the households boosting their savings rate. These are new themes, and the theme is about getting small. That’s going to play very well into Rich Bernstein’s decision two months ago to allocate an extra 15 percentage points to his fixed income portfolio. Now we’re talking about fixed income. We’re talking about bonds that are high quality and have non-callable protection.
Nominal GDP growth has highest correlation with yields
I’ll tell you that the really key forecast next year coming from the economics department here is the nominal GDP, nominal, price times quantity, because we’re calling for nominal GDP growth next year to average 1.5%. That is going to be very bullish for sectors that have proven earnings stability and reliable dividend growth, and it’s going to be very bullish for bonds. I say that, because I know that the critical driving factor for bonds is not fiscal deficits. It’s not the dollar and, guess what, it’s not commodities. Nominal GDP growth has the highest correlation. People look and they say, “Four percent 10-year note; who’d want to touch it?” The reality is that nominal GDP growth this year is averaging 4%. The fact that the 10-year note is averaging 4% is not really a big mystery, if you’re looking at the macro underpinnings.
Now, if I’m right on 1.5% nominal GDP growth for next year, all I can tell you is that the last time we had a condition like that was in 1958. All I can tell you is that 1958, the funds rate averaged to 1.5% and the 10-year note averaged 3%. If you’re going to ask me if we have a realistic chance of going back and retesting the June 2003 lows and the 10-year note or the March 2008 lows and the 10-year note, I firmly believe that’s going to happen. I believe that’s going to also provide you with very handsome total returns.
Sunday, August 31, 2008
Looking for clues in past downturns
IT is a forgone conclusion that we are entering a period of economic slowdown. Or perhaps, the signs have been there for some months but people are now finally choosing not to be in denial.
For five straight years between 2003 and 2007, companies in Singapore have been registering robust growth in revenues and earnings. The past few years can almost be described as a golden era for corporates where demand for their products was strong and costs were low, be it financing costs, or raw materials costs or even staff costs.
This has led to soaring profits. But things took an about-turn in the last 12 months. Oil and other raw material prices shot through the roof. The economic outlook is now very uncertain with companies not creating as many jobs. Against that backdrop, consumers have turned cautious and are tightening their belts. Consequently, demand has softened. So companies are hit on both ends, weaker demand and higher costs.
In the current environment, it is inevitable that earnings will decline. But by how much?
I thought it would be illuminating if we could go back to the last two downturns we’ve gone through and see what kind of impact the economic slowdown had on corporate earnings.
I used the Straits Times Index component stocks, since they are fairly representative of the economy. And I only used companies which have operating records going as far back as 1995. There were 18 of them and their financial records were downloaded from Bloomberg.
They are: City Developments, Cosco Corp, DBS Group, Fraser & Neave, Genting International, Hongkong Land, Jardine Cycle and Carriage, Jardine Strategic, Keppel Corp, Keppel Land, Noble Group, NOL, OCBC Bank, Singapore Airlines, SembCorp Marine, Singapore Press Holdings, SingTel and United Overseas Bank.
Back in 1995, the 18 companies had a combined revenue of $38.2 billion. Operating profit and net profit came to $8.2 billion and $6.4 billion respectively. As at 2007, the corresponding numbers were $143.8 billion, $20.6 billion and $22.2 billion.
During the past 12 years, revenue had grown by a compounded rate of 11.7 per cent a year, while profits grew by 11 per cent a year.
The year 1996 continued to be a good one, and the aggregate revenue rose 12 per cent while net earnings climbed 19 per cent.
Then came 1997, the second half of which marked the start of the Asian financial crisis. By the end of that year, the combined net profit of the 18 companies had fallen by 18 per cent. There was however still growth in the top line, with revenue expanding by 9 per cent.
The Asian crisis played itself out, and while it did, people were getting gloomier. By the end of 1998, net earnings fell a whopping 39 per cent. Still, revenue managed to edge up by 4 per cent.
Exactly a year after the Asian crisis started, the economies in the region staged a strong rebound - helped in no small part by the Internet boom that was taking place in the US.
The despair a year ago was replaced by euphoria by end of 1999. And for that year, the 18 companies’ net earnings more than doubled from the year before. In other words, the profit decline of the two prior years had been clawed back, and the aggregate profits of $8.3 billion in 1999 was about 8 per cent higher than the $7.7 billion chalked up in 1996.
The good times carried on until 2000, even though the air was slowly being let out of the Internet or dotcom bubble by early 2000.
And to make matters worse, US came under terrorist attacks in 2001 and the world became a much darker place. In 2001, the aggregate net earnings plunged by 36 per cent, and the following year, by another 12 per cent.
But just like the Asian crisis a four years earlier, when the recovery came, earnings came roaring back. In 2003, earnings surged 96 per cent and the following year, by another 76 per cent.
Net earnings growth in the subsequent three years were not as dramatic, although those years saw an acceleration of revenue growth.
It could be that the profits came from non-cash items like revaluation of certain assets, or the companies actually disposed of some of their assets at a profit. These disposals were one-off events and not part of the companies’ normal operations.
So as can be seen, in the previous two cycles, earnings decline span over two years.
The two-year earnings decline duration confirmed the finding of an analysis by Citigroup’s global strategy team.
The analysts studied MSCI Global Earnings Index over the last 35 years. They found that earnings weakness takes place over extended periods of time. They are not normally a one or two quarter event. They have averaged just over two years, they said. ‘The longest, in the early 1990s, lasted nearly four years. The shortest decline was in the late 1990s, but that still took over a year.
‘With earnings having peaked at the end of November 2007 the current period of weakness would look to have only just started if history is any guide,’ they said in a report in early June.
And on average, the peak to trough decline is 25 per cent. The two most severe declines were in early 1990s and early 2000s. Earnings fell by over 35 per cent. While the former was over an extended time frame, the latter, the most severe decline of them all, was of relatively short duration, they noted.
The Citigroup analysts said that historically, earnings have peaked well after the economic cycle and have not troughed until the economy is into recovery mode.
But for the current cycle, the peak in earnings occurred much earlier, in fact even before the global economy has really started to slow.
This is because the massive writedowns that have led to a collapse in the financial sector’s earnings have been brought about largely by non-cyclical factors, principally financial engineering and leverage, so the normal lagged relationship has not applied this time, they said.
Sector-wise, not all experienced earnings declines during periods of global weakness. Defensive sectors continued to see growth regardless of the harshness of the economic downturn, they said. ‘Utilities and health care sector earnings have always risen. Consumer staples earnings fell only once. Cyclical sectors have borne the brunt of declines. The commodity sectors have been particularly weak. Energy’s average decline has been 30 per cent and Materials 35 per cent. ‘Elsewhere amongst the cyclicals, declines have averaged around 20 per cent.’
So based on past cycles, global corporate earnings could fall anywhere between 10 per cent and 40 per cent going forward. The average has been 25 per cent.
Another approach is to look at the likely impact if return on equity (ROE) were to return to long-term average levels or collapse to previous trough levels.
Global ROE hit 35-year highs (16.1 per cent) last summer, driven by leverage in the financials sector, record profit margins, a shrinking equity base and an extremely robust global economy.
Despite falling since then, it still remains at historically elevated levels. Reverting the ROE to its 10-, 20- and 30-year averages, which range between 11.8 per cent and 12.6 per cent, would result in earnings declines of 22-27 per cent from last November’s peak.
But ROEs usually fall below averages, said the Citigroup analysts. If they fall to previous troughs, which have been between 8 per cent and 11 per cent, earnings would decline anywhere between 30 per cent and 50 per cent, averaging just over 40 per cent. ‘On this basis, the risks to earnings remain substantial,’ they said.
But in the report, Citi said it was of the opinion that the current earnings downturn could turn out to be a relatively mild one. ‘How could we be wrong?,’ the analysts asked. ‘There are some obvious reasons,’ they said. These include a more severe and extended economic slowdown, with emerging economy resilience proving temporary, a collapse in commodity prices, stronger-than-expected cost pressures and the credit crunch evolving into a more systemic financial crisis.
Are there already signs that some of the scenarios mentioned are starting to emerge? Perhaps, hence investors definitely have to be vigilant.
The worst, it seems, may not be over yet.
For five straight years between 2003 and 2007, companies in Singapore have been registering robust growth in revenues and earnings. The past few years can almost be described as a golden era for corporates where demand for their products was strong and costs were low, be it financing costs, or raw materials costs or even staff costs.
This has led to soaring profits. But things took an about-turn in the last 12 months. Oil and other raw material prices shot through the roof. The economic outlook is now very uncertain with companies not creating as many jobs. Against that backdrop, consumers have turned cautious and are tightening their belts. Consequently, demand has softened. So companies are hit on both ends, weaker demand and higher costs.
In the current environment, it is inevitable that earnings will decline. But by how much?
I thought it would be illuminating if we could go back to the last two downturns we’ve gone through and see what kind of impact the economic slowdown had on corporate earnings.
I used the Straits Times Index component stocks, since they are fairly representative of the economy. And I only used companies which have operating records going as far back as 1995. There were 18 of them and their financial records were downloaded from Bloomberg.
They are: City Developments, Cosco Corp, DBS Group, Fraser & Neave, Genting International, Hongkong Land, Jardine Cycle and Carriage, Jardine Strategic, Keppel Corp, Keppel Land, Noble Group, NOL, OCBC Bank, Singapore Airlines, SembCorp Marine, Singapore Press Holdings, SingTel and United Overseas Bank.
Back in 1995, the 18 companies had a combined revenue of $38.2 billion. Operating profit and net profit came to $8.2 billion and $6.4 billion respectively. As at 2007, the corresponding numbers were $143.8 billion, $20.6 billion and $22.2 billion.
During the past 12 years, revenue had grown by a compounded rate of 11.7 per cent a year, while profits grew by 11 per cent a year.
The year 1996 continued to be a good one, and the aggregate revenue rose 12 per cent while net earnings climbed 19 per cent.
Then came 1997, the second half of which marked the start of the Asian financial crisis. By the end of that year, the combined net profit of the 18 companies had fallen by 18 per cent. There was however still growth in the top line, with revenue expanding by 9 per cent.
The Asian crisis played itself out, and while it did, people were getting gloomier. By the end of 1998, net earnings fell a whopping 39 per cent. Still, revenue managed to edge up by 4 per cent.
Exactly a year after the Asian crisis started, the economies in the region staged a strong rebound - helped in no small part by the Internet boom that was taking place in the US.
The despair a year ago was replaced by euphoria by end of 1999. And for that year, the 18 companies’ net earnings more than doubled from the year before. In other words, the profit decline of the two prior years had been clawed back, and the aggregate profits of $8.3 billion in 1999 was about 8 per cent higher than the $7.7 billion chalked up in 1996.
The good times carried on until 2000, even though the air was slowly being let out of the Internet or dotcom bubble by early 2000.
And to make matters worse, US came under terrorist attacks in 2001 and the world became a much darker place. In 2001, the aggregate net earnings plunged by 36 per cent, and the following year, by another 12 per cent.
But just like the Asian crisis a four years earlier, when the recovery came, earnings came roaring back. In 2003, earnings surged 96 per cent and the following year, by another 76 per cent.
Net earnings growth in the subsequent three years were not as dramatic, although those years saw an acceleration of revenue growth.
It could be that the profits came from non-cash items like revaluation of certain assets, or the companies actually disposed of some of their assets at a profit. These disposals were one-off events and not part of the companies’ normal operations.
So as can be seen, in the previous two cycles, earnings decline span over two years.
The two-year earnings decline duration confirmed the finding of an analysis by Citigroup’s global strategy team.
The analysts studied MSCI Global Earnings Index over the last 35 years. They found that earnings weakness takes place over extended periods of time. They are not normally a one or two quarter event. They have averaged just over two years, they said. ‘The longest, in the early 1990s, lasted nearly four years. The shortest decline was in the late 1990s, but that still took over a year.
‘With earnings having peaked at the end of November 2007 the current period of weakness would look to have only just started if history is any guide,’ they said in a report in early June.
And on average, the peak to trough decline is 25 per cent. The two most severe declines were in early 1990s and early 2000s. Earnings fell by over 35 per cent. While the former was over an extended time frame, the latter, the most severe decline of them all, was of relatively short duration, they noted.
The Citigroup analysts said that historically, earnings have peaked well after the economic cycle and have not troughed until the economy is into recovery mode.
But for the current cycle, the peak in earnings occurred much earlier, in fact even before the global economy has really started to slow.
This is because the massive writedowns that have led to a collapse in the financial sector’s earnings have been brought about largely by non-cyclical factors, principally financial engineering and leverage, so the normal lagged relationship has not applied this time, they said.
Sector-wise, not all experienced earnings declines during periods of global weakness. Defensive sectors continued to see growth regardless of the harshness of the economic downturn, they said. ‘Utilities and health care sector earnings have always risen. Consumer staples earnings fell only once. Cyclical sectors have borne the brunt of declines. The commodity sectors have been particularly weak. Energy’s average decline has been 30 per cent and Materials 35 per cent. ‘Elsewhere amongst the cyclicals, declines have averaged around 20 per cent.’
So based on past cycles, global corporate earnings could fall anywhere between 10 per cent and 40 per cent going forward. The average has been 25 per cent.
Another approach is to look at the likely impact if return on equity (ROE) were to return to long-term average levels or collapse to previous trough levels.
Global ROE hit 35-year highs (16.1 per cent) last summer, driven by leverage in the financials sector, record profit margins, a shrinking equity base and an extremely robust global economy.
Despite falling since then, it still remains at historically elevated levels. Reverting the ROE to its 10-, 20- and 30-year averages, which range between 11.8 per cent and 12.6 per cent, would result in earnings declines of 22-27 per cent from last November’s peak.
But ROEs usually fall below averages, said the Citigroup analysts. If they fall to previous troughs, which have been between 8 per cent and 11 per cent, earnings would decline anywhere between 30 per cent and 50 per cent, averaging just over 40 per cent. ‘On this basis, the risks to earnings remain substantial,’ they said.
But in the report, Citi said it was of the opinion that the current earnings downturn could turn out to be a relatively mild one. ‘How could we be wrong?,’ the analysts asked. ‘There are some obvious reasons,’ they said. These include a more severe and extended economic slowdown, with emerging economy resilience proving temporary, a collapse in commodity prices, stronger-than-expected cost pressures and the credit crunch evolving into a more systemic financial crisis.
Are there already signs that some of the scenarios mentioned are starting to emerge? Perhaps, hence investors definitely have to be vigilant.
The worst, it seems, may not be over yet.
Richard Russell On The Market
It’s OK to be confused. It happens to me all the time. I receive about 20 advisory reports ever week, and in my 50 years in this business I can’t ever remember such utter confusion (or let’s call it differences of opinions). Many leading economists can’t even agree as to whether we’re in a recession or not.
And yes, the news is awful. The best economists in the nation are warning of bad things to come. Lower house prices, rising home inventories, hundreds of local banks fated to go under, Europe slowing down, foreign stock indices crumbling, commodities collapsing. You want bad news and even worse predictions, they’re a dime a dozen.
Ah, but nobody has the ultimate answer to this one — has the stock market discounted the worst — or not? On this crucial count, nobody has the answer to this trillion dollar question. Nobody.
There are any number of good arguments as to why we’re in a bear market or a bull market. I want to review some of the evidence on either side of the puzzle.
First, volatility is currently high — the VIX has been running over the 20 level for months on end. High volatility is a characteristic of bear markets. High volatility is usually a result of huge differences in opinions. One day the bulls run the stock market higher, the next day the bears hammer it down. In bull markets, volatility tends to be on the low side. Big-move days are rarer, and the advances tend to be steady and relatively calm. High volatility is a bear market characteristic. So score one for the bears.
Last week saw the Dow up over 300 points on two separate days. But those big surges did not have the power that typical advances have, following the turn up from a bear market bottom. Neither of last week’s 300-point Dow advances was a 90% up-day. The market acted more like an oversold bounce with added short covering. Score another for the bears.
Investor’s seem to be somewhat discouraged but not panicked and not desperate. At true bear market bottoms sentiment tends to be black-bearish. We haven’t been there yet.
All the above are in favor of the bear market designation. The action has not been typical bull market action. If we are in a bear market, then following the current rally, the market will turn down again to test, and probably violate, the July l4 lows (Dow 10962.44).
……………………………………..
Following are the bull’s arguments (the bull stance is that the decline from the 2007 highs was a deceptive and atypical correction in an ongoing bull market).
Following their January 17 lows, the D-J Transportation Average rallied, then backed off, but the Transports never even hinted of confirming the series of new lows set by the D-J Industrial Average. As of last Friday, the Transports closed a huge 1075 points above their January 17 low of 4140.29. This is hardly bear market action. As a matter of fact, as of last Friday the Transports were only 231 points below their all-time high recorded in July 2007.
The recent bull market advance started in October 2002 at Dow 7286. The advance carried the to Dow 14164 in October 2007. The 50% or halfway level of that entire advance comes in at 10725. According to the 50% Principle, it would be bullish if the Dow on any and all declines holds above 10725, the halfway level.
On July 15 the Dow declined to 10962.54. That decline halted exactly 237 points ABOVE the 10725 or 50% level. Was that a coincidence? Or was the market trying to tell us something? Was the fact that the Dow halted its decline 237 points above the 10725 level a significant (but unpublicized) bullish act?
Below we see a Point&Figure chart of the very broad Wilshire 5000 stock index. I’ve been directing subscribers’ attentions to this chart. Note that the Wilshire plummeted to a low at the 12250 box. From there it rallied up to the 13150 box. In fact, the Wilshire rallied to the 13150 box twice, and each time it was turned back. Note the tight consolidation. Then last week the Wilshire (last column of green boxes) broke out to the upside. Following the obvious consolidation, I have to consider last week’s breakout as bullish. And the rally continued today. The 13150 level on the Wilshire should now represent support on any further weakness. Price action trumps all other considerations. Give the bulls a gold ring and a cigar. Well, at least so far.
I’ll be honest. I am impressed by the Lowry’s argument that suggests that the July 15was not a legitimate bottom for this market.
But I’m also impressed by the bullish arguments that I laid out in the section above. Very frankly, I can’t come to a firm conclusion as to whether we’re dealing with a bull or a bear market. Sometimes you just have to wait and allow the market to tell its story. Remember, we may be in a hurry, but the market never is.
Fred Hickey, who writes the great “The High-Tech Strategist” report, expects the market to fool everybody and head down while at the same time he expects gold to head higher. My old buddy, Joe Granville, who’s been great at calling the shots, now expects the market to head higher into the Dow 1200s.
Martin Pring is an old-timer; he wrote one of the classic books on technical analysis. Below is the opening of a recent report that he wrote — Published by Pring Turner, here is the opening:
“Yes, the financial news gets worse every day. Yes, the average stock is down more than 25% over the past thirteen months. Yes, the housing market is still reeling and foreclosure activity is rising. Yes, the price of gas is skyrocketing. And yes, this too will pass, and the economy and stock market will begin a new expansion and sustainable bull market, as all business cycles have.
“Over our several decades of investment management experience, we have witnessed many business cycle recessions and stock market declines. They all have one thing in common. In the midst of the most negative financial news, the stock market (fulfilling its role as an accurate leading economic indicator) begins to move higher in anticipation of the next economic recovery. We believe the market has more than discounted all the bad news out there and is putting the finishing touches on the bottoming process for stocks. Yes, a significant advance is set to begin that will take stocks much higher in the year ahead.” (Thanks to David Fuller of FullerMoney out of London for the above).
Me, I’m going to stay largely in cash and gold for a while, but I’ll keep adding top-quality dividend-paying stocks to the compounding portfolios that I manage (stocks added — GE, JNJ, PG, MCD).
And yes, the news is awful. The best economists in the nation are warning of bad things to come. Lower house prices, rising home inventories, hundreds of local banks fated to go under, Europe slowing down, foreign stock indices crumbling, commodities collapsing. You want bad news and even worse predictions, they’re a dime a dozen.
Ah, but nobody has the ultimate answer to this one — has the stock market discounted the worst — or not? On this crucial count, nobody has the answer to this trillion dollar question. Nobody.
There are any number of good arguments as to why we’re in a bear market or a bull market. I want to review some of the evidence on either side of the puzzle.
First, volatility is currently high — the VIX has been running over the 20 level for months on end. High volatility is a characteristic of bear markets. High volatility is usually a result of huge differences in opinions. One day the bulls run the stock market higher, the next day the bears hammer it down. In bull markets, volatility tends to be on the low side. Big-move days are rarer, and the advances tend to be steady and relatively calm. High volatility is a bear market characteristic. So score one for the bears.
Last week saw the Dow up over 300 points on two separate days. But those big surges did not have the power that typical advances have, following the turn up from a bear market bottom. Neither of last week’s 300-point Dow advances was a 90% up-day. The market acted more like an oversold bounce with added short covering. Score another for the bears.
Investor’s seem to be somewhat discouraged but not panicked and not desperate. At true bear market bottoms sentiment tends to be black-bearish. We haven’t been there yet.
All the above are in favor of the bear market designation. The action has not been typical bull market action. If we are in a bear market, then following the current rally, the market will turn down again to test, and probably violate, the July l4 lows (Dow 10962.44).
……………………………………..
Following are the bull’s arguments (the bull stance is that the decline from the 2007 highs was a deceptive and atypical correction in an ongoing bull market).
Following their January 17 lows, the D-J Transportation Average rallied, then backed off, but the Transports never even hinted of confirming the series of new lows set by the D-J Industrial Average. As of last Friday, the Transports closed a huge 1075 points above their January 17 low of 4140.29. This is hardly bear market action. As a matter of fact, as of last Friday the Transports were only 231 points below their all-time high recorded in July 2007.
The recent bull market advance started in October 2002 at Dow 7286. The advance carried the to Dow 14164 in October 2007. The 50% or halfway level of that entire advance comes in at 10725. According to the 50% Principle, it would be bullish if the Dow on any and all declines holds above 10725, the halfway level.
On July 15 the Dow declined to 10962.54. That decline halted exactly 237 points ABOVE the 10725 or 50% level. Was that a coincidence? Or was the market trying to tell us something? Was the fact that the Dow halted its decline 237 points above the 10725 level a significant (but unpublicized) bullish act?
Below we see a Point&Figure chart of the very broad Wilshire 5000 stock index. I’ve been directing subscribers’ attentions to this chart. Note that the Wilshire plummeted to a low at the 12250 box. From there it rallied up to the 13150 box. In fact, the Wilshire rallied to the 13150 box twice, and each time it was turned back. Note the tight consolidation. Then last week the Wilshire (last column of green boxes) broke out to the upside. Following the obvious consolidation, I have to consider last week’s breakout as bullish. And the rally continued today. The 13150 level on the Wilshire should now represent support on any further weakness. Price action trumps all other considerations. Give the bulls a gold ring and a cigar. Well, at least so far.
I’ll be honest. I am impressed by the Lowry’s argument that suggests that the July 15was not a legitimate bottom for this market.
But I’m also impressed by the bullish arguments that I laid out in the section above. Very frankly, I can’t come to a firm conclusion as to whether we’re dealing with a bull or a bear market. Sometimes you just have to wait and allow the market to tell its story. Remember, we may be in a hurry, but the market never is.
Fred Hickey, who writes the great “The High-Tech Strategist” report, expects the market to fool everybody and head down while at the same time he expects gold to head higher. My old buddy, Joe Granville, who’s been great at calling the shots, now expects the market to head higher into the Dow 1200s.
Martin Pring is an old-timer; he wrote one of the classic books on technical analysis. Below is the opening of a recent report that he wrote — Published by Pring Turner, here is the opening:
“Yes, the financial news gets worse every day. Yes, the average stock is down more than 25% over the past thirteen months. Yes, the housing market is still reeling and foreclosure activity is rising. Yes, the price of gas is skyrocketing. And yes, this too will pass, and the economy and stock market will begin a new expansion and sustainable bull market, as all business cycles have.
“Over our several decades of investment management experience, we have witnessed many business cycle recessions and stock market declines. They all have one thing in common. In the midst of the most negative financial news, the stock market (fulfilling its role as an accurate leading economic indicator) begins to move higher in anticipation of the next economic recovery. We believe the market has more than discounted all the bad news out there and is putting the finishing touches on the bottoming process for stocks. Yes, a significant advance is set to begin that will take stocks much higher in the year ahead.” (Thanks to David Fuller of FullerMoney out of London for the above).
Me, I’m going to stay largely in cash and gold for a while, but I’ll keep adding top-quality dividend-paying stocks to the compounding portfolios that I manage (stocks added — GE, JNJ, PG, MCD).
A Value Investor Looks At China
What do Starbucks and China have in common? A lot! Both got us hooked on consumption: one of fancy, expensive caffeinated liquids; the other on cheap foreign made goods. Both have defied the conventional wisdom - they grew faster and longer than common sense told us was possible. They also share another striking commonality: both are suffering from late stage growth obesity (LSGO).
The Starbucks story
With the beautiful benefit of hindsight we know what happened to Starbucks - it grew too fast, opened too many stores, and sacrificed its own standards to meet unrealistic targets. The company first claimed that it only had a few hundred stores that it needed to close, and then the few hundred spilled into six hundred. Weak consumer spending will likely push Starbucks to re-examine its store count again, doubling or tripling the store closures.
Starbucks percentage of new stores growth in 2007 was only slightly lower than it was in 1999. But in 1999 it had 2,000 stores; in 2007 it was pushing a 10,000 company owned stores mark. Let’s put this in perspective: in 1999 Starbucks opened 447 stores - 1.8 stores per working day; in 2007 that number more than tripled to 1,403 stores a year - 5.5 stores per working day. At this level of growth physical limitations come in: there is only so much real estate that fits a company’s criteria at a certain point in time. Management started sacrificing on the quality of their decisions, compromises were made that were unthinkable several years before. Stores were opened too close to each other or on the wrong side of the street, expensive leases were signed, they even hired baristas that would have fit in better at McDonalds - you get the idea.
Unfortunately the present and the future will pay for the decisions of the past: stores will need to be closed, long-term leases terminated, charges taken, corporate costs created in hopes of high growth eliminated, and corporate culture of partnership strained by barista layoffs.
Starbucks needs to go on a permanent growth diet (at least in the US), and realize that it has the metabolism of a 37 year old and can digest fewer new stores. By tightening its standards for opening new stores the company will be on the way to recovery, though at slower growth. Starbucks is blessed with financial strength, capable management and unbelievable brand. If management admits to themselves that the heydays of growth are behind, recovery should be fairly painless. Starbucks generates tremendous operating cash flows, which in the past were completely consumed by opening new stores. If the company were to go on the LSGO diet, its capital expenditures would decline and free cash flows balloon - the value unlocked.
But this discussion is not about Starbucks, it is about what is taking place in China.
The Great China story
The benefit of hindsight that provides clarity in analysis of Starbucks today is not there for China, at least not yet. But if you were to open your mind and look past today’s cheery newspaper headlines you’d see that China is suffering from a severe case of LSGO.
Ten for ten. Since 1998 its GDP has grown at about a 10% annual real growth rate, and its economy more than tripled in size (in real terms). There were no recessions, just expansion - the Chinese miracle growth? The origins of China’s tremendous growth are well known: large population migrating from low (farming) to higher productivity (manufacturing) activity, cheap labor, a capitalism-friendlier communist government, and insatiable demand from the US and the rest of the developed world for cheap goods.
Unlike Starbucks - a private enterprise that has free market principles deeply inbred in its DNA - China is a communist country. Though it is moving towards free market capitalism, it is not there yet. The rule of law is weak, the country infested with corruption, and due to central planning and tight government control of the banking system capital is often allocated based on cronyism (or political relationships) not merit.
Prolonged high growth in this environment results in inefficiencies that are compounded year after year. In other words, though the growth is high, the quality of growth is low, thus asset allocation decisions are likely to be poor. The ten year super-high growth marathon put China at high risk, actually more likely of a certainty, of a severe case of LSGO.
From today’s perch we can only guess of the consequences of LSGO, but we’ll gain that clarity after the fact - a luxury we don’t have. Newspapers that are praising the Chinese growth miracle today will write exposes on what went and is going wrong in China.
I have absolutely no facts to back up what I am about to say, but it is not hard to imagine future stories about poverty stricken farmers that moved to big cities for a better life and found despair; or that inland migration (from farming to factories) only brings a onetime productivity jump as poorly educated farmers-turned-factory-workers add little to productivity improvements afterwards; or how weak and debt ridden the financial system is; or the devastating impact that pollution has on health and productivity; or how the biggest shopping mall in the world, that happens to be in China, is almost completely empty.
Oh wait, the story about the shopping mall is not a figment of my imagination (I am not that good) but has already taken place. In 2005 NY Times ran an article titled China, New Land of Shoppers, Builds Malls on Gigantic Scale, it talked about the biggest shopping mall in the world that happened to be in Dongguan, China. The article said:
“Not long ago, shopping in China consisted mostly of lining up to entreat surly clerks to accept cash in exchange for ugly merchandise that did not fit. But now, Chinese have started to embrace America’s modern “shop till you drop” ethos and are in the midst of a buy-at-the-mall frenzy…. by 2010, China is expected to be home to at least 7 of the world’s 10 largest malls… Already, four shopping malls in China are larger than the Mall of America. Two, including the South China Mall, are bigger than the West Edmonton Mall in Alberta, which just surrendered its status as the world’s largest to an enormous retail center in Beijing.” (emphasis added)
Fast forward three years and you find a very different story: the biggest mall in the world - the South China mall, with space for fifteen hundred stores, only has a dozen stores open for business - it is empty. Shoppers never materialized. Billions of dollars have been wasted.
Analyzing the Chinese economy while it is growing at superfast rates is like analyzing a credit card company or a mortgage originator during an economic expansion - all you see is reward - the growth. But the defaults - the risk - are masked by a healthy economy and constantly increasing new business that is profitable at first. The true colors of that growth only appear after the economy slows down and new accounts mature. (In fact, the banks or credit card companies in the U.S. that showed the lowest loan growth during last expansionary cycle have a lot fewer credit problems than those that did - U.S. Bank Co comes to mind here.)
The consequences of LSGO are likely to be very painful for China. As of today we don’t know how much of the recent growth came from wasteful, unproductive growth. Only after a slowdown will the true problems surface.
The Speed. What makes things even worse is that China cannot afford a slow down. I discussed this in the past but it is worth repeating. The Chinese economy is like the bus from the movie “Speed”. In the movie the bus is wired by a villain (played by Dennis Hopper) with explosives, and will explode if its speed drops below 50 miles per hour. The Chinese economy has 1.3 billion unsuspecting people on board. It could blow if economic growth drops below its historical pace.
A combination of high financial and operation leverage sprinkled with past high growth rates will send this economy into a severe recession if growth rates slow down. Let me explain:
High operational leverage. China has become a de facto manufacturer for the world. With the exception of food products, it is difficult finding a product that was not, at least in part, manufactured in China. Industrial production accounts for 49% of GDP, double the rate of most developed nations (i.e. industrial production for the United States is 20.5 % of GDP, UK 18.2% , and Japan 26.5%).
Chinese miracle growth is largely driven by the manufacturing sector; historically its industrial production grew at a faster rate than GDP. The manufacturing industry is very capital intensive. Building factories requires a large upfront investment. High commodity prices and rapid wage inflation has driven those costs up. Once a factory is built the costs of running it are to a large degree independent of the utilization level - they are fixed - a classical definition of operational leverage. On top of these factors, laying-off workers is a politically sensitive process in China, which creates another layer of fixed costs.
High financial leverage. Debt is the instrument of choice in China. Due to a lack of equity-fund- raising alternatives (their stock market is very young), bank debt and underground finance companies that charge very high interest rates are the predominate sources of capital in China - this generates a great degree of financial leverage. (Though according to my friend Bill Mann, The Motley Fool’s advisor of Global Gains newsletter, a frequent visitor to China, state owned enterprises are much more leveraged than private enterprises.)
Total operational leverage. Large piles of debt (financial leverage) combined with high fixed costs (operational leverage) create a very high total operational leverage.
Total operational leverage in China is elevated further as factories are built to accommodate future demand - this is a classical byproduct of LGSO. It is a human tendency to draw straight lines and thus making linear projections from the past into the future. During the fast growth period the angle of the straight lines is tilted upward, causing an over investment in fixed assets, as inability to keep up with demand may cause manufacturers to lose valuable customers. (Fear of over investment is overrun by fear of losing customers.)
This type of thinking results in tremendous overcapacity when demand cools. Here is an example: let’s say a company saw demand for its widgets rise 10% year after year. It builds a new factory to accommodate future demand, let’s say five years. It will likely model a 10% annual increase in demand as well. But what if demand comes in at 6% a year over the next five years? This will translate into overcapacity - not 4% but 20% (4% per year times five years). Suddenly you don’t need to build factories or add capacity for awhile.
This greatly leveraged growth is terrific as long as the economy continues to grow at a fast pace: sales rise, costs rise at a slower rate (in large they are fixed) - margins expand - the beauty of leverage. However, leverage is not so sweet and soft when sales decline. Overcapacity is a death sentence in the manufacturing (fixed costs) world. As companies face overcapacity or slowdown in demand, they try to stimulate sales by cutting prices, which in part lead to price wars (similar to what we observed in the U.S. between Sprint, MCI and AT&T in the long distance business during the mid 90s) and to a fatal deflation. Sales decline, costs remain the same - margins collapse.
The weakness in the US and European economies will temper demand for Chinese made goods. China is already showing first signs of slow down - inflation is increasing and rate of real growth is decreasing.
It gets worse: high commodity prices
Chinese demand for stuff (oil, metals, machinery etc…) has a tremendous impact on commodities, driving their prices many fold. High (and rising) commodity prices are negative for developed world economies but they are catastrophic to developing economies - they bring comparatively higher inflation and often stagflation. Here is why:
Inflation is sourced from two broad categories: commodities (stuff) and wages. Emerging markets are twice as cursed when it comes to inflation:
Commodity prices (less shipping costs and government controls - the Chinese government limits price increases on certain commodities, but we know that doesn’t work in the long-term) are the same around the world. Thus the U.S. and China will see a similar increase in commodity prices (at least in dollar terms). But the commodity component represents a larger portion of the total product cost in China than in the U.S., as wages in China are a less significant component of a total cost. For instance, bread baked in the U.S. and China will require the same amount of wheat and wheat will cost as much. But baker wages will be significantly larger in the U.S. than in China and will result in a much higher cost of the finished product. Therefore, a spike in wheat prices will have a larger impact on the loaf of bread in China than in the US.
Wage inflation: the US and Europe have little wage inflation, as rising unemployment has diminished the already weak bargaining power of the labor force, keeping wages in check. Economic expansion has put significant upward pressure on wages inflation in China (and India as well).
In combination, these two factors were responsible for inflation in high single digits in China, double the rate of inflation in the U.S.
China is not the cheapest place in the world to manufacture, not anymore. To its benefit, cheaper countries (Singapore, Vietnam etc…) are not big enough to steal a significant amount of capacity and the US in many cases doesn’t have the needed infrastructure to bring manufacturing back. Appreciation in the renminbi and high oil prices (which are driving shipping rates up, placing a significant premium on the distance factor) are making Chinese produced goods even less attractive. Something has to give: either the U.S. will consume less or China will keep prices low to stimulate the demand, swallowing the loss, or a combination of both.
It gets even worse…
I constantly catch myself wanting to say “the story only gets worse”, but unfortunately it does. The US and Europe can cope with energy and food inflation a lot better than China and other developing nations, as we spend a lot less on food and energy as a percent of our income and have a lot more discretionary income. (Just take a look at magazine section in the book store. There is probably a fishing magazine for the left handed fishermen.)
Though the Chinese consume a lot less gasoline than Americans. They don’t have as many cars and don’t drive as much, but they do have stomachs - they eat. High energy prices have translated in food inflation that in China runs in the high teens. The average American family spends only 15% of their household budget on food, whereas the Chinese spend 37% . Maybe this is one of the reasons their shopping malls are empty. People that pay high gasoline prices but are full don’t riot, but hungry people do. The current situation raises political risk in China and also the chances that government (social) intervention will rise. This also puts in doubt the significant development of a Chinese middle class, at least in the near future.
When I wrote an article for Financial Times in May discussing risks in stuff stocks (commodities, energy and industrials) I called today’s environment “a global commodity bubble”. I was imprecise, after a conversation with the brilliant Ed Easterling of Crestmont Research (by the way, Ed wrote “Unexpected Returns” - a must read) and reading a wonderful interview with James Montier by Kate Welling, I’d like use James’ more precise definition of today’s environment: a “global growth expectations” bubble. After all, it is the supply demand (to a large degree) that was responsible for this unprecedented growth in “stuff”, shifting the mentality of the market into “this time is different” gear. It is not.
In the past “stuff” stocks were cyclical, their margins played a very predictable foxtrot of bouncing together with the whims of the US economy. Today they are behaving if as Google is their middle name - their sales are climbing in double digits, margins keep expanding and now they are called “growth” stocks. They are not. It is just Chinese late stage growth obesity, which has disproportionately impacted the demand for stuff, creating an expectation that the “growth story” will continue forever. Nothing is forever. Starbucks discovered that and so will China. China is likely to have a bright future, but it doesn’t consist of straight to the sky growth trajectories.
Implications. Demand for commodities will decline, while more supply from past investments (there is a significant lag) will be coming to the market - they’ll come crushing down to earth. Companies that make stuff will suffer, their margins are at multi-multi-multi-year highs, margins pendulum will swing the other way, to the other extreme. Suddenly they won’t appear to be as cheap. (Take a look at my January Barron’s article in which I discuss the risk in corporate margins and May Financial Times article which explores China and stuff stocks.)
The Starbucks story
With the beautiful benefit of hindsight we know what happened to Starbucks - it grew too fast, opened too many stores, and sacrificed its own standards to meet unrealistic targets. The company first claimed that it only had a few hundred stores that it needed to close, and then the few hundred spilled into six hundred. Weak consumer spending will likely push Starbucks to re-examine its store count again, doubling or tripling the store closures.
Starbucks percentage of new stores growth in 2007 was only slightly lower than it was in 1999. But in 1999 it had 2,000 stores; in 2007 it was pushing a 10,000 company owned stores mark. Let’s put this in perspective: in 1999 Starbucks opened 447 stores - 1.8 stores per working day; in 2007 that number more than tripled to 1,403 stores a year - 5.5 stores per working day. At this level of growth physical limitations come in: there is only so much real estate that fits a company’s criteria at a certain point in time. Management started sacrificing on the quality of their decisions, compromises were made that were unthinkable several years before. Stores were opened too close to each other or on the wrong side of the street, expensive leases were signed, they even hired baristas that would have fit in better at McDonalds - you get the idea.
Unfortunately the present and the future will pay for the decisions of the past: stores will need to be closed, long-term leases terminated, charges taken, corporate costs created in hopes of high growth eliminated, and corporate culture of partnership strained by barista layoffs.
Starbucks needs to go on a permanent growth diet (at least in the US), and realize that it has the metabolism of a 37 year old and can digest fewer new stores. By tightening its standards for opening new stores the company will be on the way to recovery, though at slower growth. Starbucks is blessed with financial strength, capable management and unbelievable brand. If management admits to themselves that the heydays of growth are behind, recovery should be fairly painless. Starbucks generates tremendous operating cash flows, which in the past were completely consumed by opening new stores. If the company were to go on the LSGO diet, its capital expenditures would decline and free cash flows balloon - the value unlocked.
But this discussion is not about Starbucks, it is about what is taking place in China.
The Great China story
The benefit of hindsight that provides clarity in analysis of Starbucks today is not there for China, at least not yet. But if you were to open your mind and look past today’s cheery newspaper headlines you’d see that China is suffering from a severe case of LSGO.
Ten for ten. Since 1998 its GDP has grown at about a 10% annual real growth rate, and its economy more than tripled in size (in real terms). There were no recessions, just expansion - the Chinese miracle growth? The origins of China’s tremendous growth are well known: large population migrating from low (farming) to higher productivity (manufacturing) activity, cheap labor, a capitalism-friendlier communist government, and insatiable demand from the US and the rest of the developed world for cheap goods.
Unlike Starbucks - a private enterprise that has free market principles deeply inbred in its DNA - China is a communist country. Though it is moving towards free market capitalism, it is not there yet. The rule of law is weak, the country infested with corruption, and due to central planning and tight government control of the banking system capital is often allocated based on cronyism (or political relationships) not merit.
Prolonged high growth in this environment results in inefficiencies that are compounded year after year. In other words, though the growth is high, the quality of growth is low, thus asset allocation decisions are likely to be poor. The ten year super-high growth marathon put China at high risk, actually more likely of a certainty, of a severe case of LSGO.
From today’s perch we can only guess of the consequences of LSGO, but we’ll gain that clarity after the fact - a luxury we don’t have. Newspapers that are praising the Chinese growth miracle today will write exposes on what went and is going wrong in China.
I have absolutely no facts to back up what I am about to say, but it is not hard to imagine future stories about poverty stricken farmers that moved to big cities for a better life and found despair; or that inland migration (from farming to factories) only brings a onetime productivity jump as poorly educated farmers-turned-factory-workers add little to productivity improvements afterwards; or how weak and debt ridden the financial system is; or the devastating impact that pollution has on health and productivity; or how the biggest shopping mall in the world, that happens to be in China, is almost completely empty.
Oh wait, the story about the shopping mall is not a figment of my imagination (I am not that good) but has already taken place. In 2005 NY Times ran an article titled China, New Land of Shoppers, Builds Malls on Gigantic Scale, it talked about the biggest shopping mall in the world that happened to be in Dongguan, China. The article said:
“Not long ago, shopping in China consisted mostly of lining up to entreat surly clerks to accept cash in exchange for ugly merchandise that did not fit. But now, Chinese have started to embrace America’s modern “shop till you drop” ethos and are in the midst of a buy-at-the-mall frenzy…. by 2010, China is expected to be home to at least 7 of the world’s 10 largest malls… Already, four shopping malls in China are larger than the Mall of America. Two, including the South China Mall, are bigger than the West Edmonton Mall in Alberta, which just surrendered its status as the world’s largest to an enormous retail center in Beijing.” (emphasis added)
Fast forward three years and you find a very different story: the biggest mall in the world - the South China mall, with space for fifteen hundred stores, only has a dozen stores open for business - it is empty. Shoppers never materialized. Billions of dollars have been wasted.
Analyzing the Chinese economy while it is growing at superfast rates is like analyzing a credit card company or a mortgage originator during an economic expansion - all you see is reward - the growth. But the defaults - the risk - are masked by a healthy economy and constantly increasing new business that is profitable at first. The true colors of that growth only appear after the economy slows down and new accounts mature. (In fact, the banks or credit card companies in the U.S. that showed the lowest loan growth during last expansionary cycle have a lot fewer credit problems than those that did - U.S. Bank Co comes to mind here.)
The consequences of LSGO are likely to be very painful for China. As of today we don’t know how much of the recent growth came from wasteful, unproductive growth. Only after a slowdown will the true problems surface.
The Speed. What makes things even worse is that China cannot afford a slow down. I discussed this in the past but it is worth repeating. The Chinese economy is like the bus from the movie “Speed”. In the movie the bus is wired by a villain (played by Dennis Hopper) with explosives, and will explode if its speed drops below 50 miles per hour. The Chinese economy has 1.3 billion unsuspecting people on board. It could blow if economic growth drops below its historical pace.
A combination of high financial and operation leverage sprinkled with past high growth rates will send this economy into a severe recession if growth rates slow down. Let me explain:
High operational leverage. China has become a de facto manufacturer for the world. With the exception of food products, it is difficult finding a product that was not, at least in part, manufactured in China. Industrial production accounts for 49% of GDP, double the rate of most developed nations (i.e. industrial production for the United States is 20.5 % of GDP, UK 18.2% , and Japan 26.5%).
Chinese miracle growth is largely driven by the manufacturing sector; historically its industrial production grew at a faster rate than GDP. The manufacturing industry is very capital intensive. Building factories requires a large upfront investment. High commodity prices and rapid wage inflation has driven those costs up. Once a factory is built the costs of running it are to a large degree independent of the utilization level - they are fixed - a classical definition of operational leverage. On top of these factors, laying-off workers is a politically sensitive process in China, which creates another layer of fixed costs.
High financial leverage. Debt is the instrument of choice in China. Due to a lack of equity-fund- raising alternatives (their stock market is very young), bank debt and underground finance companies that charge very high interest rates are the predominate sources of capital in China - this generates a great degree of financial leverage. (Though according to my friend Bill Mann, The Motley Fool’s advisor of Global Gains newsletter, a frequent visitor to China, state owned enterprises are much more leveraged than private enterprises.)
Total operational leverage. Large piles of debt (financial leverage) combined with high fixed costs (operational leverage) create a very high total operational leverage.
Total operational leverage in China is elevated further as factories are built to accommodate future demand - this is a classical byproduct of LGSO. It is a human tendency to draw straight lines and thus making linear projections from the past into the future. During the fast growth period the angle of the straight lines is tilted upward, causing an over investment in fixed assets, as inability to keep up with demand may cause manufacturers to lose valuable customers. (Fear of over investment is overrun by fear of losing customers.)
This type of thinking results in tremendous overcapacity when demand cools. Here is an example: let’s say a company saw demand for its widgets rise 10% year after year. It builds a new factory to accommodate future demand, let’s say five years. It will likely model a 10% annual increase in demand as well. But what if demand comes in at 6% a year over the next five years? This will translate into overcapacity - not 4% but 20% (4% per year times five years). Suddenly you don’t need to build factories or add capacity for awhile.
This greatly leveraged growth is terrific as long as the economy continues to grow at a fast pace: sales rise, costs rise at a slower rate (in large they are fixed) - margins expand - the beauty of leverage. However, leverage is not so sweet and soft when sales decline. Overcapacity is a death sentence in the manufacturing (fixed costs) world. As companies face overcapacity or slowdown in demand, they try to stimulate sales by cutting prices, which in part lead to price wars (similar to what we observed in the U.S. between Sprint, MCI and AT&T in the long distance business during the mid 90s) and to a fatal deflation. Sales decline, costs remain the same - margins collapse.
The weakness in the US and European economies will temper demand for Chinese made goods. China is already showing first signs of slow down - inflation is increasing and rate of real growth is decreasing.
It gets worse: high commodity prices
Chinese demand for stuff (oil, metals, machinery etc…) has a tremendous impact on commodities, driving their prices many fold. High (and rising) commodity prices are negative for developed world economies but they are catastrophic to developing economies - they bring comparatively higher inflation and often stagflation. Here is why:
Inflation is sourced from two broad categories: commodities (stuff) and wages. Emerging markets are twice as cursed when it comes to inflation:
Commodity prices (less shipping costs and government controls - the Chinese government limits price increases on certain commodities, but we know that doesn’t work in the long-term) are the same around the world. Thus the U.S. and China will see a similar increase in commodity prices (at least in dollar terms). But the commodity component represents a larger portion of the total product cost in China than in the U.S., as wages in China are a less significant component of a total cost. For instance, bread baked in the U.S. and China will require the same amount of wheat and wheat will cost as much. But baker wages will be significantly larger in the U.S. than in China and will result in a much higher cost of the finished product. Therefore, a spike in wheat prices will have a larger impact on the loaf of bread in China than in the US.
Wage inflation: the US and Europe have little wage inflation, as rising unemployment has diminished the already weak bargaining power of the labor force, keeping wages in check. Economic expansion has put significant upward pressure on wages inflation in China (and India as well).
In combination, these two factors were responsible for inflation in high single digits in China, double the rate of inflation in the U.S.
China is not the cheapest place in the world to manufacture, not anymore. To its benefit, cheaper countries (Singapore, Vietnam etc…) are not big enough to steal a significant amount of capacity and the US in many cases doesn’t have the needed infrastructure to bring manufacturing back. Appreciation in the renminbi and high oil prices (which are driving shipping rates up, placing a significant premium on the distance factor) are making Chinese produced goods even less attractive. Something has to give: either the U.S. will consume less or China will keep prices low to stimulate the demand, swallowing the loss, or a combination of both.
It gets even worse…
I constantly catch myself wanting to say “the story only gets worse”, but unfortunately it does. The US and Europe can cope with energy and food inflation a lot better than China and other developing nations, as we spend a lot less on food and energy as a percent of our income and have a lot more discretionary income. (Just take a look at magazine section in the book store. There is probably a fishing magazine for the left handed fishermen.)
Though the Chinese consume a lot less gasoline than Americans. They don’t have as many cars and don’t drive as much, but they do have stomachs - they eat. High energy prices have translated in food inflation that in China runs in the high teens. The average American family spends only 15% of their household budget on food, whereas the Chinese spend 37% . Maybe this is one of the reasons their shopping malls are empty. People that pay high gasoline prices but are full don’t riot, but hungry people do. The current situation raises political risk in China and also the chances that government (social) intervention will rise. This also puts in doubt the significant development of a Chinese middle class, at least in the near future.
When I wrote an article for Financial Times in May discussing risks in stuff stocks (commodities, energy and industrials) I called today’s environment “a global commodity bubble”. I was imprecise, after a conversation with the brilliant Ed Easterling of Crestmont Research (by the way, Ed wrote “Unexpected Returns” - a must read) and reading a wonderful interview with James Montier by Kate Welling, I’d like use James’ more precise definition of today’s environment: a “global growth expectations” bubble. After all, it is the supply demand (to a large degree) that was responsible for this unprecedented growth in “stuff”, shifting the mentality of the market into “this time is different” gear. It is not.
In the past “stuff” stocks were cyclical, their margins played a very predictable foxtrot of bouncing together with the whims of the US economy. Today they are behaving if as Google is their middle name - their sales are climbing in double digits, margins keep expanding and now they are called “growth” stocks. They are not. It is just Chinese late stage growth obesity, which has disproportionately impacted the demand for stuff, creating an expectation that the “growth story” will continue forever. Nothing is forever. Starbucks discovered that and so will China. China is likely to have a bright future, but it doesn’t consist of straight to the sky growth trajectories.
Implications. Demand for commodities will decline, while more supply from past investments (there is a significant lag) will be coming to the market - they’ll come crushing down to earth. Companies that make stuff will suffer, their margins are at multi-multi-multi-year highs, margins pendulum will swing the other way, to the other extreme. Suddenly they won’t appear to be as cheap. (Take a look at my January Barron’s article in which I discuss the risk in corporate margins and May Financial Times article which explores China and stuff stocks.)
GMO’s Jeremy Grantham sees prolonged credit crisis
The credit crisis that has ravaged world markets since last summer will fester for years and result in anemic economic growth in Japan, the United States and most of Europe through 2009, according to an influential Wall Street investor.
A combination of tighter global lending standards, rooted in mounting mortgage defaults, and falling U.S. and European home prices could eat deeply into already slowing growth worldwide, Jeremy Grantham, chairman and market strategist of money manager GMO LLC, said in an interview late Tuesday.
Grantham, who had warned of the danger that the U.S. housing market posed long before others, said the current credit crisis has “got many more tentacles… than the ones we’ve seen over the last 30 years.”
“We are in a recessionary phase that will last perhaps two and two and a half years,” said Grantham, who helps oversee about $126 billion in assets at GMO.
“It will be, interestingly, unlike anything else we’ve seen.”
Grantham, often called a “perma-bear” for his dour view on U.S. equities, correctly predicted a crash two months before the technology bubble burst in 2000.
His outlook for the environment now is grim, if not dire.
He recommends investors hold cash, and if they must be invested, he favors large-cap U.S. equities.
The United States and other economies might not be savaged by negative quarters of growth, but the sentiment will be “quite novel in feel without the theatrical aspect of a real nose-dive. With any luck… we won’t have them,” he said.
Rising asset prices and a credit binge that drove the U.S. economy for 25 years is over and won’t return for years to come, he said. That “end of an era” will slow economic growth and force both U.S. consumers and companies to readjust, Grantham added.
“We had a debt bubble in almost every nook and cranny, and in different times they are deflating,” he said. Now, the world is dealing with the secondary effects of slowing consumer and corporate consumption, Grantham said.
Central bankers, who have been “really quite incompetent,” will do everything possible to prevent a vicious cycle downward of lower consumption and lower production, he said.
Grantham, who is amazed at how smart investors failed to see the housing bubble and ensuing crisis, is also surprised by those who express little concern about China’s centrally planned economy and the strong likelihood of slower growth.
“Why have they become wonderful economists?” Grantham said. “What they have done is they have become wonderfully lucky like the rest of us.”
The odds that China, a major driver of global economic growth this decade, will stumble seem extremely high, he said. A Chinese downturn would send shockwaves through many economies that depend on its voracious demand for raw materials.
A third effect of weaker production and eventually rising unemployment in the United States, Europe and Japan, and even in some emerging countries, also will take its toll.
Added together, a more prolonged and painful recession than anyone has imagined will occur, an economic downturn that will come closer in global reach to anything the world has seen since the Great Depression, Grantham said.
“The possibility of it becoming very serious on a global basis is very much higher than 2001, 2002,” he said. “That’s the scary part.”
Where should investors hide? Grantham said large-cap U.S. stocks provide “an absolute guaranteed no-brainer.”
“Their profit margins are the only profit margins in any group we look at anywhere that aren’t measurably above average at all,” he explained. “Everything else, the profit margins are way over average globally, including emerging markets — very
vulnerable, hugely mean-reverting,” he warned.
Grantham said they have lagged other asset classes over the past six years: “They’ve been left behind, exactly the time you would need them.”
A combination of tighter global lending standards, rooted in mounting mortgage defaults, and falling U.S. and European home prices could eat deeply into already slowing growth worldwide, Jeremy Grantham, chairman and market strategist of money manager GMO LLC, said in an interview late Tuesday.
Grantham, who had warned of the danger that the U.S. housing market posed long before others, said the current credit crisis has “got many more tentacles… than the ones we’ve seen over the last 30 years.”
“We are in a recessionary phase that will last perhaps two and two and a half years,” said Grantham, who helps oversee about $126 billion in assets at GMO.
“It will be, interestingly, unlike anything else we’ve seen.”
Grantham, often called a “perma-bear” for his dour view on U.S. equities, correctly predicted a crash two months before the technology bubble burst in 2000.
His outlook for the environment now is grim, if not dire.
He recommends investors hold cash, and if they must be invested, he favors large-cap U.S. equities.
The United States and other economies might not be savaged by negative quarters of growth, but the sentiment will be “quite novel in feel without the theatrical aspect of a real nose-dive. With any luck… we won’t have them,” he said.
Rising asset prices and a credit binge that drove the U.S. economy for 25 years is over and won’t return for years to come, he said. That “end of an era” will slow economic growth and force both U.S. consumers and companies to readjust, Grantham added.
“We had a debt bubble in almost every nook and cranny, and in different times they are deflating,” he said. Now, the world is dealing with the secondary effects of slowing consumer and corporate consumption, Grantham said.
Central bankers, who have been “really quite incompetent,” will do everything possible to prevent a vicious cycle downward of lower consumption and lower production, he said.
Grantham, who is amazed at how smart investors failed to see the housing bubble and ensuing crisis, is also surprised by those who express little concern about China’s centrally planned economy and the strong likelihood of slower growth.
“Why have they become wonderful economists?” Grantham said. “What they have done is they have become wonderfully lucky like the rest of us.”
The odds that China, a major driver of global economic growth this decade, will stumble seem extremely high, he said. A Chinese downturn would send shockwaves through many economies that depend on its voracious demand for raw materials.
A third effect of weaker production and eventually rising unemployment in the United States, Europe and Japan, and even in some emerging countries, also will take its toll.
Added together, a more prolonged and painful recession than anyone has imagined will occur, an economic downturn that will come closer in global reach to anything the world has seen since the Great Depression, Grantham said.
“The possibility of it becoming very serious on a global basis is very much higher than 2001, 2002,” he said. “That’s the scary part.”
Where should investors hide? Grantham said large-cap U.S. stocks provide “an absolute guaranteed no-brainer.”
“Their profit margins are the only profit margins in any group we look at anywhere that aren’t measurably above average at all,” he explained. “Everything else, the profit margins are way over average globally, including emerging markets — very
vulnerable, hugely mean-reverting,” he warned.
Grantham said they have lagged other asset classes over the past six years: “They’ve been left behind, exactly the time you would need them.”
Exclusive Interview: Jim Rogers Predicts Bigger Financial Shocks Loom, Fueling a Malaise That May Last for Years
The U.S. financial crisis has cut so deep – and the government has taken on so much debt in misguided attempts to bail out such companies as Fannie Mae (FNM) and Freddie Mac (FRE) – that even larger financial shocks are still to come, global investing guru Jim Rogers said in an exclusive interview with Money Morning.
Indeed, the U.S. financial debacle is now so ingrained – and a so-called “Super Crash” so likely – that most Americans alive today won’t be around by the time the last of this credit-market mess is finally cleared away – if it ever is, Rogers said.
The end of this crisis “is a long way away,” Rogers said. “In fact, it may not be in our lifetimes.”
During a 40-minute interview during a wealth-management conference in this West Coast Canadian city last month, Rogers also said that:
U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke should “resign” for the bailout deals he’s handed out as he’s tried to battle this credit crisis.
That the U.S. national debt – the roughly $5 trillion held by the public– essentially doubled in the course of a single weekend because of the Fed-led credit crisis bailout deals.
That U.S. consumers and investors can expect much-higher interest rates – noting that if the Fed doesn’t raise borrowing costs, market forces will make that happen.
And that the average American has no idea just how bad this financial crisis is going to get.
“The next shock is going to be bigger and bigger, still,” Rogers said. “The shocks keep getting bigger because we keep propping things up … [and] bailing everyone out.”
Rogers first made a name for himself with The Quantum Fund, a hedge fund that’s often described as the first real global investment fund, which he and partner George Soros founded in 1970. Over the next decade, Quantum gained 4,200%, while the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index climbed about 50%.
It was after Rogers “retired” in 1980 that the investing masses got to see him in action. Rogers traveled the world (several times), and penned such bestsellers as “Investment Biker” and the recently released “A Bull in China.” And he made some historic market calls: Rogers predicted China’s meteoric growth a good decade before it became apparent and he subsequently foretold of the powerful updraft in global commodities prices that’s fueled a year-long bull market in the agriculture, energy and mining sectors.
Rogers’ candor has made him a popular figure with individual investors, meaning his pronouncements are always closely watched. Here are some of the highlights from the exclusive interview we had with the author and investor, who now makes his home in Singapore:
Keith Fitz-Gerald (Q): Looks like the financial train wreck we talked about earlier this year is happening.
Jim Rogers: There was a train wreck, yes. Two or three – more than one, as you know. [U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S.] Bernanke and his boys both came to the rescue. Which is going to cover things up for a while. And then I don’t know how long the rally will last and then we’ll be off to the races again. Whether the rally lasts six days or six weeks, I don’t know. I wish I did know that sort of thing, but I never do.
(Q):What would Chairman Bernanke have to do to “get it right?”
Rogers: Resign.
(Q): Is there anything else that you think he could do that would be correct other than let these things fail?
Rogers: Well, at this stage, it doesn’t seem like he can do it. He could raise interest rates – which he should do, anyway. Somebody should. The market’s going to do it whether he does it or not, eventually.
The problem is that he’s got all that garbage on his balance sheet now. He has $400 billion of questionable assets owing to the feds on his balance sheet. I mean, he could try to reverse that. He could raise interest rates. Yeah, that’s what he could do. That would help. It would cause a shock to the system, but if we don’t have the shock now, the shock’s going to be much worse later on. Every shock, so far, has been worse than the last shock. Bear-Stearns [now part of JP Morgan Chase & Co. (JPM)] was one thing and then it’s Fannie Mae (FNM), you know, and now Freddie Mac (FRE).
The next shock’s going to be even bigger still. So the shocks keep getting bigger because we kept propping things up and this has been going on at least since Long-Term Capital Management. They’ve been bailing everyone out and [former Fed Chairman Alan] Greenspan took interest rates down and then he took them down again after the “dot-com bubble” shock, so I guess Bernanke could try to start reversing some of this stuff.
But he has to not just reverse it – he’d have to increase interest rates a lot to make up for it and that’s not going to solve the problem either, because the basic problems are that America’s got a horrible tax system, it’s got litigation right, left, and center, it’s got horrible education system, you know, and it’s got many, many, many [other] problems that are going to take a while to resolve. If he did at least turn things around – turn some of these policies around – we would have a sharp drop, but at least it would clean out some of the excesses and the system could turn around and start doing better.
But this is academic – he’s not going to do it. But again the best thing for him would be to abolish the Federal Reserve and resign. That’ll be the best solution. Is he going to do that? No, of course not. He still thinks he knows what he’s doing.
(Q): Earlier this year, when we talked in Singapore, you made the observation that the average American still doesn’t know anything’s wrong – that anything’s happening. Is that still the case?
Rogers:Yes.
(Q): What would you tell the “Average Joe” in no-nonsense terms?
Rogers: I would say that for the last 200 years, America’s elected politicians and scoundrels have built up $5 trillion in debt. In the last few weekends, some un-elected officials added another $5 trillion to America’s national debt.
Suddenly we’re on the hook for another $5 trillion. There have been attempts to explain this to the public, about what’s happening with the debt, and with the fact that America’s situation is deteriorating in the world.
I don’t know why it doesn’t sink in. People have other things on their minds, or don’t want to be bothered. Too complicated, or whatever.
I’m sure when the [British Empire] declined there were many people who rang the bell and said: “Guys, we’re making too many mistakes here in the U.K.” And nobody listened until it was too late.
When Spain was in decline, when Rome was in decline, I’m sure there were people who noticed that things were going wrong.
(Q): Many experts don’t agree with – at the very least don’t understand – the Fed’s current strategies. How can our leaders think they’re making the right choices? What do you think?
Rogers: Bernanke is a very-narrow-gauged guy. He’s spent his whole intellectual career studying the printing of money and we have now given him the keys to the printing presses. All he knows how to do is run them.
Bernanke was [on the record as saying] that there is no problem with housing in America. There’s no problem in housing finance. I mean this was like in 2006 or 2005.
(Q): Right.
Rogers: He is the Federal Reserve and the Federal Reserve more than anybody is supposed to be regulating these [financial institutions], so they should have the inside scoop, if nothing else.
(Q): That’s problematic.
Rogers: It’s mind-boggling. Here’s a man who doesn’t understand the market, who doesn’t understand economics – basic economics. His intellectual career’s been spent on the narrow-gauge study of printing money. That’s all he knows.
Yes, he’s got a PhD, which says economics on it, but economics can be one of 200 different narrow fields. And his is printing money, which he’s good at, we know. We’ve learned that he’s ready, willing and able to step in and bail out everybody.
There’s this worry [whenever you have a major financial institution that looks ready to fail] that, “Oh my God, we’re going to go down, and if we go down, the whole system goes down.”
This is nothing new. Whole systems have been taken down before. We’ve had it happen plenty of times.
(Q): History is littered with failed financial institutions.
Rogers: I know. It’s not as though this is the first time it’s ever happened. But since [Chairman Bernanke’s] whole career is about printing money and studying the Depression, he says: “Okay, got to print some more money. Got to save the day.” And, of course, that’s when he gets himself in deeper, because the first time you print it, you prop up Institution X, [but] then you got to worry about institution Y and Z.
(Q): And now we’ve got a dangerous precedent.
Rogers: That’s exactly right. And when the next guy calls him up, he’s going to bail him out, too.
(Q): What do you think [former Fed Chairman] Paul Volcker thinks about all this?
Rogers: Well, Volcker has said it’s certainly beyond the scope of central banking, as he understands central banking.
(Q): That’s pretty darn clear.
Rogers: Volcker’s been very clear – very clear to me, anyway – about what he thinks of it, and Volcker was the last decent American central banker. We’ve had couple in our history: Volcker and William McChesney Martin were two.
You know, McChesney Martin was the guy who said the job of a good central banker was to take away the punchbowl when the party starts getting good. Now [the Fed] – when the party starts getting out of control – pours more moonshine in. McChesney Martin would always pull the bowl away when people started getting a little giggly. Now the party’s out of control.
(Q): This could be the end of the Federal Reserve, which we talked about in Singapore. This would be the third failure – correct?
Rogers: Yes. We had two central banks that disappeared for whatever reason. This one’s going to disappear, too, I say.
(Q): Throughout your career you’ve had a much-fabled ability to spot unique points in history – inflection points, if you will. Points when, as you put it, somebody puts money in the corner at which you then simply pick up.
Rogers: That’s the way to invest, as far as I’m concerned.
(Q): So conceivably, history would show that the highest returns go to those who invest when there’s blood in the streets, even if it’s their own.
Rogers: Right.
(Q): Is there a point in time or something you’re looking for that will signal that the U.S. economy has reached the inflection point in this crisis?
Rogers: Well, yeah, but it’s a long way away. In fact, it may not be in our lifetimes. Of course I covered my shorts – my financial shorts. Not all of them, but most of them last week.
So, if you’re talking about a temporary inflection point, we may have hit it.
If you look back at previous countries that have declined, you almost always see exchange controls – all sorts of controls – before failure. America is already doing some of that. America, for example, wouldn’t let the Chinese buy the oil company, wouldn’t let the [Dubai firm] buy the ports, et cetera.
But I’m really talking about full-fledged, all-out exchange controls. That would certainly be a sign, but usually exchange controls are not the end of the story. Historically, they’re somewhere during the decline. Then the politicians bring in exchange controls and then things get worse from there before they bottom.
Before World War II, Japan’s yen was two to the dollar. After they lost the war, the yen was 500 to the dollar. That’s a collapse. That was also a bottom.
These are not predictions for the U.S., but I’m just saying that things have to usually get pretty, pretty, pretty, pretty bad.
It was similar in the United Kingdom. In 1918, the U.K. was the richest, most powerful country in the world. It had just won the First World War, et cetera. By 1939, it had exchange controls and this is in just one generation. And strict exchange controls. They in fact made it an act of treason for people to use anything except the pound sterling in settling debts.
(Q): Treason? Wow, I didn’t know that.
Rogers: Yes…an act of treason. It used to be that people could use anything they wanted as money. Gold or other metals. Banks would issue their own currencies. Anything. You could even use other people’s currencies.
Things were so bad in the U.K. in the 1930s they made it an act of treason to use anything except sterling and then by ’39 they had full-exchange controls. And then, of course, they had the war and that disaster. It was a disaster before the war. The war just exacerbated the problems. And by the mid-70s, the U.K. was bankrupt. They could not sell long-term government bonds. Remember, this is a country that two generations or three generations before had been the richest most powerful country in the world.
Now the only thing that saved the U.K. was the North Sea oil fields, even though Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher likes to take credit, but Margaret Thatcher has good PR. Margaret Thatcher came into office in 1979 and North Sea oil started flowing. And the U.K. suddenly had a huge balance-of-payment surplus.
You know, even if Mother Teresa had come in [as prime minister] in ’79, or Joseph Stalin, or whomever had come in 1979 – you know, Jimmy Carter, George Bush, whomever – it still would’ve been great.
You give me the largest oil field in the world and I’ll show you a good time, too. That’s what happened.
(Q): What if Thatcher had never come to power?
Rogers: Who knows, because the U.K. was in such disastrous straits when she came in. And that’s why she came to power…because it was such a disaster. I’m sure she would’ve made things better, but short of all that oil, the situation would’ve continued to decline.
So it may not be in our lifetimes that we’ll see the bottom, just given the U.K.’s history, for instance.
(Q): That’s going to be terrifying for individual investors to think about.
Rogers: Yeah. But remember that America had such a magnificent and gigantic position of dominance that deterioration will take time. You know, you don’t just change that in a decade or two. It takes a lot of hard work by a lot of incompetent people to change the situation. The U.K. situation I just explained…that decline was over 40 or 50 years, but they had so much money they could have continued to spiral downward for a long time.
Even Zimbabwe, you know, took 10 or 15 years to really get going into it’s collapse, but Robert Mugabe came into power in 1980 and, as recently as 1995, things still looked good for Zimbabwe. But now, of course, it’s a major disaster.
That’s one of the advantages of Singapore. The place has an astonishing amount of wealth and only 4 million people. So even if it started squandering it in 2008, which they may be, it’s going to take them forever to do so.
(Q): Is there a specific signal that this is “over?”
Rogers: Sure…when our entire U.S. cabinet has Swiss bank accounts. Linked inside bank accounts. When that happens, we’ll know we’re getting close because they’ll do it even after it’s illegal – after America’s put in the exchange controls.
(Q): They’ll move their own money.
Rogers: Yeah, because you look at people like the Israelis and the Argentineans and people who have had exchange controls – the politicians usually figured it out and have taken care of themselves on the side.
(Q): We saw that in South Africa and other countries, for example, as people tried to get their money out.
Rogers: Everybody figures it out, eventually, including the politicians. They say: “You know, others can’t do this, but it’s alright for us.” Those days will come. I guess when all the congressmen have foreign bank accounts, we’ll be at the bottom.
But we’ve got a long way to go, yet.
Indeed, the U.S. financial debacle is now so ingrained – and a so-called “Super Crash” so likely – that most Americans alive today won’t be around by the time the last of this credit-market mess is finally cleared away – if it ever is, Rogers said.
The end of this crisis “is a long way away,” Rogers said. “In fact, it may not be in our lifetimes.”
During a 40-minute interview during a wealth-management conference in this West Coast Canadian city last month, Rogers also said that:
U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke should “resign” for the bailout deals he’s handed out as he’s tried to battle this credit crisis.
That the U.S. national debt – the roughly $5 trillion held by the public– essentially doubled in the course of a single weekend because of the Fed-led credit crisis bailout deals.
That U.S. consumers and investors can expect much-higher interest rates – noting that if the Fed doesn’t raise borrowing costs, market forces will make that happen.
And that the average American has no idea just how bad this financial crisis is going to get.
“The next shock is going to be bigger and bigger, still,” Rogers said. “The shocks keep getting bigger because we keep propping things up … [and] bailing everyone out.”
Rogers first made a name for himself with The Quantum Fund, a hedge fund that’s often described as the first real global investment fund, which he and partner George Soros founded in 1970. Over the next decade, Quantum gained 4,200%, while the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index climbed about 50%.
It was after Rogers “retired” in 1980 that the investing masses got to see him in action. Rogers traveled the world (several times), and penned such bestsellers as “Investment Biker” and the recently released “A Bull in China.” And he made some historic market calls: Rogers predicted China’s meteoric growth a good decade before it became apparent and he subsequently foretold of the powerful updraft in global commodities prices that’s fueled a year-long bull market in the agriculture, energy and mining sectors.
Rogers’ candor has made him a popular figure with individual investors, meaning his pronouncements are always closely watched. Here are some of the highlights from the exclusive interview we had with the author and investor, who now makes his home in Singapore:
Keith Fitz-Gerald (Q): Looks like the financial train wreck we talked about earlier this year is happening.
Jim Rogers: There was a train wreck, yes. Two or three – more than one, as you know. [U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S.] Bernanke and his boys both came to the rescue. Which is going to cover things up for a while. And then I don’t know how long the rally will last and then we’ll be off to the races again. Whether the rally lasts six days or six weeks, I don’t know. I wish I did know that sort of thing, but I never do.
(Q):What would Chairman Bernanke have to do to “get it right?”
Rogers: Resign.
(Q): Is there anything else that you think he could do that would be correct other than let these things fail?
Rogers: Well, at this stage, it doesn’t seem like he can do it. He could raise interest rates – which he should do, anyway. Somebody should. The market’s going to do it whether he does it or not, eventually.
The problem is that he’s got all that garbage on his balance sheet now. He has $400 billion of questionable assets owing to the feds on his balance sheet. I mean, he could try to reverse that. He could raise interest rates. Yeah, that’s what he could do. That would help. It would cause a shock to the system, but if we don’t have the shock now, the shock’s going to be much worse later on. Every shock, so far, has been worse than the last shock. Bear-Stearns [now part of JP Morgan Chase & Co. (JPM)] was one thing and then it’s Fannie Mae (FNM), you know, and now Freddie Mac (FRE).
The next shock’s going to be even bigger still. So the shocks keep getting bigger because we kept propping things up and this has been going on at least since Long-Term Capital Management. They’ve been bailing everyone out and [former Fed Chairman Alan] Greenspan took interest rates down and then he took them down again after the “dot-com bubble” shock, so I guess Bernanke could try to start reversing some of this stuff.
But he has to not just reverse it – he’d have to increase interest rates a lot to make up for it and that’s not going to solve the problem either, because the basic problems are that America’s got a horrible tax system, it’s got litigation right, left, and center, it’s got horrible education system, you know, and it’s got many, many, many [other] problems that are going to take a while to resolve. If he did at least turn things around – turn some of these policies around – we would have a sharp drop, but at least it would clean out some of the excesses and the system could turn around and start doing better.
But this is academic – he’s not going to do it. But again the best thing for him would be to abolish the Federal Reserve and resign. That’ll be the best solution. Is he going to do that? No, of course not. He still thinks he knows what he’s doing.
(Q): Earlier this year, when we talked in Singapore, you made the observation that the average American still doesn’t know anything’s wrong – that anything’s happening. Is that still the case?
Rogers:Yes.
(Q): What would you tell the “Average Joe” in no-nonsense terms?
Rogers: I would say that for the last 200 years, America’s elected politicians and scoundrels have built up $5 trillion in debt. In the last few weekends, some un-elected officials added another $5 trillion to America’s national debt.
Suddenly we’re on the hook for another $5 trillion. There have been attempts to explain this to the public, about what’s happening with the debt, and with the fact that America’s situation is deteriorating in the world.
I don’t know why it doesn’t sink in. People have other things on their minds, or don’t want to be bothered. Too complicated, or whatever.
I’m sure when the [British Empire] declined there were many people who rang the bell and said: “Guys, we’re making too many mistakes here in the U.K.” And nobody listened until it was too late.
When Spain was in decline, when Rome was in decline, I’m sure there were people who noticed that things were going wrong.
(Q): Many experts don’t agree with – at the very least don’t understand – the Fed’s current strategies. How can our leaders think they’re making the right choices? What do you think?
Rogers: Bernanke is a very-narrow-gauged guy. He’s spent his whole intellectual career studying the printing of money and we have now given him the keys to the printing presses. All he knows how to do is run them.
Bernanke was [on the record as saying] that there is no problem with housing in America. There’s no problem in housing finance. I mean this was like in 2006 or 2005.
(Q): Right.
Rogers: He is the Federal Reserve and the Federal Reserve more than anybody is supposed to be regulating these [financial institutions], so they should have the inside scoop, if nothing else.
(Q): That’s problematic.
Rogers: It’s mind-boggling. Here’s a man who doesn’t understand the market, who doesn’t understand economics – basic economics. His intellectual career’s been spent on the narrow-gauge study of printing money. That’s all he knows.
Yes, he’s got a PhD, which says economics on it, but economics can be one of 200 different narrow fields. And his is printing money, which he’s good at, we know. We’ve learned that he’s ready, willing and able to step in and bail out everybody.
There’s this worry [whenever you have a major financial institution that looks ready to fail] that, “Oh my God, we’re going to go down, and if we go down, the whole system goes down.”
This is nothing new. Whole systems have been taken down before. We’ve had it happen plenty of times.
(Q): History is littered with failed financial institutions.
Rogers: I know. It’s not as though this is the first time it’s ever happened. But since [Chairman Bernanke’s] whole career is about printing money and studying the Depression, he says: “Okay, got to print some more money. Got to save the day.” And, of course, that’s when he gets himself in deeper, because the first time you print it, you prop up Institution X, [but] then you got to worry about institution Y and Z.
(Q): And now we’ve got a dangerous precedent.
Rogers: That’s exactly right. And when the next guy calls him up, he’s going to bail him out, too.
(Q): What do you think [former Fed Chairman] Paul Volcker thinks about all this?
Rogers: Well, Volcker has said it’s certainly beyond the scope of central banking, as he understands central banking.
(Q): That’s pretty darn clear.
Rogers: Volcker’s been very clear – very clear to me, anyway – about what he thinks of it, and Volcker was the last decent American central banker. We’ve had couple in our history: Volcker and William McChesney Martin were two.
You know, McChesney Martin was the guy who said the job of a good central banker was to take away the punchbowl when the party starts getting good. Now [the Fed] – when the party starts getting out of control – pours more moonshine in. McChesney Martin would always pull the bowl away when people started getting a little giggly. Now the party’s out of control.
(Q): This could be the end of the Federal Reserve, which we talked about in Singapore. This would be the third failure – correct?
Rogers: Yes. We had two central banks that disappeared for whatever reason. This one’s going to disappear, too, I say.
(Q): Throughout your career you’ve had a much-fabled ability to spot unique points in history – inflection points, if you will. Points when, as you put it, somebody puts money in the corner at which you then simply pick up.
Rogers: That’s the way to invest, as far as I’m concerned.
(Q): So conceivably, history would show that the highest returns go to those who invest when there’s blood in the streets, even if it’s their own.
Rogers: Right.
(Q): Is there a point in time or something you’re looking for that will signal that the U.S. economy has reached the inflection point in this crisis?
Rogers: Well, yeah, but it’s a long way away. In fact, it may not be in our lifetimes. Of course I covered my shorts – my financial shorts. Not all of them, but most of them last week.
So, if you’re talking about a temporary inflection point, we may have hit it.
If you look back at previous countries that have declined, you almost always see exchange controls – all sorts of controls – before failure. America is already doing some of that. America, for example, wouldn’t let the Chinese buy the oil company, wouldn’t let the [Dubai firm] buy the ports, et cetera.
But I’m really talking about full-fledged, all-out exchange controls. That would certainly be a sign, but usually exchange controls are not the end of the story. Historically, they’re somewhere during the decline. Then the politicians bring in exchange controls and then things get worse from there before they bottom.
Before World War II, Japan’s yen was two to the dollar. After they lost the war, the yen was 500 to the dollar. That’s a collapse. That was also a bottom.
These are not predictions for the U.S., but I’m just saying that things have to usually get pretty, pretty, pretty, pretty bad.
It was similar in the United Kingdom. In 1918, the U.K. was the richest, most powerful country in the world. It had just won the First World War, et cetera. By 1939, it had exchange controls and this is in just one generation. And strict exchange controls. They in fact made it an act of treason for people to use anything except the pound sterling in settling debts.
(Q): Treason? Wow, I didn’t know that.
Rogers: Yes…an act of treason. It used to be that people could use anything they wanted as money. Gold or other metals. Banks would issue their own currencies. Anything. You could even use other people’s currencies.
Things were so bad in the U.K. in the 1930s they made it an act of treason to use anything except sterling and then by ’39 they had full-exchange controls. And then, of course, they had the war and that disaster. It was a disaster before the war. The war just exacerbated the problems. And by the mid-70s, the U.K. was bankrupt. They could not sell long-term government bonds. Remember, this is a country that two generations or three generations before had been the richest most powerful country in the world.
Now the only thing that saved the U.K. was the North Sea oil fields, even though Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher likes to take credit, but Margaret Thatcher has good PR. Margaret Thatcher came into office in 1979 and North Sea oil started flowing. And the U.K. suddenly had a huge balance-of-payment surplus.
You know, even if Mother Teresa had come in [as prime minister] in ’79, or Joseph Stalin, or whomever had come in 1979 – you know, Jimmy Carter, George Bush, whomever – it still would’ve been great.
You give me the largest oil field in the world and I’ll show you a good time, too. That’s what happened.
(Q): What if Thatcher had never come to power?
Rogers: Who knows, because the U.K. was in such disastrous straits when she came in. And that’s why she came to power…because it was such a disaster. I’m sure she would’ve made things better, but short of all that oil, the situation would’ve continued to decline.
So it may not be in our lifetimes that we’ll see the bottom, just given the U.K.’s history, for instance.
(Q): That’s going to be terrifying for individual investors to think about.
Rogers: Yeah. But remember that America had such a magnificent and gigantic position of dominance that deterioration will take time. You know, you don’t just change that in a decade or two. It takes a lot of hard work by a lot of incompetent people to change the situation. The U.K. situation I just explained…that decline was over 40 or 50 years, but they had so much money they could have continued to spiral downward for a long time.
Even Zimbabwe, you know, took 10 or 15 years to really get going into it’s collapse, but Robert Mugabe came into power in 1980 and, as recently as 1995, things still looked good for Zimbabwe. But now, of course, it’s a major disaster.
That’s one of the advantages of Singapore. The place has an astonishing amount of wealth and only 4 million people. So even if it started squandering it in 2008, which they may be, it’s going to take them forever to do so.
(Q): Is there a specific signal that this is “over?”
Rogers: Sure…when our entire U.S. cabinet has Swiss bank accounts. Linked inside bank accounts. When that happens, we’ll know we’re getting close because they’ll do it even after it’s illegal – after America’s put in the exchange controls.
(Q): They’ll move their own money.
Rogers: Yeah, because you look at people like the Israelis and the Argentineans and people who have had exchange controls – the politicians usually figured it out and have taken care of themselves on the side.
(Q): We saw that in South Africa and other countries, for example, as people tried to get their money out.
Rogers: Everybody figures it out, eventually, including the politicians. They say: “You know, others can’t do this, but it’s alright for us.” Those days will come. I guess when all the congressmen have foreign bank accounts, we’ll be at the bottom.
But we’ve got a long way to go, yet.
投资大师费舍的理论与实践
菲利普.费舍（Philips A Fisher）是华尔街极受尊重和推崇的投资家。他1928年毕业于斯坦福大学商学院，旋即进入旧金山国安盎格鲁国民银行投资银行部充当证券分析师，开始了他的投资生涯。在美国股市大崩盘后的1931年，他年仅23岁时就创立了费舍公司（Fisher & Co.），主要从事投资顾问业务，并从此走上了一条投资大师的传奇之路。在此后几十年的投资生涯中，他成功地发掘出并长期持有了摩托罗拉、德州仪器等大型的超级成长股，不仅个人获得了巨大的财富，也为他在专业人士的圈子里面赢得了煊赫的名声。在他的投资生涯中，最成功的、也最为后人所称道的就是1955年，在摩托罗拉还是一家无名小公司的时候，他就断然大量买入其股票并长期持有，在此后的20多年里，摩托罗拉迅速成长为全球性的一流公司，股价也涨了20多倍。
作为一名一流的投资大师，费舍显得异常低调，几乎从不接受各种访问，以致于在一般投资者中并不知名；但是1959年他的名著《怎样选择成长股》一经出版，立时成为广大投资者必备的教科书，该书随即成为《纽约时报》有史以来登上畅销书排行榜的第一部投资著作；费舍现已被视为现代投资理论的开路先锋之一，"成长股"这一概念也随着该书的畅销而成为投资者耳熟能详的名词，追寻"成长股"的"成长型投资"更是自此成为了美国股市多年以来的主流投资理念之一。
投资理念的核心：发现成长股，抓住它！
在费舍的传世名著《怎样选择成长股》里，他对有关成长股的标准、如何寻找成长股、怎样把握时机获利等一系列重要问题进行了全面而详尽的阐述。
——什么是成长股？
费舍对通常进行的经济大势预测不抱什么希望，他说投资人更应该集中精力选择能够使自己以最小的代价和风险来获得最大收益的公司，这些也就是所谓的“成长股”。他提出了选择成长股的15个要点，他认为，一家公司如果能够符合其中相当多的要点，则具有比较高的投资价值，也就可以称为“成长股”。这15个要点大致围绕着以下的四个方面：
第一是公司面临的市场状态和它的竞争能力：这家公司的营业额在几年之内能否大幅成长？有没有优越的销售渠道？这两个问题的答案是判断一个公司是否值得研究的基本条件。
营业额的增长前景首先取决于需求增长的状况，公司的管理水平也必须保持在较高的水平上。另外，对于企业销售能力的分析往往被忽视，绝大多数分析人员只满足于依赖一些粗略的指标来分析企业的销售能力。费舍认为这些比率太过粗疏，根本不足以成为判断投资价值的依据，要了解一家企业真正的行销能力，必须要到其竞争对手和客户那里去做艰苦而细致的调查。
第二是公司的研发水平：该公司研发活动的效率如何？为了进一步提高总体销售水平，发现新的产品增长点，管理层推进研发活动的决心有多大？
费舍认为，一家公司财务稳健性的最根本的保证就在于能够不断开发新的、能够保证相当利润量的产品线，而这直接取决于研发活动的水平，观察研发活动有两个最重要的角度：一是研发活动的经济效益如何；再者就是公司高层对于研发活动的态度如何，是否能够认识到目前市场的增长极限并且未雨绸缪。
第三就是公司的成本与收益状况：公司的成本控制水平如何？利润处在什么水平上，有没有采取什么得力的措施来维持或者改善利润水平？有没有长期的盈利展望？
费舍极为看中企业长远的盈利能力，他也一直在追寻那些净利润率持续高于行业均值的公司；他明确指出：“投资于利润率过低的公司，绝对无法获得最高的长期利润。”他的理由是，利润率低的公司财务体质过于虚弱，抗打击能力弱，在经济不景气中最可能首先倒下。
第四也是最重要的一点就是公司的管理水平：公司的人事关系、管理团队内部的关系如何？公司管理阶层的深度够吗？在可预见的将来，这家公司是否还会继续发行股票筹资，现有持股人的利益是否因预期中的成长而大幅受损？管理层的诚信态度是否不容置疑？
费舍认为良好的人事关系（特别是管理团队内部的良好氛围）和管理层足够的深度是保证企业能够高效发展的基本保证之一；而对于公司的融资能力，他旗帜鲜明的指出：如果几年内公司将增发新股融资，而现有的每股盈余只会小幅增加，则我们只能有一个结论，也就是管理阶层的财务判断能力相当差，因此该公司不值得投资。
在所有判断公司是否值得投资的标准中，费舍把公司管理层的诚信状况作为最后一个，也是做为最重要的要点提了出来。早在1959年他就斩钉截铁地写到：“不管其他所有事务上得到多高的评价，如果管理阶层对股东无强烈的责任感，投资人绝对不要认真考虑投资这样一家公司。”
——怎样找到它？
对这些要点了然于胸之后，如何从上千家公司中选出若干家符合上述标准的呢？对此，费舍的经验就是首先求助于富有经验的投资专家，但是专家提供的线索总的来说仍然只是原始资料，而要从其中迅速筛选出若干家值得进一步研究的公司，则主要靠经验了。
心中有了被选对象的大致范围之后，费舍就开始了他称之为“闲聊”的过程，寻找尽可能多的信息来源，不断丰富自己对所研究的公司的认识，“闲聊”对象主要应该是：该公司的竞争对手、供应商和客户、大学和政府的科学家、行业协会的成员以及公司以前的员工等。
费舍坚持认为，只有从侧面了解到有关于一家公司至少50%以上的信息之后，才可以去拜访目标公司的管理阶层，否则就是一种极其危险的状态：因为投资人对目标公司没有足够多的了解，极容易被公司的管理人员所误导；此外，也根本无从判断最基本的要点之一——高管人员本身的能力。
——何时买卖？
费舍投资哲学的核心就在于找到现在被市场忽视、但是未来几年内每股盈余将有大幅度成长的少数股票；进一步地，想要获得可能获得的最高收益，就应该仔细考虑出时机问题。
费舍对此有独到的见解，对于传统的依据景气研究以及对未来的预测来决定是否买卖股票的做法，他持否定的态度。他明确提出：过分信任经济预测的可靠性，无异于拿自己的全部积蓄去冒险。
费舍认为，最佳买入点应该是在“盈余即将大幅度改善，但盈余增加的展望还没有推升该公司的股票价格时”，而抓住最佳买入点的基础就在于能够正确判断目标公司相对于整体经济会有什么样的表现。另外，由于市场的原因导致的股价大幅下跌也是买进优质股的好时机。
对于卖出持股，费舍认为只能基于三个理由：首先是原始买进时就犯下了错误；其次是公司出现了重大问题，管理出现退步，或者是增长潜力消耗殆尽，难于继续拥有突出的表现。第三个理由是投资者又发现了比手中持有的股票更优秀的品种。费舍认为最后一种情况非常罕见，而且随时准备更换持股组合的风险其实很大。
——投资人不应该做什么？
在费舍眼里，投资过程中充满了各种各样的陷阱，而且他本人正是在不断犯错的过程中逐渐成长起来的，为此，他专门总结了一些投资人应该尽量避免的东西：
——不要分散投资。费舍认为：人的精力总是有限的，过于分散化迫使投资人买入很多并没有充分了解的公司股票，而这可能比投资过于集中还要危险。他根据自己的经验给出了一个最低限度分散投资的优先顺序：A。审慎选出根基稳固的大型成长股，并且至少应该拥有5只以上，但其产品线最多只能略微重叠；B。较少投资于那些介于上述股票和高风险的年轻成长型公司之间的股票；C。最后才可以考虑风险较高的年轻的成长股。
——不可过分依赖数字。这里说的数字主要指一只股票前几年的价格列表、每股盈余的状况等等一般投资人所津津乐道的数据。费舍的一个重要原则就是：“主宰股价走势的是未来，不是过去。”在做出是否购买某只股票的决策时，它过去几年的价格变动或者是每股盈余等等根本就无关紧要。
——买进真正优秀的成长股时，除了价格之外，也不要忽视时机因素。有的时候，你会成功地找到一直真正有潜力的成长股，但是很有可能你面临的情况是：它的价格现在正处在一个不合理的高价位上。费舍推荐了一种方法，即：研究这家公司过去成功的经营计划，可以发现这些经营计划在发展阶段的某一点，必然会反映在股价上面，而在这个时间附近买进，就很有可能在接近最低价位的地方获得极有潜力的股票。
——不要缁铢必较。许多投资人都会为自己将要买卖的股票设定一个心理价位，费舍对此的批评可谓一针见血：作为一名希望凭借股票成长性在几年之内获得高额收益的投资人来说，为了一点小小的价格差异就放弃交易，绝对是得不偿失。
——不要忽视市盈率的分析。市盈率是一个非常重要的概念，但是许多人没有认识到市盈率只有跟公司经营的特性联系起来，才能够真实反映其价格的“含金量”。费舍认为如果一个公司能够不断开发出新的获利来源，而且所在的行业亦可望有相近的成长动力，则其5—10年之后的市盈率肯定要远高于一般的股票，即使其现在的价格已经相当可观，其实还是非常值得投资的。
作为一名一流的投资大师，费舍显得异常低调，几乎从不接受各种访问，以致于在一般投资者中并不知名；但是1959年他的名著《怎样选择成长股》一经出版，立时成为广大投资者必备的教科书，该书随即成为《纽约时报》有史以来登上畅销书排行榜的第一部投资著作；费舍现已被视为现代投资理论的开路先锋之一，"成长股"这一概念也随着该书的畅销而成为投资者耳熟能详的名词，追寻"成长股"的"成长型投资"更是自此成为了美国股市多年以来的主流投资理念之一。
投资理念的核心：发现成长股，抓住它！
在费舍的传世名著《怎样选择成长股》里，他对有关成长股的标准、如何寻找成长股、怎样把握时机获利等一系列重要问题进行了全面而详尽的阐述。
——什么是成长股？
费舍对通常进行的经济大势预测不抱什么希望，他说投资人更应该集中精力选择能够使自己以最小的代价和风险来获得最大收益的公司，这些也就是所谓的“成长股”。他提出了选择成长股的15个要点，他认为，一家公司如果能够符合其中相当多的要点，则具有比较高的投资价值，也就可以称为“成长股”。这15个要点大致围绕着以下的四个方面：
第一是公司面临的市场状态和它的竞争能力：这家公司的营业额在几年之内能否大幅成长？有没有优越的销售渠道？这两个问题的答案是判断一个公司是否值得研究的基本条件。
营业额的增长前景首先取决于需求增长的状况，公司的管理水平也必须保持在较高的水平上。另外，对于企业销售能力的分析往往被忽视，绝大多数分析人员只满足于依赖一些粗略的指标来分析企业的销售能力。费舍认为这些比率太过粗疏，根本不足以成为判断投资价值的依据，要了解一家企业真正的行销能力，必须要到其竞争对手和客户那里去做艰苦而细致的调查。
第二是公司的研发水平：该公司研发活动的效率如何？为了进一步提高总体销售水平，发现新的产品增长点，管理层推进研发活动的决心有多大？
费舍认为，一家公司财务稳健性的最根本的保证就在于能够不断开发新的、能够保证相当利润量的产品线，而这直接取决于研发活动的水平，观察研发活动有两个最重要的角度：一是研发活动的经济效益如何；再者就是公司高层对于研发活动的态度如何，是否能够认识到目前市场的增长极限并且未雨绸缪。
第三就是公司的成本与收益状况：公司的成本控制水平如何？利润处在什么水平上，有没有采取什么得力的措施来维持或者改善利润水平？有没有长期的盈利展望？
费舍极为看中企业长远的盈利能力，他也一直在追寻那些净利润率持续高于行业均值的公司；他明确指出：“投资于利润率过低的公司，绝对无法获得最高的长期利润。”他的理由是，利润率低的公司财务体质过于虚弱，抗打击能力弱，在经济不景气中最可能首先倒下。
第四也是最重要的一点就是公司的管理水平：公司的人事关系、管理团队内部的关系如何？公司管理阶层的深度够吗？在可预见的将来，这家公司是否还会继续发行股票筹资，现有持股人的利益是否因预期中的成长而大幅受损？管理层的诚信态度是否不容置疑？
费舍认为良好的人事关系（特别是管理团队内部的良好氛围）和管理层足够的深度是保证企业能够高效发展的基本保证之一；而对于公司的融资能力，他旗帜鲜明的指出：如果几年内公司将增发新股融资，而现有的每股盈余只会小幅增加，则我们只能有一个结论，也就是管理阶层的财务判断能力相当差，因此该公司不值得投资。
在所有判断公司是否值得投资的标准中，费舍把公司管理层的诚信状况作为最后一个，也是做为最重要的要点提了出来。早在1959年他就斩钉截铁地写到：“不管其他所有事务上得到多高的评价，如果管理阶层对股东无强烈的责任感，投资人绝对不要认真考虑投资这样一家公司。”
——怎样找到它？
对这些要点了然于胸之后，如何从上千家公司中选出若干家符合上述标准的呢？对此，费舍的经验就是首先求助于富有经验的投资专家，但是专家提供的线索总的来说仍然只是原始资料，而要从其中迅速筛选出若干家值得进一步研究的公司，则主要靠经验了。
心中有了被选对象的大致范围之后，费舍就开始了他称之为“闲聊”的过程，寻找尽可能多的信息来源，不断丰富自己对所研究的公司的认识，“闲聊”对象主要应该是：该公司的竞争对手、供应商和客户、大学和政府的科学家、行业协会的成员以及公司以前的员工等。
费舍坚持认为，只有从侧面了解到有关于一家公司至少50%以上的信息之后，才可以去拜访目标公司的管理阶层，否则就是一种极其危险的状态：因为投资人对目标公司没有足够多的了解，极容易被公司的管理人员所误导；此外，也根本无从判断最基本的要点之一——高管人员本身的能力。
——何时买卖？
费舍投资哲学的核心就在于找到现在被市场忽视、但是未来几年内每股盈余将有大幅度成长的少数股票；进一步地，想要获得可能获得的最高收益，就应该仔细考虑出时机问题。
费舍对此有独到的见解，对于传统的依据景气研究以及对未来的预测来决定是否买卖股票的做法，他持否定的态度。他明确提出：过分信任经济预测的可靠性，无异于拿自己的全部积蓄去冒险。
费舍认为，最佳买入点应该是在“盈余即将大幅度改善，但盈余增加的展望还没有推升该公司的股票价格时”，而抓住最佳买入点的基础就在于能够正确判断目标公司相对于整体经济会有什么样的表现。另外，由于市场的原因导致的股价大幅下跌也是买进优质股的好时机。
对于卖出持股，费舍认为只能基于三个理由：首先是原始买进时就犯下了错误；其次是公司出现了重大问题，管理出现退步，或者是增长潜力消耗殆尽，难于继续拥有突出的表现。第三个理由是投资者又发现了比手中持有的股票更优秀的品种。费舍认为最后一种情况非常罕见，而且随时准备更换持股组合的风险其实很大。
——投资人不应该做什么？
在费舍眼里，投资过程中充满了各种各样的陷阱，而且他本人正是在不断犯错的过程中逐渐成长起来的，为此，他专门总结了一些投资人应该尽量避免的东西：
——不要分散投资。费舍认为：人的精力总是有限的，过于分散化迫使投资人买入很多并没有充分了解的公司股票，而这可能比投资过于集中还要危险。他根据自己的经验给出了一个最低限度分散投资的优先顺序：A。审慎选出根基稳固的大型成长股，并且至少应该拥有5只以上，但其产品线最多只能略微重叠；B。较少投资于那些介于上述股票和高风险的年轻成长型公司之间的股票；C。最后才可以考虑风险较高的年轻的成长股。
——不可过分依赖数字。这里说的数字主要指一只股票前几年的价格列表、每股盈余的状况等等一般投资人所津津乐道的数据。费舍的一个重要原则就是：“主宰股价走势的是未来，不是过去。”在做出是否购买某只股票的决策时，它过去几年的价格变动或者是每股盈余等等根本就无关紧要。
——买进真正优秀的成长股时，除了价格之外，也不要忽视时机因素。有的时候，你会成功地找到一直真正有潜力的成长股，但是很有可能你面临的情况是：它的价格现在正处在一个不合理的高价位上。费舍推荐了一种方法，即：研究这家公司过去成功的经营计划，可以发现这些经营计划在发展阶段的某一点，必然会反映在股价上面，而在这个时间附近买进，就很有可能在接近最低价位的地方获得极有潜力的股票。
——不要缁铢必较。许多投资人都会为自己将要买卖的股票设定一个心理价位，费舍对此的批评可谓一针见血：作为一名希望凭借股票成长性在几年之内获得高额收益的投资人来说，为了一点小小的价格差异就放弃交易，绝对是得不偿失。
——不要忽视市盈率的分析。市盈率是一个非常重要的概念，但是许多人没有认识到市盈率只有跟公司经营的特性联系起来，才能够真实反映其价格的“含金量”。费舍认为如果一个公司能够不断开发出新的获利来源，而且所在的行业亦可望有相近的成长动力，则其5—10年之后的市盈率肯定要远高于一般的股票，即使其现在的价格已经相当可观，其实还是非常值得投资的。
Saturday, August 30, 2008
投资就是一种收藏
全世界的人有三种致富模式: 一是打工，二是创业，三是投资，知与行的距离，是世界上最远的距离。
每个人用不同的方式创造自己的财富。有一句话叫做“投资致富胜过勤劳致富”。如果靠打工致富，你的财富目标大概达到百万级；如果靠创业致富，财富目标达到千万级；如果靠投资致富，财富目标可以达到亿万级。投资虽说有风险，但不做投资的风险更大。在美国历史上从1900年到2000年的100年间，货币贬值54倍，换句话来讲，一美元的购买力，100年以后只有1/54。
投资是永恒时间的抗衡理财致富是“马拉松竞赛”而非“百米冲刺”，比的是耐力而不是爆发力。对于短期无法预测而长期具有高报酬率的投资，最安全的投资策略是：先投资，等待机会再投资。
投资就是一种收藏不用看盘，不用技术分析，也不用打听消息，只需要常识，选股没有独门秘籍，首先选择中国最好的行业，寻找一个长期向好的行业很重要。其次是选择这个行业中最好的公司，那些具有广阔市场、能够抵御通涨、能够长期生存下去的、有足够利润率的企业应该是值得投资的，而且长期投资想不赚钱都很难。纵观巴菲特投资的那些伟大的企业无非是这几大类，消费品、制药、石油采掘、房地产、金融服务、连锁零售等，·选择了一只好的股票，是决定投资胜负的关键。你就能够成为中国股市的大赢家，成为这个财富膨胀和转移时代最大的受益者。
一个笃定的价值投资者
我们说选价值投资你实际上是选择了一条人迹更少的路
我们该如何面对不确定的未来
你到底要持有什么样的资产来穿越这个时代, 我觉得这是个很严肃的事情
熊市一样赚大钱
你发现这个好企业, 实际上不是说现在牛市来了, 它涨了几倍而是说什么, 在牛市来之前的前两三年这些
真正好的企业已经在涨了
如何面对市场波动
比如说市场回调跌的很厉害您会不会在遇见这个跌势刚刚形成的时候抛股票
我们不抛我可能就是, 我们还接着买, 我们是这样一个做法
投资无秘密
我觉得投资本身没有秘密我能看到的, 别人都能看到, 坚持是最艰难的选择
每个人用不同的方式创造自己的财富。有一句话叫做“投资致富胜过勤劳致富”。如果靠打工致富，你的财富目标大概达到百万级；如果靠创业致富，财富目标达到千万级；如果靠投资致富，财富目标可以达到亿万级。投资虽说有风险，但不做投资的风险更大。在美国历史上从1900年到2000年的100年间，货币贬值54倍，换句话来讲，一美元的购买力，100年以后只有1/54。
投资是永恒时间的抗衡理财致富是“马拉松竞赛”而非“百米冲刺”，比的是耐力而不是爆发力。对于短期无法预测而长期具有高报酬率的投资，最安全的投资策略是：先投资，等待机会再投资。
投资就是一种收藏不用看盘，不用技术分析，也不用打听消息，只需要常识，选股没有独门秘籍，首先选择中国最好的行业，寻找一个长期向好的行业很重要。其次是选择这个行业中最好的公司，那些具有广阔市场、能够抵御通涨、能够长期生存下去的、有足够利润率的企业应该是值得投资的，而且长期投资想不赚钱都很难。纵观巴菲特投资的那些伟大的企业无非是这几大类，消费品、制药、石油采掘、房地产、金融服务、连锁零售等，·选择了一只好的股票，是决定投资胜负的关键。你就能够成为中国股市的大赢家，成为这个财富膨胀和转移时代最大的受益者。
一个笃定的价值投资者
我们说选价值投资你实际上是选择了一条人迹更少的路
我们该如何面对不确定的未来
你到底要持有什么样的资产来穿越这个时代, 我觉得这是个很严肃的事情
熊市一样赚大钱
你发现这个好企业, 实际上不是说现在牛市来了, 它涨了几倍而是说什么, 在牛市来之前的前两三年这些
真正好的企业已经在涨了
如何面对市场波动
比如说市场回调跌的很厉害您会不会在遇见这个跌势刚刚形成的时候抛股票
我们不抛我可能就是, 我们还接着买, 我们是这样一个做法
投资无秘密
我觉得投资本身没有秘密我能看到的, 别人都能看到, 坚持是最艰难的选择
如果把中国财富看为一只股票，则中国政府控制了75％的筹码
耶鲁大学的教授陈志武先生最近写了两篇精妙绝伦的好文（见后文附件），解释了最近一直困扰我的一个问题：在经济增长的三个火车头中的出口和投资都面临减速的前提下，内需有可能成为中国经济的新动力吗？
在中国115.6万亿的资产财富中，只有27.6万亿是民间私人的，剩下的88万亿属于国家所有（其中大约2/3为土地资产，其余1/3为国有企业价值）。在私人最重要的两类收入财产性收入和劳动性收入中，初部分已经崛起的城市中产阶级外，中国人的财产性增殖收入少得可怜。在人民币升值和资本市场的大力发展中，中国政府的资产性财富被充分的显化和增强。
与之相对比，美国政府基本没有生产性资产，美国的私人财富为73万亿美元。根据陈教授的研究，过去10年美国家庭的资产性财务增长与劳动收入储蓄的比例为22：1。这是美国人不需要储蓄，而大量负债消费的根本原因。
上述的对比分析给了我如下的分析和体会：
1、直接受益与政府消费的行业可能会面临较好的发展空间
其实内需消费是包括两个方面的，一个方面是个人的需求，另一个方面是政府的需求。在中国目前的政策环境下，政府消费的增长率可能会远远高于个人需求的增长率。
谈及政府消费，也许军工业是最典型的代表。
另外一个，我想中国政府对医疗改革的投入必将大大增强。按照陈教授的研究，中国政府花在医疗卫生、社会保障和就业福利上的比例仅仅为财政支出的15％，但是美国政府在这三项上的开支约占了联邦政府总支出的61％。
2、中国政府对国内经济的控制力是任何一个现代大国都无法相提并论的。在全球经济一体化的今天，中国虽然不可避免地会受到外部冲击。但在人民币没有自由汇兑，和中国政府“坐庄”中国股市和中国房地产的前提下（从另外一个角度解释陈教授的话，可以认为中国政府控制了中国财富这个超级大盘股75％的筹码），中国的股市和楼市使绝对不可能出现《伟大的博弈》中所描述的华尔街式崩裂的。在1929年大崩盘前，与欧洲相比，美国在资本市场发展过程中波幅更大的原因是美国的联邦政府对经济的控制力更弱。同理，千万不要小看我们伟大的政府。中国政府今天的实力让我想起了一个新加坡教授曾经开玩笑的话：“新加坡政府可以让它的GDP按照它希望的任何比率增长”，这是一个笑话，但从政府对经济的控制和影响力看，新加坡是最接近与中国的一个国家了。
3、在通货膨胀的大背景下，没有财产性收入的完全依赖劳动性收入的民众将面临进一步的压力，贫富差距进一步拉大。
4、中国的政治和经济改革进入了一个关键的时间点。能否让更多的个体分享到财产性增值的收益是内需能否全面启动的关键。
真为生于这么一个伟大的国家，生于这么一个伟大的时代而骄傲。
陈志武：对改革路径的再思考
——陈志武教授访谈
2008年2月16日《经济观察报》
经济观察报：最近各界讨论最多的有几个话题，一个就是围绕新《劳动合同法》的一些争议，另一个话题就是中国经济正在出现新的国有化——国进民退，还有一个话题就是在宏观调控中，很多政府机构的行为又退回到强制性的行政手段，包括对一些竞争性产业的价格上涨进行直接控制。请您结合这段时间你的调查和了解，谈谈您对这些问题的看法。
陈志武：改革开放30年，到今天经济成就很大，这是世人所见、所公认的，中国人的勤劳终于有了成效。但是，我们也看到许多问题，特别是因为政治改革、体制改革滞后，各种问题开始表现出来，社会矛盾也有恶化的趋势。也因为过去只顾经济发展而忽视体制改革、忽视对过去30年经济成功背后的真正原因的研究认识，在今天的具体政策制定上，极容易做一些搬石头砸自己脚的事情，比如，重新国进民退，重回强制性行政干预，以各类名义大肆征税，强化政府作为投资者和消费者的角色，推出备受争议的新《劳动合同法》。表面看起来这些现象互不相关，但却都是中国式渐进改革的必然结果，如果再继续下去，可能到哪一天经济倒退了还不一定知道是怎么回事。
实际上，从改革开放30年的成就和问题中，我们更能理解几年前杨小凯跟林毅夫关于“后发优势”和“后发劣势”的争论。“后发优势”指的是后发展的国家可以从先发达国家那里很快模仿到技术、不用重复先发达国家走过的弯路，这即为优势。而杨小凯的“后发劣势”论指的是，正因为后发展国家可以轻便地模仿，一下就能快速搞经济，所以，后发国家会缺乏动力去改革自己的制度。正由于来得太轻松、能以技术替代制度变革，就没动力在根本性制度上做有利于长久发展的变革，结果牺牲了长久繁荣的机会，后发便利反成了“劣势”。
几年前，人们更多看到的是中国经济的快速增长，所以，那时不少人认同林毅夫的“后发优势”论。但是，现在，我们的确正在经历杨小凯讲的“后发劣势”。我真希望更多人能认识到这一点，并在中国尽早完成那些必要的宪政民主制度改革，以纠正“后发劣势”。
重新思考中国“奇迹。
经济观察报：那么在您看来，中国过去30年经济改革成功的主要原因是什么？
陈志武：过去30年的经济成功，是中国通过“改革”（市场化、私有化）和“开放”充分利用了后发的“优势”部分所致。我要强调，仅仅“改革”和“开放”是难以造成这些成就的，因为晚清、民国时期是私有市场经济（所以，那时不需要做市场化、私有化“改革”），而且也是“开放”（尽管晚清是被迫“开放”），可是那时的“改革开放”没有产生这种经济成功。另外，单凭中国人的勤劳不足以产生这种经济成就，因为不只是今天的中国人才勤劳，晚清、民国时期的中国人也照样勤劳，所以，勤劳是必要的、是起点，可是，单靠勤劳创造不出奇迹。如果说今天的成功是因为“人多力量大”使中国成为世界工厂，这也站不住脚，原因是1830年时中国人口占世界的五分之二，而今天只占五分之一。那么，过去30年的经济成就是否真的是现代经济学无法解释的“奇迹”呢？
客观讲，中国经济成就至少包括两个主因：已成熟的工业技术和有利于自由贸易的世界秩序。这种发展条件或说机遇来自于世界，具体讲来自西方，而非源自中国。“改革开放”的贡献在于让中国加入了起源于中国之外的世界潮流，让中国搭上了全球化的便车。后发之所以有“优势”也在于这种“便车”已经存在。如何理解这点呢？
首先，我们看到，根据英国著名经济史学家安德森"麦迪逊的估算，从公元元年到1880年左右，世界人均GDP花了1880年时间才增加了一倍。然而，从1880年到2000年，这短短120年里，全球人均GDP就增加了近5倍。也就是说，过去120年所完成的人均收入增幅，是1880年之前近两千年人类所完成的增幅的5倍。这种发展发生在中国之外，在中国积极加入全球化之前，世界潮流也想把中国卷入，但中国要么拒绝、要么不情愿地介入。
从19世纪到20世纪，为什么会有这么大的发展？到1880年，工业革命已经过一个多世纪的发展，全面进入新的高潮，特别是从那以后，电气技术、汽车技术、飞机技术、电话技术相继出现，1940年代后又出现电脑和互联网，生产技术方面也出现了许多根本性突破。工业制造技术越来越成熟，使其跨国界移植不成问题，而交通运输和通信技术的发展使这种跨国移植又变得可行。这些发展从根本上使世界人均GDP自1880年后发生飞速增长。这是中国在1978年一“改革开放”即能快速发展的重要前提，没有这种工业革命背景就不会有中国的成就。
经济观察报：讲到这种前提对中国过去30年发展的贡献，您能否举几个例子？
陈志武：例子太多了，简单说，中国GDP的80%以上都来自现代工业和服务业。比如，中石油一家公司去年的利润就将近2000亿元人民币，营业额超过8000亿，对中国GDP贡献一万亿以上（包括间接贡献）。仔细想一想，中石油给中国GDP的贡献是源自哪里？这一万亿的产出，在100年以前是不可能有的。换句话说，100年前的晚清政府，不管它有多能干，也不可能出现中石油这样的大企业。据我了解，地下钻油技术最早在1859年的美国宾夕法尼亚州发明，而石油行业真正有规模地发展还是1900年后的事，在那之前谈不上有什么石油行业。
原因主要有几个。第一，汽车业是1900年之后才开始，到了1910、1920年代在美国才有比较快速的发展。如果没有汽车行业，没有这么多的私人汽车，如果没有1930年代在美国建设的高速公路网络，汽车的普及就不可能。没有汽车的普及，没有很多私家车的话，对石油的需求就不可能大。汽车的普及是石油业的前提。第二，飞机是另一个对石油业的推动力量，但虽然莱特兄弟第一次试飞成功是在1903年，航空运输的真正兴起是二战以后的事。
从这个意义上说，即使晚清、民国中国再能干，也不可能出现像中石油这样的大企业。而相比之下，到1978年中国“改革开放”的时候，石油行业在全球已经很大，汽车烧油的程度、海运、空运的规模，都已非常高。到那时为止，全球汽车业的规模、空运业和石油业规模的发展，客观上讲，跟中国没有太多关系。1978年以后，中国很快就出现了中石油、中石化以及中海油这些大能源企业，现在这三家企业加在一起对中国GDP的贡献占10%左右。电力行业等等也是19世纪后发展起来的。
经济观察报：中国经济增长得益于世界发展的大潮流，这一点不会有争议。但，对于中国人均GDP从1978到1998年短短20年间就翻了两倍，人们觉得这是“奇迹”，是中国历史和世界历史上所没有的。
陈志武：这当然是很大的成就，值得我们所有中国人庆祝。但是，我们也必须看到其背景。从1880年到1978年，世界人均GDP翻了三倍多，而在此期间中国的人均GDP只翻了一倍，等于是中国把工业革命带来的发展机会留给了1978年以后。实际上，从1950年到现在，全球人均GDP翻了两倍，而中国人均GDP从1978年到现在也翻了两倍多。也就是说，全世界人均GDP花了50年才完成的增长，中国只花了30年，中国的速度不是更快吗？表面上，确实是这样。可是，50年前国际秩序和工业技术的发达程度，跟30年以前中国要“改革开放”时的情况，是没办法比的。
比如，个人电脑和微软这类软件企业都是在1970年代末、1980年代初才出现，互联网在1980年代以后出现。这些新技术使生产能力、生产效率提高很多，只要后发国家愿意模仿，越是后加入发展的国家，其追赶的速度可以越快。此外，在过去30年，不仅通讯技术和运输技术使各国的市场范围在全球扩张，而且从美国的里根、英国的撒切尔夫人，到苏联的戈尔巴乔夫，到中国的邓小平，那么多国家都同时进行私有化改革、自由贸易改革，使市场的全球化发生突破性变化，这些当然加快了中国的追赶速度，肯定比50年前选择发展的日本等亚洲国家能更快赶上。
不要说中国，就连美国的UPS（联邦快递）公司也一样，UPS是美国最老的从事快递的物流公司，单单从这家快递物流公司的变迁就能看得出来过去30年发展机会的变迁。1909年UPS在西雅图成立，二战之前虽然有一些发展，但规模不大，可是去年这个公司的销售额是492亿美元，到这个水平的增长主要发生在过去30年。如果没有这期间的全球化和各国私有化改革，UPS的销售额不可能达到这种规模。
从UPS的情形我们也看到，第一，从技术发展角度讲，晚清时候的中国不可能出现过去30年这种经济增长，民国时期也不可能。第二，从国际秩序变迁角度看，情况也如此。1914年之前，全球贸易体系和世界秩序是以海军实力为基础，你没有海军势力，你就不能发展世际贸易。连当年的跨国公司也要有自己的海军。换句话说，晚清政府即使想把当时的中国变成世界工厂，也不可能，因为先要有自己强大的海军。但是，二战之后，新的全球秩序是以规则为主体，今天美国的跨国公司要有许多律师，而不需要养庞大的军队。这也就是为什么1978年邓小平说让中国改革开放，在中国没有强大海军的情况下，马上就可以开展国际贸易。之所以能这样，是因为维系全球贸易秩序和产权秩序靠的是规则，而不是靠炮舰武力。于是，即使没有强大海军，也不妨碍中国从事大规模对外贸易，让中国变为世界工厂。
在讨论过去30年经济增长的时候，往往只把注意力关注在中国的纵向发展上，看今天的中国跟过去比怎样，这样当然看到奇迹。但是，如果把中国过去30年的发展、过去150年的发展放在全世界的大框架做横向比较，并考虑到同期间的科学技术水平和国际秩序状况，我们会发现，过去30年的发展于其说是中国的奇迹，还不如说是世界带来的奇迹。如果靠模仿也能给中国带来奇迹，那恰恰说明西方过去500年发展的科学技术和所建立的世界秩序的厉害。
经济观察报：这就是所谓的后发优势了。
陈志武：是的，越是往后才加入全球贸易、资本全球化和现代科学技术行业的国家，在增长速度方面就越有优势。到目前，中国占世界人口五分之一，但对科技创新的贡献、对建立并维系世界秩序的贡献却很少，低于五分之一，但，这些并没妨碍中国利用别人建立的技术和世界秩序发展。所以，“后发优势”实在太强了，以至于变成了“劣势”！正因为模仿也能一夜暴富，使大家容易产生错觉，好像政治改革做不做、法治有没有、国有经济比重低不低、政府干预少不少、对权力有无实质性制衡，都不重要，因为反正经济能快速发展。甚至还推出所谓的“北京共识”。得出“北京共识”这一结论本身就足以说明“后发劣势”的严重性。
那些成熟的工业技术以及全球化给中国等后发国家带来的增长势头是这么强，是这么势不可挡，以至于在人们还不完全清楚为什么的情况下中国增长的奇迹就已发生了，以至于让“北京共识”者下结论说经济发展跟产权制度无关、跟体制改革无关、跟私有还是公有无关、跟民主无关。他们没有意识到，模仿对于一个处于初期的后发国家来说的确能管用，但如果要靠一国经济自身持续内生出增长的推动力，仅仅模仿是不够的。
国有经济要完全民营化
经济观察报：前些年大家还强调“国退民进”、“小政府大社会”理念，但现在似乎朝相反的方向走。这是不是“后发劣势”的表现？
陈志武：关于国家在经济中的定位、国有经济、国有企业的认识是“后发劣势”的具体表现之一，前些年大家对产权私有化、对国家退出经济的认识很到位，但是，正如刚才讲的，以模仿为主线的“后发优势”实在太强，特别是在2001年加入WTO之后，中国国有、私有的企业都在增长，于是，一些学者和官员开始感到资产由谁所有不重要了，国家相对于社会、相对于私人的界限在哪里也不重要了。我必须强调，如果只是靠模仿、靠出口制造来增长经济，国有企业或许也行，过去这些年的现实表现可能是如此。但是，中国的经济增长不能再依赖出口市场带动了，实际上今后的出口市场空间也不可能像以前那样无限地拓展了，必须靠内需、靠内生的增长动力。而国有制从本质上在抑制中国内需的增长。
以前关于国企是否应该民营化、私有化的讨论，只停留在国企和民企谁的资产回报率更高、谁的效率更高这些标准上，好像只要国企的效率跟民企一样高，就行。
但，那是一种非常狭窄的标准。比如，今天许多人抱怨中国经济增长这么快，但普通大众的收入和生活状况不见得有太多改变，他们没有足够地分享改革开放的成果。
为什么会是这样呢？大家喜欢把注意力放在分配制度上，说资本家拿的太多。但是，在今天的中国，最大的资本家是谁？是国家，具体讲，是国资委和财政部。在中国经济仍然以国有制为主体的情况下，增长的结果是，国家越来越富，而老百姓拿的是极少部分，这不仅抑制内需增长，而且扭曲产业结构。社会中的贫富差距的确在扩大，但国家与民间之间的贫富差距以远远更夸张的速度在扩大。
如何理解这点？以美国为例，过去十年里，美国家庭累计储蓄15000亿美元，这个数字不小。但是，如果我们看看美国土地、企业资产、房产等等，把所有资产的升值加在一起，那么，过去10年里，美国家庭累计资产升值总额为35万亿美元。把这两个数字放在一起来做比较，你发现，资产性财富增长跟劳动收入储蓄的比例差不多是22：1。由此，我们容易理解，为什么美国人把劳动收入基本都花掉，存下的钱很少，因为有了这么多的资产性财富增长以后，美国人不需要去储蓄。这也是为什么美国的消费内需这么高，可以为美国、中国、日本、韩国等的经济增长提供推动力。其中，非常关键的一点是美国所有的生产性资产是私有、土地也是私有，这些资产收入和增值都直接属于私人，通过资本化、金融化的发展使美国人可以把土地、生产性资产随时可以变现，随时能转换成消费或者再投资。私有制，使美国人的消费增长不仅跟劳动收入直接挂钩，更重要的是，也直接跟资产性收入、跟资产增值挂钩，在资产性财富和私人消费间的距离几乎是零。私有制是内需驱动型经济增长模式的基础。
相比之下，在土地公有、主要生产性资产也国有的制度安排下，中国的老百姓消费跟土地增值、跟资产性财富增值、跟资产性收入没有关系。如果中国的GDP按年均10%的快速增长的话，土地和资产的价值应该在以超过10%的速度在长，可是，这些增值对国内家庭的需求增长几乎没有影响，因为那些资产和土地都不是私人的，是个人所没法花或做再投资的。初步算，到去国有土地的总价值约为50万亿元。国有企业资产呢？国资委主任李荣融在2007年8月《求是》杂志上谈到，到2006年底，全国有11.9万家国有企业，平均每家资产为2.4亿元，所有国企资产加在一起值29万亿元。也就是说，国有土地加国有企业的总价值为79万亿元。按13亿人口算，人均国有资产财富6万元。假如这些资产价值每年照GDP的速度增长，一年会增7.8万亿元，这部分财富增值如果分到个人头上，那么每个中国人的年收入就多6千元，小孩、老年人等所有中国公民都算在内了。也就是说，假如每家有夫妻、老年父母以及独生小孩一个，每户五人，那么，这些财富增值算到家庭的层面，每家每年的收入就多了3万元！
资产性收入呢？即使不考虑土地收入、不考虑地方国有企业的收入，仅央企去年的利润就为9800亿元，分到13亿人头上，这又多了753元。每户5口人家每年又多了3765元！
但是，我们知道，这每家每年可以有的33765元的资产增值和收入是可以想象，但因为是国有而拿不到手，更是无法由私人花的。任何一个正常的中国人都不会说，“因为这些国有资产增值、国有土地增值了，所以按照全民所有的概念，我也有一份，所以今天我可以多花些钱，我今年可以多花些钱了”，没有一个正常的中国人会这么想。因为大家知道，在国有制之下，这些资产的升值、土地的升值，跟自己可以花的钱没有关系。这就是为什么只要国有制、公有制在中国经济中唱主角，经济增长所能带来的内需就远低于本来可以有的水平，未来的增长还必须依赖出口市场。私有制之下，资产增值和资产收入可以转变成新的内需增长，而在国有制之下，这链条就给卡住了。
经济观察报：国内比较流行的一种说法是，国有企业应该通过增加分红的方式，把国有企业掌握的资源减少，多少可以避免“第二次国有化”越来越强化的趋势。您是怎么看待这个说法的？
陈志武：这有一定的道理。因为把更多的钱从中石油、中石化、中移动这些企业转移到财政部，至少可以限制这些企业在许多相关、不相关行业里盲目扩张，去抢占本来属于民间的收入增长机会。但，这样做从根本上不解决问题，把国有企业的收入通过分红转移到财政部，财政部怎么花？用什么机制去监督它？这种分红并没有把任何一分钱分到中国公民的手里，对内需没有影响，是换汤不换药。财政部不是没钱花，去年的财政收入就涨了31%，到5.1万亿元，他们的钱太多，而老百姓的钱太少。所以，最好的办法是将公有土地和国有资产全部私有化，把这些财产权分回给中国公民，让他们不只从劳动收入中分享到改革开放的成果，而且能从资产增值和资产收入中分享到好处，这样才能纠正目前“国家越来越富、民众相对越穷”、内需增长不足的局面。
经济观察报：关于私有化的问题，我们感到不只是在认识上会有障碍，而且在这种改革的迫切性上目前会有相当困难。在经济快速增长的时候，要想决策层进行私有化改革，是否能行得通？
陈志武：这就得看政治家的远见和魄力了。的确，正由于我们谈到的“后发优势”，决策者会难以主动进行这种改革，但为了中国的长久持续发展，这种改革是十分必要、也是有远见的。实际上，现在的压力或说进行这种私有化的必要性很高。第一，由于美国次级按揭贷款问题可能使美国和全球经济出现滞涨或者萧条，这对高度依赖出口市场的中国经济会有较大的负面影响。为了保证国内的就业和收入增长，必须想法刺激内需的增长。就像1998年的住房市场化改革和住房按揭贷款的推出从根本上刺激中国经济增长，使中国从亚洲金融危机中顺利地走出来，这次，如果能将国有资产私有化分到老百姓个人，必将刺激中国经济的内需，也将进一步带动新的产业高潮。
第二，中国的产业结构也必须转型，重型制造业太重，服务业太轻。以前苏联为例，在国有计划经济下，苏联经济也曾经增长很快，只是它增长的是制造业和军工，而不是服务业。今天的中国还基本如此，当资产增值和资产收入的绝大头都属于国家的、由国有企业和政府机构去花费时，他们当然更喜欢看得见、摸得着的制造业和重化工业。相比之下，如果通过资产私有化把国有财产、土地还回给老百姓，资产增值后老百姓家庭的消费会跟着增加，他们的消费需求必然更能带动第三产业的发展。因此，国有经济支持的是一种产业结构，私有经济支持的是另一种产业结构。谁可以决定钱怎么花，最终会决定该经济的产业结构。
第三，国有经济份量越重，对法治建设的威胁就越大。换言之，为了法治发展，中国也应该私有化。如何理解这点呢？根据对几十个国家的情况做的研究，我发现，一个国家国有经济的比重越高，它的法治水平就越差。为什么会是这样？民营企业界的人对这一点可能有很强的感受，因为任何行业只要有国有企业介入，那个行业就别想有平等竞争，也别想有法治。道理很简单，国有企业后面的股东是国家，国家是唯一可以合法使用暴力、可以随意修改法律法规、可以根据其意愿解释法律和各种政策的机构。所以，有这样一个掌握绝对特权的股东在背后，国有企业只要进入任何行业，那个行业的民营企业、合资企业、外资企业就没法平等竞争了，一旦有法律纠纷，法官跟国企是一边的，同属国家机构，你说法官会平等对待国企和民企吗？更何况国资委还直接跟法院打招呼，要他们注意保护国有资产呢。
比如，几年前，中石油、中石化挤掉民营加油站的事就很典型，这两家国企通过国务院出台一些法规，要求在一平方公里范围内不能有超过多少家加油站，最后逼着民营加油站必须以一个象征性价格卖给中石油、中石化。别的行业也是这样，只要国企一出现，它们就可通过法律法规把民企挤垮。
最近了解到，在造船行业中，国家发改委规定十万马力以上的轮船发动机，必须经发改委的审批才可以造。表面看，要发改委批，那申请一下不就行了吗？但实际上，发改委这些年的做法是，把这种大型发动机的制造和造船机会基本只留给大型国企，不给民企。所以，国有企业的存在会从根本上破坏各行业的游戏规则，法治就只能是一种愿望，但不能成为现实，因为法治的第一原则是法律面前人人平等，而民企跟国企不可能平等。
经济观察报：那么，在具体操作上，如何将国有资产私有化呢？
陈志武：应该把国资委体系掌握的国有资产一部分划拨给社保基金，剩下的跟国土资源部掌握的一些国有土地一起放到一个或几个大基金，然后把基金份额分给全国老百姓，每个公民得到同样多的基金股份，并允许个人自由交易这些基金股份，就像现在的股票基金可以交易一样。
我知道很多人会说，俄罗斯和东欧国家当年不正是这样做的吗？这不是休克疗法吗？其实，这是一种误解。第一，当时的休克疗法更多指的是政治制度改革和法制改革在先、经济改革在后的改革路径，而不是私有化基金的做法。第二，当时的俄罗斯还没有基金行业、也没有股票市场的运作经验，更没有配套的证券法律和法院。相比之下，中国的基金行业、股市规模、证券法律与监管架构都已有多年的发展和经验，不存在操作上的真空，基金交易和证券监管已有较强的基础，社会大众也有多年的股票和基金交易经验，因此，今天在中国做私有化基金在操作上不会有问题。
财政民主、《劳动合同法》与后发劣势
经济观察报：当年建立国有经济主要是基于让人民共同富裕、基于福利国家的理想。那么，现在如果将国有资产都私有化，今后国家如何为社会提供生活保障、医疗卫生、教育等服务呢？
陈志武：这中间有很多误区，甚至是误导。首先，我要强调，1950年代将私有财产和私有土地进行全面国有化的时候，给老百姓有个这样的许诺：你把你的土地和财产都归公、给国家，这是你的付出，但你今后的工作、生活、医疗、养老、小孩教育都由国家包了。那是一种对称的交易。可是，过去30年的改革过程中，国家把老百姓的工作、住房、医疗、教育等责任丢回给了老百姓个人，国家基本不管了，但，在另一方面，国家却没有把当年国有化过来的私人财产和土地还给老百姓。这等于是说，搞了50年的国有经济，到最后，老百姓把财产丢掉了，给了国家，但自己的生活却还是要自己负责。
那么，在当前这些国有资产没有私有化、还掌握在国家手里的情况下，中国公民是否就真的得到很多政府福利呢？我们可看看政府在直接涉及老百姓的医疗卫生、社会保障和就业福利上的开支，据财政部长谢旭人先生的介绍，2007年在这三项上的总开支约6000亿元，相当于财政总开支的15%，为全年GDP的2.4%，分到13亿人身上，人均461元（相当于一个普通工人一年收入的3%）。而在没有国有经济的美国，去年在同样三项上的开支约为15000亿美元，相当于联邦政府总开支的61%，为美国GDP的11.5%，分到3亿美国人身上，人均5000美元（相当于一个普通美国人年收入的六分之一）。
不管按绝对数字算，还是按相对水平，美国政府回馈给老百姓的医疗与社会保障都远高于中国，尽管美国是十足的私有经济。按照国有化运动的初衷，国有制本应该带来更多的社会福利，我们本应该看到完全相反的情况。
许多人说，中国还处于初级发展阶段，所以没法跟美国以及其它市场经济国家比。——这说法站不住脚。美国去年的财政税收占GDP才18%，而中国5.1万亿元财政收入占GDP的20%。所以，即使不算国企收入和国有资产增值，仅财政税收，中国政府的相对收入就高于美国，没有理由在民生上的开支低于美国。如果说中国没有美国富所以财政开支会有不同的考虑，那么，中国不是更应该把财政开支放在民生上吗？不是没有钱，而是有没有对财政预算过程的实质监督问题，以至于政府钱多后更倾向于在形象工程、政府办公大楼上浪费，也当然为腐败提供了温床。
这又回到了“后发劣势”的问题。中国的立法机构——全国人大，地方各级立法机构，还有媒体和其他监督机制，对财政预算的监督和问责很少，只有每年十天的全国“两会”时候大家象征性地举举手，就把5万亿人民币的财政预算通过了。这些预算的逻辑到底是什么？是不是有些地方应该多花，有些方面要少花？是不是该把更多的钱从行政开支以及其他浪费性开支中转移到老百姓的福利上，提供更多的社会保障、医疗保障、教育投入？
由于开放的头些年增长来得太容易，所以，对政府权力的监督、对财政预算的监督没有实质性发展，使得国家财政的花法不明晰，弱势群体的利益在预算过程中无法得到体现。人们好像认为民主只是少数人的抽象诉求。实际上，民主的必要性并不抽象，是涉及到纳税人的钱、人民财产怎么花、怎么分的问题。
经济观察报：您上面提到的这些与《劳动合同法》有什么关系？
陈志武：国家财政税收5万亿，国家又垄断所有的土地权和拥有那么多生产性资产，可是，政府照样没有给老百姓提供起码的社会保障、医疗保障和教育支持。把民生责任推回给民间自己以后，普通大众的生活安全靠什么呢？这就引出来一些问题，“后发劣势”就表现出了了。本来，应该通过宪政改革强化国家对老百姓民生的责任，让国家不能只征税、只控制土地和资产而不对国民的社会保障负责，但这条路的难处较大，所以，就有了新《劳动合同法》这条更容易过的捷径。
这部法律的初衷是要保护劳动者的权益，这当然非常好。但是，其中是否有太多条款从本质上是把政府没有尽到的社会保障责任推到企业身上？比如，在跟一些参与起草《劳动合同法》的专家讨论中了解到，之所以规定任何人在一个雇用单位工作10年以上即为终身职员，是怕35岁或更年长的人如果被解雇就会再找不到工作，在没有社会保障和失业保障的情况下，可能会有太多的人到中年后没工作，从而变成社会负担。所以，他们就规定工作10年以上就不能再被解雇。还有，企业跟员工签约了两次以后，就不能再把他解雇，等等。《劳动合同法》也规定所有劳动关系都必须有劳动合同，否则，超过一年没合同的就自然认定雇员为终身雇员。
虽然立法的愿望是好的，但实际效果会适得其反。第一，受害最大的是有技能的工人、中产阶层和大学毕业生，因为农民工流动性很大，10年对他们太久，两次签约可能已经正好，而那些真正水平高、技能特殊的人才又不会在乎有没有铁饭碗，他们到哪里都有人要。对于那些有大学教育但没有什么特殊技能的人，可能在岗位工作时间快到10年前被解雇。第二，过去30年中国经济之所以能增长这么快，很重要的原因是中国巨大的便宜劳动力供给，让中国成为世界工厂，也因为劳动力市场通过改革变得越来越自由。而新的《劳动合同法》使劳动力市场的交易成本大大增加，从根本上改变中国在国际经济中的核心竞争优势，对中国经济会产生根本性的冲击。《劳动合同法》加快了全球制造业向其它国家转移。第三，很多用人单位在雇人方面会变得非常谨慎，能少雇人就少雇。所以，今后的整体就业水平会更难上升，特别是对大学毕业生的影响会很大。
有一点值得一说，那就是，并非没有劳动合同、没有劳动合同法，劳动者的权益就必然受到随便的侵犯。在美国，比如我所在的康州，一般的企业都没有劳动合同，雇用关系是随意的（employment at will），也就是说，雇主在任何时候想解雇谁，都行，也不需理由。这么听起来好像劳动者在随时被侵犯了，但实际的情况正相反，因为解雇人是件很严肃的事，虽然你可以随意解雇员工，但你还得考虑到如果你随便解雇人，其他的雇员是否会有安全感呢？他们见到你的行为是否会全部另找公司呢？这样一来，在我所看到、了解到的美国企业里，没有看到随意解雇人的，反而是想尽办法把人留住，美国劳动者的工作环境就是这样一步步改进的。不用担心如果没有劳动法的保护，劳动力市场就必然对劳动者不利了。反倒是限制性过度的劳动法会阻碍整体就业机会的增长，让更多人没有工作。
我之所以举这个例子，就是因为新《劳动合同法》的出台是“后发劣势”的一种具体表现。由于中国过去回避了实质性的宪政制度改革，到今天，虽然财政税收占GDP比重比美国的高，虽然中国有这么多国有资产和公有土地，但是，中国却照样没有到位的社会保障、失业福利、医疗保障、教育福利，到后来，就想通过《劳动合同法》把社会保障和生活安全的责任推到用人单位身上，往企业身上转嫁。没想到转嫁的结果是，把中国更多的就业机会往别的国家送。
我觉得，中国现在必须进行实质性宪政制度改革，为法治打基础，让政府承担应该的责任，而不是让“后发劣势”继续下去。同时，也应该将土地、将国有资产分回到私人手里，让中国老百姓除了工资收入外，也能享受到土地升值、资产升值的好处，带动内需的增长，使中国经济模式发生根本性转型，降低对出口的依赖度。只有这样，才能结束目前“国家太富、老百姓太穷”的局面。
中国政府规模有多大
2007年，国家财政税收增加了31%，达到5.1万亿元，占GDP的21%，相当于3.7亿城镇居民的可支配收入、12.3亿农民的纯收入。也就是说，政府一年花的钱等于3.7亿个城镇居民、12.3亿农民一年可以花的钱。政府要这么多的老百姓才能供养，当然很庞大。这里，我们不妨从几个不同角度来把握其“大小”。
跟历史比，跟美国比
相对帝制时期的政府规模如何？既然中国今日又逢盛世，我们不妨先以康乾盛世时期作为一个参照。乾隆中期的1766年，朝廷财政税收为4937万两银子。在1760年前后，荷兰东印度公司对当时的北京、广州老百姓的收入和消费做过细致调查，据其历史档案，那时一个普通北京人的年收入大约为24两银子(每月2两左右)。这样，4937万两银子相当于205万普通北京人的收入，即只要205万个北京人的收入就够供养盛世时期的乾隆政府，那当然是小政府。我们或可说当时中国其他地方居民的收入比北京低，所以，以北京人收入作为标准，降低了为供养乾隆政府所需要的人数。但是，那时的全国人均收入不一定比北京低多少，比如，1950年以前北京的人均收入属全国平均水平，最多是中等偏上，只有到实行了国有制计划经济之后，北京的相对人均收入才开始飙升，把全国其他地方甩在身后。退一步讲，即使乾隆时期全国城镇平均收入只有北京人的一半，那么，朝廷岁入也只是410万人的年收入，跟今天的3.7亿个城镇居民、12.3亿农民的可支配收入才能支持政府的开支，无法相提并论。
也许我们会说，今天任何国家的政府规模都不能跟过去的做直接比较，因为传统农业经济对政府的依赖度低，而现代经济的交易复杂性特别高，所以，离不开政府在安全和产权与契约保障方面的支持。没有政府保护产权、维护契约权益，就难以有现代经济。这当然有道理。按照这个思路推下去，美国应该是一个很好的参照系，因为美国的金融证券市场、知识产权市场以及其他现代产业在全球来说最发达，此外，它还扮演世界警察角色，所以它的政府职能应该不低于任何其他国家。在社会福利支持上，美国也不亚于西欧。
然而，2007年美国联邦政府的财政税收为2.4万亿美元，占GDP的18%，相当于8500万普通美国人一年的可支配收入。也就是说，为了支持美国政府的开支，需要8500万美国人的可支配收入，这当然远比中国政府的开支需要3.7亿城市居民的可支配收入低。中国有5.4亿城镇居民、8亿农民，加在一起，去年民间的可支配收入总共为10.7万亿元。也就是说，5.1万亿元的政府财政税收约等于民间可支配收入总额的一半。相比之下，美国民间的可支配收入总量为8.4万亿美元，2.4万亿美元的政府财政税收相当于民间可支配收入总量的四分之一。
由此可见，我们的政府规模相对远大于美国政府。
政府规模是如何变迁的？
过去30年里，中国的政府规模并非一开始就这么大。如果说“小政府、大社会”一直是改革的理想，那么，1978－1995年间确是如此走向。改革之初的1978年，国家财政税收相当于3.3亿城镇居民的可支配收入、8.5亿农民的纯收入。那时的政府也不小，这就是为什么要改革政府的原因之一，但那时的政府毕竟要负责城市人从摇篮到坟墓方方面面的生活开支，所以，政府当然大。
随着改革的进行，到1985年，财政税收相当于2.7亿城镇居民、5亿农民的纯收入(见图一、图二)。到1995年，财政税收相当于1.46亿城镇居民、3.9亿农民的纯收入。1.46亿城镇人口的可支配收入才能支持政府的开支，政府还是很大，可那是近30年里“最小”的政府了。
1993—1994年的分税制改革从根本上逆转了头17年的方向。那次改革把税权下放，从中央到省、到地方、到县和乡，每级只要求下一级在每项税种中往上交多少比例的税收，剩下的权限就留给下级政府。从表面看，税权下放而不是由中央统一掌权，是件好事，会给地方更多发展经济的激励。只不过，当时好心的改革设计者没想到或不愿意想到，在没有实质性权力制约的体系下，特别是在新加税种的权力不在立法机构而是在行政部门的国情下，把税权下放等于是为各级政府随意加税大开绿灯，国民没有正式途径对随意增加的税负表达意见。
经常有人说，在别国行得通的制度安排，一到中国就水土不服。之所以如此，是因为在中国没有对征税权的根本性约束。所以，水土不服的根源在于有没有对权力的制约上。
1995年后财政税收逐年回升，到2004年，财政税收相当于2.8亿城镇居民的可支配收入、9亿农民的纯收入。随后的三年更是加速征税，到2007年，政府的财政税收已经远远超改革开放初1978年时的规模，达到历史“最大”规模。
我们也可以把政府、城镇居民、农民看成中国的三大群体。那么，在改革开放的成果中，哪个群体受益最多呢？自1995年到2007年的12年里，政府财政税收年均增长16%(去掉通货膨胀率后)，城镇居民可支配收入年均增长8%，农民的纯收入年均增长6.2%。这期间，GDP的年均增长速度为10.2%。图三给出三个群体的累计收入增长情况。
因此，只有政府的收入以远高于GDP的速度在增长，城镇居民的收入增长速度次之，农民的收入增长最慢，速度远低于GDP的增速。从1995到2007年，去掉通胀成分后，政府财政收入增加5.7倍，城镇居民人均可支配收入增加1.6倍，农民人均纯收入仅增长1.2倍。
财政税收之外
不过，上面的计算只反映了政府总收入的一部分，还有预算外的政府收入、资产增值和资产性收入并不在其内。也就是说，财政税收只是政府最“看得见”的收入部分。实际上，随着中国经济这些年的高速发展，政府作为中国最大的资产所有者，其拥有的国有企业资产、公有土地以及矿产资源的增值比财政税收更大、增长速度更快。
到2006年，国有土地的总价值大约为50万亿元。国资委主任李荣融在2007年8月《求是》杂志上谈到，到2006年底，全国有11.9万家国有企业，平均每家资产为2.4亿元，所有国企资产加在一起值29万亿元。也就是说，2006年底，国有土地加国有企业的总价值为79万亿元。去年，中国GDP增长11.4%，假设土地和国有资产以同样于GDP的增速升值(资产升值速度一般高于GDP)，这意味国有资产去年增值9万亿，比财政税收的5.1万亿多80%。
2007年，国有企业的总利润为1.6万亿元。因此，去年国家资产和土地所有者的“可支配收入”共有10.6万亿元。
把国家的资产性可支配收入和财政税收的5.1万亿加在一起，去年政府可以支配的总收入是15.7万亿元，这等于11.4亿城镇居民的可支配收入、37.9亿农民的纯收入。
中美民间财富结构对比
当然中国家庭也持有财富，包括房地产、企业股权、金融证券、银行储蓄等等，只不过主要是城镇居民有这些，农民没有土地、也没有太多储蓄，他们的财富很少。据发改委估算，到2005年底，全国城镇居民的总资产价值为20.6万亿。如果过去两年均按略高于2005年GDP的速度增值，也即按每年15%增值，那么，到去年底，全国居民资产为27.6万亿元，不到价值为88万亿的国有资产与国有土地的三分之一。
中国民间资产加国有资产共115.6万亿元，相当于GDP的4.7倍。
相比之下，美国政府基本没有生产性资产，也只有少量的土地。至2007年底，美国私人家庭资产的总值为73万亿美元，相当于GDP的5.4倍，比中国的总资产与GDP比值略高一些。其原因是美国资产的金融化程度全球最高，资产流动性越大，其资本价值就越高。但两国的总资产与GDP之比，大致相当。
可是，在两国，财富在民间和政府之间的分享结构截然不同。在中国，多于76%的资产由政府拥有，民间只有不到四分之一的资产。而在美国，其资产基本都在民间个人和家庭手中。这两种不同的财富持有结构会带来什么差别呢？
其差别表现在很多方面，包括经济增长模式、产业结构、法治发展上，等等。这里，让我们集中看看，这种结构对国家和民间在财富赛跑上有什么影响。
美国家庭资产的73万亿美元中，有近35万亿来自过去十年的资产增值，而从劳动等可支配收入中累计储蓄的才1.5万亿美元。所以，美国人的财富增长基本靠资产升值，而由劳动等所得的非资产性可支配收入(去年为8.4万亿美元)基本全部花掉，这既是为什么美国的储蓄率现在为-1%，也是为什么美国的内需这么强盛。好在美国的资产基本都是私人所有，所以，美国人能够只靠资产升值来使自己的财富水平上升。
中国的115.6万亿元资产财富中，只有27.6万亿是民间私人的，剩下的88万亿属国家所有。如果2008年中国GDP和资产价值都上升10%，那么，老百姓从资产升值中得到2.76万亿元，而政府能得到8.8万亿元。政府从经济增长所带来的资产财富升值中得到的份额，是民间的三倍。
这就是为什么在中国资产升值难以带来消费的财富效应、资产升值带动不了太多的内需增长的原因。
国家的钱花到哪里了？
按照上面谈到的，去年政府财政税收5.1万亿，国有资产与土地升值至少9万亿，国有企业的总利润为1.6万亿元，政府总共有15.7万亿的收入可以花，这些钱花在哪里了？如果政府把钱花在民生上，那不是从相当程度上代替了老百姓花吗？在效果上，由老百姓自己花这些钱和由政府代替老百姓花，这两种安排会有大的区别吗？按照许多主张政府要推出各种名目税收的人的说法，通过税收和国有资产，政府能够实现“第二次再分配”，以降低收入差距。但是，实际真的如此吗？
据财政部长谢旭人介绍，2007年政府在直接涉及老百姓的医疗卫生、社会保障和就业福利上的开支，总共约6000亿元，相当于财政总开支的15%，为全年GDP的2.4%，分到13亿人身上，人均461元(相当于城镇居民人均可支配收入的3%)。而在没有国有经济的美国，去年在同样三项上的开支约为15000亿美元，相当于联邦政府总开支的61%，为美国GDP的11.5%，分到3亿美国人身上，人均5000美元(相当于美国人均可支配收入的18%)。
许多人说，中国还处于发展中阶段，所以没法跟美国以及其他市场经济国家比。这种说法站不住脚。美国去年的财政税收仅占GDP的18%，而中国5.1万亿元财政收入占GDP的20%。所以，即使不算国企收入和国有资产增值，仅财政税收，中国政府的相对收入就高于美国，没有理由在民生上的开支比例低于美国。中国政府不是没有钱花，而是没有对财政预算过程的实质监督，以至于政府钱多后更倾向于在形象工程、政府办公大楼上浪费，在高资源消耗、高环境污染又不创造就业的工业项目上投资，也当然为腐败提供了温床。
正因为中国太多的收入和资产财富掌握在政府手中，而不是将更多收入、更多资产由私人去消费、去投资，使跟民生贴近的服务业难以发展。在这种情况下，第三产业发展所需要的投资和消费需求从哪里来？
既然美国政府为了刺激经济从次级按揭贷款危机中走出来，而给每家老百姓寄支票直接退税，把钱退给纳税人自己去花，那么，我们为什么不能把一些税收、国企利润、国有资产增值退回给中国家庭呢？比如，也给他们寄去汇票。国民们也该直接分享一点国企的红利了。当然，最好是把许多国有企业资产民营化、把土地还给农民，因为这些本来就是国民自己的。
在中国115.6万亿的资产财富中，只有27.6万亿是民间私人的，剩下的88万亿属于国家所有（其中大约2/3为土地资产，其余1/3为国有企业价值）。在私人最重要的两类收入财产性收入和劳动性收入中，初部分已经崛起的城市中产阶级外，中国人的财产性增殖收入少得可怜。在人民币升值和资本市场的大力发展中，中国政府的资产性财富被充分的显化和增强。
与之相对比，美国政府基本没有生产性资产，美国的私人财富为73万亿美元。根据陈教授的研究，过去10年美国家庭的资产性财务增长与劳动收入储蓄的比例为22：1。这是美国人不需要储蓄，而大量负债消费的根本原因。
上述的对比分析给了我如下的分析和体会：
1、直接受益与政府消费的行业可能会面临较好的发展空间
其实内需消费是包括两个方面的，一个方面是个人的需求，另一个方面是政府的需求。在中国目前的政策环境下，政府消费的增长率可能会远远高于个人需求的增长率。
谈及政府消费，也许军工业是最典型的代表。
另外一个，我想中国政府对医疗改革的投入必将大大增强。按照陈教授的研究，中国政府花在医疗卫生、社会保障和就业福利上的比例仅仅为财政支出的15％，但是美国政府在这三项上的开支约占了联邦政府总支出的61％。
2、中国政府对国内经济的控制力是任何一个现代大国都无法相提并论的。在全球经济一体化的今天，中国虽然不可避免地会受到外部冲击。但在人民币没有自由汇兑，和中国政府“坐庄”中国股市和中国房地产的前提下（从另外一个角度解释陈教授的话，可以认为中国政府控制了中国财富这个超级大盘股75％的筹码），中国的股市和楼市使绝对不可能出现《伟大的博弈》中所描述的华尔街式崩裂的。在1929年大崩盘前，与欧洲相比，美国在资本市场发展过程中波幅更大的原因是美国的联邦政府对经济的控制力更弱。同理，千万不要小看我们伟大的政府。中国政府今天的实力让我想起了一个新加坡教授曾经开玩笑的话：“新加坡政府可以让它的GDP按照它希望的任何比率增长”，这是一个笑话，但从政府对经济的控制和影响力看，新加坡是最接近与中国的一个国家了。
3、在通货膨胀的大背景下，没有财产性收入的完全依赖劳动性收入的民众将面临进一步的压力，贫富差距进一步拉大。
4、中国的政治和经济改革进入了一个关键的时间点。能否让更多的个体分享到财产性增值的收益是内需能否全面启动的关键。
真为生于这么一个伟大的国家，生于这么一个伟大的时代而骄傲。
陈志武：对改革路径的再思考
——陈志武教授访谈
2008年2月16日《经济观察报》
经济观察报：最近各界讨论最多的有几个话题，一个就是围绕新《劳动合同法》的一些争议，另一个话题就是中国经济正在出现新的国有化——国进民退，还有一个话题就是在宏观调控中，很多政府机构的行为又退回到强制性的行政手段，包括对一些竞争性产业的价格上涨进行直接控制。请您结合这段时间你的调查和了解，谈谈您对这些问题的看法。
陈志武：改革开放30年，到今天经济成就很大，这是世人所见、所公认的，中国人的勤劳终于有了成效。但是，我们也看到许多问题，特别是因为政治改革、体制改革滞后，各种问题开始表现出来，社会矛盾也有恶化的趋势。也因为过去只顾经济发展而忽视体制改革、忽视对过去30年经济成功背后的真正原因的研究认识，在今天的具体政策制定上，极容易做一些搬石头砸自己脚的事情，比如，重新国进民退，重回强制性行政干预，以各类名义大肆征税，强化政府作为投资者和消费者的角色，推出备受争议的新《劳动合同法》。表面看起来这些现象互不相关，但却都是中国式渐进改革的必然结果，如果再继续下去，可能到哪一天经济倒退了还不一定知道是怎么回事。
实际上，从改革开放30年的成就和问题中，我们更能理解几年前杨小凯跟林毅夫关于“后发优势”和“后发劣势”的争论。“后发优势”指的是后发展的国家可以从先发达国家那里很快模仿到技术、不用重复先发达国家走过的弯路，这即为优势。而杨小凯的“后发劣势”论指的是，正因为后发展国家可以轻便地模仿，一下就能快速搞经济，所以，后发国家会缺乏动力去改革自己的制度。正由于来得太轻松、能以技术替代制度变革，就没动力在根本性制度上做有利于长久发展的变革，结果牺牲了长久繁荣的机会，后发便利反成了“劣势”。
几年前，人们更多看到的是中国经济的快速增长，所以，那时不少人认同林毅夫的“后发优势”论。但是，现在，我们的确正在经历杨小凯讲的“后发劣势”。我真希望更多人能认识到这一点，并在中国尽早完成那些必要的宪政民主制度改革，以纠正“后发劣势”。
重新思考中国“奇迹。
经济观察报：那么在您看来，中国过去30年经济改革成功的主要原因是什么？
陈志武：过去30年的经济成功，是中国通过“改革”（市场化、私有化）和“开放”充分利用了后发的“优势”部分所致。我要强调，仅仅“改革”和“开放”是难以造成这些成就的，因为晚清、民国时期是私有市场经济（所以，那时不需要做市场化、私有化“改革”），而且也是“开放”（尽管晚清是被迫“开放”），可是那时的“改革开放”没有产生这种经济成功。另外，单凭中国人的勤劳不足以产生这种经济成就，因为不只是今天的中国人才勤劳，晚清、民国时期的中国人也照样勤劳，所以，勤劳是必要的、是起点，可是，单靠勤劳创造不出奇迹。如果说今天的成功是因为“人多力量大”使中国成为世界工厂，这也站不住脚，原因是1830年时中国人口占世界的五分之二，而今天只占五分之一。那么，过去30年的经济成就是否真的是现代经济学无法解释的“奇迹”呢？
客观讲，中国经济成就至少包括两个主因：已成熟的工业技术和有利于自由贸易的世界秩序。这种发展条件或说机遇来自于世界，具体讲来自西方，而非源自中国。“改革开放”的贡献在于让中国加入了起源于中国之外的世界潮流，让中国搭上了全球化的便车。后发之所以有“优势”也在于这种“便车”已经存在。如何理解这点呢？
首先，我们看到，根据英国著名经济史学家安德森"麦迪逊的估算，从公元元年到1880年左右，世界人均GDP花了1880年时间才增加了一倍。然而，从1880年到2000年，这短短120年里，全球人均GDP就增加了近5倍。也就是说，过去120年所完成的人均收入增幅，是1880年之前近两千年人类所完成的增幅的5倍。这种发展发生在中国之外，在中国积极加入全球化之前，世界潮流也想把中国卷入，但中国要么拒绝、要么不情愿地介入。
从19世纪到20世纪，为什么会有这么大的发展？到1880年，工业革命已经过一个多世纪的发展，全面进入新的高潮，特别是从那以后，电气技术、汽车技术、飞机技术、电话技术相继出现，1940年代后又出现电脑和互联网，生产技术方面也出现了许多根本性突破。工业制造技术越来越成熟，使其跨国界移植不成问题，而交通运输和通信技术的发展使这种跨国移植又变得可行。这些发展从根本上使世界人均GDP自1880年后发生飞速增长。这是中国在1978年一“改革开放”即能快速发展的重要前提，没有这种工业革命背景就不会有中国的成就。
经济观察报：讲到这种前提对中国过去30年发展的贡献，您能否举几个例子？
陈志武：例子太多了，简单说，中国GDP的80%以上都来自现代工业和服务业。比如，中石油一家公司去年的利润就将近2000亿元人民币，营业额超过8000亿，对中国GDP贡献一万亿以上（包括间接贡献）。仔细想一想，中石油给中国GDP的贡献是源自哪里？这一万亿的产出，在100年以前是不可能有的。换句话说，100年前的晚清政府，不管它有多能干，也不可能出现中石油这样的大企业。据我了解，地下钻油技术最早在1859年的美国宾夕法尼亚州发明，而石油行业真正有规模地发展还是1900年后的事，在那之前谈不上有什么石油行业。
原因主要有几个。第一，汽车业是1900年之后才开始，到了1910、1920年代在美国才有比较快速的发展。如果没有汽车行业，没有这么多的私人汽车，如果没有1930年代在美国建设的高速公路网络，汽车的普及就不可能。没有汽车的普及，没有很多私家车的话，对石油的需求就不可能大。汽车的普及是石油业的前提。第二，飞机是另一个对石油业的推动力量，但虽然莱特兄弟第一次试飞成功是在1903年，航空运输的真正兴起是二战以后的事。
从这个意义上说，即使晚清、民国中国再能干，也不可能出现像中石油这样的大企业。而相比之下，到1978年中国“改革开放”的时候，石油行业在全球已经很大，汽车烧油的程度、海运、空运的规模，都已非常高。到那时为止，全球汽车业的规模、空运业和石油业规模的发展，客观上讲，跟中国没有太多关系。1978年以后，中国很快就出现了中石油、中石化以及中海油这些大能源企业，现在这三家企业加在一起对中国GDP的贡献占10%左右。电力行业等等也是19世纪后发展起来的。
经济观察报：中国经济增长得益于世界发展的大潮流，这一点不会有争议。但，对于中国人均GDP从1978到1998年短短20年间就翻了两倍，人们觉得这是“奇迹”，是中国历史和世界历史上所没有的。
陈志武：这当然是很大的成就，值得我们所有中国人庆祝。但是，我们也必须看到其背景。从1880年到1978年，世界人均GDP翻了三倍多，而在此期间中国的人均GDP只翻了一倍，等于是中国把工业革命带来的发展机会留给了1978年以后。实际上，从1950年到现在，全球人均GDP翻了两倍，而中国人均GDP从1978年到现在也翻了两倍多。也就是说，全世界人均GDP花了50年才完成的增长，中国只花了30年，中国的速度不是更快吗？表面上，确实是这样。可是，50年前国际秩序和工业技术的发达程度，跟30年以前中国要“改革开放”时的情况，是没办法比的。
比如，个人电脑和微软这类软件企业都是在1970年代末、1980年代初才出现，互联网在1980年代以后出现。这些新技术使生产能力、生产效率提高很多，只要后发国家愿意模仿，越是后加入发展的国家，其追赶的速度可以越快。此外，在过去30年，不仅通讯技术和运输技术使各国的市场范围在全球扩张，而且从美国的里根、英国的撒切尔夫人，到苏联的戈尔巴乔夫，到中国的邓小平，那么多国家都同时进行私有化改革、自由贸易改革，使市场的全球化发生突破性变化，这些当然加快了中国的追赶速度，肯定比50年前选择发展的日本等亚洲国家能更快赶上。
不要说中国，就连美国的UPS（联邦快递）公司也一样，UPS是美国最老的从事快递的物流公司，单单从这家快递物流公司的变迁就能看得出来过去30年发展机会的变迁。1909年UPS在西雅图成立，二战之前虽然有一些发展，但规模不大，可是去年这个公司的销售额是492亿美元，到这个水平的增长主要发生在过去30年。如果没有这期间的全球化和各国私有化改革，UPS的销售额不可能达到这种规模。
从UPS的情形我们也看到，第一，从技术发展角度讲，晚清时候的中国不可能出现过去30年这种经济增长，民国时期也不可能。第二，从国际秩序变迁角度看，情况也如此。1914年之前，全球贸易体系和世界秩序是以海军实力为基础，你没有海军势力，你就不能发展世际贸易。连当年的跨国公司也要有自己的海军。换句话说，晚清政府即使想把当时的中国变成世界工厂，也不可能，因为先要有自己强大的海军。但是，二战之后，新的全球秩序是以规则为主体，今天美国的跨国公司要有许多律师，而不需要养庞大的军队。这也就是为什么1978年邓小平说让中国改革开放，在中国没有强大海军的情况下，马上就可以开展国际贸易。之所以能这样，是因为维系全球贸易秩序和产权秩序靠的是规则，而不是靠炮舰武力。于是，即使没有强大海军，也不妨碍中国从事大规模对外贸易，让中国变为世界工厂。
在讨论过去30年经济增长的时候，往往只把注意力关注在中国的纵向发展上，看今天的中国跟过去比怎样，这样当然看到奇迹。但是，如果把中国过去30年的发展、过去150年的发展放在全世界的大框架做横向比较，并考虑到同期间的科学技术水平和国际秩序状况，我们会发现，过去30年的发展于其说是中国的奇迹，还不如说是世界带来的奇迹。如果靠模仿也能给中国带来奇迹，那恰恰说明西方过去500年发展的科学技术和所建立的世界秩序的厉害。
经济观察报：这就是所谓的后发优势了。
陈志武：是的，越是往后才加入全球贸易、资本全球化和现代科学技术行业的国家，在增长速度方面就越有优势。到目前，中国占世界人口五分之一，但对科技创新的贡献、对建立并维系世界秩序的贡献却很少，低于五分之一，但，这些并没妨碍中国利用别人建立的技术和世界秩序发展。所以，“后发优势”实在太强了，以至于变成了“劣势”！正因为模仿也能一夜暴富，使大家容易产生错觉，好像政治改革做不做、法治有没有、国有经济比重低不低、政府干预少不少、对权力有无实质性制衡，都不重要，因为反正经济能快速发展。甚至还推出所谓的“北京共识”。得出“北京共识”这一结论本身就足以说明“后发劣势”的严重性。
那些成熟的工业技术以及全球化给中国等后发国家带来的增长势头是这么强，是这么势不可挡，以至于在人们还不完全清楚为什么的情况下中国增长的奇迹就已发生了，以至于让“北京共识”者下结论说经济发展跟产权制度无关、跟体制改革无关、跟私有还是公有无关、跟民主无关。他们没有意识到，模仿对于一个处于初期的后发国家来说的确能管用，但如果要靠一国经济自身持续内生出增长的推动力，仅仅模仿是不够的。
国有经济要完全民营化
经济观察报：前些年大家还强调“国退民进”、“小政府大社会”理念，但现在似乎朝相反的方向走。这是不是“后发劣势”的表现？
陈志武：关于国家在经济中的定位、国有经济、国有企业的认识是“后发劣势”的具体表现之一，前些年大家对产权私有化、对国家退出经济的认识很到位，但是，正如刚才讲的，以模仿为主线的“后发优势”实在太强，特别是在2001年加入WTO之后，中国国有、私有的企业都在增长，于是，一些学者和官员开始感到资产由谁所有不重要了，国家相对于社会、相对于私人的界限在哪里也不重要了。我必须强调，如果只是靠模仿、靠出口制造来增长经济，国有企业或许也行，过去这些年的现实表现可能是如此。但是，中国的经济增长不能再依赖出口市场带动了，实际上今后的出口市场空间也不可能像以前那样无限地拓展了，必须靠内需、靠内生的增长动力。而国有制从本质上在抑制中国内需的增长。
以前关于国企是否应该民营化、私有化的讨论，只停留在国企和民企谁的资产回报率更高、谁的效率更高这些标准上，好像只要国企的效率跟民企一样高，就行。
但，那是一种非常狭窄的标准。比如，今天许多人抱怨中国经济增长这么快，但普通大众的收入和生活状况不见得有太多改变，他们没有足够地分享改革开放的成果。
为什么会是这样呢？大家喜欢把注意力放在分配制度上，说资本家拿的太多。但是，在今天的中国，最大的资本家是谁？是国家，具体讲，是国资委和财政部。在中国经济仍然以国有制为主体的情况下，增长的结果是，国家越来越富，而老百姓拿的是极少部分，这不仅抑制内需增长，而且扭曲产业结构。社会中的贫富差距的确在扩大，但国家与民间之间的贫富差距以远远更夸张的速度在扩大。
如何理解这点？以美国为例，过去十年里，美国家庭累计储蓄15000亿美元，这个数字不小。但是，如果我们看看美国土地、企业资产、房产等等，把所有资产的升值加在一起，那么，过去10年里，美国家庭累计资产升值总额为35万亿美元。把这两个数字放在一起来做比较，你发现，资产性财富增长跟劳动收入储蓄的比例差不多是22：1。由此，我们容易理解，为什么美国人把劳动收入基本都花掉，存下的钱很少，因为有了这么多的资产性财富增长以后，美国人不需要去储蓄。这也是为什么美国的消费内需这么高，可以为美国、中国、日本、韩国等的经济增长提供推动力。其中，非常关键的一点是美国所有的生产性资产是私有、土地也是私有，这些资产收入和增值都直接属于私人，通过资本化、金融化的发展使美国人可以把土地、生产性资产随时可以变现，随时能转换成消费或者再投资。私有制，使美国人的消费增长不仅跟劳动收入直接挂钩，更重要的是，也直接跟资产性收入、跟资产增值挂钩，在资产性财富和私人消费间的距离几乎是零。私有制是内需驱动型经济增长模式的基础。
相比之下，在土地公有、主要生产性资产也国有的制度安排下，中国的老百姓消费跟土地增值、跟资产性财富增值、跟资产性收入没有关系。如果中国的GDP按年均10%的快速增长的话，土地和资产的价值应该在以超过10%的速度在长，可是，这些增值对国内家庭的需求增长几乎没有影响，因为那些资产和土地都不是私人的，是个人所没法花或做再投资的。初步算，到去国有土地的总价值约为50万亿元。国有企业资产呢？国资委主任李荣融在2007年8月《求是》杂志上谈到，到2006年底，全国有11.9万家国有企业，平均每家资产为2.4亿元，所有国企资产加在一起值29万亿元。也就是说，国有土地加国有企业的总价值为79万亿元。按13亿人口算，人均国有资产财富6万元。假如这些资产价值每年照GDP的速度增长，一年会增7.8万亿元，这部分财富增值如果分到个人头上，那么每个中国人的年收入就多6千元，小孩、老年人等所有中国公民都算在内了。也就是说，假如每家有夫妻、老年父母以及独生小孩一个，每户五人，那么，这些财富增值算到家庭的层面，每家每年的收入就多了3万元！
资产性收入呢？即使不考虑土地收入、不考虑地方国有企业的收入，仅央企去年的利润就为9800亿元，分到13亿人头上，这又多了753元。每户5口人家每年又多了3765元！
但是，我们知道，这每家每年可以有的33765元的资产增值和收入是可以想象，但因为是国有而拿不到手，更是无法由私人花的。任何一个正常的中国人都不会说，“因为这些国有资产增值、国有土地增值了，所以按照全民所有的概念，我也有一份，所以今天我可以多花些钱，我今年可以多花些钱了”，没有一个正常的中国人会这么想。因为大家知道，在国有制之下，这些资产的升值、土地的升值，跟自己可以花的钱没有关系。这就是为什么只要国有制、公有制在中国经济中唱主角，经济增长所能带来的内需就远低于本来可以有的水平，未来的增长还必须依赖出口市场。私有制之下，资产增值和资产收入可以转变成新的内需增长，而在国有制之下，这链条就给卡住了。
经济观察报：国内比较流行的一种说法是，国有企业应该通过增加分红的方式，把国有企业掌握的资源减少，多少可以避免“第二次国有化”越来越强化的趋势。您是怎么看待这个说法的？
陈志武：这有一定的道理。因为把更多的钱从中石油、中石化、中移动这些企业转移到财政部，至少可以限制这些企业在许多相关、不相关行业里盲目扩张，去抢占本来属于民间的收入增长机会。但，这样做从根本上不解决问题，把国有企业的收入通过分红转移到财政部，财政部怎么花？用什么机制去监督它？这种分红并没有把任何一分钱分到中国公民的手里，对内需没有影响，是换汤不换药。财政部不是没钱花，去年的财政收入就涨了31%，到5.1万亿元，他们的钱太多，而老百姓的钱太少。所以，最好的办法是将公有土地和国有资产全部私有化，把这些财产权分回给中国公民，让他们不只从劳动收入中分享到改革开放的成果，而且能从资产增值和资产收入中分享到好处，这样才能纠正目前“国家越来越富、民众相对越穷”、内需增长不足的局面。
经济观察报：关于私有化的问题，我们感到不只是在认识上会有障碍，而且在这种改革的迫切性上目前会有相当困难。在经济快速增长的时候，要想决策层进行私有化改革，是否能行得通？
陈志武：这就得看政治家的远见和魄力了。的确，正由于我们谈到的“后发优势”，决策者会难以主动进行这种改革，但为了中国的长久持续发展，这种改革是十分必要、也是有远见的。实际上，现在的压力或说进行这种私有化的必要性很高。第一，由于美国次级按揭贷款问题可能使美国和全球经济出现滞涨或者萧条，这对高度依赖出口市场的中国经济会有较大的负面影响。为了保证国内的就业和收入增长，必须想法刺激内需的增长。就像1998年的住房市场化改革和住房按揭贷款的推出从根本上刺激中国经济增长，使中国从亚洲金融危机中顺利地走出来，这次，如果能将国有资产私有化分到老百姓个人，必将刺激中国经济的内需，也将进一步带动新的产业高潮。
第二，中国的产业结构也必须转型，重型制造业太重，服务业太轻。以前苏联为例，在国有计划经济下，苏联经济也曾经增长很快，只是它增长的是制造业和军工，而不是服务业。今天的中国还基本如此，当资产增值和资产收入的绝大头都属于国家的、由国有企业和政府机构去花费时，他们当然更喜欢看得见、摸得着的制造业和重化工业。相比之下，如果通过资产私有化把国有财产、土地还回给老百姓，资产增值后老百姓家庭的消费会跟着增加，他们的消费需求必然更能带动第三产业的发展。因此，国有经济支持的是一种产业结构，私有经济支持的是另一种产业结构。谁可以决定钱怎么花，最终会决定该经济的产业结构。
第三，国有经济份量越重，对法治建设的威胁就越大。换言之，为了法治发展，中国也应该私有化。如何理解这点呢？根据对几十个国家的情况做的研究，我发现，一个国家国有经济的比重越高，它的法治水平就越差。为什么会是这样？民营企业界的人对这一点可能有很强的感受，因为任何行业只要有国有企业介入，那个行业就别想有平等竞争，也别想有法治。道理很简单，国有企业后面的股东是国家，国家是唯一可以合法使用暴力、可以随意修改法律法规、可以根据其意愿解释法律和各种政策的机构。所以，有这样一个掌握绝对特权的股东在背后，国有企业只要进入任何行业，那个行业的民营企业、合资企业、外资企业就没法平等竞争了，一旦有法律纠纷，法官跟国企是一边的，同属国家机构，你说法官会平等对待国企和民企吗？更何况国资委还直接跟法院打招呼，要他们注意保护国有资产呢。
比如，几年前，中石油、中石化挤掉民营加油站的事就很典型，这两家国企通过国务院出台一些法规，要求在一平方公里范围内不能有超过多少家加油站，最后逼着民营加油站必须以一个象征性价格卖给中石油、中石化。别的行业也是这样，只要国企一出现，它们就可通过法律法规把民企挤垮。
最近了解到，在造船行业中，国家发改委规定十万马力以上的轮船发动机，必须经发改委的审批才可以造。表面看，要发改委批，那申请一下不就行了吗？但实际上，发改委这些年的做法是，把这种大型发动机的制造和造船机会基本只留给大型国企，不给民企。所以，国有企业的存在会从根本上破坏各行业的游戏规则，法治就只能是一种愿望，但不能成为现实，因为法治的第一原则是法律面前人人平等，而民企跟国企不可能平等。
经济观察报：那么，在具体操作上，如何将国有资产私有化呢？
陈志武：应该把国资委体系掌握的国有资产一部分划拨给社保基金，剩下的跟国土资源部掌握的一些国有土地一起放到一个或几个大基金，然后把基金份额分给全国老百姓，每个公民得到同样多的基金股份，并允许个人自由交易这些基金股份，就像现在的股票基金可以交易一样。
我知道很多人会说，俄罗斯和东欧国家当年不正是这样做的吗？这不是休克疗法吗？其实，这是一种误解。第一，当时的休克疗法更多指的是政治制度改革和法制改革在先、经济改革在后的改革路径，而不是私有化基金的做法。第二，当时的俄罗斯还没有基金行业、也没有股票市场的运作经验，更没有配套的证券法律和法院。相比之下，中国的基金行业、股市规模、证券法律与监管架构都已有多年的发展和经验，不存在操作上的真空，基金交易和证券监管已有较强的基础，社会大众也有多年的股票和基金交易经验，因此，今天在中国做私有化基金在操作上不会有问题。
财政民主、《劳动合同法》与后发劣势
经济观察报：当年建立国有经济主要是基于让人民共同富裕、基于福利国家的理想。那么，现在如果将国有资产都私有化，今后国家如何为社会提供生活保障、医疗卫生、教育等服务呢？
陈志武：这中间有很多误区，甚至是误导。首先，我要强调，1950年代将私有财产和私有土地进行全面国有化的时候，给老百姓有个这样的许诺：你把你的土地和财产都归公、给国家，这是你的付出，但你今后的工作、生活、医疗、养老、小孩教育都由国家包了。那是一种对称的交易。可是，过去30年的改革过程中，国家把老百姓的工作、住房、医疗、教育等责任丢回给了老百姓个人，国家基本不管了，但，在另一方面，国家却没有把当年国有化过来的私人财产和土地还给老百姓。这等于是说，搞了50年的国有经济，到最后，老百姓把财产丢掉了，给了国家，但自己的生活却还是要自己负责。
那么，在当前这些国有资产没有私有化、还掌握在国家手里的情况下，中国公民是否就真的得到很多政府福利呢？我们可看看政府在直接涉及老百姓的医疗卫生、社会保障和就业福利上的开支，据财政部长谢旭人先生的介绍，2007年在这三项上的总开支约6000亿元，相当于财政总开支的15%，为全年GDP的2.4%，分到13亿人身上，人均461元（相当于一个普通工人一年收入的3%）。而在没有国有经济的美国，去年在同样三项上的开支约为15000亿美元，相当于联邦政府总开支的61%，为美国GDP的11.5%，分到3亿美国人身上，人均5000美元（相当于一个普通美国人年收入的六分之一）。
不管按绝对数字算，还是按相对水平，美国政府回馈给老百姓的医疗与社会保障都远高于中国，尽管美国是十足的私有经济。按照国有化运动的初衷，国有制本应该带来更多的社会福利，我们本应该看到完全相反的情况。
许多人说，中国还处于初级发展阶段，所以没法跟美国以及其它市场经济国家比。——这说法站不住脚。美国去年的财政税收占GDP才18%，而中国5.1万亿元财政收入占GDP的20%。所以，即使不算国企收入和国有资产增值，仅财政税收，中国政府的相对收入就高于美国，没有理由在民生上的开支低于美国。如果说中国没有美国富所以财政开支会有不同的考虑，那么，中国不是更应该把财政开支放在民生上吗？不是没有钱，而是有没有对财政预算过程的实质监督问题，以至于政府钱多后更倾向于在形象工程、政府办公大楼上浪费，也当然为腐败提供了温床。
这又回到了“后发劣势”的问题。中国的立法机构——全国人大，地方各级立法机构，还有媒体和其他监督机制，对财政预算的监督和问责很少，只有每年十天的全国“两会”时候大家象征性地举举手，就把5万亿人民币的财政预算通过了。这些预算的逻辑到底是什么？是不是有些地方应该多花，有些方面要少花？是不是该把更多的钱从行政开支以及其他浪费性开支中转移到老百姓的福利上，提供更多的社会保障、医疗保障、教育投入？
由于开放的头些年增长来得太容易，所以，对政府权力的监督、对财政预算的监督没有实质性发展，使得国家财政的花法不明晰，弱势群体的利益在预算过程中无法得到体现。人们好像认为民主只是少数人的抽象诉求。实际上，民主的必要性并不抽象，是涉及到纳税人的钱、人民财产怎么花、怎么分的问题。
经济观察报：您上面提到的这些与《劳动合同法》有什么关系？
陈志武：国家财政税收5万亿，国家又垄断所有的土地权和拥有那么多生产性资产，可是，政府照样没有给老百姓提供起码的社会保障、医疗保障和教育支持。把民生责任推回给民间自己以后，普通大众的生活安全靠什么呢？这就引出来一些问题，“后发劣势”就表现出了了。本来，应该通过宪政改革强化国家对老百姓民生的责任，让国家不能只征税、只控制土地和资产而不对国民的社会保障负责，但这条路的难处较大，所以，就有了新《劳动合同法》这条更容易过的捷径。
这部法律的初衷是要保护劳动者的权益，这当然非常好。但是，其中是否有太多条款从本质上是把政府没有尽到的社会保障责任推到企业身上？比如，在跟一些参与起草《劳动合同法》的专家讨论中了解到，之所以规定任何人在一个雇用单位工作10年以上即为终身职员，是怕35岁或更年长的人如果被解雇就会再找不到工作，在没有社会保障和失业保障的情况下，可能会有太多的人到中年后没工作，从而变成社会负担。所以，他们就规定工作10年以上就不能再被解雇。还有，企业跟员工签约了两次以后，就不能再把他解雇，等等。《劳动合同法》也规定所有劳动关系都必须有劳动合同，否则，超过一年没合同的就自然认定雇员为终身雇员。
虽然立法的愿望是好的，但实际效果会适得其反。第一，受害最大的是有技能的工人、中产阶层和大学毕业生，因为农民工流动性很大，10年对他们太久，两次签约可能已经正好，而那些真正水平高、技能特殊的人才又不会在乎有没有铁饭碗，他们到哪里都有人要。对于那些有大学教育但没有什么特殊技能的人，可能在岗位工作时间快到10年前被解雇。第二，过去30年中国经济之所以能增长这么快，很重要的原因是中国巨大的便宜劳动力供给，让中国成为世界工厂，也因为劳动力市场通过改革变得越来越自由。而新的《劳动合同法》使劳动力市场的交易成本大大增加，从根本上改变中国在国际经济中的核心竞争优势，对中国经济会产生根本性的冲击。《劳动合同法》加快了全球制造业向其它国家转移。第三，很多用人单位在雇人方面会变得非常谨慎，能少雇人就少雇。所以，今后的整体就业水平会更难上升，特别是对大学毕业生的影响会很大。
有一点值得一说，那就是，并非没有劳动合同、没有劳动合同法，劳动者的权益就必然受到随便的侵犯。在美国，比如我所在的康州，一般的企业都没有劳动合同，雇用关系是随意的（employment at will），也就是说，雇主在任何时候想解雇谁，都行，也不需理由。这么听起来好像劳动者在随时被侵犯了，但实际的情况正相反，因为解雇人是件很严肃的事，虽然你可以随意解雇员工，但你还得考虑到如果你随便解雇人，其他的雇员是否会有安全感呢？他们见到你的行为是否会全部另找公司呢？这样一来，在我所看到、了解到的美国企业里，没有看到随意解雇人的，反而是想尽办法把人留住，美国劳动者的工作环境就是这样一步步改进的。不用担心如果没有劳动法的保护，劳动力市场就必然对劳动者不利了。反倒是限制性过度的劳动法会阻碍整体就业机会的增长，让更多人没有工作。
我之所以举这个例子，就是因为新《劳动合同法》的出台是“后发劣势”的一种具体表现。由于中国过去回避了实质性的宪政制度改革，到今天，虽然财政税收占GDP比重比美国的高，虽然中国有这么多国有资产和公有土地，但是，中国却照样没有到位的社会保障、失业福利、医疗保障、教育福利，到后来，就想通过《劳动合同法》把社会保障和生活安全的责任推到用人单位身上，往企业身上转嫁。没想到转嫁的结果是，把中国更多的就业机会往别的国家送。
我觉得，中国现在必须进行实质性宪政制度改革，为法治打基础，让政府承担应该的责任，而不是让“后发劣势”继续下去。同时，也应该将土地、将国有资产分回到私人手里，让中国老百姓除了工资收入外，也能享受到土地升值、资产升值的好处，带动内需的增长，使中国经济模式发生根本性转型，降低对出口的依赖度。只有这样，才能结束目前“国家太富、老百姓太穷”的局面。
中国政府规模有多大
2007年，国家财政税收增加了31%，达到5.1万亿元，占GDP的21%，相当于3.7亿城镇居民的可支配收入、12.3亿农民的纯收入。也就是说，政府一年花的钱等于3.7亿个城镇居民、12.3亿农民一年可以花的钱。政府要这么多的老百姓才能供养，当然很庞大。这里，我们不妨从几个不同角度来把握其“大小”。
跟历史比，跟美国比
相对帝制时期的政府规模如何？既然中国今日又逢盛世，我们不妨先以康乾盛世时期作为一个参照。乾隆中期的1766年，朝廷财政税收为4937万两银子。在1760年前后，荷兰东印度公司对当时的北京、广州老百姓的收入和消费做过细致调查，据其历史档案，那时一个普通北京人的年收入大约为24两银子(每月2两左右)。这样，4937万两银子相当于205万普通北京人的收入，即只要205万个北京人的收入就够供养盛世时期的乾隆政府，那当然是小政府。我们或可说当时中国其他地方居民的收入比北京低，所以，以北京人收入作为标准，降低了为供养乾隆政府所需要的人数。但是，那时的全国人均收入不一定比北京低多少，比如，1950年以前北京的人均收入属全国平均水平，最多是中等偏上，只有到实行了国有制计划经济之后，北京的相对人均收入才开始飙升，把全国其他地方甩在身后。退一步讲，即使乾隆时期全国城镇平均收入只有北京人的一半，那么，朝廷岁入也只是410万人的年收入，跟今天的3.7亿个城镇居民、12.3亿农民的可支配收入才能支持政府的开支，无法相提并论。
也许我们会说，今天任何国家的政府规模都不能跟过去的做直接比较，因为传统农业经济对政府的依赖度低，而现代经济的交易复杂性特别高，所以，离不开政府在安全和产权与契约保障方面的支持。没有政府保护产权、维护契约权益，就难以有现代经济。这当然有道理。按照这个思路推下去，美国应该是一个很好的参照系，因为美国的金融证券市场、知识产权市场以及其他现代产业在全球来说最发达，此外，它还扮演世界警察角色，所以它的政府职能应该不低于任何其他国家。在社会福利支持上，美国也不亚于西欧。
然而，2007年美国联邦政府的财政税收为2.4万亿美元，占GDP的18%，相当于8500万普通美国人一年的可支配收入。也就是说，为了支持美国政府的开支，需要8500万美国人的可支配收入，这当然远比中国政府的开支需要3.7亿城市居民的可支配收入低。中国有5.4亿城镇居民、8亿农民，加在一起，去年民间的可支配收入总共为10.7万亿元。也就是说，5.1万亿元的政府财政税收约等于民间可支配收入总额的一半。相比之下，美国民间的可支配收入总量为8.4万亿美元，2.4万亿美元的政府财政税收相当于民间可支配收入总量的四分之一。
由此可见，我们的政府规模相对远大于美国政府。
政府规模是如何变迁的？
过去30年里，中国的政府规模并非一开始就这么大。如果说“小政府、大社会”一直是改革的理想，那么，1978－1995年间确是如此走向。改革之初的1978年，国家财政税收相当于3.3亿城镇居民的可支配收入、8.5亿农民的纯收入。那时的政府也不小，这就是为什么要改革政府的原因之一，但那时的政府毕竟要负责城市人从摇篮到坟墓方方面面的生活开支，所以，政府当然大。
随着改革的进行，到1985年，财政税收相当于2.7亿城镇居民、5亿农民的纯收入(见图一、图二)。到1995年，财政税收相当于1.46亿城镇居民、3.9亿农民的纯收入。1.46亿城镇人口的可支配收入才能支持政府的开支，政府还是很大，可那是近30年里“最小”的政府了。
1993—1994年的分税制改革从根本上逆转了头17年的方向。那次改革把税权下放，从中央到省、到地方、到县和乡，每级只要求下一级在每项税种中往上交多少比例的税收，剩下的权限就留给下级政府。从表面看，税权下放而不是由中央统一掌权，是件好事，会给地方更多发展经济的激励。只不过，当时好心的改革设计者没想到或不愿意想到，在没有实质性权力制约的体系下，特别是在新加税种的权力不在立法机构而是在行政部门的国情下，把税权下放等于是为各级政府随意加税大开绿灯，国民没有正式途径对随意增加的税负表达意见。
经常有人说，在别国行得通的制度安排，一到中国就水土不服。之所以如此，是因为在中国没有对征税权的根本性约束。所以，水土不服的根源在于有没有对权力的制约上。
1995年后财政税收逐年回升，到2004年，财政税收相当于2.8亿城镇居民的可支配收入、9亿农民的纯收入。随后的三年更是加速征税，到2007年，政府的财政税收已经远远超改革开放初1978年时的规模，达到历史“最大”规模。
我们也可以把政府、城镇居民、农民看成中国的三大群体。那么，在改革开放的成果中，哪个群体受益最多呢？自1995年到2007年的12年里，政府财政税收年均增长16%(去掉通货膨胀率后)，城镇居民可支配收入年均增长8%，农民的纯收入年均增长6.2%。这期间，GDP的年均增长速度为10.2%。图三给出三个群体的累计收入增长情况。
因此，只有政府的收入以远高于GDP的速度在增长，城镇居民的收入增长速度次之，农民的收入增长最慢，速度远低于GDP的增速。从1995到2007年，去掉通胀成分后，政府财政收入增加5.7倍，城镇居民人均可支配收入增加1.6倍，农民人均纯收入仅增长1.2倍。
财政税收之外
不过，上面的计算只反映了政府总收入的一部分，还有预算外的政府收入、资产增值和资产性收入并不在其内。也就是说，财政税收只是政府最“看得见”的收入部分。实际上，随着中国经济这些年的高速发展，政府作为中国最大的资产所有者，其拥有的国有企业资产、公有土地以及矿产资源的增值比财政税收更大、增长速度更快。
到2006年，国有土地的总价值大约为50万亿元。国资委主任李荣融在2007年8月《求是》杂志上谈到，到2006年底，全国有11.9万家国有企业，平均每家资产为2.4亿元，所有国企资产加在一起值29万亿元。也就是说，2006年底，国有土地加国有企业的总价值为79万亿元。去年，中国GDP增长11.4%，假设土地和国有资产以同样于GDP的增速升值(资产升值速度一般高于GDP)，这意味国有资产去年增值9万亿，比财政税收的5.1万亿多80%。
2007年，国有企业的总利润为1.6万亿元。因此，去年国家资产和土地所有者的“可支配收入”共有10.6万亿元。
把国家的资产性可支配收入和财政税收的5.1万亿加在一起，去年政府可以支配的总收入是15.7万亿元，这等于11.4亿城镇居民的可支配收入、37.9亿农民的纯收入。
中美民间财富结构对比
当然中国家庭也持有财富，包括房地产、企业股权、金融证券、银行储蓄等等，只不过主要是城镇居民有这些，农民没有土地、也没有太多储蓄，他们的财富很少。据发改委估算，到2005年底，全国城镇居民的总资产价值为20.6万亿。如果过去两年均按略高于2005年GDP的速度增值，也即按每年15%增值，那么，到去年底，全国居民资产为27.6万亿元，不到价值为88万亿的国有资产与国有土地的三分之一。
中国民间资产加国有资产共115.6万亿元，相当于GDP的4.7倍。
相比之下，美国政府基本没有生产性资产，也只有少量的土地。至2007年底，美国私人家庭资产的总值为73万亿美元，相当于GDP的5.4倍，比中国的总资产与GDP比值略高一些。其原因是美国资产的金融化程度全球最高，资产流动性越大，其资本价值就越高。但两国的总资产与GDP之比，大致相当。
可是，在两国，财富在民间和政府之间的分享结构截然不同。在中国，多于76%的资产由政府拥有，民间只有不到四分之一的资产。而在美国，其资产基本都在民间个人和家庭手中。这两种不同的财富持有结构会带来什么差别呢？
其差别表现在很多方面，包括经济增长模式、产业结构、法治发展上，等等。这里，让我们集中看看，这种结构对国家和民间在财富赛跑上有什么影响。
美国家庭资产的73万亿美元中，有近35万亿来自过去十年的资产增值，而从劳动等可支配收入中累计储蓄的才1.5万亿美元。所以，美国人的财富增长基本靠资产升值，而由劳动等所得的非资产性可支配收入(去年为8.4万亿美元)基本全部花掉，这既是为什么美国的储蓄率现在为-1%，也是为什么美国的内需这么强盛。好在美国的资产基本都是私人所有，所以，美国人能够只靠资产升值来使自己的财富水平上升。
中国的115.6万亿元资产财富中，只有27.6万亿是民间私人的，剩下的88万亿属国家所有。如果2008年中国GDP和资产价值都上升10%，那么，老百姓从资产升值中得到2.76万亿元，而政府能得到8.8万亿元。政府从经济增长所带来的资产财富升值中得到的份额，是民间的三倍。
这就是为什么在中国资产升值难以带来消费的财富效应、资产升值带动不了太多的内需增长的原因。
国家的钱花到哪里了？
按照上面谈到的，去年政府财政税收5.1万亿，国有资产与土地升值至少9万亿，国有企业的总利润为1.6万亿元，政府总共有15.7万亿的收入可以花，这些钱花在哪里了？如果政府把钱花在民生上，那不是从相当程度上代替了老百姓花吗？在效果上，由老百姓自己花这些钱和由政府代替老百姓花，这两种安排会有大的区别吗？按照许多主张政府要推出各种名目税收的人的说法，通过税收和国有资产，政府能够实现“第二次再分配”，以降低收入差距。但是，实际真的如此吗？
据财政部长谢旭人介绍，2007年政府在直接涉及老百姓的医疗卫生、社会保障和就业福利上的开支，总共约6000亿元，相当于财政总开支的15%，为全年GDP的2.4%，分到13亿人身上，人均461元(相当于城镇居民人均可支配收入的3%)。而在没有国有经济的美国，去年在同样三项上的开支约为15000亿美元，相当于联邦政府总开支的61%，为美国GDP的11.5%，分到3亿美国人身上，人均5000美元(相当于美国人均可支配收入的18%)。
许多人说，中国还处于发展中阶段，所以没法跟美国以及其他市场经济国家比。这种说法站不住脚。美国去年的财政税收仅占GDP的18%，而中国5.1万亿元财政收入占GDP的20%。所以，即使不算国企收入和国有资产增值，仅财政税收，中国政府的相对收入就高于美国，没有理由在民生上的开支比例低于美国。中国政府不是没有钱花，而是没有对财政预算过程的实质监督，以至于政府钱多后更倾向于在形象工程、政府办公大楼上浪费，在高资源消耗、高环境污染又不创造就业的工业项目上投资，也当然为腐败提供了温床。
正因为中国太多的收入和资产财富掌握在政府手中，而不是将更多收入、更多资产由私人去消费、去投资，使跟民生贴近的服务业难以发展。在这种情况下，第三产业发展所需要的投资和消费需求从哪里来？
既然美国政府为了刺激经济从次级按揭贷款危机中走出来，而给每家老百姓寄支票直接退税，把钱退给纳税人自己去花，那么，我们为什么不能把一些税收、国企利润、国有资产增值退回给中国家庭呢？比如，也给他们寄去汇票。国民们也该直接分享一点国企的红利了。当然，最好是把许多国有企业资产民营化、把土地还给农民，因为这些本来就是国民自己的。
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