Time

Monday, December 31, 2007

美卡債拖欠率遽增 專家發出警告

美國人遲付信用卡帳單的情況越來越普遍,過去這一年未按時付帳單(delinquency)和不履行還款義務(default)的比率增加到兩位數字,專家並警告未來情況將更嚴重。

美聯社(AP)分析了美國最大信用卡發卡公司的財務資料,發現拖欠還款超過90天的信用卡帳戶增加最多。專家說,許多屋主財務情況惡化,部分是次級房貸危機的副產品。史丹福大學訪問學者,也是信用危險專家的克里夫‧譚(Cliff Tan,譯音)說:「債務最終會滲透到其他領域,可能從房貸開始,滲透到信用卡,也可能反其道而行。」

AP審查了17家大信用卡信託基金,發現遲付信用卡帳單至少30天的帳戶金額,今年10月比去年同期增加26%,達173億元,占全部信用卡未還本息的4%以上。這些信用卡的發卡公司包括美國商業銀行、Capital One和零售商家庭站(Home Depot)、華爾市場(Wal-Mart)等。

根據各信託基金向證券管理委員會提出的報告,不履行還款義務的比率10月也上升18%,達9億6100萬元。不履行還款義務是指貸款公司基本上已放棄借款人會還款的希望,並沖銷虧損。

嚴重的拖欠還款也大幅上升,一些全國最大的貸款公司,包括Advanta、GE Money Bank和匯豐銀行(HSBC),都報告拖欠還款至少90天的帳戶金額,比去年同期增加50%以上。

AP分析了由信用卡信託基金控制的3億2500萬個個人信用卡帳戶,這些信託基金是由信用卡發卡公司設立的,旨在把信用卡債務出售給投資人,類似許多銀行把次級貸款加以包裝和出售,出售給投資人的信用卡債務,占聯準會認定美國人信用卡債務9200億元的45%。

即使最近變壞的貸款大增,信用卡業務仍是非常非常賺錢的,這主要是由於其利率最高可達36%,再加上延遲還款的罰款和其他罰款。但各信託基金21日提出報告,顯示遲付信用卡還款的趨勢延續到11月,11月拖欠還款和不履行還款義務的比率都比去年同期增加,許多也比10月增加。

許多經濟學家預測,拖欠還款和不履行還款義務在節日購物季過後,將進一步增加,Economy.com公司首席經濟學家和共同創辦人贊迪說,房貸問題是造成拖欠信用卡還款的原因之一,其他原因還包括中西部、南部和西部部分地區疲弱的工作市場,這些地區的房地產市場已受重創。此外,專家也表示,美國長期以來認為債務,即使是高利率的信用卡債務,都不是大問題,消費者無窮的欲望和花費,是美國的經濟基礎,但人們將承擔自己行為的後果,這是一個痛苦的過程

New STI

New STI (30 Stocks) - From 10 Jan 2008

CAPITALAND
CAPITAMALL TRUST
CITY DEVELOPMENTS
COSCO CORPORATION (S)
DBS GROUP HOLDINGS
FRASER AND NEAVE
GENTING INTERNATIONAL
HONG KONG LAND
JARDINE CYCLE & CARRIAGE
JARDINE STRATEGIC
KEPPEL CORPORATION
KEPPEL LAND
NEPTUNE ORIENT LINES
NOBLE GROUP
OLAM INTERNATIONAL
OVERSEA-CHINESE BANKING CORPORATION
SEMBCORP INDUSTRIES
SEMBCORP MARINE
SIA ENGINEERING
SINGAPORE AIRLINES
SINGAPORE EXCHANGE
SINGAPORE PRESS HOLDINGS
SINGAPORE TECHNOLOGIES ENGINEERING
SINGAPORE TELECOM
STARHUB
THAI BEVERAGE
UNITED OVERSEAS BANK
WILMAR INTERNATIONAL
YANGZIJIANG SHIPBUILDING HOLDINGS
YANLORD LAND GROUP

Investing tricks of the wealthy

RECENTLY, I asked a wealth manager whether an average investor can make more money by mimicking the investment strategies of the rich. He answered: not really. Later he explained that the rich invest differently because, well, they're different. They can take more risks because they have more money to lose. Furthermore, they can speculate and have a short-term view because losing money is not a problem for them.

Well, I do not totally agree with his opinion. For the past few years, I have been advising wealthy people on their financial well-being. As a financial adviser, my job is to help these rich clients search for financial services who meet their needs. Throughout my interaction with them, I have gained an insight into how they accumulate wealth.

I can tell that the rich don't necessarily have any special insights into which stocks or assets are going to soar. But what they do have is the confidence to apply a disciplined and systematic approach to managing their money. They have the habit of applying common sense to each investment opportunity facing them. Even though the interests of wealthy investors are not always necessarily aligned with those of the average investor, there are a number of principles and strategies employed by wealthy investors that do apply to virtually anyone who seeks to invest for the future.

It is a common fact that most financial textbooks teach us that in order to build wealth we need diversification, wealth preservation and strategic growth. To me, this not an accurate statement in itself because two of those strategies - diversification and preservation - don't help to build wealth. Perhaps the rich use these two strategies to maintain wealth.

After they have accumulated great wealth, they didn't use the strategies during the accumulation phase and they tend to preserve the wealth they have built. Yet average investors have not yet reached the ranks of the financially independent, so they are generally more concerned about investment growth and losses. The wealthy, as a general rule, do not have this concern. At the same time, they also learn how to avoid taxes legally so that they can keep their money working for them and learn how to pass their assets on to the future generations without the government taking a huge part of what they spent their lives building.

Another common perception is that the rich take more risk, therefore they accumulate wealth faster. However, the truth is that the majority of rich people do not build their fortunes by speculating on high-risk investments as is commonly believed. My experience tells me that the rich do not heavily rely on high-risk investment vehicles like hedge funds or venture capital funds but are moderate risk takers who put more than half of their money into listed securities and keep a large amount as cash. The reason for this is that they have so much money that even if they do not meet their goals for investment growth, it would not be bad news to them; however losing their financial independence would be devastating.

So how do the rich invest? Unlike the average investor, the rich think long term in most of their investment strategies. They believe that there is power in long-term thinking and many of them make it habit of doing so. Great investors like Warren Buffett - his successes in investment include Washington Post Co, where Berkshire invested US$11 million in 1973 and which investment was worth US$1.3 billion at the end of 2006. That is 33 years of holding power which demonstrates his investment philosophy - always invest for the long term. Hence, most rich do not engage in short-term speculation but have a long-term goal in mind.

However, the rich make use of risk by taking advantage of risk. They often build fortunes using volatile assets and investments but that does not mean they were engaging in risky behaviour. They understand the risk and embrace risk because they know it always brings an opportunity for growth; however, the average investor is fearful of risk. Nevertheless, taking risk for the rich does not mean taking a shot in the dark. The rich take calculated risk that means to gain knowledge first and to consider the consequences of failing before taking action. The rich overcome fear with knowledge as knowledge can cause fear to fade away.

The rich also demand value for their money. Otherwise, how do you think they got to be rich in the first place? Value to them is buying assets at a discount to its intrinsic value. So for them the right time to buy is when there is weakness in the market. They buy when others are despondently selling and sell when others are greedily buying. This requires the greatest fortitude but also has the greatest rewards. This bargain-hunting approach to buying value will enable them to buy quality assets at reasonable prices. So they buy when there is bad news and sell on good news. For instance, some of the wealthy invest because they understand that the weakness is only temporary, and the stock price had fully priced in negative news and it was time for them to hunt for bargains again.

If we look back at the Singapore stock market, there are many opportunities for investors to bargain hunt and buy on bad news, e.g. the Asian financial crisis in 1997/98, the Sept 11 terrorist attack and SARS. The rich take advantage of these negative events to buy assets, whether in real estate or stocks and that's where value can be found. However, the average investor will seek to sell and get out of a bear market fearing that the asset will fall in value.

To the rich, probably now is the best time to sell and get out of the market, where all assets prices have gone up in value. Over the past years, we have very good reports about our economic growth and all the good news are now factored into the stock price, so for the rich it's time to sell.

Another investing secret of the rich is that they approach investing like a business. They set up a business plan, establish annual targets, then analyse the results and they have reasonable expectation. At the end of the day what they want to achieve is increasing their net worth and not their income. The rich truly understand the meaning of working smart not working hard: to focus on growing your net worth is working smart but working for an income is working hard. As their net worth grows, they do not increase their spending, instead they increase their investment. By repeating this over the years, once their net worth is built to a certain level, they are free to do what they want. Hence, to increase your net worth you need patience, knowledge, and wisdom.

Often they are not willing to pay more for investment services simply because they find a particular adviser to be charming or knowledgeable. Nor do they chase after the hottest manager or the most publicised fund. Instead, they go shopping for the best combination of reasonable fees and consistently good performance. However, they will pay for advice from people who have specialised knowledge in a field they need to learn about. They don't believe in free advice as it can often be the most expensive advice.

As you can see, most investing secrets of the rich are nothing more than a combination of basic common sense and knowledge. The difference between the rich and the average investor is that they have the self-confidence to stick to the basics and to find out what they need to know. They don't get caught up in the theory of the week or the trend of the month. It's an approach that's easy to articulate but difficult to follow.

However, average investors can learn important lessons from the wealthy, specifically the need to manage both risk and their own investment expectations. The failure to match expectations to the risk an investor is willing to take can result in frequent switching among investments, or even worse. Now the good news for the average investor is that you can apply many of the same techniques to your own investments, no matter how big or small your portfolio is.

Sunday, December 30, 2007

Dividend Investing

One can be a value or growth oriented investor. Long term results favour value investing. Dividend growth investing combines the two approaches by looking for stocks that are undervalued but which have high and sustainable growth rates. This essay by John Dorfman is worth reading from this perspective.

•Growth of yield is the single best piece of information an investor can have since it implies:

–A company is financially strong enough to raise its dividend.
–There are sufficient earnings to support a dividend increase.
–Management has a clear commitment to grow the company.
–Management is confident enough about future cash flows to share current prosperity with share holders.

•Rising dividends impact a stock’s total return. All things being equal, when the dividend increases over a period of time, the stock price increases proportionately. Moreover, a rising dividend creates additional appreciation based on the appeal to investors of expected future dividend growth.

•A simple rule of thumb: CURRENT YIELD + DIVIDEND GROWTH = EXPECTED AVERAGE ANNUALIZED TOTAL RETURN

•Analysis starts with quantitative and financial screens. Evaluated are:

•Cash Flow •High projected growth of dividend
•Low payout ratios •High dividend yield
•Balance sheet strength •Consistent dividend growth history

Using high dividend yield as a screen for stocks

Readers of Show Me The Money 2 by Ms Teh hooi Ling would have came accross this article she published in the Business Times on 5 July 2003.

In that article, she explore using high dividend yield as a screen for stocks, measuring their performance against those that do not. It was found that your chances of picking a winner increases if you screen stocks that pays their shareholders well. Also a large proportion of the stock’s positve equity returns was due to the dividend component thater than the price appreciation component.

She listed down some companies that were providing above average yields. All stocks then was yielding at least 4.2% to 10.4% (thats my beloved ASJ btw). I Thought its interesting to see how they were doing this 3 years since she release that article.

I calculated the total dividend returns as well as the price appreciation. The results are listed below. Note that F&N and SPH subsequently had a split, so I couldn’t effectively calculate them.

One can gather a few things from the data.
--The dividend yield of all stocks were at least 5% per annum.
--Dividend returns have reduce the capital losses of many counters. However they still underperformed the market.
--Well covered (blue chip stocks) tend to perform better than those ulu ones.
--Average yield was 11% per annum.

All stocks still give out dividends during this period one way or another. Note that some counters such as ASJ and Transit did stop giving during some of the years.

Conclusion:
--Looking at high yields is not enough.
--Yield stocks which cannot expand its free cashflow, ROE consistently, Average
management will most likely be bad investment as well.

Dividends can be important drivers for your overall returns. But if you buy at the wrong price, your end result will not look good either.

Risk in picking dividend stocks

The strategy has the potential to outperform the market as a whole, but stock selection should not be made on the basis of dividend profile alone to optimise the risk and return available.

Decreasing the risk
Consideration should always be given to all available company information, such as the quality of the balance sheet, cash flows and growth prospects. Companies that pay higher dividend yields on a sustained basis tend to operate in mature established industries. This can make them less volatile and not as high risk as others, but it is still important to diversify geographically and across sectors to decrease the overall portfolio risk.

Investing through a fund has some noteable advantages over directly purchasing the same underlying assets. Firstly, by investing in a collective fund an individual can cost-effectively gain exposure to a broad selection of stocks.

Typically, a fund would have a minimum investment amount, but this investment would gain exposure to the performance of the whole portfolio within the fund.

Except for very large investments, it can be difficult to cost-effectively purchase the same diverse range of stocks directly.

Taxation of funds
The taxation treatment of funds is also a major factor in deciding whether it is suitable to invest in this way, and is particularly important in relation to investing in equities with a high dividend yield.

While different classes of investor are subject to differing tax regulations, and everybody’s individual situation is different, investing in a high yield equity fund would generally be considered more attractive from a tax perspective than direct investment.

Dividend income received by an individual is liable to income tax at that person’s marginal rate.

This can impact on the attractiveness of high yielding equities, particularly for those investors paying income tax at the higher rate as this is significantly higher than the tax rate chargeable on capital gains. Direct investment in equities therefore carries this potential drawback.

Rich Man Poor Man

The article is written by Richard Russell. John Mauldin wrote a introduction to this article:

What can one say about my friend Richard Russell without using a lot of superlatives? Richard has been writing and publishing the Dow Theory Letters since 1958, and never has he missed an issue! It is the longest newsletter service continuously published by one person in the investment business. Richard is now 80 years old, and writes an extremely popular daily e-letter, full of commentary on the markets and whatever interests him that day. He gets up at 3 am or so and starts his daily (massive) reading and finishes the letter just after the markets close. He is my business hero.

He was the first writer to recommend gold stocks in 1960. He called the top of the 1949-66 bull market, and called the bottom of the bear market in 1974 almost to the day, predicting a new bull market. (Think how tough it was to call for a bull market in late 1974, when things looked really miserable!) He was a bombardier in WWII, lived through the Depression, wars, and bull and bear markets. I would say that Russell is one of those true innate market geniuses that have simply forgotten more than most of us will ever know, except I am not certain he has forgotten anything. His daily letter is loaded with references and wisdom from the past and gives us a guide to the future.

When I asked Richard to contribute an article, I wanted his wisdom more than his actual market theory, and that is what he has given us. You (and your kids!) should read this again and again! Richard lives in La Jolla with his wife Faye.

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Making money entails a lot more than predicting which way the stock or bond markets are heading or trying to figure which stock or fund will double over the next few years.
For the great majority of investors, making money requires a plan, self-discipline, and desire. I say “for the great majority of people,” because if you’re a Steven Spielberg or a Bill Gates you don’t have to know about the Dow or the markets or about yields or price/earnings ratios. You’re a phenomenon in your own field, and you’re going to make big money as a by-product of your talent and ability. But this kind of genius is rare.

For the average investor, you and me, we’re not geniuses so we have to have a financial plan. In view of this, I offer below a few rules and a few thoughts on investing that we must be aware of if we are serious about making money.

I. The Power of Compounding

Rule 1: Compounding.
One of the most important lessons for living in the modern world is that to survive you’ve got to have money. But to live (survive) happily, you must have love, health (mental and physical), freedom, intellectual stimulation — and money. When I taught my kids about money, the first thing I taught them was the use of the “money bible.” What’s the money bible? Simple, it’s a volume of the compounding interest tables.

Compounding is the royal road to riches. Compounding is the safe road, the sure road, and fortunately anybody can do it. To compound successfully you need the following: perseverance in order to keep you firmly on the savings path. You need intelligence in order to understand what you are doing and why. You need knowledge of the mathematical tables in order to comprehend the amazing rewards that will come to you if you faithfully follow the compounding road. And, of course, you need time, time to allow the power of compounding to work for you. Remember, compounding only works through time.

But there are two catches in the compounding process. The first is obvious — compounding may involve sacrifice (you can’t spend it and still save it). Second, compounding is boring — b-o-r-i-n-g. Or I should say it’s boring until (after seven or eight years) the money starts to pour in. Then, believe me, compounding becomes very interesting. In fact, it becomes downright fascinating!

In order to emphasize the power of compounding, I am including the following extraordinary study, courtesy of Market Logic, of Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33306.

In this study we assume that investor B opens an IRA at age 19. For seven consecutive periods he puts $2,000 into his IRA at an average growth rate of 10% (7% interest plus growth). After seven years this fellow makes NO MORE contributions — he’s finished.

A second investor, A, makes no contributions until age 26 (this is the age when investor B was finished with his contributions). Then A continues faithfully to contribute $2,000 every year until he’s 65 (at the same theoretical 10% rate).

Now study the incredible results. B, who made his contributions earlier and who made only seven contributions, ends up with MORE money than A, who made 40 contributions but at a LATER TIME. The difference in the two is that B had seven more early years of compounding than A. Those seven early years were worth more than all of A’s 33 additional contributions.

This is a study that I suggest you show to your kids. It’s a study I’ve lived by, and I can tell you, “It works.” You can work your compounding with muni-bonds, with a good money market fund, with T-bills, or say with five-year T-notes.

Rule 2: Don’t Lose Money.
This may sound naive, but believe me it isn’t. If you want to be wealthy, you must not lose money; or I should say, you must not lose BIG money. Absurd rule, silly rule? Maybe, but MOST PEOPLE LOSE MONEY in disastrous investments, gambling, rotten business deals, greed, poor timing. Yes, after almost five decades of investing and talking to investors, I can tell you that most people definitely DO lose money, lose big-time — in the stock market, in options and futures, in real estate, in bad loans, in mindless gambling, and in their own businesses.

Rule 3: Rich Man, Poor Man.
In the investment world the wealthy investor has one major advantage over the little guy, the stock market amateur, and the neophyte trader. The advantage that the wealthy investor enjoys is that HE DOESN’T NEED THE MARKETS. I can’t begin to tell you what a difference that makes, both in one’s mental attitude and in the way one actually handles one’s money.

The wealthy investor doesn’t need the markets, because he already has all the income he needs. He has money coming in via bonds, T-bills, money-market funds, stocks, and real estate. In other words, the wealthy investor never feels pressured to “make money” in the market.

The wealthy investor tends to be an expert on values. When bonds are cheap and bond yields are irresistibly high, he buys bonds. When stocks are on the bargain table and stock yields are attractive, he buys stocks. When real estate is a great value, he buys real estate. When great art or fine jewelry or gold is on the “giveaway” table, he buys art or diamonds or gold. In other words, the wealthy investor puts his money where the great values are.

And if no outstanding values are available, the wealthy investors waits. He can afford to wait. He has money coming in daily, weekly, monthly. The wealthy investor knows what he is looking for, and he doesn’t mind waiting months or even years for his next investment (they call that patience).

But what about the little guy? This fellow always feels pressured to “make money.” And in return he’s always pressuring the market to “do something” for him. But sadly, the market isn’t interested. When the little guy isn’t buying stocks offering 1% or 2% yields, he’s off to Las Vegas or Atlantic City trying to beat the house at roulette. Or he’s spending 20 bucks a week on lottery tickets, or he’s “investing” in some crackpot scheme that his neighbor told him about (in strictest confidence, of course).

And because the little guy is trying to force the market to do something for him, he’s a guaranteed loser. The little guy doesn’t understand values, so he constantly overpays. He doesn’t comprehend the power of compounding, and he doesn’t understand money. He’s never heard the adage, “He who understands interest, earns it. He who doesn’t understand interest, pays it.” The little guy is the typical American, and he’s deeply in debt.

The little guy is in hock up to his ears. As a result, he’s always sweating — sweating to make payments on his house, his refrigerator, his car, or his lawn mower. He’s impatient, and he feels perpetually put upon. He tells himself that he has to make money — fast. And he dreams of those “big, juicy mega-bucks.” In the end, the little guy wastes his money in the market, or he loses his money gambling, or he dribbles it away on senseless schemes. In short, this “money-nerd” spends his life dashing up the financial down escalator.

But here’s the ironic part of it. If, from the beginning, the little guy had adopted a strict policy of never spending more than he made, if he had taken his extra savings and compounded it in intelligent, income-producing securities, then in due time he’d have money coming in daily, weekly, monthly, just like the rich man. The little guy would have become a financial winner, instead of a pathetic loser.

Rule 4: Values.
The only time the average investor should stray outside the basic compounding system is when a given market offers outstanding value. I judge an investment to be a great value when it offers (a) safety, (b) an attractive return, and (c) a good chance of appreciating in price. At all other times, the compounding route is safer and probably a lot more profitable, at least in the long run.

II. Time
TIME: Here’s something they won’t tell you at your local brokerage office or in the “How to Beat the Market” books. All investing and speculation is basically an exercise in attempting to beat time.

“Russell, what are you talking about?”

Just what I said — when you try to pick the winning stock or when you try to sell out near the top of a bull market or when you try in-and-out trading, you may not realize it but what you’re doing is trying to beat time.

Time is the single most valuable asset you can ever have in your investment arsenal. The problem is that none of us has enough of it.

But let’s indulge in a bit of fantasy. Let’s say you have 200 years to live, 200 years in which to invest. Here’s what you could do. You could buy $20,000 worth of municipal bonds yielding, say, 5.5%.

At 5.5% money doubles in 13 years. So here’s your plan: each time your money doubles you add another $10,000. So at the end of 13 years you have $40,000 plus the $10,000 you’ve added, meaning that at the end of 13 years you have $50,000.

At the end of the next 13 years you have $100,000, you add $10,000, and then you have $110,000. You reinvest it all in 5.5% munis, and at the end of the next 13 years you have $220,000 and you add $10,000, making it $230,000.

At the end of the next 13 years you have $460,000 and you add $10,000, making it $470,000.

In 200 years there are 15.3 doubles. You do the math. By the end of the 200th year you wouldn’t know what to do with all your money. It would be coming out of your ears. And all with minimum risk.

So with enough time, you would be rich — guaranteed. You wouldn’t have to waste any time picking the right stock or the right group or the right mutual fund. You would just compound your way to riches, using your greatest asset: time.

There’s only one problem: in the real world you’re not going to live 200 years. But if you start young enough or if you start your kids early, you or they might have anywhere from 30 to 60 years of time ahead of you.

Because most people have run out of time, they spend endless hours and nervous energy trying to beat time, which, by the way, is really what investing is all about. Pick a stock that advances from 3 to 100, and if you’ve put enough money in that stock you’ll have beaten time. Or join a company that gives you a million options, and your option moves up from 3 to 25 and again you’ve beaten time.

How about this real example of beating time. John Walter joined AT&T, but after nine short months he was out of a job. The complaint was that Walter “lacked intellectual leadership.” Walter got $26 million for that little stint in a severance package. That’s what you call really beating time. Of course, a few of us might have another word for it — and for AT&T.

III. Hope
HOPE: It’s human nature to be optimistic. It’s human nature to hope. Furthermore, hope is a component of a healthy state of mind. Hope is the opposite of negativity. Negativity in life can lead to anger, disappointment, and depression. After all, if the world is a negative place, what’s the point of living in it? To be negative is to be anti-life.

Ironically, it doesn’t work that way in the stock market. In the stock market hope is a hindrence, not a help. Once you take a position in a stock, you obviously want that stock to advance. But if the stock you bought is a real value, and you bought it right, you should be content to sit with that stock in the knowledge that over time its value will out without your help, without your hoping.

So in the case of this stock, you have value on your side — and all you need is patience. In the end, your patience will pay off with a higher price for your stock. Hope shouldn’t play any part in this process. You don’t need hope, because you bought the stock when it was a great value, and you bought it at the right time.

Any time you find yourself hoping in this business, the odds are that you are on the wrong path — or that you did something stupid that should be corrected.

Unfortunately, hope is a money-loser in the investment business. This is counterintuitive but true. Hope will keep you riding a stock that is headed down. Hope will keep you from taking a small loss and, instead, allow that small loss to develop into a large loss.

In the stock market hope gets in the way of reality, hope gets in the way of common sense. One of the first rules in investing is “don’t take the big loss.” In order to do that, you’ve got to be willing to take a small loss.

If the stock market turns bearish, and you’re staying put with your whole position, and you’re HOPING that what you see is not really happening — then welcome to poverty city. In this situation, all your hoping isn’t going to save you or make you a penny. In fact, in this situation hope is the devil that bids you to sit — while your portfolio of stocks goes down the drain.

In the investing business my suggestion is that you avoid hope. Forget the siren, hope; instead, embrace cold, clear reality.

IV. Acting
ACTING: A few days ago a young subscriber asked me, “Russell, you’ve been dealing with the markets since the late 1940s. This is a strange question, but what is the most important lesson you’ve learned in all that time?”

I didn’t have to think too long. I told him, “The most important lesson I’ve learned comes from something Freud said. He said, ‘Thinking is rehearsing.’ What Freud meant was that thinking is no substitute for acting. In this world, in investing, in any field, there is no substitute for taking action.”

This brings up another story which illustrates the same theme. J.P. Morgan was “Master of the Universe” back in the 1920s. One day a young man came up to Morgan and said, “Mr. Morgan, I’m sorry to bother you, but I own some stocks that have been acting poorly, and I’m very anxious about these stocks. In fact worrying about those stocks is starting to ruin my health. Yet, I still like the stocks. It’s a terrible dilemma. What do you think I should do, sir?”

Without hesitating Morgan said, “Young man, sell to the sleeping point.”

The lesson is the same. There’s no substitute for acting. In the business of investing or the business of life, thinking is not going to do it for you. Thinking is just rehearsing. You must learn to act.

That’s the single most important lesson that I’ve learned in this business.

Again, and I’ve written about this episode before, a very wealthy and successful investor once said to me, “Russell, do you know why stockbrokers never become rich in this business?”

I confessed that I didn’t know. He explained, “They don’t get rich because they never believe their own bullshit.”

Again, it’s the same lesson. If you want to make money (or get rich) in a bull market, thinking and talking isn’t going to do it. You’ve got to buy stocks. Brokers never do that. Do you know one broker who has?

A painful lesson:
Back in 1991 when we had a perfect opportunity, we could have ended Saddam Hussein’s career, and we could have done it with ease. But those in command, for political reasons, didn’t want to face the adverse publicity of taking additional US casualties. So we stopped short, and Saddam was home free. We were afraid to act. And now we’re dealing with that failure to act with another and messier war.

In my own life many of the mistakes I’ve made have come because I forgot or ignored the “acting lesson.” Thinking is rehearsing, and I was rehearsing instead of acting. Bad marriages, bad investments, lost opportunities, bad business decisions — all made worse because we fail for any number of reasons to act.

The reasons to act are almost always better than the reasons you can think up not to act. If you, my dear readers, can understand the meaning of what is expressed in this one sentence, then believe me, you’ve learned a most valuable lesson. It’s a lesson that has saved my life many times. And I mean literally, it’s a lesson that has saved my life.

Saturday, December 29, 2007

STI to hit new high

Some of the reasons that I have turning bullish on our STI market, going forward into 2008:

1) Our econonmy should be able to achieve 7.5% growth to 8% growth for 2007.

2) According to our MTI, S'pore economy should be expanding again at 4.5% for 2008. S'pore should expand by another 4% to 5% for 2009 despite a possible U.S recession in 2008. 2008 & 2009's growth supported by the IRs prjects, Jurong Island projects, more private & public housing projects in 2008 to 2009.

3) Contrary some bearish expectations, our corporate earnings should be still growing by 3% to 5% for 2008, lead by banks, property & Oil & Gas companies.

4) They are full of spare/excess liquidity in our banking system. According to recent MAS official report, our local residents deposits has risen to $232billion in Oct 2007. All this are excess funds/excess liquidity not invested in stock market yet. This figure should rise further in Jan 2008 when all employees receive their year end bonus by lastest Jan 2008.

Please note that stock markets are driven by liquidity also, beside fundamentals.

5) On a global scale, the spared/excess liquidity by the Soveriegn Wealth Funds (SWFs), other Oil Exporters, China & S'pore Govts, could easily exceed USD7 trillions, should be much more. Not forgetting, the Oil exporters will get richer in the next 12 months to 24 months as long as Nymex stay above USD70 for the next 12 to 24 months. Saudi's SWFs alone, already USD900billion easily.

6) What the SWFs is doing to rescue to U.S. banks now, is not even 10% of their SWFs. Hence, the U.S. banks should be prepare for any possible "hostile takeover" by the SWFs, if the subprime mess get worse.

7) Decoupling is already happening, otherwise Dow Jones should be 8,700 by now.

Please note that i am only 80% confidence that STI would hit 4100 by April 2008. My confident level would only increase to 90% if Dows would drop further to 10,500 in 2008.

Sell Dows & buy STI market is my strategy for 2008. STI may have 30% to 40% chance to hit 4410 by Dec 2008.

Friday, December 28, 2007

A key reason why we think a recession in 2008 is unlikely

Monetary policy was not particularly tight at any point in this economic cycle.

Generally, recessions begin when the Fed over-tightens monetary policy in an attempt to dampen inflation pressures. While the Fed ultimately lifted interest rates by a substantial 425 bps in the current cycle, this was from record low levels.
Real interest rates arguably never went into restrictive territory, and since the Fed was so quick to cut interest rates (-100 bps in the last three months) the probability of recession decreases substantially.

In the current cycle, the real fed funds rate, defined as the level of the nominal fed funds rate minus the year-over-year change in the core CPI, peaked at 3.0% in June 2007. In the 2001 recession, the real fed funds rate peaked at 4.0%; and in the recession before that, 1990-1991, it peaked at 5.3%. The average real fed funds rate at the start of a recession is 5.0%, which is 200 bps above where the fed funds rate peaked in the current cycle. A lower peak in real fed funds combined with aggressive easing since then should eventually help steady the financial markets and economy. We expect another 50 bps in rate cuts as an insurance move to assure a second half 2008 acceleration. We project the unemployment rate to edge up slightly in the next few months and headline inflation to decelerate as energy prices stabilize/decline in response to
slower growth--accordingly, inflation expectations should drift lower.

If economic growth was accelerating significantly, we would be more worried about inflation. However, the reacceleration should be modest at best, since most of the pick-up in domestic demand will likely be back-loaded into H2 2008.

After all, the traditional channel through which lower interest rates lift growth, namely housing, is a channel that is likely to be of limited use in the near term since the housing sector continues to work through a massive supply imbalance which may be relatively immune to lower interest rates. Consequently, the possibility of a longer and more extended period of declining home prices cannot be ruled out and with that increased downside growth risks.

Did Jim Rogers imply that Temasek is stupid ?

Jim Rogers, [ former partner of George Soros in the famed Quantum Fund ] a fund manager who has traveled extensively in emerging markets and lives part of the year in Asia, says sovereign wealth funds in Abu Dhabi and Singapore that recently made large investments in Citigroup and UBS AG are likely to lose a lot of money on their ploys.

"They're making a big mistake; these banks have many more problems still ahead. They should wait until these companies are really on the ropes a few years from now . . . and trading at $5 a share."

But aren't they supposed to be the smart money? Maybe not. "I know these people, and they have never given me the impression that they're smarter than anyone else," Rogers says. " They have gigantic amounts of money, but they've made a bad judgment in these cases."

Citi, Merrill, JPMorgan face larger writeoffs: Goldman

CitiGroup Inc may need to slash its dividend 40 percent to preserve capital, and with Merrill Lynch & Co and JPMorgan Chase & Co may write off $33.6 billion of debt this quarter as the global credit crunch deepens, a Goldman Sachs & Co analyst said.
"It will be a couple of quarters before the current credit crisis is fully digested by the markets," the analyst, William Tanona, wrote in a report released on Thursday. "Fourth-quarter trading results are likely to be among the weakest we have seen in some time."
Tanona nearly doubled his forecast for write-downs after mortgage losses led investors to shun debt they once thought safe but now deem risky.
He now expects Citigroup, Merrill and JPMorgan to write off a respective $18.7 billion, $11.5 billion and $3.4 billion for collateralized debt obligations this quarter, up from a respective $11 billion, $6 billion and $1.7 billion.
Tanona also said Citigroup may in 2008 cut its quarterly dividend of 54 cents a share, equal to a 7.1 percent yield, to help raise or preserve $5 billion to $10 billion of capital. He rates Citigroup "sell," and Merrill and JPMorgan "neutral."
Citigroup spokeswoman Shannon Bell and JPMorgan spokesman Joe Evangelisti declined to comment. Merrill did not return several requests for comment. Citigroup has projected an $8 billion to $11 billion fourth-quarter write-down.
In afternoon trading, Citigroup shares fell 92 cents, or 3 percent, to $29.53; Merrill fell $1.28, or 2.35 percent, to $53.26, and JPMorgan fell 89 cents, or 2 percent, to $44.05.
Through Wednesday, the shares were down 45 percent, 41 percent and 7 percent, respectively, this year.
Financial companies including Bank of America Corp and Switzerland's UBS AG have already announced more than $70 billion of write-offs tied to the credit crisis.
Debt losses led to Citigroup replacing Chief Executive Charles Prince with Vikram Pandit, and Merrill replacing Chief Executive Stanley O'Neal with John Thain.


BILLIONS STILL AT RISK
Tanona said that after the projected write-downs, Citigroup would still be exposed to $24.5 billion of CDOs, Merrill $7.7 billion and JPMorgan $5 billion.
He said Merrill's write-down will be larger than previously expected because Thain will try to clean up problems now rather than let them fester in 2008.
The analyst boosted his forecast for fourth-quarter losses per share to $1.33 from 52 cents at Citigroup, and to $7.00 from $1.50 at Merrill. He cut his forecast for profit per share at JPMorgan to 65 cents from $1.04.
Analysts on average expect respective losses of 61 cents and $4.00 per share at Citigroup and Merrill, and a profit of $1.01 per share at JPMorgan in the fourth quarter, according to Reuters Estimates.
Brad Hintz, a Sanford C. Bernstein & Co analyst, on Thursday predicted a $10 billion fourth-quarter write-down at Merrill, leading to a quarterly loss of $5.10 per share.
Last month, Citigroup shored up capital by selling a $7.5 billion stake to Abu Dhabi's government. Merrill, meanwhile, on Monday announced a $6.2 billion infusion from Singapore's government and money manager Davis Selected Advisers.

Tuesday, December 25, 2007

Sheldon Adelson Quotes

I look at every business and ask, How long can this last ?
How can I identify the status quo and change it ?

《孙子兵法》与金融投资

《孙子兵法》的谋略应用于金融投资,是近年一个新的热门课题。
金融投资在中国,包括银行存贷、投资经济、房地产开发、股票买卖等活动,都充满着竞争和风险,宛如战场作战一样。
因此,《孙子兵法》的思想谋略在金融投资领域也大有用武之地,成为人们涉足金融市场进行投资,经营房地产,买卖证券时的参照宝典。

《孙子兵法》可以应用于金融投资的谋略很多,以下仅归纳出十四种谋略方法并结合具体实例加以阐述。

一 事关“死生存亡”,必须谨慎操作
《孙子·计篇》开头就明言:“兵者,国之大事,死生之地,存亡之道,不可不察也。”用兵打仗,事关人民的“死生”,国家的“存亡”,一定要细致考察,方可作出决定。在金融投资领域,稍有差错,损失就难以弥补,因而也是一个“死生之地”,要认真研究它的“存亡之道”。先以银行存贷来说,风险就无处不在,无时不有。有的银行巨额资金被人骗走,或者贷给信用不好、无偿还能力的人,以致资金流失,无法挽回。
前不久,日本位居二十家大银行之一的北海道拓殖银行,由于经营不善,造成巨额呆账,受挤兑风潮的冲击,被迫宣布破产,就是一例。投资建设项目、经营房地产、进行证券交易也是如此。弄得不好,投下去的大量资金会付之东流,血本无归。有的人向亲朋好友借钱炒股,希望侥幸发财,但由于操作失误,结果事与愿违负债累累。这样的教训是极其深刻的。

大凡精明的金融投资者,都懂得从事这项活动的风浪,赚大钱的机遇与倾家荡产的风险同存,因而总是小心翼翼,谨慎操作。香港兴业国际集团总经理查懋声在开发房地产时,经常通过合资或联营的方式来减少投资风险。在开发一栋大型商住楼时,他联合了香港新世界发展公司,虽然当时他完全有能力独家开发。有经济分析家说:“即使查氏看准了某个机遇,他也只会作50%的尝试,绝不会100%投入进去。”查懋声还主张多点投资。前不久,他同别人合伙买下了东京市中心一块地皮。查对别人说:“香港房地产市场发展一直不太稳定,时有起伏。我需要开辟一个同香港房地产市场互为补充的市场。这样,在香港市场不景气的时候,香港兴业国际集团在其他地方仍然会有所作为。"
香港兴业国际集团在查总经理稳健谨慎的主持下,不断开拓发展,成为香港房地产业经营得最好的公司之一。
  
二 “合于利而动”,采取果断措施
《孙子·火攻篇》指出:“合于利而动,不合于利而止。”它告诉人们:兴师打仗一定要经过周密考虑,认准有利才付诸行动;如果发现形势不妙,无利可图,就应当立即停止。孙子还一再强调:“非利不动,非得不用。" (同上)这就是说,无利可得,决不行动;没有胜算,决不用兵。孙子的这条原则,对于从事金融投资的人,也是一个极好的座右铭。
证券交易是一项波动性很大的活动。股票投资者在买进股票后,往往会在股票下跌的阶段惶恐不安。这时,特别需要牢记孙子的话:“合于利而动,不合于利而止。”股票下跌,形势不利,投资者可以按兵不动,暂时休息,静心观察股市的变化;也可抛出后再低收扩股,待到股市出现转机,股票价格上升,交易有利时再抛售回捞。有的投资者深怕股票一再下跌,在“不合于利”的情况下轻易抛出,因而使自己遭受重大损失。
在进行投资趋向选择时,一方面要考虑其是否有高额的回报率,另一方面则要预测其有没有风险,要力求以最小的代价换取最大的利益。在这种场合,“合于利而动,不合于利而止”,仍然是投资者决策的法宝。香港中策投资公司在黄鸿年领导下,于1992年3月以后趁政策放宽的大好时机,采取果断行动,选择国内大连、泉州、重庆、杭州等有利地点,收购一批有发展潜力和盈利条件的中型国有企业,变为其控股的公司,利用这些企业已具有的生产管理能力、自成系统的销售网络和稳定的客户,取得了巨大的经济利益。
  
三 “知彼知己”,作出正确抉择
《孙子·谋攻篇》指出:“知彼知己者,百战不殆;不知彼而知己,一胜一负;不知彼,不知己,每战必殆。" 《地形篇》又说:“知彼知己,胜乃不殆;知天知地,胜乃可全。" 可见,在战争中应尽量多了解和掌握“彼”“己”双方的情况,以及“天”时、“地”利等客观条件,这对于作出正确的决策去夺取战争的胜利,避免判断失误而陷入危险的境地,具有极重要的意义。在进行金融投资活动时,“知彼知己”、“知天知地”同样是战胜风险、获得利润、避免失误、稳步发展的可靠保证。
银行要发展存贷款业务,且要避免信用风险,一定要加深对客户的了解,特别要选择信誉好、周转快、效益高、偿还能力强的企业为主要业务对象。

参加股票交易需要了解的情况也很多。
首先,要买某公司的股票,应摸清下列情况:
(1)发行公司的历史背景和盈利记录;
(2)发行公司的管理制度及水平;
(3)产品的专利和商标知名度;
(4)公司的生产能力及经营的多样性;
(5)公司的资产配置及股东的数量和结构;
(6)公司的成长过程和发展前途。
掌握公司的实情后,还要了解股市的动态,如股价的走势、股民的投资趋向等。同时,投资者本人对自己也应有清醒的认识,如个人的资金数额、操作熟练程度、盈亏承受能力等。此外,天时、地利对股市也有影响。如气候炎热,生产冷饮、空调、冰箱、电扇的厂家,经营状况特佳,引起股价上涨;农业丰收或自然灾害,也会导致股价的涨跌;特别是政治事件,如小平同志南巡讲话、中英有关香港问题的谈判,对股价的升降关系尤大。只有“知彼知己”、“知天知地”才能在股市中选股有方,摸准行情,买卖得宜,稳获利润。
投资于重大项目,要了解包括政治、经济、文化、科技、民族、宗教、人口、地理、国防等情况,同时对自己的资金状况、运作能力也要有一个清醒的认识。初学投资的人要谨慎把握,听取别人的经验教训;注意观察投资条件和环境,做好调研,避免失误。
  
四 “修道而保法”,使业务稳步发展
《孙子兵法》强调:“善用兵者,修道而保法,故能为胜败之政。" (《形篇》)可知在战争中,“修道而保法”是赢得胜利、避免失败的强有力措施。对于金融界和投资者来说,“修道而保法”同样是发展业务,赢得利润,减少失误,避免风险的良策。
金融业的“修道”,首先是要加强对银行广大职工的思想教育,帮助他们树立正确的人生观,培养他们良好的道德品质和爱岗敬业的精神;为客户提供优质、文明、快捷、周到、方便、满意的服务,改善工作条件,完善服务功能,促进各项业务顺利发展。
目前,有的银行在发放贷款和管理贷款中存在的有法不依、管理不善等问题,已成为国有金融资产流失的一个重要原因:贷款中对借款主体资格审查不严,草率放款;对贷款用途跟踪检查不力,借款人改变资金用途现象严重;少数银行贷款时效意识差,在贷款到期后未及时向借款人、担保人催促还贷。还有一些部门违规操作,奖惩不明,这些都亟须加强整改。
  
五 “未战而庙算”,保证投资盈利
《孙子兵法》对于战前的准备工作给予充分的关注,特别强调在战前要进行“庙算”,即在庙堂上举行会议。孙子指出:“夫未战而庙算胜者,得算多也。" “多算胜,少算不胜。" (《计篇》)在战前进行周密的计算,作出种种趋利避害的部署,作战就能胜利;战前少算或不算,盲目指挥和行动,必然导致战争的失败。在进行金融投资活动时,也必须“未战而庙算”,把各方面的情况都计算清楚,再作出妥善的决策,方能保证成功,取得良好的经济效益。
股票投资者在购买股票前,都要先对各股票发行公司的经营实绩和盈利情况、各种股票的行情涨落和发展趋势、银行利率的高低和国家政策的走向、股市的冷热和股民的动态作一番细致的“庙算”。倘若盈利的条件充分,就选择股票果断投资;倘若时机还不成熟,盈利的把握不大或无盈利的可能,就按兵不动。投资股票“未战而庙算”应当沉着冷静,尽量考虑多方面的因素,切忌不加思索,盲目行动。
投资承办一项大型活动,也要在事前进行“庙算”:哪些是必要的支出,哪些可以盈利。把支出的部分尽量节约而又不损害活动的质量,把盈利的部分尽量扩大而其方式又非常得体,这样既能搞好活动,又能取得利润,投资者也喜获回报。
  
六 “择人而任势”,银行存贷快速增长
《孙子·势篇》指出:善战者,“能择人而任势”。这句话是说,善于指挥作战的人,一是“能择人”;二是能“任势”. “择人”首先要选择将帅。孙子在《计篇》中论述,将帅应当具有“智、信、仁、勇、严”五种优秀品质。他又强调:“夫将者,国之辅也。辅周则国必强,辅隙则国必弱。" (《谋攻篇》)可见,将帅辅佐的好坏对国家的强弱有着直接的关系。除选择将帅外,还要选择士兵。孙子又说:“兵无选锋,曰北。" (《地形篇》)选择精锐的士兵担任攻坚的先锋,这对夺取战争的胜利也异常重要。上述孙子关于指挥战争必须“择人”的论述,对于金融机构的建设同样有着指导意义。
办好银行也要选择两种人才:一是高级管理人员,即孙子所说的“将”,他们具有“智、信、仁、勇、严”五种品质,能在风云变幻的金融市场中作出明智的决策,能仁爱下属,又勇于开拓,严格管理;二是财会人员,即孙子所说的“锋”,他们在银行中独当一面,既有财会知识和运算本领,又有高度的责任心和洞察力。当然,选择人才还应以精为主。孙子指出:“兵非益多也,惟无武进,足以并力、料敌,取人而已。" (《行军篇》)银行的工作人员也不是越多越好,人员的配备要科学、合理,对一些新设网点或业务量较少的网点应实行一人多岗制,以提高经营效益。
进行金融投资活动,除必须“择人”外,还要善于“任势”。孙子说:“善战者,求之于势,不责于人。" (《势篇》) 金融投资方面的“任势”主要是利用社会诸方面变动对金融股市行情升降的影响,借机操作,获取利润。如国际或国内某一政治形势的变化,经济及金融发展运行的冷热趋势的变化等。
甚至连国际关系的变动和气候的变化都会影响到股市行情的变化,能够利用其中有利的因素投资获取利润,避免不利因素的影响,减少风险即为金融投资方面的“任势”.
金融投资者在“任势”的同时,还要造势,即孙子所说:“乃为之势,以佐其外。" (《计篇》)如何造势,可以有各种各样的方法。近年来,各银行为了拓展业务,增加存贷款,进行大量的造势活动。如有的银行与报刊、电台、电视台建立稳定的合作关系,经常宣传报道该行业务建设和优质文明服务取得的成绩;有的银行组织职工上街设点进行业务咨询,解答市民有关储蓄和贷款的疑难问题;有的银行举办支持地方经济建设成就展览和科技开发、技术进步成果展览,以扩大自身的影响;有的银行增加网点,充分调动全员吸存的积极性,改善服务功能,集存、汇、兑、贷于一体;有的银行除存贷款外,还全面拓展其他业务,如租赁设备、对外担保、代理收费、信托投资等。上述这些“为之势”的方法,使各银行的业务量大大增加,盈利不断上升。
  
七 “料敌制胜”,取得高效益回报
《孙子兵法》强调,在战争中要判明敌情,从而制定取胜的计划,这样就能一举击垮敌人,获得重大的战果。《地形篇》指出:“料敌制胜,计险厄远近,上将之道也。”进行金融投资活动,也必须牢记孙子的这一论述,把投资对象的变化动态,前面道路上的“险厄远近”,都了解得清清楚楚,然后伺机出击,破敌制胜。
早年由香港移居美国的华人司徒炎恩,长期投资股票,深知其中的奥秘。为了选择股票投资,他经常做市场的调查研究和资料搜集,除了看公司年报外,还要亲自试验某些公司的产品,以判断该公司的生意前景,确定其股票的升值潜力。1992年,当他十四岁时,炎恩动用了多年储蓄下来的七百美元买了一家电脑软件公司的股票,因为他经过调查研究,肯定此公司的股票有升值潜力。结果三个月后,股票升值逾倍。他把股票卖掉,净赚了八百美元。1993年,他向家人、亲戚、好友集资两万美元,成立基金,自任经理。由于他深通其中的门道,基金每年都有三成多的增长。他在管理父亲十多万美元的退休基金时,投资六种股票,结果,这些股票都大幅度的升值。在投资股票的道路上,司徒炎恩“料敌制胜,计险厄远近”,成了人人称道的“股票神童”.
开办个体商店一直是人们投资的热点。服装店、餐馆、百货店、食品店、书店、音像店、花鸟商店等等,什么样的商店最能赚钱?这是投资者首先必须调查清楚的问题。开办一家商店,房租的费用是多少?进货需要多少资金?办执照、工商税需要缴多少?其他如装修费、运输费、人工费还要加多少?该商品进货的渠道怎么样?进货后的利润率是多少?开办这种商店,附近有没有同行竞争者?店址选择在何处对销售最为有利?什么商品近期最热销?每天的营业额和净收入大概是多少?商品会不会滞销和积压?会不会变质和报废?商品的损耗率一般是多少?如何防止商品的积压和变质以把损失减少到最低限度?对于上述这些问题如能事先了解,“料敌制胜,计险厄远近”,作出正确的决策,投资者自然能获取大利。

八 “善出奇”,结丰硕成果
战争要取得胜利主要靠奇兵的突然袭击。《孙子·势篇》指出:“凡战者,以正合,以奇胜。”奇兵的出击要不断变换花样,正如孙子所说:“善出奇者,无穷如天地,不竭如江河。" (同上)只有这样才能使敌人防不胜防,无法应付,从而取得重大的战果。进行金融投资活动,也要“善出奇”,才能不断拓展业务,使盈利迅速增长。
银行的业务不能停留在一般的储蓄存款、信用贷款上,必须“善出奇”。为了在竞争中得到更多的业务,工商银行抢先出台为供电部门代收电费的业务项目,接着别的银行也都跟着增加了此项业务。此后,工商银行又出新招,为各企业部门代发工资,不久又为其他银行所仿效。现在银行业务仅代收费一项,就已有代收水费、煤气费、电费、电话费、寻呼机费、移动电讯费、交通违章罚款等七八种之多。“善出奇”推动着竞争,促进银行工作的完善和发展,也极大地方便了广大居民。
投资办企业必须“善出奇”,才能吸引顾客,取得好的效益。近年来,某些企业由于市场变化和自身管理不善,产品积压,造成资金大量沉淀,周转困难。为尽快处理这些积压产品,有的企业特开辟“积压产品门市部”,把积压产品集中在一起,实行特价销售。此一“出奇”举措,给积压产品找到了出路,收回了企业部分呆滞资金,还密切了企业与消费者的关系,为他们提供经济实惠的商品。
企业家的投资也要“善出奇”,以奇求发展。1950年,香港企业家李嘉诚将自己艰苦积蓄下来的几千元钱用以投资办厂。当时塑胶制品在香港市场刚刚出现,它既轻便又牢固且价格低廉,颇受顾客欢迎,大有取代木制品和金属制品之势。李嘉诚看准行情,办起了“长江塑胶厂”。由于产品新颖,十分畅销,初次投资,就“出奇”制胜,获利丰厚。20世纪50年代后期,欧洲出现塑胶花热,亚洲也逐渐盛行。李嘉诚又迅速将其工厂转产塑胶花,这种产品一上市,就以其色泽鲜艳、保存长久、价格便宜而受人喜爱。李嘉诚以这种“奇”特的产品,再获厚利。从60年代起,香港经济开始起飞,各国投资者、企业家纷至沓来。李嘉诚看准房地产必然大涨,便大量收购地皮和楼宇,成为香港最大的地产业发展公司。从90年代起,李嘉诚认定改革开放的中国大陆潜力无穷,便又把投资方向转入北京、上海、福州和广东等地。投资项目的“善出奇”和不断地更新,使李嘉诚的财富扶摇直上。目前,他是世界知名的华人富豪之一。

九 “践墨随敌”,不断增强金融实力
《孙子·虚实篇》指出:“夫兵形象水,……水因地而制流,兵因敌而制胜。故兵无常势,水无常形,能因敌变化而取胜者,谓之神。" 《九地篇》进一步强调:“践墨随敌,以决战事。”这就是说,带兵作战时一定要随着敌情的变化而临事决策,以变应变,方能趋利避害,巧妙地取胜敌人。在进行金融投资活动时,也要密切注意市场的动态,“践墨随敌”,作出应变的计划和措施,才能使资金日益扩展,实力不断增强。
股票市场风云变幻,在进行股票投资时,必须牢记“因敌变化”的方针,运用“践墨随敌”的策略。当投资者已经买进几种股票后,就要全面认真地分析股市形势和动向。走势向上,有涨的潜力的,就应持股在手,争取实现利润的最大化;那些风雨飘摇、不断下滑,无利可图的,就应立即放手,以避免更大的损失。沉着机智,随敌应变,便会保证你的股资不断升值。
经济形势如大海波涛,有时潮起,有时潮落,投资者必须根据市场状况,“践墨随敌”、“因敌变化”,采取相应的措施,才能稳获大利,不被潮水吞没。20世纪60年代后期,香港投资者冯景禧仔细研究了欧美股市的产生和发展,明显感到香港股市的繁荣已为期不远,乃与合伙人创办“新鸿基”证券公司。进入70年代,香港股市出现火爆场面。冯氏在这涨潮到来之前,早已扩大了办公面积,购进了世界上最先进的计算机设备,并大大增加了雇员。其公司的业务量在几年中翻了几十倍,所得佣金和发行利润达上亿元港币。
当香港股价暴涨几年之后,投机集团开始大量抛出,股市进入低潮。1974年又发生世界性经济衰退,一时间股价狂泻不止,许多小交易所不得不关门。面对形势逆转,冯景禧“因敌变化”,及时成立财务公司,开展用股票抵押贷款业务。此举除能收利息外,还可在股民无力偿还贷款时吞掉作抵押的股票。以后如股市有短期好转,又可把低价吞进的股票抛出套取现金。
1984年,香港回归问题的前途开始明朗化,股市行情也逐渐好转。到1986年,冯氏联合其他三家较大的证券公司,成立香港联合证券交易所。1991年股市出现涨潮,他又不失时机地赚了一大笔。由于“践墨随敌”,在各种复杂的形势下他都能随机应变,冯景禧的“新鸿基”证券公司不断扩大,设备更新,宏图大展。
运用“因敌变化”的策略,还要有“人弃我取,人取我与”的雅量,“出其所不趋,趋其所不意” (《虚实篇》) ,把资金投到大家不愿意投而又前景看好的地方,这样就必定能发达起来。1967年,香港社会因受大陆“文化大革命”的影响,社会出现了不安定现象,房地产价格也随之大跌。当时年仅26岁的徐展堂看准时机,趁大家抛售楼房之际,将自己的钱全部投入购买便宜的房屋。过了两年,香港社会安定下来,很多商家又欲购买房地产业,楼价急剧上涨。此时徐展堂又尽快把自己贱价收购的房屋卖出,因而赚了很多钱。20世纪80年代初,正值中英就香港问题谈判期间,香港社会又出现了一些流言蜚语,人心不定。不少富有人家为把资金转移到美国、加拿大及澳大利亚,纷纷抛售房产,使房价再次大跌。这时财力十分雄厚的徐展堂又“出其所不趋”,与人反向而行。他把在加拿大和澳大利亚购置的房产卖给了移到这些国家的香港人,再用这些资金和其他资金大量收购香港的廉价地皮和楼房产。两三年后,谣言销声匿迹,香港社会趋于稳定,房地产又开始升值。徐展堂此时抛售手中的房产,再次获得丰厚利润。由于“践墨随敌”、“出其所不趋”,在形势变化时灵活应变,善于投资的徐展堂在贱买贵卖中使他的财富迅速增长。

十 “先为不可胜”,形成竞争明显优势
《孙子·形篇》指出:“善战者,先为不可胜,以待敌之可胜。" “善战者,立于不败之地,而不失敌之败也。”这些论述,对于进行金融投资活动的人,同样是极为有用的策略。以经营银行为例,“先为不可胜”,就要改善服务态度,提高服务质量,加强业务宣传,开辟融资渠道,提高职工素质,健全监督机制,优化环境面貌,增加服务网点,主动争取存贷,解决客户困难。如此去做,银行的营业额一定大量增加,成为“不可胜”的实体。如若竞争对手出现账目混乱、贪污严重、职工消极、大量亏损的“可胜”迹象,就可一举将其击败,令其倒闭或被兼并。

股票投资者也要“先为不可胜”,其方法是:
(1)多方了解有关股票交易的情况,听取专家意见,阅读有关书籍,提高自己的业务水平;
(2)关注股市动态,掌握股市走势,直接从交易所或间接通过广播、电视、报刊获取大量信息,摸准行情,及时行动;
(3)选择效益高、信誉好,价格坚挺、成交量可观的公司股票去投资,而不要去买那些效益低、信誉差,价格下滑、成交量小的公司股票。
这样,投资者就如一位足智多谋、胆大心细、握有重兵的“不可胜”的将军,一旦股市出现大起大落的“可胜”之势,投资者就“不失”时机地果断行动,一举而获取厚利。

住宅房屋投资者“先为不可胜”,应该选择交通便捷、环境优美、设备完善、质量可靠、结构新颖、式样别致、设施齐全、居住舒适的住宅,投资购买,以待升值。山东胶州市商品房的投资者,着力建成功能完善的小区,吸引了不少购房者,形成房屋销售中的“不可胜”之势。一些在外地务工、经商的人员,以及外资企业的外籍管理人员,看上胶州良好的居住和生活环境,纷纷购房安家落户,从而使胶州市的住宅房屋投资者稳得高额回报。

十一 “并敌一向”,当机立断成大功
《孙子·九地篇》指出:“为兵之事,在于顺(通“慎”)详敌之意,并敌一向,千里杀将。此谓巧能成事者也。”孙子在这里告诉人们一个在作战时“巧能成事”的诀窍,就是要谨慎地审察敌人的意图动态,然后集中兵力指向敌人薄弱而容易攻击的一点,这样即使奔袭千里也能擒杀敌将,取得重大的战果。在金融投资活动中,运用《孙子兵法》集中兵力“并敌一向”的策略,同样可以收到“巧能成事”的奇效。
股票投资者在初涉股市时,先要“顺详敌之意”,摸清各种股票的公司业绩、价格走势、近期动态和股市风潮,然后选择一二种有升值潜质的股票,看准行情,当机立断,集中资金“并敌一向”,大量购进又大量抛出。由于股票数额巨大,一进一出便能净赚一大笔。孙子还谈到临阵时的行动策略:“始如处女,敌人开户;后如脱兔,敌不及拒。" (同上)涉足股市,开始也要像“处女”一样,谨慎观察,好似各种股票都在向你“开户”,任你挑选购买。等到看准哪一种股票有利可得,就像“脱兔”一样迅速行动,在其他股民还没有反应之时大量购进。当其涨到一定程度,再伺机抛出,如此便可巧获大利。

在上海股市中有一个人称“杨百万”的传奇人物杨怀定,他炒股获厚利的经验也是谨慎观察,当机立断,蓄锐一击,巧能成事。杨怀定原是上海铁合金厂仓库负责人,1988年一次意外变故,他辞职了。扔下“铁饭碗”回家,妻子承包电线厂已攒下5万元家底,这成了他闯荡股海的资本。
1990年春天,全国经济滑坡,上海股市萧条,行情急剧下跌。与股市冷落形成鲜明对照,银行却热闹非凡,全国各地都在开展“保值储蓄”,利率节节升高。杨怀定从观察中领悟到:眼下银行利率太高,已高出企业资金增值率,工厂开工不如坐吃利息。如此下去,利率肯定要跌。一旦下跌,市民的大量资金必然再次涌向股市,股票必涨无疑。他当机立断,买进一千股。4月14日晚,广播中发出银行利率全面调低的信息,紧接着股价迅速暴涨。杨怀定“顺详敌之意,并敌一向”,在这次涨潮中巧赚30万元。
初试得手,他又开始盘算:7月1日,国家将向市民兑换国库券,这次要有8亿元现款上市,上海股市一定会再涨。于是,他买进一千股后,又添加一千股。当年7月底,恰逢大批深圳青年涌进上海炒股,股价扶摇直上。百元股票8月升至226. 34元,9月再创新高。这时,杨怀定将二千股全部出手,竟赚进50万。
1991年春节刚过,杨怀定又盯上了“龙头股”。这是电真空公司的股票,因为它在当时八家上市股票中影响最大,人们便称它为“龙头”。杨怀定经过谨慎观察,认定它必涨无疑,于是“并敌一向”,买进六千八百股。2月26日,“龙头股”升到50.75元。他把电真空巨股抛出,又赚了一大笔。如今,“杨百万”早已成了“杨千万”,他投资的触角也由单一的股票证券转向包括房地产、期货在内的多种经营。
杨怀定在股市的战场上屡屡获胜的一个重要的原因就是他掌握信息动态。他订有全国报刊二百多种,把这些东西称为“信息雷达”。他说:“在上海股市,我之所以能立于不败之地,除了吃透政策、捕捉信息外,积累数据、反复调用计算机是极重要的一环。”在他的电子计算机内,储存了几年前上海公开发行的所有债券的信息,包括发行日、利率、发行总量等。这些债券的兑付大半明显制约着股市行情。因此,对每一个即将到来的交易日的股价走向,杨怀定心里都早已有谱。“顺详敌之意”,使杨怀定的投资活动不断开拓发展,走上成功之路。
  
十二 警惕“诡道”设下投资陷阱
《孙子·计篇》指出:用兵打仗,应采取“诡道”手段,即诡诈的办法。接着他列举了“能而示之不能,用而示之不用,近而示之远,远而示之近。利而诱之,乱而取之……" ; “攻其无备,出其不意”等十四种诡诈的策略,并称这是“兵家之胜”,即兵家胜敌的奥妙所在。进行金融投资活动,有时也可使用“诡道”,以使自己的业务发展,投资增值,但这应该以不违反法律为原则。同时,更重要的,必须提高警惕,谨防别人以“诡道”设下陷阱,使你银行倒闭,投资泡汤。在这一方面有着很多深刻的教训。
股市交易许多人在那里虚张声势,造成假象,引诱一般股民上钩。等股价涨到相当高价位时,他们一边继续吹涨风,一边暗地里大量抛出手中股票。这些大户,股价不涨而“示之”要涨,抛出股票而“示之”购进;“利而诱之,乱而取之”; “攻其无备,出其不意”,从中牟取暴利。有些股民跟在后面,必然会判断失误而吃大亏。
金融借贷中的“诡道”行为会形成很多陷阱。民间私人之间的借贷是一种资金融通,借贷者往往以高利率为条诱饵,“利而诱之”,令有钱者出借,然后把借到的钱用于经商、办婚事,甚至赌博,到期很难还本付息,而造成债务纠纷。

《孙子兵法》的谋略应用于金融投资活动,除上述十二条外,还可以举出多种:
(1) 由出口变为向海外投资,可以“因粮于敌” (《作战篇》) ,充分利用当地的资源和劳动力,从而降低成本和运费;
(2)向国内或海外投资,应当“避实而击虚” (《虚实篇》) , 避开强手如林、竞争激烈的地区而投资于未开发或发展中的市场;
(3)股票市场变化多端,投资者应注意“兵之情主速” (《九地篇》) ,看准行情有利可得,便快速买进或抛出;
(4)国际金融市场自由活跃,我们应当“致人而不致于人” (《虚实篇》) ,利用外资发展经济,而不要被人控制,扰乱金融秩序;
(5)投资者选派得力的管理人员去经营,应做到“将能而君不御” (《谋攻篇》) ,充分发挥其才能而不要横加干预;
(6)投资者聘用雇员,应当“视卒如爱子” (《地形篇》) ,把他们当作一家人,与他们同甘共苦,同舟共济;
(7)投资者对雇员应有赏罚激励机制,给贡献突出者发奖金或加薪,“不修其功” (《火攻篇》)或“罚不行”(《行军篇》)都是有害的;
(8)股票投资最好能“用间”先知国家政策、公司实绩和大户动向;投资办商店或企业也可“用间”探察对手有什么新招。

可以肯定,运用以上《孙子兵法》这二十种谋略,将会帮助你在金融投资活动中从容应对,稳获厚利。

索罗斯的反身性理论

索罗斯的反身性理论, 现在看到的很浮浅,但有启发性:
一、索罗斯认为市场的预期都是错误的,但由于从众心理导致现实往往因这种错误的预期而发生偏差,造成预期与未来事实相符的假象;
二、市场不能以理性的做为基础假设;
三、思考者和被思考者其实都不可避免的参与了市场,所以,思考者不可以排除自己对市场的影响。
不很准确,但索罗斯的这种思维是波普尔思想理论的一种发展和实践,应该好好关注。

著名投资大师索罗斯的投资哲学建立在“反身性理论”的基础之上。

它的理论含义是:    
假设人的行为是y,人的认识是x,由于人的行动一定是由人的认识所左右的,因此,行为是认识的函数,表述为:y=f    
它的含义是:有什么样的知识就有什么样的行为。    

同样,人的认识并不是孤立出现的,人的认识是受客观世界的影响的,而客观世界又是与人们的行为紧密相关的。这也就意味着,人的行为对人的认识有反作用,认识是行为的函数,表述为:    x=F    
它的含义是:有某一类行为就会有某一类知识。    

把上述两个式子合并之后,我们可以得到这样的公式:    y=f(F)    x=F(f)    

这就是说,x和y都是它自身变化的函数——认识是认识变化的的函数,行为是行为变化的函数。    

索罗斯将该函数模式称作“反射性”。它实际上也是一种“自回归系统”。    

索罗斯同时认为,由于人认识上的局限性,所以,人的认识永远不可能达到绝对真理,因此,人的认识永远是片面的、不完全的。这种片面和不完全将会逐渐被累加,直到最后产生崩溃。    

反映到金融市场上,索罗斯的观点就好理解了:由于人的认识永远是片面的和不完全的,因此,人的行为也自然永远不可能是正确的,所以:市场永远是错的。既然市场永远是错的,那么,达到极点,市场必然会崩溃。    

在这样的理论指导下,索罗斯在投资实践中就全力对付市场的错误,并从中挖掘投资机会。在《金融炼金术》中,他记录了1985年8月16日-1987年11月7日的一次实验性投资过程,这一过程,他的资金增值达到了113%,取得了空前的成功。    

也是在这样的理论指导下,他才取得了一次交易赚10亿美元、通过个人基金之力将英国银行挤出欧洲汇率机制、推动了亚洲金融危机的发展。    
 

但索罗斯毕竟是一个伟大的投资家。即使有俄罗斯和香港的失败,也无损于他作为一个国际著名投资家的形象。他的投资实践之所以能取得成功,并不是他的运气格外好,也不是他的资金实力格外他,而是来自于他独特的投资哲学。    

投资哲学升华于投资理论。
投资理论是实践的总结,是经验的成果。而投资哲学则是投资理论的抽象化。投资理论总是片面的、有独特适应性的,但投资哲学则相对完整,并有广泛的适应性。投资哲学甚至就属于哲学的一种,可以指导人生和社会。能在投资哲学层面上讨论投资的人,本就不多。而上升到投资哲学的人则自然会想到社会哲学、人生哲学。所以,索罗斯作为一个投资家而谈社会、谈政治、谈哲学,更印证了他的伟大之处。    

但是,索罗斯所预言的股市的崩溃、欧元体系的崩溃、共产社会(他所谓的“封闭社会”)的崩溃,是否一定会发生呢?在《索罗斯:走在时间曲线前面的人》一书中,索罗斯自己也承认,既然存在着认识的局限性,那么,他的“反身性”也就必然是有局限的,“反身性理论本身就是反身性的”,他说,“这个理论导出一个问题:你怎么能够相信你知道有缺陷的信念呢”?既然如此,崩溃也许就未必会发生。    

索罗斯的伟大也就在于此,他敢于承认自己的错误,他的理论必然将葬送他的理论。

但索罗斯在俄罗斯的损失也就在于此。他看到了反身性,看到了俄罗斯经济的复苏,也想到了俄罗斯政府的应对措施。他在俄罗斯债券崩溃后去买债券,因为他相信市场是错误的。他确实看对了,但他没有笑到最后,相反,在俄罗斯大败而归。假设他的资金和时间足够丰富,他确实可以在几年后大赚一笔,因为俄罗斯债券随后大幅度上涨,上涨的基础就是石油价格的暴涨给俄罗斯带来的经济复苏。    

这就是投资者都会面临的一个困局:我们永远只知道现在,而不知道过去和将来。站在行情的曲线上,我们无法预测这一点与过去的哪一时刻哪一点相似,也无法预测这一点的未来将是哪一点。海森堡的测不准理论说,人们不可能在知道事物具体位置的同时也知道事物的运行速度。索罗斯预见到了俄罗斯的经济即将复苏、债券即将反弹,但他不知道的是“什么时候”。在实际投资的过程中,他进入了一个“鞅”的状态:你明明知道自己会赢,但你必须要有足够的时间、足够的金钱再加上足够的信心。    

其实,索罗斯的失败也正是他自己理论伟大之处。按照他的反身性理论,人们认识的误区会逐渐累计,达到极点,则必然崩溃。而他自己,他的“反身性”理论也存在着误区,这个误区同样会逐渐累计,达到极点,他自己也必然崩溃。    

“我是正确的,因为我错误”。这是一个悖论。    
从索罗斯的著作中可以看出,他的炼金术理论在描述上还存在着一定的缺陷,他的所谓反身性是承认一种“正反馈系统”,如人的认识偏差的累加造成的崩溃。但世界上任何系统都绝对不会只有正反馈,一定存在一定的负反馈,这种负反馈,就是对正反馈的一种修正。犹如股市,假设正反馈是上涨,则它一定存在着下跌的负反馈。犹如人,自高自大的人也不会一直自高自大下去,他也会有谦虚的时候。作为一种自反馈体系,系统会自发地修正其运行轨迹,防止其崩溃。       
根据热力学第二定律,在一个孤立的系统中,倾向于从有序转向无序,或者说从低熵状态转向高熵状态。熵是一种无序的程度。有序的维持需要能量,无序的维持则耗散能量。达到无序总是容易的,而走向有序则需要付出代价。    

而金融市场,恰恰就是一种高熵的无序状态。证券市场的有效性是其典型证明。我们无法知道今日上涨之后明日会上涨还是下跌,因为它是随机的。以上海证券市场为例,从1992年5月21日开放到2003年5月15日,合计2690个交易日。其收盘上涨的次数是1343次,下跌的次数是1347次,二者只相差4次,基本属于1:1的比例,符合随机分布特征。这种随机分布特征,就是一种高熵状态。这种高熵状态的产生,正是负反馈的结果。    

由于有了负反馈的存在,崩溃出现的几率就更少。要把握崩溃的机会投资获利,难度就相当大——要抓住一种出现几率很低的投资机会,本就几率不大。所以,索罗斯的前期投资的成功,实在是难能可贵。    

索罗斯投资失败后,也有自反馈的机会。我相信他现在读自己的著作感受应该有差异。尤其是他也许会修改他的“开放社会”理论。   

让人疑惑的是,金融市场的不确定性、反身性既然存在,未来的投资应该如何做呢?索罗斯没有给出答案,他的实验也是有成功、有失败。在总结实验过程的时候,他也做了自我批评。实际上,即使他这次实验完全成功,也无法不正视后来俄罗斯投资失败的现实。    

不过,我们可以从他的理论中推断出一些结果来:既然市场永远是错的,那就坚持跟市场反向操作。这就涉及一个问题:怎样判断“市场大趋势”呢?

我想,常规的判断也许比较困难,但突发性的崩溃、延续性的趋势突然加剧,都可以看成市场过度反应的例证。这样的市场机会,每年都可能发生。投资操作,可以放弃常规性的、日常性的交易,而重点抓这种崩溃或加剧,则胜算也许会比较大.

《孙子兵法》中的投资心理学决定股市成败关键

早在2500多年前,中国古代兵圣孙武就已经意识到心理因素在战争中的重要性,意识到心理因素是实施军事谋略的基础条件之一,孙武在其流传千古的军事名著《孙子兵法》中也多次提到心理因素的关键地位。时至今日,《孙子兵法》中提出的心理因素仍然是决定股市投资成败的关键性因素。  

《孙子兵法--九变篇》曰:故将有五危:
必死,可杀也;
必生,可虏也;
忿速,可侮也;
廉洁,可辱也;
爱民,可烦也。
凡此五者,将之过也,用兵之灾也。覆军杀将,必以五危,不可不察也。
  
意思是说:将帅有五种性格上的弱点,只知拼命死战的心理,会被杀死;有贪生怕死的心理,会被俘虏;性情急躁的,会因为经不起刺激,从而失去理智;爱好廉洁的名声,会不能忍受羞辱;爱护民众,并且竭尽全力的保护民众的,会导致过多的烦劳。所以这五种心理弱点,是将领的过错,也是用兵的灾难。军队覆没,将领牺牲,必定是由于这五种危险引起的,是不能不仔细慎重的。

这五种心理弱点也同样是最容易导致股市中投资者失败的主要心理因素,必须注意加以克服:
  
盲目胆大心理。
有些投资者从未认真系统地学习过投资理论技巧,也没有经过任何模拟训练,甚至连最起码的证券基础知识都不明白,就贸然的进入股市,参与投资,其资金帐户的迅速贬值将是必然的选择。还有的投资者一旦发现股价飚升或股评家推荐,就不假思索大胆追涨,常常因此被套牢在高位。

贪婪恐惧心理。
即使是一个聪明人,当他产生恐惧心理时也会变的愚笨。在证券市场中,恐惧常会使投资者的投资水平发挥失常,屡屡出现失误、并最终导致投资失败。因此,恐惧是投资者在股市中获取赢利的最大障碍之一。投资者要在证券市场中取得成功,必须要克服恐惧。
  
急切焦躁心理。
毕竟人非圣贤,由于股市风云莫测,投资者有时难免会心浮气噪。这种焦躁心理是炒股的大忌,它会使投资者操盘技术大打折扣,还会导致投资者不能冷静思考而做出无法挽回的错误决策。心理急切焦躁的投资者不仅最容易失败,也最容易灰心。很多时候投资者就是在充满焦躁情绪的投资中一败涂地的。
  
缺乏忍耐心理。
有些投资者恨不得,股票刚一买入就立即上涨,最好是大幅上涨。但是出现这种情况的概率很小,大多数情况下,即使是处于强势的个股也不可避免的要经历洗盘、震荡、回档、盘整等过程。这正是考验投资者耐心的时候,千万不要象得了芝麻丢了西瓜的猴子一样,看见其它股涨的好,就割肉追涨,或者赚了一点蝇头小利就急忙抛出,往往会得不偿失。
  
不愿放弃一切的心理。
证券市场中有数不清的投资机遇,但是,投资者的时间、精力和资金是有限的,是不可能把握住所有的投资机会,这就需要投资者有所取舍,通过对各种投资机会的轻重缓急、热点的大小先后等多方面衡量,有选择地放弃小的投资机遇,才能更好把握更大的投资机遇。
  
《孙子兵法--九变篇》曰:故用兵之法,无恃其不来,恃吾有以待之;无恃其不攻,恃吾有所不可攻也。意思是用兵的原则是:不能有指望敌人不会来的侥幸心理,而要依靠自己做好了充分准备;不能有指望敌人不会攻击的侥幸心理,而要依靠自己有了使敌人无法进攻的力量和防御。
  
在证券交易中,投资者中存在着各种形式的侥幸心理:当股市刚刚进入熊市以后,许多投资者明明发现市场已经是山雨欲来风满楼,但是仍然幻想着股市跌不深、幻想着救市、幻想着反转、幻想手中的股票一夜间成为黑马,无数次的逃生机会就在这种种不切实际的幻想中悄悄失去,这些幻想就是诞生于侥幸心理之上。侥幸心理是危害投资者利益,容易导致投资失败的主要原因之一。
  
还有的投资者总是抱着赌一把的侥幸心理。特别是有些新入市的投资者对股市缺乏必要的了解,以为股市是提款机,总想着一夜暴富和快速发财。实际上,炒股是一种投资行为,炒股和其它的实业投资行为一样,都有投入有产出、有风险有收益。
  
有侥幸心理的投资者通常缺乏正确研判市场的能力,正是因为他们缺乏对市场的足够认识,缺乏对趋势的清醒辨别。所以,他们的投资行为往往是建立在没有客观依据的基础上的,对他们来说,选股就如同是押宝,买卖操作就象是赌博。
  
股市是风险投资市场,投资者置身其中不能存有指望风险不会降临的侥幸心理,而要提高自身抵御风险的能力。(剽窃行为是可耻的,请联合证券的唐刚毅停止你的抄袭行为)具体而言要做到:在具体实施操作前,要制定周密的操盘计划;操作方案中要有完善的止损计划和止损标准,并且在发觉研判失误时,能果断止损。这样才不会在突如其来的打击中束手无策,也不会在漫漫熊途中越套越深。另外还要注意,不要盲目的追高,不要刻意的去追求暴利,要完全放弃赌一把的侥幸心理。
  
《孙子兵法--火攻篇》曰:“主不可以怒而兴师,将不可以愠而攻战。合于利而动,不合于利而止。怒可以复喜,愠可以复悦,亡国不可以复存,死者不可以复生。故明主慎之,良将警之。此安国全军之道也。”
  
意思是说:国君不可因愤怒而发动战争,将帅不可因气愤而出阵求战。对国家有利才用兵,对国家不利就要停止战争。愤怒可以恢复到欣喜,气忿可以恢复到高兴。国忘了就不能复存,人死了就不能再生。所以,对于战争,明智的国君要慎重,贤良的将帅要警惕,这是安定国家和保全军队的关键!
  
投资者也应该对投资行为保持慎重的态度,只有在符合利益原则的条件才可以参与投资,不符合利益原则的投资行为坚决不参与。在投资中千万不能因为生气而影响投资的情绪。更不能在处境被动时采用赌气式的操作,因为生气可以转化为平静、被动可以转化为主动,而赌气导致的失败往往会使投资者在物质和精神上遭受双重打击,所造成的损失将是难以弥补的。

READING THE MIND OF MR. MARKET

George Soros believes that everyone's view of the world is "somehow flawed or distorted," and how Soros turned that realization into a powerful investment tool.

While struggling with philosophical questions, Soros made what he considered to be a major intellectual discovery:
"I came to the conclusion that basically all our views of the world are somehow flawed or distorted, and then I concentrated on the importance of this distortion in shaping events."

Applying that discovery to himself, Soros concluded: "I am fallible." This was not just an observation; it became his operational principle and overriding belief.

Most people agree that other people make mistakes. Most will admit to having made mistakes - in the past. But who will openly acknowledge that they are fallible while making a decision?
Very few, as Soros implies in his comment in the book, Soros on Soros, about his former partner, Jim Rogers (fund manager and author of The Investment Biker): "The big difference between Jim Rogers and me was that Jim thought that the prevailing view was always wrong, whereas I thought that we may be wrong also."

When Soros acts in the investment arena, he remains aware that he can be wrong, and is critical of his own thought processes. This gives him unparalleled mental flexibility and agility.

If, as Soros believed, everybody's view of the world is "somehow flawed or distorted," then our understanding of the world is necessarily imperfect and often wrong.

Soros turned his realization that people's understanding of reality is imperfect into a powerful investment tool. On those occasions when he could see what others could not - because they were blinded, for example, by their beliefs - he came into his element.

When he started the Quantum Fund he tested his theory by searching for developing market trends or sudden changes about to happen that nobody else had noticed.

He found one such trend change in the banking industry.
Heavily regulated since the 1930s, banks were seen as staid, steady, conservative and most of all boring investments. There was no future for a hotshot Wall Street analyst in the banking business.
Soros sensed this was about to change: the old-style managers were retiring and being replaced by new, aggressive youngsters with MBAs. This new management, he felt, would focus on the bottom line and shake up the industry.
In 1972, Soros published a report titled "The Case for Growth Banks," forecasting that bank shares were about to take off. "He recommended some of the better-managed banks. In time, bank stocks began to rise, and Soros garnered a 50% profit."

Where Buffett seeks to buy $1 for 40 or 50 cents, Soros is happy to pay $1, or even more, for $1 when he can see a change coming that will drive that dollar up to $2 or $3.

To Soros, our distorted perceptions are a factor in shaping events. As he puts it, "what beliefs do is alter facts" in a process he calls reflexivity, which he outlined in his book The Alchemy of Finance.

For some, like the trader Paul Tudor Jones, the book was "revolutionary"; it clarified events "that appeared so complex and so overwhelming," as he wrote in the foreword.

To most others, however, the book was impenetrable, even unreadable, and few people grasped the idea of reflexivity Soros was attempting to convey. Indeed, as Soros wrote in the preface of the paperback edition, "Judging by the public reaction...I have not been successful in demonstrating the significance of reflexivity. Only the first part of my argument - that the prevailing bias affects market prices - seems to have registered. The second part - that the prevailing bias can in certain circumstances also affect the so-called fundamentals and changes in market prices cause changes in market prices - seems to have gone unnoticed."

Changes in market prices cause changes in market prices? Sounds ridiculous.
But it's not. To give just one example, as stock prices go up, investors feel wealthier and spend more money. Company sales and profits rise as a result. Wall Street analysts point to these "improving fundamentals," and urge investors to buy. That sends stocks up further, making investors even wealthier, so they spend even more. And so on it goes. This is what Soros calls a "reflexive process" - a feedback loop: a change in stock prices has caused a change in company fundamentals which, in turn, justifies a further rise in stock prices. And so on.

You have no doubt heard of this particular reflexive process. Academics have written about it; even the Federal Reserve has issued a paper on it. It's known as "The Wealth Effect."

Reflexivity is a feedback loop: perceptions change facts; and facts change perceptions. As happened when the Thai baht collapsed in 1997. In July 1997 the Central Bank of Thailand let its currency float. The bank expected devaluation of around 20%; but by December the baht collapsed from 26 to the U.S. dollar to over 50, a fall of more than 50%.

The bank had figured out that the baht was "really worth" around 32 to the dollar. Which it may well have been according to theoretical models of currency valuation. What the bank failed to take into account was that floating the baht set in motion a self-reinforcing process of reflexivity that sent the currency into free-fall.

Thailand was one of the "Asian Tigers," a country that was developing rapidly and was seen to be following in Japan's footsteps. Fixed by the government to the U.S. dollar, the Thai baht was considered a stable currency. So international bankers were happy to lend Thai companies billions of U.S. dollars. And the Thais were happy to borrow them because U.S. dollar interest rates were lower.

When the currency collapsed, the value of the U.S. dollar debts companies had to repay suddenly exploded...when measured in baht. The fundamentals had changed.
Seeing this, investors dumped their Thai stocks. As they exited, foreigners converted their baht into dollars and took them home. The baht crumbled some more. More and more Thai companies looked like they would never be able to repay their debts. Both Thais and foreigners kept selling.

Thai companies cut back and sacked workers. Unemployment skyrocketed; workers had less to spend - and those who still had money to spend held onto it from fear of uncertainty. The Thai economy tanked...and the outlook for many large Thai companies, even those with no significant dollar debts, began to look more and more precarious.
As the baht fell, the Thai economy imploded - and the baht fell some more. A change in market prices had caused a change in market prices.

For Soros, reflexivity is the key to understanding the cycle of boom followed by bust. Indeed, he writes, "A boom/bust process occurs only when market prices...influence the so-called fundamentals that are supposed to be reflected in market prices."

His method is to look for situations where "Mr. Market's" perceptions diverge widely from the underlying reality. On those occasions when Soros can see a reflexive process taking hold of the market, he can be confident that the developing trend will continue for longer, and prices will move far higher (or lower) than most people using a standard analytical framework expect.
Soros applies his philosophy to identify a market trend in its early stages and position himself before the crowd catches on.

In 1969 a new financial vehicle, real estate investment trusts (REITs), attracted his attention. He wrote an analysis - widely circulated at the time - in which he predicted a "Four Act" reflexive boom/bust process that would send these new securities sky-high - before they collapsed.

Act I: As bank interest rates were high, REITs offered an attractive alternative to traditional sources of mortgage finance. As they caught on, Soros foresaw a rapid expansion of the number of REITs coming to market.

Act II: Soros expected that the creation of new REITs, and expansion of existing ones would pour floods of new money into the mortgage market, causing a housing boom. That would, in turn, increase the profitability of REITs and send the price of their trust units skyrocketing.

Act III: To quote from his report, "The self-reinforcing process will continue until mortgage trusts have captured a significant part of the construction loan market." As the housing boom slackened, real estate prices would fall, REITs would hold an increasing number of uncollectible mortgages - "and the banks will panic and demand that their lines of credit be paid off."

Act IV: As REIT earnings fall, there would be a shakeout in the industry...a collapse.
Since "the shakeout is a long time away," Soros advised there was plenty of time to profit from the boom part of the cycle. The only real danger he foresaw "is that the self-reinforcing process [Act II] would not get under way at all."

The cycle unfolded just as Soros had expected, and he made handsome profits as the boom progressed. Having turned his attention to other things, over a year later after REITs had already begun to decline, he came across his original report and "I decided to sell the group short more or less indiscriminately." His fund took another million dollars in profits out of the market.

Soros had applied reflexivity to make money on the way up and the way down.
To some, Soros's method may appear similar to trend-following. But trend-followers (especially chartists) normally wait for a trend to be confirmed before investing. When the trend-followers pile in (as in "Act II" of the REIT cycle) Soros is already there. Sometimes he would add to his positions as the trend-following behavior of the market increased the certainty of his convictions about the trend.

But how do you know when the trend is coming to an end? The average trend-follower can never be sure. Some get nervous as their profits build, often bailing out on a bull market correction. Others wait until a change in trend is confirmed - which only happens when prices have passed their highs and the bear market is under way.

But Soros's investment philosophy provides a framework for analyzing how events will unfold. So he can stay with the trend longer, and take far greater profits from it than most other investors. And, as in the REIT example, profit from both the boom and the bust.

Soros's theory of reflexivity is his explanation for Mr. Market's manic-depressive mood swings. In Soros's hands it becomes a method for identifying when the mood of the market is about to change, for enabling him to "read the mind of the market."

Sunday, December 23, 2007

散戶的孫子兵法 觀念可以打敗技術

第一章 始計篇 第一條 死生之地 存亡之道
根據證管會的統計,臺灣有一半以上的成年人,都曾投資過股票。如果扣除掉不能或沒辦法投資的人口,幾乎所有四肢健全的成年人,都是股海染缸的一分子,所以投資股票這件事,當然就是每個家庭的「家之大事」。股票投資其實有點像慢性中毒,剛開始只是好玩,輸贏幾次就越玩越大,最後就有可能演變為「死生之地」「存亡之道」。投資人如果能在投資前,先做好基本的功課及研究,相信很多錯誤都是可以避免的。
孫子兵法是一本專門研究戰爭的書,但很多人也把它用於商場。商場如戰場,股票市場的爾虞我詐,簡直就是戰爭的翻版,散戶投資人要想投資獲利,孫子兵法也是一門必修的學分。

第二章 作戰篇 第五條 兵貴勝 不貴久
投資跟投機是有差異的,長期的計劃叫投資,短線的賺差價叫投機。就主力大戶的立場來說--「兵貴勝 不貴久」,因為他們需要擴充信用或質押股票來護盤,所以必須採取速戰速決的戰略。如果作戰時間曠廢時日,各項費用與日俱增,結果通常都是災難收場。華隆的華國飯店,新巨群的中鋼結構,都是師老兵疲的結果。就散戶的立場來看,應該是「兵貴久 不貴勝」,因為你是拿閒錢投資,什麼時候賺不重要,多等幾天也無妨,只要有一天會賺就好。
股市的消息及資訊,都是被人所掌握,想要短線投機賺差價,正好是落入主力的陷阱中,所以投資結果通常都是凶多吉少,投資人怎麼可以捨棄自己的長處,反而去就自己的短處呢?

第三章 謀攻篇 第七條 此五者,知勝之道也
投資會不會賺,一開始的觀念,幾乎就已經決定了結果,這個觀念就是「知己」。你可以打贏董監大戶+內線嗎?你的家人信任你去買股票嗎?你是投資不是賭博嗎?風險多大你能控制嗎?萬一長期套牢也可以生活無慮嗎?你有努力做功課嗎?股票投資會不會賺錢,根本就不需要在戰場上決定,投資前先仔細的研究分析清楚,你自己就會先知道結果。

第四章 軍形篇 第二條 不可勝者,守也
打勝仗是不容易的事,你先要準備充分,然後想辦法乘人之危,最後要一鼓作氣,這樣才有可能成功。即使能把對方打敗,自己通常也是傷痕累累血流成河。但是防守就不一樣了,只要準備充分,有吃有喝加上銅牆鐵壁,你高興守多久就可以守多久,敵人最後只能棄兵曳甲,另外去尋找比較容易下手的目標。
我在選擇股票的時候,第一個考量不是會不會賺,而是這支股票應該不會讓我賠。進攻者的輸贏,其實不是非常重要,即使輸了,也可以逃回老家重新準備。防守者可不可以守得住,就是很重要的事,因為覆巢之下幾乎都是「無完卵」。

第九章 行軍篇 第三條 謹覆索之
股票市場基本上是個詐騙橫行的地方,你想得到的騙術這裡都有。如果想要投資成功,你就必須知道那裡不能去,那些消息不能聽。我認為所有的明牌都不能信,包括我報的明牌在內,當然明牌充斥的地方,也是不能去的地方。你能相信的,只有按照正確的觀念研究,你自己努力所得到的成果。

第十章 地形篇 第六條 進不求名,退不避罪
股票投資永遠有風險,很多人的失敗不是輸,贏的時候可能更危險,因為輕忽燥進的結果,不但會把贏的輸掉,更有可能演變成一場大災難。我就曾經因為獲利而隨便投資過一次,代價是三年動彈不得,還差一點把以前賺的全輸掉。投資股票我們必須以平常心看待輸贏,贏了,拿一部份出來讓人生更多色彩。輸了,就當是自己努力不夠,但決不會傷到老本,該唱的歌還是照唱,該跳的舞當然也要繼續跳。
吳王闔閭有意向中原擴張,首要的敵人就是強大的楚國。以實力較弱的吳國來說,打勝仗唯一的方法,就是找一位能用兵的大將,才有可能以寡擊眾。經過伍子胥七次的舉薦,默默無名的孫武得到吳王的信任,最後幫吳王打敗了楚國,成功的逐鹿中原。散戶投資股票的條件雖然很差,但是只要方法觀念正確,能夠知己又知彼,還是有獲利的機會,讓我們大家一起來努力吧。

股市孫子兵法 42 法門

1、虛者勝
孫子曰:“兵者,詭道也。”意思是欺騙敵人也是一種兵法。若只是正直作戰是不能獲勝的。欺騙人或被欺騙有時也是一種智慧的比賽,也是一種策略。孫子在兵法中一再說過,真實的策略要隱瞞,因為如果讓敵方知道了真實情形,則我方的弱點暴露就會招致失敗。“兵之形,避實而擊虛”。關於虛實有兩種解釋,其一是空虛的虛,指力量薄弱,給人有機可乘。充實的實,指士氣旺盛,戰斗力強的狀態。第二種解釋就是虛偽的虛,事實的實。
股價的變動,反映了投資者內心的虛實。有很多的投資者並沒有自己的謀略,僅僅領先商業情報作為謀略攻勢。但只依據情報往往是不能獲勝的。要注意事實,所謂事實,就是要收集可以信賴的數字,然後作定量的研究,根據自己的目的意圖把這些數字作適當的處理,這樣,自己就會有一個根據地,然後從這裡看清股市的虛實動態,等待攻擊的機會。

2、要跟從勢
孫子曰:“勢者,因利而制權也。”將此運用到投資方面的意思就是:股票市場上的勢就是資金的流動。金錢流動的強弱就代表封的強弱,勢是因為期待賺錢而產生的。期待愈大,資金的流動性也就愈大,勢就愈強,而其他人也會跟著這個勢進行,所以也就加強了這個盛世,在這種狀態下任何人都無法壓制這個勢。這勢就會發揮意想不到的威力,而出現令人驚異的行情。
孫子認為在戰爭中,要保持站在有利的地位,只要擁有有利地位,勢就永遠在自己這邊,但勢的變動性很大。現在雖然在自己這邊,可只要敵人一有動靜,自己這方就有可能陷入不利的地位。投資股票也是如此,因為大家都想賺錢,於是順著強勢而去買股票,股票也因此而一路高漲,但這時候只要某些人開始套利,那投資者賺錢的期待就會感到不安,買手採取觀望的態度,勢也就慢慢萎縮了。在此期間,如果賣壓一增加,今後對於漲價的希望就會破滅,股價也會下跌。所以說,市場的動態是由勢來決定和支配的,而自己的力量無法造成勢的投資者,就只有跟著勢來進行。但必須跟著勢強的股票,以加強本身的勢。

3、文武雙全
孫子曰:“故令之以文,齊之以武,是謂必取。”意思是所以要教士兵學會仁義,以軍法訓練士兵,才能成為必可取勝之軍旅。運用於股票市場就是:“文”就如股票投資中的基本分析,“武”就象股市中的技術分析,作為一個投資者要文武雙全,才能出入自如,成為股市上贏家。

4、結交須先知
孫子曰:“是故不知諸侯之謀者,不能預交。”意思是不了解各國諸候的企圖,不能與之結交朋友。在股票投資中,與其他做手一起炒股票必須事先了解其他做手的目的,投資策略是什麼,作到知已知彼,以免偷雞不成反蝕一把米。

5、靜觀其變
孫子曰:“火發而兵靜,待而勿攻。”意思是敵人內部火勢已經燃起,而敵軍仍能保持鎮靜,要觀察等待,不要馬上進攻。在股票行場中,在低檔價位出現連續利空,且重大的利空出現而股價仍然跌不下去時,不要把股票賣出去,更不可放空。

6、貴在先知
孫子曰:“明君賢將,所以動而勝入,成功出於眾者,先知也。先知者,不可取一鬼神,不可象於事,不可驗於度,必取於人,知敵之情者。”意思是:“英明的君王,賢能的將帥,之所以一出兵就能戰勝敵人,成就超出一般人之上,就是因為能先了解敵情。要事先了解敵情,不可取決於鬼神迷信,不可以用過去相似的事做比較,也不可以用日月星辰運行的位置做推測的依據,一定要取決於間諜的情報,才能真正了解敵情。在股票市場中,只有知已知彼,才能百戰百勝,尤其是在敵暗我明的情況下,更應如此。市場主力大戶的心理是難以推測的。

7、心迷股市轉,心悟轉股市
孫臏曰:“凡兵之道陣、勢、變、權。”察此四者,所以破強敵,取猛將也,得四者生,失四者死亡交叉。”意思是凡數戰斗有四要素:第一;實施戰斗在於陣;第二,陣勢優於敵人;第三,造成勝敵之優勢;第四,乘勢掌握機會在於權。戰爭的目的在於求得勝利,勝利在於戰略戰術設計之優良,而戰略戰術的設計,則以陣、勢、變、權為戰斗的四要素。所以孫臏說:能夠明察這四種道理的,就可以破強敵而擒猛將,得此四者則生,失此四者則死亡交叉。在股票市場中,作為投資者要心迷股市轉,心悟轉股市,在進行股票操作前,先策划整體的操作戰略,瞄準和確認股市中的大勢,占有比對方更有利的優勢地位,隨機應變,善於把握比較好的時機,能夠做到這樣,在股票市場中定能穩操勝算。

8、必備素質
孫子曰:“將帥須知,1.上知天之道;2.下知地之理;3.內得其民之心;4.外知敵之情;5.用兵則知八陣之運用日;6.見可勝之形則戰;見無可勝之形則上。”意思是,作為將帥需要知道天之道即陰陽、寒暑風雨、晦明。下知地之理,即為知道地之遠近、陰易、廣狹、死亡交叉生。內得其民之心,即為內得其民則同仇敵愾,為國家效命。外知敵方之情,即為知敵之強弱,將之賢愚,以及正品、裝備、戰術等。用兵則知八陣之部署與運用,則可以知已之長攻敵。在股票市場中,作為市場主力和操槃者需要知道股票的大勢,了解投資大眾的心理,也要了解公司董監事對股價所持的態度,還有其他主力對作的現象。另外,在炒股票時,要注意制定策略,在有把握贏的趨勢中才下場,若在沒有把握的情況下應暫時休息。

9、攻其不備 出其不意
孫子曰: “攻其不備,出其不意”意思是在戰爭中,要乘敵人在無防備的情況下,在敵方思想松懈,放松警惕的情況下,乘敵人不注意時攻打沒有防備的地方。在股票投資中也是如此,一些市場老手和做手總是在市場熱火朝天、大勢正旺的時候賣出股票,而在市場冷落,人流稀少,岌岌可危的情況下買進股票,最後總是碩果累累。

10、兵貴神速
孫子曰:“故兵貴勝不貴久。”意思是用兵作戰的目的是要取得勝利,絕不能拖延太久。因為戰爭一拖延太久,就會失去精銳的士兵,戰斗力就會降低。另外,如果戰爭拖得過久,國家的負擔就過大,費用會增加。在股票投資上也是如此。所以在股市處於槃局的情況下不要進入股市,待衝破趨勢線,並出現買、賣訊號時再進場,真可謂事半功倍。

11、不戰而屈人之兵
孫子曰:“是故百戰百勝非善之善者也;不戰而屈人之兵,善之善者也。”意思是,打仗即使是打了100次贏了100次,也算不上高明中的最高明,能夠不發動戰斗而敵軍降服才是高明中的最高明。在股票投資中也是如此,有些投資者進入股市100次,而且每次都獲利,但一百次下來,累計所獲的利潤還沒看得準的長線投資者所賺的錢多。其中奧妙在於,一個只注意眼前的利潤,而另一個則放長線,釣大魚;一個重局部,一個重整個大勢。

12、速戰速決
孫子曰:“其用戰也貴勝,久則鈍兵挫銳,攻城則力屈。放兵聞挫速,未睹巧之外也,故兵久百國利者,未之有也。故不盡知用兵之害者,則不能盡知用兵之利也。”其意指,用兵作戰,以取得勝利為第一要素,戰爭的時間一拖長,則兵器鈍弊,士氣也會受到挫折,進攻的時候戰斗力消耗殆盡。所以用兵的道理在於迅速,不可逞巧持久。長時間用兵作戰對國家有利的,是從來沒有的事。因此,不能全面徹底了解用兵的害處,也就不能真正了解用兵的好處。在風雲變幻的股票市場上也是如此,如果長期投資,就會受到中途跌價的損失,如果要等到股價恢復,就需要花費很長的時間。另外,在股票投資中若領先借款作信用交易,日後也就會臨背負利息增加的負擔,償還期一到,往往會做某些損失來處理這些事。因此,當股票市場出現槃局的情況下,不要進入市場,等待衝破趨勢線以及出現買或賣的信號時,迅速入場,往往會收到事半功倍的效果。

13、運籌帷 ?
孫子曰:“夫未戰而廟算勝者,得算多也,未戰而廟算不勝者,得算少也;多算勝,少算不勝,而況於無算呼?”意思是在戰爭未發動以前,先在廟宇裡預測估算比較敵方和我方優勢和劣勢,估算的結果,如我方優勢條件居多,奪取勝利的機會便大,如我方所占優勢較少,則得勝的機會亦較少。多做比較計算,對敵我方面的形勢就越有把握,少做比較計算就越沒有把握,更何況毫無計算比較呢?在股票市場中,投資可以,投機也可以,但就是不能賭博。在購買股票之前,要冷靜地思考,仔細地分析自己的經濟能力有多大,能承擔多大的風險,適合於長線還是短線。經過一番比較分析後,再選擇適當的時機,把優良的股票作為自己買進的對象。

14、權衡利弊
孫子曰:“智者之慮,必雜於利害。雜於利而務可信也,雜於害而患可解也。合於利而動,不合於利而止。”意思是明智的將帥在考慮問題的時候,必定要同時兼顧有利的一面和有害的一面。在有利的狀況中考慮有利的一面,可以增強信心,加固信念。在有利的狀況,考慮有害的一面,可以解除隱患,總之,有利才行動,無利則不妄動。在股票投資中,凡事不可都向好的地方想,不實的海市蜃樓,只會帶來遺憾,重要的是投資者在買賣股票上要把可能獲得的利益和遭受的虧損進行衡量和分析。然後再進行投資,免得走勢與自己的想法相違時而後悔莫及。在無利潤的情況下,或看不準行情的情況下最好不要投資。投資應以能否獲利為前提。

15、明察詳情 呼風喚雨
孫子曰:“將軍之事,靜以幽,正以治,能愚士率之耳目,使之先知。易其事,華其謀,使人無識,居其所,遷其途,使人不得慮。帥與之期,如登高而去其梯,師與之深,入諸侯之地而發其機。若驅群羊。驅而往,驅而來,莫知所之。聚三軍之眾,投之於險,此將軍之事也。九地之變,屈伸之利,人情之理,不可不察也。”意思是統帥軍隊這件事情要冷靜,沉著,深思遠慮,要公正無私,嚴整不亂。要約束士兵的視聽,使他對用兵的計畫不知道,改變已經決定的事,更動已經決定的計畫,使人無法測知動向,改變駐地,更改行軍路線,使人意想不到。突然下令出征,如令登高處而撤走樓梯,使之抱有死亡交叉無歸的決心。主帥帶領士兵深入到諸侯之要地,才象發動弓弩之機一般飛射而出。又象趕羊群一般,趕過來趕過去,使士兵都不知道要到那裡去,集結大軍投入危險的戰場是將軍的責任。因此,各種地形的變化,進退伸縮的利與不利,士兵的情緒與心理,都是不能不仔細考察的。在股票市場中,主力大戶如同統帥千軍萬馬的將軍,一呼百應。一聽到主力大戶拔檔,便又不限價地大批殺出。所以,一般的投資大眾有時簡直是摸不清方向,只有跟著主力轉。而主力大戶,一般都非常注意投資散戶的心理和動向。

16、穩操勝算
孫子曰:“故善用兵者,譬如率然,率然者,常山之蛇也,擊其首,則尾至;擊其尾則首至;擊其中,其首尾俱至。夫吳人與越人相惡也,吳越同舟共濟而遇風,其相救也如左右手。”其意指,善於用兵的人,就象常山的蛇一樣,打它頭部,尾部就來救護;打它的尾部,其頭部又來策應;打它的中間,頭尾一起來救。例如吳國人和越國人不和,但同乘一船而遇上了風浪,也能如左右手一樣互相救援。在股市裡,具有非常豐富操作經驗的投資者,操槃一定是有條不紊,在看錯行情的情況下能保本,看對行情時,賺大錢。所以有經驗的炒作老手,在股市風雲裡,能任憑風浪起,穩坐釣魚台。一般的投資大眾應不斷地研習股市行情,做一個成功的投資者。

17、深思熟慮 穩中求勝
孫子曰:“知兵者,動而不迷,興而不空。”意思是個真正懂得用兵的將帥,他的一切行動都是深思熟慮的產物,而不是盲目的行動,一切措施均有無窮的變化。專門從事股票研究的人,操作勝算較大,而一些盲目投資入市的人也到處亂碰,到頭來可能是竹籃打水一場空,手中持有的“白花花的銀子”也丟失了。因此,入股市投資,千萬不能盲人騎瞎馬,而要勤於思考,勤於分析股市行情,經過思考以後再做投資決策。

18、隨機應變
孫子曰:“故進不求名,退不避罪,唯民是保,而利於主,國之寶也。”意思是做主將的人必須把握住,不貪求戰勝的虛名,不加避退卻的罪責,只求保國為民,只求有利於群主,這樣的將帥是國家的瑰寶。在股票市場裡,作為投資專家或投資顧問,應該象將在外,君命有所不受的邊疆大臣一樣,隨著股市行情的變化,要採取隨機應變的策略,不能囿於過去成功的經驗,要面對現實的形勢,制定切實可行的措施,以達到賺錢的目的。

19、避開“五危”
孫子曰:“將有五危,必死亡交叉可殺,必生可虜,貪速可悔,廉潔可辱,愛民可煙。凡此五危,將之過也,用兵之災也。”意思是,將帥有五種最危險的事,只知死亡交叉拼,如暴虎憑河,就可能遭敵人所殺;貪生怕死亡交叉,臨陣畏怯,就可能被敵人俘虜;性子急燥,又輕易發怒,就可能受池凌辱;廉潔好名,就可能經不起誹謗;慈眾愛民,則可能被敵人煩擾。這五項危險,都是將帥易犯的錯誤,也是用兵作戰的大害。在股票市場中,有些曾在股市風雲中享有盛譽的人,由於犯了上述“五危”,而淪落風塵。因此,作為一個股市上的投資老手或專家,應避開“五然”,不要在成功的舞台上只扮演“曇花一現”的角色。要不斷完善自己,克服缺點,爭當股市上的常勝高手。

20、千軍易得 一將難求
孫子曰:“將者,智、信、仁、勇、嚴也。”意思是:作為一個軍事將領必須具備:才智、威信、仁愛、英勇、嚴肅等素質。“對於股票市場的主力大戶,一般的投資大眾又敬又畏,愛跟著搭轎,又怕被 “套牢”。實際上,主力大戶就象統帥千軍萬成的將領,是股市中難得的人才。正所謂“千軍易得,一將難求”。

21、謹慎投資
孫子曰:“兵者國之大事,死亡交叉生之地,存亡之道,不可不察也。”意思是:戰爭是國家的大事,直接關係到人民大眾的生死亡交叉,也關係到國家的存亡。所以,必需審慎思考體察才行。在股市裡,金錢的輸贏,直接關係到投資者的身家性命,沒有把握賺錢的投資者最好不要輕易介入,不可匆忙投入股市。

22、心浮氣躁多失敗
孫子曰:“不爭天下之交,不養天下之杖,信已之私,威加於敵,故其成可拔,其國可墜。投之亡地然後存,陷之死亡交叉地然後生。”意思是不爭取友好邦國,不培養深通機謀之士。只憑一已之私,憑民兵威制敵,本身將有城破國毀的可能。在股票市場裡,炒股票的人,一般都宜心平氣靜,如果是心浮氣躁,多以失敗而告終。

23、冷靜從事
孫子曰:“夫戰勝攻取,而不修其功者凶,命曰費留。故曰:明主慮之,即時修之,非利之功,非得不用,非危不戰。主不可怒而與師,將不可慍而致戰;合於利而動,不合利而上。怒可以復喜,慍可以復悅;亡國不可以復存,死亡交叉者不可以復生。胡明尹慎之,即將警之,此安國全軍。”意思是凡戰必勝,攻必取,而不能鞏固勝利成果,是很危險的事。這就叫做“費留”。所以說,明智的國君一定得考慮這一點,杰出的將帥也必須認真處置,不是對國家有利,就不行動,不能取得勝利就不用兵,不是非常危險就不作戰。國群切不可因一時憤怒而動員作戰,將帥也不可因一時之憤怒而與敵交戰,要符合國家的利益才能行動,符合國家利益即停止。憤怒可以轉化為喜悅,但是,國家亡了就不可以恢復舊觀,人死亡交叉了更不能復活。所以,明智的君主一定慎重用兵,杰出的將軍一定要警惕用兵,這才是安定國家、保全軍旅的根本所在。在股票市場中,切記賠錢不加碼是期貨交易的一條重要守則。投資者當投資股票虧損的時候,一定要保持頭腦冷靜。所謂君子報仇十年不晚,留得青山在,作為日後擇機再入的資本。切忌在輸錢的時候,喪失理智,胡亂操作,最終一敗塗地。

24、量力而行
孫子曰:“故小敵之堅,大致之擒也。”意思是,力量弱小的軍隊,如自不量力地去硬碰硬,就必須會變成強大敵人的俘虜。在股市裡,以丙種融資作股票的投資人,必須藝高膽大,否則的話,一個反轉,便容易斷頭。用大錢賺小錢,成功的概率高,而以小錢去賺大錢,則有可能造成以卵擊石的下場。

25、知已知彼 百戰不殆
孫子曰:“知已知彼,百戰不殆;知天知地,勝乃可全。”意思是既了解敵人,又了解自己,那麼可以經曆百次戰斗也不會發生危險。既了解天時,又了解地利,勝利的機會就完全無缺了。在股市裡,投資者應做到既知道自己的能耐和經濟實力,又要分析、研究各個股票的個性,做到知已知彼。另外,還要分析整個國家的經濟大勢。做到了這幾點,投資獲利便可穩操勝券了。

26、蓄勢待發
孫子曰:“昔之善戰者,先為不可勝,必待敵之可勝。勝可知,而不可為。故善戰者,先立於不敗之地,而不失敵之敗也。是故勝兵先勝,而後求戰,敗兵先戰,而後求勝。”意思是,古代善於用兵用戰的人,總是先製造有利形勢,而使自己不被敵人戰勝,然後再等待可能戰勝敵人的機會。勝利固然可以事先知道,但是敵人有無可乘之隙,卻不能勉強造成,所以善於用兵作戰者,先要站在不失敗的基礎上,使敵人無機可乘,而且不要錯過敵人敗亡的機會。所以勝利者都是先創造必勝的條件,然後再與敵人作戰,只有失敗者,總是先與敵人作戰,然後再僥幸求勝。在股市裡,凡事預則立。投資者在投資股票前,要先研究基本分析、技術分析和財務分析,待比較透徹地了解以後,再進入股票市場,進行實戰操作。這樣勝算的把握就較大。

27、有備無患
孫子曰:“故用兵者,無恃吾有以待之。無恃其不攻,恃吾有所不可攻也。”意思是:所以用兵的法則是,不要寄希望於敵人不會來,而要靠自己有萬全的準備,嚴陣以待;不要寄希望於敵人不會進攻,而要靠自己有敵人無法攻破的力量。在股市中,過度地擴張信用是導致失敗的一個很重要的因素,股市上的行情沒有絕對的,如果市場行情盡如人意的話,那麼股市中就沒有輸家。因此,適度的操作策略與資金管理可以確保投資的成果。

28、逆勢操作失敗多
孫子曰:“兵非貴益多,惟無武進,足以並力料敵取人而已。夫惟無慮而易敵者,必擒於人。”意思是,用兵作戰,並不在於兵愈多愈好,只要不輕視敵人而盲目躁進,就可以集中力量,算敵人之虛實,乘勝追擊,只有無深謀遠慮,而又輕視敵人者,才必遭敵所擒。在股票市場裡,大戶並不一定都是贏家。作為大戶,如果妄自尊大,驕傲自滿,逆勢操作的話,結局也只有一個,那就是敗亡。作為投資散戶,也並非不能取得較大的戰果,只在勤研技術,勣蓄力量,來日一樣可以成為大戶。

29、師傅領進門 修行在各人
孫子曰:“陣而後戰,兵法之常,運用之妙,存乎一心。”意思是在決戰之前應先設計好戰略戰術,這是用兵最基本的方法。至於臨戰時的隨機應變,就不是事先能預測到的,往往要反應敏銳,靈活機動地乘機把握對我方最有利的方法策略才是。在股票市場中也是如此,“師父領進門,修行在個人。”股市中的千變萬化,沒有絕對的上昇或下跌大勢,一個投資者,要想穩操勝算,獲取豐厚的利潤,就必須靈活地運用自己所學,並跟著股市大勢隨機應變。千萬不能鑽進所學的知識走不出來。

30、守攻高招
孫子曰:“善守者,藏於九地之下,善動者,動於九天之上。”意思是,擅長於防守的人,象深藏於地底一樣,使人無法知其虛實,善於進攻的人,象飛躍於高空一樣,使人無法防備。“在股市裡,善於炒做的主力大戶,往往是深藏不露, ?壓進貨做好底部區,然後配合宣傳攻勢突破阻力線,造成軋空股票狂漲的形勢,然後暗中分段出貨,賺取巨額利潤,然後暗中分段出貨,賺取巨額利潤,真可謂 “股林高手”。

31、出奇制勝
孫子曰:“凡戰者,以正合,以奇勝。”意思是,大凡作戰都是以用兵的正常法則與敵方交戰,然後順應戰況的變化,用奇兵取勝。在股票市場中,投資者除了謀求正規的基本分析、財務分析、技術分析技巧外,尤其是要注意市場心理的分析研究,這樣才能根據股市的變化,用靈活的對策獲利。

32、避實擊虛
孫子曰:“天兵形象水,水之形,避高而趨下;兵之形,避實而擊虛。”意思是用兵的規律象水一樣,水流動的規律是以高處向低處流,用兵的規律是避開敵人的鋒芒、堅強之處。而攻擊其虛弱的地方。在股市裡,股票價格若漲不上去的話就回檔下來整理,跌不下去就反彈向上,這是股票價格波動的規律,多方和空方哪一方較弱的話,就會成輸家,較強的一方便是贏家。

33、退一步 進二步
孫子曰:“運爭之難者,以迂為直,以患為利。”意思是在戰爭中制勝條件最難的就是:如何化迂迥曲折的遠路為直線的近路,如何化種種不利因素為有利因素。在股票市場中,主力操作股票都是為了前進先後退,為了跳高先蹲下,結果都是滿載而歸。

34、透過現象看本質
孫子曰:“辭卑而益備者,進也。辭強而進驅者,退也。見利百不進者,勞也。”意思是如果敵人的使者言辭謙卑,但軍旅卻勣極準備應戰,這是向我方進攻的先兆。如果使者言辭強硬,並且在行動上擺出進攻的姿態,這是敵方後退的預兆。敵人看見了利益而不行動,表示軍心疲憊。在股票市場中,低檔利空消息頻傳是主力大戶進貨的大好時機。高檔利多消息不斷傳出,是主力出貨的時機。有時市場傳言,專家預測股票的價格將昇至更高時,卻被多頭買超了,大家準備獲利,結果反而後繼無力。

35、虛虛實實 霧裡看花
孫子曰:“故攻者,敵不知其所守;善守者,敵不知其所攻。微乎!至於無形,神乎!神乎!至於無聲,故能為敵之司命。”意思是所以善於進攻的,能使敵人不知如何防守才好,善於防守者,能使敵人不知怎樣進攻才好。多麼微妙啊!微妙到看不出一點形跡,多麼神奇啊!神奇到沒有一點聲息,所以就能夠掌握敵人的生死亡交叉存亡的大權。在股票市場中,主力大戶要掌握主動之權,操作股票漲中帶跌,跌中有漲,虛虛實實,實實虛虛,將對方的心理搞亂。如在低檔 ?壓進貨,讓人以為是破線該跌,股價處在高檔的時候,拉高出貨,讓人誤以為形勢一片大好。使人無法感覺到股價將向高處走,只有做到了這樣,才能掌握住股價昇跌的控制權。

36、靜中顯“神”
孫子曰:“始如處女,敵人開戶,後如脫兔,敵不及拒。”意思是在開始的時候象處女一樣沉靜,等待敵人放松了戒備,然後象脫兔一樣迅速,使敵人對抗不及,從而取得勝利。在股票市場中,當股價處於槃底狀況時,許多投資者失去了信心,大量拋出手持股票。等股價一突破槃局,馬上就以迅雷不及掩耳的方法,快速挺昇,待散戶知道時,已經來不及了。

37、凡事預則立
孫子曰:“故知戰之地,知戰之日,則可千裡而會戰。”意思是只要事先能預知與敵人交戰的地點,能預知與敵人交戰的時間,那麼即使是長途跋涉,也可以與敵人決戰。在股票市場中,如果投資者能運用基本分析和技術分析的各種方法,先預測股價的上昇和下跌的幅度,再根據自己的經濟實力制定投資操作策略,這樣,買賣股票的成功概率就會高多了。

38、如何駕馭市場
孫子曰:“故不知諸侯之謀者,不能預交,非霸王之兵。故三軍之事,親莫親於間,賞莫於間,事莫密於間,非聖者不能用間,非仁義不能使間,非微妙不能得間之實。微哉!無所不用間也。”意思是不了解諸侯政策的不能預先結交,就不能算作是霸主的軍旅。所以軍隊中的一切事務,沒有比間諜再親信了,也沒有比間諜賞賜更厚了,更沒有比間諜再機密了,不能才智過人的將帥,不能運用間諜:不是大仁大義的人,不能差遣間諜;不是用心細微,手段巧妙,不能辯別情報之真偽。微妙啊!微妙啊!真是無處不可用間謀。在股票市場裡,有很多消息,傳言虛虛實實,簡直是令人難以捉摸。所以眾多的散戶本來想搭轎。結果變成了抬轎,想拔檔結果被洗出場,市場主力,決不是最新近的朋友。作為投資者本身應多研究心理分析,技術分析,這才是上策。

39、樣樣顯功力
孫子曰:“疾如風、徐如林、侵掠如火,不動如山,難知如陰,動如雷霆。”意思是軍旅行動時,快速如風;靜止時,肅穆嚴整如林木一般;進攻敵人時,如燎燃的烈火,猛不可擋;防守時,如山岳一樣不可動搖;隱蔽時,如烏雲遮天,使敵人無從知曉;快速動作起來,如導雷不及掩耳,使敵人無從退避。在股市裡,做手、董監、炒手做股票的過程就是如此。

40、長紅會更紅(避其銳氣擊其惰歸)
孫子曰:“故善用兵者,避其銳氣,擊其惰歸。無邀正正之旗,勿擊堂堂之陣,此治變者也。”意思是所以善於用兵作戰的將帥,先在初期避開銳氣,再利用其惰怠思歸時發動攻擊。不要迎擊旗幟整齊,部暑周密的敵人,不要攻擊陣容強大,實力雄厚的敵人。在股票市場中,一般的投資散戶都有一個不好的習慣,尤其是在期貨幣場中,往往在初期漲勢中作賣單,結果往往被軋空,正所謂“心急吃不得熱粥。”實際上應在確認漲勢已完時富檔槃旋數天,才可以作融資。這種方法比較保險,也就是長紅會更紅不可太早賣出。

41、順勢行動
孫子曰:“商陵勿向、指兵勿逆。佯北勿從,銳率勿攻,餌兵勿食,窮寇勿追,此用兵之法也。”意思是敵人從高地衝下來,不可以正面迎擊,以避擊鋒銳;敵人偽裝退卻,不要去跟蹤追擊,以免中了埋伏;當敵人士氣正旺的時候不要進攻;當敵人用小部隊引誘的時候,不要去理睬;對正在揮師回國的軍隊,不要去阻擋,包圍敵軍時要留下缺口,以免敵人全力死亡交叉戰;對陷入絕境的敵人,不要過分迫近,以免其拼死亡交叉反扑,這些都是用兵應當把握的原則。在股票市場中,投資者若能順勢操作則會事半功倍,逆勢操作就會自取滅亡。賺錢的時候,只吃八分便行,勿求功德太圓滿,留點好處給別人,實際上就是將最大的風險留給別人承擔。

42、從現象把握實質
孫子曰:“諄諄翁翁,徐與人言者,夫眾也。數賞者,窘也。數罰者,困也。”意思是將帥若對士兵反復叮嚀,神情不安,柔弱無威,表示已得不到擁護。一再犒賞士兵,表示已經沒有辦法。將帥若一再處罰士兵,則表示將帥統御有困難。在股票市場中,如果是高檔利多消息捷報頻傳,股價只有小漲甚至小跌,表示股價上昇的動力不足,可能會大回檔,此時應該考慮賣出。

股市中的"孫子兵法"

大約2500年前,孫子寫道:知彼知己者,百戰不殆。

其實,你在這些金融市場上運作的時間越長,你就越可能把這些市場視為巨大的戰場。把交易視作戰鬥、戰爭。儘管並不存在著弓箭手和劍客們埋伏在下一個山頭準備切斷你與主力的聯繫,但在金融舞臺上,你會發現自己處在一種異域的、不友好的環境中,其中有許多參與者隨時準備把你同你的資金與自信心分離開來。
因此你必須對市場有一個全面的了解;具有相當水準的經驗只是整個戰鬥的一部分,你還應不斷回想自己的行為,以便從以前的各種戰鬥中汲取有價值的經驗教訓。事實上,單就把市場看成"戰場"這一描述上看,也進一步證實了人們對引用孫子兵法的信賴程度。正如孫子所說,你必須"知己",而這一點在金融投機中是再重要不過的了。

孫子曰:夫未戰而廟算勝者,得算多也;未戰而廟算不勝者,得算少也。多算勝,少算不勝。  

你是否注意到這樣一個事實:當你稍微提前準備建立或對衝頭寸時,如果這一行為是建立在謠言、傳說或小道消息上,較那種事先估測所知道的事情的每一個方面並把決定建立在對所有因素細緻入微的研究上的情形而言,成功的可能性要小得多,當然,在我自己的交易中我已經注意到了這一事實。

孫子曰:夫鈍兵挫銳、屈力殫貨……雖有智者,不能善其後矣....

.除非你感覺財力雄厚並有信心能控制事情的結果,即能帶來高利或僅遭受小損失,否則你就不要進行交易或做出投資決策;而且,如果你在這次戰役中未能獲勝,但你有信心,知道總體而言,你能夠成功,那麼你就應繼續進行另外一次戰役。  

孫子曰:兵之債主速,乘人之不及。  

如果你在市場上進行交易,不管你是日交易商還是頭寸(長期行為)交易商、一旦你從你所使用的任何一個時機選擇指標中獲得可操作的信號,那麼你應毫不猶豫地進行這次交易,而且要迅速。當別人還在等著找出某一特定的行情變動發生的原因時,你應當已經處在市場中,下達了交易指令,並按照你所採用的策略行事。這是一種快步的競賽,你必須勇敢,並且一旦你的信號"指示"你採取行動時,你就立即執行。這不是猶豫或害怕的時候,不要怕犯下錯誤,因為你的止損指令不會使你遭受很大的損失。但是,如果從你所相信的技術分析方法中你得到了確鑿的交易信號,你仍感到害怕,這樣是沒人能幫你的。  

孫子曰:故殺敵者,怒也;取敵之利者,貨也。  

每當我經歷一場艱難而漫長的戰役,而我的決策又很聰明(或說很幸運),我常常獎給自己一些能帶來滿足感的有形物品.這可能是一次比較特殊的晚餐,或象最近,我從自己所贏得的一場高利交易收益中買了一架我嚮往已久的照相機。這一策略的最集中表現恐伯要算下面這件事了:當我持有的巨大的銅的多頭頭寸在經歷了長達9個月的市場漲跌之後最終贏利時,我買了一艘漂亮的46英尺內燃機發動的帆船。當最終結清該頭寸並一次性支付帆船買價時,我的滿足感真是不勝言表的。  

孫子曰:防患于未然,防微杜漸  

當你仍在進行紙上交易並準備你的策略時,在你安靜、安全的辦公室裏計劃著金融戰役是更為容易的。整個戰役的每一方面都應加以研究和佑算:如果價格上漲……如果價格下跌應該做些什麼?在哪方面以及怎樣增加頭寸(金字塔)……在哪方面以及怎樣減少頭寸的規模?如果所待頭寸變得不利,你是立即解除該頭寸,或者你會再次進入市場持有反方向的頭寸?交易的這些以及許多其他方面都應在巨大的金融風險形成之前提前分析並估算出來。提前在紙面上做這些分析是很容易的;但一旦你承擔了責任,投入了資金和自我,這些要做起來就相當困難了。  

孫子曰:強身而不為其所困,養心而不為其所擾,處世而不為其所侵,謀事而歹為其所患。

一般,除非無論從心理還是從身體上我們都感覺很好時,我們進行交易是不能達到最佳效果的。一個人處於近乎最佳狀態時並不是最好的。交易成功,就如同體育競技、音樂演奏或棋類比賽要取得成功一樣,需要一個人達到心理和體力上的最佳狀態,注意力集中以及有約束能力。如果你不具備上述條件,你應當清楚,在此情形下,你應處在市場之外直到你清楚地知道你已達到了自己的最佳狀態。同樣、不要讓外界影響干擾你交易上的注意力。有一篇介紹我交易方式的文章曾提到我有一次競忽略了在我的辦公樓舉行的消防訓練;事實是當時我完全被市場上所展開的激動人心的交易事件所吸引,猜測著我對各種不同的市場上發生的事件的可能反應。  

孫子日:故善用兵者,避其銳氣、擊其惰歸,此治氣者也。以治待亂,以靜待嘩,此治心者也。  

與此相應,我要講一下利沃默曾描述過的一件事:他的一位自命不凡的交易夥伴決定從其市場利潤中為其女友買一件皮外套。地連續幾次遭受損失之後,另一個人接受了這一挑戰並試圖"賺得"這件外套,但他也同樣失敗了。
最後,這一群人中的其他人也都這樣嘗試了,但他們都遭受了同樣的命運並最終放棄了這項計劃。總的結果是,這件100的外套總共花費了他們大約1000,而且到了最後這件外套仍未能買成。
靠推測就能賺錢並不容易;但是當你以一種有防備的、超然的以及完全的注意來取得這一想要得到的東西時就會相當可行的。如果你想得到樂趣,過得高興,做點別的什麼事;但一旦你在市場上操作時、一定要嚴肅認真,按邏輯辦事。

最後,孫子還告訴我們要保持客觀,以冷靜的態度估計事物情形,以及經過認真計劃的行動所具有的優勢。讓我們再回來看看利沃默對於當代交易策略的類似解說。  

能夠判斷準確並且堅持自己的判斷的投資者是不同凡響的。我發現這是最難學會的事情之一。
但只有市場操作者緊緊掌握這一本領他才能賺取高利。一個經過訓練的交易者要賺取百萬美元,較對交易一無所知的交易者賺上幾百美元要容易得多,這句話確實道出了真理

股本收益率和盈利率之间的关系

在公司的股本收益率走势和未来的盈利走势之间存在着某种关系,这是巴菲特在许多场合表达过的观点。如果年度股本收益率上升,盈利率也应该同样上升。如果股本收益率的走势稳定,那么盈利率走势也有可能同样稳定,并且具有较高的预见性。
  股本收益率=净收益/(期初资本+期末资本)/2 当一家公司取得较高水平的股本收益率时,表明它在运用股东们提供的资产时富有效率。因此,公司就会以较高的速度提高股本价值,由此也使股价得到相应的提升。
  在公司的股本收益率走势和未来的盈利走势之间存在着某种关系,这是巴菲特在许多场合表达过的观点。如果年度股本收益率上升,盈利率也应该同样上升。如果股本收益率的走势稳定,那么盈利率走势也有可能同样稳定,并且具有较高的预见性。将注意力集中在股本收益率上面,投资者可以更有信心地预测未来盈利。也就是说,如果你能估计公司未来的股本收益率,那么你就可以估计股本价值在年度间的增长。并且,如果你能估计股本价值的增长,你就能合理地预测取得每一年年终股本价值所需的盈利水平。
  巴菲特的投资组合中,包括一些消费品及消费者周期股票,这显示了他对持续的、高水平的股本收益率的偏好。例如,可口可乐和吉列都取得了介于30%-50%之间的稳定的年度股本收益率。这对于已存在了数十年的公司来说,是一个惊人的纪录。几乎所有巴菲特投资的上市公司都取得了平均水平为15%或者更高的年度股本收益率。通过它们较高的内部收益以及低于平均水平的资本需求,这些公司年复一年地创造出了高水平的股本收益率。
  高水平的股本收益率和公司所处的行业有较大的关系。一般来说,医药和消费品类公司的股本收益率较高而且相对较稳定。

不想做股市下一个傻瓜?你可以做得比巴菲特更好

巴菲特之所以那些成功,主要原因是他精于价值的分析与遵循古老的商业法则“贱买贵卖”。

无可厚非的,巴菲特是一位数理天才,而格雷厄姆他的老师则是位更出色的数理天才。格雷厄姆与人合著的《证券分析》则是相当与西方基督世界圣经,开创用数学方式分析股票的先河。

巴菲特绝对是一位智者,他知道什么做得来什么做不来。这样有一个好处是,他的世界里,不确定性已经被他大大降低,而投资最大的风险来源于不确定性,这也是他所能成功的原因。

现在谈回格雷厄姆,格雷厄姆是用数字来显示一个企业的面貌,确切的是说,用“会计”。现在所谓的“基本面”分析都是格雷厄姆式的。比如资本回报率、流动比率、周转率等等。这些比率在财经的网站上很容易就可以找到。如果单靠比率的高低而购买是冲动的。首先中国上市公司所做的报表都是很“漂亮”的(证监会的责任),然后如果你不进行同行业、国内外的对比,你是找不出好马。最后,你理解这些这个数字,但你不一定理解数字背后所代表的含义。

格雷厄姆熟悉他那时候所谓的热门高科技——铁路,这比现在热门的生物科技、IT等行业好理解多了。事实上,格雷厄姆除了是一位投资者外,他还是许多公司的董事,这锻炼到他只要看报表就能成功的进行投资的地步(他不光是买卖股票,还重组企业等手段)。

如果你们还是坚持要自己操作,那就限定你只能购买你所熟悉或能感受的股票。这是巴菲特的能力圈的概念,也是林奇所宣导的业余投资者能做得更好。投资要决是:一定要买自己熟悉的股票,如果你所在的公司是上市的,现在运转的良好,那你为什么不成为自己公司的股东呢?如果你公司的状况不好,但你的竞争对手却做得非常之好,那你购买对手的股票也是很合理的。

好的股票应该是从生活中寻找的,而不是从某些小道消息或者是“大师”口中听到。传播这些消息给你的人他们是需要你来拉他们一把,不然套久了是不舒服的。

巴菲特--道,更多的是一种“商道”。做生意做买卖,不熟不做是一个道理。很多买股票的偏偏是不熟的硬要买,赔钱的不是你就讲不过去了。

巴菲特学格雷厄姆最成功的是:“价值投资”。说普遍点就是:贱买贵卖。说通俗点就是:买便宜又好的。

核心是找被市场低估的股票。很多时候,股票的价格是人们心中对它所定的一个“心理价”。
格雷厄姆在乎的是当下的价值,现在该企业值多少钱,我以低多少钱买到,然后等到价值与价格相同时卖出。根据他的性格,如果他认为一个企业无法再创造更多的价值报答给股东如果清算更有价值的话,那就清算。格雷厄姆是十足的资本家,买卖股票的时候你也要把自己变为资本家,除非你想成为无产阶级…

巴菲特喜欢的是购买企业然后放手让别人去管,他曾经说过格雷厄姆只喜欢便宜货,这也是他与老师最大的区别。巴菲特成为首富的原因是他看重的是企业长远的发展。而格雷厄姆则看到当下,他或许更喜欢清算价值。

这是两种不同的哲学,一种是未来,一种是现在。这也就形成来两者不同的风险。投资与企业未来的发展“成长股”是需要冒很大的风险的,首先,该成长股的股票就已经是高估了,再者,企业未来能否如愿的继续发展更是一个问题。巴菲特另一个天才的地方是,他会“冰鉴”:懂得寻找“能人”管理着的企业与市场。

对于格雷厄姆的方法是“科学的”可学习与复制的。而巴菲特的得成功显得艺术性大于科学,因为他是巴菲特,他有他的成功,你是你,你也是有你的。格雷厄姆的方法+天赋就是巴菲特式的成功。

巴菲特成就是他发现未来的价值,然后用低成本买进、持有、卖出(他喜欢买进不怎么卖出)。而他所发现的这个未来的价值,主要是当前的资产被低估,而未来价格会认同价值.

这个“资产”的含义不单单是报表所显示的,还包括管理者的才能、企业的品牌价值、用户群体、壁垒(包括技术、市场准入程度)等有关市场竞争的因素。

巴菲特还是讲一个在牛市的策略,选“好”股票,买入,忘掉。
别忘了,象个资本家一样思考。

巴菲特 头脑开放--格雷厄姆的影响

话说伟大的物理学家爱因斯坦死后进入了天堂,上帝把他安排到一间四个人的房子里。爱因斯坦向第一个人问道:“你的智商是多少?”那人回答:“160。”爱因斯坦喜出望外地说:“太好了!我正担心在这里找不到人一起探讨相对论呢。”他又问第二个人,那人说自己的智商是120。爱因斯坦显然有些失望,他叹了一口气说:“也好,我们还是可以讨论一些数学问题的。”最后,他问第三个人,那人说他的智商还不到80。于是,爱因斯坦皱起了眉头,过了很久才继续说道:“看来我们只能聊聊股市了。
”这个故事对股民的调侃不无刻薄,可是它却说出了一个听起来颇似悖论的道理:股市里不以学历智愚评判一个人的能力,更不以个人的社会背景和社会角色来断定一个人的才气。只要有一个永远开放的头脑,踏踏实实地做自己本份内的事,那么通向成功的路也许并不遥远。

相对于艺术家天赋而言,理财的能力是否也是可以继承呢?巴菲特从不认为自己在投资方面的非凡成就出自天赋,但他一再强调那些伟大的投资家及其理论对自己产生过的重要影响,他认为,如果不是站在了这些巨人的肩上,他便不可能有今天的成绩。

投资作为近代经济发展的产物,经历了一百多年的发展,期间也产生了许多在市场上风光一时的投资家,此外,那些在书斋里研究经济的学院派学者们也提出过许多影响深远的理论,巴菲特正是从这些人的身上不断汲取养料,并灵活加以应用,最终形成了自己的“巴氏投资理论”。

格雷厄姆的影响在巴菲特工作的案头,多年来一直摆放着几个版本的本杰明·格雷厄姆与戴维·多德撰写的著作《有价证券分析》。巴菲特认为,自己的投资策略85%来自于格雷厄姆。


巴菲特一直是一个极度自信的人。他说:“我很早以前便知道我会很有钱的。”

由于受到做股票经纪人的父亲的影响,巴菲特很早便对股票的市场分析产生兴趣。他尝试了自己发明的种种市场指数,但结果都不能让他满意。1949年,巴菲特进入内布拉斯加大学学习,期间读了那本对他影响极为深远的著作《聪明的投资者》后,他毫不犹豫地放弃了自己原先“发明”的那些方法,成为格雷厄姆投资学说的追随者。他后来选择在哥伦比亚大学攻读经济学硕士,原因就是这本书的作者在那里教书,他希望能亲自与这位投资界的大人物交流。

巴菲特一直相信,与聪明的人交往会使自己也变得聪明。在读了《聪明的投资者》之后,巴菲特便开始想办法接近格雷厄姆。他从《名人词典》中得知本杰明?格雷厄姆是GEICO公司的主席,这家公司通过邮票来销售汽车保险,而不通过经纪人。在一个星期六,巴菲特来到这家公司,他向看门人询问这里是否有人愿意和他谈谈。看门人将他带去见了戴维森,即这家公司后来的首席执行官。巴菲特不断向他提问,而戴维斯也做了认真的回答,五个小时后,巴菲特对这家公司和它的股票已有了相当程度的了解,这才满意地离开那里。经过这次谈话后,巴菲特准备购买GEICO公司的一些股份,虽然许多人并不看好它。GEICO公司的命运一波三折,市值一度从700万美元升到了10亿美元,成为华尔街的新宠。可后来又由于公司管理不善而濒临破产的边缘。不过,自从第一次与其接触后,巴菲特便一直关注着GEICO,25年后,他买入了这家公司15%的股份,此时公司也进入了又一个稳步发展的阶段。

从哥伦比亚大学毕业后,巴菲特致信格雷厄姆,表达了自己想无偿为他工作的愿望,但遭到格雷厄姆的拒绝。于是,巴菲特回到家乡奥马哈,在父亲的股票经纪人公司工作,并积极推销GEICO公司的股票,不过业绩并不好。不过,巴菲特与格雷厄姆一直保持着联系,他非常乐于向这位导师吐露自己的想法,同样,格雷厄姆也非常喜欢这位年轻人,常常花很长时间与他交谈。

1954年,格雷厄姆建议巴菲特前去纽约为格雷厄姆―纽曼公司工作,巴菲特如约前往。巴菲特认为,在格雷厄姆—纽曼公司工作的两年让他一生受益匪浅。在那期间,他对上百家公司进行了调查,并分析它们是否符合格雷厄姆的投资标准。巴菲特从这种大量的调查与分析工作中,发现了格雷厄姆投资标准卓越的优点与突出的缺陷,并发展出了自己的投资理论,正所谓“青出于蓝而胜于蓝”。

格雷厄姆的投资理论着重对企业进行数量分析,并建立了一套股票分析模型。依照格雷厄姆的理论,投资者应当在某个企业的价值被市场化低估的市场买入。比如说,你在一个健全的企业中仅以它自有资本三分之二的价格出售时买进,然后在市场价格达到它的资本账面价值时卖掉。
格雷厄姆的理论使他本人及其投资者大获全胜,从市场中获得了极为丰厚的利润,但它并不能使巴菲特感到满意,他认为这种投资方法缺少灵活性,而且他也怀疑用这种标准衡量所有企业是否真的恰当。
巴菲特认为,有些企业的价值竟然被市场低估,但由于公司的经营状况不佳,那么投资者的业绩也不会好,所以,你必须瞪大眼睛,从被市场低估的行业中,选出那种能够一直保持快速发展的高成长性公司的股票。
此外,巴菲特认为格雷厄姆的投资理论没有对商业特权进行明确的区分,就连他本人十分强调的“健康的企业”实际上也是一种局限。
格雷厄姆绝不会在企业出现丑闻时购买股票,可这却是巴菲特十分重视的购买时机。格雷厄姆的巨大成就在于他将证券分析从以前的定性分析发展到定量分析。定性分析一般是通过研究一个公司的产品及运作方式来展望股票的前景,而定量分析则注重对已有的数据进行数量分析。
格雷厄姆并不想采用那些他的读者根本无法亲眼看到的所谓“内幕信息”。

虽然那时候还没有人能够预言巴菲特日后所取得的辉煌成就,但他的确具备了一个开创事业的投资家所必备的所有条件:
全面而系统的理论学习、
细致认真的实践准备、
良好的心理素质以及
对证券投资的执着追求。

也许有人感到不解,巴菲特为什么不选择在纽约开始自己的事业,而是回到家乡小镇奥马哈呢?最重要的是这里很少有谣言传播的空间。

在巴菲特日后的发展上,格雷厄姆的影响随处可见。格雷厄姆极力主张投资者不要将注意力仅仅放在行情上,而要放在股票所代表的企业上,通过对企业的盈利状况、资产状况及未来前景的分析来评估企业的内在价值。

他认为市场绝非一个能够精确衡量企业价值的天平,相反,它更像是一个由无数人参与游戏的“投票机”,每个人的决定都掺杂着理性与感性的成份,而与企业真正的价值相去甚远;而投资的真正涵义就在于,当市场的价格远远低于企业的内在价值时进行投资,然后等待价格回升。

概括而言,格雷厄姆的投资理念可以概括为三点:
一是坚持理性投资;
二是确保本金安全;
三是以可量化的内在价值为选股依据。

巴菲特注重对企业进行详尽的分析,他认为,如果一个投资者不去关心公司的经营现状的话,那一定是非常愚蠢的事,他曾经尖刻地嘲讽那些热衷于谈论股票走势的经纪人,说他们就像是将天文望远镜搁置在一旁,而去讨论占星学的天文工作者,这种作法是极为荒唐可笑、懒惰而愚昧的。

事实上,这种注重对企业进行分析的策略,恰恰正是格雷厄姆投资理论的精华所在。巴菲特曾说:“格雷厄姆所倡导的并非卓越投资,他也不是一时的风云人物。他所倡导的是合理投资,我认为,只要不是过于急于求成,合理投资将会使你非常富有,而且更妙的是它不会使你变得更穷。”

就像所有那些出色的学生一样,巴菲特虽然从前辈那里汲取了不少经验,但他又绝不拘泥于此,他以自己所受过的专业训练为根基,结合自己的经验,渐渐超越前辈,成为华尔街乃至全世界最受瞩目的人物。

下面的这段话,也许能够总结出巴菲特对这位对自己的生活与事业产生重要影响的大师的看法:“我认为,格雷厄姆的思想观点足以作为你智力结构的基础。除了这些思想观点之外你还能求助什么。这些思想观点没有一个是复杂的,也没有一个需要数学才能或者此类形式的东西。

格雷厄姆说,投资者应当将股票看作细小的商业部分,要把市场波动看作你最好的朋友,而非敌人。
要知道,你的利润有时来自于对朋友们的愚忠而非参与市场的波动。”

巴菲特式投资的六要素:不要频频换手

巴菲特式投资的六要素,称巴菲特的神秘之处恰在于他简单有效的投资方式。   

有“股神”之称的沃伦·巴菲特看起来是个慈祥长者,他似乎更喜欢家乡奥马哈的农场,而不是曼哈顿市中心的董事会会议室。这种朴素作风也体现在他的投资方式上。用他自己的话说,就是管好自己的事,做自己“力所能及”的事。

在20世纪90年代末,巴菲特成功地躲过了网络科技泡沫的破裂,只因为他觉得“我不懂这些”。同时,他却敢于大手笔投资可口可乐公司。

巴菲特的投资方式究竟有什么要素?文章列举了6点供投资者参考:

1、赚钱而不要赔钱
这是巴菲特经常被引用的一句话:“投资的第一条准则是不要赔钱;第二条准则是永远不要忘记第一条。”因为如果投资一美元,赔了50美分,手上只剩一半的钱,除非有百分之百的收益,才能回到起点。
巴菲特最大的成就莫过于在1965年到2006年间,历经3个熊市,而他的伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司只有一年(2001年)出现亏损。

2、别被收益蒙骗
巴菲特更喜欢用股本收益率来衡量企业的盈利状况。股本收益率是用公司净收入除以股东的股本,它衡量的是公司利润占股东资本的百分比,能够更有效地反映公司的盈利增长状况。
根据他的价值投资原则,公司的股本收益率应该不低于15%。在巴菲特持有的上市公司股票中,可口可乐的股本收益率超过30%,美国运通公司达到37%。

3、要看未来
人们把巴菲特称为“奥马哈的先知”,因为他总是有意识地去辨别公司是否有好的发展前途,能不能在今后25年里继续保持成功。巴菲特常说,要透过窗户向前看,不能看后视镜。
预测公司未来发展的一个办法,是计算公司未来的预期现金收入在今天值多少钱。这是巴菲特评估公司内在价值的办法。然后他会寻找那些严重偏离这一价值、低价出售的公司。

4、坚持投资能对竞争者构成巨大“屏障”的公司
预测未来必定会有风险,因此巴菲特偏爱那些能对竞争者构成巨大“经济屏障”的公司。这不一定意味着他所投资的公司一定独占某种产品或某个市场。例如,可口可乐公司从来就不缺竞争对手。但巴菲特总是寻找那些具有长期竞争优势、使他对公司价值的预测更安全的公司。
20世纪90年代末,巴菲特不愿投资科技股的一个原因就是:他看不出哪个公司具有足够的长期竞争优势。   

5、要赌就赌大的
绝大多数价值投资者天性保守。但巴菲特不是。他投资股市的620亿美元集中在45只股票上。他的投资战略甚至比这个数字更激进。在他的投资组合中,前10只股票占了投资总量的90%。晨星公司的高级股票分析师贾斯廷·富勒说:“这符合巴菲特的投资理念。不要犹豫不定,为什么不把钱投资到你最看好的投资对象上呢?”   

6、要有耐心等待
如果你在股市里换手,那么可能错失良机。巴菲特的原则是:不要频频换手,直到有好的投资对象才出手。
巴菲特常引用传奇棒球击球手特德·威廉斯的话:“要做一个好的击球手,你必须有好球可打。”如果没有好的投资对象,那么他宁可持有现金。据晨星公司统计,现金在伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的投资配比中占18%以上,而大多数基金公司只有4%的现金。

巴菲特谈股票经

世界投资大师沃伦・巴菲特告诫股民,美国的通货膨胀正在上涨,股民应当调整自己的投资策略。巴菲特仍然坚持不买技术公司的股票。

仅次于微软公司董事长比尔・盖茨的世界第二富豪沃伦・巴菲特在伯克希尔・哈撒韦公司Berkshire Hathaway的股东大会上,针对人们最关心的通货膨胀问题发表了他的看法。

*警告投资人注意通货膨胀*
巴菲特承认美国经济正在增长,但通货膨胀的上涨力度也相当大。巴菲特说:“通货膨胀是投资者的真正敌人。巴菲特告诫股民在通胀增长阶段明智的做法是投资不受通胀影响的国家债券,或者寻找那些具有独特产品和独特服务的公司,或者寻找那些受通货膨胀影响较小的公司进行投资。
不过,巴菲特没有具体建议人们最好去购买哪些公司的股票。据媒体报道,巴菲特自己的公司伯克希尔・哈撒韦公司的投资组合中占比例较大的是软饮料公司可口可乐公司、保险公司GEICO以及牛奶制品公司“皇后牛奶品( Dairy Queen)”公司等。

*仍然坚持不买科技股*
在高科技股票最红火的九十年代末以不碰科技股而闻名的巴菲特在现今技术股走过底谷开始回升的时候依然坚持不买科技股。
巴菲特当年为了表示对微软公司比尔・盖茨的尊重而买了一股微软的股票。巴菲特在5月2号的股东大会上依然幽默地表示,他现在坚持不买科技股的原因是他看不懂这些科技股。
巴菲特回忆几年前美国科技股红极一时的时候,称那个时代是全世界疯狂的时代,投资人在股市以不现实的速度快速膨胀的时候忽视了普通常识。巴菲特目前依然坚持他的投资理念,只购买那些他能看得懂的公司的股票。这位亿万富翁表示,他的投资策略没有变化,还是“了解公司、分析公司的潜力。”
对网路搜寻引擎公司GOOGLE,巴菲特似乎也并不感兴趣。他说,GOOGLE的“业务非常好,但我猜GOOGLE股票的价位也会非常高。我们从不买初次上市的股票。我们从不指望能够买到低于实际价值的初始股。我们不玩这种游戏。”巴菲特认为,初始股通常都标价过高。

*被称为投资教皇*
巴菲特在数十年间获得的投资回报率都远远高于市场平均水平。他因此而被人称为“世界资本教皇”。但是,他并不忌讳自己犯过的投资错误。他表示,投资是一个风险很大的行业,不犯错误是不可能的。
巴菲特最后悔的错误是当初没有购买更多的美国连锁百货商店沃马特的股票。他认为,零售业是个薄利的行业,沃马特经营得很好。巴菲特坦承“他的这个错误给公司造成一百亿美元的代价。”他的意思是,由于当初没有买入更多的沃马特的股票,而使公司少赚了一百亿美元。

*不看好证券市场*
巴菲特认为,这些年来,美国股票价格一直都比较高。随着越来越多的投资人涌入证券市场,股票市场的吸引力大不如以前。巴菲特认为,如果没有很好的投资机会,持有现金应该是投资策略的首选。
伯克希尔・哈撒韦公司目前的现金总额是三百一十亿美元。如何使用这笔庞大的现金进行投资,对沃伦・巴菲特来说,也是一个头痛的问题。

Saturday, December 22, 2007

Is there any reason for the fall in high yielding dividend counters?

I know a lot of folks are fans of high yielding stocks (high dividends stocks) and are heavily vested in it. If you have notice recently, a lot of these high yields are falling like flies.
What happens in such a situation? the yield gets more attractive. some good examples are MIIF, Allco REIT, Cambridge REIT, Babcock & Brown.

So do they make a good buy now?
I’m still investigating the repercussions of the sub prime mess and credit squeeze and their effect to these counters.
Personally for me to be vested, I would really need a bloody large yield to make me feel safe. Even then, it might not be enough.

Considerations:
Inflationary environment will make holding high yielding counters very risky. If the rate of inflation truly picks up, even if you are holding a counter yielding 6% it will still be badly affected if the short term rates hovers around 4% and upwards. Investors would demand higher yields to hold such counters. If they are unable to do this through yield accreted business moves, their share price must fall to compensate to achieve the market demand yield.

Competition between securities:
this has slipped my mind but a post in channelnewsasia alert me to such a possibility:

In my opinion if someone holds BBSFF from IPO until now, the person would have made a loss on his position including all the dividend. If someone buy the counter during its rally to $1.22, he or she would have lost more. Only if you buy at the low of $0.80plus then you are still green…

The more fundamental question is why the price is dropping if the yield is very attractive. I believe all the high yielding stocks was affected by the credit crunch due to the sub prime loss.

Why? Major players such as funds, financial institution such as banks have to liquidate their holdings of global stocks to raise cash. This caused the price of such stocks to drop substantially.

Few months ago, investors are not asking for high returns on their investment such as convertible bonds. In fact a lot of M&A activity was done cheaply. Look at the present situation…UBS are paying 9% to GIC per annual for their investment. Morgan Stanley is paying the same to China fund. Citigroup is paying 11% to their Middle-East investor. This shows that investors are asking for much higher yield in the current market.

Let me post a question for thoughts…If you are a institutional investor, would you lend your money to UBS or Morgan Stanley at 9% or buy BBSFF at much higher yield?
I am not trying to talk down the share price of BBSFF but i just want to explain the logic why the high yield of BBSSF is not able to support the share price.

So the lesson learn is not to buy because the yield is good.
Always ponder about:
1. Free Cash flow strength
2. Business model in future and current economic climate
3. Ability to improve cash flow
4. Profits Margin