林奇强调投资需用闲钱，最好投资者要有房子，以及所有的价值投资大师，或者价值投机大师，都强调耐心，其实都是从不同侧面反应了对精确定位的否定。如果不是闲钱，决不可能有悠游的心态去等待。一旦估测错误，便如坠入人间炼狱。
用时间和安全边际共同弥补定性测量的不精确是大师们的基本手法。
同时，林奇强调要跟踪，但不要频繁跟踪，是建立在事物是永衡运动以及事物的变化需要一个过程这两个哲理的基础之上。
巴菲特强调如果企业根本性恶化就不要抛弃它，这是因为在事物发展是一个曲折的螺旋式过程。阶段性的挫折是事物发展的常态，因此费雪说过，因阶段性挫折而导致股价的非理性下跌，是建仓的好机会，因为这不是事物发展的主要趋势。这种暂时性挫折，只会带来更好的安全边际。也许会延长价值回归的时间。
投资者可衡量大概的等待时间以及大概的安全边际，进行取舍。
价值投资一个卖出的基本原则就是：有更好的投资机会。这个更好的投资机会，因人而异，因投资者的盈利期望、分析能力以及等待能力都不一样。所以“机会成本”因人而异。错过他人能把握的机会，并不一定是羞耻的，因为也许这对他人是机会，对自己可能是灾难。
价值投资，就是以定性为主，以定量为辅的投资，即便通过定量计算，也要给出足够的冗余，才能保证计算结果不会犯定性的错误。
巴菲特为什么喜欢业务简单的企业，因为业务一旦复杂，影响因素就呈几何级数增加，即便抽提出每个业务的主要影响因素，对于企业这个系统而言，输入还是太多，每个变量之间的相互作用关系只能估测，那么会造成巨大的误差，从而导致定性的错误。
不是导致安全边际要求太高而失去投资的机会，就是安全边际估计不足，导致投资风险剧增。我很容易理解为什么由诺贝尔经济学奖获得者坐镇的基金用精确计算来指导投资会一败涂地。我也认为人类情绪的预测比天体运行轨迹的测算要难很多，根本不是一个数量级的。牛顿算不出没有什么羞耻的。
Saturday, July 26, 2008
战胜股市两个要素
不要试图战胜市场
巴菲特认为，如果所有人认为经济衰退的阴霾很快就会结束，其程度也不会太厉害时，事实往往相反。他说：“目前，我不会有一毛钱的投资是基于宏观经济预期的，我也不认为投资者应该基于宏观预期而买卖股票。”
巴菲特说：“不要指望投资者从今天所看到的东西影响其投资策略。我们的投资者应当基于以下因素：
第一，即使知道经济总体的发展趋势，也并不意味着你就知道股市会如何发展演变；
第二，投资者不可能在选股上比别人优秀很多。股票只有在持有相当长时间之后才会称得上是个好东西。”
巴菲特称，他对美国经济的长期走势依然充满信心，但必须清楚地意识到，美国经济不可能在每年、每月或者每周都表现良好。他说：“如果你不认同我的这个观点，最好不要投资股市。我认为美国经济的生产率每年都在提高，这在长期而言是绝对正面的消息。投资者失败的主要原因是过高的手续费和总是试图战胜市场。”
避免一次性买入
对于非专业投资者，巴菲特建议，如果你不想成为一个主动投资者，那么最好选择指数型基金，特别是低成本的指数基金，而且应该在一段时间里持续买入。
他说，个人投资者可能无法选择最优的价格或者最合适的时机买入，他们最需要避免的是以错误的价格、买入错误的股票。个人投资者需要记住这么一点：你应当拥有美国公司的一小部分权益，而不是某个时间一次性全部买入。
投资者有两件事情可能做错：你可能买入了错误的股票；或者你在错误的时间买入或卖出了股票。正确的事情是：你基本上不需要卖出你的股票。巴菲特说：“我一再声称，投资者应当在别人贪婪时自己谨慎，别人谨慎时自己变得贪婪。如果你在别人贪婪时比别人更贪婪，在别人谨慎时比别人更谨慎，那么你最好不要有任何投资。”
巴菲特认为，如果所有人认为经济衰退的阴霾很快就会结束，其程度也不会太厉害时，事实往往相反。他说：“目前，我不会有一毛钱的投资是基于宏观经济预期的，我也不认为投资者应该基于宏观预期而买卖股票。”
巴菲特说：“不要指望投资者从今天所看到的东西影响其投资策略。我们的投资者应当基于以下因素：
第一，即使知道经济总体的发展趋势，也并不意味着你就知道股市会如何发展演变；
第二，投资者不可能在选股上比别人优秀很多。股票只有在持有相当长时间之后才会称得上是个好东西。”
巴菲特称，他对美国经济的长期走势依然充满信心，但必须清楚地意识到，美国经济不可能在每年、每月或者每周都表现良好。他说：“如果你不认同我的这个观点，最好不要投资股市。我认为美国经济的生产率每年都在提高，这在长期而言是绝对正面的消息。投资者失败的主要原因是过高的手续费和总是试图战胜市场。”
避免一次性买入
对于非专业投资者，巴菲特建议，如果你不想成为一个主动投资者，那么最好选择指数型基金，特别是低成本的指数基金，而且应该在一段时间里持续买入。
他说，个人投资者可能无法选择最优的价格或者最合适的时机买入，他们最需要避免的是以错误的价格、买入错误的股票。个人投资者需要记住这么一点：你应当拥有美国公司的一小部分权益，而不是某个时间一次性全部买入。
投资者有两件事情可能做错：你可能买入了错误的股票；或者你在错误的时间买入或卖出了股票。正确的事情是：你基本上不需要卖出你的股票。巴菲特说：“我一再声称，投资者应当在别人贪婪时自己谨慎，别人谨慎时自己变得贪婪。如果你在别人贪婪时比别人更贪婪，在别人谨慎时比别人更谨慎，那么你最好不要有任何投资。”
闭着眼睛投资股票
拿的是至少能闲置3年的钱，不改变生活水平，不改变生活方式，原来怎样过投资后照样怎样过，原来做什么投资后照样做什么。
价值投资者只坚信一点，那就是股价上涨的唯一理由是公司利润增长。
价值投资者是谦虚的投资者，不奢望赚尽天下所有的钱。
价值投资者只寻找和自己品性一致的公司即谦虚的公司，它们聚焦于某一块自己擅长的业务，持之以恒，矢志不渝。至于那种认为自己做好了某一项业务后，就狂妄地认为自己可以做好很多业务进行多元化的公司，是价值投资者远离的公司。
找到你的梦中王子或白雪公主，用至少5个月的时间跟他（她）恋爱，对你的梦中情人（目标公司）了如指掌。算出你目标公司的内在价值，等待机会来临。股价超过价值时，我们耐心等待，就是知道还会走高，我们不买进，我们不赚泡沫的钱，一定是低买高卖，不赞成做短期波段，而是股价过分超估才抛售。
市场的暴涨和暴跌源于人性的贪婪和恐惧，众人参与的市场，其贪婪和恐惧是理性的人无法预测的。投资要看得长远，不能看市场的眼色行事，要有自己的眼光。不要跟着市场情绪跑，要利用市场的情绪以便宜的好价格买进好股票。
那些想从短期波动中赚钱的人，不管是在上升行情还是下跌行情中，他都会很痛苦，想要把握市场的波动的想法一定会让你抓狂，扰乱心绪，最终摧毁你的自信。
我以为用那么多时间去关注市场行情，还不如多跑几个公司或商场或专卖店，了解自己所投资公司的实际销售行情更有用，也让你心里对这个公司的价值更有信心。
如果你手头上的公司是值得投资的公司，一定不要被眼前的恐慌情绪扰乱了阵脚，要坚定你当初的理性决定。短期的损失本来就是过眼烟云，不必在乎，毕竟你手头的钱足够你日常花费，你投资的钱并不是要拿出来急用的。
只要所投资公司的利润在每年增长，就是在熊市，其股票价格也会稍微上涨。公司利润增长股价长期必将上升几乎和万有引力定律一样确凿。
现在很多好公司股票的价格都到了值得买进的时候，虽然我们无法预料股价是不是还会下跌，但是只要我们关注的公司到了合适的价位，我们就会买进，我们不奢望买到最低价，就像我们不奢望卖到最高价一样。
现在抛售好公司廉价筹码的投资者，那是你自己在戕害自己，这种“带血的筹码”，除非你自己交出，没有人能逼迫你交出。今天卖出好公司廉价筹码的人在不久的将来将会痛恨自己，最终会在股价上涨一阵后再买进来。
在当前中国的股市里，对于价值投资者来说，留足生活费，闭着眼睛把你研究透了好公司买进来就是了。
价值投资者只坚信一点，那就是股价上涨的唯一理由是公司利润增长。
价值投资者是谦虚的投资者，不奢望赚尽天下所有的钱。
价值投资者只寻找和自己品性一致的公司即谦虚的公司，它们聚焦于某一块自己擅长的业务，持之以恒，矢志不渝。至于那种认为自己做好了某一项业务后，就狂妄地认为自己可以做好很多业务进行多元化的公司，是价值投资者远离的公司。
找到你的梦中王子或白雪公主，用至少5个月的时间跟他（她）恋爱，对你的梦中情人（目标公司）了如指掌。算出你目标公司的内在价值，等待机会来临。股价超过价值时，我们耐心等待，就是知道还会走高，我们不买进，我们不赚泡沫的钱，一定是低买高卖，不赞成做短期波段，而是股价过分超估才抛售。
市场的暴涨和暴跌源于人性的贪婪和恐惧，众人参与的市场，其贪婪和恐惧是理性的人无法预测的。投资要看得长远，不能看市场的眼色行事，要有自己的眼光。不要跟着市场情绪跑，要利用市场的情绪以便宜的好价格买进好股票。
那些想从短期波动中赚钱的人，不管是在上升行情还是下跌行情中，他都会很痛苦，想要把握市场的波动的想法一定会让你抓狂，扰乱心绪，最终摧毁你的自信。
我以为用那么多时间去关注市场行情，还不如多跑几个公司或商场或专卖店，了解自己所投资公司的实际销售行情更有用，也让你心里对这个公司的价值更有信心。
如果你手头上的公司是值得投资的公司，一定不要被眼前的恐慌情绪扰乱了阵脚，要坚定你当初的理性决定。短期的损失本来就是过眼烟云，不必在乎，毕竟你手头的钱足够你日常花费，你投资的钱并不是要拿出来急用的。
只要所投资公司的利润在每年增长，就是在熊市，其股票价格也会稍微上涨。公司利润增长股价长期必将上升几乎和万有引力定律一样确凿。
现在很多好公司股票的价格都到了值得买进的时候，虽然我们无法预料股价是不是还会下跌，但是只要我们关注的公司到了合适的价位，我们就会买进，我们不奢望买到最低价，就像我们不奢望卖到最高价一样。
现在抛售好公司廉价筹码的投资者，那是你自己在戕害自己，这种“带血的筹码”，除非你自己交出，没有人能逼迫你交出。今天卖出好公司廉价筹码的人在不久的将来将会痛恨自己，最终会在股价上涨一阵后再买进来。
在当前中国的股市里，对于价值投资者来说，留足生活费，闭着眼睛把你研究透了好公司买进来就是了。
Friday, July 25, 2008
借貸
現時借錢買《滙豐》，可得更多好處，這是十年難得一遇「借錢有息收」的時機…錯，不是十年難得一遇，應該是經常都遇上，過去01年的911事件、03年的沙士時期及今年的次按大騙案等，真是八年三遇。
我經提到孖展，因為太重要，但此亦是最不喜歡的話題，因為牽涉到數字，而且要反復推算，難以說得明白，現在亦不準備仔細談論數字等問題，只對借貸作一些補充，有關孖展炒股之事，可見於『炒股十八年』中：
10年10倍，廿年百倍
一直以來『財來有方』(見『炒股十八年』~財來有方)是我的投資方向、「十萬股《滙豐》」是我明確目標，但以資產增值來說還有一個「10年10倍、廿年百倍」的預期，只要買到優質股票，找到入巿良機，加上孖展威力，要做到「10年10倍」之計並不難：先用孖展把本金擴大3倍，再配合股票的四倍上升，就可完成目標。但更真實情況是：只要10年中股票上升2至3倍已可達標，因有股息的收入及再投資，而且10年中必再遇上股價大跌時機，利用相對上一次危機時上升了不少的股價，加大孖展額，很快股份會重上升軌，帶來更大利潤；10年間2至3倍的股價上升主要是由業績帶動，而非由大牛巿的情緒帶動，因有業績支持，投資者更有能力長期持有股票，賺盡升幅，相反10年間即使股價不升，也不會跌到哪裏，因此投資者可以大手買入，與一般股民只小注投資，又怕大升股份回吐而急於出售，未能賺盡多倍相比，此計劃就簡單可行得多。要出現最差情況，《滙豐》倒閉或10年間股價原地踏步的可能性是相當微，因此這是一個穏中求勝、求大勝而非小勝的計劃。
套利交易
「10年10倍」計劃中，孖展明顯是一個倍數器，把收益擴大，除此以外，當中還有套利交易成份，現時銀行同業拆息約1.5%，很多國際大證劵行提供拆息加1厘的借貸利率，即約2.5%的借貸息率，(可惜只為800萬港幣價值的投資戶口服務，)假若以全借貸資金買入5厘股息回報的《滙豐》，每年就有淨股息收2.5%，代入1倍本金，2倍借貸情況，就是每年有10%回報，(這個回報是相對孖展客投入的本金，即ROE)，10年就是100%回報，還未計算利用股息再投資《滙豐》及股息的每年增長。
套息交易(或套利交易)是很普遍，特別在外滙、商品及債劵巿場，甚至是跨巿場的交易，例如沽日元，買《滙豐》，大型投資銀行可以為客戶提供所需股務。對某些投資者來說套息是主要的考慮，例如畢菲特於03年時取高股息的《中石油》而棄當時剛初次派息的《中移動》，相信與套息考慮有密切關係，其時美國利率正是戰後最低水平。
轉換時空
我對於能否發達，完成10萬股《滙豐》或「10年10倍」的計劃沒有懷疑，但本人能否消遙生活、享受財富就是一個大問題，可能六個月後就染上急病，與世長辭，若現在盡情消費，享受生活，又怕一旦長命百歲，老來拿不出入住老人院的費用。唯一的解決方法就是努力投資，同時借錢消費，利用將來得到的財富支付現時累積的債務。
借債不還錢
2003年10月中，本人需用資金8萬元，原計劃沽出股票套現(800股《滙豐》x$100當時巿價)，最後利用孖展戶口套現8萬，計劃5年後才出售股票，歸還借貸款項，5年來800股《滙豐》所收取的總股息是多於8萬元借貸需付的總利息，即最終我並無為借貸付出利息，而且《滙豐》的股價由當時的$100上升至現時約$135，帶來了35%帳面增值，似乎我應把歸還8萬元的計劃再推遲5年，或者是50年，又或是乾脆不還，相信將得到更多淨利息收入及更大比例的股份增值。
保護資產
富翁甲君喜好遊樂，鍾情遊艇、名車，他把所有「玩具」注入信託公司，亦購買必需保險，但仍為信託公司立下一紙借據，表明甲君為合法債權人，一旦公司清盤，需向甲君清還債務，這樣甲君就有多種保障，保護資產。
本人亦利用孖展把資金抽離投資戶口，當中没有出售股票，只是債項加大了，但由於股票的價值已上升了，問題也不應太大，一旦股巿反復，完全超出預計，損失也將是巿場上賺回來的資金，而絶非本金。
股民了解借貸，除有助本身的投資理財外，更可了解巿場及企業運作，必有助選擇時機及股票.
香港首富李嘉誠提點股民應量力而為，切忌借錢炒股；全球首富畢菲特曾言：「現金是安全，債務是危險」。很多大企業或個人都因債務而走向絶路，兩位商界奇才，大財主之言不無道理。可是現實中，他們都是借貸高手：
百佳
1999年超巿家樂福撤出香港，李超人被傳媒質問百佳是否有打壓對手，壟斷巿場，當時李超人表示，旗下百佳利潤甚微，一百元生意只得一元利潤，經營超巿只為社會就業率著想。
可是1%的純利率不等於百佳是一盤利潤微薄的生意，百佳貨品全出於供應商，供應商亦會提供一個先賣貨，後收錢的付款期限，即百佳只是代售或轉售，需要先出資買入貨品的比例很低，近乎0%，假若百佳銷售$100貨品的成本比例是5%，(所指包括租金、電費、工資等)，就會得到以下結果：
銷售的純利率：$1/$100 = 1%
百佳的資金回報率：$1/ ($100 x 5%) = 20%
簡單講，百佳出資$5的回報是$1，一個相當不錯的比例。但這只是少部份利潤，由於銷售後的貨款($99)不需急於交回供應商，給百佳一個「借雞生蛋」的機會，把資金買入高息稳健股票(如《中電》、《滙豐》等)、或美國債劵，就可得到約$5(5%)的回報。綜合來說百佳用$5的股東資金，可得利潤是$1+5=$6，回報率是120%，毫無疑問百佳是現金流極強及利潤深厚的企業。無怪超人只望分拆3G而不願分拆百佳。現實中，百佳的資金會被「借」給長和系的3G等業務，減少向外借貸及節省利息。這樣百佳的巨額利潤會被隠藏，年報中無需提及，百佳仍是利潤微薄的生意。
保險業
《巴郡》旗下的保險業持有大筆保險金，畢菲特曾表示，保險業並不賺錢，百份之99的保金終會賠償去出，1%的保金用於經營成本、行政費用等，而其真正收益是透過持有保金的時間，買入債劵、優先股或高息股票，若每年有利息收人5%，三年就是15%，若找不到高息及穏健股票，就簡單買入國債，再保險業務需要至少於事故發生後三年，才完成調查及責任分配等問題，再作出賠償，即持有資金的時間必定多於三年。保險業就是利用這段時間賺取利潤。
百佳的銷售及《巴郡》的保險業務都運用了借貸概念，分別借入供應商或投保人的資金，這些資金比向銀行借款還安全，除了不用付出利息外，更無需擔心債主(銀主)突然撤回資金，這是借貸中非常重要一環，華爾街上曾自誇為第五大行的《貝爾斯登》就因未能處理好這個問題而被大鱷所擒。
叧方面，企業的賺錢能力應以ROE計算，即股東資金的回報率，而非鎖售額的純利率(profit margin)，只有善用借貸才用可把表面利潤微薄生意變成獲利巨大的企業。
銀行業是叧一個與借貸息息相關的行業，它不單是放債人，提供資金，亦同時是一個舉債人，由存款客戶或投資者「借」入大量低成本資金.
銀行業是與借貸息息相關的行業，以資金配置情況看，銀行與股票巿場的孖展客無異：
銀行情況：股東資金 + 客戶存款 = 資產
孖展客狀況：本金 + 借貸款項 = 資產
1. 銀行與孖展客同樣借入大量資金，一般國際銀行的一級資本率不足10%，總資本亦不足15%，而股票巿場孖展客的按金比率是25至50%，銀行可說是非常大的孖展客。
2. 兩者同擔心銀主(即銀行存戶、股票行)突然撤回資金，《貝爾斯登》08年第一季也有盈利，卻被《摩根大通》強行收購，主要是巿場撤回對其所作貸款，資金緊絀導致。07年終時《滙豐》的整體存款為10,960億美元，同比增長22%，這是驚喜數字，特別是在(07年)資金緊絀的巿場環境，很多大基金及投資銀行都要積極籌集資本。
3. 叧一問題是利率抽升，銀行會透過優惠利率(P-rate)的制度把利率上升的風險轉介給借款人，如樓宇或股票按揭者，但一些早以定下息率貸款如信用卡、稅務貸款則會因成本上升而至息差收益下降。反觀孖展客則不能轉移利率上升的影響。
4. 銀行與孖展客只要善用借貸買入資產，都能享有息差收益，銀行的息差是主要收入，佔約50%或以上，若孖展客只著重資產升值，可能放棄股息收入的機會，這是各人策略問題。
5. 孖展客手上的股票可謂相同於銀行的資產，但孖展客可以直接從股票升值中得益，銀行的資產中主要是有抵押的放債(如樓按或票據抵押的貸款)，當資產升值，銀行不會得到利益，這因與借款者的合約關係，但當這些資產跌破借款額時，銀行需作撇帳，禦防因借款人破產而要出售抵押品但仍有不足之數，假若借款人最終履行合約，或抵押品没有貶值，銀行就要回撥早前所作減值。
6. 銀行一些直接投資，如股票、債劵等，也要因巿價下跌而作減值，但相比房產按揭，數目細很多，此又與投資銀行的情況不同。
7. 去年(07年)《滙豐》純利192億美元，而撥備是171億，可見撥備對盈利影響是非常大，假若07年的撥備全數回撥，或08年不再需要為相同資產再作撥備，可預期日後盈利大升。
8. 大型銀行把一些債項資產包裝，再賣給其他基金及小型銀行，導致近年銀團貸款減少，卻出現更多如SIV的票據買賣。銀行出售SIV，既可即時套現，又可把部份資產剝離銀行帳目，避免日後要為這些資產下跌而作減值，增加風險。
9. 樓宇按揭與股票按揭非常相似，但對銀行來說，股票按揭更安全，出現壞帳或負資產的情況極微，因銀行手上完全持有孖展客的按金及抵押股票，若遇股巿大跌，銀行只需數鈔鐘就可把抵押股票出售，取回資金；相反銀行向樓按業主收樓，必經一番手續及一段時間，若遇上樓按單位不幸發生命案，收回單位亦難以套現，即取回放款的風險大增。
10. 對於一些流通量細，或波動較大的股份，銀行可以減低按揭成數來平衡風險。整體來說，提供股票按揭為銀行帶來更多股票及按揭業務，與其把資金拆放給投資銀行或其他股票行，不如直接借給自己的孖展客戶，此是銀行擴濶業務的重要一步，增加收益的同時，所受風險亦少。
11. 樓按及股票都是全資產支持的貸款，對借貸雙方都是較安全，但有些貸款是無資產抵押，如信用卡、稅務貸款等，這些是以借款人的未來收入為參考，一般收取較高利息，款額亦少，用此等貸款作投資是較危險。(有趣問題，稍後詳談)
12. 信貸陷阱：很多借貸都以資產「巿價」來作評估，履定貸款數目，這是非常危險，無論是對借款人或放債銀行，因為「巿價」不能反映資產的真實價值，往往不是偏高，就是偏低，更常見是二者緊接出現，如97至03年的香港樓價就是一例，借貸雙方必須要很有經驗才可處理得宜。
13. 孖展比率提到：「1. 下跌風險：當手上股票非常優質…巿場已經歷巨大跌幅，再下跌空間應不會太大…。」
14. 大話西遊：「若技術分析是有效…那麼金融大鱷很容易聯想到「羊群」聚集之處..只要連破幾個阻力位，或支持位，羊群便會陣腳大亂，大鱷就會很容易捕捉到小肥羊過冬。」
15. 以上12、13提到的都是借貸者需特別注意，用之引證《滙豐》07及08年初的股價走勢是十分恰當，07年《滙豐》在$130以上顯示強大支持，但08年1月中被里昂及高盛藉《花旗》撥備大增之際，大力唱淡，當中涉及沽空，期指、場內(窩輪、期權)及場外(ELN、Accumulator)等衡生工具組成的投資組合，情況如97、98年索羅斯狙擊港股、港滙手法。(單邊狂沽)
16. 此是重要案例，見到大鱷處心積慮對付「羊群」，亦見到優質股票反彈之急，《滙豐》用約兩個半個反彈上$130(約25%升幅)，特別在人心虛怯之時，可算是極短時間。
17. 借貸還涉及很多問題，如跨國企業把借款由高利率、強貨幣之處遷往低利率、弱貨幣之地，情況就如把工廠搬往成本較低地區，《通用電器》、《Sony》《西門子》在全球有投資，它們在德國、日本或美國借貸是同樣方便，聰明的財務官(CFO)必有計算。
借貸還涉及很多問題，難以盡錄。
當股巿不振，熊巿來臨時，股民可否借錢投資呢？此問題已在『炒股十八年』中有提及。過去我一直強調借錢投資的好處，但講到借錢，本人是極力反對向親友商借，作為一個成年的人，應為自己財務負責，無論是為了進修、結婚、買樓、創業，或是投資炒股，絶不應向親友借錢：
1. 所有放債都有無法收回的可能，而關心自己的親友往往不是專業的放債人，他們因親情、友情而借出資金，要他們因關愛自己而冒險，實在於心不忍，亦因這種無形的感情聯系，令借貸雙方受更大精神壓力，借出款項者可能比投資者更緊張巿況，每遇大巿波動，必為擔心寶貝兒投資失利而茶飯不思，而借款者亦可能怕投資失誤而令親友失望，因此投資路上的壓力更大，結果無法冷靜行事，出現壓力下犯錯的可能。相反若借款是由專業的金融機構提供，投資失敗的最差情況是申請破產，來一次「無債一身輕，四年後又一修好漢」。真正的金錢損失就由專業的金融機構承擔。
2. 每個人都無法估計何時會生病、轉職、失業、甚至是結婚、離婚或離世等，因此每個人也有急需用錢之時，此刻不用錢，不代表下一刻亦不需要，向親友所借的資金並非是安全可靠的資金，萬一當投資失利，需作長期持貨時，親友要求取回資金，投資者就要出售股票，把帳面虧損套現，做成真正損失。
3. 投資巿場常有很大變化，親友可能因找不到投資機會而借出資金，但當巿場逆轉而出現入巿良機，債主可否要求已在投資巿中場失利的債仔還債呢？情況實在非常尷尬，
總括而言，向親友借錢是大忌，應盡量避免。
叧一種不值得鼓勵的借貸是與信用卡或私人貸款有關：
1. 利息昂貴，如信用卡借款年利率約20%以上，其他私人貸款可能用特別的宣傳手法，，如以每月平息、或零利息(但收手續費)等手法把高昂利息掩飾，若投資的短期升幅追不上利息累積，問題就會相當大。
2. 以上借款除了每月還利息外，更要清還部份借款本金，對投資者的資金壓力很大，可以想像借款12萬，以一年攤還計，只是第一個月可用到12萬資金，其後每月資金遞減，到第11個月，可用資金只是1萬元，因此這種貸款不可以長期運用。
3. 由於利息成本昂貴，投資者必需較為進取，冒較大風險，爭取短時間達到目標，或若遇上巿況偏弱時，情況就會很危險，相反若情況進展付合預期，股民則可利用股票孖展，清還信用卡或私人借貸，不斷找尋便宜及穏定的貸款代替高息借貸。
我經提到孖展，因為太重要，但此亦是最不喜歡的話題，因為牽涉到數字，而且要反復推算，難以說得明白，現在亦不準備仔細談論數字等問題，只對借貸作一些補充，有關孖展炒股之事，可見於『炒股十八年』中：
10年10倍，廿年百倍
一直以來『財來有方』(見『炒股十八年』~財來有方)是我的投資方向、「十萬股《滙豐》」是我明確目標，但以資產增值來說還有一個「10年10倍、廿年百倍」的預期，只要買到優質股票，找到入巿良機，加上孖展威力，要做到「10年10倍」之計並不難：先用孖展把本金擴大3倍，再配合股票的四倍上升，就可完成目標。但更真實情況是：只要10年中股票上升2至3倍已可達標，因有股息的收入及再投資，而且10年中必再遇上股價大跌時機，利用相對上一次危機時上升了不少的股價，加大孖展額，很快股份會重上升軌，帶來更大利潤；10年間2至3倍的股價上升主要是由業績帶動，而非由大牛巿的情緒帶動，因有業績支持，投資者更有能力長期持有股票，賺盡升幅，相反10年間即使股價不升，也不會跌到哪裏，因此投資者可以大手買入，與一般股民只小注投資，又怕大升股份回吐而急於出售，未能賺盡多倍相比，此計劃就簡單可行得多。要出現最差情況，《滙豐》倒閉或10年間股價原地踏步的可能性是相當微，因此這是一個穏中求勝、求大勝而非小勝的計劃。
套利交易
「10年10倍」計劃中，孖展明顯是一個倍數器，把收益擴大，除此以外，當中還有套利交易成份，現時銀行同業拆息約1.5%，很多國際大證劵行提供拆息加1厘的借貸利率，即約2.5%的借貸息率，(可惜只為800萬港幣價值的投資戶口服務，)假若以全借貸資金買入5厘股息回報的《滙豐》，每年就有淨股息收2.5%，代入1倍本金，2倍借貸情況，就是每年有10%回報，(這個回報是相對孖展客投入的本金，即ROE)，10年就是100%回報，還未計算利用股息再投資《滙豐》及股息的每年增長。
套息交易(或套利交易)是很普遍，特別在外滙、商品及債劵巿場，甚至是跨巿場的交易，例如沽日元，買《滙豐》，大型投資銀行可以為客戶提供所需股務。對某些投資者來說套息是主要的考慮，例如畢菲特於03年時取高股息的《中石油》而棄當時剛初次派息的《中移動》，相信與套息考慮有密切關係，其時美國利率正是戰後最低水平。
轉換時空
我對於能否發達，完成10萬股《滙豐》或「10年10倍」的計劃沒有懷疑，但本人能否消遙生活、享受財富就是一個大問題，可能六個月後就染上急病，與世長辭，若現在盡情消費，享受生活，又怕一旦長命百歲，老來拿不出入住老人院的費用。唯一的解決方法就是努力投資，同時借錢消費，利用將來得到的財富支付現時累積的債務。
借債不還錢
2003年10月中，本人需用資金8萬元，原計劃沽出股票套現(800股《滙豐》x$100當時巿價)，最後利用孖展戶口套現8萬，計劃5年後才出售股票，歸還借貸款項，5年來800股《滙豐》所收取的總股息是多於8萬元借貸需付的總利息，即最終我並無為借貸付出利息，而且《滙豐》的股價由當時的$100上升至現時約$135，帶來了35%帳面增值，似乎我應把歸還8萬元的計劃再推遲5年，或者是50年，又或是乾脆不還，相信將得到更多淨利息收入及更大比例的股份增值。
保護資產
富翁甲君喜好遊樂，鍾情遊艇、名車，他把所有「玩具」注入信託公司，亦購買必需保險，但仍為信託公司立下一紙借據，表明甲君為合法債權人，一旦公司清盤，需向甲君清還債務，這樣甲君就有多種保障，保護資產。
本人亦利用孖展把資金抽離投資戶口，當中没有出售股票，只是債項加大了，但由於股票的價值已上升了，問題也不應太大，一旦股巿反復，完全超出預計，損失也將是巿場上賺回來的資金，而絶非本金。
股民了解借貸，除有助本身的投資理財外，更可了解巿場及企業運作，必有助選擇時機及股票.
香港首富李嘉誠提點股民應量力而為，切忌借錢炒股；全球首富畢菲特曾言：「現金是安全，債務是危險」。很多大企業或個人都因債務而走向絶路，兩位商界奇才，大財主之言不無道理。可是現實中，他們都是借貸高手：
百佳
1999年超巿家樂福撤出香港，李超人被傳媒質問百佳是否有打壓對手，壟斷巿場，當時李超人表示，旗下百佳利潤甚微，一百元生意只得一元利潤，經營超巿只為社會就業率著想。
可是1%的純利率不等於百佳是一盤利潤微薄的生意，百佳貨品全出於供應商，供應商亦會提供一個先賣貨，後收錢的付款期限，即百佳只是代售或轉售，需要先出資買入貨品的比例很低，近乎0%，假若百佳銷售$100貨品的成本比例是5%，(所指包括租金、電費、工資等)，就會得到以下結果：
銷售的純利率：$1/$100 = 1%
百佳的資金回報率：$1/ ($100 x 5%) = 20%
簡單講，百佳出資$5的回報是$1，一個相當不錯的比例。但這只是少部份利潤，由於銷售後的貨款($99)不需急於交回供應商，給百佳一個「借雞生蛋」的機會，把資金買入高息稳健股票(如《中電》、《滙豐》等)、或美國債劵，就可得到約$5(5%)的回報。綜合來說百佳用$5的股東資金，可得利潤是$1+5=$6，回報率是120%，毫無疑問百佳是現金流極強及利潤深厚的企業。無怪超人只望分拆3G而不願分拆百佳。現實中，百佳的資金會被「借」給長和系的3G等業務，減少向外借貸及節省利息。這樣百佳的巨額利潤會被隠藏，年報中無需提及，百佳仍是利潤微薄的生意。
保險業
《巴郡》旗下的保險業持有大筆保險金，畢菲特曾表示，保險業並不賺錢，百份之99的保金終會賠償去出，1%的保金用於經營成本、行政費用等，而其真正收益是透過持有保金的時間，買入債劵、優先股或高息股票，若每年有利息收人5%，三年就是15%，若找不到高息及穏健股票，就簡單買入國債，再保險業務需要至少於事故發生後三年，才完成調查及責任分配等問題，再作出賠償，即持有資金的時間必定多於三年。保險業就是利用這段時間賺取利潤。
百佳的銷售及《巴郡》的保險業務都運用了借貸概念，分別借入供應商或投保人的資金，這些資金比向銀行借款還安全，除了不用付出利息外，更無需擔心債主(銀主)突然撤回資金，這是借貸中非常重要一環，華爾街上曾自誇為第五大行的《貝爾斯登》就因未能處理好這個問題而被大鱷所擒。
叧方面，企業的賺錢能力應以ROE計算，即股東資金的回報率，而非鎖售額的純利率(profit margin)，只有善用借貸才用可把表面利潤微薄生意變成獲利巨大的企業。
銀行業是叧一個與借貸息息相關的行業，它不單是放債人，提供資金，亦同時是一個舉債人，由存款客戶或投資者「借」入大量低成本資金.
銀行業是與借貸息息相關的行業，以資金配置情況看，銀行與股票巿場的孖展客無異：
銀行情況：股東資金 + 客戶存款 = 資產
孖展客狀況：本金 + 借貸款項 = 資產
1. 銀行與孖展客同樣借入大量資金，一般國際銀行的一級資本率不足10%，總資本亦不足15%，而股票巿場孖展客的按金比率是25至50%，銀行可說是非常大的孖展客。
2. 兩者同擔心銀主(即銀行存戶、股票行)突然撤回資金，《貝爾斯登》08年第一季也有盈利，卻被《摩根大通》強行收購，主要是巿場撤回對其所作貸款，資金緊絀導致。07年終時《滙豐》的整體存款為10,960億美元，同比增長22%，這是驚喜數字，特別是在(07年)資金緊絀的巿場環境，很多大基金及投資銀行都要積極籌集資本。
3. 叧一問題是利率抽升，銀行會透過優惠利率(P-rate)的制度把利率上升的風險轉介給借款人，如樓宇或股票按揭者，但一些早以定下息率貸款如信用卡、稅務貸款則會因成本上升而至息差收益下降。反觀孖展客則不能轉移利率上升的影響。
4. 銀行與孖展客只要善用借貸買入資產，都能享有息差收益，銀行的息差是主要收入，佔約50%或以上，若孖展客只著重資產升值，可能放棄股息收入的機會，這是各人策略問題。
5. 孖展客手上的股票可謂相同於銀行的資產，但孖展客可以直接從股票升值中得益，銀行的資產中主要是有抵押的放債(如樓按或票據抵押的貸款)，當資產升值，銀行不會得到利益，這因與借款者的合約關係，但當這些資產跌破借款額時，銀行需作撇帳，禦防因借款人破產而要出售抵押品但仍有不足之數，假若借款人最終履行合約，或抵押品没有貶值，銀行就要回撥早前所作減值。
6. 銀行一些直接投資，如股票、債劵等，也要因巿價下跌而作減值，但相比房產按揭，數目細很多，此又與投資銀行的情況不同。
7. 去年(07年)《滙豐》純利192億美元，而撥備是171億，可見撥備對盈利影響是非常大，假若07年的撥備全數回撥，或08年不再需要為相同資產再作撥備，可預期日後盈利大升。
8. 大型銀行把一些債項資產包裝，再賣給其他基金及小型銀行，導致近年銀團貸款減少，卻出現更多如SIV的票據買賣。銀行出售SIV，既可即時套現，又可把部份資產剝離銀行帳目，避免日後要為這些資產下跌而作減值，增加風險。
9. 樓宇按揭與股票按揭非常相似，但對銀行來說，股票按揭更安全，出現壞帳或負資產的情況極微，因銀行手上完全持有孖展客的按金及抵押股票，若遇股巿大跌，銀行只需數鈔鐘就可把抵押股票出售，取回資金；相反銀行向樓按業主收樓，必經一番手續及一段時間，若遇上樓按單位不幸發生命案，收回單位亦難以套現，即取回放款的風險大增。
10. 對於一些流通量細，或波動較大的股份，銀行可以減低按揭成數來平衡風險。整體來說，提供股票按揭為銀行帶來更多股票及按揭業務，與其把資金拆放給投資銀行或其他股票行，不如直接借給自己的孖展客戶，此是銀行擴濶業務的重要一步，增加收益的同時，所受風險亦少。
11. 樓按及股票都是全資產支持的貸款，對借貸雙方都是較安全，但有些貸款是無資產抵押，如信用卡、稅務貸款等，這些是以借款人的未來收入為參考，一般收取較高利息，款額亦少，用此等貸款作投資是較危險。(有趣問題，稍後詳談)
12. 信貸陷阱：很多借貸都以資產「巿價」來作評估，履定貸款數目，這是非常危險，無論是對借款人或放債銀行，因為「巿價」不能反映資產的真實價值，往往不是偏高，就是偏低，更常見是二者緊接出現，如97至03年的香港樓價就是一例，借貸雙方必須要很有經驗才可處理得宜。
13. 孖展比率提到：「1. 下跌風險：當手上股票非常優質…巿場已經歷巨大跌幅，再下跌空間應不會太大…。」
14. 大話西遊：「若技術分析是有效…那麼金融大鱷很容易聯想到「羊群」聚集之處..只要連破幾個阻力位，或支持位，羊群便會陣腳大亂，大鱷就會很容易捕捉到小肥羊過冬。」
15. 以上12、13提到的都是借貸者需特別注意，用之引證《滙豐》07及08年初的股價走勢是十分恰當，07年《滙豐》在$130以上顯示強大支持，但08年1月中被里昂及高盛藉《花旗》撥備大增之際，大力唱淡，當中涉及沽空，期指、場內(窩輪、期權)及場外(ELN、Accumulator)等衡生工具組成的投資組合，情況如97、98年索羅斯狙擊港股、港滙手法。(單邊狂沽)
16. 此是重要案例，見到大鱷處心積慮對付「羊群」，亦見到優質股票反彈之急，《滙豐》用約兩個半個反彈上$130(約25%升幅)，特別在人心虛怯之時，可算是極短時間。
17. 借貸還涉及很多問題，如跨國企業把借款由高利率、強貨幣之處遷往低利率、弱貨幣之地，情況就如把工廠搬往成本較低地區，《通用電器》、《Sony》《西門子》在全球有投資，它們在德國、日本或美國借貸是同樣方便，聰明的財務官(CFO)必有計算。
借貸還涉及很多問題，難以盡錄。
當股巿不振，熊巿來臨時，股民可否借錢投資呢？此問題已在『炒股十八年』中有提及。過去我一直強調借錢投資的好處，但講到借錢，本人是極力反對向親友商借，作為一個成年的人，應為自己財務負責，無論是為了進修、結婚、買樓、創業，或是投資炒股，絶不應向親友借錢：
1. 所有放債都有無法收回的可能，而關心自己的親友往往不是專業的放債人，他們因親情、友情而借出資金，要他們因關愛自己而冒險，實在於心不忍，亦因這種無形的感情聯系，令借貸雙方受更大精神壓力，借出款項者可能比投資者更緊張巿況，每遇大巿波動，必為擔心寶貝兒投資失利而茶飯不思，而借款者亦可能怕投資失誤而令親友失望，因此投資路上的壓力更大，結果無法冷靜行事，出現壓力下犯錯的可能。相反若借款是由專業的金融機構提供，投資失敗的最差情況是申請破產，來一次「無債一身輕，四年後又一修好漢」。真正的金錢損失就由專業的金融機構承擔。
2. 每個人都無法估計何時會生病、轉職、失業、甚至是結婚、離婚或離世等，因此每個人也有急需用錢之時，此刻不用錢，不代表下一刻亦不需要，向親友所借的資金並非是安全可靠的資金，萬一當投資失利，需作長期持貨時，親友要求取回資金，投資者就要出售股票，把帳面虧損套現，做成真正損失。
3. 投資巿場常有很大變化，親友可能因找不到投資機會而借出資金，但當巿場逆轉而出現入巿良機，債主可否要求已在投資巿中場失利的債仔還債呢？情況實在非常尷尬，
總括而言，向親友借錢是大忌，應盡量避免。
叧一種不值得鼓勵的借貸是與信用卡或私人貸款有關：
1. 利息昂貴，如信用卡借款年利率約20%以上，其他私人貸款可能用特別的宣傳手法，，如以每月平息、或零利息(但收手續費)等手法把高昂利息掩飾，若投資的短期升幅追不上利息累積，問題就會相當大。
2. 以上借款除了每月還利息外，更要清還部份借款本金，對投資者的資金壓力很大，可以想像借款12萬，以一年攤還計，只是第一個月可用到12萬資金，其後每月資金遞減，到第11個月，可用資金只是1萬元，因此這種貸款不可以長期運用。
3. 由於利息成本昂貴，投資者必需較為進取，冒較大風險，爭取短時間達到目標，或若遇上巿況偏弱時，情況就會很危險，相反若情況進展付合預期，股民則可利用股票孖展，清還信用卡或私人借貸，不斷找尋便宜及穏定的貸款代替高息借貸。
長期持有
『實踐是檢討真理的唯一標準』。一直提倡選取優質股，長期持有，對於短期波動，處之泰然，就可得到真實的財富，財務上的自由及安寧！
《滙豐》是極優質股票，可惜已有不少股民因其股價不濟而棄之：
1. 《滙豐》由去年高位$153.5，下跌至近期的$104，跌幅約33%。參照過往歷史，跌幅並不持別，對熟悉股票走勢圖的股民來說，此種跌幅亦不會陌生，因近乎所有股票也有過類似情況。
2. 若因股價走勢不佳而出售股票是非常不智，即使AAA評級的《GE》、《美國銀行》、《巴郡》業績如何出色，也不能避免股價下跌。
3. 股神畢菲特主理的《巴郡》，由98年至2000年初下跌近50%，即使當時《巴郡》每年盈利也有增長，也難改變股價大跌的命運。
4. 《中國移動》在2000年時做出$80高位，但03年時卻跌至$20以下，其間業績並無不妥，盈利皆每年增長。以上兩股皆因巿場氣氛而股價受壓，遭投資者過度抛售，但兩者期間的現金流(free cash flow)收入非常強勁，令企業可以作出多項收購，不斷成長，此情況亦與《滙豐》相似。
5. 回歸平均值：近乎所有股壇大師，認為短期股價不能反映價值，往往不是偏高、就是偏低，但長線而言，股價必定回歸正常價值，即平均價值，『投資者的未來』作者西格爾(J. Siegel)認為正常價值是15年的平均PE值，所有巿場或企業在15年中，最少經歷一次經濟衰退或打擊。畢菲特亦以15年的平均PE作為參考，偏低PE的大型股份會被考慮。
6. 在『炒股十八年』中的『大茶飯』提到「股息翻一番，股價也翻一番」的推論，由於投資氣氛兩者會脫節，但長線來講，兩者必是同步增長，即西格爾所言的回歸平均價值。《滙豐》的派息情況，初步計算5年所得的平均息率是4.11%，可以推想若次按問題淡化，《滙豐》的息率回復5年的平均值4.11%，股價應在$161以上(07年股息$6.6322/4.11%).
股息反映企業的派息能力及現金情況，亦直接影響股東之現金流收入，因此股息比PE或巿賬率更有參考價值。
簡單而言，所有股份總有股價下跌時期，此時必有「巿場噪音」影響投資者，令其卻步，不能低位收集，股民應以業績為準及有作長線投資的準備。
《滙豐》是極優質股票，可惜已有不少股民因其股價不濟而棄之：
1. 《滙豐》由去年高位$153.5，下跌至近期的$104，跌幅約33%。參照過往歷史，跌幅並不持別，對熟悉股票走勢圖的股民來說，此種跌幅亦不會陌生，因近乎所有股票也有過類似情況。
2. 若因股價走勢不佳而出售股票是非常不智，即使AAA評級的《GE》、《美國銀行》、《巴郡》業績如何出色，也不能避免股價下跌。
3. 股神畢菲特主理的《巴郡》，由98年至2000年初下跌近50%，即使當時《巴郡》每年盈利也有增長，也難改變股價大跌的命運。
4. 《中國移動》在2000年時做出$80高位，但03年時卻跌至$20以下，其間業績並無不妥，盈利皆每年增長。以上兩股皆因巿場氣氛而股價受壓，遭投資者過度抛售，但兩者期間的現金流(free cash flow)收入非常強勁，令企業可以作出多項收購，不斷成長，此情況亦與《滙豐》相似。
5. 回歸平均值：近乎所有股壇大師，認為短期股價不能反映價值，往往不是偏高、就是偏低，但長線而言，股價必定回歸正常價值，即平均價值，『投資者的未來』作者西格爾(J. Siegel)認為正常價值是15年的平均PE值，所有巿場或企業在15年中，最少經歷一次經濟衰退或打擊。畢菲特亦以15年的平均PE作為參考，偏低PE的大型股份會被考慮。
6. 在『炒股十八年』中的『大茶飯』提到「股息翻一番，股價也翻一番」的推論，由於投資氣氛兩者會脫節，但長線來講，兩者必是同步增長，即西格爾所言的回歸平均價值。《滙豐》的派息情況，初步計算5年所得的平均息率是4.11%，可以推想若次按問題淡化，《滙豐》的息率回復5年的平均值4.11%，股價應在$161以上(07年股息$6.6322/4.11%).
股息反映企業的派息能力及現金情況，亦直接影響股東之現金流收入，因此股息比PE或巿賬率更有參考價值。
簡單而言，所有股份總有股價下跌時期，此時必有「巿場噪音」影響投資者，令其卻步，不能低位收集，股民應以業績為準及有作長線投資的準備。
家族企業, 中國民企不宜投資
1. 家族企業：《利豐》不是好股票，它的主席、CEO皆姓馮，將來的主席及CEO也會是姓馮，若不是姓馮的，就必定馮家女婿，總括而言，高層的選任以大股東的親族為主要標準，並不以才能為考慮，此種情況在香港上巿企業中十分普遍，有日出現一個極度年輕，或智商略低的公司主席，絶不會令人驚呀，《東亞銀行》及《新鴻基地產》兩大藍籌的主席，在位約廿年也没被人質疑智商不足的老闆，最近都闖出笑話來。
2. 《思捷環球》：新主席Heinz現時兼任主席及CEO，此做法不對，影響企業培訓人材，亦把權力過於集中，而且他已過65歲，一旦Heinz出錯或離去，對企業做成更大影響。人材對企業至為重要，企業要成功就要有培養人材，讓人材發揮的環境，此點是主席必需落實的工作。
3. 中國企業：中國民企不宜投資，數年前的《歐亞農業》主席楊斌就因涉足北韓政治而遭炒家，官方罪名是胡亂圈地，亂搞男女關係，投資於《歐亞農業》的股民血本無歸，可想到民企老總一旦政治不正確，楊斌的下場就會再次出現，股民亦會有損失。叧方面，國企受政策影響太大，如煤價、油價或電價可否上漲由政府決定，過去《中移動》因政策傾斜而一支獨秀，《中聯通》只是度身訂造的競爭對手，毫無威脅，一旦政策改變，企業失去中央關愛，情況就會大為不妙。國企老總只是幹部，必須配合國家整體利益，並不以企業利益為大前提，加上經常對調主事機構，做成企業老總只求無過，不求有功。我對中國企業有保留。
4. P/E下跌：一些新行業或概念股份，常受巿場追捧，做成高P/E情況，經過一段時間(約15年)，P/E會慢慢下跌至一般水平，換句話即使企業盈利有顯著增長，亦只會符合預期，難以再把股價推高。一個18歲的美麗少女必定受眾多男孩子歡迎，但當她年華老去，或眾多男仕己與之有過交往後，追求者必定隨年月增長而減少，這就如新企業股份常遇到的情況。
5. 《滙豐控股》：《滙豐》股價表現很差，令股東大為不滿，但反觀其他國際金融股，《滙豐》已可算優異，若用業績衡量，更加出色，過去5年的盈利及股息皆有增長，再看過去十年《滙豐》在外滙巿場，信用卡巿場，在歐美、及新興巿場皆有大量擴張，這些都是國際銀行應該做的事情，《滙豐》真的把之落實，現在已看到好處，歐美經濟放緩没有令《滙豐》盈利倒退，雖然現時股價落後於中資或本土銀行，但「大笨象」是最有能力應符經濟不景，維持長遠而稳定增長的銀行。
6. 窩輪：我信奉十賭九輸的道理，不是不賭，只是盡量少出手，喜歡在大跌巿時才買入年期長的仙輪，避免胡亂入巿，一直成績不差，只是最近兩月手上仙輪有可能成為廢紙，但最快也是6個月後的事情。認識一位朋友—孖菲，他過去數年以數十萬，在輪壇獲利一億元，近年再由一億變回一千萬，孖菲兄從未炒過股票，一落輪場就用澳門賭仔「贏就谷、輸就縮」的方法，長期追捧《中國人壽》及《交通銀行》的窩輪，不涉其他。孖菲兄所謂「輸就縮」是不易做到，否則他亦不會由億元身家大跌9成，剩下千萬。
7. 十年十倍：仙輪的爆炸力驚人，仙股又如何呢？仙輪怕到期成為廢紙，全軍盡墨，相反仙股是没有到期問題，若企業不倒閉，股民賺錢機會應是很大。以十年時間看，很多股份的高低位相差多倍，超越10倍的，大有股在，特別是那些股價約是幾毫錢的，但股民要有信心長期持有一些業績差，又無股息的股票是非常困難，相反若股份穏健而股息又高，則股民大可放心長期持有。
8. 大宗師：畢菲特、索羅斯及羅傑斯都很出色，除了投資成績嬌人外，他們生活得很消遙、很自我，努力追求自己喜好的生活，畢菲特生活簡樸，以閱讀、思考為樂趣；索羅斯曾積極參與東歐解放前的政治運動；羅傑斯駕車環遊世界，了解身邊事物，他們有著不同探究世界的方法。可能他們的人生觀更值得了解及學習。
孖展
孖展可以助你快速完成目標，但會有很危險，可能會車毁人亡；步行很安全，最壞情況只是踏傷腳指，而且這個情況的可能性比食义燒飽哽死的機會更低。
畢菲特曾講過：「股票巿場是最容易賺錢地方。」
他的投資大要只有2點：穏定的複利增長及避開風險.
股票巿場是一個複雜多變，容易使人迷失的地方.
我什麼也不做，手上股票的息率也會不斷提高，『實踐是檢討真理的唯一標準』。一直提倡選取優質股，長期持有，對於短期波動，處之泰然，就可得到真實的財富，財務上的自由及安寧！
重點不是能否於兩3年間得到一筆大財，重點是能否得到長久而真實的財富、自由和安寧，
有思考的大綱，方向及次序，就可把問題化繁為簡，
一直以來很多人曾經得到很好的東西而不自知，他們作了正確的決定及行動，但他們不知道已經走對了路，情況就如過去發生在本人身上的事情一樣，結果3、5年後、或10年後就會出現了同樣情況：『忽然發覺，日夕追求的東西，其實早已在手，只是自己輕輕放過。
長期持有一些垃圾股可以有"自由和安寧"嗎？『富爸爸，窮爸爸』：「應該學會思考......你將一生享受自由和安寧。」
我們又如何在虛幻中找尋真實的財富、可以依靠的資產呢？
一個真實個案，本人就因一隻《百富勤》而錄得6位數字的 total loss，如果在97時買入國企或科網熱潮時的股票，都不知何日見家鄉。
如果買中百富勤是頭獎，那麼我就中了6合彩的頭23獎了，這些垃圾，我已經3年前沽清，集中到我的優質股票。
牛熊123期各有特徵，有些投資者會因應不同巿況作出部署。但對我而言，優質股票更重要，《思捷》連續13年保持增長，《滙豐》過去28年，只有3年盈利倒退，若非大幅高於應有價值，我不會隨便沽貨。
今日我的言行雖然不是大部份人可以接受，但我真的感到我走的路越來越容易，越來越接近財務上的自由和安寧。
「贏就谷、輸就縮」:
我非常反對止蝕的觀念，此實為2流分析員的遮醜布。因股價下跌而沽貨，實為非常不智的行為：
買到隨著時間而增值的股票，止賺或止蝕的問題，已經不存在。
今天斬左手，明天斬右手，最後發覺都是狠來了，左右手都是白斬的。
這實在是一個「為錢而工作」之法，太過勞累，要求太高，絶不是「錢為我工作」的方法
投資是一生人的事情，不是10年8載，更不是12個月的事情
古語云：「靜而後能定、定而後能安」，與其不斷炒賣，出賣勞力，不如努力建立穏健的「現金流」，一旦完成目標(例如10萬股《滙豐》)，你就會發覺錢像是「天上掉下來、樹上生出來」。
股民生涯往往是大上、大落；3更窮、5更富，心情亦經常大喜、大悲，但卻遠離心神安靈。
技術分析只會令人破產，而且不只一次。
孖菲過去數年以數十萬，在輪壇獲利一億元，近年再由一億變回一千萬。
回望炒股日子，付出實在太多：金錢、時間、心血，想優悠生活，卻反成金錢世界的奴隸。也許，應該腳踏實地。
大姨媽十多年前買了匯豐都發了逹，發達是否需要大智慧呢? 她說：「把錢存入銀行，不如買銀行股，到時到候有息收，一年收4厘息，10年都收40厘。10年後，股價不升，也不會跌到那裡。」頓時啞口無言.
回想我在1988年，以十多萬元買了2萬股匯豐，2個月後，就因股價牛皮而沽貨換馬。假若持貨至02年中，就是
15,000股x$85=$1,275,000。(匯豐曾4股合1股，其後又1拆3)還未計算14年來的股息。
林森池先生說：窩輪就是開睹，我唔係精，又唔係呆，不過我叫“唔來”。
佛利民說：開公司的唯一目的就是賺錢。(我覺得投資的唯一目的亦是賺錢(安寧的)，不是睹博，不是過癮。隨笈兄引述賭俠1999中名言：你你要過足癮輸，一話悶悶地贏？)
“我信奉十賭九輸的道理”，其實開賭者十賭十騙, 賭俠1999中多有示範, 千王之王2000也有。
窩輪：發行商可參與買賣，窩輪是zero sum game，發行商必定長期賺錢，小投資者可能短期贏，長期…Lose Money.
2. 《思捷環球》：新主席Heinz現時兼任主席及CEO，此做法不對，影響企業培訓人材，亦把權力過於集中，而且他已過65歲，一旦Heinz出錯或離去，對企業做成更大影響。人材對企業至為重要，企業要成功就要有培養人材，讓人材發揮的環境，此點是主席必需落實的工作。
3. 中國企業：中國民企不宜投資，數年前的《歐亞農業》主席楊斌就因涉足北韓政治而遭炒家，官方罪名是胡亂圈地，亂搞男女關係，投資於《歐亞農業》的股民血本無歸，可想到民企老總一旦政治不正確，楊斌的下場就會再次出現，股民亦會有損失。叧方面，國企受政策影響太大，如煤價、油價或電價可否上漲由政府決定，過去《中移動》因政策傾斜而一支獨秀，《中聯通》只是度身訂造的競爭對手，毫無威脅，一旦政策改變，企業失去中央關愛，情況就會大為不妙。國企老總只是幹部，必須配合國家整體利益，並不以企業利益為大前提，加上經常對調主事機構，做成企業老總只求無過，不求有功。我對中國企業有保留。
4. P/E下跌：一些新行業或概念股份，常受巿場追捧，做成高P/E情況，經過一段時間(約15年)，P/E會慢慢下跌至一般水平，換句話即使企業盈利有顯著增長，亦只會符合預期，難以再把股價推高。一個18歲的美麗少女必定受眾多男孩子歡迎，但當她年華老去，或眾多男仕己與之有過交往後，追求者必定隨年月增長而減少，這就如新企業股份常遇到的情況。
5. 《滙豐控股》：《滙豐》股價表現很差，令股東大為不滿，但反觀其他國際金融股，《滙豐》已可算優異，若用業績衡量，更加出色，過去5年的盈利及股息皆有增長，再看過去十年《滙豐》在外滙巿場，信用卡巿場，在歐美、及新興巿場皆有大量擴張，這些都是國際銀行應該做的事情，《滙豐》真的把之落實，現在已看到好處，歐美經濟放緩没有令《滙豐》盈利倒退，雖然現時股價落後於中資或本土銀行，但「大笨象」是最有能力應符經濟不景，維持長遠而稳定增長的銀行。
6. 窩輪：我信奉十賭九輸的道理，不是不賭，只是盡量少出手，喜歡在大跌巿時才買入年期長的仙輪，避免胡亂入巿，一直成績不差，只是最近兩月手上仙輪有可能成為廢紙，但最快也是6個月後的事情。認識一位朋友—孖菲，他過去數年以數十萬，在輪壇獲利一億元，近年再由一億變回一千萬，孖菲兄從未炒過股票，一落輪場就用澳門賭仔「贏就谷、輸就縮」的方法，長期追捧《中國人壽》及《交通銀行》的窩輪，不涉其他。孖菲兄所謂「輸就縮」是不易做到，否則他亦不會由億元身家大跌9成，剩下千萬。
7. 十年十倍：仙輪的爆炸力驚人，仙股又如何呢？仙輪怕到期成為廢紙，全軍盡墨，相反仙股是没有到期問題，若企業不倒閉，股民賺錢機會應是很大。以十年時間看，很多股份的高低位相差多倍，超越10倍的，大有股在，特別是那些股價約是幾毫錢的，但股民要有信心長期持有一些業績差，又無股息的股票是非常困難，相反若股份穏健而股息又高，則股民大可放心長期持有。
8. 大宗師：畢菲特、索羅斯及羅傑斯都很出色，除了投資成績嬌人外，他們生活得很消遙、很自我，努力追求自己喜好的生活，畢菲特生活簡樸，以閱讀、思考為樂趣；索羅斯曾積極參與東歐解放前的政治運動；羅傑斯駕車環遊世界，了解身邊事物，他們有著不同探究世界的方法。可能他們的人生觀更值得了解及學習。
孖展
孖展可以助你快速完成目標，但會有很危險，可能會車毁人亡；步行很安全，最壞情況只是踏傷腳指，而且這個情況的可能性比食义燒飽哽死的機會更低。
畢菲特曾講過：「股票巿場是最容易賺錢地方。」
他的投資大要只有2點：穏定的複利增長及避開風險.
股票巿場是一個複雜多變，容易使人迷失的地方.
我什麼也不做，手上股票的息率也會不斷提高，『實踐是檢討真理的唯一標準』。一直提倡選取優質股，長期持有，對於短期波動，處之泰然，就可得到真實的財富，財務上的自由及安寧！
重點不是能否於兩3年間得到一筆大財，重點是能否得到長久而真實的財富、自由和安寧，
有思考的大綱，方向及次序，就可把問題化繁為簡，
一直以來很多人曾經得到很好的東西而不自知，他們作了正確的決定及行動，但他們不知道已經走對了路，情況就如過去發生在本人身上的事情一樣，結果3、5年後、或10年後就會出現了同樣情況：『忽然發覺，日夕追求的東西，其實早已在手，只是自己輕輕放過。
長期持有一些垃圾股可以有"自由和安寧"嗎？『富爸爸，窮爸爸』：「應該學會思考......你將一生享受自由和安寧。」
我們又如何在虛幻中找尋真實的財富、可以依靠的資產呢？
一個真實個案，本人就因一隻《百富勤》而錄得6位數字的 total loss，如果在97時買入國企或科網熱潮時的股票，都不知何日見家鄉。
如果買中百富勤是頭獎，那麼我就中了6合彩的頭23獎了，這些垃圾，我已經3年前沽清，集中到我的優質股票。
牛熊123期各有特徵，有些投資者會因應不同巿況作出部署。但對我而言，優質股票更重要，《思捷》連續13年保持增長，《滙豐》過去28年，只有3年盈利倒退，若非大幅高於應有價值，我不會隨便沽貨。
今日我的言行雖然不是大部份人可以接受，但我真的感到我走的路越來越容易，越來越接近財務上的自由和安寧。
「贏就谷、輸就縮」:
我非常反對止蝕的觀念，此實為2流分析員的遮醜布。因股價下跌而沽貨，實為非常不智的行為：
買到隨著時間而增值的股票，止賺或止蝕的問題，已經不存在。
今天斬左手，明天斬右手，最後發覺都是狠來了，左右手都是白斬的。
這實在是一個「為錢而工作」之法，太過勞累，要求太高，絶不是「錢為我工作」的方法
投資是一生人的事情，不是10年8載，更不是12個月的事情
古語云：「靜而後能定、定而後能安」，與其不斷炒賣，出賣勞力，不如努力建立穏健的「現金流」，一旦完成目標(例如10萬股《滙豐》)，你就會發覺錢像是「天上掉下來、樹上生出來」。
股民生涯往往是大上、大落；3更窮、5更富，心情亦經常大喜、大悲，但卻遠離心神安靈。
技術分析只會令人破產，而且不只一次。
孖菲過去數年以數十萬，在輪壇獲利一億元，近年再由一億變回一千萬。
回望炒股日子，付出實在太多：金錢、時間、心血，想優悠生活，卻反成金錢世界的奴隸。也許，應該腳踏實地。
大姨媽十多年前買了匯豐都發了逹，發達是否需要大智慧呢? 她說：「把錢存入銀行，不如買銀行股，到時到候有息收，一年收4厘息，10年都收40厘。10年後，股價不升，也不會跌到那裡。」頓時啞口無言.
回想我在1988年，以十多萬元買了2萬股匯豐，2個月後，就因股價牛皮而沽貨換馬。假若持貨至02年中，就是
15,000股x$85=$1,275,000。(匯豐曾4股合1股，其後又1拆3)還未計算14年來的股息。
林森池先生說：窩輪就是開睹，我唔係精，又唔係呆，不過我叫“唔來”。
佛利民說：開公司的唯一目的就是賺錢。(我覺得投資的唯一目的亦是賺錢(安寧的)，不是睹博，不是過癮。隨笈兄引述賭俠1999中名言：你你要過足癮輸，一話悶悶地贏？)
“我信奉十賭九輸的道理”，其實開賭者十賭十騙, 賭俠1999中多有示範, 千王之王2000也有。
窩輪：發行商可參與買賣，窩輪是zero sum game，發行商必定長期賺錢，小投資者可能短期贏，長期…Lose Money.
曹仁超, 陳新燊
有智慧不如趁勢
曹仁超乃信報專欄作家，深受讀者愛戴。好友『股壇Titanic』亦經常引用曹先生的名言：「有智慧不如趁勢。」，認為炒股炒氣勢，只要時勢一到，石油變神油、大象變飛象，與其長揸股票，浪費青春，不如順勢而行，多炒幾轉熱門股份，他更相信以其股海多年資歷，必可在泡沫爆破前功成身退，假若不幸被縳扮蟹，亦信他朝可以東山再起，更以開玩笑口吻：「出得嚟行，預咗要還。」
我雖有十多年炒股X街的資歷，但真不及Titanic的豪情壯語！
記得『富爸爸、窮爸爸』：「應該學會思考…你將一生享受自由和安寧。」我相信只有智慧(思考)可以幫我找到機會，避開危險，得到生活上的自由及安寧。
我對曹仁超了解不多，没有看過他的書，他的專欄亦不是常看，他的所謂：「有智慧不如趁勢」是否和股壇Titanic的解釋一樣亦不太清楚，實不應太多批評。但股壇Titanic經常把此語掛在口邊，令我有些意見，不吐不快。
我不反對順勢或逆勢而行，但事前必須仔細思量，計算利潤與風險，還有自己的應變能力，不可因別人一句話而貿然行動，曹仁超股票行出身，打滾多年，又是信報資料硏究部的主管級人馬，對股巿有硏究外，眼光亦長遠很多，此點正是股壇Titanic所缺乏的，只知盲目追逐眼前利潤是十分危險，投資巿塲上的大趨勢多以悲劇收塲，例如七、八十年代的金巿狂熱，九十年代的樓巿泡沫或2000年的科網熱，「趁熱」的投資大多損手離塲。
牛熊巿
曹仁超對牛熊巿況有硏究，但這種方法是有盲點，例如沙士後股巿谷底回升，曹仁超認為是熊巿短期反彈，到他確認巿況後才入巿，就會否錯失良機，如果以股票內在投資價值而買賣，就可以避開這個盲點，既安全又有較大的利潤。
止蝕唔止賺
曹仁超對炒股提出「止蝕唔止賺」，而我非常反對「止賺」、「止蝕」等觀念，
提倡此種觀念等同鼓勵別人輕率、隨便買賣，把事情的重點本末倒置，只要投資者做好買股前準備，小心計算，不因別人推介或一事衝動而貿然入巿，有很多損失是可以避免。即使有日沽貨離塲，亦不是因股價觸及止蝕價，只是股份質素改變或有其他更好的投資機會。
金巿
曹仁超幾年前已指出黃金將大升。曹仁超的功力可見一斑。但我對金巿並無興趣，主要是：
1. 黃金本身是商品，並無創富能力，價格升跌全因供求關係，可說是賭博而非投資。
2. 投機者因黃金大升而入巿，一旦金價末能再進，必引致大幅抛售。
3. 金巿的孖展比例相當高(約5~10%按金)，持好倉需付利息，相反沽空黃金卻有息可收，沽家明顯佔上風，一旦巿況逆轉，跌勢不但急，而且可能潛伏一段非常長時間才重回家鄉，現時金價需創25年新高，但還末能超越歷史高位，可想一旦高位被縳，是相當痛苦。
4. 忽然想到陳新燊的名言：「十年黃金變爛銅」，當金價不斷上升，就會引發沽盤，沽家有息可收，可以以戰養戰，若能找到高位，似乎沽金的吸引力比較大。
曹先生股海浮沉多年，一定有其優勝之處。但投資者切忌人云亦云、或一知半解，若能小心思考，謹慎行事必可得到財富、自由和安寧。
曹仁超乃信報專欄作家，深受讀者愛戴。好友『股壇Titanic』亦經常引用曹先生的名言：「有智慧不如趁勢。」，認為炒股炒氣勢，只要時勢一到，石油變神油、大象變飛象，與其長揸股票，浪費青春，不如順勢而行，多炒幾轉熱門股份，他更相信以其股海多年資歷，必可在泡沫爆破前功成身退，假若不幸被縳扮蟹，亦信他朝可以東山再起，更以開玩笑口吻：「出得嚟行，預咗要還。」
我雖有十多年炒股X街的資歷，但真不及Titanic的豪情壯語！
記得『富爸爸、窮爸爸』：「應該學會思考…你將一生享受自由和安寧。」我相信只有智慧(思考)可以幫我找到機會，避開危險，得到生活上的自由及安寧。
我對曹仁超了解不多，没有看過他的書，他的專欄亦不是常看，他的所謂：「有智慧不如趁勢」是否和股壇Titanic的解釋一樣亦不太清楚，實不應太多批評。但股壇Titanic經常把此語掛在口邊，令我有些意見，不吐不快。
我不反對順勢或逆勢而行，但事前必須仔細思量，計算利潤與風險，還有自己的應變能力，不可因別人一句話而貿然行動，曹仁超股票行出身，打滾多年，又是信報資料硏究部的主管級人馬，對股巿有硏究外，眼光亦長遠很多，此點正是股壇Titanic所缺乏的，只知盲目追逐眼前利潤是十分危險，投資巿塲上的大趨勢多以悲劇收塲，例如七、八十年代的金巿狂熱，九十年代的樓巿泡沫或2000年的科網熱，「趁熱」的投資大多損手離塲。
牛熊巿
曹仁超對牛熊巿況有硏究，但這種方法是有盲點，例如沙士後股巿谷底回升，曹仁超認為是熊巿短期反彈，到他確認巿況後才入巿，就會否錯失良機，如果以股票內在投資價值而買賣，就可以避開這個盲點，既安全又有較大的利潤。
止蝕唔止賺
曹仁超對炒股提出「止蝕唔止賺」，而我非常反對「止賺」、「止蝕」等觀念，
提倡此種觀念等同鼓勵別人輕率、隨便買賣，把事情的重點本末倒置，只要投資者做好買股前準備，小心計算，不因別人推介或一事衝動而貿然入巿，有很多損失是可以避免。即使有日沽貨離塲，亦不是因股價觸及止蝕價，只是股份質素改變或有其他更好的投資機會。
金巿
曹仁超幾年前已指出黃金將大升。曹仁超的功力可見一斑。但我對金巿並無興趣，主要是：
1. 黃金本身是商品，並無創富能力，價格升跌全因供求關係，可說是賭博而非投資。
2. 投機者因黃金大升而入巿，一旦金價末能再進，必引致大幅抛售。
3. 金巿的孖展比例相當高(約5~10%按金)，持好倉需付利息，相反沽空黃金卻有息可收，沽家明顯佔上風，一旦巿況逆轉，跌勢不但急，而且可能潛伏一段非常長時間才重回家鄉，現時金價需創25年新高，但還末能超越歷史高位，可想一旦高位被縳，是相當痛苦。
4. 忽然想到陳新燊的名言：「十年黃金變爛銅」，當金價不斷上升，就會引發沽盤，沽家有息可收，可以以戰養戰，若能找到高位，似乎沽金的吸引力比較大。
曹先生股海浮沉多年，一定有其優勝之處。但投資者切忌人云亦云、或一知半解，若能小心思考，謹慎行事必可得到財富、自由和安寧。
Wednesday, July 23, 2008
谢国忠：世界经济挥不去的阴影
现在，世界经济已进入滞胀，通货膨胀居高不下，增长也开始下滑，预计这一阶段将持续两年。各主要央行正通过减息与注入流动性来稳定金融系统，但对金融稳定的偏重加大了通胀压力。要等到金融状况足够好的时候，央行才会将重点转向价格稳定。2009年下半年，主要央行将开始提高利率以反击通胀，这可能导致全球经济在2010年进入衰退。
全球经济通胀的信号
随着泡沫破裂，资金正在离开房地产和信贷市场，进入大宗商品市场。除供给约束外，这是推动商品通胀的主要力量。当商品通货膨胀推高各地生活成本时，工资膨胀就近在眼前，于是带来第二波通货膨胀。为挽救金融机构而采取的宽松货币政策更会火上浇油。房地产及信贷泡沫的破裂降低了经济增速，这确实可以从需求方面减轻通胀压力，但在成本方面，当前的货币环境是高度通货膨胀性的，从工业用金属、能源、农产品到劳动力，莫不如此。
2011年，下一轮经济周期或许就将开始。它会和上一轮周期(2003年到2007年)一样吗？我认为不会。过去20年的低通胀毋宁说是一个例外，而不是规律。未来，通货膨胀会更为频繁地发生。即便全球经济从当前的危机中恢复，因巨额债务而繁荣的商业，仍将步履维艰。
过去20年，全球通胀率一直稳步下降，金融市场将这一趋势归功于央行的政策。即便每次美国经济受到什么威胁，格林斯潘就削减利率、注入流动性，通胀率也还是下降。很多人都以为，格林斯潘对保持经济增长和低通胀有什么秘方。但我多年来一直认为，格林斯潘正领导美国和世界经济走上一条歧路。低通货膨胀率不是缘于美联储或其他任何央行的政策，而是因为“冷战”结束和全球化兴起。
与此同时，中国和印度也改变了经济发展的方向。它们本是规模较小的农业经济体，但随着制造能力扩大，它们的改变为世界所感知。特别是中国，在全球贸易增长中扮演了重要角色。过去30年，中国出口增加了150倍；2008年，中国有可能超过德国，成为全世界最大的贸易国。中国崛起的速度是史无前例的。值得注意的是，中国已经是全球制造业的价格制定者。并且，随着制造业企业不断迁往中国，它也对全球劳动力成本有巨大影响。
苏联解体引起商品价格长期低迷，中国增长压低生产成本，两者结合带来了全球低通胀。格林斯潘只是在正确的时间出现在了正确的位置上，不断降低的通胀与央行并没有多大关系。而且，以美联储为首的各主要央行认为，低通胀意味着允许宽松的货币政策，这犯了一个大错误。
宽松货币政策对资产价格有重大影响。前苏联和中国引发的通货紧缩力量，阻断了货币供应增长对消费品价格的影响，即货币供应增长没有导致CPI上升。于是，货币流入资产市场，引起资产价格上升。虽然债券价格上涨，但其收益率在上世纪90年代大幅下降。当债券市场不能吸收更多货币时，多余的货币就流入股票市场，形成科技股泡沫。2000年，科技股泡沫破裂，过剩流动性又通过新的信贷工具流向房地产市场。而在债券和科技股泡沫时期，由于金融成本降低，财富效应增加，房地产价格已经被高估。
房地产泡沫破裂给格林斯潘的声誉蒙上巨大阴影。出于自卫，格林斯潘今年3月17日在《金融时报》中发表题为“我们永远不会有完美的风险模型”的文章。他辩称，央行不能在事前识别经济泡沫，只能在泡沫破裂后放松货币政策，以减少影响；并且，房地产泡沫在许多国家都同时发生，因此，美联储是无法阻止的。但事实上，这两个理由都是错误的。
现代历史上，泡沫频频出现。当股市市净率超过3倍，房地产价格连续三年或更长时间比收入增长更快时，通常就是泡沫。当然，例外是有的，将来也还会有。但泡沫对未来经济发展有非常严重的影响，即使不能百分之百确定它是泡沫，央行也应该纠正资产市场。格林斯潘的逻¼却相反，他相信在不确定是否泡沫的情况下，央行应该尽可能容忍市场的上升趋势。显然，他的这种哲学并没有在眼下的繁荣与将来的潜在损失间保持平衡。
格林斯潘开出的药方也有问题。货币供给过剩通常是泡沫的一部分，当泡沫破裂时，印刷更多的货币会恶化通货膨胀。当然，没有人质疑格林斯潘的药方，因为到泡沫破裂时，通货膨胀问题就不是那么显眼了。但印钞票最终还是会导致通胀。印得越多，通胀越高。
格林斯潘论点的第二部分，即房地产泡沫在许多国家都发生，因此原因不在美联储，这一论断也是错误的。在所有央行中，美联储是扩大货币供给的领头羊。由于美元是全球贸易的基准货币，其他央行要么跟随美联储，要么就得承受本币升值的后果。大多数央行更关心自身的经济，于是选择跟随美联储。
全球化的一个副产品就是货币政策的外部效应。如果一个国家采取措施控制通胀，其自身的经济增长就会下降，同时有利于降低其他经济体的通胀。这种溢出效应使得所有央行都不愿意采取紧缩政策。未来两年，这一互动过程将对通胀走势产生重要影响。最后的结果会是，通货膨胀达到一个高位，令所有央行同时感到惊慌。
中国将引领全球经济通胀
当前，全球经济正处在一轮经济周期的末尾，其特征是泡沫破裂和低速增长。到一定时间以后，经济将会复苏，新的周期也会开始，但其转变过程非常重要。我相信，2010年下半年，央行会将重点从金融稳定转向价格稳定，并采取紧缩性政策。到时，全球经济很可能会经历另一次下降，其程度会比当前更为严重。
俄罗斯经济复苏，依靠的是石油价格上涨，这部分又是由于西方的货币政策。收入上升带来了俄罗斯自身对自然资源的消费增长。中东欧国家已加入欧盟，逐渐趋近西方生活水平。如俄罗斯在20世纪90年代遭遇经济疲软和弱势货币一样，1989年至1999年间，中东欧国家经济增长率仅为年均1.2%。但2000年以后，其年均增长率达到5%，规模也达3万亿美元。
俄罗斯和中东欧国家的名义GDP高于中国，其石油消耗是中国的70%。就资源消费而言，它们一度构成世界经济的巨大通缩力量——1989年至 1999年间，其石油消费的减少量是中国增加量的2倍。它们的复苏，将在能源市场上产生与中国需求同样重要的影响。就劳动力供给来说，中东欧国家的失业率比西欧低；而且，俄罗斯及中东欧国家与西欧一样，都经历着社会的老龄化。在我看来，它们的劳动力市场条件，也将推动全球通胀。
中国制造业的发展是保持低通胀的另一个原因。但这一低成本扩张已经走到尽头。四种重要投入品——劳动力、土地、煤和环境——都已经达到供给极限。在很长一段时间里，煤矿无利可图；沿海的装配工厂在不增加工资的条件下，就能招到内陆数以万计的工人；地方政府还通过提供廉价的工业用地和税收优惠吸引投资，却忽视环境保护。
以国际价格测算，中国能源消费成本已经超过GDP的10%。当然，价格控制和补贴使这一数字有所降低。但能源在 GDP中的份额仍然很高，其价格上涨将带来显著的通胀，因此，中国制造业发展的能源成本将显著提高。年轻劳动力已经短缺。这是中国劳动力市场的重要转折点。
中国住宅与商业用地的价格也大幅飙升。自2000年来，许多一线城市地价已经上升10倍或更多。地方政府依然试图控制工业用地价格，以留住现有企业，吸引更多企业。但土地价格膨胀通过生活成本提高，已经进入了总体生产成本，这需要工资的提高来抵消。许多企业在选择厂址时，已经将本地房地产价格纳入考虑因素。我估计，工资水平的一半是由房地产价格决定的。
最后，但并非最不重要的，是松懈的环境保护在中国的低成本扩张中占据重要地位。20年前，制造业发展初期，环境恶化程度较低，污染相对于环境的承受力仍然较少。但目前，环境恶化已经到达极限，累积污染非常严重。中国不得不采取严厉的环境保护标准以防止灾难的出现。这是生产成本提高的另一因素。
新兴经济体的通胀有很多原因。过剩货币的增加会导致货币贬值和通胀，但这不必然带来全球通胀。贬值和通胀对其他国家的影响可能互相抵消。例如，中国通胀率在20世纪80年代以美元计是4%，90年代已经是零。因此，对于世界来说，中国经济是通缩性的。但美元自2000年以来年均贬值达5.1%，高于美国的通胀率，并且这一趋势仍在继续。未来10年，中国也许将引领全球经济通胀，即由于人民币升值，中国以美元计价的通货膨胀率高于世界其他地区。
全球经济通胀的信号
随着泡沫破裂，资金正在离开房地产和信贷市场，进入大宗商品市场。除供给约束外，这是推动商品通胀的主要力量。当商品通货膨胀推高各地生活成本时，工资膨胀就近在眼前，于是带来第二波通货膨胀。为挽救金融机构而采取的宽松货币政策更会火上浇油。房地产及信贷泡沫的破裂降低了经济增速，这确实可以从需求方面减轻通胀压力，但在成本方面，当前的货币环境是高度通货膨胀性的，从工业用金属、能源、农产品到劳动力，莫不如此。
2011年，下一轮经济周期或许就将开始。它会和上一轮周期(2003年到2007年)一样吗？我认为不会。过去20年的低通胀毋宁说是一个例外，而不是规律。未来，通货膨胀会更为频繁地发生。即便全球经济从当前的危机中恢复，因巨额债务而繁荣的商业，仍将步履维艰。
过去20年，全球通胀率一直稳步下降，金融市场将这一趋势归功于央行的政策。即便每次美国经济受到什么威胁，格林斯潘就削减利率、注入流动性，通胀率也还是下降。很多人都以为，格林斯潘对保持经济增长和低通胀有什么秘方。但我多年来一直认为，格林斯潘正领导美国和世界经济走上一条歧路。低通货膨胀率不是缘于美联储或其他任何央行的政策，而是因为“冷战”结束和全球化兴起。
与此同时，中国和印度也改变了经济发展的方向。它们本是规模较小的农业经济体，但随着制造能力扩大，它们的改变为世界所感知。特别是中国，在全球贸易增长中扮演了重要角色。过去30年，中国出口增加了150倍；2008年，中国有可能超过德国，成为全世界最大的贸易国。中国崛起的速度是史无前例的。值得注意的是，中国已经是全球制造业的价格制定者。并且，随着制造业企业不断迁往中国，它也对全球劳动力成本有巨大影响。
苏联解体引起商品价格长期低迷，中国增长压低生产成本，两者结合带来了全球低通胀。格林斯潘只是在正确的时间出现在了正确的位置上，不断降低的通胀与央行并没有多大关系。而且，以美联储为首的各主要央行认为，低通胀意味着允许宽松的货币政策，这犯了一个大错误。
宽松货币政策对资产价格有重大影响。前苏联和中国引发的通货紧缩力量，阻断了货币供应增长对消费品价格的影响，即货币供应增长没有导致CPI上升。于是，货币流入资产市场，引起资产价格上升。虽然债券价格上涨，但其收益率在上世纪90年代大幅下降。当债券市场不能吸收更多货币时，多余的货币就流入股票市场，形成科技股泡沫。2000年，科技股泡沫破裂，过剩流动性又通过新的信贷工具流向房地产市场。而在债券和科技股泡沫时期，由于金融成本降低，财富效应增加，房地产价格已经被高估。
房地产泡沫破裂给格林斯潘的声誉蒙上巨大阴影。出于自卫，格林斯潘今年3月17日在《金融时报》中发表题为“我们永远不会有完美的风险模型”的文章。他辩称，央行不能在事前识别经济泡沫，只能在泡沫破裂后放松货币政策，以减少影响；并且，房地产泡沫在许多国家都同时发生，因此，美联储是无法阻止的。但事实上，这两个理由都是错误的。
现代历史上，泡沫频频出现。当股市市净率超过3倍，房地产价格连续三年或更长时间比收入增长更快时，通常就是泡沫。当然，例外是有的，将来也还会有。但泡沫对未来经济发展有非常严重的影响，即使不能百分之百确定它是泡沫，央行也应该纠正资产市场。格林斯潘的逻¼却相反，他相信在不确定是否泡沫的情况下，央行应该尽可能容忍市场的上升趋势。显然，他的这种哲学并没有在眼下的繁荣与将来的潜在损失间保持平衡。
格林斯潘开出的药方也有问题。货币供给过剩通常是泡沫的一部分，当泡沫破裂时，印刷更多的货币会恶化通货膨胀。当然，没有人质疑格林斯潘的药方，因为到泡沫破裂时，通货膨胀问题就不是那么显眼了。但印钞票最终还是会导致通胀。印得越多，通胀越高。
格林斯潘论点的第二部分，即房地产泡沫在许多国家都发生，因此原因不在美联储，这一论断也是错误的。在所有央行中，美联储是扩大货币供给的领头羊。由于美元是全球贸易的基准货币，其他央行要么跟随美联储，要么就得承受本币升值的后果。大多数央行更关心自身的经济，于是选择跟随美联储。
全球化的一个副产品就是货币政策的外部效应。如果一个国家采取措施控制通胀，其自身的经济增长就会下降，同时有利于降低其他经济体的通胀。这种溢出效应使得所有央行都不愿意采取紧缩政策。未来两年，这一互动过程将对通胀走势产生重要影响。最后的结果会是，通货膨胀达到一个高位，令所有央行同时感到惊慌。
中国将引领全球经济通胀
当前，全球经济正处在一轮经济周期的末尾，其特征是泡沫破裂和低速增长。到一定时间以后，经济将会复苏，新的周期也会开始，但其转变过程非常重要。我相信，2010年下半年，央行会将重点从金融稳定转向价格稳定，并采取紧缩性政策。到时，全球经济很可能会经历另一次下降，其程度会比当前更为严重。
俄罗斯经济复苏，依靠的是石油价格上涨，这部分又是由于西方的货币政策。收入上升带来了俄罗斯自身对自然资源的消费增长。中东欧国家已加入欧盟，逐渐趋近西方生活水平。如俄罗斯在20世纪90年代遭遇经济疲软和弱势货币一样，1989年至1999年间，中东欧国家经济增长率仅为年均1.2%。但2000年以后，其年均增长率达到5%，规模也达3万亿美元。
俄罗斯和中东欧国家的名义GDP高于中国，其石油消耗是中国的70%。就资源消费而言，它们一度构成世界经济的巨大通缩力量——1989年至 1999年间，其石油消费的减少量是中国增加量的2倍。它们的复苏，将在能源市场上产生与中国需求同样重要的影响。就劳动力供给来说，中东欧国家的失业率比西欧低；而且，俄罗斯及中东欧国家与西欧一样，都经历着社会的老龄化。在我看来，它们的劳动力市场条件，也将推动全球通胀。
中国制造业的发展是保持低通胀的另一个原因。但这一低成本扩张已经走到尽头。四种重要投入品——劳动力、土地、煤和环境——都已经达到供给极限。在很长一段时间里，煤矿无利可图；沿海的装配工厂在不增加工资的条件下，就能招到内陆数以万计的工人；地方政府还通过提供廉价的工业用地和税收优惠吸引投资，却忽视环境保护。
以国际价格测算，中国能源消费成本已经超过GDP的10%。当然，价格控制和补贴使这一数字有所降低。但能源在 GDP中的份额仍然很高，其价格上涨将带来显著的通胀，因此，中国制造业发展的能源成本将显著提高。年轻劳动力已经短缺。这是中国劳动力市场的重要转折点。
中国住宅与商业用地的价格也大幅飙升。自2000年来，许多一线城市地价已经上升10倍或更多。地方政府依然试图控制工业用地价格，以留住现有企业，吸引更多企业。但土地价格膨胀通过生活成本提高，已经进入了总体生产成本，这需要工资的提高来抵消。许多企业在选择厂址时，已经将本地房地产价格纳入考虑因素。我估计，工资水平的一半是由房地产价格决定的。
最后，但并非最不重要的，是松懈的环境保护在中国的低成本扩张中占据重要地位。20年前，制造业发展初期，环境恶化程度较低，污染相对于环境的承受力仍然较少。但目前，环境恶化已经到达极限，累积污染非常严重。中国不得不采取严厉的环境保护标准以防止灾难的出现。这是生产成本提高的另一因素。
新兴经济体的通胀有很多原因。过剩货币的增加会导致货币贬值和通胀，但这不必然带来全球通胀。贬值和通胀对其他国家的影响可能互相抵消。例如，中国通胀率在20世纪80年代以美元计是4%，90年代已经是零。因此，对于世界来说，中国经济是通缩性的。但美元自2000年以来年均贬值达5.1%，高于美国的通胀率，并且这一趋势仍在继续。未来10年，中国也许将引领全球经济通胀，即由于人民币升值，中国以美元计价的通货膨胀率高于世界其他地区。
CS Maintains Singapore Market At Overweight
Credit Suisse maintains Overweight call on Singapore market, says bottom-up valuation suggests 20% upside from current levels (based on MSCI Singapore index).
"Singapore continues to demonstrate its defensive qualities in the current volatile markets;" notes Singapore market has substantially outperformed region since early May; down 10% vs MSCI Asia-excluding Japan, down 18%.
Broker maintains Overweight call on banks, transport, telecom, media sectors, Underweight call on real estate, capital goods sectors. Notes Olam, UOB, Raffles Education, SIA, SPH as top picks for Singapore; but Keppel Corp., City Developments least preferred.
"Singapore continues to demonstrate its defensive qualities in the current volatile markets;" notes Singapore market has substantially outperformed region since early May; down 10% vs MSCI Asia-excluding Japan, down 18%.
Broker maintains Overweight call on banks, transport, telecom, media sectors, Underweight call on real estate, capital goods sectors. Notes Olam, UOB, Raffles Education, SIA, SPH as top picks for Singapore; but Keppel Corp., City Developments least preferred.
Roubini: More Than $1 Trillion Needed to Solve Housing Crisis
Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson has been putting on a full-court press in the last 24 hours, making the case for his plan to shore-up Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
"I would rather not be in the position of asking for extraordinary authorities to support the GSEs," Paulson said in a speech Tuesday in NYC. "But I am playing the hand that I have been dealt. There is a need to support efforts that strengthen Fannie and Freddie's ability to continue to play their important role in financing mortgages and in our capital markets more broadly."
The timing of Paulson's speech -- and various and sundry media appearances -- is not coincidental. This week, Congress is expected to vote on housing legislation that includes Paulson's plan, which a GAO report said is likely to cost the government $25 billion.
But $25 billion -- or even the GAO's worst-case $100 billion estimate -- pales in comparison to the cost of doing nothing, says Nouriel Roubini, NYU professor and chairman of RGE Monitor.
"We have to find a solution where government intervention prevents a disorderly outcome" in the housing market that leads to a "systemic banking crisis," Roubini says.
The housing bill, which earmarks $300 billion to backstop mortgages after lenders agree to lower mortgage payments, is "a step in the right direction" but "doesn't do enough," he says, predicting the government will ultimately need to spend more than $1 trillion.
Roubini's main concern stems from a view that the "housing recession is not bottoming by any standards," in contrast to hopeful comments from Paulson on Fox News and Barron's last weekend.
The economist believes U.S. home prices will ultimately fall 30% from their peak -- vs. 18% to date according to the S&P Case-Shiller Index -- "before bottoming out some point in 2010."
In the interim, the negative wealth effect of declining home values and increase in "underwater" mortgages will lead to more Americans walking away from their homes. Such "jingle mail" threatens to ultimately cost $1 trillion in credit losses, wiping out 75% of the capital of U.S. financial institutions, Roubini warns.
It is that "disorderly" outcome Roubini says the government cannot afford to let happen. With "the charade" that Fannie and Freddie weren't already government agencies over, he believes a nationalization of the 50% of mortgages not owned or guaranteed by Fannie and Freddie will be necessary, and the Frank-Dodd Bill is a small step down that road.
From Roubini's view, nationalizing housing avoids the government having to nationalization the entire banking system, making it the lesser of two evils.
"I would rather not be in the position of asking for extraordinary authorities to support the GSEs," Paulson said in a speech Tuesday in NYC. "But I am playing the hand that I have been dealt. There is a need to support efforts that strengthen Fannie and Freddie's ability to continue to play their important role in financing mortgages and in our capital markets more broadly."
The timing of Paulson's speech -- and various and sundry media appearances -- is not coincidental. This week, Congress is expected to vote on housing legislation that includes Paulson's plan, which a GAO report said is likely to cost the government $25 billion.
But $25 billion -- or even the GAO's worst-case $100 billion estimate -- pales in comparison to the cost of doing nothing, says Nouriel Roubini, NYU professor and chairman of RGE Monitor.
"We have to find a solution where government intervention prevents a disorderly outcome" in the housing market that leads to a "systemic banking crisis," Roubini says.
The housing bill, which earmarks $300 billion to backstop mortgages after lenders agree to lower mortgage payments, is "a step in the right direction" but "doesn't do enough," he says, predicting the government will ultimately need to spend more than $1 trillion.
Roubini's main concern stems from a view that the "housing recession is not bottoming by any standards," in contrast to hopeful comments from Paulson on Fox News and Barron's last weekend.
The economist believes U.S. home prices will ultimately fall 30% from their peak -- vs. 18% to date according to the S&P Case-Shiller Index -- "before bottoming out some point in 2010."
In the interim, the negative wealth effect of declining home values and increase in "underwater" mortgages will lead to more Americans walking away from their homes. Such "jingle mail" threatens to ultimately cost $1 trillion in credit losses, wiping out 75% of the capital of U.S. financial institutions, Roubini warns.
It is that "disorderly" outcome Roubini says the government cannot afford to let happen. With "the charade" that Fannie and Freddie weren't already government agencies over, he believes a nationalization of the 50% of mortgages not owned or guaranteed by Fannie and Freddie will be necessary, and the Frank-Dodd Bill is a small step down that road.
From Roubini's view, nationalizing housing avoids the government having to nationalization the entire banking system, making it the lesser of two evils.
8 indicators which suggest a rally?
ML Strategist, Mark Matthews,identify 8 indicators which suggest a rally should take place over the next couple of months:
1) US financials have bounced from an important support level last tested in 2000. They are up 26% from their lows of July 15, while Asian financials, which have fell just as much year-to-date, are only up 8%.
2) According to Investor Intelligence, the number of US bears over bulls is at its widest margin since 1994,
3) US small caps generally lead Asia - the Russell 2,000 has bounced 9% from July 7, while Asia is flat over the same period,
4) Net fund flows out of Asian markets of USD13bn year-to-date suggest an extreme in redemptions,
5) Asia is close to 2 standard deviations from the mean of its 200-day moving average, in the past this deviation extreme has been followed by rallies, on average of 3.0% over the next 1 month, 10.0% over the next 3 months, 8.3% over the next 6 months and 21.4% over the next 12 months.
6) The Relative Strength Index (average gain relative to average loss over 14 days) has turned up from its low of 17 in early July, to 44 as of yesterday,
7) Oil speculators have begun to reduce their positions on NYMEX and oil has reverted below USD130/b,
8) The region is now trading on 15x trailing earnings, below the average of 16.5x of the past 5 years.
1) US financials have bounced from an important support level last tested in 2000. They are up 26% from their lows of July 15, while Asian financials, which have fell just as much year-to-date, are only up 8%.
2) According to Investor Intelligence, the number of US bears over bulls is at its widest margin since 1994,
3) US small caps generally lead Asia - the Russell 2,000 has bounced 9% from July 7, while Asia is flat over the same period,
4) Net fund flows out of Asian markets of USD13bn year-to-date suggest an extreme in redemptions,
5) Asia is close to 2 standard deviations from the mean of its 200-day moving average, in the past this deviation extreme has been followed by rallies, on average of 3.0% over the next 1 month, 10.0% over the next 3 months, 8.3% over the next 6 months and 21.4% over the next 12 months.
6) The Relative Strength Index (average gain relative to average loss over 14 days) has turned up from its low of 17 in early July, to 44 as of yesterday,
7) Oil speculators have begun to reduce their positions on NYMEX and oil has reverted below USD130/b,
8) The region is now trading on 15x trailing earnings, below the average of 16.5x of the past 5 years.
Two-pronged strategy makes sense for bombed out old hot China favourites
Today may well mark the start of an “Olympics” rally for China stocks on SGX.
Last year’s hot favourites especially mid to big cap stocks with sound fundamentals and proven earnings track record have crashed from around two-thirds to 75% from their peaks with many below their IPO prices – the benchmark Shanghai SE Composite Index has crashed 58% from its Oct record 6124 high to 2567 early this month.
It makes sound strategy for players to move perhaps even aggressively into these stocks both for short term trading as well as investment as gains can be made on technical rebounds which we are witnessing today and as medium to long term investments for chances of making 30-50% gains within the next one year should be bright with limited 5-15% downside risks.
It is highly unlikely that the major China indices would lose two-thirds of their values – we have already seen 58% crash from peak to recent “bottom” which means at worst the downside would be around 2200-2300 on SCI (today at 2837).
It is also unlikely that China would crash more than Vietnam, which was down 67% from 1111 to 364 last month on the Ho Chi Minh stock index but is recovering well now, up 22.5% from bottom to 446 today, still down 60% from peak.
The 3 China stocks on the STI – Cosco, Yangijiang and Yanlord – would easily come to mind as “safer” bets but there are many former hot stocks including FerroChina, Fibrechem, Sino Techfibre, Synear Foods, China Hongzing and Li Heng, which deserve a fresh look.
Cosco ($3.20) crashed 66% from $8.20 to $2.79, should recover further to around $3.50 and $3.70-90 in the short and medium term. YZJ (80 cents) down a massive 73% from $2.87 to 76.5 cents can recover to 90-95c once resistance at 84-85c is overcome.
Yanlord ($2.12) which has lost 63% from $4.40 to $1.65 has short term hurdle at $2.30 but medium term $2.70-80 should be a fair target.
FerroChina ($1.22) has also crashed from $2.87 to $1.02, down 64%, should overcome $1.30 and move to $1.50-60.
Fibrechem (63c) down 72% from $1.90 to 53.5c, should rebound to 67-68c and later to 74-75c.
Sino Techfibre (56c) has recovered from its 44.5c low, down 74% from $1.73 peak and should be able to move above 60c to 64-65c.
Synear Foods (45.5c) lost 85% from $2.52 to 37c, and should rebound back to this month’s 50-52c high.
China Hongxing (51c) down 72% from $1.45 to 40.5c, should recover to 58-59c and later to 68-70c.
Li Heng (61c) has lost 44% from 87c to 49c, and is below March IPO price of 80c. Its strong rebound from 49c on good volumes imply likely test of 65-68c resistance.
Last year’s hot favourites especially mid to big cap stocks with sound fundamentals and proven earnings track record have crashed from around two-thirds to 75% from their peaks with many below their IPO prices – the benchmark Shanghai SE Composite Index has crashed 58% from its Oct record 6124 high to 2567 early this month.
It makes sound strategy for players to move perhaps even aggressively into these stocks both for short term trading as well as investment as gains can be made on technical rebounds which we are witnessing today and as medium to long term investments for chances of making 30-50% gains within the next one year should be bright with limited 5-15% downside risks.
It is highly unlikely that the major China indices would lose two-thirds of their values – we have already seen 58% crash from peak to recent “bottom” which means at worst the downside would be around 2200-2300 on SCI (today at 2837).
It is also unlikely that China would crash more than Vietnam, which was down 67% from 1111 to 364 last month on the Ho Chi Minh stock index but is recovering well now, up 22.5% from bottom to 446 today, still down 60% from peak.
The 3 China stocks on the STI – Cosco, Yangijiang and Yanlord – would easily come to mind as “safer” bets but there are many former hot stocks including FerroChina, Fibrechem, Sino Techfibre, Synear Foods, China Hongzing and Li Heng, which deserve a fresh look.
Cosco ($3.20) crashed 66% from $8.20 to $2.79, should recover further to around $3.50 and $3.70-90 in the short and medium term. YZJ (80 cents) down a massive 73% from $2.87 to 76.5 cents can recover to 90-95c once resistance at 84-85c is overcome.
Yanlord ($2.12) which has lost 63% from $4.40 to $1.65 has short term hurdle at $2.30 but medium term $2.70-80 should be a fair target.
FerroChina ($1.22) has also crashed from $2.87 to $1.02, down 64%, should overcome $1.30 and move to $1.50-60.
Fibrechem (63c) down 72% from $1.90 to 53.5c, should rebound to 67-68c and later to 74-75c.
Sino Techfibre (56c) has recovered from its 44.5c low, down 74% from $1.73 peak and should be able to move above 60c to 64-65c.
Synear Foods (45.5c) lost 85% from $2.52 to 37c, and should rebound back to this month’s 50-52c high.
China Hongxing (51c) down 72% from $1.45 to 40.5c, should recover to 58-59c and later to 68-70c.
Li Heng (61c) has lost 44% from 87c to 49c, and is below March IPO price of 80c. Its strong rebound from 49c on good volumes imply likely test of 65-68c resistance.
VIX會否因普及而失效？
「Buy and Hold」投資策略，過去令譚甫屯賺取超過200億美元身家，亦令畢非德一度成為世界首富。隨着2007年10月美股大牛市結束，上述策略風光日子不再，應改為利用VIX去捉熊腳（7月15日極有可能係熊市二期內第二隻腳）。但捉熊腳唔係人人啱玩，各位要小心。
物超所值項目愈嚟愈難搵
世上愈來愈多「價值投資法」信徒，响咁情況下，要搵到物超所值投資項目機會愈來愈細，除非擁有超人智慧（但大部分人都冇）。
換言之，美國6月份CPI雖然上升5％，但人民面對係「通縮」！曾經歷過1997到2003年香港人應該最明白，每年樓價回落10％合共六年滋味，消費力自然萎縮，相若環境將喺美國重演，再加上金融業大裁員（金融業係OECD國家人口中最高收入行業），美國人將面對收入下降。所以我老曹擔心係美國同歐洲進入九十年代日式衰退，最終拖垮油價甚至金價，而毋須再要聯儲局加息，只有新興經濟國先至係進入滯脹。
上周由美國證監限制拋空而引發三天補倉潮，如客觀形勢未改善，完成補倉後，美股成交將十分靜。五窮、六絕、七翻身，到7月份股市已累積唔少淡倉（7月15日VIX一度見30），引發平倉潮並唔奇。問題係7月完成平倉後，8月及9月業績公布期股市又點？
VIX（喺美國CBOE交易）已愈來愈普及，當佢上升，代表投資者驚慌；當佢回落，代表投資者信心十足。職業投機者便反其道而行，今年5月喺孟買股票交易所更引入印度VIX。CBOE同台灣交易所、德國Eurex及Euronext達成協議，引入上述股市VIX。市場亦開始計算原油、黃金、外滙及利率VIX，形成全球一片VIX熱。VIX最後命運會否一如其他分析工具，因太普及而漸漸失效？
物超所值項目愈嚟愈難搵
世上愈來愈多「價值投資法」信徒，响咁情況下，要搵到物超所值投資項目機會愈來愈細，除非擁有超人智慧（但大部分人都冇）。
換言之，美國6月份CPI雖然上升5％，但人民面對係「通縮」！曾經歷過1997到2003年香港人應該最明白，每年樓價回落10％合共六年滋味，消費力自然萎縮，相若環境將喺美國重演，再加上金融業大裁員（金融業係OECD國家人口中最高收入行業），美國人將面對收入下降。所以我老曹擔心係美國同歐洲進入九十年代日式衰退，最終拖垮油價甚至金價，而毋須再要聯儲局加息，只有新興經濟國先至係進入滯脹。
上周由美國證監限制拋空而引發三天補倉潮，如客觀形勢未改善，完成補倉後，美股成交將十分靜。五窮、六絕、七翻身，到7月份股市已累積唔少淡倉（7月15日VIX一度見30），引發平倉潮並唔奇。問題係7月完成平倉後，8月及9月業績公布期股市又點？
VIX（喺美國CBOE交易）已愈來愈普及，當佢上升，代表投資者驚慌；當佢回落，代表投資者信心十足。職業投機者便反其道而行，今年5月喺孟買股票交易所更引入印度VIX。CBOE同台灣交易所、德國Eurex及Euronext達成協議，引入上述股市VIX。市場亦開始計算原油、黃金、外滙及利率VIX，形成全球一片VIX熱。VIX最後命運會否一如其他分析工具，因太普及而漸漸失效？
投資要朝秦暮楚
今年上半年美國股票投資回報率，係美國1930年以來最差半年，甚至畢非德巴郡亦令人失望。美國銀行、花旗、瑞銀等股價跌幅皆超過50％，更加唔好話地區性銀行，跌幅超過90％者比比皆是，令所謂「價值投資法」極受投資界質疑，响股市愈來愈有效率環境下，一般投資者能否再搵到物超所值項目？
入行四十年，我老曹學到嘢唔多。
第一項：
投資市場係最好僕人、最嚴厲老闆（較林行止兄更嚴厲）。如你做啱，它會獎勵你很多；如你做錯，佢會令你傾家蕩產。
第二項：
溝上唔溝落。持有winner，讓利潤往前跑；沽出loser，請快快止蝕，記住止蝕唔止賺。
第三項：
價值投資法只適合牛市起步時，唔適合牛市結束期（唔信？請試吓喺去年10月入市滋味）。你最大敵人係你自己感情，例如自大、睇唔起別人、戀上你投資等等。响愛情路上，我老曹主張尊一；投資路上，我老曹主張朝三暮四、朝秦暮楚、見異思遷。請永遠唔好同投資項目談戀愛。
第四項：
唔好預測。1990年我老曹曾預測日股將衰足十六年（靈感來自美股1966至82年），結果只衰足十三年，所以話千萬不可「亂測」。2007年10月，長達二十五年美股超級牛市已結束，相信有排衰，投資者宜朝秦暮楚，以及將投資重心由歐、美轉向中、印。相信中、印股市進入V形走勢（即跌得快、跌得重，但日後升得急、升幅大，極有可能係2009年）。有如我老曹响1997年棄港往英一樣，唔好再留戀歐、美矣。
入行四十年，我老曹學到嘢唔多。
第一項：
投資市場係最好僕人、最嚴厲老闆（較林行止兄更嚴厲）。如你做啱，它會獎勵你很多；如你做錯，佢會令你傾家蕩產。
第二項：
溝上唔溝落。持有winner，讓利潤往前跑；沽出loser，請快快止蝕，記住止蝕唔止賺。
第三項：
價值投資法只適合牛市起步時，唔適合牛市結束期（唔信？請試吓喺去年10月入市滋味）。你最大敵人係你自己感情，例如自大、睇唔起別人、戀上你投資等等。响愛情路上，我老曹主張尊一；投資路上，我老曹主張朝三暮四、朝秦暮楚、見異思遷。請永遠唔好同投資項目談戀愛。
第四項：
唔好預測。1990年我老曹曾預測日股將衰足十六年（靈感來自美股1966至82年），結果只衰足十三年，所以話千萬不可「亂測」。2007年10月，長達二十五年美股超級牛市已結束，相信有排衰，投資者宜朝秦暮楚，以及將投資重心由歐、美轉向中、印。相信中、印股市進入V形走勢（即跌得快、跌得重，但日後升得急、升幅大，極有可能係2009年）。有如我老曹响1997年棄港往英一樣，唔好再留戀歐、美矣。
油价不可能回跌
屋漏偏逢连夜雨，用来形容今天全球的经济情况最恰当不过。美国次贷风暴未平息，对金融市场的冲击越来越大，原油价格继续看涨，而“成本推动型”通货膨胀正严重冲击亚洲经济增长，持续时间越长，造成伤害就越大。今年亚洲地区的通胀率，将是1997年至1998年亚洲金融风暴以来最高的。美国金融市场的烂摊子，最终还是必须由美国政府通过纾困措施抢救。但油价没有立即解决的方案，油价牵动所有的经济活动，最后的结果是令人心烦的连夜雨，变成一场世界性的倾盆大雨。油价高涨有两个说法：油价有可能下降吗？下降幅度会有多大？今天油价的高涨有两个说法，一是投机炒作，另一个是求过于供。国际大炒家索罗斯（George Soros）早前将矛头指向投机活动，有些分析师认为炒作成分不到15％；股神巴菲特（Warren Buffett）认为供求紧张刺激油价狂上，持有相同看法的专家也不少。唯一可以肯定的是，油价还是会屡创新高。曾任布什政府能源顾问的Simmons & Co行政总裁的西蒙斯（Matt Simmons）指出，全球产油量已于2005年见顶，并将于不久之后大幅萎缩。这位石油财经专家说：“到了2015年，假如我们能够维持每日6000万 桶产量，已是相当幸运（目前每日约8500万桶）；我担心届时只剩下每日4000万桶。”巴菲特近日接受CNBC访问时指出，原油供应过去数十年来，一直大量超前实际所需，直至最近一两年增产空间已所剩无几，才会导致油价节节上升。而投机活动并非高油价主因，若禁止原油期货买卖，高油价问题也不会有什么改变。有“末日博士”之称的麦嘉华(Marc Faber)也认为，全球原油供给远小于需求，油价未来将上看每桶300美元。麦嘉华最近受邀到台湾演讲时表示，亚洲有36亿人，每天原油需求量2200万桶，美国仅3亿人，每天却需要2200万桶，且原油进口率从过去23％一路 提升到现在的73％；中国和印度过去需求量已大增一倍，未来12至15年，需求量会再增加一倍，这些因素将会使得原油供应不足。他也表 示，1988年以前，每年发现新原油蕴藏量均大于需求量，甚至在1964年发现最大新原油蕴藏量为480亿桶，当时需求量仅120亿桶，不过目前每年原油 需求量为300亿桶，新发现原油蕴藏量仅50亿桶至60亿桶，需求远大于供给，未来油价不可能下跌，甚至有机会达到每桶300美元。
专家预测--世界产油量今年见顶
2005年4月间，油价突破每桶60美元，当时有市场已预见石油产量快见顶，很多专家和知名的分析师都加入成为“百元油价俱乐部”会员，认定油价将会无可避免地冲破每桶100美元。“产油量见顶”是指全球石油产量升到最高点后掉头下跌。而近两年来，油价一直在高价位盘旋，上涨至150美元只是时间问题。当时，全球顶尖能源分析家西蒙斯在英国爱丁堡一个石油会议上发出警告，中东国家的石油蕴藏量可能远低于官方数字，国际油价可能在三年内冲破每桶100美元，虽然石油需求不断上升，但“产油量见顶”的局面正迅速来临，触发石油危机，令全球经济崩溃。在90年代，石油低价推动了经济繁荣，但相反的，紧随在石油危机之后的往往就是经济危机，美国历史经验已告诉了我们这个残酷的事实。因此，如果这次石油价格继续上涨，必然会拖累美国经济乃至世界经济。亚洲国家及其他新兴国家近年来对石油的需求大增，以中国为例，目前中国每日的石油消耗量已接近2000万桶，相信在未来五年，来自亚洲国家的需求会超过4000万桶，令全球每日石油消耗量持续上升。50年代创建“石油顶峰理论”模式的哈佛大学教授金·胡伯博士（King Hubbert），在“The Impending World Oil Shortage”一书中，曾准确预测美国的石油产量在70年代会达到高峰，世界石油产出在2005－2010年达到顶峰，之后会逐渐下降直到枯竭。金·胡伯于2004年再次指出，世界产油量将在2008年见顶，其后产油量将急速下滑。他更预测，石油蕴藏量将在30年内完全被消耗，这个预测也得到实例的证明，例如目前14％被发现的新油田都是位于14个古老的大型油田附近，而余下的85％被发现的新油田则属于小型油田。另一个事实是，陆地的油井也快开采完，石油商纷纷将目标转向海上，这造成钻油台的订单大增。油井逐渐枯竭是眼前的事实，全球将要面对的是油井枯竭后造成的长期影响，甚至引发灾难性后果。按这种供求趋势，油价即使下降，幅度也是有限的。近年随着石油需求的猛增，金·胡伯预言就快成真，能源界和各国政府已在为未来如何应付能源危机而担忧。而能源危机迫在眉睫，各国对能源的争夺可能是未来导致冲突的主要原因。
高油价冲击汽车业和制造业
油价飙涨使得全球汽车业重新洗牌，耗油量大的大型车在美国车市滞销，省油小型汽车看俏。美国汽车龙头通用公司六天前刚宣布业务大整顿方案。卡车和休旅车向来是通用的金鸡母，金鸡母下不了蛋，约有160亿美元债务的通用，股价这个月初已跌破10美元，为50年来头一遭。油价成倍上涨，使得过去数10年成为“世界工厂”的中国生产成本日益上升，不少生产商已搁置在中国的增产计划。中国除了面对重大的通胀压力，土地和工资成本已不再便宜，油价的大幅飙升，更使厂商必须考虑到运输费用，而当年把北美厂房关掉的美国企业，开始把生产线搬回北美本土。全球制造业很快将再次掀起大挪移。为了降低因油价飙升而不断上涨的运输成本，厂商会考虑把制造基地搬到距离消费者更近的地点，因此会把进一步扩大海外生产的计划冻结。这将使过去30年来将生产线转移到海外的情况出现一次大逆转。从亚洲运输一个40英尺的集装箱到美国东岸，目前成本已是八年前（当时油价20美元一桶）的三倍，若油价飙至每桶200美元，运费还会再增加一倍。因此将生产线设在成本更低的地区，已是不可取的做法。离开最终消费市场越远的生产基地，生产成本再便宜，也抵不上运输成本。油价继续上升，运输成本在最终价格中所占的比例将更大。美元的疲弱、中东政局紧张及油公司的劳工问题，将对已经高胀的全球油价造成更大推升压力，油价更没有下跌的理由，很快，我们将看到更多行业受到重创，航空业是其中之一。
专家预测--世界产油量今年见顶
2005年4月间，油价突破每桶60美元，当时有市场已预见石油产量快见顶，很多专家和知名的分析师都加入成为“百元油价俱乐部”会员，认定油价将会无可避免地冲破每桶100美元。“产油量见顶”是指全球石油产量升到最高点后掉头下跌。而近两年来，油价一直在高价位盘旋，上涨至150美元只是时间问题。当时，全球顶尖能源分析家西蒙斯在英国爱丁堡一个石油会议上发出警告，中东国家的石油蕴藏量可能远低于官方数字，国际油价可能在三年内冲破每桶100美元，虽然石油需求不断上升，但“产油量见顶”的局面正迅速来临，触发石油危机，令全球经济崩溃。在90年代，石油低价推动了经济繁荣，但相反的，紧随在石油危机之后的往往就是经济危机，美国历史经验已告诉了我们这个残酷的事实。因此，如果这次石油价格继续上涨，必然会拖累美国经济乃至世界经济。亚洲国家及其他新兴国家近年来对石油的需求大增，以中国为例，目前中国每日的石油消耗量已接近2000万桶，相信在未来五年，来自亚洲国家的需求会超过4000万桶，令全球每日石油消耗量持续上升。50年代创建“石油顶峰理论”模式的哈佛大学教授金·胡伯博士（King Hubbert），在“The Impending World Oil Shortage”一书中，曾准确预测美国的石油产量在70年代会达到高峰，世界石油产出在2005－2010年达到顶峰，之后会逐渐下降直到枯竭。金·胡伯于2004年再次指出，世界产油量将在2008年见顶，其后产油量将急速下滑。他更预测，石油蕴藏量将在30年内完全被消耗，这个预测也得到实例的证明，例如目前14％被发现的新油田都是位于14个古老的大型油田附近，而余下的85％被发现的新油田则属于小型油田。另一个事实是，陆地的油井也快开采完，石油商纷纷将目标转向海上，这造成钻油台的订单大增。油井逐渐枯竭是眼前的事实，全球将要面对的是油井枯竭后造成的长期影响，甚至引发灾难性后果。按这种供求趋势，油价即使下降，幅度也是有限的。近年随着石油需求的猛增，金·胡伯预言就快成真，能源界和各国政府已在为未来如何应付能源危机而担忧。而能源危机迫在眉睫，各国对能源的争夺可能是未来导致冲突的主要原因。
高油价冲击汽车业和制造业
油价飙涨使得全球汽车业重新洗牌，耗油量大的大型车在美国车市滞销，省油小型汽车看俏。美国汽车龙头通用公司六天前刚宣布业务大整顿方案。卡车和休旅车向来是通用的金鸡母，金鸡母下不了蛋，约有160亿美元债务的通用，股价这个月初已跌破10美元，为50年来头一遭。油价成倍上涨，使得过去数10年成为“世界工厂”的中国生产成本日益上升，不少生产商已搁置在中国的增产计划。中国除了面对重大的通胀压力，土地和工资成本已不再便宜，油价的大幅飙升，更使厂商必须考虑到运输费用，而当年把北美厂房关掉的美国企业，开始把生产线搬回北美本土。全球制造业很快将再次掀起大挪移。为了降低因油价飙升而不断上涨的运输成本，厂商会考虑把制造基地搬到距离消费者更近的地点，因此会把进一步扩大海外生产的计划冻结。这将使过去30年来将生产线转移到海外的情况出现一次大逆转。从亚洲运输一个40英尺的集装箱到美国东岸，目前成本已是八年前（当时油价20美元一桶）的三倍，若油价飙至每桶200美元，运费还会再增加一倍。因此将生产线设在成本更低的地区，已是不可取的做法。离开最终消费市场越远的生产基地，生产成本再便宜，也抵不上运输成本。油价继续上升，运输成本在最终价格中所占的比例将更大。美元的疲弱、中东政局紧张及油公司的劳工问题，将对已经高胀的全球油价造成更大推升压力，油价更没有下跌的理由，很快，我们将看到更多行业受到重创，航空业是其中之一。
循環周期影響股市
7月21日，周一。恒指升658.71，收22532.9；成交696.4億元。7月期指升631點，收22605點；8月期指升597點，收22578點。短期展望阻力漸現，但中期睇法，呢一潮升市可維持到8月下半月才完成。請參考以下分析。五窮、六絕、七翻身。以RSI睇，踏入7月份已出現背馳；以循環理論（cycle theory）睇，7月9日起下跌浪完成，上升浪開始。7月16日恒指20988.74係咪熊市二期內第二隻腳？今天恒指升穿由5月5日開始嘅下降軌，即類似今年3月至5月嘅熊市二期反彈由7月16日開始，估計可維持四十五天左右（由7月9日起計）即。用VIX指數睇，7月16日係另一隻熊腳機會極大，即股市進入中期睇好期。
循環周期影響股市
捉熊腳並非一般散戶可應付嘅遊戲，需要高度技巧，並能克服個人心魔才行，一旦形勢轉為不利，便應立即止蝕離場。你能做得到咩？去年有幾多所謂投資專家能掌握去年10月股市高潮而減持？循環理論我老曹1974年11月開始學習（當年有關書籍由行止兄所贈），但至今仍少見一般分析員利用此法分析（cyclical analyst），理由係掌握上述理論必須有幾深嘅數學基礎才掂。
其中最微細嘅浪約九至十一天（此乃移動平均數係十天之理由）；大一D係二點三個月約十周（此乃50天移動平均數出現嘅理由）。再大一D係五點七六個月二十五周（即一百二十五天）；再大係十七點三個月七十五周（三百七十五天）。完成一個大浪需要五十一點九二個月二百二十五周（一千一百二十五天），此乃二百二十五周移動平均數出現嘅理由。
上述循環互為影響，而形成股市韻律（rhythms），常見韻律有十七個月（或七十五周），即由低至高再返回低點需時十七個月；第二種係四點三二年（二百二十五周）。一個經濟盛衰影響通常需四點三二年才完成，再大一D係八點六四年、十七點二八年及三十四年半。
對股市影響最大係四點三二年同十七點二八年嘅循環周期；四個四點三二年組成十七點二八年。以香港1984年年中起步，第一個四點二五年係1988年第三季、1993年初、1997年8月、2001年下半年。第一個四點三二年嘅波浪係十七年大浪中嘅上升浪，即1984至88年第三季，上升日子多、下跌日子少；第二個四點三二年嘅浪亦係十七年浪中嘅上升浪，亦係上升日子多、下跌日子少（如當地經濟向上，第三個四點三二年浪亦係，此乃港股响1997年8月見頂嘅理由）。第四個浪便難逃一跌，至2001年年中，完成十七點二八年周期。當然，真正嘅cycle theory十分深奧難明，必須懂得計幾何者才可以學習。簡單D講，如你喺1984年已明白十七點二五年周期，便可避過1997年入市及2001年下半年加入大舉拋售行列。
不過，點解另一個四點三二年周期無法將恒指由2001年中到03年上半年呢兩年內推上？就係受三十四年嗰個更長更大嘅周期所影響。根據三十四點五年周期，2001年起已進入下降周期，呢個大周期壓抑住四點三二年小周期向上嘅力量，令今次呢個十七年周期升市由2003年4月才開始。
上述教cycle嘅書，1974年11月由行止兄所送，唔知家吓市場上係咪仲有售。各位可試試上網搵搵，呢本書叫做Investing for Profit with Torque Analysis of Stock Market Cycles，作者係William C. Garrett。香港投資者已經相當成熟，學習cycle分析相信亦唔會走火入魔（但數學基礎差者不宜學習）。
循環周期影響股市
捉熊腳並非一般散戶可應付嘅遊戲，需要高度技巧，並能克服個人心魔才行，一旦形勢轉為不利，便應立即止蝕離場。你能做得到咩？去年有幾多所謂投資專家能掌握去年10月股市高潮而減持？循環理論我老曹1974年11月開始學習（當年有關書籍由行止兄所贈），但至今仍少見一般分析員利用此法分析（cyclical analyst），理由係掌握上述理論必須有幾深嘅數學基礎才掂。
其中最微細嘅浪約九至十一天（此乃移動平均數係十天之理由）；大一D係二點三個月約十周（此乃50天移動平均數出現嘅理由）。再大一D係五點七六個月二十五周（即一百二十五天）；再大係十七點三個月七十五周（三百七十五天）。完成一個大浪需要五十一點九二個月二百二十五周（一千一百二十五天），此乃二百二十五周移動平均數出現嘅理由。
上述循環互為影響，而形成股市韻律（rhythms），常見韻律有十七個月（或七十五周），即由低至高再返回低點需時十七個月；第二種係四點三二年（二百二十五周）。一個經濟盛衰影響通常需四點三二年才完成，再大一D係八點六四年、十七點二八年及三十四年半。
對股市影響最大係四點三二年同十七點二八年嘅循環周期；四個四點三二年組成十七點二八年。以香港1984年年中起步，第一個四點二五年係1988年第三季、1993年初、1997年8月、2001年下半年。第一個四點三二年嘅波浪係十七年大浪中嘅上升浪，即1984至88年第三季，上升日子多、下跌日子少；第二個四點三二年嘅浪亦係十七年浪中嘅上升浪，亦係上升日子多、下跌日子少（如當地經濟向上，第三個四點三二年浪亦係，此乃港股响1997年8月見頂嘅理由）。第四個浪便難逃一跌，至2001年年中，完成十七點二八年周期。當然，真正嘅cycle theory十分深奧難明，必須懂得計幾何者才可以學習。簡單D講，如你喺1984年已明白十七點二五年周期，便可避過1997年入市及2001年下半年加入大舉拋售行列。
不過，點解另一個四點三二年周期無法將恒指由2001年中到03年上半年呢兩年內推上？就係受三十四年嗰個更長更大嘅周期所影響。根據三十四點五年周期，2001年起已進入下降周期，呢個大周期壓抑住四點三二年小周期向上嘅力量，令今次呢個十七年周期升市由2003年4月才開始。
上述教cycle嘅書，1974年11月由行止兄所送，唔知家吓市場上係咪仲有售。各位可試試上網搵搵，呢本書叫做Investing for Profit with Torque Analysis of Stock Market Cycles，作者係William C. Garrett。香港投資者已經相當成熟，學習cycle分析相信亦唔會走火入魔（但數學基礎差者不宜學習）。
Tuesday, July 22, 2008
趁熊市建立高股息组合
最近一家英文财经日报形容目前的股市，为一场“完美风暴”(A PERFECT STORM)，意思是说这场风暴是由所有不利因素凑在一起形成的－－石油价格暴涨，次级房贷余波荡漾，国内政局充满变数，所有这些因素，不约而同，在同一个时间内出现，导致股市人心惶惶。
再加上一些投资研究机构和预言家，预测股市会跌破1000点，使投资者有“股市末日”之感。
有人问我：“股市还会再跌吗？”。坦白说，我不知道，我也不认为有谁会知道。
所有的猜测，都是根据目前已知的宏观和微观因素作出的。而这些因素分分钟在变，当这些因素改变时，预言家的预测，可能马上来一个180度的转变，所以，如果你根据预言家的预测作出投资决定的话，你会疲於奔命。
逆向投资
反向投资者必须养成一种习惯，当所有的人都看坏股市时，就应该从相反的角度去看股市。
股市中的每一宗交易，其实都是一半人看好，一半人看坏的具体表现。如果所有的人都看好的话，就不会有卖家了，同样的，如果所有人都看坏的话，就不会有买家出现了。目前股市仍相当活跃，说明了有人看好，有人看坏。所以所有报章上出现的预测，或是预言家的猜测，只是股市中无数看法中的其中一种看法而已。所以，任何的预言，只能作为参考，切勿尽信。
造成目前熊市的罪魁祸首是油价，油价在短短的一年中暴升一倍，是不是纯粹因供不应求造成的？有可能长期持续下去吗？
历史经验告诉我们：其进锐者其退速。抛向天空的铁球，一定会跌回地面，因为铁球不可能在“空”中找到支撑点，支撑点必然是在“实”地上。油价如果不是供求失衡造成的，则总有一天会暴跌，届时国际经济的景观就不同了。
洪峰已过
次级房贷闹了整年，已沉寂下来，相信“洪峰”已过，把眼光放远一点，就不会那么悲观。
至於国内政局，我始终认为，这是两线制这个婴孩诞生前的阵痛。国家独立五十年，人民早已过了“不惑”之年，看事情已更理智，只要执政党和反对党遵循宪法，国家的稳定将持续。
所以，以反向的角度看，这场“完美风暴”提供了有胆识者一个机会，以合理价格买进五星级股票的机会。
经过一轮的大跌，投资风险已大减。目前的企业已更健全，财务管理已更小心翼翼。更重要的是，绝大部份好股都没有负债或负债率不高，1997年金融风暴的情况不可能出现。因为大家已系好完全带，渡过“完美风暴”，绝对不成问题，业绩表现虽然参差不齐，但基本上应可保持平稳。
在牛市中，股价大涨，周息率(股息收益率Dividend Yield)只有3-4%。经过这一轮暴跌后，许多五星级股票的毛周息率，高达7-8%，已比银行定期存款的利息高一倍。
这实在是一个建立高股息股票投资组合的良好机会。
高股息五星级股票的股息收入，也比屋租更高，买进作为长期，比买屋更划算。
再加上一些投资研究机构和预言家，预测股市会跌破1000点，使投资者有“股市末日”之感。
有人问我：“股市还会再跌吗？”。坦白说，我不知道，我也不认为有谁会知道。
所有的猜测，都是根据目前已知的宏观和微观因素作出的。而这些因素分分钟在变，当这些因素改变时，预言家的预测，可能马上来一个180度的转变，所以，如果你根据预言家的预测作出投资决定的话，你会疲於奔命。
逆向投资
反向投资者必须养成一种习惯，当所有的人都看坏股市时，就应该从相反的角度去看股市。
股市中的每一宗交易，其实都是一半人看好，一半人看坏的具体表现。如果所有的人都看好的话，就不会有卖家了，同样的，如果所有人都看坏的话，就不会有买家出现了。目前股市仍相当活跃，说明了有人看好，有人看坏。所以所有报章上出现的预测，或是预言家的猜测，只是股市中无数看法中的其中一种看法而已。所以，任何的预言，只能作为参考，切勿尽信。
造成目前熊市的罪魁祸首是油价，油价在短短的一年中暴升一倍，是不是纯粹因供不应求造成的？有可能长期持续下去吗？
历史经验告诉我们：其进锐者其退速。抛向天空的铁球，一定会跌回地面，因为铁球不可能在“空”中找到支撑点，支撑点必然是在“实”地上。油价如果不是供求失衡造成的，则总有一天会暴跌，届时国际经济的景观就不同了。
洪峰已过
次级房贷闹了整年，已沉寂下来，相信“洪峰”已过，把眼光放远一点，就不会那么悲观。
至於国内政局，我始终认为，这是两线制这个婴孩诞生前的阵痛。国家独立五十年，人民早已过了“不惑”之年，看事情已更理智，只要执政党和反对党遵循宪法，国家的稳定将持续。
所以，以反向的角度看，这场“完美风暴”提供了有胆识者一个机会，以合理价格买进五星级股票的机会。
经过一轮的大跌，投资风险已大减。目前的企业已更健全，财务管理已更小心翼翼。更重要的是，绝大部份好股都没有负债或负债率不高，1997年金融风暴的情况不可能出现。因为大家已系好完全带，渡过“完美风暴”，绝对不成问题，业绩表现虽然参差不齐，但基本上应可保持平稳。
在牛市中，股价大涨，周息率(股息收益率Dividend Yield)只有3-4%。经过这一轮暴跌后，许多五星级股票的毛周息率，高达7-8%，已比银行定期存款的利息高一倍。
这实在是一个建立高股息股票投资组合的良好机会。
高股息五星级股票的股息收入，也比屋租更高，买进作为长期，比买屋更划算。
Monday, July 21, 2008
Gauging Sentiment with the Volatility Index
More and more investors are using options prices offered up by the Chicago Board Options Exchange's Volatility Index, or VIX, to help determine market direction. Here we'll look at what VIX is, how it is developed and how it is useful to investors.
What Is the VIX?
The VIX is one of the investment industries most widely accepted methods to gauge stock market volatility. The first version of this index was developed by the CBOE in 1993 and was calculated by taking the weighted average of implied volatility for the Standard and Poor's 100 Index (OEX) calls and puts. However, in Sept 2003 they revised it to give a more accurate depiction of broad market volatility. In essence, VIX is a gauge of investors' confidence or non-confidence in market conditions.
It is important to understand that the VIX does not measure the volatility of a single issue or option instrument, but uses a wide range of strike prices of various calls and puts that are all based on the S&P 500. What is formed is a more accurate measure of the markets expectation of near-term volatility.
Determining Market Direction
Incorporating a wide range of S&P 500 index options truly makes this index a cross-section of investor sentiment. The VIX has an inverse relationship to the market, and a chart of the indicator will usually be shown with the scale inverted to show the low readings at the top and high readings at the bottom.
A low VIX, a range of 20 to 25, indicates traders have become somewhat uninterested in the market and generally indicates a sell-off. The value of VIX increases as the market goes down and decreases when the market moves in an upward direction. A rising stock market is seen as less risky and a declining stock market more risky. The higher the perceived risk in stocks, the higher the implied volatility and the more expensive the associated options, especially puts. Hence, implied volatility is not about the size of the price swings, but rather the implied risk associated with the stock market. When the market declines, the demand for puts usually increases. Increased demand means higher put prices and higher implied volatilities.
For contrarians, comparing VIX action with that of the market can yield good clues on future direction or duration of a move. The further VIX increases in value, the more panic there is in the market. The further VIX decreases in value, the more complacency there is in the market. As a measure of complacency and panic, VIX is often used as a contrarian indicator. Prolonged and/or extremely low VIX readings indicate a high degree of complacency and are generally regarded at bearish. Some contrarians view readings below 20 as excessively bearish. Conversely, prolonged and/or extremely high VIX readings indicate a high degree or anxiety or even panic among options traders and are regarded at bullish. High VIX readings usually occur after an extended or sharp decline and sentiment is still quite bearish. Some contrarians view readings above 30 as bullish.
Conflicting signals between VIX and the market can yield sentiment clues for the short term, also. Overly bullish sentiment or complacency is regarded as bearish by contrarians. On the other hand, overly bearish sentiment or panic is regarded as bullish. If the market declines sharply and VIX remains unchanged or decreases in value (towards complacency), it could indicate that the decline has further to go. Contrarians might take the view that there is still not enough bearishness or panic in the market to warrant a bottom. If the market advances sharply and VIX increases in value (towards panic), it could indicate that the advance has further to go. Contrarians might take the view that there is not enough bullishness or complacency to warrant a top.
In this chart of the VIX indicator for the 20 months preceding Aug 2002, you can see by the three red down arrows that the market sentiment was bearish and implied that volatility was extremely high. A black up-arrow shows the market turning somewhat more bullish and less volatile in Apr 2002. Knowing the events of the preceding six months, it is not surprising that the VIX would move sharply back to a bearish sentiment not seen since the disaster of Sept 11, 2001. You can see that in the last few weeks shown on the chart that the sentiment wanted to turn a little more bullish but there continued to be a bearish hold on the markets.
This is an indicator that is rarely out of step when it is viewed from market directions on a broad scale and will more than likely help investors see the bottom forming and the next strong bull market develop.
What Is the VIX?
The VIX is one of the investment industries most widely accepted methods to gauge stock market volatility. The first version of this index was developed by the CBOE in 1993 and was calculated by taking the weighted average of implied volatility for the Standard and Poor's 100 Index (OEX) calls and puts. However, in Sept 2003 they revised it to give a more accurate depiction of broad market volatility. In essence, VIX is a gauge of investors' confidence or non-confidence in market conditions.
It is important to understand that the VIX does not measure the volatility of a single issue or option instrument, but uses a wide range of strike prices of various calls and puts that are all based on the S&P 500. What is formed is a more accurate measure of the markets expectation of near-term volatility.
Determining Market Direction
Incorporating a wide range of S&P 500 index options truly makes this index a cross-section of investor sentiment. The VIX has an inverse relationship to the market, and a chart of the indicator will usually be shown with the scale inverted to show the low readings at the top and high readings at the bottom.
A low VIX, a range of 20 to 25, indicates traders have become somewhat uninterested in the market and generally indicates a sell-off. The value of VIX increases as the market goes down and decreases when the market moves in an upward direction. A rising stock market is seen as less risky and a declining stock market more risky. The higher the perceived risk in stocks, the higher the implied volatility and the more expensive the associated options, especially puts. Hence, implied volatility is not about the size of the price swings, but rather the implied risk associated with the stock market. When the market declines, the demand for puts usually increases. Increased demand means higher put prices and higher implied volatilities.
For contrarians, comparing VIX action with that of the market can yield good clues on future direction or duration of a move. The further VIX increases in value, the more panic there is in the market. The further VIX decreases in value, the more complacency there is in the market. As a measure of complacency and panic, VIX is often used as a contrarian indicator. Prolonged and/or extremely low VIX readings indicate a high degree of complacency and are generally regarded at bearish. Some contrarians view readings below 20 as excessively bearish. Conversely, prolonged and/or extremely high VIX readings indicate a high degree or anxiety or even panic among options traders and are regarded at bullish. High VIX readings usually occur after an extended or sharp decline and sentiment is still quite bearish. Some contrarians view readings above 30 as bullish.
Conflicting signals between VIX and the market can yield sentiment clues for the short term, also. Overly bullish sentiment or complacency is regarded as bearish by contrarians. On the other hand, overly bearish sentiment or panic is regarded as bullish. If the market declines sharply and VIX remains unchanged or decreases in value (towards complacency), it could indicate that the decline has further to go. Contrarians might take the view that there is still not enough bearishness or panic in the market to warrant a bottom. If the market advances sharply and VIX increases in value (towards panic), it could indicate that the advance has further to go. Contrarians might take the view that there is not enough bullishness or complacency to warrant a top.
In this chart of the VIX indicator for the 20 months preceding Aug 2002, you can see by the three red down arrows that the market sentiment was bearish and implied that volatility was extremely high. A black up-arrow shows the market turning somewhat more bullish and less volatile in Apr 2002. Knowing the events of the preceding six months, it is not surprising that the VIX would move sharply back to a bearish sentiment not seen since the disaster of Sept 11, 2001. You can see that in the last few weeks shown on the chart that the sentiment wanted to turn a little more bullish but there continued to be a bearish hold on the markets.
This is an indicator that is rarely out of step when it is viewed from market directions on a broad scale and will more than likely help investors see the bottom forming and the next strong bull market develop.
Mysterious VIX Divergences
A fascinating and mysterious daily anomaly occasionally occurs in the celebrated VIX Implied Volatility Index. It is always quite odd to witness in real-time as it occurs, and it never ceases to leave me puzzled when I see it. I am not alone either, as even though these anomalies are rare whenever one spawns I inevitably receive e-mails from other speculators around the world sharing my curiosity at the event.
With several of these odd VIX anomalies transpiring in recent months, an amount that kind of intuitively just felt like a high frequency, this week I would like to take a look at this strange phenomenon, which I call VIX Divergences.
Anomalies are always interesting in the financial markets. The entire art of speculation rests on the idea, which sometimes works and sometimes doesn’t, that past market performance can yield valuable clues about future market direction. Whenever apparent anomalies arise, speculators have to decide whether they may have predictive power or not.
An anomaly with apparent predictive power can be extremely valuable to speculators. If the markets generally usually do one particular thing after an anomaly transpires, speculators can trade accordingly in the future whenever that particular anomaly spawns again. On the other hand, the vast majority of market anomalies generally lack any predictive power. They are probably the product of essentially random market factors that simply do not grant a speculation edge to those who observe them.
Are these mysterious VIX Divergences the precious predictive kind of anomaly, valuable to speculators, or the random kind, essentially useless to all but the fanatical market nerds like me interested in arcane market trivia? In order to gain an idea of which way the VIX Divergences would slide on the grand predictive/random scale, we allocated some research time this week to investigating this curious phenomenon.
In order to understand the VIX Divergences, you first have to understand the VIX itself.
For over a decade now, the celebrated and widely followed VIX has been the implied volatility index for the elite S&P 100. Implied volatility refers to the index’s calculation methodology, which is rather complex and involves computing what the volatility would be on a hypothetical 30-calendar-day at-the-money OEX (S&P 100) index-options contract. The math behind the VIX is pretty intimidating, but fortunately speculators don’t need to understand the calculations in order to actually use the VIX in their own trading.
At a practical level, the VIX is in effect the de facto “fear gauge” for the US equity markets. When investors and speculators are scared, they tend to get frightened into trading more and volatility, along with the VIX, soars. When investors and speculators grow complacent and content, they tend to trade less and volatility, and the VIX, withers.
Therefore the VIX is extremely useful to contrarian speculators looking to trade opposite of the thundering herd, as I have documented in many past essays including “Trading the NASDAQ Bust 2” and “Trading the Relative VIX 2”. A really low VIX often signals a major interim top in the markets, the very time to sell long positions and throw short. Conversely a very high VIX virtually always signals a major interim bottom in the markets, the ideal moment to close short positions and throw long.
On an interesting side note, I would be remiss to fail to mention that just this past Monday, September 22nd, the VIX calculation methodology was changed substantially by its custodian, the venerable Chicago Board Options Exchange. This is big news for index speculators!
Now instead of being based off of the S&P 100 (OEX), going forward the VIX is now the implied volatility index for the entire S&P 500 (SPX), of which the S&P 100 is a massive subset. In addition, the range of options strike prices included in the actual VIX formula has been broadened, and individual options used as formula ingredients will now be weighted based on their distance from true at-the-money options. Options closer to being at-the-money will have a higher weight than those farther out-of-the-money.
It all sounds complicated, and it is, but at this stage in the game I suspect the changes will not materially affect the usefulness of the VIX for speculators. The S&P 100 stocks, the index for the original VIX, currently run about 70% of the market-cap of the entire S&P 500, the subject of the new VIX, so the original VIX already reflected the most important 70% of the new VIX. The benchmark SPX is a more relevant index for speculators than the OEX anyway, and the new VIX ought to better reflect its prospects.
That being said, only time and research will tell if the new VIX proves to be as useful to speculators in real-time as the original VIX has been. We are going to be watching the new VIX closely at Zeal, along with the original VIX which will now be calculated going forward under the symbol VXO. All speculators who use the VIX in their trading really need to go read the CBOE’s original announcement in order to gain a basic understanding of what the new VIX just introduced this week truly entails.
Back to the task at hand, thankfully the anomalous VIX divergences are far easier to understand than the VIX calculation methodology.
Because the VIX is effectively a proxy for general sentiment in the markets, it tends to move in lockstep opposition to the major indices. Whenever the stock markets are up, people grow complacent and fear wanes. This leads to a lower VIX. So the vast majority of the time, if the Big Three US stock indices are up, then the VIX will close lower on that particular trading day.
Conversely when the major stock indices slide lower, fear gradually begins to grow and fester within investors and speculators. Folks start getting scared and increase their trading, which vaults up volatility and leads to a higher VIX. Once again in the vast majority of the time, if the Big Three US indices close down odds are the VIX will head higher on that particular trading day.
This usual inverse relationship between the stock markets and the VIX is well known and heavily studied. The anomaly of the VIX Divergences arises when this relationship breaks on a material change in the stock indices. For example, what if the US stock markets and VIX are both up or both down by material amounts on the same trading day? These rare days do indeed occur and are the perplexing VIX Divergences!
In order to research these VIX Divergences, we used the S&P 500 as a proxy for the US stock markets as a whole. The S&P 500 is the flagship US index as well as the most important one on Earth, and its massive market cap encompasses the majority of the entire US equity-market capitalization.
Next we had to decide on what kind of move we would consider to be relevant in the S&P 500 on a daily basis, a threshold for uncovering VIX Divergences. Certified Public Accountants use a concept called materiality, the idea of ignoring small variations unless they reach a certain threshold that would make them meaningful to a financial statement as a whole. Since I originally hail from that strange CPA world, the many esoteric teachings of accountancy still ricochet around my skull.
As active speculators, my team at Zeal and I generally consider any single-day change of under 1% in the equity markets to be immaterial, not important. Internally, if the markets are either up less than 1% or down less than 1% on any given trading day, we call them unchanged. A sub-1% move most often seems to be purely random, attributable to general market noise, without much bearing on major trends in progress.
I decided to carry our practical 1% daily materiality threshold from speculating into our research this week. As such, for the purposes of this essay a VIX Divergence only occurs when both the S&P 500 and the VIX move by 1% or more in the same direction on the same trading day. If either the S&P 500 or VIX moved by less than 1% on any trading day, or they moved in different directions, that day could not be considered an official VIX Divergence.
We sub-divided these divergences into two categories, positive and negative. A positive VIX Divergence occurs when both the S&P 500 and VIX close more than 1% higher on the same trading day. A negative VIX Divergence is witnessed when both the S&P 500 and VIX close more than 1% lower on the same trading day.
How often do these VIX Divergences occur? We chose to initially limit our focus to the Great Bear market period since 2000 in this essay. The graph below shows positive VIX Divergence dates in green and negative VIX Divergence dates in red. These VIX Divergences are indeed rare events and it is no wonder that they leave speculators in awe and amazement when they transpire.
As you can see above, there have been exactly 13 VIX Divergence days since 2000, 6 positive and 7 negative. For reference there are 935 trading days shown in this chart, so a VIX Divergence day has only been witnessed 1.4% of the time in our Great Bear market to date! I don’t know about you, but a 1%ish occurrence of these odd anomalies is pretty darned rare in my book!
Of these 935 trading days since 2000, there were 403 days when the S&P 500 moved by more than 1% in either direction, 776 days when the VIX moved by more than 1% in either direction, and 380 days when both the SPX and VIX had absolute daily moves greater than 1%. Of the SPX absolute 1% move days, 53% were down. Regarding the VIX absolute 1% move days, 52% were down.
Of course in a Great Bear market we would expect the majority of 1% absolute move days in the SPX to be down, since there is a prevailing bearish downtrend, but then the majority of the VIX 1% absolute move days should probably be up due to the usual SPX/VIX inverse relationship. This wasn’t the case in the actual data though. VIX 1% down days were slightly more common than VIX 1% up days, kind of strange in a Great Bear market.
I suspect this is due to the asymmetric nature of the VIX. While it generally falls towards complacency slowly over time, fear often ignites rapidly as a stock-market waterfall decline accelerates. On the graph above the massive VIX spikes showing widespread popular fear soar into the heavens from nothing, towering spires on the chart. This rapidly ignited fear bleeds off slowly though, leading to more material VIX down days than up days.
Now if all these numbers haven’t put you to sleep yet, you are probably noticing a pattern. If these VIX Divergences are truly random, meaningless market noise that lacks a predictable future-activity quality, the distribution should be about equal. After all, markets can either go up or down and a random distribution of days would yield about 50/50 up days and down days, right?
On our grand predictive/random scale I mentioned in opening, the raw stats seem to lean towards the pure random side. Out of 13 VIX Divergences since 2000, roughly half are positive and half are negative. In addition, also about half of the SPX and VIX absolute 1% days are up and half down, farther exacerbating the sense of randomness. An even distribution of positive/negative VIX Divergences does not look hopeful in terms of speculators being able to actually successfully deploy future trades based on these rare days alone.
So can we throw these VIX Divergences out as meaningless trivia? Maybe, but upon closer visual examination they offer even more insight than their underlying statistical distribution would suggest.
For example, if you examine the 13 VIX Divergence dots on the chart above, all but 2 are above the S&P 500 line. They tend to occur at higher points in the SPX, or observed another way, they generally tend to occur when the index is poised for a pullback or outright waterfall decline. The 8/13/2002 red negative divergence dot, by the way, really should appear above the SPX line as it happened when the index was trading near 885, far above the July 2002 interim lows under 800.
So out of these 13 VIX Divergences, 12 occurred near higher points or times preceding a significant decline in the S&P 500. The only outlier that truly occurred on an interim low was the negative VIX Divergence of 9/21/2001, which transpired on the V-bounce low only weeks after the 9/11 attacks. On that peculiar day of market history the S&P 500 fell by 1.9% to carve a new interim low but the VIX also fell 1.6% to a still very high level of 48.27.
So with the exception of the strange post-9/11 action, 12 of the 13 VIX Divergences tended to occur anywhere from a few days to a few weeks before minor pullbacks or even major downlegs. Both positive and negative divergences occurred, on average, at relatively low VIX levels marking complacency. The average positive VIX Divergence occurred at 23.5 on the VIX, while the average negative VIX Divergence happened around 33.1 or so, which is still not super high in VIX terms. Average negative VIX Divergences ran at VIX levels 41% higher than average positive VIX Divergences.
As you can see above, our latest three VIX Divergences were all positive, with the most recent happening in early September. Even during a strong bear-market rally, these VIX Divergences seemed to herald minor pullbacks in the S&P 500. Our most recent VIX Divergence of September 2nd happened when the SPX closed at 1022, only about 1.7% below its latest interim high of 1040 or so achieved last week. Perhaps this particular VIX Divergence heralds a pullback or outright major decline too. Only time will tell!
For another perspective on these VIX Divergences, we graphed the same 13 shown above
against the Relative VIX, a hybrid measure of the VIX relative to its 200-day moving average. This helps us gain a better sense of where the VIX was trading in relation to its current 200-day baseline when these VIX Divergences arose out of the market mists to captivate speculators.
Once again, both positive and negative VIX Divergences tended to occur when the VIX was relatively low. The average positive VIX Divergence day occurred at a Relative VIX around 0.81, while the average negative VIX Divergence day was seen around a Relative VIX of 1.26, about 56% higher. Even the negative VIX Divergences were fairly low though, as an extremely high Relative VIX reading will challenge 1.80, lofty levels that have never witnessed a VIX Divergence day with the notable exception of the post 9/11 V-bounce 9/21 negative VIX Divergence at a Relative VIX level of 1.72.
So apparent statistical randomness aside, is there a pattern emerging here? Perhaps. These VIX Divergence days, with the exception of 9/21/2001, seem to tend to occur around complacent moments in market time. It is almost as if traders are indecisive near high points so they are trading in a method unconventional enough to drive both the S&P 500 and VIX 1% or more in the same direction on the same trading day.
While the markets don’t immediately slide right after a VIX Divergence day by default, they certainly appear to slide more often than not within days or weeks of this rare indecision and decoupling of the VIX and its usual relationship with the S&P 500. If I had to make an interpretation of these VIX Divergence days, I would have to say that the odds are slightly bearish after they occur, either for a temporary short-term pullback or a serious Great Bear downleg.
Nevertheless though, since these odd VIX Divergences are not overwhelmingly mapped right at major interim tops or major interim bottoms, at this stage in the game I don’t think there is enough evidence to lean heavily on VIX Divergence days for trading cues. While the visual distribution of these anomalous days is provocative and leans towards a bearish interpretation, the statistical data underneath is running close enough to 50/50 across the board to tilt the scales away from predictability and towards randomness.
VIX Divergences aside, the VIX and Relative VIX themselves are offering a great deal of insight for speculators today. This weekend I will be working hard on the upcoming October issue of our monthly Zeal Intelligence newsletter, to be published in the middle of next week for our subscribers, which will discuss the current index-speculation scene and outline our current strategy and tactics for playing it. Naturally the volatility indices will factor into this discussion on index-options trading strategy moving forward for the remainder of 2003 and beyond.
The bottom line is the mysterious VIX Divergences quite a few speculators have observed in recent months are certainly intriguing, but at first glance the evidence is not compelling enough to trade directly upon. Naturally there are countless variations of this line of inquiry which could affect the results, including defining materiality at different levels, but at 1% absolute moves the VIX Divergence day distribution remains tantalizing but not conclusive enough to speculate upon.
While these mysterious VIX Divergences may indeed wield some predictive power, the element of randomness in their statistical underpinnings is too powerful to ignore. Nevertheless, we will continue noting these odd days when they occur in the future and perhaps some useful and actionable trading information will yet emerge out of the VIX Divergences.
With several of these odd VIX anomalies transpiring in recent months, an amount that kind of intuitively just felt like a high frequency, this week I would like to take a look at this strange phenomenon, which I call VIX Divergences.
Anomalies are always interesting in the financial markets. The entire art of speculation rests on the idea, which sometimes works and sometimes doesn’t, that past market performance can yield valuable clues about future market direction. Whenever apparent anomalies arise, speculators have to decide whether they may have predictive power or not.
An anomaly with apparent predictive power can be extremely valuable to speculators. If the markets generally usually do one particular thing after an anomaly transpires, speculators can trade accordingly in the future whenever that particular anomaly spawns again. On the other hand, the vast majority of market anomalies generally lack any predictive power. They are probably the product of essentially random market factors that simply do not grant a speculation edge to those who observe them.
Are these mysterious VIX Divergences the precious predictive kind of anomaly, valuable to speculators, or the random kind, essentially useless to all but the fanatical market nerds like me interested in arcane market trivia? In order to gain an idea of which way the VIX Divergences would slide on the grand predictive/random scale, we allocated some research time this week to investigating this curious phenomenon.
In order to understand the VIX Divergences, you first have to understand the VIX itself.
For over a decade now, the celebrated and widely followed VIX has been the implied volatility index for the elite S&P 100. Implied volatility refers to the index’s calculation methodology, which is rather complex and involves computing what the volatility would be on a hypothetical 30-calendar-day at-the-money OEX (S&P 100) index-options contract. The math behind the VIX is pretty intimidating, but fortunately speculators don’t need to understand the calculations in order to actually use the VIX in their own trading.
At a practical level, the VIX is in effect the de facto “fear gauge” for the US equity markets. When investors and speculators are scared, they tend to get frightened into trading more and volatility, along with the VIX, soars. When investors and speculators grow complacent and content, they tend to trade less and volatility, and the VIX, withers.
Therefore the VIX is extremely useful to contrarian speculators looking to trade opposite of the thundering herd, as I have documented in many past essays including “Trading the NASDAQ Bust 2” and “Trading the Relative VIX 2”. A really low VIX often signals a major interim top in the markets, the very time to sell long positions and throw short. Conversely a very high VIX virtually always signals a major interim bottom in the markets, the ideal moment to close short positions and throw long.
On an interesting side note, I would be remiss to fail to mention that just this past Monday, September 22nd, the VIX calculation methodology was changed substantially by its custodian, the venerable Chicago Board Options Exchange. This is big news for index speculators!
Now instead of being based off of the S&P 100 (OEX), going forward the VIX is now the implied volatility index for the entire S&P 500 (SPX), of which the S&P 100 is a massive subset. In addition, the range of options strike prices included in the actual VIX formula has been broadened, and individual options used as formula ingredients will now be weighted based on their distance from true at-the-money options. Options closer to being at-the-money will have a higher weight than those farther out-of-the-money.
It all sounds complicated, and it is, but at this stage in the game I suspect the changes will not materially affect the usefulness of the VIX for speculators. The S&P 100 stocks, the index for the original VIX, currently run about 70% of the market-cap of the entire S&P 500, the subject of the new VIX, so the original VIX already reflected the most important 70% of the new VIX. The benchmark SPX is a more relevant index for speculators than the OEX anyway, and the new VIX ought to better reflect its prospects.
That being said, only time and research will tell if the new VIX proves to be as useful to speculators in real-time as the original VIX has been. We are going to be watching the new VIX closely at Zeal, along with the original VIX which will now be calculated going forward under the symbol VXO. All speculators who use the VIX in their trading really need to go read the CBOE’s original announcement in order to gain a basic understanding of what the new VIX just introduced this week truly entails.
Back to the task at hand, thankfully the anomalous VIX divergences are far easier to understand than the VIX calculation methodology.
Because the VIX is effectively a proxy for general sentiment in the markets, it tends to move in lockstep opposition to the major indices. Whenever the stock markets are up, people grow complacent and fear wanes. This leads to a lower VIX. So the vast majority of the time, if the Big Three US stock indices are up, then the VIX will close lower on that particular trading day.
Conversely when the major stock indices slide lower, fear gradually begins to grow and fester within investors and speculators. Folks start getting scared and increase their trading, which vaults up volatility and leads to a higher VIX. Once again in the vast majority of the time, if the Big Three US indices close down odds are the VIX will head higher on that particular trading day.
This usual inverse relationship between the stock markets and the VIX is well known and heavily studied. The anomaly of the VIX Divergences arises when this relationship breaks on a material change in the stock indices. For example, what if the US stock markets and VIX are both up or both down by material amounts on the same trading day? These rare days do indeed occur and are the perplexing VIX Divergences!
In order to research these VIX Divergences, we used the S&P 500 as a proxy for the US stock markets as a whole. The S&P 500 is the flagship US index as well as the most important one on Earth, and its massive market cap encompasses the majority of the entire US equity-market capitalization.
Next we had to decide on what kind of move we would consider to be relevant in the S&P 500 on a daily basis, a threshold for uncovering VIX Divergences. Certified Public Accountants use a concept called materiality, the idea of ignoring small variations unless they reach a certain threshold that would make them meaningful to a financial statement as a whole. Since I originally hail from that strange CPA world, the many esoteric teachings of accountancy still ricochet around my skull.
As active speculators, my team at Zeal and I generally consider any single-day change of under 1% in the equity markets to be immaterial, not important. Internally, if the markets are either up less than 1% or down less than 1% on any given trading day, we call them unchanged. A sub-1% move most often seems to be purely random, attributable to general market noise, without much bearing on major trends in progress.
I decided to carry our practical 1% daily materiality threshold from speculating into our research this week. As such, for the purposes of this essay a VIX Divergence only occurs when both the S&P 500 and the VIX move by 1% or more in the same direction on the same trading day. If either the S&P 500 or VIX moved by less than 1% on any trading day, or they moved in different directions, that day could not be considered an official VIX Divergence.
We sub-divided these divergences into two categories, positive and negative. A positive VIX Divergence occurs when both the S&P 500 and VIX close more than 1% higher on the same trading day. A negative VIX Divergence is witnessed when both the S&P 500 and VIX close more than 1% lower on the same trading day.
How often do these VIX Divergences occur? We chose to initially limit our focus to the Great Bear market period since 2000 in this essay. The graph below shows positive VIX Divergence dates in green and negative VIX Divergence dates in red. These VIX Divergences are indeed rare events and it is no wonder that they leave speculators in awe and amazement when they transpire.
As you can see above, there have been exactly 13 VIX Divergence days since 2000, 6 positive and 7 negative. For reference there are 935 trading days shown in this chart, so a VIX Divergence day has only been witnessed 1.4% of the time in our Great Bear market to date! I don’t know about you, but a 1%ish occurrence of these odd anomalies is pretty darned rare in my book!
Of these 935 trading days since 2000, there were 403 days when the S&P 500 moved by more than 1% in either direction, 776 days when the VIX moved by more than 1% in either direction, and 380 days when both the SPX and VIX had absolute daily moves greater than 1%. Of the SPX absolute 1% move days, 53% were down. Regarding the VIX absolute 1% move days, 52% were down.
Of course in a Great Bear market we would expect the majority of 1% absolute move days in the SPX to be down, since there is a prevailing bearish downtrend, but then the majority of the VIX 1% absolute move days should probably be up due to the usual SPX/VIX inverse relationship. This wasn’t the case in the actual data though. VIX 1% down days were slightly more common than VIX 1% up days, kind of strange in a Great Bear market.
I suspect this is due to the asymmetric nature of the VIX. While it generally falls towards complacency slowly over time, fear often ignites rapidly as a stock-market waterfall decline accelerates. On the graph above the massive VIX spikes showing widespread popular fear soar into the heavens from nothing, towering spires on the chart. This rapidly ignited fear bleeds off slowly though, leading to more material VIX down days than up days.
Now if all these numbers haven’t put you to sleep yet, you are probably noticing a pattern. If these VIX Divergences are truly random, meaningless market noise that lacks a predictable future-activity quality, the distribution should be about equal. After all, markets can either go up or down and a random distribution of days would yield about 50/50 up days and down days, right?
On our grand predictive/random scale I mentioned in opening, the raw stats seem to lean towards the pure random side. Out of 13 VIX Divergences since 2000, roughly half are positive and half are negative. In addition, also about half of the SPX and VIX absolute 1% days are up and half down, farther exacerbating the sense of randomness. An even distribution of positive/negative VIX Divergences does not look hopeful in terms of speculators being able to actually successfully deploy future trades based on these rare days alone.
So can we throw these VIX Divergences out as meaningless trivia? Maybe, but upon closer visual examination they offer even more insight than their underlying statistical distribution would suggest.
For example, if you examine the 13 VIX Divergence dots on the chart above, all but 2 are above the S&P 500 line. They tend to occur at higher points in the SPX, or observed another way, they generally tend to occur when the index is poised for a pullback or outright waterfall decline. The 8/13/2002 red negative divergence dot, by the way, really should appear above the SPX line as it happened when the index was trading near 885, far above the July 2002 interim lows under 800.
So out of these 13 VIX Divergences, 12 occurred near higher points or times preceding a significant decline in the S&P 500. The only outlier that truly occurred on an interim low was the negative VIX Divergence of 9/21/2001, which transpired on the V-bounce low only weeks after the 9/11 attacks. On that peculiar day of market history the S&P 500 fell by 1.9% to carve a new interim low but the VIX also fell 1.6% to a still very high level of 48.27.
So with the exception of the strange post-9/11 action, 12 of the 13 VIX Divergences tended to occur anywhere from a few days to a few weeks before minor pullbacks or even major downlegs. Both positive and negative divergences occurred, on average, at relatively low VIX levels marking complacency. The average positive VIX Divergence occurred at 23.5 on the VIX, while the average negative VIX Divergence happened around 33.1 or so, which is still not super high in VIX terms. Average negative VIX Divergences ran at VIX levels 41% higher than average positive VIX Divergences.
As you can see above, our latest three VIX Divergences were all positive, with the most recent happening in early September. Even during a strong bear-market rally, these VIX Divergences seemed to herald minor pullbacks in the S&P 500. Our most recent VIX Divergence of September 2nd happened when the SPX closed at 1022, only about 1.7% below its latest interim high of 1040 or so achieved last week. Perhaps this particular VIX Divergence heralds a pullback or outright major decline too. Only time will tell!
For another perspective on these VIX Divergences, we graphed the same 13 shown above
against the Relative VIX, a hybrid measure of the VIX relative to its 200-day moving average. This helps us gain a better sense of where the VIX was trading in relation to its current 200-day baseline when these VIX Divergences arose out of the market mists to captivate speculators.
Once again, both positive and negative VIX Divergences tended to occur when the VIX was relatively low. The average positive VIX Divergence day occurred at a Relative VIX around 0.81, while the average negative VIX Divergence day was seen around a Relative VIX of 1.26, about 56% higher. Even the negative VIX Divergences were fairly low though, as an extremely high Relative VIX reading will challenge 1.80, lofty levels that have never witnessed a VIX Divergence day with the notable exception of the post 9/11 V-bounce 9/21 negative VIX Divergence at a Relative VIX level of 1.72.
So apparent statistical randomness aside, is there a pattern emerging here? Perhaps. These VIX Divergence days, with the exception of 9/21/2001, seem to tend to occur around complacent moments in market time. It is almost as if traders are indecisive near high points so they are trading in a method unconventional enough to drive both the S&P 500 and VIX 1% or more in the same direction on the same trading day.
While the markets don’t immediately slide right after a VIX Divergence day by default, they certainly appear to slide more often than not within days or weeks of this rare indecision and decoupling of the VIX and its usual relationship with the S&P 500. If I had to make an interpretation of these VIX Divergence days, I would have to say that the odds are slightly bearish after they occur, either for a temporary short-term pullback or a serious Great Bear downleg.
Nevertheless though, since these odd VIX Divergences are not overwhelmingly mapped right at major interim tops or major interim bottoms, at this stage in the game I don’t think there is enough evidence to lean heavily on VIX Divergence days for trading cues. While the visual distribution of these anomalous days is provocative and leans towards a bearish interpretation, the statistical data underneath is running close enough to 50/50 across the board to tilt the scales away from predictability and towards randomness.
VIX Divergences aside, the VIX and Relative VIX themselves are offering a great deal of insight for speculators today. This weekend I will be working hard on the upcoming October issue of our monthly Zeal Intelligence newsletter, to be published in the middle of next week for our subscribers, which will discuss the current index-speculation scene and outline our current strategy and tactics for playing it. Naturally the volatility indices will factor into this discussion on index-options trading strategy moving forward for the remainder of 2003 and beyond.
The bottom line is the mysterious VIX Divergences quite a few speculators have observed in recent months are certainly intriguing, but at first glance the evidence is not compelling enough to trade directly upon. Naturally there are countless variations of this line of inquiry which could affect the results, including defining materiality at different levels, but at 1% absolute moves the VIX Divergence day distribution remains tantalizing but not conclusive enough to speculate upon.
While these mysterious VIX Divergences may indeed wield some predictive power, the element of randomness in their statistical underpinnings is too powerful to ignore. Nevertheless, we will continue noting these odd days when they occur in the future and perhaps some useful and actionable trading information will yet emerge out of the VIX Divergences.
Riding the cycle
Why volatility will never go away
CAN it only be a year ago that volatility was so low in the financial markets? Traders must have found their lives awfully dull, without so much as a currency crisis to get the pulse racing.
Some began to argue that volatility had moved to a structurally lower level thanks to the activity of hedge funds and to the development of complex products and derivatives. A new, more sophisticated financial system had spread risk more efficiently, it was said.
But over the past 12 months, the standard measure of stockmarket volatility, the Vix (or volatility index), has roughly doubled. On top of that, there have been wild swings in government bond yields, a jump in debt spreads and the continuing decline of the dollar.
To grasp one reason why volatility has surged, you need to understand how the Vix is calculated. The measure is derived from the world of options, the instruments that allow investors to protect themselves against (or speculate on) future price movements. A call option, for example, gives the holder the right to buy an asset at a specified price within a specified period.
Say there are two shares, each trading at $80; one is a young technology company, the other a staid power generator. In each case, there is an option contract offering the chance to buy the shares at $100 at some point within the next three months. Logically, you would expect to have to shell out more for the option to buy the technology company's shares, since it is more likely suddenly to announce some whizzy breakthrough that causes its share price to shoot upwards. In other words, it costs more to purchase options on assets that are likely to be more volatile in price.
When one “reverse engineers” an option price (taking out factors such as the time value of money), the residual factor is known as implied volatility, which could be described as the uncertainty applying to the asset. The Vix represents this figure for the S&P 500 index.
The vast majority of options expire without being exercised; the asset price never moves sufficiently to make it worthwhile. To put this in technical terms, the implied volatility in the option price turns out to be higher than the realised volatility. So there are plenty of people who earn a decent income by selling options; just like insurers, they earn a premium every time they make a sale.
In quiet markets, the number of people who want to sell options increases, driving their prices, and thus the level of implied volatility, down. That was one reason why volatility was so low last year. But when the markets went into a tailspin in August, volatility suddenly surged; it became much more likely that those who had previously bought options would be able to exercise them (particularly put options, which grant the right to sell at a given price). Option-sellers suddenly faced losses; some, realising the risks, probably withdrew from the business. That forced implied volatility even higher.
There is thus a cyclical element to volatility, as investors move from complacency to alarm. That fits in with the work of Hyman Minsky, an economist who suggested that periods of stability may sow the seeds of future volatility. If economic growth and interest rates are stable, businesses and consumers will be encouraged to take more risks, and in particular to take on more debt. Eventually, small changes in interest rates will have a much greater impact on balance sheets and on consumer willingness to spend.
A long-term graph of the Vix hints at cyclicality, with periods of great choppiness in the early and late 1990s book-ending an era of relative calm in the middle of the decade. It is hard to say that any level is “normal”; volatility is in itself volatile.
It may be ever so. Another important factor behind market movements must be the difference in incentives between investing institutions, such as pension funds, and the intermediaries that work on their behalf. Pension funds would like nothing better than for asset markets to rise in a steady, predictable fashion, so it would be easy to work out how to meet their liabilities. But that would not be so great for traders. Steady markets would give investors fewer reasons to deal, and so traders would have less chance to earn the spread between sell and buy prices. And the more volatile markets are, the better the chance that a trader will be on the right side of some big price move, and win himself a fat bonus. So traders are tempted into making big bets, and in doing so also add to volatility.
It is small comfort for the rest of us, but every time the Vix jumps sharply, someone at a hedge fund has just earned himself a nice new yacht.
CAN it only be a year ago that volatility was so low in the financial markets? Traders must have found their lives awfully dull, without so much as a currency crisis to get the pulse racing.
Some began to argue that volatility had moved to a structurally lower level thanks to the activity of hedge funds and to the development of complex products and derivatives. A new, more sophisticated financial system had spread risk more efficiently, it was said.
But over the past 12 months, the standard measure of stockmarket volatility, the Vix (or volatility index), has roughly doubled. On top of that, there have been wild swings in government bond yields, a jump in debt spreads and the continuing decline of the dollar.
To grasp one reason why volatility has surged, you need to understand how the Vix is calculated. The measure is derived from the world of options, the instruments that allow investors to protect themselves against (or speculate on) future price movements. A call option, for example, gives the holder the right to buy an asset at a specified price within a specified period.
Say there are two shares, each trading at $80; one is a young technology company, the other a staid power generator. In each case, there is an option contract offering the chance to buy the shares at $100 at some point within the next three months. Logically, you would expect to have to shell out more for the option to buy the technology company's shares, since it is more likely suddenly to announce some whizzy breakthrough that causes its share price to shoot upwards. In other words, it costs more to purchase options on assets that are likely to be more volatile in price.
When one “reverse engineers” an option price (taking out factors such as the time value of money), the residual factor is known as implied volatility, which could be described as the uncertainty applying to the asset. The Vix represents this figure for the S&P 500 index.
The vast majority of options expire without being exercised; the asset price never moves sufficiently to make it worthwhile. To put this in technical terms, the implied volatility in the option price turns out to be higher than the realised volatility. So there are plenty of people who earn a decent income by selling options; just like insurers, they earn a premium every time they make a sale.
In quiet markets, the number of people who want to sell options increases, driving their prices, and thus the level of implied volatility, down. That was one reason why volatility was so low last year. But when the markets went into a tailspin in August, volatility suddenly surged; it became much more likely that those who had previously bought options would be able to exercise them (particularly put options, which grant the right to sell at a given price). Option-sellers suddenly faced losses; some, realising the risks, probably withdrew from the business. That forced implied volatility even higher.
There is thus a cyclical element to volatility, as investors move from complacency to alarm. That fits in with the work of Hyman Minsky, an economist who suggested that periods of stability may sow the seeds of future volatility. If economic growth and interest rates are stable, businesses and consumers will be encouraged to take more risks, and in particular to take on more debt. Eventually, small changes in interest rates will have a much greater impact on balance sheets and on consumer willingness to spend.
A long-term graph of the Vix hints at cyclicality, with periods of great choppiness in the early and late 1990s book-ending an era of relative calm in the middle of the decade. It is hard to say that any level is “normal”; volatility is in itself volatile.
It may be ever so. Another important factor behind market movements must be the difference in incentives between investing institutions, such as pension funds, and the intermediaries that work on their behalf. Pension funds would like nothing better than for asset markets to rise in a steady, predictable fashion, so it would be easy to work out how to meet their liabilities. But that would not be so great for traders. Steady markets would give investors fewer reasons to deal, and so traders would have less chance to earn the spread between sell and buy prices. And the more volatile markets are, the better the chance that a trader will be on the right side of some big price move, and win himself a fat bonus. So traders are tempted into making big bets, and in doing so also add to volatility.
It is small comfort for the rest of us, but every time the Vix jumps sharply, someone at a hedge fund has just earned himself a nice new yacht.
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