华尔街金融风暴，让人们看到了山雨欲来的这一幕幕：2007年8月开始，美联储累计向金融系统注资1472．5亿美元，；9月18日决定降息0．5个百分点，进入“降息周期”； 2007年底至今年初，花旗、美林、瑞银等因次级贷款出现巨额亏损，美国政府和六大房贷商提出“救生索计划”；2008年3月，美国第五大投资银行贝尔斯登濒临破产，美联储紧急注资，并大幅降息75个基点；2008年7月23日，美国财政部宣布斥资3000亿美元救助“两房”，9月7日宣布接管“两房”； 2008年9月中下旬，6大央行联合注资，美政府7000亿金融救援计划，AIG被政府接管。
危机才刚刚开始，可全球化的金融大收购战役却在这场混乱中不断开始演绎。美国最大的银行倒闭案后不久，又一家银行可能成为被收购对象。美联银行（Wachovia）已经开始与一系列潜在收购者谈判，包括花旗(Citigroup)、西班牙国家银行(Banco Santander)、富国银行（Wells Fargo）等。与此同时，摩根大通正式（JPMorgan Chase）宣布，收购华盛顿互助银行。除此之外，其它一系列全球金融收购战开始大举进行：英国巴克莱银行以17.5亿美元收购雷曼部分资产；日本野村收购欧洲雷曼；中国银行23亿元收购法国洛希尔银行20%股权；日本三菱日联银行收购摩根士丹利20%股份；中石化136亿收购加拿大油气公司股权；法国电力集团230亿收购英国能源集团等等，让全球金融市场在这场混乱中显的更加脆弱。透过这些事件，我们发现，这场收购战有可能会让不断加剧的金融危机陷入更大的风险漩涡，全球金融市场有可能会被这场收购战导致的更加混乱。
由次贷危机引发的华尔街独立投行时代的终结，是有深刻原因的。在痛惜之余，我们不禁感慨，究竟是什么原因导致这些投行巨擘风光不再？国内投行从中可得到哪些启示？
首先，投行是一种高风险、高收益的行业。华尔街投行在博取高收益的同时，没有把风险控制放在重要位置上。在上世纪３０年代，美国通过法律将投行与商业银行相互分离，正是基于投行风险较高的考虑。经过时代的变迁，当前投行业务的风险远胜往昔。投行的高风险可以从两个方面看出：
（１）证券行业是个波动性很大、周期性很强的行业，投行的业绩波动因而很大。
（２）从华尔街的实际看，投行们对短期借款过分依赖，高的资产负债率削弱了投行的风险抵抗能力。货币市场的风吹草动往往会给投行致命一击。
其次，在利率的驱使下，投行的精英们痴迷于设计复杂的衍生品，致使投行的盈利模式不是建立在健康的实体经济和基础资产上。伴随信用链条的拉长、产品复杂度的增加，这些投行愈加脆弱。作为“人祸”，华尔街金融风暴的发生很大程度上跟投行精英们缺乏职业操守有关。他们既没有如实向客户揭示产品可能的风险，投行自身也没有采取有效措施管理风险，把风险传递给更广泛的机构和人群。次贷危机的冲击为何一波接着一波，根源在于这些机构的资产质量低劣。这些资产直接或间接与次级抵押贷款有关，是在次级抵押贷款的基础上衍生出来的。基础资产的风险如同毒瘤一样经由衍生品侵袭整个金融体系。
最后，在独立投行模式下，美国证券交易委员会作为唯一的监管主体，监管漏洞较多，客观上助长了投行们的放任自流与胆大妄为。与之形成对照的是，在美国，商业银行受到多个监管机构的监管，而且有一些保护性措施。由此不难理解为何华尔街投行在危机袭来时，要么被银行收购，要么变身为银行。
对国内投行来说，华尔街投行的失败有很多教训可资借鉴。首先，在分业经营的前提下，为了降低风险，国内投行可考虑：
（１）依托金融控股公司（投行作为控股公司的附属企业），增强抗风险能力。尽管投行风险比较大，但从整个控股公司层面看，风险或许在可控范围内。
（２）拓展业务，通过业务的多元化来分散风险。在传统的经纪、自营、承销、代客理财之外，增加直投、融资融券和股指期货业务。其次，适当增加投行的自有资本比例。再次，在条件允许的情况下，适当拓宽投行的资金来源渠道，提高资金来源的稳定性。最后，创新的步伐不能停歇。我们不能学华尔街因创新过度、过滥而因噎废食，不敢创新。但要严把基础资产的质量关，做好风险控制。对于管理层而言，如何在管制与创新之间寻求平衡是一个重大挑战。
Tuesday, September 30, 2008
再思华尔街
刚刚过去的一周，一场百年不遇的金融大海啸席卷整个华尔街。
一家接一家大型金融机构轰然倒下，美国政府史无前例地动用万亿美元生死大救赎，各国央行空前一致出手救市，投资者的心随着股指剧烈波动而上下起伏。
美国投资银行经营模式的激进转变、美国金融市场过度自由的监管和发展模式以及过于“廉价”的信用，是导致华尔街金融危机的三座“冰山”。他认为，我们应该认真研讨华尔街危机给我们带来的启示，借鉴其教训，但也要充分考虑我国国情，要看到我国资本市场的发展模式和发展阶段与华尔街的不同。我国资本市场发展应该审慎推进金融创新，强化风险控制机制，走可持续发展的道路。
“海面下的三座冰山”
美国次贷危机的爆发只是“海面上的浮冰”，是华尔街金融危机的直接诱因。华尔街金融危机的根源，源自隐藏于水底的三座“冰山”，其最早的形成，在某种意义上可以追溯到上个世纪的九十年代。
第一，美国投资银行的经营模式在过去十年间发生了巨大变化，过度投机和过高的杠杆率使得投行走上了一条不归之路。传统上以赚取佣金收入为主、对资本金要求很低的投资银行，在高利润的诱惑和激烈竞争的压力下，大量从事次贷市场和复杂产品的投资，投行悄然变成了追逐高风险的对冲基金。例如，高盛公司在近年内，直接股权投资和其他投资所获占到其总收入的80％左右。出于竞争压力，其他投资银行也在做类似的转型。在对大量金融衍生品的交易中，投行赚取了大量利润，例如高盛和摩根斯坦利两家投行在过去十几年中每年的平均净资产回报率高达20％左右，远远高出商业银行12％－13％的回报率。但同时，这些投行也拆借了大量资金，“钱不够就借”，杠杆比率一再提高，从而积累了巨大的风险。雷曼兄弟宣布进入破产保护时，其负债高达6130亿美元，负债权益比是6130∶260，美林被收购前负债权益比率也超过20倍。
过高的杠杆比率，使得投行的经营风险不断上升，而投资银行在激进参与的同时，却没有对风险进行足够的控制。一方面，由于杠杆率较高，一旦投资出现问题会使其亏损程度远远超出资本金；另一方面，高杠杆使得这些投资银行对流动性要求较高，在市场较为宽松时，尚可通过货币市场融资来填补交易的资金缺口，而一旦自身财务状况恶化，评级公司降低其评级使融资成本上升，便可能造成投资银行无法通过融资维持流动性，贝尔斯登便是因此遭挤兑而倒下。同样，评级公司降低雷曼兄弟的评级，也是其彻底崩盘的重要因素。
1998年，长期资本管理公司（LTCM）一家对冲基金倒下，就掀起了金融市场的轩然大波，而现在这么多投资银行实际上在变相从事对冲基金的业务却缺乏相应的风险控制措施，潜在的风险可想而知。
第二，美国金融市场过度自由化的发展模式走到了极端，衍生品过度泛滥，监管长期缺位，直至出现系统性的崩溃。摩根斯坦利亚洲区前主席曾表示，在全球所有金融市场中，东京和纽约的金融市场可能是两个极端。东京市场是全世界最没有创新的证券市场，而纽约市场是全世界最有活力的市场。他说，两个市场迥然不同的原因可能非常小，那就是，在两个市场上对证券的定义有所不同。在东京市场，证券被定义成为“Stock or Bond”——也就是，股票或债券。如果一个金融产品不是股票或者债券，上市之前政府的审批可能长达两年。而纽约是另外一个极端，那就是“Anything Under the Sun”——太阳底下的任何东西，只要你能想到，“上午一包装，下午就能卖出去”。所以各种金融衍生品和证券化产品在美国非常多，金融机构不停地创造出各种各样眼花缭乱的复杂产品，通过柜台交易（OTC），不需要论证，也没有监管，只要有对手方买，能够成交就行，当然这些对手方大都也是金融机构。这种模式使得金融产品极大地丰富，但有时候容易走过头了，使得资产证券化产品等金融衍生品过度泛滥。“一旦系统性风险出现的时候，危机就来得很快。”
第三，从上个世纪九十年代开始，美国信用体系越来越“廉价”，不仅透支了未来，也埋下了一颗“定时炸弹”。这从申办信用卡可见一斑。九十年代初期，中国留学生到美国，大概半年后才能拿到第一张信用卡。但到九十年代末期，一个刚到美国的中国留学生一周之内就会收到几张信用卡，甚至在机场飞机刚落地就有信用卡公司主动给他办理。上个世纪九十年代以来，美国人透支未来的消费习惯愈演愈盛，而透支的利息高达17%左右，信用卡公司为了追逐这个高额利润，就疯狂地到处寻找下一个客户，甚至主动给毫无信用记录的人邮寄信用卡。同时，17%的利润，也使得信用卡公司能够承担较大比例的坏帐，所以大量信用卡公司也疏于控制信用卡使用环节中的各种风险，出现了问题就轻松地将其作为坏帐撇掉。但如果某一天这17%的高利润不能延续，风险就来了。
很大程度上，次贷的发生就和“廉价”的信用相关。格林斯潘时期，美联储不断降低利息，大量资金涌入房地产市场，推高房价。房地产市场的持续火爆，使得美国众多银行对于房地产市场的预期过于乐观，贷款条件不断放松，以至于没有任何信用记录或信用记录很差的居民也可以申请贷款。这些低质量的贷款随后通过美国发达的金融衍生品市场不断包装被销往全球，然而，复杂的金融衍生工具和漫长的销售链条，导致投资者看不到贷款质量的高低，与此同时，风险可以得到分散但却不可能消除，等到美国进入加息周期，房地产市场泡沫破裂，这些风险就会像埋藏的定时炸弹被引爆。
深刻反思华尔街危机的教训
“此次危机不会是华尔街最后一次金融危机。华尔街不断地发生这种危机，历史上已发生过很多次，这次只是又发生了一次而已。”祁斌认为，华尔街的发展历史中，大大小小的危机出现过上百次。从某种意义上来说，金融市场的发展历史就是一部不断发生危机、不断进行修正的过程，只是这次危机是最新的一次，并且在很多人看来，其涉及面之广和影响之大，是史无前例的。
首先，是要对美国投资银行运作模式的缺陷深入分析。近年来，投资银行纷纷开始由传统上以服务为主、靠赚取佣金的业务模式转向以资金交易为主的经营模式，大量涉足衍生品交易、对冲基金这些风险较高的领域，变相成为对冲基金，而在这一过程中风险控制又没有及时跟上，导致其纷纷陷入困境。
华尔街金融机构过度强调短期回报的激励机制也是危机产生的诱因之一，金融机构高管的薪酬和激励机制没有与机构的风险管理、长期业绩相挂钩，形成了较高的“道德风险”，促成管理层短期行为倾向较重，为迎合追求利润的需要，投资银行不断设计复杂的产品以至于其自身都难以对这些产品的风险加以判断，也就难以进行风险控制了。
此外，此次危机暴露出投资银行资本金不足的问题和运营模式的缺陷。未来，全能银行是否会成为投行业务的唯一“宿主”？独立的投行还会不会有存在的空间？如果有，如何修正现有的投行的经营模式，是否需要对投资银行的资本金设定更加严格的要求？是否应该考虑将高风险的投资业务剥离成为独立子公司？“高盛和大摩申请成为银行金融控股公司，并不意味着投资银行业务的结束，可能更多的是投行业务管理模式的转型，以及对过去一段时期激进风格的修正。商业银行和投资银行可以互相借鉴对方的管理模式”。但与此同时，并入或转为商业银行的投资银行如何切实做到有效监控风险？与商业银行的文化冲突如何协调？这些问题仍然需要我们深入研究。国金融市场曾出现过数次较大的危机，美联储多次采取注资、降息等方式，这在当时可能是不得已的选择，但是这也许是对未来的一种过度透支，暂时把问题掩盖下去，最后问题暴露的时候，变得不可收拾。当然，众所周知，这其中的平衡是很难把握的。
第三，如何对金融创新实施有效监管值得我们反思。此次危机表明，在证券化产品风险充分暴露前就进行大规模推广存在一定问题，也不符合审慎监管的原则。全球化和金融混业也加大了监管的难度。如何强化监管部门对创新产品的主观判断和裁量的权利，同时又能保证这种裁量的科学性及防范可能的道德风险？如何建立一个适应不断发展变化的金融市场的有效金融监管体系？这些都需要我们进一步思考。
第四，国际金融市场联系日趋紧密，如何防范或有效阻断金融风险的传递需要深入研究。此次危机表明，在国际金融市场日趋一体化的情况下，金融风险在各个不同的子市场及全球市场的传播更为迅速、更为广泛，如何对大规模的系统性金融风险有较为有效的预警措施？如何有效阻断金融风险的传递？如何建立起不同国家监管机构之间的协调机制？这些都值得我们进一步研究。
辩证看待华尔街危机
华尔街发生的危机，在我国也激起了广泛的讨论，这对于我们更加科学地推动资本市场的发展将起到非常积极的作用。但发达市场发生的风暴也给我们带来了很多疑惑，虚拟经济的利与弊、金融创新的风险与回报、资本市场发展模式的选择等，都成为讨论的焦点。
要进一步探讨美国次贷危机可以给我们提供什么经验和教训，还要求我们深刻认识华尔街和中国资本市场的不同———发展阶段的不同和发展模式的不同。祁斌表示，这场危机给我们提供了一次观察和反思金融市场发展模式和方向的机会。他认为，“需要仔细比较中美两国金融市场的异同点，才能准确解读次贷危机。不认真研究和汲取华尔街危机的教训是不负责任的，误读华尔街的危机也是十分危险的。”
在发展阶段上，美国市场经过了两百多年的发展，在一些领域中，如一些传统的投行业务，已经达到一定的饱和期，发展速度也明显放慢了。同时，我们还应该看到，尽管此次危机对其金融体系有很大的打击，但美国市场仍然是一个相对发达的市场。美国市场的金融产品高度复杂，甚至近年来高度泛滥。而我国的资本市场仍处于新兴加转轨的初级阶段，国民经济对于资本市场提供的服务还有巨大的需求，同时，我国经济的转型和自主创新经济体系的构建也需要资本市场提供有效的支持。从金融产品的角度来看，我们也处在发展的早期。两者的情况有很大的不同。因此，我们不能因为美国金融市场的危机而停止我们发展的步伐。我们应该在认真研究和汲取美国市场的教训的同时，坚定不移地推动资本市场的改革和发展，走稳健发展和可持续发展之路。不能因为美国市场犯了错误，我们也停下来，那将使我们错失良机。世界金融市场的竞争是非常激烈和残酷的，对此，我们一定要有非常清醒的认识。
从发展模式来看，美国金融市场的发展模式基本上是一个自下而上、自我演进的模式。其间有过一次重大调整是在1929年前后。两百多年前美国资本市场萌芽时，完全是放任自流的状态，政府不介入，在前100年里甚至对上市公司没有信息披露的法律要求，134年里都没有证券监管机构。到1929年股市崩溃，政府不介入不行了，才进行修正，成立了监管机构，制定了证券交易和监管的法律法规，试图寻找到政府与市场的平衡点。随后，这个过程也一直在不断地反复和摇摆中。近年的一个例子是，1998年，美国的长期资本公司造成美国市场崩溃后，很多人士都呼吁对对冲基金（hedge fund）实施监管，但是到现在美国监管机构还没有这样做。总体来说，美国反对政府干预的力量非常强。相信这次危机以后，要求加强对hedge fund监管的声音又会高起来。而我们则是自上而下的发展模式，从市场发展早期开始，一直是政府和市场力量来共同推动市场的发展。应该说，没有绝对的自由也没有绝对的管制，金融市场的健康发展需要寻找两者的平衡点。
此次危机爆发以后，美国将不可避免地从过度的自由化向中间点回归。而我国资本市场的发展，在相当长一段时间内，简化行政审批，加强监管，推动市场化改革一直是大方向和主旋律。过去三十年，中国经济社会发生了巨大的变革，按照西方经济学家的评论，“在人类历史上，还从未有过如此多的人，在如此短暂的时间里，生活水平获得了如此巨大的提高”，正是由于经济领域的市场化改革才使得中国经济成为了全世界最为亮丽的一道风景线。资本市场的发展规律也是如此，但是这一市场化改革的过程也必须是一个渐进的过程，需要我们把握节奏，不断找寻政府与市场力量的合理的平衡点，以更加有效地推动我国资本市场的发展。此次美国的危机提供了一个过犹不及、自由化泛滥、整个社会也为此支付了高昂成本的经典案例，对我们很有警示和帮助作用。
同时，此次危机也再次证明，虚拟经济的发展如果脱离了实体经济发展的实际需要就会产生灾难性的结果。资产证券化等金融创新的出现本意，是将这些贷款在证券化市场上进行分拆、打包、定价和交易，为广大投资者所持有，进而起到分散风险的作用，但是由于金融衍生工具过于复杂，销售链条过长，同时出于对高额利润的盲目追求和竞争的压力，所有参与这些过程的金融机构都忽视了必要的风险控制。加之越来越多的金融机构纯粹为了追求高利润而参加到复杂金融衍生品的创设、交易和投机中，使这些业务变成了纯粹的金钱游戏，使得很多复杂产品尤其是金融衍生品的市场交易与其分散金融市场风险的初衷差之千里，远远脱离了实体经济发展的需求，金融危机的最终降临成为必然。
但是，尽管虚拟经济的发展过程中不断有“剑走偏锋”的情况出现，我们不能由此否定虚拟经济对实体经济发展的重要推动作用。历史反复证明，资本市场在推动各国经济发展过程中起到举足轻重的作用，依然还是当今全球竞争的战略制高点。
“真正的华尔街是什么？华尔街实际上不光是指它‘物理’上的含义和它作为一个金融市场的代表，它其实还是指美国金融服务业的一批专业人才，这批人大概有30万，如果说每天傍晚，所有的这些人群都退去的时候，华尔街只是一座空城。”他表示，由于华尔街发生大规模的动荡，大量训练有素的金融专业人才失去工作，一部分华尔街的金融人才特别是我国留学生可能为我国金融机构所用，使我国资本市场在金融人才的国际竞争中获得有利地位。
在全球化时代的今天，国际竞争日趋白热化，我国资本市场要屹立于世界之林，最根本的还是要不断提升自身竞争力。为此，我们要继续强化基础性制度建设，加快我国资本市场改革和发展的步伐，推动资本市场的健康和可持续发展。
一家接一家大型金融机构轰然倒下，美国政府史无前例地动用万亿美元生死大救赎，各国央行空前一致出手救市，投资者的心随着股指剧烈波动而上下起伏。
美国投资银行经营模式的激进转变、美国金融市场过度自由的监管和发展模式以及过于“廉价”的信用，是导致华尔街金融危机的三座“冰山”。他认为，我们应该认真研讨华尔街危机给我们带来的启示，借鉴其教训，但也要充分考虑我国国情，要看到我国资本市场的发展模式和发展阶段与华尔街的不同。我国资本市场发展应该审慎推进金融创新，强化风险控制机制，走可持续发展的道路。
“海面下的三座冰山”
美国次贷危机的爆发只是“海面上的浮冰”，是华尔街金融危机的直接诱因。华尔街金融危机的根源，源自隐藏于水底的三座“冰山”，其最早的形成，在某种意义上可以追溯到上个世纪的九十年代。
第一，美国投资银行的经营模式在过去十年间发生了巨大变化，过度投机和过高的杠杆率使得投行走上了一条不归之路。传统上以赚取佣金收入为主、对资本金要求很低的投资银行，在高利润的诱惑和激烈竞争的压力下，大量从事次贷市场和复杂产品的投资，投行悄然变成了追逐高风险的对冲基金。例如，高盛公司在近年内，直接股权投资和其他投资所获占到其总收入的80％左右。出于竞争压力，其他投资银行也在做类似的转型。在对大量金融衍生品的交易中，投行赚取了大量利润，例如高盛和摩根斯坦利两家投行在过去十几年中每年的平均净资产回报率高达20％左右，远远高出商业银行12％－13％的回报率。但同时，这些投行也拆借了大量资金，“钱不够就借”，杠杆比率一再提高，从而积累了巨大的风险。雷曼兄弟宣布进入破产保护时，其负债高达6130亿美元，负债权益比是6130∶260，美林被收购前负债权益比率也超过20倍。
过高的杠杆比率，使得投行的经营风险不断上升，而投资银行在激进参与的同时，却没有对风险进行足够的控制。一方面，由于杠杆率较高，一旦投资出现问题会使其亏损程度远远超出资本金；另一方面，高杠杆使得这些投资银行对流动性要求较高，在市场较为宽松时，尚可通过货币市场融资来填补交易的资金缺口，而一旦自身财务状况恶化，评级公司降低其评级使融资成本上升，便可能造成投资银行无法通过融资维持流动性，贝尔斯登便是因此遭挤兑而倒下。同样，评级公司降低雷曼兄弟的评级，也是其彻底崩盘的重要因素。
1998年，长期资本管理公司（LTCM）一家对冲基金倒下，就掀起了金融市场的轩然大波，而现在这么多投资银行实际上在变相从事对冲基金的业务却缺乏相应的风险控制措施，潜在的风险可想而知。
第二，美国金融市场过度自由化的发展模式走到了极端，衍生品过度泛滥，监管长期缺位，直至出现系统性的崩溃。摩根斯坦利亚洲区前主席曾表示，在全球所有金融市场中，东京和纽约的金融市场可能是两个极端。东京市场是全世界最没有创新的证券市场，而纽约市场是全世界最有活力的市场。他说，两个市场迥然不同的原因可能非常小，那就是，在两个市场上对证券的定义有所不同。在东京市场，证券被定义成为“Stock or Bond”——也就是，股票或债券。如果一个金融产品不是股票或者债券，上市之前政府的审批可能长达两年。而纽约是另外一个极端，那就是“Anything Under the Sun”——太阳底下的任何东西，只要你能想到，“上午一包装，下午就能卖出去”。所以各种金融衍生品和证券化产品在美国非常多，金融机构不停地创造出各种各样眼花缭乱的复杂产品，通过柜台交易（OTC），不需要论证，也没有监管，只要有对手方买，能够成交就行，当然这些对手方大都也是金融机构。这种模式使得金融产品极大地丰富，但有时候容易走过头了，使得资产证券化产品等金融衍生品过度泛滥。“一旦系统性风险出现的时候，危机就来得很快。”
第三，从上个世纪九十年代开始，美国信用体系越来越“廉价”，不仅透支了未来，也埋下了一颗“定时炸弹”。这从申办信用卡可见一斑。九十年代初期，中国留学生到美国，大概半年后才能拿到第一张信用卡。但到九十年代末期，一个刚到美国的中国留学生一周之内就会收到几张信用卡，甚至在机场飞机刚落地就有信用卡公司主动给他办理。上个世纪九十年代以来，美国人透支未来的消费习惯愈演愈盛，而透支的利息高达17%左右，信用卡公司为了追逐这个高额利润，就疯狂地到处寻找下一个客户，甚至主动给毫无信用记录的人邮寄信用卡。同时，17%的利润，也使得信用卡公司能够承担较大比例的坏帐，所以大量信用卡公司也疏于控制信用卡使用环节中的各种风险，出现了问题就轻松地将其作为坏帐撇掉。但如果某一天这17%的高利润不能延续，风险就来了。
很大程度上，次贷的发生就和“廉价”的信用相关。格林斯潘时期，美联储不断降低利息，大量资金涌入房地产市场，推高房价。房地产市场的持续火爆，使得美国众多银行对于房地产市场的预期过于乐观，贷款条件不断放松，以至于没有任何信用记录或信用记录很差的居民也可以申请贷款。这些低质量的贷款随后通过美国发达的金融衍生品市场不断包装被销往全球，然而，复杂的金融衍生工具和漫长的销售链条，导致投资者看不到贷款质量的高低，与此同时，风险可以得到分散但却不可能消除，等到美国进入加息周期，房地产市场泡沫破裂，这些风险就会像埋藏的定时炸弹被引爆。
深刻反思华尔街危机的教训
“此次危机不会是华尔街最后一次金融危机。华尔街不断地发生这种危机，历史上已发生过很多次，这次只是又发生了一次而已。”祁斌认为，华尔街的发展历史中，大大小小的危机出现过上百次。从某种意义上来说，金融市场的发展历史就是一部不断发生危机、不断进行修正的过程，只是这次危机是最新的一次，并且在很多人看来，其涉及面之广和影响之大，是史无前例的。
首先，是要对美国投资银行运作模式的缺陷深入分析。近年来，投资银行纷纷开始由传统上以服务为主、靠赚取佣金的业务模式转向以资金交易为主的经营模式，大量涉足衍生品交易、对冲基金这些风险较高的领域，变相成为对冲基金，而在这一过程中风险控制又没有及时跟上，导致其纷纷陷入困境。
华尔街金融机构过度强调短期回报的激励机制也是危机产生的诱因之一，金融机构高管的薪酬和激励机制没有与机构的风险管理、长期业绩相挂钩，形成了较高的“道德风险”，促成管理层短期行为倾向较重，为迎合追求利润的需要，投资银行不断设计复杂的产品以至于其自身都难以对这些产品的风险加以判断，也就难以进行风险控制了。
此外，此次危机暴露出投资银行资本金不足的问题和运营模式的缺陷。未来，全能银行是否会成为投行业务的唯一“宿主”？独立的投行还会不会有存在的空间？如果有，如何修正现有的投行的经营模式，是否需要对投资银行的资本金设定更加严格的要求？是否应该考虑将高风险的投资业务剥离成为独立子公司？“高盛和大摩申请成为银行金融控股公司，并不意味着投资银行业务的结束，可能更多的是投行业务管理模式的转型，以及对过去一段时期激进风格的修正。商业银行和投资银行可以互相借鉴对方的管理模式”。但与此同时，并入或转为商业银行的投资银行如何切实做到有效监控风险？与商业银行的文化冲突如何协调？这些问题仍然需要我们深入研究。国金融市场曾出现过数次较大的危机，美联储多次采取注资、降息等方式，这在当时可能是不得已的选择，但是这也许是对未来的一种过度透支，暂时把问题掩盖下去，最后问题暴露的时候，变得不可收拾。当然，众所周知，这其中的平衡是很难把握的。
第三，如何对金融创新实施有效监管值得我们反思。此次危机表明，在证券化产品风险充分暴露前就进行大规模推广存在一定问题，也不符合审慎监管的原则。全球化和金融混业也加大了监管的难度。如何强化监管部门对创新产品的主观判断和裁量的权利，同时又能保证这种裁量的科学性及防范可能的道德风险？如何建立一个适应不断发展变化的金融市场的有效金融监管体系？这些都需要我们进一步思考。
第四，国际金融市场联系日趋紧密，如何防范或有效阻断金融风险的传递需要深入研究。此次危机表明，在国际金融市场日趋一体化的情况下，金融风险在各个不同的子市场及全球市场的传播更为迅速、更为广泛，如何对大规模的系统性金融风险有较为有效的预警措施？如何有效阻断金融风险的传递？如何建立起不同国家监管机构之间的协调机制？这些都值得我们进一步研究。
辩证看待华尔街危机
华尔街发生的危机，在我国也激起了广泛的讨论，这对于我们更加科学地推动资本市场的发展将起到非常积极的作用。但发达市场发生的风暴也给我们带来了很多疑惑，虚拟经济的利与弊、金融创新的风险与回报、资本市场发展模式的选择等，都成为讨论的焦点。
要进一步探讨美国次贷危机可以给我们提供什么经验和教训，还要求我们深刻认识华尔街和中国资本市场的不同———发展阶段的不同和发展模式的不同。祁斌表示，这场危机给我们提供了一次观察和反思金融市场发展模式和方向的机会。他认为，“需要仔细比较中美两国金融市场的异同点，才能准确解读次贷危机。不认真研究和汲取华尔街危机的教训是不负责任的，误读华尔街的危机也是十分危险的。”
在发展阶段上，美国市场经过了两百多年的发展，在一些领域中，如一些传统的投行业务，已经达到一定的饱和期，发展速度也明显放慢了。同时，我们还应该看到，尽管此次危机对其金融体系有很大的打击，但美国市场仍然是一个相对发达的市场。美国市场的金融产品高度复杂，甚至近年来高度泛滥。而我国的资本市场仍处于新兴加转轨的初级阶段，国民经济对于资本市场提供的服务还有巨大的需求，同时，我国经济的转型和自主创新经济体系的构建也需要资本市场提供有效的支持。从金融产品的角度来看，我们也处在发展的早期。两者的情况有很大的不同。因此，我们不能因为美国金融市场的危机而停止我们发展的步伐。我们应该在认真研究和汲取美国市场的教训的同时，坚定不移地推动资本市场的改革和发展，走稳健发展和可持续发展之路。不能因为美国市场犯了错误，我们也停下来，那将使我们错失良机。世界金融市场的竞争是非常激烈和残酷的，对此，我们一定要有非常清醒的认识。
从发展模式来看，美国金融市场的发展模式基本上是一个自下而上、自我演进的模式。其间有过一次重大调整是在1929年前后。两百多年前美国资本市场萌芽时，完全是放任自流的状态，政府不介入，在前100年里甚至对上市公司没有信息披露的法律要求，134年里都没有证券监管机构。到1929年股市崩溃，政府不介入不行了，才进行修正，成立了监管机构，制定了证券交易和监管的法律法规，试图寻找到政府与市场的平衡点。随后，这个过程也一直在不断地反复和摇摆中。近年的一个例子是，1998年，美国的长期资本公司造成美国市场崩溃后，很多人士都呼吁对对冲基金（hedge fund）实施监管，但是到现在美国监管机构还没有这样做。总体来说，美国反对政府干预的力量非常强。相信这次危机以后，要求加强对hedge fund监管的声音又会高起来。而我们则是自上而下的发展模式，从市场发展早期开始，一直是政府和市场力量来共同推动市场的发展。应该说，没有绝对的自由也没有绝对的管制，金融市场的健康发展需要寻找两者的平衡点。
此次危机爆发以后，美国将不可避免地从过度的自由化向中间点回归。而我国资本市场的发展，在相当长一段时间内，简化行政审批，加强监管，推动市场化改革一直是大方向和主旋律。过去三十年，中国经济社会发生了巨大的变革，按照西方经济学家的评论，“在人类历史上，还从未有过如此多的人，在如此短暂的时间里，生活水平获得了如此巨大的提高”，正是由于经济领域的市场化改革才使得中国经济成为了全世界最为亮丽的一道风景线。资本市场的发展规律也是如此，但是这一市场化改革的过程也必须是一个渐进的过程，需要我们把握节奏，不断找寻政府与市场力量的合理的平衡点，以更加有效地推动我国资本市场的发展。此次美国的危机提供了一个过犹不及、自由化泛滥、整个社会也为此支付了高昂成本的经典案例，对我们很有警示和帮助作用。
同时，此次危机也再次证明，虚拟经济的发展如果脱离了实体经济发展的实际需要就会产生灾难性的结果。资产证券化等金融创新的出现本意，是将这些贷款在证券化市场上进行分拆、打包、定价和交易，为广大投资者所持有，进而起到分散风险的作用，但是由于金融衍生工具过于复杂，销售链条过长，同时出于对高额利润的盲目追求和竞争的压力，所有参与这些过程的金融机构都忽视了必要的风险控制。加之越来越多的金融机构纯粹为了追求高利润而参加到复杂金融衍生品的创设、交易和投机中，使这些业务变成了纯粹的金钱游戏，使得很多复杂产品尤其是金融衍生品的市场交易与其分散金融市场风险的初衷差之千里，远远脱离了实体经济发展的需求，金融危机的最终降临成为必然。
但是，尽管虚拟经济的发展过程中不断有“剑走偏锋”的情况出现，我们不能由此否定虚拟经济对实体经济发展的重要推动作用。历史反复证明，资本市场在推动各国经济发展过程中起到举足轻重的作用，依然还是当今全球竞争的战略制高点。
“真正的华尔街是什么？华尔街实际上不光是指它‘物理’上的含义和它作为一个金融市场的代表，它其实还是指美国金融服务业的一批专业人才，这批人大概有30万，如果说每天傍晚，所有的这些人群都退去的时候，华尔街只是一座空城。”他表示，由于华尔街发生大规模的动荡，大量训练有素的金融专业人才失去工作，一部分华尔街的金融人才特别是我国留学生可能为我国金融机构所用，使我国资本市场在金融人才的国际竞争中获得有利地位。
在全球化时代的今天，国际竞争日趋白热化，我国资本市场要屹立于世界之林，最根本的还是要不断提升自身竞争力。为此，我们要继续强化基础性制度建设，加快我国资本市场改革和发展的步伐，推动资本市场的健康和可持续发展。
Kenneth L Fisher
Profile
Ken Fisher is the younger of Philip Fisher's two sons. After graduating from college in 1972, he worked for his father's investment firm for a year. He continued to accompany him on research visits until 1982, learning at first hand the art of interviewing management and employees.
But meanwhile, he set up and ran his own firm, based on a value investing philosophy very different to his father's. Fisher Jr preference was for "a stock that was dirt cheap because it was better than its bad image". Thus he has always bought in a similar contrarian spirit to that of his father. But he tends to sell once the reputation and the share price of his purchases have returned to normal levels.
He has also gained from his father a knowledge and understanding of the American technology sector, where he has scored many of his greatest successes. But he has been equally happy to own US and European stocks in traditional businesses like tobacco. He has set up an office in London to facilitate further investment in Europe.
Ken Fisher pioneered the Price to Sales Ratio, as documented in his 1984 book 'Super Stocks', and the small cap value category equity management and is a top-ranked market forecaster according to CXO Advisory Group.He has been published or written about in most US, British, and German financial newspapers and magazines, and his academic research has been showcased in many financial journals, including The Financial Analysts Journal and The Journal of Portfolio Management.
Long-term returns
Not known.
Biggest success
In early 1981, Ken Fisher bought around 1.5% of the shares of Verbatim Corporation, a producer of computer diskettes. The company had suffered widely-publicised problems with its products. The view on Wall Street was that it was poorly managed and financed, and likely to lose out to its rivals. But within 2 years, its shares had recovered from $3.50 to over $55 - a rise of 1,500% - at which point Fisher sold.
As chronicled in his monthly Forbes column, Fisher called the top of the tech bubble on March 6, 2000, and predicted the last 3 bear markets (’87, ’90, ‘01/’02).
Method and guidelines
First draw up a shortlist of Super Companies:
"A Super Company is a business which distinguishes itself because it can generate internally funded growth at well above average rates."
The main distinguishing features of a Super Company are:
Growth orientation - a management obsession with growth, which is also communicated to and shared with staff.
Marketing excellence - an ability to identify and satisfy customer needs.
An unfair advantage - such as being the lowest-cost producer in a sector
Creative personnel relations - especially listening to the ideas of staff
The best in financial controls - with leading-edge processes and systems.
Source: Super Stocks, K Fisher, 1984
Most companies go through product cycles, as sales of Product A start to sag before those from newly-introduced Product B have had time to grow. This often causes a 'glitch', i.e. sales fall, profits turn to losses and the share price plummets. This is the time to start considering buying the shares.
A product cycle
Lossmaking companies are hard to value. Solve this problem by using Price:Sales Ratios (PSRs):
PSR =Market capitalization ÷ Total sales
(e.g. £100m cap ÷ £200m sales = 0.5)
If you can identify a Super Company
going through a glitch
with a low PSR
with new products on the way, and hence a pickup in sales
- you may be looking at a Super Stock, and an opportunity to make 3-10 times your money in 3-5 years.
Follow these rules for buying and selling:
Rule 1: Try to avoid stocks with PSRs greater than 1.5. Don't consider buying any stock with a PSR greater than 3
Rule 2: Maybe look to seek Super Companies with PSRs of 0.75 or less
Rule 3: Consider selling stock in any Super Company when the PSR rises to between 3.0 and 6.0
Also sell when a company ceases to have the characteristics of a Super Company.
An additional check on Super Stocks is their Price:Research Ratio (PRR):
PRR = Market capitalization ÷ Research and development expenditure
(e.g. £100m cap ÷ £20m R&D = 5)
R&D is not necessarily a highly sophisticated activity. It can be quite basic product development work. The idea is to buy research that is likely to produce good profits in future while it is still cheap. To do this:
Rule 1: Don't ever buy a Super Company selling at a PRR greater than 15.
Rule 2: Find Super Companies with a PRR of 5 to 10.
Research suggests
Low PSRs work best with smaller companies. Very large companies naturally tend to have PSRs of 1.0 or less.
PSRs also work well with Super Companies in businesses unrelated to high technology.
Key sayings
"It is the glitch that makes Super Stocks out of Super Companies. If you learn how to price these correctly, you can reap the profits of a Super Stock - and get rich with the glitch."
"'Fortunes from failures' is a recurrent theme in financial history."
"The largest profits regularly result from buying stocks at low PSRs."
"As a company increases in size, it can look forward to the eventuality of its PSR being no higher than the highest PSRs for other companies of its future size."
Further information
Fisher Jr's first and most important book is Super Stocks, which describes his successes with bombed-out tech stocks in the early Eighties. His other books are Wall Street Waltz, 100 Minds That Made the Market and the NY Times Bestseller 'The Only Three Questions that Count'. You can keep up with his current thinking by reading his excellent column in Forbes magazine (he is the 4th longest running columnist in Forbes' 90-year history), or visit Fisher Investments website www.fi.com.
Fisher Investments have entered a partnership with publisher John Wiley & Sons to do the first ever publishing imprint by a money manager - Fisher Investments Press. The first title is due out late 2008, 'Ten Roads to Riches', by Ken Fisher.
Ken Fisher is the younger of Philip Fisher's two sons. After graduating from college in 1972, he worked for his father's investment firm for a year. He continued to accompany him on research visits until 1982, learning at first hand the art of interviewing management and employees.
But meanwhile, he set up and ran his own firm, based on a value investing philosophy very different to his father's. Fisher Jr preference was for "a stock that was dirt cheap because it was better than its bad image". Thus he has always bought in a similar contrarian spirit to that of his father. But he tends to sell once the reputation and the share price of his purchases have returned to normal levels.
He has also gained from his father a knowledge and understanding of the American technology sector, where he has scored many of his greatest successes. But he has been equally happy to own US and European stocks in traditional businesses like tobacco. He has set up an office in London to facilitate further investment in Europe.
Ken Fisher pioneered the Price to Sales Ratio, as documented in his 1984 book 'Super Stocks', and the small cap value category equity management and is a top-ranked market forecaster according to CXO Advisory Group.He has been published or written about in most US, British, and German financial newspapers and magazines, and his academic research has been showcased in many financial journals, including The Financial Analysts Journal and The Journal of Portfolio Management.
Long-term returns
Not known.
Biggest success
In early 1981, Ken Fisher bought around 1.5% of the shares of Verbatim Corporation, a producer of computer diskettes. The company had suffered widely-publicised problems with its products. The view on Wall Street was that it was poorly managed and financed, and likely to lose out to its rivals. But within 2 years, its shares had recovered from $3.50 to over $55 - a rise of 1,500% - at which point Fisher sold.
As chronicled in his monthly Forbes column, Fisher called the top of the tech bubble on March 6, 2000, and predicted the last 3 bear markets (’87, ’90, ‘01/’02).
Method and guidelines
First draw up a shortlist of Super Companies:
"A Super Company is a business which distinguishes itself because it can generate internally funded growth at well above average rates."
The main distinguishing features of a Super Company are:
Growth orientation - a management obsession with growth, which is also communicated to and shared with staff.
Marketing excellence - an ability to identify and satisfy customer needs.
An unfair advantage - such as being the lowest-cost producer in a sector
Creative personnel relations - especially listening to the ideas of staff
The best in financial controls - with leading-edge processes and systems.
Source: Super Stocks, K Fisher, 1984
Most companies go through product cycles, as sales of Product A start to sag before those from newly-introduced Product B have had time to grow. This often causes a 'glitch', i.e. sales fall, profits turn to losses and the share price plummets. This is the time to start considering buying the shares.
A product cycle
Lossmaking companies are hard to value. Solve this problem by using Price:Sales Ratios (PSRs):
PSR =Market capitalization ÷ Total sales
(e.g. £100m cap ÷ £200m sales = 0.5)
If you can identify a Super Company
going through a glitch
with a low PSR
with new products on the way, and hence a pickup in sales
- you may be looking at a Super Stock, and an opportunity to make 3-10 times your money in 3-5 years.
Follow these rules for buying and selling:
Rule 1: Try to avoid stocks with PSRs greater than 1.5. Don't consider buying any stock with a PSR greater than 3
Rule 2: Maybe look to seek Super Companies with PSRs of 0.75 or less
Rule 3: Consider selling stock in any Super Company when the PSR rises to between 3.0 and 6.0
Also sell when a company ceases to have the characteristics of a Super Company.
An additional check on Super Stocks is their Price:Research Ratio (PRR):
PRR = Market capitalization ÷ Research and development expenditure
(e.g. £100m cap ÷ £20m R&D = 5)
R&D is not necessarily a highly sophisticated activity. It can be quite basic product development work. The idea is to buy research that is likely to produce good profits in future while it is still cheap. To do this:
Rule 1: Don't ever buy a Super Company selling at a PRR greater than 15.
Rule 2: Find Super Companies with a PRR of 5 to 10.
Research suggests
Low PSRs work best with smaller companies. Very large companies naturally tend to have PSRs of 1.0 or less.
PSRs also work well with Super Companies in businesses unrelated to high technology.
Key sayings
"It is the glitch that makes Super Stocks out of Super Companies. If you learn how to price these correctly, you can reap the profits of a Super Stock - and get rich with the glitch."
"'Fortunes from failures' is a recurrent theme in financial history."
"The largest profits regularly result from buying stocks at low PSRs."
"As a company increases in size, it can look forward to the eventuality of its PSR being no higher than the highest PSRs for other companies of its future size."
Further information
Fisher Jr's first and most important book is Super Stocks, which describes his successes with bombed-out tech stocks in the early Eighties. His other books are Wall Street Waltz, 100 Minds That Made the Market and the NY Times Bestseller 'The Only Three Questions that Count'. You can keep up with his current thinking by reading his excellent column in Forbes magazine (he is the 4th longest running columnist in Forbes' 90-year history), or visit Fisher Investments website www.fi.com.
Fisher Investments have entered a partnership with publisher John Wiley & Sons to do the first ever publishing imprint by a money manager - Fisher Investments Press. The first title is due out late 2008, 'Ten Roads to Riches', by Ken Fisher.
巴菲特方程式
我们都懂逆向操作的道理，但没人说得比巴菲特更传神，他说：我喜欢在悲观的股市环境中操作，原因不在我喜欢那种情绪，而是我喜欢那种情绪所产生的价格！
永远只在市场价格远低於企业价值时进场！
华伦·巴菲特是30年来最出色的股市投资人之一，他採取的价值型投资策略，是根据企业的根本价值来选择投资标的，不受股价波动、整体经济气氛或者其他任何外部因素影响。他使用的投资方法，主要遵循下列四项原则：
一、绝不追赶股市每天的波动
市场存在的理由，只是为了方便买卖，不是为了订定价值。在市场上只要留意有没有人愿意以绝不容错过的价格出售股票。
二、不必尝试分析或烦恼整体的经济状况
如果你没办法预测股市每天的动向，怎样才能十拿九稳地预测经济的前景？
三、买企业，不是买公司的股票
买进股票的时候，要想成是买整家企业，必须遵守下列的原则：
' 企业原则
1.你以投资人的角度来看，这家企业是不是很简单、容易理解？
2. 这家企业过去的营运状况是不是始终如一？
3. 这家企业的长期展望是不是良好？
' 管理原则
1. 管理阶层的行事作为是否合乎理性？
2. 管理阶层对待股东是否诚信？
3. 管理团队能否力抗随波逐流？
' 财务原则
1. 重点是股东权益报酬率，不是每股盈餘。
2. 计算「业主盈余」。
3. 寻找获利率高的公司。
4. 公司每保留一块钱的盈餘，是不是能够至少多创造一块钱的市场价值？
' 市场原则
1. 这家企业的价值是多少？
2. 目前能不能以远低于企业价值的折价买进这家企业？
四、管理一套企业投资组合
买一家公司的股票时，必须了解公司的营运基本面而不只是拥有一张纸。
循巴菲特足迹，找创投业新高峰
对于投资标的，创投同业可能认为现在景气不佳，不应该只是投入资金，还要亲自介入企业管理团队。我的作法，偏向巴菲特的作法，不介入投资标的的管理问题，也无意改变原先的领导团队。其次，我也向我们产业分析师教育，要从看懂财务报表开始，接着一定要亲自拜访企业，唯有亲眼所见、亲耳所闻，才有机会找出真正优秀的标的。实践的方法上，以下进一步详述：
1. 看出财务报表的病灶：通常股权集中的公司，投资风险比较低，代理成本也低，但也有大股东独断的弊病；股权分散的公司，我会特别注意中型持股者彼此的关係。总之，我是抱持「买企业」、不是「买股票」的心态，最后的赢家必定会浮现的。巴菲特的4大原则：企业原则、管理原则、财务原则、市场原则，可以在这方面得到实证。
2. 多次亲自拜访企业：一般非科技类的企业，多数隐藏在世界各地的某个角落，已经掌握产业未来趋势的产业分析师，必须前进各地，挖掘潜在的标的企业，其中又以传统产业为最。举例来说，目前股价耀眼的帝宝在我第一次到鹿港和美拜访工厂时，今天的许董事长就住在工厂上面的阁楼，每天与生产线为伍，对车灯的模组了如指掌。有趣的是，虽然该公司在当时资金窘困，这位第一代创业家不肯轻易让外界资金注入。我们团队必须一而再、再而三地前往拜访，同时也观察该公司的核心优势，双方经过一段时间的磨合之后，才正式採取投资的行动。
「对我来说，股市根本不存在。股市存在的目的只是供我们参考，看看是不是有人愿意做出傻事。」——华伦·巴菲特
股票市场存在的目的，基本上只是为了便利股票的买卖。投资人如果想藉市场去预测未来的价格，一定会惹祸上身。一定要问这个问题：你有没有做好功课？如果你对一家公司的了解多于市场，那么何必在意市场说了些什么？其次，如果你相信一家公司的财务前景美好而买进该公司的股票，并且打算抱牢许多年，那么市场上日复一日发生的事情根本无关紧要。投资人买进任何股票之后，不须靠市场来确认他们买得没错。定期观察市场的唯一目的，是检查有没有人笨到以很便宜的价格出售好公司的股票。
永远只在市场价格远低於企业价值时进场！
华伦·巴菲特是30年来最出色的股市投资人之一，他採取的价值型投资策略，是根据企业的根本价值来选择投资标的，不受股价波动、整体经济气氛或者其他任何外部因素影响。他使用的投资方法，主要遵循下列四项原则：
一、绝不追赶股市每天的波动
市场存在的理由，只是为了方便买卖，不是为了订定价值。在市场上只要留意有没有人愿意以绝不容错过的价格出售股票。
二、不必尝试分析或烦恼整体的经济状况
如果你没办法预测股市每天的动向，怎样才能十拿九稳地预测经济的前景？
三、买企业，不是买公司的股票
买进股票的时候，要想成是买整家企业，必须遵守下列的原则：
' 企业原则
1.你以投资人的角度来看，这家企业是不是很简单、容易理解？
2. 这家企业过去的营运状况是不是始终如一？
3. 这家企业的长期展望是不是良好？
' 管理原则
1. 管理阶层的行事作为是否合乎理性？
2. 管理阶层对待股东是否诚信？
3. 管理团队能否力抗随波逐流？
' 财务原则
1. 重点是股东权益报酬率，不是每股盈餘。
2. 计算「业主盈余」。
3. 寻找获利率高的公司。
4. 公司每保留一块钱的盈餘，是不是能够至少多创造一块钱的市场价值？
' 市场原则
1. 这家企业的价值是多少？
2. 目前能不能以远低于企业价值的折价买进这家企业？
四、管理一套企业投资组合
买一家公司的股票时，必须了解公司的营运基本面而不只是拥有一张纸。
循巴菲特足迹，找创投业新高峰
对于投资标的，创投同业可能认为现在景气不佳，不应该只是投入资金，还要亲自介入企业管理团队。我的作法，偏向巴菲特的作法，不介入投资标的的管理问题，也无意改变原先的领导团队。其次，我也向我们产业分析师教育，要从看懂财务报表开始，接着一定要亲自拜访企业，唯有亲眼所见、亲耳所闻，才有机会找出真正优秀的标的。实践的方法上，以下进一步详述：
1. 看出财务报表的病灶：通常股权集中的公司，投资风险比较低，代理成本也低，但也有大股东独断的弊病；股权分散的公司，我会特别注意中型持股者彼此的关係。总之，我是抱持「买企业」、不是「买股票」的心态，最后的赢家必定会浮现的。巴菲特的4大原则：企业原则、管理原则、财务原则、市场原则，可以在这方面得到实证。
2. 多次亲自拜访企业：一般非科技类的企业，多数隐藏在世界各地的某个角落，已经掌握产业未来趋势的产业分析师，必须前进各地，挖掘潜在的标的企业，其中又以传统产业为最。举例来说，目前股价耀眼的帝宝在我第一次到鹿港和美拜访工厂时，今天的许董事长就住在工厂上面的阁楼，每天与生产线为伍，对车灯的模组了如指掌。有趣的是，虽然该公司在当时资金窘困，这位第一代创业家不肯轻易让外界资金注入。我们团队必须一而再、再而三地前往拜访，同时也观察该公司的核心优势，双方经过一段时间的磨合之后，才正式採取投资的行动。
「对我来说，股市根本不存在。股市存在的目的只是供我们参考，看看是不是有人愿意做出傻事。」——华伦·巴菲特
股票市场存在的目的，基本上只是为了便利股票的买卖。投资人如果想藉市场去预测未来的价格，一定会惹祸上身。一定要问这个问题：你有没有做好功课？如果你对一家公司的了解多于市场，那么何必在意市场说了些什么？其次，如果你相信一家公司的财务前景美好而买进该公司的股票，并且打算抱牢许多年，那么市场上日复一日发生的事情根本无关紧要。投资人买进任何股票之后，不须靠市场来确认他们买得没错。定期观察市场的唯一目的，是检查有没有人笨到以很便宜的价格出售好公司的股票。
John Neff
Investment style
Hard-core value investment, based on buying good companies with moderate growth and high dividends while out of favour, and selling once they rise to fair value.
Profile
Neff is known as 'the professional's professional', because many fund managers entrusted their money to him in the belief that it would be in safe hands. That view was justified by his remarkably consistent performance. For more than 30 years, the Windsor Fund routinely featured in the top 5 percent of all US mutual funds.
Neff studied industrial marketing at college, but attended night classes to get a degree in banking and finance. In 1954, he became a securities analyst with the National City Bank of Cleveland. Both there and at his next firm, Wellington Management, he pursued a value style of investment modelled on the writings of Ben Graham. He went on to apply this to three equity-and-income funds - Windsor, Gemini and Qualified Dividend - with spectacular results until his retirement in 1995.
An unassuming man, who always encouraged his colleagues to collaborate in his decisions, Neff never sought to publicize himself during his career in the same way as many star fund managers. But with the recent publication of his memoirs, John Neff on Investing, he is at last achieving the wider recognition he deserves.
Long-term returns
The average annual total return from the Windsor Fund during Neff's 32-year tenure was 13.7%, against a return from the S&P500 index of 10.6%.
Biggest success
Neff invested a huge proportion of his fund in Ford in 1984, when everyone feared it might go bust and the P/E ratio had sunk to 2.5! He paid an average price of under $14. Within 3 years, the price had climbed to $50, making Windsor profits of $500m.
Method and guidelines
Neff describes himself as 'a low price-earnings investor'. He hunts for stocks that are cheaply priced in relation to the total return indicated by the sum of their earnings growth plus their dividend yield. He calls this the 'terminal relationship' or, more colloquially, 'what you pay for what you get'. You might also think of it as the GYP (Growth & Yield:P/E) ratio:
(Earnings Growth + Dividend Yield) ÷ P/E ratio
Neff recommends comparing the GYP ratio on your stocks and on your whole portfolio with that on the market.
Example
Average forecast portfolio EPS growth (%)
plus average forecast portfolio dividend yield
divided by average forecast portfolio P/E
= (7 + 5) ÷ 10
= a GYP of 1.2
Average forecast market EPS growth (%)
plus average forecast market dividend yield
divided by average forecast market P/E
= (15 + 2) ÷ 28
= a GYP of 0.6
On the above figures, your portfolio would be twice as attractive as the market. (This is only an example. The actual relationship would usually be much closer.)
Consider avoiding, putting into your portfolio stocks that significantly reduce its overall attractiveness. Instead, set a target buying price that represents the GYP you are after and wait for the price to fall to that level.
If two companies offer a prospective 14% return, but Company A's consists of 14% earnings growth and no dividend, whereas Company B's consists of 7% growth plus a 7% dividend, it is better to choose Company B, because the dividend makes the outcome more certain.
Following this principle, Neff has always stuck to a simple investment style based on the following 7 selection criteria:
Low P/E ratio.
Fundamental earnings growth above 7%.
A solid, and ideally rising, dividend.
A much-better-than-average total return in relation to the P/E ratio.
No exposure to cyclical downturns without a compensatory low P/E.
Solid companies in growing fields.
A strong fundamental case for investment.
Source: John Neff on Investing, J Neff, 1999
A good place to look for ideas is the New Lows column in the back pages of the FT. Many, if not most, of the companies mentioned are generally bad investments. But shares in surprisingly good companies sometimes slide to new lows on bad news. Test these to see if they meet the 7 selection criteria. (Neff calls this the 'Hmmmph' test: "Some names I would not have expected to see on this list elicit an audible 'Hmmmph'.")
Don't chase highly recognized growth stocks. Their P/E ratios are invariably pushed up to ridiculously expensive levels. This greatly increases the risk of a sudden collapse in the share price.
Stick to a firm selling strategy, or you risk losing your profits. There are two basic reasons to sell:
Fundamentals deteriorate
The price approaches or matches your expectations.
The main fundamentals to keep an eye on are earnings estimates and 5-year growth rates. If these start to slip, sell at once.
Pay more attention to the GYP ratio of your portfolio than to the market. But if the market becomes very expensive and it is hard to find worthwhile purchases, it is permissible to hold up to 20% of your funds in cash until new opportunities emerge.
The best profits are usually made after market panics.
Key sayings
"Absent stunning growth rates, low P/E stocks can capture the wonders of P/E expansion with less risk than skittish growth stocks."
"As a low P/E investor, you have to distinguish misunderstood and overlooked stocks selling at bargain prices from many more stocks with lacklustre prospects."
"A dividend increase is one kind of 'free plus'. A free plus is the return investors enjoy over and above initial expectations. One of Ben Franklin's wise observations offers a parallel: 'He who waits upon Fortune is never sure of a dinner.' As I see it, a superior yield at least lets you snack on hors d'oeuvres while waiting for the main meal."
"An awful lot of people keep a stock too long because it gives them warm fuzzies - particularly when a contrarian stance has been vindicated. If they sell it, they lose bragging rights."
Hard-core value investment, based on buying good companies with moderate growth and high dividends while out of favour, and selling once they rise to fair value.
Profile
Neff is known as 'the professional's professional', because many fund managers entrusted their money to him in the belief that it would be in safe hands. That view was justified by his remarkably consistent performance. For more than 30 years, the Windsor Fund routinely featured in the top 5 percent of all US mutual funds.
Neff studied industrial marketing at college, but attended night classes to get a degree in banking and finance. In 1954, he became a securities analyst with the National City Bank of Cleveland. Both there and at his next firm, Wellington Management, he pursued a value style of investment modelled on the writings of Ben Graham. He went on to apply this to three equity-and-income funds - Windsor, Gemini and Qualified Dividend - with spectacular results until his retirement in 1995.
An unassuming man, who always encouraged his colleagues to collaborate in his decisions, Neff never sought to publicize himself during his career in the same way as many star fund managers. But with the recent publication of his memoirs, John Neff on Investing, he is at last achieving the wider recognition he deserves.
Long-term returns
The average annual total return from the Windsor Fund during Neff's 32-year tenure was 13.7%, against a return from the S&P500 index of 10.6%.
Biggest success
Neff invested a huge proportion of his fund in Ford in 1984, when everyone feared it might go bust and the P/E ratio had sunk to 2.5! He paid an average price of under $14. Within 3 years, the price had climbed to $50, making Windsor profits of $500m.
Method and guidelines
Neff describes himself as 'a low price-earnings investor'. He hunts for stocks that are cheaply priced in relation to the total return indicated by the sum of their earnings growth plus their dividend yield. He calls this the 'terminal relationship' or, more colloquially, 'what you pay for what you get'. You might also think of it as the GYP (Growth & Yield:P/E) ratio:
(Earnings Growth + Dividend Yield) ÷ P/E ratio
Neff recommends comparing the GYP ratio on your stocks and on your whole portfolio with that on the market.
Example
Average forecast portfolio EPS growth (%)
plus average forecast portfolio dividend yield
divided by average forecast portfolio P/E
= (7 + 5) ÷ 10
= a GYP of 1.2
Average forecast market EPS growth (%)
plus average forecast market dividend yield
divided by average forecast market P/E
= (15 + 2) ÷ 28
= a GYP of 0.6
On the above figures, your portfolio would be twice as attractive as the market. (This is only an example. The actual relationship would usually be much closer.)
Consider avoiding, putting into your portfolio stocks that significantly reduce its overall attractiveness. Instead, set a target buying price that represents the GYP you are after and wait for the price to fall to that level.
If two companies offer a prospective 14% return, but Company A's consists of 14% earnings growth and no dividend, whereas Company B's consists of 7% growth plus a 7% dividend, it is better to choose Company B, because the dividend makes the outcome more certain.
Following this principle, Neff has always stuck to a simple investment style based on the following 7 selection criteria:
Low P/E ratio.
Fundamental earnings growth above 7%.
A solid, and ideally rising, dividend.
A much-better-than-average total return in relation to the P/E ratio.
No exposure to cyclical downturns without a compensatory low P/E.
Solid companies in growing fields.
A strong fundamental case for investment.
Source: John Neff on Investing, J Neff, 1999
A good place to look for ideas is the New Lows column in the back pages of the FT. Many, if not most, of the companies mentioned are generally bad investments. But shares in surprisingly good companies sometimes slide to new lows on bad news. Test these to see if they meet the 7 selection criteria. (Neff calls this the 'Hmmmph' test: "Some names I would not have expected to see on this list elicit an audible 'Hmmmph'.")
Don't chase highly recognized growth stocks. Their P/E ratios are invariably pushed up to ridiculously expensive levels. This greatly increases the risk of a sudden collapse in the share price.
Stick to a firm selling strategy, or you risk losing your profits. There are two basic reasons to sell:
Fundamentals deteriorate
The price approaches or matches your expectations.
The main fundamentals to keep an eye on are earnings estimates and 5-year growth rates. If these start to slip, sell at once.
Pay more attention to the GYP ratio of your portfolio than to the market. But if the market becomes very expensive and it is hard to find worthwhile purchases, it is permissible to hold up to 20% of your funds in cash until new opportunities emerge.
The best profits are usually made after market panics.
Key sayings
"Absent stunning growth rates, low P/E stocks can capture the wonders of P/E expansion with less risk than skittish growth stocks."
"As a low P/E investor, you have to distinguish misunderstood and overlooked stocks selling at bargain prices from many more stocks with lacklustre prospects."
"A dividend increase is one kind of 'free plus'. A free plus is the return investors enjoy over and above initial expectations. One of Ben Franklin's wise observations offers a parallel: 'He who waits upon Fortune is never sure of a dinner.' As I see it, a superior yield at least lets you snack on hors d'oeuvres while waiting for the main meal."
"An awful lot of people keep a stock too long because it gives them warm fuzzies - particularly when a contrarian stance has been vindicated. If they sell it, they lose bragging rights."
大器晚成的莱利.海特
莱利.海特在大学时代教授上金融课时在拿期货开“玩笑”时已开始与期货结下不解之缘。但在正式投入炒家的行列，其间经过甚为曲折的途径，大器晚成，是莱利.海特的写照。学业并不突出，毕业后，什么工作都试过，每一个岗位停留时间都不长，1968年莱利.海特终于投身投机行业，第一个踏脚是股票经纪，数年后，成为全职期货经纪。
莱利.海特在刚开始接受股票培训时了解到“蓝筹”股票的来源可追溯到蒙特卡罗的赌场，最大的筹码是以蓝色印制的，因此引申出来，蓝筹股是代表第一线的大股，海特恍然大悟：哦，我明白了，这不就是赌博嘛!于是他将股票分析的书籍抛诸脑后，立即去买了一本名为《击败庄家》的书，看完后得出一个结论：“成功的投资方法就是掌握概率。只要你能算出入市成功或失败的概率，就能找到战胜市场的办法，足以克敌制胜。”莱利.海特后来研究和发展的电脑交易系统都是以此为基础的。
入行十年之后，莱利.海特开始捕捉到时常的节奏，订下进攻大计，成立了“明治投资管理公司”，先后罗致了两位人才，分别是统计学博士马菲士和电脑专家米马戴文，根据 10年下来积累了丰富的经验，形成了自己一套独特的交易体系。通过他们的科学测试来验证自己的做单体系，结果非常理想。“明治投资管理公司”的投资策略重点：在于平稳的增长，不追求超高收益，目标是稳定、持续的收益率。1981年来的七年时间，公司的收益率平均年增长超过30％，按年度结算，最低的一年也赚了13％，最高增长率为60%，连续6个月最大的亏损仅有l5％，如果以连续12个月作为结算期，亏损亦不超过计划1%。由于表现稳定而出色，公司旗下基金增长速度惊人， 1981年开始成立时只有200万美元， 10年后已累计超过8亿美元。
很多投资者都在使用电脑交易系统，但是赚钱还是少数，原因何在呢？莱利.海特在谈到电脑交易系统说，大部分投资者经常更改电脑交易系统，倘一失手，即时改用另一套系统，甚至在电脑系统发出入市信号，仍三心二意的不愿依照信号执行等等。在和许多投资者闲谈之间，经常的听到事后怨言：“我的电脑交易系统表现极为准确，可惜我并没有依计行事，否则可以赢到历年来最大的胜仗。”在使用电脑交易系统时一定要遵守交易原则，电脑系统是你的偶像，你的指挥官，神圣不可侵犯，要有像岳飞的“愚忠”，只要是有较高胜率的交易系统，长期的循规蹈矩，必会胜算在握。莱利.海特管理的基金是一直保持很低的亏损率，在高风险的期货行当是少有的。这与莱利.海特非常重视面对风险、控制风险和回避风险有密切的关系。
面对风险。在还是当经纪的时候，上司经常教导他：当你的客户出现大亏损的时候，必须立刻通知客户，否则必定有第三者代劳，破坏你与客户的关系。在某日联邦储备局FED突然改变政策，令到市场大势做一百八十度的转变，“明治投资管理公司”其中一个大客户，一间瑞士银行，净值大跌，投资经理们手足无措，向莱利.海特请示，莱利.海特立即打电话向银行解释：“类似的突变市势几年内才会出现一次，纯属意外。而敝公司作战计划，是以长期性平稳增长为主，长远开看，信心十足。”这样一来可以降低了我们的心理压力，拖延作出反应的方法，是不同炒家常用的弊病，也是产生纠纷的根源，后来该银行增加了一倍投资额，成为公司大重要客户。在控制风险方面，莱利.海特认为不管你了解多少情况，心中多么肯定，总还是有错的可能，所以随时要有准备。所以风险控制一定要严格、决不要把身家性命押上去，对最坏的结果有所准备。莱利.海特的一位现今世界上最大的咖啡炒家朋友，他清清楚楚的知道咖啡的运输过程，与主要的咖啡出产国的部长都甚有交情，可以说对基本因素及有关资料了如指掌。有一次请他到他伦敦的住所去作客，席间酒酣耳热，乘兴问莱利.海特：“海特，你怎么可能比我更懂咖啡期货呢?”海特回答说：“没错，我对咖啡一无所知，连喝都不喝。”“那你怎么做交易呢？我只看有多大风险。”那老兄不大相信，又问了不下5次，每次海特都是讲：“控制风险。”三个月后，那位朋友做咖啡期货赔掉l亿美元。看起来海特的话他没听进去。
除了面对风险和控制风险，更重要的是主动的回避风险，莱利.海特的方针是平稳中求增长，波涛汹涌的市场，虽然是很多人期待的机会，但并非理想的投资对象，当你把握不好就变成是无限的风险了。所以宁愿错过机会，亦不想去冒受不必的风险，是莱利.海特的第一教条。莱利.海特的心得归结成两句话：一，你如果不赌，就不可能赢。二、你如果把筹码全输光了，就不可能再赌。
莱利.海特在刚开始接受股票培训时了解到“蓝筹”股票的来源可追溯到蒙特卡罗的赌场，最大的筹码是以蓝色印制的，因此引申出来，蓝筹股是代表第一线的大股，海特恍然大悟：哦，我明白了，这不就是赌博嘛!于是他将股票分析的书籍抛诸脑后，立即去买了一本名为《击败庄家》的书，看完后得出一个结论：“成功的投资方法就是掌握概率。只要你能算出入市成功或失败的概率，就能找到战胜市场的办法，足以克敌制胜。”莱利.海特后来研究和发展的电脑交易系统都是以此为基础的。
入行十年之后，莱利.海特开始捕捉到时常的节奏，订下进攻大计，成立了“明治投资管理公司”，先后罗致了两位人才，分别是统计学博士马菲士和电脑专家米马戴文，根据 10年下来积累了丰富的经验，形成了自己一套独特的交易体系。通过他们的科学测试来验证自己的做单体系，结果非常理想。“明治投资管理公司”的投资策略重点：在于平稳的增长，不追求超高收益，目标是稳定、持续的收益率。1981年来的七年时间，公司的收益率平均年增长超过30％，按年度结算，最低的一年也赚了13％，最高增长率为60%，连续6个月最大的亏损仅有l5％，如果以连续12个月作为结算期，亏损亦不超过计划1%。由于表现稳定而出色，公司旗下基金增长速度惊人， 1981年开始成立时只有200万美元， 10年后已累计超过8亿美元。
很多投资者都在使用电脑交易系统，但是赚钱还是少数，原因何在呢？莱利.海特在谈到电脑交易系统说，大部分投资者经常更改电脑交易系统，倘一失手，即时改用另一套系统，甚至在电脑系统发出入市信号，仍三心二意的不愿依照信号执行等等。在和许多投资者闲谈之间，经常的听到事后怨言：“我的电脑交易系统表现极为准确，可惜我并没有依计行事，否则可以赢到历年来最大的胜仗。”在使用电脑交易系统时一定要遵守交易原则，电脑系统是你的偶像，你的指挥官，神圣不可侵犯，要有像岳飞的“愚忠”，只要是有较高胜率的交易系统，长期的循规蹈矩，必会胜算在握。莱利.海特管理的基金是一直保持很低的亏损率，在高风险的期货行当是少有的。这与莱利.海特非常重视面对风险、控制风险和回避风险有密切的关系。
面对风险。在还是当经纪的时候，上司经常教导他：当你的客户出现大亏损的时候，必须立刻通知客户，否则必定有第三者代劳，破坏你与客户的关系。在某日联邦储备局FED突然改变政策，令到市场大势做一百八十度的转变，“明治投资管理公司”其中一个大客户，一间瑞士银行，净值大跌，投资经理们手足无措，向莱利.海特请示，莱利.海特立即打电话向银行解释：“类似的突变市势几年内才会出现一次，纯属意外。而敝公司作战计划，是以长期性平稳增长为主，长远开看，信心十足。”这样一来可以降低了我们的心理压力，拖延作出反应的方法，是不同炒家常用的弊病，也是产生纠纷的根源，后来该银行增加了一倍投资额，成为公司大重要客户。在控制风险方面，莱利.海特认为不管你了解多少情况，心中多么肯定，总还是有错的可能，所以随时要有准备。所以风险控制一定要严格、决不要把身家性命押上去，对最坏的结果有所准备。莱利.海特的一位现今世界上最大的咖啡炒家朋友，他清清楚楚的知道咖啡的运输过程，与主要的咖啡出产国的部长都甚有交情，可以说对基本因素及有关资料了如指掌。有一次请他到他伦敦的住所去作客，席间酒酣耳热，乘兴问莱利.海特：“海特，你怎么可能比我更懂咖啡期货呢?”海特回答说：“没错，我对咖啡一无所知，连喝都不喝。”“那你怎么做交易呢？我只看有多大风险。”那老兄不大相信，又问了不下5次，每次海特都是讲：“控制风险。”三个月后，那位朋友做咖啡期货赔掉l亿美元。看起来海特的话他没听进去。
除了面对风险和控制风险，更重要的是主动的回避风险，莱利.海特的方针是平稳中求增长，波涛汹涌的市场，虽然是很多人期待的机会，但并非理想的投资对象，当你把握不好就变成是无限的风险了。所以宁愿错过机会，亦不想去冒受不必的风险，是莱利.海特的第一教条。莱利.海特的心得归结成两句话：一，你如果不赌，就不可能赢。二、你如果把筹码全输光了，就不可能再赌。
Winning the home run hitter's game
Investing is not only about buying the right assets at the right time. It's also about having rules that keep you from doing dumb things at the wrong time.
Of all the great fund managers who have appeared in Money Magazine over the past decades, no one proved that point better (or more entertainingly) than Ralph Wanger, the wisecracking, philosophizing manager of the Acorn Fund.
Wanger set out in 1970 to invest in small companies; through 2003 he did that and only that, with remarkable success. While the S&P 500 index climbed 12.1 percent a year, Acorn racked up an annualized 16.3 percent, one of the best records ever.
Wanger, 72 and retired, recently met with Money's Jason Zweig. As usual, Wanger asked nearly as many questions as he answered - and in the process found time to explain why life is like laundry, why focus matters and what Babe Ruth teaches us about stock picking.
Q. Why do you think you turned out to be a good investor?
A. At Acorn we had a clear philosophy - to be long-term holders of smaller companies with financial strength, entrepreneurial managers and understandable businesses - and we stuck to it.
Sticking to it is key. Richard J. Daley's one ambition was to become mayor of Chicago. Not President, not ambassador to the U.N., just mayor of Chicago. And since he already was mayor of Chicago, his life was much simpler. I thought that was worth emulating.
Q. Anything else?
A. I had always thought that to be a good investor you needed to hit a lot of singles and not strike out often. I was wrong. Investing, especially in small companies, is a home-run-hitter's game.
Q. When did you learn that?
A. Late '70s, maybe. The point is, 99 percent of what you do in life I classify as laundry. It's stuff that has to be done, but you don't do it better than anybody else, and it's not worth much.
Once in a while, though, you do something that changes your life dramatically. You decide to get married, you have a baby - or, if you're an investor, you buy a stock that goes up twentyfold.
So these rare events tend to dominate things. At Acorn, for example, I might have owned 300 stocks at any given time; most disappeared into the laundry basket.
But 10 might go up many times in value, and they made all the difference.
Look, how many home runs did Babe Ruth hit in his best year?
Q. Sixty, in 1927.
A. How many times did he strike out that year?
Q. Darn, I used to know that. I think it was...
A. Why don't you know?
Q. Uh, because when you hit that many home runs, it doesn't matter how many times you strike out.
A. Exactly. You're a great straight man.
Q. Thanks. So how many times did Babe Ruth strike out?
A. Don't know. Not interested. It's the winners that count. You want to have big positions in your winners, and the losers are trivial, eventually.
Q. But you can't just run out and find a stock that's going to rise twentyfold. No one can see that clearly into the future.
A. If you're looking for a home run - a great investment for five years or 10 years or more - then the only way to beat this enormous fog that covers the future is to identify a long-term trend that will give a particular business some sort of edge.
Q. For example?
A. A $600 PlayStation now has more computing power than you could have gotten 20 years ago for $100,000. So you don't want to invest in the computing power itself; those prices keep dropping. You want what's downstream from the technology.
Years ago I bought International Game Technology, which took a simple microprocessor, packaged it with coin slots, called it a slot machine and sold it to casinos for $8,000. It was a great stock.
Q. Are the principles of investing helpful elsewhere in life?
A. Being disciplined, being honest, having a set of rules and following them no matter what, thinking long term, controlling your emotions - these are all useful. But only so useful and only in part of life. You don't want to treat your wife or your kids like an investment.
I mean, you don't want to say, "Kid, you got a D-minus in English. I'm selling you." That doesn't work.
Of all the great fund managers who have appeared in Money Magazine over the past decades, no one proved that point better (or more entertainingly) than Ralph Wanger, the wisecracking, philosophizing manager of the Acorn Fund.
Wanger set out in 1970 to invest in small companies; through 2003 he did that and only that, with remarkable success. While the S&P 500 index climbed 12.1 percent a year, Acorn racked up an annualized 16.3 percent, one of the best records ever.
Wanger, 72 and retired, recently met with Money's Jason Zweig. As usual, Wanger asked nearly as many questions as he answered - and in the process found time to explain why life is like laundry, why focus matters and what Babe Ruth teaches us about stock picking.
Q. Why do you think you turned out to be a good investor?
A. At Acorn we had a clear philosophy - to be long-term holders of smaller companies with financial strength, entrepreneurial managers and understandable businesses - and we stuck to it.
Sticking to it is key. Richard J. Daley's one ambition was to become mayor of Chicago. Not President, not ambassador to the U.N., just mayor of Chicago. And since he already was mayor of Chicago, his life was much simpler. I thought that was worth emulating.
Q. Anything else?
A. I had always thought that to be a good investor you needed to hit a lot of singles and not strike out often. I was wrong. Investing, especially in small companies, is a home-run-hitter's game.
Q. When did you learn that?
A. Late '70s, maybe. The point is, 99 percent of what you do in life I classify as laundry. It's stuff that has to be done, but you don't do it better than anybody else, and it's not worth much.
Once in a while, though, you do something that changes your life dramatically. You decide to get married, you have a baby - or, if you're an investor, you buy a stock that goes up twentyfold.
So these rare events tend to dominate things. At Acorn, for example, I might have owned 300 stocks at any given time; most disappeared into the laundry basket.
But 10 might go up many times in value, and they made all the difference.
Look, how many home runs did Babe Ruth hit in his best year?
Q. Sixty, in 1927.
A. How many times did he strike out that year?
Q. Darn, I used to know that. I think it was...
A. Why don't you know?
Q. Uh, because when you hit that many home runs, it doesn't matter how many times you strike out.
A. Exactly. You're a great straight man.
Q. Thanks. So how many times did Babe Ruth strike out?
A. Don't know. Not interested. It's the winners that count. You want to have big positions in your winners, and the losers are trivial, eventually.
Q. But you can't just run out and find a stock that's going to rise twentyfold. No one can see that clearly into the future.
A. If you're looking for a home run - a great investment for five years or 10 years or more - then the only way to beat this enormous fog that covers the future is to identify a long-term trend that will give a particular business some sort of edge.
Q. For example?
A. A $600 PlayStation now has more computing power than you could have gotten 20 years ago for $100,000. So you don't want to invest in the computing power itself; those prices keep dropping. You want what's downstream from the technology.
Years ago I bought International Game Technology, which took a simple microprocessor, packaged it with coin slots, called it a slot machine and sold it to casinos for $8,000. It was a great stock.
Q. Are the principles of investing helpful elsewhere in life?
A. Being disciplined, being honest, having a set of rules and following them no matter what, thinking long term, controlling your emotions - these are all useful. But only so useful and only in part of life. You don't want to treat your wife or your kids like an investment.
I mean, you don't want to say, "Kid, you got a D-minus in English. I'm selling you." That doesn't work.
Ralph Wanger
Investment style
Theme-driven investment in smaller growth companies for the medium to long term.
Profile
After a brief period in insurance, Wanger joined Harris Associates in 1960 as an analyst. Later he became a portfolio manager. In 1970, he was put in charge of the Acorn Fund. He has since turned this into one of the top-performing growth funds of the last 30 years.
In the six months after its launch, the Acorn Fund lost over a third of its value in the most severe market downturn since the Thirties. Thankfully, the market recovered in the second half of the year and the fund survived. But the experience taught Wanger the value of a light-hearted approach to the vagaries of the market.
He subsequently became famous for his amusing quarterly reports:
"Some people have written to tell me they became shareholders just so they can receive the reports, which makes the quarterlies the world's most expensive literary magazine."
He recently summarized his time at the fund in his book A Zebra in Lion Country (1999).
Long-term returns
The Acorn Fund returned 17.2% annually between 1970 and 1998, against a return from the S&P500 index of 14.4%.
Biggest success
Wanger has made big money from many small companies. One is International Game Technology, the world's leading maker of slot machines. He paid $1 a share for it in 1988, when new management had just taken over and were planning a new range of electronic slot machines. In 1993, the stock hit a high of $40.
Method and guidelines
Concentrate on spotting trends that will last for at least 4-5 years.
Your life is driven by strong economic, social and technological trends. These also drive corporate sales and profits. When thinking of investing, start by looking around you and picking out those trends you think will be the most important and longest-lasting. Wanger's own favourites include:
the information revolution, and particularly its impact on costs
the expansion of world telephone and data networks
the business of leisure, boosted by affluent older baby-boomers
outsourcing, as companies strip down to their core functions
money management, essential for the future wealth of an aging world.
Think small.
Smaller companies as a group have made far more profitable investments than larger ones. Although you cannot buy large numbers of them, try to focus your research on the best prospects in this group. Consider avoiding micro companies - they can be too risky. (In the UK, this means sticking to companies with a capitalization of about £30m-£250m.)
The best small companies are those that dominate their chosen niche. Their characteristics include:
growing markets for their products
good design
efficient, low-cost manufacturing
outstanding, entrepreneurial management
skilled marketing
high profit margins.
Look downstream for the best profits.
T Rowe Price focused on the leaders in growth industries. But the best money is often to be made by the downstream beneficiaries of a growth business. To use the old cliché, it wasn't the prospectors that made the money in the Yukon gold rush, it was those who sold them the picks and shovels.
Example
Rather than investing in semiconductor companies like Intel that manufactured microchips, Wanger went for cellular telephone companies that built their products into handsets.
Insist on financial strength.
Growth can only be sustained by companies with strong finances. It will be undermined by those that have to guzzle cash to feed their growth. So
Check the balance sheet to see if there is too much debt, or rising debt
Check that other liabilities, such as pension payments, are reasonable
Look for real cash generation, not simply accounting profits
As a rule, avoid turnarounds, start-ups and new issues, which tend to be weakly financed, especially if they are blue-sky tech companies.
Insist on fundamental value.
A good company is not necessarily a good stock unless it is attractively priced. Look for companies that are cheap in relation to their earnings-growth potential.
A crude measure of potential is the PEG
A better measure is to estimate the likely earnings per share 2 years ahead and multiply that by the likely P/E to arrive at a probable value. P/E ratios will be higher if interest rates are lower, and vice versa.
(Professionals calculate this using a 'dividend discount model'.)
Sell only reluctantly.
If you have done your homework, you should be able to hold stocks for at least 4-5 years as a trend plays out. Wanger himself only turns over about one-quarter of his portfolio each year.
Sometimes, though, the P/E will rise to dangerous levels. Then you should consider selling some or all of your stock to reduce risk. Wanger sold International Game Technology when its P/E reached 40 and its estimated growth rate was 25%.
"In real-life portfolio management, sell decisions are often tough. You can't really apply hard-and-fast rules. Instead, you have to continually re-evaluate each situation."
Source: A Zebra in Lion Country
Key sayings
"First I determine themes that will be played out over the next several years. Then I identify groups of stocks that reflect those themes."
"What I don't want are me-too companies that rank fifth or sixth in their industry, because their profit margins will rarely be as good as those of the industry leaders."
"Going downstream - investing in the businesses that will benefit from new technology rather than in the technology companies themselves - is often the smarter strategy."
"Assume that one of your eccentric friends who runs a large bank has just offered to lend you a great deal of money at about 10 percent interest, with which you may tender for all the stock of the company you are studying at the current market price. If you study the company and say 'Boy, this is terrific! Give me the loan and I'll do it. I'll quit my job and go run that company. It's a tremendous bargain,' then you probably have a good stock."
Theme-driven investment in smaller growth companies for the medium to long term.
Profile
After a brief period in insurance, Wanger joined Harris Associates in 1960 as an analyst. Later he became a portfolio manager. In 1970, he was put in charge of the Acorn Fund. He has since turned this into one of the top-performing growth funds of the last 30 years.
In the six months after its launch, the Acorn Fund lost over a third of its value in the most severe market downturn since the Thirties. Thankfully, the market recovered in the second half of the year and the fund survived. But the experience taught Wanger the value of a light-hearted approach to the vagaries of the market.
He subsequently became famous for his amusing quarterly reports:
"Some people have written to tell me they became shareholders just so they can receive the reports, which makes the quarterlies the world's most expensive literary magazine."
He recently summarized his time at the fund in his book A Zebra in Lion Country (1999).
Long-term returns
The Acorn Fund returned 17.2% annually between 1970 and 1998, against a return from the S&P500 index of 14.4%.
Biggest success
Wanger has made big money from many small companies. One is International Game Technology, the world's leading maker of slot machines. He paid $1 a share for it in 1988, when new management had just taken over and were planning a new range of electronic slot machines. In 1993, the stock hit a high of $40.
Method and guidelines
Concentrate on spotting trends that will last for at least 4-5 years.
Your life is driven by strong economic, social and technological trends. These also drive corporate sales and profits. When thinking of investing, start by looking around you and picking out those trends you think will be the most important and longest-lasting. Wanger's own favourites include:
the information revolution, and particularly its impact on costs
the expansion of world telephone and data networks
the business of leisure, boosted by affluent older baby-boomers
outsourcing, as companies strip down to their core functions
money management, essential for the future wealth of an aging world.
Think small.
Smaller companies as a group have made far more profitable investments than larger ones. Although you cannot buy large numbers of them, try to focus your research on the best prospects in this group. Consider avoiding micro companies - they can be too risky. (In the UK, this means sticking to companies with a capitalization of about £30m-£250m.)
The best small companies are those that dominate their chosen niche. Their characteristics include:
growing markets for their products
good design
efficient, low-cost manufacturing
outstanding, entrepreneurial management
skilled marketing
high profit margins.
Look downstream for the best profits.
T Rowe Price focused on the leaders in growth industries. But the best money is often to be made by the downstream beneficiaries of a growth business. To use the old cliché, it wasn't the prospectors that made the money in the Yukon gold rush, it was those who sold them the picks and shovels.
Example
Rather than investing in semiconductor companies like Intel that manufactured microchips, Wanger went for cellular telephone companies that built their products into handsets.
Insist on financial strength.
Growth can only be sustained by companies with strong finances. It will be undermined by those that have to guzzle cash to feed their growth. So
Check the balance sheet to see if there is too much debt, or rising debt
Check that other liabilities, such as pension payments, are reasonable
Look for real cash generation, not simply accounting profits
As a rule, avoid turnarounds, start-ups and new issues, which tend to be weakly financed, especially if they are blue-sky tech companies.
Insist on fundamental value.
A good company is not necessarily a good stock unless it is attractively priced. Look for companies that are cheap in relation to their earnings-growth potential.
A crude measure of potential is the PEG
A better measure is to estimate the likely earnings per share 2 years ahead and multiply that by the likely P/E to arrive at a probable value. P/E ratios will be higher if interest rates are lower, and vice versa.
(Professionals calculate this using a 'dividend discount model'.)
Sell only reluctantly.
If you have done your homework, you should be able to hold stocks for at least 4-5 years as a trend plays out. Wanger himself only turns over about one-quarter of his portfolio each year.
Sometimes, though, the P/E will rise to dangerous levels. Then you should consider selling some or all of your stock to reduce risk. Wanger sold International Game Technology when its P/E reached 40 and its estimated growth rate was 25%.
"In real-life portfolio management, sell decisions are often tough. You can't really apply hard-and-fast rules. Instead, you have to continually re-evaluate each situation."
Source: A Zebra in Lion Country
Key sayings
"First I determine themes that will be played out over the next several years. Then I identify groups of stocks that reflect those themes."
"What I don't want are me-too companies that rank fifth or sixth in their industry, because their profit margins will rarely be as good as those of the industry leaders."
"Going downstream - investing in the businesses that will benefit from new technology rather than in the technology companies themselves - is often the smarter strategy."
"Assume that one of your eccentric friends who runs a large bank has just offered to lend you a great deal of money at about 10 percent interest, with which you may tender for all the stock of the company you are studying at the current market price. If you study the company and say 'Boy, this is terrific! Give me the loan and I'll do it. I'll quit my job and go run that company. It's a tremendous bargain,' then you probably have a good stock."
Learning From the Great Investors
In college, I tried to read as many books about great businesses and investors as possible. I'd regularly stagger out of the investing section of the library with more books than I could carry. But while that reading gave me a great foundation, I later discovered that I'd only taken the first few steps in my journey toward becoming a better investor.
I'm still nowhere near where I hope to be, but I thought I'd pause to reflect on the vital lessons I've learned by observing some of the world's greatest investors.
Mohnish Pabrai: Dig deeper.
Like Michael Jordan on the basketball court, Mohnish Pabrai makes investing seem so easy. Whether it owes to his experience as an information-technology entrepreneur, or simply stems from some innate talent, Pabrai seems to have unbelievable skill in finding opportunity where others see only uncertainty.
In his first book, Mosaic: Perspectives on Investing, Pabrai describes his investment in funeral-home operator Stewart Enterprises (Nasdaq: STEI), at a time when the company had a $500 million debt payment coming due in a couple of years.
"Bankrupt" is perhaps the most terrifying word in money management. A holding that goes bankrupt not only makes you look like a goat, but might even cost you your job. Stewart's looming debt payment, and the fearful uncertainty that accompanied it, became a dealbreaker for many investors.
But Pabrai saw that Stewart could simply sell some of its funeral homes to pay off the debt. That's precisely what happened, and Pabrai's fund made roughly 100% from its investment. In Pabrai's latest book, the excellent The Dhandho Investor, curious Fools can find further details about this strategy of low-risk, high-uncertainty investing.
Eddie Lampert: Capital allocation, capital allocation, capital allocation.
As a Yale undergrad, secretive hedge fund manager Eddie Lampert allegedly spent considerable time reverse-engineering Warren Buffett's investments, hoping to indirectly learn from the greatest investor of all time.
He subsequently went to Goldman Sachs, where he learned from legendary arbitrageur Robert Rubin. From there, he started his own hedge fund. Ever since, he's basically been shooting out the lights.
Although Lampert rarely speaks to the press, it's clear from his successes with K-Mart, Sears, and AutoZone -- as well as his letters to Sears shareholders -- that he holds capital allocation sacred.
With Lampert's help, the companies he owns have scoured their assets, working to deploy capital as productively as possible. It's amazing how much idle cash is locked up or wasted in real estate, inventory and working capital, and capital expenditures. From Lampert, I learned that superior capital allocation can help turn a laggard into a leader, and that investors should closely monitor how management invests its assets.
Joel Greenblatt: High earnings yields + high returns on capital = good.
Joel Greenblatt's Gotham Capital has allegedly returned a whopping 40% a year. Greenblatt is the master of the spinoff, having successfully sent former subsidiaries such as Moody's, Ameriprise, and Live Nation off on their own.
Greenblatt also wrote two delightfully short and entertaining books, titled You Can Be a Stock Market Genius and The Little Book That Beats the Market. They teach investors that investing in companies with high returns on capital and low price-to-earnings ratios (or high earnings yields) leads to superior returns. Of course, there's a lot more to it than that, but at the end of the day, this simple formula does work wonders.
Munger: Learn to learn.
Charlie Munger, Warren Buffett's intellectual partner, wrote a wonderful book called Poor Charlie's Almanack, which deals with things like mental models, biases, and methods of thinking. Most importantly, Munger counsels readers that no one can tell you how to be a superior thinker.
You can read as many books as possible about riding a bike, but nothing compares to the experience of doing it. Hopefully, if we put enough monetary and intellectual effort into learning to become better investors, we can one day kick off the training wheels.
I'm still nowhere near where I hope to be, but I thought I'd pause to reflect on the vital lessons I've learned by observing some of the world's greatest investors.
Mohnish Pabrai: Dig deeper.
Like Michael Jordan on the basketball court, Mohnish Pabrai makes investing seem so easy. Whether it owes to his experience as an information-technology entrepreneur, or simply stems from some innate talent, Pabrai seems to have unbelievable skill in finding opportunity where others see only uncertainty.
In his first book, Mosaic: Perspectives on Investing, Pabrai describes his investment in funeral-home operator Stewart Enterprises (Nasdaq: STEI), at a time when the company had a $500 million debt payment coming due in a couple of years.
"Bankrupt" is perhaps the most terrifying word in money management. A holding that goes bankrupt not only makes you look like a goat, but might even cost you your job. Stewart's looming debt payment, and the fearful uncertainty that accompanied it, became a dealbreaker for many investors.
But Pabrai saw that Stewart could simply sell some of its funeral homes to pay off the debt. That's precisely what happened, and Pabrai's fund made roughly 100% from its investment. In Pabrai's latest book, the excellent The Dhandho Investor, curious Fools can find further details about this strategy of low-risk, high-uncertainty investing.
Eddie Lampert: Capital allocation, capital allocation, capital allocation.
As a Yale undergrad, secretive hedge fund manager Eddie Lampert allegedly spent considerable time reverse-engineering Warren Buffett's investments, hoping to indirectly learn from the greatest investor of all time.
He subsequently went to Goldman Sachs, where he learned from legendary arbitrageur Robert Rubin. From there, he started his own hedge fund. Ever since, he's basically been shooting out the lights.
Although Lampert rarely speaks to the press, it's clear from his successes with K-Mart, Sears, and AutoZone -- as well as his letters to Sears shareholders -- that he holds capital allocation sacred.
With Lampert's help, the companies he owns have scoured their assets, working to deploy capital as productively as possible. It's amazing how much idle cash is locked up or wasted in real estate, inventory and working capital, and capital expenditures. From Lampert, I learned that superior capital allocation can help turn a laggard into a leader, and that investors should closely monitor how management invests its assets.
Joel Greenblatt: High earnings yields + high returns on capital = good.
Joel Greenblatt's Gotham Capital has allegedly returned a whopping 40% a year. Greenblatt is the master of the spinoff, having successfully sent former subsidiaries such as Moody's, Ameriprise, and Live Nation off on their own.
Greenblatt also wrote two delightfully short and entertaining books, titled You Can Be a Stock Market Genius and The Little Book That Beats the Market. They teach investors that investing in companies with high returns on capital and low price-to-earnings ratios (or high earnings yields) leads to superior returns. Of course, there's a lot more to it than that, but at the end of the day, this simple formula does work wonders.
Munger: Learn to learn.
Charlie Munger, Warren Buffett's intellectual partner, wrote a wonderful book called Poor Charlie's Almanack, which deals with things like mental models, biases, and methods of thinking. Most importantly, Munger counsels readers that no one can tell you how to be a superior thinker.
You can read as many books as possible about riding a bike, but nothing compares to the experience of doing it. Hopefully, if we put enough monetary and intellectual effort into learning to become better investors, we can one day kick off the training wheels.
The Greatest Investors: Thomas Rowe Price, Jr.
Personal Profile
Thomas Rowe Price spent his formative years struggling with the Depression, and the lesson he learned was not to stay out of stocks but to embrace them. Price viewed financial markets as cyclical. As a "crowd opposer," he took to investing in good companies for the long term, which was virtually unheard of at this time. His investment philosophy was that investors had to put more focus on individual stock-picking for the long term. Discipline, process consistency and fundamental research became the basis for his successful investing career. .
Price graduated from Swarthmore College with a degree in chemistry in 1919 before discovering that he liked working with numbers better than chemicals. He moved into a career in investments when he started working with the Baltimore-based brokerage firm of Mackubin Goodrich, which today is known as Legg Mason. Price eventually rose to become its chief investment officer.
Over time, Price became frustrated by the fact that "the firm did not fully comprehend his definition of growth stocks," so Price founded T. Rowe Price Associates in 1937. At that time, he defied convention by charging fees based on investments that clients had with the firm, not commissions, and always "putting the client's interests first." Price believed that as his clients prospered, the firm would too.
In 1950, he introduced his first mutual fund, the T. Rowe Price Growth Stock Fund. He was the company's CEO until his retirement in the late 1960s. He eventually sold the company in the early 1970s, but the firm retained his name and, today, one of the nation's premier investment houses.
Investment Style
Thomas Rowe Price's investment management philosophy was based on investment discipline, process consistency and fundamental analysis. He pioneered the methodology of growth investing by focusing on well-managed companies in fertile fields whose earnings and dividends were expected to grow faster than inflation and the overall economy. John Train, author of "The Money Masters", says that Price looked for these characteristics in growth companies:
Superior research to develop products and markets.
A lack of cutthroat competition.
A comparative immunity from government regulation.
Low total labor costs, but well-paid employees.
At least a 10% return on invested capital, sustained high profit margins, and a superior growth of earnings per share.
Price and his firm became extremely successful employing the growth stock approach to buying stocks. By 1965, he had spent almost thirty years as a growth advocate. At that time, many of his favorite stocks became known in the market as "T. Rowe Price stocks." However, by the late '60s, he had become wary of the market's unquestioning enthusiasm for growth stocks – he felt the time had come for investors to change their orientation. He thought price multiples had become unreasonable and decided that the long bull market was over. This is when he began to sell his interests in T. Rowe Price Associates.
By 1973-1974, what Price's forecast took shape and growth stocks fell hard and fast. Much to Price's dismay, his namesake firm barely managed to survive. Obviously, the term, "irrational exuberance" didn't exist in those days, but its destructive force was well appreciated by Thomas Rowe Price.
Quotes
"It is better to be early than too late in recognizing the passing of one era, the waning of old investment favorites and the advent of a new era affording new opportunities for the investor."
"If we do well for the client, we'll be taken care of."
"Change is the investor's only certainty."
"No one can see ahead three years, let alone five or ten. Competition, new inventions - all kinds of things - can change the situation in twelve months."
Thomas Rowe Price spent his formative years struggling with the Depression, and the lesson he learned was not to stay out of stocks but to embrace them. Price viewed financial markets as cyclical. As a "crowd opposer," he took to investing in good companies for the long term, which was virtually unheard of at this time. His investment philosophy was that investors had to put more focus on individual stock-picking for the long term. Discipline, process consistency and fundamental research became the basis for his successful investing career. .
Price graduated from Swarthmore College with a degree in chemistry in 1919 before discovering that he liked working with numbers better than chemicals. He moved into a career in investments when he started working with the Baltimore-based brokerage firm of Mackubin Goodrich, which today is known as Legg Mason. Price eventually rose to become its chief investment officer.
Over time, Price became frustrated by the fact that "the firm did not fully comprehend his definition of growth stocks," so Price founded T. Rowe Price Associates in 1937. At that time, he defied convention by charging fees based on investments that clients had with the firm, not commissions, and always "putting the client's interests first." Price believed that as his clients prospered, the firm would too.
In 1950, he introduced his first mutual fund, the T. Rowe Price Growth Stock Fund. He was the company's CEO until his retirement in the late 1960s. He eventually sold the company in the early 1970s, but the firm retained his name and, today, one of the nation's premier investment houses.
Investment Style
Thomas Rowe Price's investment management philosophy was based on investment discipline, process consistency and fundamental analysis. He pioneered the methodology of growth investing by focusing on well-managed companies in fertile fields whose earnings and dividends were expected to grow faster than inflation and the overall economy. John Train, author of "The Money Masters", says that Price looked for these characteristics in growth companies:
Superior research to develop products and markets.
A lack of cutthroat competition.
A comparative immunity from government regulation.
Low total labor costs, but well-paid employees.
At least a 10% return on invested capital, sustained high profit margins, and a superior growth of earnings per share.
Price and his firm became extremely successful employing the growth stock approach to buying stocks. By 1965, he had spent almost thirty years as a growth advocate. At that time, many of his favorite stocks became known in the market as "T. Rowe Price stocks." However, by the late '60s, he had become wary of the market's unquestioning enthusiasm for growth stocks – he felt the time had come for investors to change their orientation. He thought price multiples had become unreasonable and decided that the long bull market was over. This is when he began to sell his interests in T. Rowe Price Associates.
By 1973-1974, what Price's forecast took shape and growth stocks fell hard and fast. Much to Price's dismay, his namesake firm barely managed to survive. Obviously, the term, "irrational exuberance" didn't exist in those days, but its destructive force was well appreciated by Thomas Rowe Price.
Quotes
"It is better to be early than too late in recognizing the passing of one era, the waning of old investment favorites and the advent of a new era affording new opportunities for the investor."
"If we do well for the client, we'll be taken care of."
"Change is the investor's only certainty."
"No one can see ahead three years, let alone five or ten. Competition, new inventions - all kinds of things - can change the situation in twelve months."
T Rowe Price
Investment style
Cyclical investor in long-term growth companies, buying at the bottom of the business cycle and selling at the top. In later life, Price switched to a more value-driven style, investing in steady-growth, oil and gold stocks.
Profile
Price was a strong-willed and egotistical man. He never deviated from the daily agenda he set himself, nor from his decisions about when to buy and sell stocks. He demanded the same zeal and discipline from his employees. This unforgiving work ethic turned his firm into one of the largest asset managers of his day.
Price was very much an entrepreneur rather than a manager. He liked to start a fund, establish it and then move on to launch another one. Some of his most famous funds are still running today: T Rowe Price Growth Stock, New Horizons and New Era. His favourite companies, such as Avon Products and Black and Decker, actually became known as 'T Rowe Price stocks'.
But he sold the business to his associates when he saw that the prices of this group of companies were reaching absurd levels in the late Sixties. He himself changed to a more cautious and diversified approach, buying bonds and stocks from the energy and commodity sectors. The 1973-4 bear market proved the wisdom of this decision. His family portfolios soared, while those of his old firm collapsed.
Long-term returns
Price published a sample family portfolio to show how he had turned $1,000 invested in 1934 into $271,201 by the end of 1972 - a compound return of about 15.4% over 39 years.
Biggest success
Price's sample portfolio contained many striking successes. Among the most remarkable was pharmaceuticals firm Merck, bought for the equivalent of 37.5 cents in 1940 and still held 32 years later at $89.13 - a compound growth rate of about 18.6%, even without any reinvestment of dividends.
Method and guidelines
Like people, companies pass through three phases in their life cycle:
Growth
Maturity
Decadence
Look for companies in the earliest identifiable phase of growth. This growth is of two kinds:
Cyclical - growth in unit volumes of sales and in net earnings, which peaks at progressively higher levels at the top of each succeeding business cycle. These stocks are ideal for investors looking for capital gains during the recovery stage of the business cycle
Stable - growth in unit volumes and in net earnings, which persists through the downturn in the business cycle. These stocks are suitable for investors who need relatively stable income.
Concentrate on industry leaders. These can usually be identified by their competitive advantages, including:
Outstanding management
Leading-edge research and development
Patents, licences and other legally enforceable product rights
Relative protection from government regulation
Low labour costs, but good labour relations
These advantages usually go hand-in-hand with
A strong balance sheet
A high return on capital (at least 10%)
High profit margins
Consistently above-average earnings growth.
If these financial ratios are improving, that is often a good indicator that the company is still in its growth phase.
The best time to consider buying is when growth stocks are out of fashion. As a group, their P/E ratio will have fallen to roughly the same level as the market. Consider buying when the P/E is about 33% higher than the lowest point it has reached at the bottom of the last few cycles. Continue buying ('scaling in') until the price starts to rise strongly above this initial level.
The time to start selling is when the stock is 30% above your upper buying price limit. Sell off your stock gradually ('scale out') as the price continues to advance. (Price himself sold 10% every time the price rose 10%. Smaller investors may need to think in terms of selling 25-33% on each 20% advance.)
Also consider selling if
You can be reasonably certain the bull market has peaked
The company appears to be entering its mature phase
The company reports bad news
The stock price collapses on widespread selling.
Key sayings
"Even the amateur investor who lacks training and time to devote to managing his investments can be reasonably successful by selecting the best-managed companies in fertile fields for growth, buying their shares and retaining them until it becomes obvious that they no longer meet the definition of a growth stock."
"'Growth stocks' can be defined as shares in business enterprises that have demonstrated favourable underlying long-term growth in earnings and that, after careful research study, give indications of continued secular growth in future...Secular growth extends through several business cycles, with earnings reaching new high levels at the peak of each subsequent major business cycle..."
Cyclical investor in long-term growth companies, buying at the bottom of the business cycle and selling at the top. In later life, Price switched to a more value-driven style, investing in steady-growth, oil and gold stocks.
Profile
Price was a strong-willed and egotistical man. He never deviated from the daily agenda he set himself, nor from his decisions about when to buy and sell stocks. He demanded the same zeal and discipline from his employees. This unforgiving work ethic turned his firm into one of the largest asset managers of his day.
Price was very much an entrepreneur rather than a manager. He liked to start a fund, establish it and then move on to launch another one. Some of his most famous funds are still running today: T Rowe Price Growth Stock, New Horizons and New Era. His favourite companies, such as Avon Products and Black and Decker, actually became known as 'T Rowe Price stocks'.
But he sold the business to his associates when he saw that the prices of this group of companies were reaching absurd levels in the late Sixties. He himself changed to a more cautious and diversified approach, buying bonds and stocks from the energy and commodity sectors. The 1973-4 bear market proved the wisdom of this decision. His family portfolios soared, while those of his old firm collapsed.
Long-term returns
Price published a sample family portfolio to show how he had turned $1,000 invested in 1934 into $271,201 by the end of 1972 - a compound return of about 15.4% over 39 years.
Biggest success
Price's sample portfolio contained many striking successes. Among the most remarkable was pharmaceuticals firm Merck, bought for the equivalent of 37.5 cents in 1940 and still held 32 years later at $89.13 - a compound growth rate of about 18.6%, even without any reinvestment of dividends.
Method and guidelines
Like people, companies pass through three phases in their life cycle:
Growth
Maturity
Decadence
Look for companies in the earliest identifiable phase of growth. This growth is of two kinds:
Cyclical - growth in unit volumes of sales and in net earnings, which peaks at progressively higher levels at the top of each succeeding business cycle. These stocks are ideal for investors looking for capital gains during the recovery stage of the business cycle
Stable - growth in unit volumes and in net earnings, which persists through the downturn in the business cycle. These stocks are suitable for investors who need relatively stable income.
Concentrate on industry leaders. These can usually be identified by their competitive advantages, including:
Outstanding management
Leading-edge research and development
Patents, licences and other legally enforceable product rights
Relative protection from government regulation
Low labour costs, but good labour relations
These advantages usually go hand-in-hand with
A strong balance sheet
A high return on capital (at least 10%)
High profit margins
Consistently above-average earnings growth.
If these financial ratios are improving, that is often a good indicator that the company is still in its growth phase.
The best time to consider buying is when growth stocks are out of fashion. As a group, their P/E ratio will have fallen to roughly the same level as the market. Consider buying when the P/E is about 33% higher than the lowest point it has reached at the bottom of the last few cycles. Continue buying ('scaling in') until the price starts to rise strongly above this initial level.
The time to start selling is when the stock is 30% above your upper buying price limit. Sell off your stock gradually ('scale out') as the price continues to advance. (Price himself sold 10% every time the price rose 10%. Smaller investors may need to think in terms of selling 25-33% on each 20% advance.)
Also consider selling if
You can be reasonably certain the bull market has peaked
The company appears to be entering its mature phase
The company reports bad news
The stock price collapses on widespread selling.
Key sayings
"Even the amateur investor who lacks training and time to devote to managing his investments can be reasonably successful by selecting the best-managed companies in fertile fields for growth, buying their shares and retaining them until it becomes obvious that they no longer meet the definition of a growth stock."
"'Growth stocks' can be defined as shares in business enterprises that have demonstrated favourable underlying long-term growth in earnings and that, after careful research study, give indications of continued secular growth in future...Secular growth extends through several business cycles, with earnings reaching new high levels at the peak of each subsequent major business cycle..."
Thomas Rowe Price, Jr
Thomas Rowe Price, Jr. followed a very simple business principle: “What is good for the client is also good for the firm”. Rather than charge a commission, as was then the practice in the securities business, Mr. Price charged a fee based on the assets under management.
Mr. Price first entered the world of Wall Street Investing in the 1920’s. By 1937 he founded his investment firm, T. Rowe Price. Between 1937 and 1971, when he sold his firm to his former employees, Price gradually developed a theory that investing was superior to speculating.
Mr. Price is best known for developing the growth stock style of investing. Although he was trained as a chemist, he had a passion for investing. Mr. Price believed that investors could earn superior returns by investing in well-managed companies in fertile fields whose earnings and dividends could be expected to grow faster than inflation and the overall economy. The core of Mr. Price’s approach, proprietary research to guide investment selection and diversification to reduce risk, has remained part of the firm’s principles.
Mr. Price first entered the world of Wall Street Investing in the 1920’s. By 1937 he founded his investment firm, T. Rowe Price. Between 1937 and 1971, when he sold his firm to his former employees, Price gradually developed a theory that investing was superior to speculating.
Mr. Price is best known for developing the growth stock style of investing. Although he was trained as a chemist, he had a passion for investing. Mr. Price believed that investors could earn superior returns by investing in well-managed companies in fertile fields whose earnings and dividends could be expected to grow faster than inflation and the overall economy. The core of Mr. Price’s approach, proprietary research to guide investment selection and diversification to reduce risk, has remained part of the firm’s principles.
全球金融步入寒冬 港股短期易跌難升
市場擔心華府救市方案仍存變數，港股牛皮偏軟，觀望氣氛濃。
˙歐、美銀行業的次按及信貸業務損失巨大，滙豐亦公布裁員千多人，顯示全球金融業步入寒冬。
˙受金融及出口業放緩拖累，本港失業率明年料趨增，港股反彈動力會被削弱。
下周內地股市全周休市，而港股只有四個交易日，短期走勢料由美股主導.
相信下周初段港股表現反覆爭持，到周五才會較為明朗，由於缺乏內地股市指引，交投料較淡靜。技術上，恒指短期支持近18000，阻力近20000，短綫在此範圍上落居多。
花旗在金融危機中最傷
據資料顯示，自去年初以來，全球100多家最大型銀行和證券公司的資本減值和信貸損失總額已經達5,231億美元，金融機構並為此籌募了3,807億美元的資金。在各大金融機構中，花旗集團的資本減值和信貸損失總額最高，達551億美元，而所籌集資金491億美元；美林位居次席，分別為522億美元和299億美元；瑞士銀行名列第三，分別為442億美元和284億美元。
其他主要美國金融機構中，美聯銀行的資本減值和信貸損失總額為227億美元，籌集資金110億美元；美國銀行資本減值212億美元和籌集207億美元；摩根士丹利減值157億美元和集資56億美元；摩根大通減值143億美元和集資97億美元；雷曼兄弟減值138億美元和集資139億美元。美國以外的金融機構中，滙豐控股資本減值和信貸損失總額為274億美元，在所有金融機構中名列第四，籌集資金51億美元；蘇格蘭皇家銀行集團減值145億美元和集資238億美元；德意志銀行減值106億美元和集資62億美元；瑞士信貸減值105億美元和集資30億美元；巴克萊減值79億美元和集資183億美元。
明年失業率勢必趨升
睇完上述一大堆損手數據，歐、美銀行步入寒冬已無可避免，更可能還要面對漫長嚴寒，裁員之消息料陸續有來，其中滙豐昨天宣布本港連同海外將會裁減1,100名員工。由於裁員潮只是開始，本港失業率明年上升已可預期，而樓價下調亦無法避免，市場是買家世界，炒家只能退守，有能力又有置業需要之市民，大可以睇定些，等候低位入市之機會。事實上，自雷曼倒閉後，市民普遍對各類金融產品之風險意識提高，當見到買了迷你債券之苦主慘狀，投資者會擔心所買衍生工具是不是白紙一張，一間公司可以一夜倒閉，若是買樓，樓價或許有升有跌，但至少有層樓實物揸手。
金融股在熊市風險較高
以同樣邏輯，熊市之中，筆者一直以來是首先撇除金融股，因為銀行業講求之互信，熊市草木皆兵下通常好難估銀行股最壞情況有幾壞。相反，一些持實質資產如房產，收租物業，始終有一定實際需求支持，投資這類資產信心較強。同樣，一些石油煤炭股份，所擁有的是油田或煤礦，而油田及煤礦也是實質資產，所謂「爛船都有三斤釘」。因此，觀察到熊市中，房產股及能源股在初期往往同步隨大市下跌，但慢慢地，會隨市場信心逐漸回復，令市場重新注意其實質資產價值，股價跌勢自然放緩，股價找到支持並可進行築底工程，一旦確認底部，股價有望漸回升。
˙歐、美銀行業的次按及信貸業務損失巨大，滙豐亦公布裁員千多人，顯示全球金融業步入寒冬。
˙受金融及出口業放緩拖累，本港失業率明年料趨增，港股反彈動力會被削弱。
下周內地股市全周休市，而港股只有四個交易日，短期走勢料由美股主導.
相信下周初段港股表現反覆爭持，到周五才會較為明朗，由於缺乏內地股市指引，交投料較淡靜。技術上，恒指短期支持近18000，阻力近20000，短綫在此範圍上落居多。
花旗在金融危機中最傷
據資料顯示，自去年初以來，全球100多家最大型銀行和證券公司的資本減值和信貸損失總額已經達5,231億美元，金融機構並為此籌募了3,807億美元的資金。在各大金融機構中，花旗集團的資本減值和信貸損失總額最高，達551億美元，而所籌集資金491億美元；美林位居次席，分別為522億美元和299億美元；瑞士銀行名列第三，分別為442億美元和284億美元。
其他主要美國金融機構中，美聯銀行的資本減值和信貸損失總額為227億美元，籌集資金110億美元；美國銀行資本減值212億美元和籌集207億美元；摩根士丹利減值157億美元和集資56億美元；摩根大通減值143億美元和集資97億美元；雷曼兄弟減值138億美元和集資139億美元。美國以外的金融機構中，滙豐控股資本減值和信貸損失總額為274億美元，在所有金融機構中名列第四，籌集資金51億美元；蘇格蘭皇家銀行集團減值145億美元和集資238億美元；德意志銀行減值106億美元和集資62億美元；瑞士信貸減值105億美元和集資30億美元；巴克萊減值79億美元和集資183億美元。
明年失業率勢必趨升
睇完上述一大堆損手數據，歐、美銀行步入寒冬已無可避免，更可能還要面對漫長嚴寒，裁員之消息料陸續有來，其中滙豐昨天宣布本港連同海外將會裁減1,100名員工。由於裁員潮只是開始，本港失業率明年上升已可預期，而樓價下調亦無法避免，市場是買家世界，炒家只能退守，有能力又有置業需要之市民，大可以睇定些，等候低位入市之機會。事實上，自雷曼倒閉後，市民普遍對各類金融產品之風險意識提高，當見到買了迷你債券之苦主慘狀，投資者會擔心所買衍生工具是不是白紙一張，一間公司可以一夜倒閉，若是買樓，樓價或許有升有跌，但至少有層樓實物揸手。
金融股在熊市風險較高
以同樣邏輯，熊市之中，筆者一直以來是首先撇除金融股，因為銀行業講求之互信，熊市草木皆兵下通常好難估銀行股最壞情況有幾壞。相反，一些持實質資產如房產，收租物業，始終有一定實際需求支持，投資這類資產信心較強。同樣，一些石油煤炭股份，所擁有的是油田或煤礦，而油田及煤礦也是實質資產，所謂「爛船都有三斤釘」。因此，觀察到熊市中，房產股及能源股在初期往往同步隨大市下跌，但慢慢地，會隨市場信心逐漸回復，令市場重新注意其實質資產價值，股價跌勢自然放緩，股價找到支持並可進行築底工程，一旦確認底部，股價有望漸回升。
Marc Faber Says U.S. Rescue Plan Will Fail to Avert Recession
Investor Marc Faber said any proposal to rescue the U.S. financial system will fail to avert a recession in the world's largest economy.
Any stock rally in the event that a package is approved will be temporary and should be used as ``an opportunity'' to sell, said Faber, who predicted the so-called Black Monday crash in 1987. U.S. lawmakers voted yesterday to reject a $700 billion plan worked out by congressional leaders and the administration of President George W. Bush.
``The rejection of the package is good because it shows that some people in the U.S. are still sane,'' Faber said in a phone interview. ``A bailout will not buy the U.S. a way out. The government is less powerful than markets in fixing this mess.''
Faber, publisher of the Gloom, Boom & Doom report, told investors to sell U.S. stocks a week before 1987's so-called Black Monday crash, according to his Web site, and recommended buying gold at the start of its six-year rally. He manages more than $300 million.
Any stock rally in the event that a package is approved will be temporary and should be used as ``an opportunity'' to sell, said Faber, who predicted the so-called Black Monday crash in 1987. U.S. lawmakers voted yesterday to reject a $700 billion plan worked out by congressional leaders and the administration of President George W. Bush.
``The rejection of the package is good because it shows that some people in the U.S. are still sane,'' Faber said in a phone interview. ``A bailout will not buy the U.S. a way out. The government is less powerful than markets in fixing this mess.''
Faber, publisher of the Gloom, Boom & Doom report, told investors to sell U.S. stocks a week before 1987's so-called Black Monday crash, according to his Web site, and recommended buying gold at the start of its six-year rally. He manages more than $300 million.
Sell setup, Sell banks
Last week, we stated the rally in the US stock markets was seen to be countertrend bear rallies and that there were no signs pointing to major lows for the US indices. There is a strong chance of another knee-jerk rally on news that the Paulson bailout plan would be approved by the US Congress. However, do bear in mind that previous rallies on Fed rate cuts and other measures have only led to further declines. This time, the chart formations on the DJIA and the S&P 500 suggest the same. We now lower our resistance target on the DJIA from 10700-10750 to 10600-10650 and expect a decline towards 9500-9600.
In Singapore, we similarly warned that an earlier 270-point advance was highly speculative and risky. We suggested switching into defensive stocks.. Most of these stocks like SIA Engineering, SPH, Parkway Life REIT and FSL Trust have outperformed, even as the STI lost 62% of its gain to reach a low of 2399.
We continue to recommend the same defensive stocks and add CDL Hospitality Trust to the list. There is a strong possibility that the index could rally towards 2520-2535 before heading down towards 2200. We would see any such gains as opportunity to add shorts, in particular to banking stocks. We have been recommending shorts on banking stocks for the past four months, expecting them to at least re-test March lows. We still expect the same. In fact, there is a strong chance that banking stocks could correct at least another 10% from current levels.
In Singapore, we similarly warned that an earlier 270-point advance was highly speculative and risky. We suggested switching into defensive stocks.. Most of these stocks like SIA Engineering, SPH, Parkway Life REIT and FSL Trust have outperformed, even as the STI lost 62% of its gain to reach a low of 2399.
We continue to recommend the same defensive stocks and add CDL Hospitality Trust to the list. There is a strong possibility that the index could rally towards 2520-2535 before heading down towards 2200. We would see any such gains as opportunity to add shorts, in particular to banking stocks. We have been recommending shorts on banking stocks for the past four months, expecting them to at least re-test March lows. We still expect the same. In fact, there is a strong chance that banking stocks could correct at least another 10% from current levels.
Monday, September 29, 2008
环球投资之旅：最为潇洒的吉姆-罗杰斯的知与行
勤奋与投入
吉姆-罗杰斯生于1942。罗杰斯的父亲参加过二次世界大战的老兵，退役后，白天经营一家化工厂，晚上则兼职做会计，父亲为罗杰斯树立了勤奋工作的榜样。即使是现在，罗杰斯也会将他的很多成功都归于勤奋。“我并不觉得自己聪明，但我确实非常、勤奋地工作。如果你能非常努力地工作，也很热爱自己的工作，就有成功的可能”。他说，每个人都梦想着赚很多的钱，但是，我告诉你，这是不容易的。当他还是一个专职的货币经理时，他曾这样讲过：“生活中最重要的事情是工作。在工作做完之前，我不会去做任何其他事情。”
而后在与和索罗斯合作时，这种勤奋被表现得甚至为疯狂，在哥伦市环道上的办公室，他不停地工作——10年期间没有休过一次假。这在后来索罗斯的回忆录中曾经这样写道，“罗杰斯一人干了六个人的活儿。”
对于这段时期的生活，罗杰斯这样说，“再也没有比市场更令我兴奋和开心的了。那就是我想做的一切。我投入了全部精力，总是急着去了解一切能够了解的东西。干这行就像不停地在做四维拼图游戏，无论你做了什么，图件每次都会发生变化，你必须每次重新把它们拼起来。我每天每刻都坐在那里，玩着这种拼图游戏，还得赶在别人之前把图拼出来，没有比这更刺激的了。”
不过罗杰斯获得如此成就并非偶然，他的投资天分从小就已经表现得淋漓尽致了。有资料表明，5岁时他开始做平生第一份工作——在棒球赛场上拣空瓶赚钱。6岁时从父亲那里借了100美元作为做生意的启动资金，购买了一台花生烘烤机，每周五晚上在当地在高中橄榄球比赛时卖烤花生和苏打水。5年后，还清欠款，并在银行的户头存有了100美元。随后，在朝鲜战争期间，他用这100美元和父亲一起到乡下去做投机生意，购买了价格正日益飞涨的牛犊，并出钱让农民饲养，希望次年出售并卖个好价钱。不过这次的投机失败了。直到20年后，罗杰斯从书本上明白了失败的原因，由于买点太高，使他们的投资被战后价格的回落吞噬得一干二净。
独立的投资思维
摆脱了量子基金每日 18小时的工作后，罗杰斯没有再加盟任何一家投资公司。他尝试转型为专家，时常在商业电视节目中抛头露面。为了得到哥伦比亚大学体育馆的终身会员资格，他同意在该大学商学院教授 证券分析课程，以此作为交换。他最终成了一名全职教授。
罗杰斯认为投资者最重要的事情就是发展独立思考的能力。也许是投资经历让罗杰斯有着更多的感悟，他一直认为学经济的最好办法是投资做生意。他在哥伦比亚大学商学院讲学时，他教的不是那种经济学院里通常学的金融课，他教授学生他所知道的东西，教学生按他投资的方法去投资，按他的思路去看市场和机会。沃伦-巴菲特曾参加过他的一个班，“那是绝对令人激动的……他将真实的投资世界带入教室。”巴菲特认为罗杰斯对市场大趋势的把握无人能及。
与索罗斯分道扬镳后，罗杰斯始终没有抗拒过投资机会对他的诱惑。他“以自己的方式投资”，开始了他让人目眩神迷的独立投资生涯。罗杰斯“把赌注押在国家上”的投资风格体现得淋漓尽致。他用西方金融家的眼光，洞察所到之处的投资机会，并亲身实践。如果他确定一个国家比众人相信的更加有前途时，他就会在其他的投资者意识到之前，先把赌注投入到这个国家，并获得了巨大成功。
1999年，罗杰斯在其第二次环球投资旅行时曾在上海证券交易所开户，并对B股市场有过一番高论。他说B股股指已从高位下跌85%，考虑到中国的惊人潜力，投资价值之大不言而喻。此后事情的发展更验证了他的判断，1999年上海B股指数只有50多点，而2001年最高到达240多点，两年多的时间获得4-6倍的利润。
罗杰斯认为，“我喜欢赚钱，让我们一起赚钱吧。最重要的是，你要知道一个非常简单的道理，低买高卖。
罗杰斯最喜欢的地方是曼哈顿上西区那套 5 层维多利亚式洋房。这座房子是一位富商于 1899 年建造的。罗杰斯用很多富有异国情调的东西来装饰它，如北极熊皮制成的地毯，还有他从阿拉斯加买来的猛象长牙。1977 年，罗杰斯从第二位房主那里买来一套房子，当时纽约市处于破产边缘，房市一落千丈。他花了 10.5 万美元，而今这座房子价值逾 1500 万美元。
现在，如果你见到罗杰斯，就可以很清楚地发现，他的女儿毫无疑问已是他生活的中心。不过，罗杰斯没有为女儿购买股票，但却给她买了白金、黄金等商品。罗杰斯风趣地说：“感谢上帝，我拥有一个女儿，学着中文，钱存在瑞士，还持有大量白银和黄金。”罗杰斯认为，在过去的10~20年当中，全球股票有一个巨大的增长。在未来的10~15年内，美国和西方股票市场只会在目前的水平上窄幅波动。只要买入就能赚钱的年代已经过去。在未来的几年内，大家应该关注原油和原材料市场。原材料市场在上世纪八、九十年代一直处于巨大的熊市之中。现在，原材料市场已经开始启动，并可能在未来的10~0年内有一个持续的成长。一个长期的熊市已经结束，而一个大牛市刚刚开始。
同样罗杰斯表示，他的小女儿虽然开了银行账户，有瑞士的，有中国的，但没有美国的银行账户，因为他不看好美国经济。罗杰斯告诉大家，他的小女儿正在学中文，因为当今世界最重要最显着的变化是中国的崛起。“将来有一天，我会把全部的钱，都投资在中国。”而同样的论断在罗杰斯第一次环游世界时，拍摄播出的“机车长征”纪录片中有过，罗杰斯预测中国前途无量。
吉姆-罗杰斯投资哲理
●学习历史和哲学吧，干什么都比进商学院好；当服务员，去远东旅行。
●发现低买高卖的机会的办法，是寻找那些未被认识到的，或未被发现的概念或者变化。
●每当中央银行在维护某种东西的低价位时，聪明的投资者就会反其道而行之。不管赌什么，永远跟中央银行相反。
●投资的铁律就是正确认识供求关系。
●埋头苦读很有用处。必须独立思考，必须抛开羊群心理。
●绝不赔钱法则。除非你真的了解自己在干什么，否则什么也别做。
●价值投资法则。如果你是因为商品具有实际价值而买进，即使买进的时机不对，你也不至于遭到重大亏损。
●投资的法则之一是袖手不管，等到市场有新状况发生时才采取行动。
点评：在别人的眼里，罗杰斯是那么的潇洒自在。37岁退休，然后环游世界。但他自己并不认为投资这项工作很轻松，只是自己的兴趣所在。罗杰斯是喜欢冒险的资本家，更倾向于观察和感知真实的世界，而不是坐在办公室里看各种图表。他是第一个驾驶摩托车穿越中国的人，当时是1984年，他在小镇上接受医生的针灸治疗，在公园里的简易舞厅和年轻人跳狐步舞。之后他又曾经三次穿越中国，亲眼目睹中国发生的巨大变化。甚至可以这么说：罗杰斯比很多中国人都“中国通”，那么他看好中国显然是有说服力的。把兴趣和工作完全结合，用实地调查作为投资分析的重要补充，罗杰斯对投资事业的态度确实值得我们思考。
吉姆-罗杰斯生于1942。罗杰斯的父亲参加过二次世界大战的老兵，退役后，白天经营一家化工厂，晚上则兼职做会计，父亲为罗杰斯树立了勤奋工作的榜样。即使是现在，罗杰斯也会将他的很多成功都归于勤奋。“我并不觉得自己聪明，但我确实非常、勤奋地工作。如果你能非常努力地工作，也很热爱自己的工作，就有成功的可能”。他说，每个人都梦想着赚很多的钱，但是，我告诉你，这是不容易的。当他还是一个专职的货币经理时，他曾这样讲过：“生活中最重要的事情是工作。在工作做完之前，我不会去做任何其他事情。”
而后在与和索罗斯合作时，这种勤奋被表现得甚至为疯狂，在哥伦市环道上的办公室，他不停地工作——10年期间没有休过一次假。这在后来索罗斯的回忆录中曾经这样写道，“罗杰斯一人干了六个人的活儿。”
对于这段时期的生活，罗杰斯这样说，“再也没有比市场更令我兴奋和开心的了。那就是我想做的一切。我投入了全部精力，总是急着去了解一切能够了解的东西。干这行就像不停地在做四维拼图游戏，无论你做了什么，图件每次都会发生变化，你必须每次重新把它们拼起来。我每天每刻都坐在那里，玩着这种拼图游戏，还得赶在别人之前把图拼出来，没有比这更刺激的了。”
不过罗杰斯获得如此成就并非偶然，他的投资天分从小就已经表现得淋漓尽致了。有资料表明，5岁时他开始做平生第一份工作——在棒球赛场上拣空瓶赚钱。6岁时从父亲那里借了100美元作为做生意的启动资金，购买了一台花生烘烤机，每周五晚上在当地在高中橄榄球比赛时卖烤花生和苏打水。5年后，还清欠款，并在银行的户头存有了100美元。随后，在朝鲜战争期间，他用这100美元和父亲一起到乡下去做投机生意，购买了价格正日益飞涨的牛犊，并出钱让农民饲养，希望次年出售并卖个好价钱。不过这次的投机失败了。直到20年后，罗杰斯从书本上明白了失败的原因，由于买点太高，使他们的投资被战后价格的回落吞噬得一干二净。
独立的投资思维
摆脱了量子基金每日 18小时的工作后，罗杰斯没有再加盟任何一家投资公司。他尝试转型为专家，时常在商业电视节目中抛头露面。为了得到哥伦比亚大学体育馆的终身会员资格，他同意在该大学商学院教授 证券分析课程，以此作为交换。他最终成了一名全职教授。
罗杰斯认为投资者最重要的事情就是发展独立思考的能力。也许是投资经历让罗杰斯有着更多的感悟，他一直认为学经济的最好办法是投资做生意。他在哥伦比亚大学商学院讲学时，他教的不是那种经济学院里通常学的金融课，他教授学生他所知道的东西，教学生按他投资的方法去投资，按他的思路去看市场和机会。沃伦-巴菲特曾参加过他的一个班，“那是绝对令人激动的……他将真实的投资世界带入教室。”巴菲特认为罗杰斯对市场大趋势的把握无人能及。
与索罗斯分道扬镳后，罗杰斯始终没有抗拒过投资机会对他的诱惑。他“以自己的方式投资”，开始了他让人目眩神迷的独立投资生涯。罗杰斯“把赌注押在国家上”的投资风格体现得淋漓尽致。他用西方金融家的眼光，洞察所到之处的投资机会，并亲身实践。如果他确定一个国家比众人相信的更加有前途时，他就会在其他的投资者意识到之前，先把赌注投入到这个国家，并获得了巨大成功。
1999年，罗杰斯在其第二次环球投资旅行时曾在上海证券交易所开户，并对B股市场有过一番高论。他说B股股指已从高位下跌85%，考虑到中国的惊人潜力，投资价值之大不言而喻。此后事情的发展更验证了他的判断，1999年上海B股指数只有50多点，而2001年最高到达240多点，两年多的时间获得4-6倍的利润。
罗杰斯认为，“我喜欢赚钱，让我们一起赚钱吧。最重要的是，你要知道一个非常简单的道理，低买高卖。
罗杰斯最喜欢的地方是曼哈顿上西区那套 5 层维多利亚式洋房。这座房子是一位富商于 1899 年建造的。罗杰斯用很多富有异国情调的东西来装饰它，如北极熊皮制成的地毯，还有他从阿拉斯加买来的猛象长牙。1977 年，罗杰斯从第二位房主那里买来一套房子，当时纽约市处于破产边缘，房市一落千丈。他花了 10.5 万美元，而今这座房子价值逾 1500 万美元。
现在，如果你见到罗杰斯，就可以很清楚地发现，他的女儿毫无疑问已是他生活的中心。不过，罗杰斯没有为女儿购买股票，但却给她买了白金、黄金等商品。罗杰斯风趣地说：“感谢上帝，我拥有一个女儿，学着中文，钱存在瑞士，还持有大量白银和黄金。”罗杰斯认为，在过去的10~20年当中，全球股票有一个巨大的增长。在未来的10~15年内，美国和西方股票市场只会在目前的水平上窄幅波动。只要买入就能赚钱的年代已经过去。在未来的几年内，大家应该关注原油和原材料市场。原材料市场在上世纪八、九十年代一直处于巨大的熊市之中。现在，原材料市场已经开始启动，并可能在未来的10~0年内有一个持续的成长。一个长期的熊市已经结束，而一个大牛市刚刚开始。
同样罗杰斯表示，他的小女儿虽然开了银行账户，有瑞士的，有中国的，但没有美国的银行账户，因为他不看好美国经济。罗杰斯告诉大家，他的小女儿正在学中文，因为当今世界最重要最显着的变化是中国的崛起。“将来有一天，我会把全部的钱，都投资在中国。”而同样的论断在罗杰斯第一次环游世界时，拍摄播出的“机车长征”纪录片中有过，罗杰斯预测中国前途无量。
吉姆-罗杰斯投资哲理
●学习历史和哲学吧，干什么都比进商学院好；当服务员，去远东旅行。
●发现低买高卖的机会的办法，是寻找那些未被认识到的，或未被发现的概念或者变化。
●每当中央银行在维护某种东西的低价位时，聪明的投资者就会反其道而行之。不管赌什么，永远跟中央银行相反。
●投资的铁律就是正确认识供求关系。
●埋头苦读很有用处。必须独立思考，必须抛开羊群心理。
●绝不赔钱法则。除非你真的了解自己在干什么，否则什么也别做。
●价值投资法则。如果你是因为商品具有实际价值而买进，即使买进的时机不对，你也不至于遭到重大亏损。
●投资的法则之一是袖手不管，等到市场有新状况发生时才采取行动。
点评：在别人的眼里，罗杰斯是那么的潇洒自在。37岁退休，然后环游世界。但他自己并不认为投资这项工作很轻松，只是自己的兴趣所在。罗杰斯是喜欢冒险的资本家，更倾向于观察和感知真实的世界，而不是坐在办公室里看各种图表。他是第一个驾驶摩托车穿越中国的人，当时是1984年，他在小镇上接受医生的针灸治疗，在公园里的简易舞厅和年轻人跳狐步舞。之后他又曾经三次穿越中国，亲眼目睹中国发生的巨大变化。甚至可以这么说：罗杰斯比很多中国人都“中国通”，那么他看好中国显然是有说服力的。把兴趣和工作完全结合，用实地调查作为投资分析的重要补充，罗杰斯对投资事业的态度确实值得我们思考。
彼得·林奇功成身退
彼得·林奇出生于1944年,1990年46岁退休。13年资产从1800万美元增至140亿美元，年复式增长29%。
林奇管理麦哲伦基金13年林奇悄无声息的创造了一个奇迹和神话！麦哲伦基金管理的资产规模由2000万美元成长至140亿美元，成为当时全球资产管理金额最大的基金。
于很多人而言，彼得·林奇是一个没有“周末焦虑症”的“死多头”，股市调整对他而言只意味着廉价建仓的机会到了，他都不太像一个股市中人，因为他的心态是如此的平和，但也正是因为这样，他才取得了如此巨大的成就！
勤奋得令人惊讶
林奇非常勤奋，他每月走访公司40~50家，一年500~600家，林奇在1982年回答“什么是你成功的秘密”时说：”我每年要访问200家以上的公司并阅读700份年度报告。”不管怎样，这个数量是够惊人的。林奇不仅调研美国的上市公司，而且还到海外去寻找好股票，他曾坦承：”除了约翰·坦普，我是第一个重仓持有国外股票的国内基金经理”。结婚20年，林奇只度过两个专门假期
林奇在位期间的一些数据让人惊讶—
他一年的行程达10万英里，也就是一个工作日要走400英里。
早晨6:15他就乘车去办公室，晚上19:15才回家，路上一直都在阅读。
每天午餐他都跟一家公司洽谈。
他大约要听取200个经纪人的意见，通常一天他要接到数十个经纪人的电话，每10个电话中他大约要回一个，但一般只交谈90秒钟，并多次提示一些关键性的问题。
他和他的研究助手每个月要对将近2000个公司调查一遍，假定每打一个电话5分钟，那么就需要每周花上40个小时。
与林奇相比，中国的基金经理们一定会汗颜。我敢肯定，中国目前最勤勉的基金经理的工作强度顶多是林奇的1/3，而一般的经理也就是林奇的1/10左右，甚至更少。
1991年，就在他最颠峰的时刻，林奇却选择退休，离开共同基金的圈子。
当然他也受够了每周工作80个小时的生活，于是，和其他伟大的投资人和交易商一样，彼得·林奇带着赚来的钱，干干脆脆的离了场。
虽然他是亿万富翁，他让别人也成为了亿万富翁，但他却不是金钱的奴隶，而是主人。
成功秘诀
心态平和，稳中取胜。
纤毫小事中觅先机。
对大势与个股关系的看法：
林奇认为赢输实际和市场的关系不大，股市不过是用来验证一下是否有人在做傻事的地方。不能依赖市场来带动手里的股票上扬。 从不相信谁能预测市场。 对林奇来说，投资只是赌博的一种，没有100%安全的投资工具。
名言及观念：
“不做研究就投资，和玩扑克牌不看牌面一样盲目。”
投资前三个问题：1、你有物业吗？ 2、你有余钱投资吗？ 3、你有赚钱能力吗？
不少投资者选购股票的认真程度竟不如日常的消费购物，如果把购物时货比三家的认真用于选股，会节省更多的钱。
林奇管理麦哲伦基金13年林奇悄无声息的创造了一个奇迹和神话！麦哲伦基金管理的资产规模由2000万美元成长至140亿美元，成为当时全球资产管理金额最大的基金。
于很多人而言，彼得·林奇是一个没有“周末焦虑症”的“死多头”，股市调整对他而言只意味着廉价建仓的机会到了，他都不太像一个股市中人，因为他的心态是如此的平和，但也正是因为这样，他才取得了如此巨大的成就！
勤奋得令人惊讶
林奇非常勤奋，他每月走访公司40~50家，一年500~600家，林奇在1982年回答“什么是你成功的秘密”时说：”我每年要访问200家以上的公司并阅读700份年度报告。”不管怎样，这个数量是够惊人的。林奇不仅调研美国的上市公司，而且还到海外去寻找好股票，他曾坦承：”除了约翰·坦普，我是第一个重仓持有国外股票的国内基金经理”。结婚20年，林奇只度过两个专门假期
林奇在位期间的一些数据让人惊讶—
他一年的行程达10万英里，也就是一个工作日要走400英里。
早晨6:15他就乘车去办公室，晚上19:15才回家，路上一直都在阅读。
每天午餐他都跟一家公司洽谈。
他大约要听取200个经纪人的意见，通常一天他要接到数十个经纪人的电话，每10个电话中他大约要回一个，但一般只交谈90秒钟，并多次提示一些关键性的问题。
他和他的研究助手每个月要对将近2000个公司调查一遍，假定每打一个电话5分钟，那么就需要每周花上40个小时。
与林奇相比，中国的基金经理们一定会汗颜。我敢肯定，中国目前最勤勉的基金经理的工作强度顶多是林奇的1/3，而一般的经理也就是林奇的1/10左右，甚至更少。
1991年，就在他最颠峰的时刻，林奇却选择退休，离开共同基金的圈子。
当然他也受够了每周工作80个小时的生活，于是，和其他伟大的投资人和交易商一样，彼得·林奇带着赚来的钱，干干脆脆的离了场。
虽然他是亿万富翁，他让别人也成为了亿万富翁，但他却不是金钱的奴隶，而是主人。
成功秘诀
心态平和，稳中取胜。
纤毫小事中觅先机。
对大势与个股关系的看法：
林奇认为赢输实际和市场的关系不大，股市不过是用来验证一下是否有人在做傻事的地方。不能依赖市场来带动手里的股票上扬。 从不相信谁能预测市场。 对林奇来说，投资只是赌博的一种，没有100%安全的投资工具。
名言及观念：
“不做研究就投资，和玩扑克牌不看牌面一样盲目。”
投资前三个问题：1、你有物业吗？ 2、你有余钱投资吗？ 3、你有赚钱能力吗？
不少投资者选购股票的认真程度竟不如日常的消费购物，如果把购物时货比三家的认真用于选股，会节省更多的钱。
价值投资三原则
人类学家告诉我们：人类最强的三个欲望分别是财富、地位和权力，而财富则排在三个欲望之首。
正在或者准备走价值投资之路的朋友或许都在思考这样一个问题：价值投资一定能让我们实现自己的财富梦想吗？对于这样一个问题，价值投资实践的集大成者巴菲特如是说：“价值投资并不能充分保证我们投资盈利，因为我们不仅要在合理的价格上买入，而且我们买入的公司的未来业绩还要与我们的估计相符。”换句话说，价值投资之路并非坦途，其未来其实是充满了诸多变数和不确定性，从这一点说，价值投资与其他的投资（投机）路径没有太多的分别。然而，老巴最后话锋一转：“但是价值投资给我们提供了走向真正成功的惟一机会。”大师毕竟是大师，话语简洁，掷地有声。这是一个成功者所下的断语，价值投资者在细节上的一切探讨都是以这句话为前提的。
内在价值：最接近的就是赢家
人类财富史上有文字记载的最早的财富交换发生在古巴比伦和古埃及国王之间。交换的财富包括布匹、香料、家具、青铜器、珠宝和黄金。这样大规模的财富交换无疑蕴含着价值判断的逻辑在内。
而对价值的判断恰恰是价值投资的前提、基础和核心。
价值投资，简而言之，就是在一家公司股票的市场价格相对于其内在价值有较大折扣时买入。内在价值在理论上的定义就是一家企业在其余下的寿命中可以产生的现金的折现值。但是问题来了，一家企业余下的寿命到底有多长？能产生多少现金？这本身就充满了悬念，以这个充满了悬念的现金流为基础而形成的判断有多大的可信度?再有，折现率该如何确定？在不同的时点、不同的投资人会有不同选择，据以计算的价值必然是失之毫厘、差之千里。如果不能做到精确的价值评估，又怎能知道应该在什么价位购买股票？如果说这是价值投资人最大的困惑所在，当不为过。
关于内在价值的计算，巴菲特最主要的合伙人查理·芒格曾说过一句耐人寻味的话：巴菲特常常提到现金流量，但我却从未看到他做过什么计算。
巴菲特本人对于内在价值的计算最为详细的叙述出现在1996年致巴克夏公司股东的信中：“内在价值是估计值，而不是精确值，而且它还是在利率变化或者对未来现金流的预测修正时必须相应改变的估计值。此外，两个人根据完全相同的事实进行估值，几乎总是不可避免地得出至少是略有不同的内在价值估计值，即使对于我和查理来说也是如此，这正是我们从不对外公布我们对内在价值估计值的一个原因。”此外，巴菲特还坦承：“我们只是对于估计一小部分股票的内在价值还有点自信，但也只限于一个价值区间，而绝非那些貌似精确实为谬误的数字。价值评估既是艺术，又是科学。”与一些市场人士的想法不同，笔者更倾向于认为巴菲特这番话是真的坦诚而非卖关子。因为我们常常看到，在证券市场上，过度追求精确量化往往不会带来好的后果。最典型的例子莫过于大名鼎鼎的美国LTCM（长期资本管理公司），其高管包括1997年诺贝尔经济学奖得主、“期权定价模型之父”默顿（Robert Merton）和舒尔茨（Myron Schols）、美国前财政部副部长及联储副主席莫里斯（David Mullis）等学术界及政经界要人，堪称梦幻组合。1990年诺贝尔经济学奖获得者威廉·夏普称其为“也许是世界上学术水平最高的金融机构”，在华尔街与量子基金齐名。从运作方式上看，LTCM是通过运用电脑建立数量模型分析金融工具价格，再利用不同证券的市场价格差异进行操作，是投资界精确量化的祖师，却也难逃失败命运。LTCM曾经是如此成功——3年盈利增长2.84倍，一度成为市场唯马首是瞻的旗舰。然而就是这样一泰斗级的公司，也创造了另一项金融记录——150天亏损超过50亿美元，亏损率超过90%。正如同中国古代的项羽，百战百胜，一败而失天下。
或许，但凡介于科学和艺术层面之间的东西，都要用到中国古人说的一句话：运用之妙，存乎一心。巴菲特爱引用凯恩斯的一句话“宁要模糊的正确，不要精确的错误”，也是异曲同工。尽管我们相信在某一个特定的时空，某一公司的价值只有一个，我们也只能力求最大限度地逼进它。而赢家却总是相对的。
安全边际：越耐心越能得到
巴菲特曾在他的老师、现代证券分析创始人、人称华尔街教父的格雷厄姆那里学到两条投资规则：第一，永远不要亏损;第二，永远不要忘记第一条。
那么，如何才能做到不亏损？
格雷厄姆自己给出的答案是：“我大胆地将成功投资的秘诀精炼成四个字的座右铭：安全边际。”作为为价值投资的核心概念，如果说安全边际在整个价值投资领域中处于至高无上的地位，并不为过。它的定义非常简单而朴素：实质价值或内在价值与价格的顺差，换一种更通俗的说法，安全边际就是价值与价格相比被低估的程度或幅度。
根据定义，只有当价值被低估的时候才存在安全边际或安全边际为正，当价值与价格相当的时候安全边际为零，而当价值被高估的时候不存在安全边际或安全边际为负。价值投资者只对价值被低估特别是被严重低估的对象感兴趣。安全边际不保证能避免损失，但能保证获利的机会比损失的机会更多。
凡事喜欢精确的那些读者可能要再次失望了：原来与内在价值一样，所谓的安全边际也是一个模糊的概念，比如仅从定义我们不能确定实质价值或内在价值与价格的顺差达到什么程度才能说安全边际就是足够，并可以买入股票。
巴非特指出：“我们的股票投资策略持续有效的前提是，我们可以用具有吸引力的价格买到有吸引力的股票。对投资人来说，买入一家优秀公司的股票时支付过高的价格，将抵消这家绩优企业未来10年所创造的价值。”这就是说，忽视安全边际，即使买入优秀企业的股票，也会因买价过高而难以盈利。这一点，对于当今的中国股市，尤具警醒作用。
可以说，安全边际在理念上与传统的“富贵险中求”投资观念是截然相反的。它告诉你：如果你想要谋发达你一定不要冒风险。在每次做投资决策或投资活动中，我们一定是希望我们的风险降到最小，同时希望每次投资活动中都能取得收益的最大化。
如果想要的安全边际迟迟不来怎么办呢？那么只有两个字：等待。在我们一生的投资过程中，我们不希望也不需要每天都去做交易，很多时候我们会手持现金，耐心等待，由于市场交易群体的无理性，在不确定的时间段内，比如3至5年的周期里，总会等到一个完美的高安全边际的时刻。换句话说，市场的无效性总会带来价值低估的机会，那么这个时候就是你出手的时候。就如非洲草原的狮子，它在没有猎物的时候更多的是在草丛中慢慢的等，很有耐心地观察周围情况，直到猎物进入伏击范围才迅疾出手。如果你的投资组合里累计了很多次这样的投资成果，从长期看，你一定会取得远远超出市场回报的机会。所以安全边际的核心就在把握风险和收益的关系。
从防御角度说，对安全边际的掌握更多是一种生存的艺术。投资如行军打仗，首先确保不被敌人消灭掉是作战的第一要素，否则一切都将无从谈起。这一点在牛市氛围中，在泡沫化严重的市场里，显得尤为重要。
安全边际并不是孤立的，它是以“内在价值”为基础的，在“内在价值”的计算中，预期收益率是最有弹性的参数，预期收益率的上升和安全边际的扩大都趋向了一个结果，那就是相对低的买入价格。而就操作的层面而言，阶段性的仓位比例控制也可以视为运用安全边际的辅佐手段。
格雷厄姆和巴菲特这两个大师级的人物之所以都非常强调安全边际原则，之所以都要求一定的安全边际，其根本原因就在于，影响股票市场价格和公司经营的因素非常庞杂。而相对来说，人的预测能力是非常有限的，很容易出现预测失误。有了较大的安全边际，即使我们对公司价值的评估有一定误差、市场价格在较长时间内仍低于价值、公司发展受到暂时的挫折，都不会妨碍我们投资资本的安全性以及保证我们取得最低程度的满意报酬率。这就是安全边际原则的精髓所在。
市场波动：不可预测的加码买入机会
股票市场每天的波动都是惊人的，这既是诱惑又是陷阱。
“市场从来不是一台根据证券的内在品质而精确地客观地记录其价值的计量器，而是汇集了无数人部分出于理性（事实）部分出于感性（理念和观点）的选择的投票器。”这就是市场波动的由来。
早知道波动总是难免的，又何必劳心伤神。
格雷厄姆在去世前几个月的时候说：“如果说我在华尔街60多年的经验中发现过什么的话，那就是从来没有人能够成功地预测股市波动。”对于市场的价格波动，格雷厄姆还有一个著名的“市场先生”的寓言：就是设想自己在与一个叫市场先生的人进行股票交易，“市场先生”的特点是情绪很不稳定。因此，在他高兴的日子里，他会报出较高的价格，相反懊恼时，就会报出很低的价格。按现在通行的话说，市场常常会犯错。而一个出色的价值投资者会充分利用这种错误。设想有一天交易的时候，“市场先生”突然情绪沮丧，报出了一个低得离谱的价格，那么在这种情况下，投机客常常会按照“鳄鱼原则”的要求止损离场，而价值投资者呢？恰恰相反，会继续加码买入！这就是两种不同的价值观主导下的两种截然相反的交易策略。这就是巴菲特告诫我们的：要把市场波动看做你的朋友而不是敌人。
事实上，仅以巴菲特旗下的巴克夏公司来说，在1973年－1974年的经济衰退期间，它的股票价格从每股90美元跌至每股40美元。在1987年的股灾中，股票价格从每股大约4000美元跌至3000美元。在1990年－1991年的海湾战争期间，它再次遭到重创，股票价格从每股8900美元急剧跌至5500美元。在1998年－2000年期间，巴克夏公司宣布收购通用再保险公司（GeneralRe）之后，它的股价也从1998年中期的每股大约80000美元跌至2000年初的40800美元。可以想见，在这些时候，巴菲特在股票投资方面所受的沉重打击和巨大精神压力。如果按照“鳄鱼原则”，巴菲特应该不知道止损离场多少次了，但那样，我们也不会看到今天的“股神”。
正在或者准备走价值投资之路的朋友或许都在思考这样一个问题：价值投资一定能让我们实现自己的财富梦想吗？对于这样一个问题，价值投资实践的集大成者巴菲特如是说：“价值投资并不能充分保证我们投资盈利，因为我们不仅要在合理的价格上买入，而且我们买入的公司的未来业绩还要与我们的估计相符。”换句话说，价值投资之路并非坦途，其未来其实是充满了诸多变数和不确定性，从这一点说，价值投资与其他的投资（投机）路径没有太多的分别。然而，老巴最后话锋一转：“但是价值投资给我们提供了走向真正成功的惟一机会。”大师毕竟是大师，话语简洁，掷地有声。这是一个成功者所下的断语，价值投资者在细节上的一切探讨都是以这句话为前提的。
内在价值：最接近的就是赢家
人类财富史上有文字记载的最早的财富交换发生在古巴比伦和古埃及国王之间。交换的财富包括布匹、香料、家具、青铜器、珠宝和黄金。这样大规模的财富交换无疑蕴含着价值判断的逻辑在内。
而对价值的判断恰恰是价值投资的前提、基础和核心。
价值投资，简而言之，就是在一家公司股票的市场价格相对于其内在价值有较大折扣时买入。内在价值在理论上的定义就是一家企业在其余下的寿命中可以产生的现金的折现值。但是问题来了，一家企业余下的寿命到底有多长？能产生多少现金？这本身就充满了悬念，以这个充满了悬念的现金流为基础而形成的判断有多大的可信度?再有，折现率该如何确定？在不同的时点、不同的投资人会有不同选择，据以计算的价值必然是失之毫厘、差之千里。如果不能做到精确的价值评估，又怎能知道应该在什么价位购买股票？如果说这是价值投资人最大的困惑所在，当不为过。
关于内在价值的计算，巴菲特最主要的合伙人查理·芒格曾说过一句耐人寻味的话：巴菲特常常提到现金流量，但我却从未看到他做过什么计算。
巴菲特本人对于内在价值的计算最为详细的叙述出现在1996年致巴克夏公司股东的信中：“内在价值是估计值，而不是精确值，而且它还是在利率变化或者对未来现金流的预测修正时必须相应改变的估计值。此外，两个人根据完全相同的事实进行估值，几乎总是不可避免地得出至少是略有不同的内在价值估计值，即使对于我和查理来说也是如此，这正是我们从不对外公布我们对内在价值估计值的一个原因。”此外，巴菲特还坦承：“我们只是对于估计一小部分股票的内在价值还有点自信，但也只限于一个价值区间，而绝非那些貌似精确实为谬误的数字。价值评估既是艺术，又是科学。”与一些市场人士的想法不同，笔者更倾向于认为巴菲特这番话是真的坦诚而非卖关子。因为我们常常看到，在证券市场上，过度追求精确量化往往不会带来好的后果。最典型的例子莫过于大名鼎鼎的美国LTCM（长期资本管理公司），其高管包括1997年诺贝尔经济学奖得主、“期权定价模型之父”默顿（Robert Merton）和舒尔茨（Myron Schols）、美国前财政部副部长及联储副主席莫里斯（David Mullis）等学术界及政经界要人，堪称梦幻组合。1990年诺贝尔经济学奖获得者威廉·夏普称其为“也许是世界上学术水平最高的金融机构”，在华尔街与量子基金齐名。从运作方式上看，LTCM是通过运用电脑建立数量模型分析金融工具价格，再利用不同证券的市场价格差异进行操作，是投资界精确量化的祖师，却也难逃失败命运。LTCM曾经是如此成功——3年盈利增长2.84倍，一度成为市场唯马首是瞻的旗舰。然而就是这样一泰斗级的公司，也创造了另一项金融记录——150天亏损超过50亿美元，亏损率超过90%。正如同中国古代的项羽，百战百胜，一败而失天下。
或许，但凡介于科学和艺术层面之间的东西，都要用到中国古人说的一句话：运用之妙，存乎一心。巴菲特爱引用凯恩斯的一句话“宁要模糊的正确，不要精确的错误”，也是异曲同工。尽管我们相信在某一个特定的时空，某一公司的价值只有一个，我们也只能力求最大限度地逼进它。而赢家却总是相对的。
安全边际：越耐心越能得到
巴菲特曾在他的老师、现代证券分析创始人、人称华尔街教父的格雷厄姆那里学到两条投资规则：第一，永远不要亏损;第二，永远不要忘记第一条。
那么，如何才能做到不亏损？
格雷厄姆自己给出的答案是：“我大胆地将成功投资的秘诀精炼成四个字的座右铭：安全边际。”作为为价值投资的核心概念，如果说安全边际在整个价值投资领域中处于至高无上的地位，并不为过。它的定义非常简单而朴素：实质价值或内在价值与价格的顺差，换一种更通俗的说法，安全边际就是价值与价格相比被低估的程度或幅度。
根据定义，只有当价值被低估的时候才存在安全边际或安全边际为正，当价值与价格相当的时候安全边际为零，而当价值被高估的时候不存在安全边际或安全边际为负。价值投资者只对价值被低估特别是被严重低估的对象感兴趣。安全边际不保证能避免损失，但能保证获利的机会比损失的机会更多。
凡事喜欢精确的那些读者可能要再次失望了：原来与内在价值一样，所谓的安全边际也是一个模糊的概念，比如仅从定义我们不能确定实质价值或内在价值与价格的顺差达到什么程度才能说安全边际就是足够，并可以买入股票。
巴非特指出：“我们的股票投资策略持续有效的前提是，我们可以用具有吸引力的价格买到有吸引力的股票。对投资人来说，买入一家优秀公司的股票时支付过高的价格，将抵消这家绩优企业未来10年所创造的价值。”这就是说，忽视安全边际，即使买入优秀企业的股票，也会因买价过高而难以盈利。这一点，对于当今的中国股市，尤具警醒作用。
可以说，安全边际在理念上与传统的“富贵险中求”投资观念是截然相反的。它告诉你：如果你想要谋发达你一定不要冒风险。在每次做投资决策或投资活动中，我们一定是希望我们的风险降到最小，同时希望每次投资活动中都能取得收益的最大化。
如果想要的安全边际迟迟不来怎么办呢？那么只有两个字：等待。在我们一生的投资过程中，我们不希望也不需要每天都去做交易，很多时候我们会手持现金，耐心等待，由于市场交易群体的无理性，在不确定的时间段内，比如3至5年的周期里，总会等到一个完美的高安全边际的时刻。换句话说，市场的无效性总会带来价值低估的机会，那么这个时候就是你出手的时候。就如非洲草原的狮子，它在没有猎物的时候更多的是在草丛中慢慢的等，很有耐心地观察周围情况，直到猎物进入伏击范围才迅疾出手。如果你的投资组合里累计了很多次这样的投资成果，从长期看，你一定会取得远远超出市场回报的机会。所以安全边际的核心就在把握风险和收益的关系。
从防御角度说，对安全边际的掌握更多是一种生存的艺术。投资如行军打仗，首先确保不被敌人消灭掉是作战的第一要素，否则一切都将无从谈起。这一点在牛市氛围中，在泡沫化严重的市场里，显得尤为重要。
安全边际并不是孤立的，它是以“内在价值”为基础的，在“内在价值”的计算中，预期收益率是最有弹性的参数，预期收益率的上升和安全边际的扩大都趋向了一个结果，那就是相对低的买入价格。而就操作的层面而言，阶段性的仓位比例控制也可以视为运用安全边际的辅佐手段。
格雷厄姆和巴菲特这两个大师级的人物之所以都非常强调安全边际原则，之所以都要求一定的安全边际，其根本原因就在于，影响股票市场价格和公司经营的因素非常庞杂。而相对来说，人的预测能力是非常有限的，很容易出现预测失误。有了较大的安全边际，即使我们对公司价值的评估有一定误差、市场价格在较长时间内仍低于价值、公司发展受到暂时的挫折，都不会妨碍我们投资资本的安全性以及保证我们取得最低程度的满意报酬率。这就是安全边际原则的精髓所在。
市场波动：不可预测的加码买入机会
股票市场每天的波动都是惊人的，这既是诱惑又是陷阱。
“市场从来不是一台根据证券的内在品质而精确地客观地记录其价值的计量器，而是汇集了无数人部分出于理性（事实）部分出于感性（理念和观点）的选择的投票器。”这就是市场波动的由来。
早知道波动总是难免的，又何必劳心伤神。
格雷厄姆在去世前几个月的时候说：“如果说我在华尔街60多年的经验中发现过什么的话，那就是从来没有人能够成功地预测股市波动。”对于市场的价格波动，格雷厄姆还有一个著名的“市场先生”的寓言：就是设想自己在与一个叫市场先生的人进行股票交易，“市场先生”的特点是情绪很不稳定。因此，在他高兴的日子里，他会报出较高的价格，相反懊恼时，就会报出很低的价格。按现在通行的话说，市场常常会犯错。而一个出色的价值投资者会充分利用这种错误。设想有一天交易的时候，“市场先生”突然情绪沮丧，报出了一个低得离谱的价格，那么在这种情况下，投机客常常会按照“鳄鱼原则”的要求止损离场，而价值投资者呢？恰恰相反，会继续加码买入！这就是两种不同的价值观主导下的两种截然相反的交易策略。这就是巴菲特告诫我们的：要把市场波动看做你的朋友而不是敌人。
事实上，仅以巴菲特旗下的巴克夏公司来说，在1973年－1974年的经济衰退期间，它的股票价格从每股90美元跌至每股40美元。在1987年的股灾中，股票价格从每股大约4000美元跌至3000美元。在1990年－1991年的海湾战争期间，它再次遭到重创，股票价格从每股8900美元急剧跌至5500美元。在1998年－2000年期间，巴克夏公司宣布收购通用再保险公司（GeneralRe）之后，它的股价也从1998年中期的每股大约80000美元跌至2000年初的40800美元。可以想见，在这些时候，巴菲特在股票投资方面所受的沉重打击和巨大精神压力。如果按照“鳄鱼原则”，巴菲特应该不知道止损离场多少次了，但那样，我们也不会看到今天的“股神”。
安全的投资才是最成功的投资
现在的市场应该是价值投资者的春天，也就是所有投资者买入的时机！有的人会说我你误导了我们一年的时间，你总是在和我们谈买入买入，你是一个死多头。我承认从现在这个位置看去，以前很多点位的买入都是很高的，也就是说当初买入时机不是成熟的。但是我要说的是我也是普通人，我会犯错误，我也在不断的学习。下面就是我学习价值投资的一些体会，供大家参考，作为我自己进步的标尺。
1、投资要保守，投资第一就是资金的安全，第二还是安全，就像是价值投资者说的用四毛钱买一元钱的东西，价格是围绕价值波动的，你买入的价格低于价值，也就预示着你的资金是安全无风险的，在不久的将来价格总是会体现出价值的魅力的。在别人都不敢要的时候应该勇于买进，因为恐惧是产生打折产品的根源，近期的美国金融市场就是例子，还有中国的乳业市场，当所有的人都在慌不择路的时候，价值投资者的代表却在大肆买进，像是小伙子到了女儿国一样。
2、牛市确认的时候就是卖出的时机，反之亦然，确认的牛市也就是说大家都认可价值了，这样价值就不存在低估的现象，没有价值低估就没有安全的机会，从资金风险考虑，所以就是卖出的时机。这个时候的特征就是和所有人反着做，被许多人骂做傻瓜，去年巴菲特卖出中石油的时候不就是这样，大家都说巴菲特少赚了几十亿，但是大家没看到巴菲特已经赚了多少。所以投资要勇于做一个傻瓜，真正的成功者，并不是在买入的时候就体现出成功的，而是在卖出的时候，你会发现人家是赚钱的，很可能是赚大钱的。
3、价值投资的核心就是在价值低估的时候买进，在价值高估的时候卖出，而不是在意你的持有的时间的长短，价值投资者不以长期投资和短期投资为划分的。而且价值投资要的是东方似的模糊和粗放，而不是简单精确的西方式的标准，也就是说价值投资的范围是一个区域，而不是精确的一个点位，不以指数为标的，不以价格为目标，这是价值投资东方式的智慧精华。
4、要买入最伟大的公司，伟大的公司就是能不断成长并产生现金流的公司，不会因为市场的系统风险而出现垮塌。这样的公司让你投资后，你会睡得很安稳，也就是老巴说的如果你不愿意持有这样的公司十年，那就不要持有五分钟。伟大的公司应该是领跑者而不是跟随者，应该是创新者，有着充分竞争能力行业垄断的企业。
5、价值投资要有自己的观点，不能人云亦云，不能够被别人的言语所左右，投资者应该是确确实实的偏执者，比如说近期的银行板块。很多人认为中国的银行业会和美国的金融业一样出现破产，但是从实际情况来看，其业绩仅仅是增速减缓，所以企业倒闭的风险为零，在这样的基础上，现在的市场就是价值投资的乐园，银行板块就是投资者的天堂。
1、投资要保守，投资第一就是资金的安全，第二还是安全，就像是价值投资者说的用四毛钱买一元钱的东西，价格是围绕价值波动的，你买入的价格低于价值，也就预示着你的资金是安全无风险的，在不久的将来价格总是会体现出价值的魅力的。在别人都不敢要的时候应该勇于买进，因为恐惧是产生打折产品的根源，近期的美国金融市场就是例子，还有中国的乳业市场，当所有的人都在慌不择路的时候，价值投资者的代表却在大肆买进，像是小伙子到了女儿国一样。
2、牛市确认的时候就是卖出的时机，反之亦然，确认的牛市也就是说大家都认可价值了，这样价值就不存在低估的现象，没有价值低估就没有安全的机会，从资金风险考虑，所以就是卖出的时机。这个时候的特征就是和所有人反着做，被许多人骂做傻瓜，去年巴菲特卖出中石油的时候不就是这样，大家都说巴菲特少赚了几十亿，但是大家没看到巴菲特已经赚了多少。所以投资要勇于做一个傻瓜，真正的成功者，并不是在买入的时候就体现出成功的，而是在卖出的时候，你会发现人家是赚钱的，很可能是赚大钱的。
3、价值投资的核心就是在价值低估的时候买进，在价值高估的时候卖出，而不是在意你的持有的时间的长短，价值投资者不以长期投资和短期投资为划分的。而且价值投资要的是东方似的模糊和粗放，而不是简单精确的西方式的标准，也就是说价值投资的范围是一个区域，而不是精确的一个点位，不以指数为标的，不以价格为目标，这是价值投资东方式的智慧精华。
4、要买入最伟大的公司，伟大的公司就是能不断成长并产生现金流的公司，不会因为市场的系统风险而出现垮塌。这样的公司让你投资后，你会睡得很安稳，也就是老巴说的如果你不愿意持有这样的公司十年，那就不要持有五分钟。伟大的公司应该是领跑者而不是跟随者，应该是创新者，有着充分竞争能力行业垄断的企业。
5、价值投资要有自己的观点，不能人云亦云，不能够被别人的言语所左右，投资者应该是确确实实的偏执者，比如说近期的银行板块。很多人认为中国的银行业会和美国的金融业一样出现破产，但是从实际情况来看，其业绩仅仅是增速减缓，所以企业倒闭的风险为零，在这样的基础上，现在的市场就是价值投资的乐园，银行板块就是投资者的天堂。
安東尼·波頓 25年賺90倍的秘訣
安東尼·波頓(Anthony Bolton)為富達特別時機基金經理人，該基金自1979年成立迄今已25年，投資報酬率超過9000%，規模達40億歐元，是英國一般股票型基金中規模最大者。
他說：「如果你希望表現超越其他人，你必須持有一些與其他人不同的部位。如果你希望超越市場，不應持有的部位就是市場本身。你必須與眾不同。」
安東尼·波頓嚴守的投資金科玉律
1.了解企業本質與品質─企業在品質與永續經營能力上差異極大，必須了解企業本身、它如何賺錢及其競爭力定位。
2.了解驅動企業的關鍵變數─明辨影響一家公司績效的關鍵變數，尤其是那些公司無法控制的因素，譬如匯率、利率、稅制變化等。
3.單一企業優於集團企業─如果一家企業屬於集團性質，通常財報透明度較低。
4.與管理階層面對面─坦白、不誇張的經營階層，是波頓追求的特質。他喜歡不會過度承諾、績效卻持續超越他所傳遞的訊息的企業經理人，必須小心那些老是誇下海口卻做不到的人。
5.避免有縫就鑽的經營階層─經營階層誠信不足或見風轉舵的企業，千萬不要碰。
6.試圖領先其他人兩步─試著想清楚有什麼是今天遭到市場忽視、卻可能在未來重燃興趣的。就像下棋一樣，如果能夠比別人提早一步想到，通常都會有收穫。
7.了解資產負債表的風險─如果說股市投資人有一堂必修課，這一堂絕對會列在名單的上方。如果投資的目的在於控制下檔風險、避免踩到地雷，那麼勢必得張大眼睛好好研究資產負債表。
8.放開心胸、廣搜資源─擁有越多能夠從中發想的資源，越有機會發掘一個贏家。不過，最明顯的資源往往不是最有價值的資源。
9.緊盯企業的內部人交易─企業經營階層的交易是一項珍貴資訊，買進動作的價值又高於賣出。
10.定期檢視你的投資理由─投資也需要管理，目的在於確立你選擇一項投資機會的理由，納入投資組合後，仍應定期回過頭來檢視這些理由，尤其當有新的資訊出現時。
11.不要跟股價談戀愛─你付出多少錢買股票只對你心理有影響，實際上根本不重要。一旦情況改變，要毫不猶豫地進行停損。
12.歷史表現不具參考價值─如果人生在世，就是不斷犯錯與從中學習，那麼股票市場亦然。一檔股票無論過去表現多顯赫，都是從後照鏡看世界，你無法從中看到未來。
13.重視絕對價值─投資人需要做一些事實查證的功課，以避免被外在的繁華景象所迷惑，因此應了解一個企業的絕對價值。
14.運用技術分析作為輔助指標─有時我會用技術分析指標當作決策的一項輔助工具。當我在決定投資部位，或是否要投資時，會將其當作參考因素之一。
15.避免預測市場走勢或下大注─過去25年來，我大概只有五或六次對市場有較明確的看法。但即使在這樣的情況下，我也不會把基金全部賭在類此一面倒的看法上。
16.逆向思考─如果一個投資能讓你覺得「舒服」的話，也許就太晚了。試著與群眾逆向思考與投資，避免在股價上揚時過度樂觀。當所有人幾乎都對前景疑慮觀望之際，很可能他們都站在錯的一邊，情況正開始好轉。同樣地，如果沒什麼人擔心時，很可能就是最應該提高警覺之時。
他說：「如果你希望表現超越其他人，你必須持有一些與其他人不同的部位。如果你希望超越市場，不應持有的部位就是市場本身。你必須與眾不同。」
安東尼·波頓嚴守的投資金科玉律
1.了解企業本質與品質─企業在品質與永續經營能力上差異極大，必須了解企業本身、它如何賺錢及其競爭力定位。
2.了解驅動企業的關鍵變數─明辨影響一家公司績效的關鍵變數，尤其是那些公司無法控制的因素，譬如匯率、利率、稅制變化等。
3.單一企業優於集團企業─如果一家企業屬於集團性質，通常財報透明度較低。
4.與管理階層面對面─坦白、不誇張的經營階層，是波頓追求的特質。他喜歡不會過度承諾、績效卻持續超越他所傳遞的訊息的企業經理人，必須小心那些老是誇下海口卻做不到的人。
5.避免有縫就鑽的經營階層─經營階層誠信不足或見風轉舵的企業，千萬不要碰。
6.試圖領先其他人兩步─試著想清楚有什麼是今天遭到市場忽視、卻可能在未來重燃興趣的。就像下棋一樣，如果能夠比別人提早一步想到，通常都會有收穫。
7.了解資產負債表的風險─如果說股市投資人有一堂必修課，這一堂絕對會列在名單的上方。如果投資的目的在於控制下檔風險、避免踩到地雷，那麼勢必得張大眼睛好好研究資產負債表。
8.放開心胸、廣搜資源─擁有越多能夠從中發想的資源，越有機會發掘一個贏家。不過，最明顯的資源往往不是最有價值的資源。
9.緊盯企業的內部人交易─企業經營階層的交易是一項珍貴資訊，買進動作的價值又高於賣出。
10.定期檢視你的投資理由─投資也需要管理，目的在於確立你選擇一項投資機會的理由，納入投資組合後，仍應定期回過頭來檢視這些理由，尤其當有新的資訊出現時。
11.不要跟股價談戀愛─你付出多少錢買股票只對你心理有影響，實際上根本不重要。一旦情況改變，要毫不猶豫地進行停損。
12.歷史表現不具參考價值─如果人生在世，就是不斷犯錯與從中學習，那麼股票市場亦然。一檔股票無論過去表現多顯赫，都是從後照鏡看世界，你無法從中看到未來。
13.重視絕對價值─投資人需要做一些事實查證的功課，以避免被外在的繁華景象所迷惑，因此應了解一個企業的絕對價值。
14.運用技術分析作為輔助指標─有時我會用技術分析指標當作決策的一項輔助工具。當我在決定投資部位，或是否要投資時，會將其當作參考因素之一。
15.避免預測市場走勢或下大注─過去25年來，我大概只有五或六次對市場有較明確的看法。但即使在這樣的情況下，我也不會把基金全部賭在類此一面倒的看法上。
16.逆向思考─如果一個投資能讓你覺得「舒服」的話，也許就太晚了。試著與群眾逆向思考與投資，避免在股價上揚時過度樂觀。當所有人幾乎都對前景疑慮觀望之際，很可能他們都站在錯的一邊，情況正開始好轉。同樣地，如果沒什麼人擔心時，很可能就是最應該提高警覺之時。
卢·辛普森的投资法则
过去三十年，辛普森低调地掌管着伯克夏·哈撒韦公司旗下的保险公司盖可（Geico）超过40亿美元资产的投资管理业务，创造了惊人的业绩。在辛普森任职期间，盖可的组合每年打败标准普尔500指数约7%。
近期，晨星分析师与价值投资的另一位传奇人物卢·辛普森（Lou Simpson）进行了交流，讨论的范围甚广，涵盖了其哲学理念、投资经验以及教训。这位人物并非家喻户晓，却是巴菲特所欣赏的，多次在其致股东的信中提及，并声称其应进入投资名人堂。
过去三十年来，辛普森低调地掌管着伯克夏·哈撒韦公司（Berkshire Hath－away）旗下的保险公司盖可（Geico）超过40亿美元资产的投资管理业务，创造了惊人的业绩。在辛普森任职期间，盖可的组合每年打败标准普尔500指数约7%。说年届70的辛普森是历史上最伟大的投资者之一，应该不算言过。
尽管辛普森通常被认为是价值投资者，但他认为，刻板地分开价值股与成长股是有争议的，因为两者往往无法真正地区分开，他说自己往往喜欢买入“正在成长的价值企业”。虽然辛普森不愿谈论盖可组合中的个股，但很明显，他对于市场中一些快速成长的领域已经不陌生。例如，其满怀赞赏地谈到消费品巨头耐克（Nike），对于健康医疗产业也显示了乐观———该行业有不少股票在晨星近几个月的评级中为五星。
辛普森的观察与晨星的研究有许多地方是符合的。在晨星五星级股票中，有三分之一落在风格箱的成长区域，许多高品质的股票依然相对便宜。例如，那些具备稳定优势的股票估值出现2%的折扣，而没有优势或者优势微弱的股票则出现明显溢价。
明白看空的理由
辛普森反复强调，了解一项潜在投资的负面信息非常重要，要清楚自己为何不愿买入的理由。他认为这是确认投资想法的关键因素，会使人们更加深入地了解相关的企业。
这种方法不仅是心怀谦卑、敢于对即便在过往获得成功的观点进行论证，而且也超越了一般常识。对于看好的投资，辛普森强迫自己换另外的角度，从逻辑上考虑可能的缺点和漏洞，就仿佛要驳倒自己的投资论题一样。如果一项投资想法能够经受起这些审视，辛普森就认为可以确信无疑、毫无保留地将其纳入自己的组合。
坚守自己，勿停止学习
辛普森多次提到要审慎地停留在“自己的能力范围”内，不要投资于自己不熟悉的领域。例如，他绕开了绝大部分科技股，理由很简单，因为他不了解这些业务。同样地，尽管盖可的组合中有一些海外运营的业务，但辛普森通常并不愿意直接投资在海外的企业。理由是，他认为自己无法像对国内企业那样清晰了解海外企业。
绕开自己不熟悉的领域并非意味着固步自封。例如，辛普森讲述了他最近到印度考察，以了解其快速发展的经济。此外，他自己也是科技公司SAIC和VerSign的董事，从而有机会对这些领域进行更多深入的了解。
结合前文所述的力求相反的观点，可以想像到，在辛普森迈入人生的第八个十年，依然像学生一样孜孜不倦，即便飞越半个地球，也要抓住学习机会，找遍各种观点来佐证自己的想法，达成最周全的投资决策。
耐心是美德
辛普森感叹许多专业投资人的持有期限过短而令人可惜。他认为持有时间与投资成果有必然联系，持有越久收益越丰厚，反之亦然。
例如，一旦他看好哪只股票买入后，就多年持有。因为他已经对这家企业有广博而深入的了解，即便出现短暂的风吹草动，也不会像许多投资人那样仓促离场。只要其论点成立，他就拿着，耐心等待，享受长期成长。结果也可看到，盖可组合的换手率要比绝大部分基金低得多。
这不是说投资人就不应该减少交易，而是应该像基本面研究者那样严格行事，在决策前反复论证。在此前提下，低换手率就是一大特点。
股票胜于债券
辛普森并没有花太多时间来自上而下地研究市场，进行宏观预测。而是从投资机会是否稀少的角度来判断状况。
他认为股票并非绝对的便宜，也没那么贵。他持续寻找单个投资机会，并认为这些股票与债券相比也是真正相对便宜的。
可见，辛普森是投资于企业，而非纸上谈兵。他挖掘企业的基本面从而判断企业未来可能是什么状况，并且倾向于那些有持久竞争优势的企业。最重要的是，辛普森是专注且长期持有，对于买进的股票充满了信心———盖可的股票组合中股票个数少于20只。
近期，晨星分析师与价值投资的另一位传奇人物卢·辛普森（Lou Simpson）进行了交流，讨论的范围甚广，涵盖了其哲学理念、投资经验以及教训。这位人物并非家喻户晓，却是巴菲特所欣赏的，多次在其致股东的信中提及，并声称其应进入投资名人堂。
过去三十年来，辛普森低调地掌管着伯克夏·哈撒韦公司（Berkshire Hath－away）旗下的保险公司盖可（Geico）超过40亿美元资产的投资管理业务，创造了惊人的业绩。在辛普森任职期间，盖可的组合每年打败标准普尔500指数约7%。说年届70的辛普森是历史上最伟大的投资者之一，应该不算言过。
尽管辛普森通常被认为是价值投资者，但他认为，刻板地分开价值股与成长股是有争议的，因为两者往往无法真正地区分开，他说自己往往喜欢买入“正在成长的价值企业”。虽然辛普森不愿谈论盖可组合中的个股，但很明显，他对于市场中一些快速成长的领域已经不陌生。例如，其满怀赞赏地谈到消费品巨头耐克（Nike），对于健康医疗产业也显示了乐观———该行业有不少股票在晨星近几个月的评级中为五星。
辛普森的观察与晨星的研究有许多地方是符合的。在晨星五星级股票中，有三分之一落在风格箱的成长区域，许多高品质的股票依然相对便宜。例如，那些具备稳定优势的股票估值出现2%的折扣，而没有优势或者优势微弱的股票则出现明显溢价。
明白看空的理由
辛普森反复强调，了解一项潜在投资的负面信息非常重要，要清楚自己为何不愿买入的理由。他认为这是确认投资想法的关键因素，会使人们更加深入地了解相关的企业。
这种方法不仅是心怀谦卑、敢于对即便在过往获得成功的观点进行论证，而且也超越了一般常识。对于看好的投资，辛普森强迫自己换另外的角度，从逻辑上考虑可能的缺点和漏洞，就仿佛要驳倒自己的投资论题一样。如果一项投资想法能够经受起这些审视，辛普森就认为可以确信无疑、毫无保留地将其纳入自己的组合。
坚守自己，勿停止学习
辛普森多次提到要审慎地停留在“自己的能力范围”内，不要投资于自己不熟悉的领域。例如，他绕开了绝大部分科技股，理由很简单，因为他不了解这些业务。同样地，尽管盖可的组合中有一些海外运营的业务，但辛普森通常并不愿意直接投资在海外的企业。理由是，他认为自己无法像对国内企业那样清晰了解海外企业。
绕开自己不熟悉的领域并非意味着固步自封。例如，辛普森讲述了他最近到印度考察，以了解其快速发展的经济。此外，他自己也是科技公司SAIC和VerSign的董事，从而有机会对这些领域进行更多深入的了解。
结合前文所述的力求相反的观点，可以想像到，在辛普森迈入人生的第八个十年，依然像学生一样孜孜不倦，即便飞越半个地球，也要抓住学习机会，找遍各种观点来佐证自己的想法，达成最周全的投资决策。
耐心是美德
辛普森感叹许多专业投资人的持有期限过短而令人可惜。他认为持有时间与投资成果有必然联系，持有越久收益越丰厚，反之亦然。
例如，一旦他看好哪只股票买入后，就多年持有。因为他已经对这家企业有广博而深入的了解，即便出现短暂的风吹草动，也不会像许多投资人那样仓促离场。只要其论点成立，他就拿着，耐心等待，享受长期成长。结果也可看到，盖可组合的换手率要比绝大部分基金低得多。
这不是说投资人就不应该减少交易，而是应该像基本面研究者那样严格行事，在决策前反复论证。在此前提下，低换手率就是一大特点。
股票胜于债券
辛普森并没有花太多时间来自上而下地研究市场，进行宏观预测。而是从投资机会是否稀少的角度来判断状况。
他认为股票并非绝对的便宜，也没那么贵。他持续寻找单个投资机会，并认为这些股票与债券相比也是真正相对便宜的。
可见，辛普森是投资于企业，而非纸上谈兵。他挖掘企业的基本面从而判断企业未来可能是什么状况，并且倾向于那些有持久竞争优势的企业。最重要的是，辛普森是专注且长期持有，对于买进的股票充满了信心———盖可的股票组合中股票个数少于20只。
投资大师&失败的投资者的投资习惯
1．相信最高优先级的事情永远是保住资本，这是他的投资策略的基石。
唯一的投资目标是“赚大钱”。结果，他常常连本钱都保不住。
2．作为习惯一的结果，他是风险厌恶者。
认为只有冒大险才能赚大钱。
3．他有他自己的投资哲学，这种哲学是他的个性、能力、知识、品位和目标的表达。因此，任何两个极为成功的投资者都不可能有一样的投资哲学。
没有投资哲学或相信别人的投资哲学。
4．已经开发并检验了他自己的个性化选择，购买或抛售投资系统。
没有系统，或者不加检验和个性化调整地采纳了其他人的系统。（如果这个系统对他不管用，他会采纳另一个还是一个对他不管用的系统。）
5．认为分散化是荒唐可笑的。
没信心持有任何一个投资对象的大头寸。
6．憎恨缴纳税款和其他交易成本，巧妙地安排他的行动以合法实现税额最小化。
忽视或不重视税收和其他交易成本对长期投资效益的影响。
7．只投资于他懂的领域。
没有认识到对自身行为的深刻理解是成功的一个根本性先决条件。很少认识到赢利机会存在于（而且很有可能大量存在于）他自己的专长领域中。
8．从来不做不符合他标准的投资。可以很轻松地对任何事情说“不！”。
没有标准，或采纳了别人的标准。无法对自己的贪婪说“不”。
9．不断寻找符合他标准的新投资机会，积极进行独立调查研究。只愿意听取那些他有充分理由去尊重的投资者或分析家的意见。
总是寻找那种能让他一夜暴富的“绝对”好机会，于是经常跟着“本月热点消息”走。总是听从其他某个所谓“专家”的建议。很少在买入之前深入研究一个投资对象。他的“调查”就是从经纪人和顾问那里或昨天的报纸上得到最新的“热点”消息。
10．当他找到不符合他的标准的投资机会时，他会耐心等待，直到发现机会。
认为他合适的时候都必须在市场中有所行动。
11．在做出决策后即刻行动。
迟疑不决。
12．持有赢钱的投资，直到事先确定的退出条件成立。
很少有事先确定的退出法则。常常因担心小利润会转变成损失而匆匆脱手-因此经常错失大利润。
13．坚定地遵守他自己的系统。
总是“怀疑”他的系统-如果他有系统的话。改变标准和“立场”以证明自己的行为是合理的。
14．知道自己也会犯错。在发现错误的时候即刻纠正它们。因此很少遭受大损失。
不忍放弃赔钱的投资，寄希望于“不赔不赚”。结果经常遭受巨大的损失。
15．把错误看成学习的机会。
从不在某一种方法上坚持足够长的时间，因此也从不知道如何改进一种方法。总在寻找“速效药”。
16．随着经验的积累，他的回报也越来越多……现在他似乎能用更少的时间赚更多的钱。因为他已经“交了学费”。
不知道“交学费”是必要的。很少在实践中学习……容易重复同样的错误，直到输个精光。
17．几乎从不对任何人说他在做些什么。对其他人如何评价他的投资决策没情趣也不关心。
总在谈论他当前的投资，根据其他人的观点而不是现实变化来“检验”他的决策。
18．成功地将他的大多数任务委派给了其他人。
选择投资顾问和管理者的方法同他做投资决策的方法一样。
19．花的钱远少于他赚的钱。
有可能花的钱超过他赚的钱（大多数人是这样）。
20．工作是为了刺激和自我实现，不是为钱。
以赚钱为目标：认为投资是致富的捷径。
21．迷恋投资的过程（并从中得到满足）；可以轻松摆脱任何个别投资对象。
爱上了他的投资对象。
22．24小时不离投资。
没有为实现他的投资目标而竭尽全力（即使他知道他的目标是什么）。
23．把他的钱投到了他赖以谋生的地方。例如，沃伦·巴菲特的财产有99%是伯克夏-哈撒韦的股份，乔治·索罗斯也把他的大部分财产投入了量子基金。他们的个人利益与那些将钱托付给他们的人是完全一致的。
投资对他的净财产贡献甚微-实际上，他的投资行为常常威胁到他的财富。他的投资（以及弥补损失的）资金来自于其他地方：企业利润、薪水、退休金、公司分红，等等。
唯一的投资目标是“赚大钱”。结果，他常常连本钱都保不住。
2．作为习惯一的结果，他是风险厌恶者。
认为只有冒大险才能赚大钱。
3．他有他自己的投资哲学，这种哲学是他的个性、能力、知识、品位和目标的表达。因此，任何两个极为成功的投资者都不可能有一样的投资哲学。
没有投资哲学或相信别人的投资哲学。
4．已经开发并检验了他自己的个性化选择，购买或抛售投资系统。
没有系统，或者不加检验和个性化调整地采纳了其他人的系统。（如果这个系统对他不管用，他会采纳另一个还是一个对他不管用的系统。）
5．认为分散化是荒唐可笑的。
没信心持有任何一个投资对象的大头寸。
6．憎恨缴纳税款和其他交易成本，巧妙地安排他的行动以合法实现税额最小化。
忽视或不重视税收和其他交易成本对长期投资效益的影响。
7．只投资于他懂的领域。
没有认识到对自身行为的深刻理解是成功的一个根本性先决条件。很少认识到赢利机会存在于（而且很有可能大量存在于）他自己的专长领域中。
8．从来不做不符合他标准的投资。可以很轻松地对任何事情说“不！”。
没有标准，或采纳了别人的标准。无法对自己的贪婪说“不”。
9．不断寻找符合他标准的新投资机会，积极进行独立调查研究。只愿意听取那些他有充分理由去尊重的投资者或分析家的意见。
总是寻找那种能让他一夜暴富的“绝对”好机会，于是经常跟着“本月热点消息”走。总是听从其他某个所谓“专家”的建议。很少在买入之前深入研究一个投资对象。他的“调查”就是从经纪人和顾问那里或昨天的报纸上得到最新的“热点”消息。
10．当他找到不符合他的标准的投资机会时，他会耐心等待，直到发现机会。
认为他合适的时候都必须在市场中有所行动。
11．在做出决策后即刻行动。
迟疑不决。
12．持有赢钱的投资，直到事先确定的退出条件成立。
很少有事先确定的退出法则。常常因担心小利润会转变成损失而匆匆脱手-因此经常错失大利润。
13．坚定地遵守他自己的系统。
总是“怀疑”他的系统-如果他有系统的话。改变标准和“立场”以证明自己的行为是合理的。
14．知道自己也会犯错。在发现错误的时候即刻纠正它们。因此很少遭受大损失。
不忍放弃赔钱的投资，寄希望于“不赔不赚”。结果经常遭受巨大的损失。
15．把错误看成学习的机会。
从不在某一种方法上坚持足够长的时间，因此也从不知道如何改进一种方法。总在寻找“速效药”。
16．随着经验的积累，他的回报也越来越多……现在他似乎能用更少的时间赚更多的钱。因为他已经“交了学费”。
不知道“交学费”是必要的。很少在实践中学习……容易重复同样的错误，直到输个精光。
17．几乎从不对任何人说他在做些什么。对其他人如何评价他的投资决策没情趣也不关心。
总在谈论他当前的投资，根据其他人的观点而不是现实变化来“检验”他的决策。
18．成功地将他的大多数任务委派给了其他人。
选择投资顾问和管理者的方法同他做投资决策的方法一样。
19．花的钱远少于他赚的钱。
有可能花的钱超过他赚的钱（大多数人是这样）。
20．工作是为了刺激和自我实现，不是为钱。
以赚钱为目标：认为投资是致富的捷径。
21．迷恋投资的过程（并从中得到满足）；可以轻松摆脱任何个别投资对象。
爱上了他的投资对象。
22．24小时不离投资。
没有为实现他的投资目标而竭尽全力（即使他知道他的目标是什么）。
23．把他的钱投到了他赖以谋生的地方。例如，沃伦·巴菲特的财产有99%是伯克夏-哈撒韦的股份，乔治·索罗斯也把他的大部分财产投入了量子基金。他们的个人利益与那些将钱托付给他们的人是完全一致的。
投资对他的净财产贡献甚微-实际上，他的投资行为常常威胁到他的财富。他的投资（以及弥补损失的）资金来自于其他地方：企业利润、薪水、退休金、公司分红，等等。
普莱斯怎样选择成长股
五十年前，华尔街出现了一位证券投资的旷世奇才——洛威·普莱斯。作为当时最大基金的管理者，他对成长性的看重显得十分另类。他认为，投资者成功的捷径就是寻找成长性好的行业并长期持有该行业内优秀的上市公司。由于投资业绩突出，他逐渐成为偶像级的人物，许多追随者还成立了一个庞大的组织，他的方法被称为“洛威·普莱斯方法”，他喜欢投资的股票被称为“洛威·普莱斯股票”。
“洛威·普莱斯股票”的评价标准是：
（１）非同凡响的市场和产品开发能力；
（２）行业内没有强有力的竞争对手；
（３）不受政府的严格管制；
（４）人力资源总成本极低，但单个雇员待遇较优；
（５）每股收益能保持较高的增长率。
从这些标准可以看出，这种方法需要经验、判断力、对政治的敏锐和普通人的智慧，而不是繁琐艰难的数字分析，易于被学习和接受。选择这类股票应注意两个方面：首先是鉴别某一行业是否正处于成长阶段，其次是在这个行业中选择最有希望的公司进行投资。
普莱斯认为，当某一行业开始走下坡路时，一般都会显示出“杠杆效应”：净利润的下降速度要远快于单位销售量的下降速度。根据此，他准确地判断出３０年代铁路行业的衰退；而在“二战”之前，普莱斯就发现了航空运输、柴油发动机、空调、塑料以及电视机产业的诱人前景。
此外，夕阳行业如果脱胎换骨进入了新的成长期，不管是新产品的开发还是老产品有了新用途，都可以成为投资对象。
但是到了六十年代末期，成长型股票的价格都已经炒作到非常高的市盈率水平，普莱斯认为市场上已经没有什么便宜的成长型股票，投资方向也应当有所改变，于是把资产转让给合伙人，放弃了对公司的控制和经营。其私人财产主要投向能够抵御通货膨胀风险的资产，如房地产、自然资源、金银和债券等，成功地躲过了１９７３－１９７４年高价股的暴跌。
他之所以能够成为一代宗师，不仅在于其探索出了投资成长股的方法，更重要的是他没有教条地运用这种方法。坚持直觉、尊重现实和灵活应变是投资的最高境界。
“洛威·普莱斯股票”的评价标准是：
（１）非同凡响的市场和产品开发能力；
（２）行业内没有强有力的竞争对手；
（３）不受政府的严格管制；
（４）人力资源总成本极低，但单个雇员待遇较优；
（５）每股收益能保持较高的增长率。
从这些标准可以看出，这种方法需要经验、判断力、对政治的敏锐和普通人的智慧，而不是繁琐艰难的数字分析，易于被学习和接受。选择这类股票应注意两个方面：首先是鉴别某一行业是否正处于成长阶段，其次是在这个行业中选择最有希望的公司进行投资。
普莱斯认为，当某一行业开始走下坡路时，一般都会显示出“杠杆效应”：净利润的下降速度要远快于单位销售量的下降速度。根据此，他准确地判断出３０年代铁路行业的衰退；而在“二战”之前，普莱斯就发现了航空运输、柴油发动机、空调、塑料以及电视机产业的诱人前景。
此外，夕阳行业如果脱胎换骨进入了新的成长期，不管是新产品的开发还是老产品有了新用途，都可以成为投资对象。
但是到了六十年代末期，成长型股票的价格都已经炒作到非常高的市盈率水平，普莱斯认为市场上已经没有什么便宜的成长型股票，投资方向也应当有所改变，于是把资产转让给合伙人，放弃了对公司的控制和经营。其私人财产主要投向能够抵御通货膨胀风险的资产，如房地产、自然资源、金银和债券等，成功地躲过了１９７３－１９７４年高价股的暴跌。
他之所以能够成为一代宗师，不仅在于其探索出了投资成长股的方法，更重要的是他没有教条地运用这种方法。坚持直觉、尊重现实和灵活应变是投资的最高境界。
人性管理比理性估值更重要
在一个明显没有价值的市场环境中，大家所以愿意相信还有上涨，包括价值投资者还相信市场存在价值，原因是什么？原因并不是智力不够，而是人性和情绪上出了问题，当面对滚滚而来的财富，人已经被市场气氛所迷惑，人已经完全被感性所控制，快速大干、快上，快速飞速发展，快速走向某个伟大的状态，成为人们脑海中的全部。理智、真正的估值、真正的绝对价值、真正的普遍价值已经在人们脑海里没有了，也就是说我们对自己人性的管理，对人性在行为决策和投资决策中的可怕作用认识不够，在投资过程中始终是理性和人性两股力量共同支配着投资行为。并且人性是基础决定作用，因为理性是在人性的基础上开展工作的，一个人可能他没有理性，但不可能没有人性，理性是建立在人性基础之上的，我们说投资决策需要理性，但理性不是孤立的，理性的前提是在人性方面处于正常的状态，如果人在决策时始终处于平和、冷静、客观和实事求是中，那么这种状态下一定的理性思考就会产生出正确的思考，反之如果人的情绪处于一厢情愿，着急，贪婪、自以为是，甚至于过度自信和过度自大等等，不利的情绪中，在这种情况下，任何理性的思考已经不可能做出正确的决定，这时，理性已经成为人性的奴隶，理性已经基本不存在了，所以正确的决策必需要在平和的状态中，必须在对人性的有效控制中。
人的人性包括两方面： 一方面是有利的，比如坚定、平和、冷静、客观，另一种是不利的，比如恐惧、焦虑、着急，贪婪等等，这些都是不利于投资人的状态。在投资实践中，投资人应该把控制自己的人性，修炼自己的情绪做为一个很重大的工作，如果我们不在这个方面投入必要的努力，那么我们在理性方面投入的努力就会大打折扣。我们要借助一些简单的常识和道理，来调整情绪把握人性:一夜暴富不会长久，正常的收益率也就是百分之十几或者几十，天天发财，次次盈利这种情况也没有，别人赚了大钱，自己不眼红，安于稳定的正常收益，自己亏了钱不过分焦虑，能回归平和,当我们决定投资下一笔资金的时候，不应该忘记我们考虑有不周全的地方，应该做好必要的防范，而不是坚决的对赌。凡此种种都是简单的常识，也是人性管理和情绪控制的有效方法！
人的人性包括两方面： 一方面是有利的，比如坚定、平和、冷静、客观，另一种是不利的，比如恐惧、焦虑、着急，贪婪等等，这些都是不利于投资人的状态。在投资实践中，投资人应该把控制自己的人性，修炼自己的情绪做为一个很重大的工作，如果我们不在这个方面投入必要的努力，那么我们在理性方面投入的努力就会大打折扣。我们要借助一些简单的常识和道理，来调整情绪把握人性:一夜暴富不会长久，正常的收益率也就是百分之十几或者几十，天天发财，次次盈利这种情况也没有，别人赚了大钱，自己不眼红，安于稳定的正常收益，自己亏了钱不过分焦虑，能回归平和,当我们决定投资下一笔资金的时候，不应该忘记我们考虑有不周全的地方，应该做好必要的防范，而不是坚决的对赌。凡此种种都是简单的常识，也是人性管理和情绪控制的有效方法！
诱惑长期投资者的美丽女妖塞任----波段操作
据观察，99%以上的投资者很难抗拒 “ 波段操作 ” 。而且这个比例并没有下降的趋势，假如将股市比喻成大海，投资者是希望达到彼岸的海员的话, 那么 “ 波段操作 ” 极似希腊神话中的半岛半人的女妖塞任（sirens），常用美妙的歌声引诱航海者。
“ 波段操作 ” 本身并没有错误，而且是使投资者收益最大的理想化方法，像塞任的歌声那样美妙绝伦，问题是在于历史的长河中和实际操作中几乎没有人能持续成功。
可有人会不服：我去年波段操作很成功。但是，我只能说，人们还是过于短视，大多数人往往把短期成功的偶然性当成了必然性。
时间会检验一切。
“ 波段操作 ” 本身并没有错误，而且是使投资者收益最大的理想化方法，像塞任的歌声那样美妙绝伦，问题是在于历史的长河中和实际操作中几乎没有人能持续成功。
可有人会不服：我去年波段操作很成功。但是，我只能说，人们还是过于短视，大多数人往往把短期成功的偶然性当成了必然性。
时间会检验一切。
救助计划可能无法阻止美国经济衰退
国会在周末敲定的救助美国金融系统的计划为困境之中的信贷市场提供了急需的缓和剂，但该计划不太可能阻止经济滑向衰退。
摩根大通(J.P. Morgan)首席经济学家布鲁斯•卡斯曼(Bruce Kasman)说，这个计划有一定的好处，但我们认为经济已经陷得太深，难以避免损害。
最近经济方面传出的消息可谓暗淡无比。美国商务部上周报告说，新房销量上个月急剧下跌，表明房市状况继续恶化。另一份报告显示出，大宗商品销量8月也出现下跌，表明制造业趋于衰退，商业开支下滑。
卡斯曼说，过去一年中，商业可能是（美国经济）坚韧表现最重要的来源，随着公司削减开支，失业率也可能恶化。摩根大通目前认为，美国从今年第二季度开始陷入衰退。
道琼斯通讯社(Dow Jones Newswires)调查的经济学家们预计，本周五的就业报告9月新失业人数将为105,000人。与此同时，消费者信心疲弱，零售销量额的数据显示出购物者在缩减支出。
消费者开支也面临严重压力，今年第三季度以及第四季度可能出现下滑，如果出现这种情况，将会是1990－1991年衰退以来的首次季度开支下滑。美国人正极力应对日渐严重的失业和燃料及食品价格高涨的局面。在以节节下跌的房价和崩溃的抵押贷款市场为中心的金融危机中，2001年那种抵押贷款再融资热潮是不可能出现的。
布鲁金斯研究所(Brookings Institution)资深研究员道格拉斯•埃尔门多夫(Douglas Elmendorf)说，救助计划无法阻止衰退。对人们来说，重要的是经济低迷会持续多长时间，程度会多深。
埃尔门多夫说，到目前为止，政府对危机的应对方式是救助一个又一个金融机构，这种方式没有很好地防止信贷市场的恐慌情绪蔓延。没有政府的全面举措，信贷市场参与者就会把全部注意力放在下一个倒闭的机构会是哪家上，导致拆借活动急剧减缓，而这又会致使衰退时间延长。救助计划旨在重新树立对市场的信心。
虽然该计划可能会帮助治愈金融市场，但可能不会直接惠及状况不佳的美国经济。经济增长的主要支柱－－消费者开支和企业开支、政府开支以及出口－－已经陷入困境。美国产品的海外需求今年帮助制造行业避免了更严重的低迷，但随着世界主要经济体濒临衰退边缘，中国和印度等迅速发展的国家也失去了原有的增长势头，美国产品的海外需求预计将会趋于枯竭。
救助计划包括让政府修正贷款条件、减少明年的止赎情况的计划。这将有助于减缓未出售房屋数量膨胀、继续令房市陷入萧条的势头。但这并没有解决根本问题，即相对于房租而言，房价还是太高了。
加州大学伯克利分校经济学家巴里•埃肯格林(Barry Eichengreen)说，不管我们对信贷违约掉期和抵押贷款证券采取何种措施，房市还是会进一步下跌。
房价进一步下跌会造成更多贷款变成坏帐，从而给金融市场带来更多问题。埃肯格林预计，即便是在最乐观的情况下，衰退也会将失业率从当前的6.1%提高到8%。
不过，救助计划可能会充当救心丸的角色，让金融市场的活动恢复，并可能防止经济危机进一步恶化。Wrightson ICAP经济学家卢•克兰德尔(Lou Crandall)说，这会让潜在投资者觉得应该现在买进。
根据救助计划，财政部会将价值数千亿美元、以廉价出售的抵押贷款相关资产排除出金融系统之外。抱着机会主义心态袖手旁观、等着估值过低的证券价格变得更便宜的买家现在就得行动起来了。
克兰德尔说，这可能会令这类资产的市场重新复苏。
摩根大通(J.P. Morgan)首席经济学家布鲁斯•卡斯曼(Bruce Kasman)说，这个计划有一定的好处，但我们认为经济已经陷得太深，难以避免损害。
最近经济方面传出的消息可谓暗淡无比。美国商务部上周报告说，新房销量上个月急剧下跌，表明房市状况继续恶化。另一份报告显示出，大宗商品销量8月也出现下跌，表明制造业趋于衰退，商业开支下滑。
卡斯曼说，过去一年中，商业可能是（美国经济）坚韧表现最重要的来源，随着公司削减开支，失业率也可能恶化。摩根大通目前认为，美国从今年第二季度开始陷入衰退。
道琼斯通讯社(Dow Jones Newswires)调查的经济学家们预计，本周五的就业报告9月新失业人数将为105,000人。与此同时，消费者信心疲弱，零售销量额的数据显示出购物者在缩减支出。
消费者开支也面临严重压力，今年第三季度以及第四季度可能出现下滑，如果出现这种情况，将会是1990－1991年衰退以来的首次季度开支下滑。美国人正极力应对日渐严重的失业和燃料及食品价格高涨的局面。在以节节下跌的房价和崩溃的抵押贷款市场为中心的金融危机中，2001年那种抵押贷款再融资热潮是不可能出现的。
布鲁金斯研究所(Brookings Institution)资深研究员道格拉斯•埃尔门多夫(Douglas Elmendorf)说，救助计划无法阻止衰退。对人们来说，重要的是经济低迷会持续多长时间，程度会多深。
埃尔门多夫说，到目前为止，政府对危机的应对方式是救助一个又一个金融机构，这种方式没有很好地防止信贷市场的恐慌情绪蔓延。没有政府的全面举措，信贷市场参与者就会把全部注意力放在下一个倒闭的机构会是哪家上，导致拆借活动急剧减缓，而这又会致使衰退时间延长。救助计划旨在重新树立对市场的信心。
虽然该计划可能会帮助治愈金融市场，但可能不会直接惠及状况不佳的美国经济。经济增长的主要支柱－－消费者开支和企业开支、政府开支以及出口－－已经陷入困境。美国产品的海外需求今年帮助制造行业避免了更严重的低迷，但随着世界主要经济体濒临衰退边缘，中国和印度等迅速发展的国家也失去了原有的增长势头，美国产品的海外需求预计将会趋于枯竭。
救助计划包括让政府修正贷款条件、减少明年的止赎情况的计划。这将有助于减缓未出售房屋数量膨胀、继续令房市陷入萧条的势头。但这并没有解决根本问题，即相对于房租而言，房价还是太高了。
加州大学伯克利分校经济学家巴里•埃肯格林(Barry Eichengreen)说，不管我们对信贷违约掉期和抵押贷款证券采取何种措施，房市还是会进一步下跌。
房价进一步下跌会造成更多贷款变成坏帐，从而给金融市场带来更多问题。埃肯格林预计，即便是在最乐观的情况下，衰退也会将失业率从当前的6.1%提高到8%。
不过，救助计划可能会充当救心丸的角色，让金融市场的活动恢复，并可能防止经济危机进一步恶化。Wrightson ICAP经济学家卢•克兰德尔(Lou Crandall)说，这会让潜在投资者觉得应该现在买进。
根据救助计划，财政部会将价值数千亿美元、以廉价出售的抵押贷款相关资产排除出金融系统之外。抱着机会主义心态袖手旁观、等着估值过低的证券价格变得更便宜的买家现在就得行动起来了。
克兰德尔说，这可能会令这类资产的市场重新复苏。
Market Focus:Baptism of fire
The focus has shifted from inflationary worries to fears of asset deflation, as the process of deleveraging unwinds in the face of tightening liquidity. While we do not discount a rebound in the STI as markets have been oversold, the road ahead is bumpy as investors grapple with the knock-on effects of the global financial crisis filtering into Singapore’s small and open economy.Cheap valuation but risks have risen.
The STI has fallen to a five year low, trading at P/E of 12.5x (08F) and 11x (09F). In the event of a positive outcome from the U.S. Congress approving the US$700bn rescue package in the US, this should restore some stability to the US financial institutions. However, we are not at the end of GDP or earnings downgrade cycle yet. The risk of Singapore going into technical recession in 3Q08 is rising, given weak NODX figures.
Our base case STI target is now 2960, translating into PE of 13x on 2009 earnings. We have attempted to stress-test the STI to determine trough valuations. Based on our bear case scenario, our bottom-up target for STI is 2162 assuming Singapore’s GDP growth slows to 3% next year, property prices fall by 40% from its peak and oil price collapses to US$60/bbl. Our strategy is to pick stocks backed by cash and high yield with minimal downside risks to earnings, namely SPH and A REIT. We have highlighted STX and Keppel Corp as Fully Valued. We expect STX’s share price to fall in anticipation of an oversupply situation in dry bulkers come 2010, while Keppel Corp’s performance is dragged down by Keppel Land (oversupply in office space), refining margins peaking at SPC and slower order flows at offshore and marine.
The STI has fallen to a five year low, trading at P/E of 12.5x (08F) and 11x (09F). In the event of a positive outcome from the U.S. Congress approving the US$700bn rescue package in the US, this should restore some stability to the US financial institutions. However, we are not at the end of GDP or earnings downgrade cycle yet. The risk of Singapore going into technical recession in 3Q08 is rising, given weak NODX figures.
Our base case STI target is now 2960, translating into PE of 13x on 2009 earnings. We have attempted to stress-test the STI to determine trough valuations. Based on our bear case scenario, our bottom-up target for STI is 2162 assuming Singapore’s GDP growth slows to 3% next year, property prices fall by 40% from its peak and oil price collapses to US$60/bbl. Our strategy is to pick stocks backed by cash and high yield with minimal downside risks to earnings, namely SPH and A REIT. We have highlighted STX and Keppel Corp as Fully Valued. We expect STX’s share price to fall in anticipation of an oversupply situation in dry bulkers come 2010, while Keppel Corp’s performance is dragged down by Keppel Land (oversupply in office space), refining margins peaking at SPC and slower order flows at offshore and marine.
Sunday, September 28, 2008
专访彼得林奇／别管股灾，放胆买好股！
彼得林奇，他是连续缔造13年正报酬纪录的基金经理人，累积报酬率高达2763%，他征服股海的策略，传颂投资界。《今周刊》独家专访这位20世纪顶尖投资大师，现在，他用满满的实战经验，向台湾投资人大声宣告：别管股灾，放胆买好股！
1990年辞去基金经理人职务之后，彼得林奇低调生活，绝少接受媒体採访，这次《今周刊》排除万难，经过3个月约访，终於独家取得专访他的机会，请他就当前全球经济情势提出观察，同时也给投资人当下投资的建议。
「对於未来，我一向不做太多的猜测！」在全球经济衰退疑虑重重之际，二十世纪顶尖投资大师彼得林奇认为，任何的短线猜测都没有实质意义，如果把时间拉长，无论是经济衰退或者產业景气趋缓，终有回到正常轨道的时候。作为股市投资人，研究的重点不该是预测景气，而是应放在研究基本面上。
在投资市场充满不确定性的2008年，彼得林奇给投资人中肯的建议。他说，市场瞬息万变，谁也说不準。但是若能挑到具有潜力且股价便宜的个股，就该买进，然后静待股价反映基本面。
至於股债应该如何选择？彼得林奇认为，当然是股优於债。依照他的投资逻辑，当下应该是：别管股灾，放胆买好股。
对於担心股市仍将继续重挫的投资人，他更直截了当地说：「假使你很担心市场的波动与变化，应该开个银行帐户，把钱存在银行裡面就好，别开证券户了。」
基本上，他认为，如果太过担忧市场，就不会是个好投资人，因为你的进出动作总是顾虑太多。在市场上成功的关键，就是要能承受得起市场上的坏新闻与坏消息，市场下跌时反而可以找到机会，应该感到高兴。
1977年，彼得林奇不过是个基金界的小菜鸟，所掌管的富达麦哲伦基金，规模只有一千八百万美元。一千八百万美元，即使是以台股基金的标準来看，都还只能算是不太起眼的中小规模基金。
1990年，当他卸下经理人职务时，基金规模成长了776倍，达到140亿美元。一度，他是全球最大股票型基金的经理人。
彼得林奇没有一战暴富的传奇事跡，也没有发表过什麼一语成讖的惊人神準预言。基本上，如果不是把13年的基金操盘成绩一次回顾个够，你恐怕很难体会，他的地位能够超越眾多赫赫有名的投资大师，名列《纽约时报》二十世纪十大顶尖投资人的第二位，第一名是巴菲特。
在13年的基金操盘生涯中，彼得林奇缔造了连续13年正报酬、且连续13年超越股票型基金平均报酬率的惊人纪录。如果说人生如戏，那麼，13年来，这位演员从未ＮＧ。
13年间，彼得林奇创造了2763％的累积报酬率，比大盘涨幅整整多出了2200％。平均每年绩效超过29％。
自1990年辞去基金经理人职务后，几乎没人打探他的操作动向；彼得林奇也鲜少预测经济情势，所以，退隐之后，你很难找到他对市场展望的任何谈话，他几乎消失在所有媒体版面。
与台湾媒体难得的首度接触，发生在2001年的一场公开视讯会议。当时，美国经济正因为科技股泡沫及911事件而陷入危机。当被问及美股是否已经落底时，彼得林奇回答：「我不觉得这样的预测有什麼意义，想赚钱，就不该用短线的逻辑思考。」随后，这个世界进入了一段最强劲景气扩张期。
7年之后，全球投资气氛再度陷入绝望情境，这次《今周刊》排除万难，经过3个月约访，终於独家取得专访他的机会。在专访中，彼得林奇提出他对经济现况的观察与解读，同时发表他对投资心态与选股策略的建议，他的说法绝不艰涩深奥，却隐含了最扎实的投资成功哲学。
以下是专访内容：
关於经济：衰退后就有復甦／市场终会回归常轨，不必费心猜测
《今周刊》问（以下简称「问」）：市场上对於目前经济看法眾说纷紜，依你看，美国是否已经步入衰退？
彼得林奇答（以下简称「答」）：衰退了吗？我现在没有明确答案。事实上，我想总要等到尘埃落定之后，才能用回顾过往的口吻，告诉你这段时间究竟算不算是经济衰退。记得吗？01、02年的衰退，或者1981、82年的严重衰退，都是等到事过境迁之后，人们才会给予这段时间一个代表衰退的标籤。在此之前，任何短线的猜测都只是猜测，意义不大。
我的意思是，市场经歷多空循环的交替，总是需要一段时间，通常无法在发生的当下得知下一个阶段的变化。因此，我一向不把时间花在预测未来上。
问：如果投资人不该花费力气猜测未来，是不是代表我们也不该担心景气的多空变化？
答：自从第二次世界大战以来，我们一共经歷了十次的衰退期，然而，十次衰退之后，紧接出现的就是十次的復甦。衰退之后总是会復甦，长期来看，经济表现终究能够回到常轨，那麼，又何必去担心短期的不确定性呢？
问：难道没有任何事情值得担心吗？全球投资人现在可都正在担心著通膨和美国次贷的问题呢！
答：说到通膨，虽然我并不是经济专家，但从各种现象来看，这波通膨倒也不是来得全无道理。过去几年这个世界的生產力大幅提升，经济活动热络，这或许就能解释油价、物价高涨的现象。但，高通膨会是长期现象吗？
我还是只看眼前的数字，起码，当美国核心通膨率达到五％之后，近来国际油价及原物料价格就出现一波跌势。五％的通膨率就像是个临界点，达到这个数字，人们就会开始思考更有效率地运用资源，降低通膨继续恶化的压力。
问：次级房贷的问题呢？你认为最坏的情况是否已经过去？
答：在我看来，次贷问题现在反倒不是那麼重要了，眼前的问题，反而可能是大家所忽略的一般优良房贷。这些贷款人并非债信不佳的次级贷款者，但他们受到房市下跌影响，必须藉由二次贷款才能负担得起房贷支出。
问：总的来说，我们可以依循哪些指标，了解经济正在恢復当中，并且转趋乐观？
答：其实，我认为人们无须太过担心景气循环的週期。一般来说，这些市场的问题都将会自动修正过来。
就我而言，会特别观察人们买屋的意愿，当购屋意愿提高，建商也开始建造更多房屋，情况自然会渐渐好转起来。但值得注意的是，即使房市开始回温，也不见得就能立即用超乐观的态度解读。因为过去两、三年来的餘屋，可能还得花上12至18个月才能完全出清完毕。
关於投资：依旧首选股票／世界赚钱机会仍多，且股优於债
问：你认为经济问题不会影响股票投资，也认为美国各个產业的基本面仍然不必绝望，所以，你必然也认为现阶段的股票投资价值高於债券？
答：是的！美国十年期国库券的收益率低於4％，比Ｓ＆Ｐ500指数的报酬率来得低。自从第二次世界大战以来，Ｓ＆Ｐ五○○企业的每股盈餘成长率，平均可达17％，虽然经歷了衰退，但是平均仍有这样优异的表现，此外，你还可获得2％至3％股利。
债券在1982年之时，政府公债提供15％的利息，这在当时股票报酬普遍表现不佳时，特别显得有竞争力。不过，在我的经验当中，债券投资价值超过股票，也就只有在这一时期。
问：除了美国以外，你如何看新兴国家的表现？
答：很明显的，目前中东、俄罗斯与东欧、巴西等国的成长表现，比过去二十年来表现都还要突出，另外还有中国、印度、土耳其，都各自表现优异，与美国经济有了脱鉤现象。
问：北京奥运已经开幕，你如何看待中国市场？
答：我对中国没有深入研究，不过我知道他们的国民生產毛额（ＧＮＰ）达到8％或9％。在我的标準看来，一个国家的ＧＮＰ若是比其他国家高出二到三倍，就可说是拥有强健的生產力，或许就是值得投资、有机会赚到钱的国家。
问：那麼以亚洲来说，哪个国家最获你青睞？
答：不，请别误会，虽然我认为某些国家有赚钱机会，但不该我赚的，我就不会去赚。基本上，我不会花时间去研究印度或是中国、韩国、台湾的股票，因为光在美国，就有五千家企业够我花时间去研究了！
关於心态：对的标的就下手／太过担忧，乾脆别想投资
问：所以你仍然只专注投资在美国？
答：没错。
问：是的，你总是建议投资人应该从自己熟悉的市场下手，不过，我们现在应该等待局势更加明朗时再进场吗？
答：我不确定是否等得到所谓的局势明朗，市场真的是瞬息万变，谁也说不準。能够确定的事情是，如果你有长期投资的耐心与本钱，而且挑到了具有潜力且股价便宜的个股，就该买进，然后静待股价反映基本面。
问：对於那些担心股市仍将继续重挫的投资人，你会对他们说些什麼？
答：假使你很担心市场的波动与变化，你应该开个银行帐户，把钱存在银行裡面就好，别开证券户了。
基本上，假使太过担忧市场，就不会是个好投资人，因为你的进出动作总是顾虑太多。在市场上，成功的关键就是要能承受得起市场上的坏新闻与坏消息，市场下跌时反而可以找到机会，应该感到高兴。
问：你曾说过，太早卖掉Home Depot（ＤＩＹ工具店）和玩具反斗城，是你毕生最大的遗憾，最近，这个错误还有再犯吗？
答：很可惜，我的确又犯了几次同样错误。有一些农產品企业的股票卖得太早了。就和上述的两家公司一样，都是犯下卖得太早的错误！没想到农產品企业在我卖出后，又继续向上涨。
问：农业股前些日子飆得颇凶，太早出场，很后悔吧？
答：要说非常后悔，倒也还好。反正，我总是不停地找寻机会，找到未来对的趋势。就像之前说的，我从不试图去预测市场，不去猜测市场的高低起伏，而是把全部的精神与心力放在个别企业身上。
问：哪些企业？它们具有什麼特质？或者说，怎样的企业才能被你列入追踪名单？
答：我不能报明牌，但说穿了，这些企业的特质其实没有多麼特别。首先是拥有良好的财务结构，并且，它们可以长时间的专注在本业上。具备此二者之后，再来要看这家公司是否具有独特性、不可替代的优势。如果有，你就可能挖掘一档在未来五年、十年都能持续表现良好的企业个股……
1990年辞去基金经理人职务之后，彼得林奇低调生活，绝少接受媒体採访，这次《今周刊》排除万难，经过3个月约访，终於独家取得专访他的机会，请他就当前全球经济情势提出观察，同时也给投资人当下投资的建议。
「对於未来，我一向不做太多的猜测！」在全球经济衰退疑虑重重之际，二十世纪顶尖投资大师彼得林奇认为，任何的短线猜测都没有实质意义，如果把时间拉长，无论是经济衰退或者產业景气趋缓，终有回到正常轨道的时候。作为股市投资人，研究的重点不该是预测景气，而是应放在研究基本面上。
在投资市场充满不确定性的2008年，彼得林奇给投资人中肯的建议。他说，市场瞬息万变，谁也说不準。但是若能挑到具有潜力且股价便宜的个股，就该买进，然后静待股价反映基本面。
至於股债应该如何选择？彼得林奇认为，当然是股优於债。依照他的投资逻辑，当下应该是：别管股灾，放胆买好股。
对於担心股市仍将继续重挫的投资人，他更直截了当地说：「假使你很担心市场的波动与变化，应该开个银行帐户，把钱存在银行裡面就好，别开证券户了。」
基本上，他认为，如果太过担忧市场，就不会是个好投资人，因为你的进出动作总是顾虑太多。在市场上成功的关键，就是要能承受得起市场上的坏新闻与坏消息，市场下跌时反而可以找到机会，应该感到高兴。
1977年，彼得林奇不过是个基金界的小菜鸟，所掌管的富达麦哲伦基金，规模只有一千八百万美元。一千八百万美元，即使是以台股基金的标準来看，都还只能算是不太起眼的中小规模基金。
1990年，当他卸下经理人职务时，基金规模成长了776倍，达到140亿美元。一度，他是全球最大股票型基金的经理人。
彼得林奇没有一战暴富的传奇事跡，也没有发表过什麼一语成讖的惊人神準预言。基本上，如果不是把13年的基金操盘成绩一次回顾个够，你恐怕很难体会，他的地位能够超越眾多赫赫有名的投资大师，名列《纽约时报》二十世纪十大顶尖投资人的第二位，第一名是巴菲特。
在13年的基金操盘生涯中，彼得林奇缔造了连续13年正报酬、且连续13年超越股票型基金平均报酬率的惊人纪录。如果说人生如戏，那麼，13年来，这位演员从未ＮＧ。
13年间，彼得林奇创造了2763％的累积报酬率，比大盘涨幅整整多出了2200％。平均每年绩效超过29％。
自1990年辞去基金经理人职务后，几乎没人打探他的操作动向；彼得林奇也鲜少预测经济情势，所以，退隐之后，你很难找到他对市场展望的任何谈话，他几乎消失在所有媒体版面。
与台湾媒体难得的首度接触，发生在2001年的一场公开视讯会议。当时，美国经济正因为科技股泡沫及911事件而陷入危机。当被问及美股是否已经落底时，彼得林奇回答：「我不觉得这样的预测有什麼意义，想赚钱，就不该用短线的逻辑思考。」随后，这个世界进入了一段最强劲景气扩张期。
7年之后，全球投资气氛再度陷入绝望情境，这次《今周刊》排除万难，经过3个月约访，终於独家取得专访他的机会。在专访中，彼得林奇提出他对经济现况的观察与解读，同时发表他对投资心态与选股策略的建议，他的说法绝不艰涩深奥，却隐含了最扎实的投资成功哲学。
以下是专访内容：
关於经济：衰退后就有復甦／市场终会回归常轨，不必费心猜测
《今周刊》问（以下简称「问」）：市场上对於目前经济看法眾说纷紜，依你看，美国是否已经步入衰退？
彼得林奇答（以下简称「答」）：衰退了吗？我现在没有明确答案。事实上，我想总要等到尘埃落定之后，才能用回顾过往的口吻，告诉你这段时间究竟算不算是经济衰退。记得吗？01、02年的衰退，或者1981、82年的严重衰退，都是等到事过境迁之后，人们才会给予这段时间一个代表衰退的标籤。在此之前，任何短线的猜测都只是猜测，意义不大。
我的意思是，市场经歷多空循环的交替，总是需要一段时间，通常无法在发生的当下得知下一个阶段的变化。因此，我一向不把时间花在预测未来上。
问：如果投资人不该花费力气猜测未来，是不是代表我们也不该担心景气的多空变化？
答：自从第二次世界大战以来，我们一共经歷了十次的衰退期，然而，十次衰退之后，紧接出现的就是十次的復甦。衰退之后总是会復甦，长期来看，经济表现终究能够回到常轨，那麼，又何必去担心短期的不确定性呢？
问：难道没有任何事情值得担心吗？全球投资人现在可都正在担心著通膨和美国次贷的问题呢！
答：说到通膨，虽然我并不是经济专家，但从各种现象来看，这波通膨倒也不是来得全无道理。过去几年这个世界的生產力大幅提升，经济活动热络，这或许就能解释油价、物价高涨的现象。但，高通膨会是长期现象吗？
我还是只看眼前的数字，起码，当美国核心通膨率达到五％之后，近来国际油价及原物料价格就出现一波跌势。五％的通膨率就像是个临界点，达到这个数字，人们就会开始思考更有效率地运用资源，降低通膨继续恶化的压力。
问：次级房贷的问题呢？你认为最坏的情况是否已经过去？
答：在我看来，次贷问题现在反倒不是那麼重要了，眼前的问题，反而可能是大家所忽略的一般优良房贷。这些贷款人并非债信不佳的次级贷款者，但他们受到房市下跌影响，必须藉由二次贷款才能负担得起房贷支出。
问：总的来说，我们可以依循哪些指标，了解经济正在恢復当中，并且转趋乐观？
答：其实，我认为人们无须太过担心景气循环的週期。一般来说，这些市场的问题都将会自动修正过来。
就我而言，会特别观察人们买屋的意愿，当购屋意愿提高，建商也开始建造更多房屋，情况自然会渐渐好转起来。但值得注意的是，即使房市开始回温，也不见得就能立即用超乐观的态度解读。因为过去两、三年来的餘屋，可能还得花上12至18个月才能完全出清完毕。
关於投资：依旧首选股票／世界赚钱机会仍多，且股优於债
问：你认为经济问题不会影响股票投资，也认为美国各个產业的基本面仍然不必绝望，所以，你必然也认为现阶段的股票投资价值高於债券？
答：是的！美国十年期国库券的收益率低於4％，比Ｓ＆Ｐ500指数的报酬率来得低。自从第二次世界大战以来，Ｓ＆Ｐ五○○企业的每股盈餘成长率，平均可达17％，虽然经歷了衰退，但是平均仍有这样优异的表现，此外，你还可获得2％至3％股利。
债券在1982年之时，政府公债提供15％的利息，这在当时股票报酬普遍表现不佳时，特别显得有竞争力。不过，在我的经验当中，债券投资价值超过股票，也就只有在这一时期。
问：除了美国以外，你如何看新兴国家的表现？
答：很明显的，目前中东、俄罗斯与东欧、巴西等国的成长表现，比过去二十年来表现都还要突出，另外还有中国、印度、土耳其，都各自表现优异，与美国经济有了脱鉤现象。
问：北京奥运已经开幕，你如何看待中国市场？
答：我对中国没有深入研究，不过我知道他们的国民生產毛额（ＧＮＰ）达到8％或9％。在我的标準看来，一个国家的ＧＮＰ若是比其他国家高出二到三倍，就可说是拥有强健的生產力，或许就是值得投资、有机会赚到钱的国家。
问：那麼以亚洲来说，哪个国家最获你青睞？
答：不，请别误会，虽然我认为某些国家有赚钱机会，但不该我赚的，我就不会去赚。基本上，我不会花时间去研究印度或是中国、韩国、台湾的股票，因为光在美国，就有五千家企业够我花时间去研究了！
关於心态：对的标的就下手／太过担忧，乾脆别想投资
问：所以你仍然只专注投资在美国？
答：没错。
问：是的，你总是建议投资人应该从自己熟悉的市场下手，不过，我们现在应该等待局势更加明朗时再进场吗？
答：我不确定是否等得到所谓的局势明朗，市场真的是瞬息万变，谁也说不準。能够确定的事情是，如果你有长期投资的耐心与本钱，而且挑到了具有潜力且股价便宜的个股，就该买进，然后静待股价反映基本面。
问：对於那些担心股市仍将继续重挫的投资人，你会对他们说些什麼？
答：假使你很担心市场的波动与变化，你应该开个银行帐户，把钱存在银行裡面就好，别开证券户了。
基本上，假使太过担忧市场，就不会是个好投资人，因为你的进出动作总是顾虑太多。在市场上，成功的关键就是要能承受得起市场上的坏新闻与坏消息，市场下跌时反而可以找到机会，应该感到高兴。
问：你曾说过，太早卖掉Home Depot（ＤＩＹ工具店）和玩具反斗城，是你毕生最大的遗憾，最近，这个错误还有再犯吗？
答：很可惜，我的确又犯了几次同样错误。有一些农產品企业的股票卖得太早了。就和上述的两家公司一样，都是犯下卖得太早的错误！没想到农產品企业在我卖出后，又继续向上涨。
问：农业股前些日子飆得颇凶，太早出场，很后悔吧？
答：要说非常后悔，倒也还好。反正，我总是不停地找寻机会，找到未来对的趋势。就像之前说的，我从不试图去预测市场，不去猜测市场的高低起伏，而是把全部的精神与心力放在个别企业身上。
问：哪些企业？它们具有什麼特质？或者说，怎样的企业才能被你列入追踪名单？
答：我不能报明牌，但说穿了，这些企业的特质其实没有多麼特别。首先是拥有良好的财务结构，并且，它们可以长时间的专注在本业上。具备此二者之后，再来要看这家公司是否具有独特性、不可替代的优势。如果有，你就可能挖掘一档在未来五年、十年都能持续表现良好的企业个股……
What $700B won't buy: a quick fix for the economy
Not even $700 billion will be enough to spare the United States from more economic anguish if the government's proposed banking bailout pans out like similar desperation moves during the past two decades.
It usually takes years to recover from a financial crisis severe enough for politicians to ride to the rescue with truckloads of taxpayer money.
Take, for example, the U.S. government's August 1989 bailout of the savings-and-loan industry. The stock market fell by 12 percent within the first 14 months of the rescue plan while the economy slipped into an eight-month recession that began in July 1990. Housing prices that had just begun to erode continued to fall for another three years.
There's little reason to believe it will be dramatically different this time around, particularly since this bailout involves harder-to-value assets and comes with the U.S. economy already on the edge of a recession, if one hasn't begun already.
"This is going to take years to work out and it will be incredibly complicated," predicted banking consultant Bert Ely, who has extensively studied the U.S. government's 1989 bailout.
Although lawmakers are still sparring over the precise details, the proposed bailout would authorize the government to borrow up to $700 billion to buy the toxic assets poisoning banks. Most of these holdings are tied to mortgages made to borrowers who either can't afford to make their monthly payments or have simply chosen to default because they owe far more than their homes are worth. No one seems quite certain how much these assets are worth, but the government is betting that -- with time -- it can get a handle on it and eventually profit.
Even as the government tries to clean up the mess left by reckless home lenders, borrowers and investors, more problems are likely to stack up.
The trouble could include longer unemployment lines as struggling companies faced with declining sales and limited access to credit trim their payrolls. That could lead to even more bank failures as cash-strapped borrowers don't repay loans. And most experts think there's still a good chance the downturn in the housing and stock markets will deepen to further spook already frightened consumers.
The government is hoping its intervention will unclog the lending pipeline, but that isn't a certainty either, said Sung Won Sohn, an economics professor at California State University, Channel Islands.
"If I am a medium-sized bank on Main Street, simply because the government is bringing a bailout package to Wall Street doesn't mean I am suddenly going to change my mind and start lending money again," Sohn said.
That suggests the economic statistics won't even capture some of the collateral damage -- all the lost lending opportunities that occur as banks try to bolster their rickety balance sheets. Many banks have curtailed their lending because they are already swimming in losses and don't want to risk drowning by taking chances on more borrowers.
"The real tragedy is we will never know how many businesses would have been started or how many businesses might have expanded if all this hadn't happened," said Jonathan Macey, deputy dean of Yale Law School, who wrote a book about a government bailout in Sweden during the early 1990s.
In a best case scenario, Macey said the United States will bounce back within two years, like Sweden did after the government spent billions of dollars to salvage the country's troubled banks and prop up a slumping housing market.
Before the medicine took effect, Sweden suffered through a 20-month recession that saw nearly 60,000 companies go bankrupt, housing prices fall by 19 percent and the country's bellwether stock market index plunge 45 percent from its peak. Once the hangover ended, the good times resumed; Sweden's economic growth has averaged 3.2 percent since 1994.
Sweden spent 65 billion kronor (about $10 billion at the time), but made most of the money back because it bought a stake in some of the troubled banks. The government still owns nearly 20 percent in one bank -- a stake that is now up for sale. U.S. lawmakers also have been debating whether it makes sense to acquire stock in some of the banks that the government intends to help out.
In a more sobering situation, the payoff from the U.S. bailout might take much longer. That's what happened in Japan after its government finally intervened in a real estate and banking crisis that began in the early 1990s.
By the time the government acted in 1997, the economic hole was so deep that it took another seven or eight years to climb out. The net public outlay to clean up mess was 18 trillion yen ($168 billion), according to the Financial Services Agency.
The abysmal times in Japan during the 1990s are now known as the "lost decade." Even though the economy is better now, the Japan's stock market still hasn't returned to its peak before the bubble burst. And Japan still has about $9 billion worth of property held as collateral that needs to be sold.
It seems unlikely that the United States will have to wait as long for a recovery because the government is wading into the financial muck much more quickly than Japan did.
In contrast, the United States is promising to bail out its banks 18 months after mortgage lender New Century Financial Corp. filed for bankruptcy -- a move that set off alarms about the rot ruining home loan portfolios.
"Some resolution measures are more effective than others in restoring the banking system to health and containing the fallout on the real economy," the International Monetary Fund concluded in a study of 124 financial crises since 1970. "Above all, speed appears to be of the essence."
Even if the U.S. government is moving in time to make a difference, success is likely to hinge on the ability to figure out the right price to pay for an exotic mix of mortgage-backed investments and other serpentine securities that aren't easily appraised. And then the government must hope the housing market eventually rebounds to lift the value of the acquired assets.
If those pieces fall into place, the United States could profit or at least minimize its losses. On the flip side, the losses could be huge if the government misjudges the value of the problem assets or the housing market remains in a funk.
"The best we can hope for is that this (bailout) buys us time," said Edward Yardeni, who runs his own economic research firm.
The United States moved a little quicker to address the mortgage crisis than it did in the savings-and-loan debacle of the 1980s. Although warning signs of an industry breakdown started to flash in the mid-1980s, the government waited until August 1989 to create the Resolution Trust Corp. to dispose of the repossessed homes, offices, cars, planes and even artwork held by failed S&Ls.
During the next six years, the RTC sold nearly $400 billion in assets on the books of more than 700 failed thrifts. Taxpayers ended up sustaining a loss of $125 billion to $150 billion on the fire sale -- about 2 percent of the country's gross domestic product by the time the bailout was completed in 1995. Entering the S&L bailout, the government had projected a taxpayer loss of $40 billion to $50 billion.
If the ratio of losses to assets inherited in the latest $700 billion bailout is similar to what occurred in the S&L crisis, the taxpayers will be saddled with a bill of more than $250 billion, which also translates into about 2 percent of the nation's current GDP.
Data from the IMF's study suggest the losses could run even higher. The monetary fund calculated governments typically recover about 18 cents on every dollar spent in bailouts -- a rate that would translate into a loss of more than $500 billion. The United States seems unlikely to sustain a loss that large since it presumably will be buying the banking assets at a sharp discount -- leaving plenty of room for an upside.
Although the S&L bailout was the biggest in U.S. history before this one, the challenges facing the government are radically different.
In 1989-95, the government and an army of contractors disposed of assets that were dumped into their laps as S&Ls collapsed. And it wasn't too difficult to figure what those assets were worth because their value could be easily measured against similar property. That's not the case this time. Part of the reason so many banks are imperiled is that no one is sure what their investments are worth.
Most economists agree absorbing the bailout's costs are preferable to running the risk of the entire U.S. financial system unraveling -- a calamity that would probably trigger a global depression. But knowing things could be even worse probably won't make it easier to stomach the turmoil still to come.
"Unwinding asset and credit bubbles is a long and arduous task even with aggressive government involvement," Merrill Lynch economist David Rosenberg wrote in a report titled "Capitalism takes a sabbatical."
It usually takes years to recover from a financial crisis severe enough for politicians to ride to the rescue with truckloads of taxpayer money.
Take, for example, the U.S. government's August 1989 bailout of the savings-and-loan industry. The stock market fell by 12 percent within the first 14 months of the rescue plan while the economy slipped into an eight-month recession that began in July 1990. Housing prices that had just begun to erode continued to fall for another three years.
There's little reason to believe it will be dramatically different this time around, particularly since this bailout involves harder-to-value assets and comes with the U.S. economy already on the edge of a recession, if one hasn't begun already.
"This is going to take years to work out and it will be incredibly complicated," predicted banking consultant Bert Ely, who has extensively studied the U.S. government's 1989 bailout.
Although lawmakers are still sparring over the precise details, the proposed bailout would authorize the government to borrow up to $700 billion to buy the toxic assets poisoning banks. Most of these holdings are tied to mortgages made to borrowers who either can't afford to make their monthly payments or have simply chosen to default because they owe far more than their homes are worth. No one seems quite certain how much these assets are worth, but the government is betting that -- with time -- it can get a handle on it and eventually profit.
Even as the government tries to clean up the mess left by reckless home lenders, borrowers and investors, more problems are likely to stack up.
The trouble could include longer unemployment lines as struggling companies faced with declining sales and limited access to credit trim their payrolls. That could lead to even more bank failures as cash-strapped borrowers don't repay loans. And most experts think there's still a good chance the downturn in the housing and stock markets will deepen to further spook already frightened consumers.
The government is hoping its intervention will unclog the lending pipeline, but that isn't a certainty either, said Sung Won Sohn, an economics professor at California State University, Channel Islands.
"If I am a medium-sized bank on Main Street, simply because the government is bringing a bailout package to Wall Street doesn't mean I am suddenly going to change my mind and start lending money again," Sohn said.
That suggests the economic statistics won't even capture some of the collateral damage -- all the lost lending opportunities that occur as banks try to bolster their rickety balance sheets. Many banks have curtailed their lending because they are already swimming in losses and don't want to risk drowning by taking chances on more borrowers.
"The real tragedy is we will never know how many businesses would have been started or how many businesses might have expanded if all this hadn't happened," said Jonathan Macey, deputy dean of Yale Law School, who wrote a book about a government bailout in Sweden during the early 1990s.
In a best case scenario, Macey said the United States will bounce back within two years, like Sweden did after the government spent billions of dollars to salvage the country's troubled banks and prop up a slumping housing market.
Before the medicine took effect, Sweden suffered through a 20-month recession that saw nearly 60,000 companies go bankrupt, housing prices fall by 19 percent and the country's bellwether stock market index plunge 45 percent from its peak. Once the hangover ended, the good times resumed; Sweden's economic growth has averaged 3.2 percent since 1994.
Sweden spent 65 billion kronor (about $10 billion at the time), but made most of the money back because it bought a stake in some of the troubled banks. The government still owns nearly 20 percent in one bank -- a stake that is now up for sale. U.S. lawmakers also have been debating whether it makes sense to acquire stock in some of the banks that the government intends to help out.
In a more sobering situation, the payoff from the U.S. bailout might take much longer. That's what happened in Japan after its government finally intervened in a real estate and banking crisis that began in the early 1990s.
By the time the government acted in 1997, the economic hole was so deep that it took another seven or eight years to climb out. The net public outlay to clean up mess was 18 trillion yen ($168 billion), according to the Financial Services Agency.
The abysmal times in Japan during the 1990s are now known as the "lost decade." Even though the economy is better now, the Japan's stock market still hasn't returned to its peak before the bubble burst. And Japan still has about $9 billion worth of property held as collateral that needs to be sold.
It seems unlikely that the United States will have to wait as long for a recovery because the government is wading into the financial muck much more quickly than Japan did.
In contrast, the United States is promising to bail out its banks 18 months after mortgage lender New Century Financial Corp. filed for bankruptcy -- a move that set off alarms about the rot ruining home loan portfolios.
"Some resolution measures are more effective than others in restoring the banking system to health and containing the fallout on the real economy," the International Monetary Fund concluded in a study of 124 financial crises since 1970. "Above all, speed appears to be of the essence."
Even if the U.S. government is moving in time to make a difference, success is likely to hinge on the ability to figure out the right price to pay for an exotic mix of mortgage-backed investments and other serpentine securities that aren't easily appraised. And then the government must hope the housing market eventually rebounds to lift the value of the acquired assets.
If those pieces fall into place, the United States could profit or at least minimize its losses. On the flip side, the losses could be huge if the government misjudges the value of the problem assets or the housing market remains in a funk.
"The best we can hope for is that this (bailout) buys us time," said Edward Yardeni, who runs his own economic research firm.
The United States moved a little quicker to address the mortgage crisis than it did in the savings-and-loan debacle of the 1980s. Although warning signs of an industry breakdown started to flash in the mid-1980s, the government waited until August 1989 to create the Resolution Trust Corp. to dispose of the repossessed homes, offices, cars, planes and even artwork held by failed S&Ls.
During the next six years, the RTC sold nearly $400 billion in assets on the books of more than 700 failed thrifts. Taxpayers ended up sustaining a loss of $125 billion to $150 billion on the fire sale -- about 2 percent of the country's gross domestic product by the time the bailout was completed in 1995. Entering the S&L bailout, the government had projected a taxpayer loss of $40 billion to $50 billion.
If the ratio of losses to assets inherited in the latest $700 billion bailout is similar to what occurred in the S&L crisis, the taxpayers will be saddled with a bill of more than $250 billion, which also translates into about 2 percent of the nation's current GDP.
Data from the IMF's study suggest the losses could run even higher. The monetary fund calculated governments typically recover about 18 cents on every dollar spent in bailouts -- a rate that would translate into a loss of more than $500 billion. The United States seems unlikely to sustain a loss that large since it presumably will be buying the banking assets at a sharp discount -- leaving plenty of room for an upside.
Although the S&L bailout was the biggest in U.S. history before this one, the challenges facing the government are radically different.
In 1989-95, the government and an army of contractors disposed of assets that were dumped into their laps as S&Ls collapsed. And it wasn't too difficult to figure what those assets were worth because their value could be easily measured against similar property. That's not the case this time. Part of the reason so many banks are imperiled is that no one is sure what their investments are worth.
Most economists agree absorbing the bailout's costs are preferable to running the risk of the entire U.S. financial system unraveling -- a calamity that would probably trigger a global depression. But knowing things could be even worse probably won't make it easier to stomach the turmoil still to come.
"Unwinding asset and credit bubbles is a long and arduous task even with aggressive government involvement," Merrill Lynch economist David Rosenberg wrote in a report titled "Capitalism takes a sabbatical."
美国的救市资金全部是中国老百姓的血汗钱
最近全球都在谈论一件金融大丑闻，很不幸，它的主角就是中国。中国大陆除了拥有 “ 两房 ” 垃圾债券3763亿美元以外，还拥有5000多亿美国国债，看来早晚也是垃圾，即使不是垃圾也是在帮美国经济泡沫买单。两者之和超过9000亿美元。30年改革开放血汗换来的外汇家底大部分都套在里面。
而美国的此次金融危机，目前国家投入的救市的资金也就是7000多亿元，远远小于中国的9000多亿元资金，而这些资金对于中国的影响有多大呢？
首先是占国民经济的比例，9000多亿美元超过我们GDP的30%，而对于美国的经济，不到美国经济的10%，所以从对于经济影响的强度来讲，足以给中国经济远远超过美国经济的重创。
再者就是这些钱对于中国是肉烂在锅外，美国的金融问题的坏账，是本国经济问题造成的，与该资金对应的实物是在美国各个经济体之间的转移，是肉烂在锅里，而中国的这些债券的损失，就是肉烂在美国了，我们损失的金额都被美国鬼子赚走了。
最后我们再看一下这钱的数量，这款项已经是我们日本侵华战争损失的二倍，而且是美国反恐战争的几倍，可以武装几十艘航空母舰了，而我们当初发行2000亿美元的国债投资海外，就已经造成我们股市的地震了，而9000亿美元，相当于中国人均6000块人民币，一个家庭就是几万块钱，而我们有超过一半的人口一辈子的积蓄也就是这么多，这对于我们这样的国家是什么样的灾难啊。
对于我们的股市，中国一片的泡沫论，但是我们把美国的证券市场当作榜样，何尝为了中国救市，但是我们国家却为美国付出，这付出太大了，这样的做法已经不能简单地用愚蠢的错误来解释了。
在我们大肆的打击牛奶问题时，我们一贯的压制媒体攻击有关方面的做法此次得到放松，背后就应当是为了掩盖更大的问题，就如当年的扫黑，实际上是经济就业问题的恶化，我们这样的金融损失，是我们整个乳品行业的几十倍。
而对于中国这样的国际金融损失，现在只是泡沫还没有戳破，美好的憧憬还在，我们亲民的宰相还在，但是我们的大明王朝就是亡国在亲民的宰相手里的，老百姓重视领导的好听的，但是经济的残酷对于无知的人是没有体会的，亲民不能当饭吃，从来是说得最好听做的最好看的，背后最肮脏龌龊，就如老子的大忠大奸论。
等我们泡沫破灭的那一天，老百姓的苦难开始了，中国经济的问题开始了，股市还要继续熊下去，但领导们又有一套让老百姓信服的说辞出台了。
而美国的此次金融危机，目前国家投入的救市的资金也就是7000多亿元，远远小于中国的9000多亿元资金，而这些资金对于中国的影响有多大呢？
首先是占国民经济的比例，9000多亿美元超过我们GDP的30%，而对于美国的经济，不到美国经济的10%，所以从对于经济影响的强度来讲，足以给中国经济远远超过美国经济的重创。
再者就是这些钱对于中国是肉烂在锅外，美国的金融问题的坏账，是本国经济问题造成的，与该资金对应的实物是在美国各个经济体之间的转移，是肉烂在锅里，而中国的这些债券的损失，就是肉烂在美国了，我们损失的金额都被美国鬼子赚走了。
最后我们再看一下这钱的数量，这款项已经是我们日本侵华战争损失的二倍，而且是美国反恐战争的几倍，可以武装几十艘航空母舰了，而我们当初发行2000亿美元的国债投资海外，就已经造成我们股市的地震了，而9000亿美元，相当于中国人均6000块人民币，一个家庭就是几万块钱，而我们有超过一半的人口一辈子的积蓄也就是这么多，这对于我们这样的国家是什么样的灾难啊。
对于我们的股市，中国一片的泡沫论，但是我们把美国的证券市场当作榜样，何尝为了中国救市，但是我们国家却为美国付出，这付出太大了，这样的做法已经不能简单地用愚蠢的错误来解释了。
在我们大肆的打击牛奶问题时，我们一贯的压制媒体攻击有关方面的做法此次得到放松，背后就应当是为了掩盖更大的问题，就如当年的扫黑，实际上是经济就业问题的恶化，我们这样的金融损失，是我们整个乳品行业的几十倍。
而对于中国这样的国际金融损失，现在只是泡沫还没有戳破，美好的憧憬还在，我们亲民的宰相还在，但是我们的大明王朝就是亡国在亲民的宰相手里的，老百姓重视领导的好听的，但是经济的残酷对于无知的人是没有体会的，亲民不能当饭吃，从来是说得最好听做的最好看的，背后最肮脏龌龊，就如老子的大忠大奸论。
等我们泡沫破灭的那一天，老百姓的苦难开始了，中国经济的问题开始了，股市还要继续熊下去，但领导们又有一套让老百姓信服的说辞出台了。
巴菲特连连出手
在全球金融危机动荡不安，股指大幅下挫的最恐怖、最悲观时刻，巴菲特正在连连出手，大手笔买入。
9月18日，沃伦·巴菲特领导的伯克希尔公司旗下一家子公司以47亿美元现金购买股价数日暴跌的“星牌”能源集团。这一价格虽略高于公司17日收盘价，但远低于上周最后一个交易日即12日收盘价以及今年1月每股107.97美元的历史最高价。9月15日，“星牌”能源集团股票因受整体经济不确定因素影响而遭投资者大量抛售，短短3天时间跌去近60%。对于巴菲特来说，以如此价格购买“星牌”能源集团或许是一笔好买卖。
仅仅时隔5天，9月23日，伯克希尔公司又宣布，将以50亿美元购买高盛集团优先股。伯克希尔公司将获得的优先股股息率为10％。此外，公司还获得今后5年内任意时间购入50亿美元高盛普通股的认股权，价格为每股115美元。
而在此在前，美国国际集团以及已经申请破产的雷曼兄弟公司曾分别接触巴菲特，希望对方出资接手自己资产。不过巴菲特婉拒了雷曼：“如果我把钱投到你公司，我看不到有好回报。雷曼账面正在流血，而股市就像一把落下的刀。”而对于高盛公司，巴菲特情有独钟，他在一份新闻公告中表示，高盛是一家杰出的机构，拥有最优秀的全球业务、公认的管理有效的团队以及人才和财务资本，所有这些将使高盛继续保持其卓越的业绩。这是巴菲特出手的根本原因。
巴菲特是最擅长在股市的血雨腥风时买入的，因为这时往往是他“欢快得像小马驹”的时候。短短5天内的两笔交易强烈地昭示出巴菲特的投资风格，那就是“在别人贪婪的时候恐惧，而在别人恐惧的时候贪婪。”相信在不久的将来，巴菲特又将以出色的业绩称冠投资界。
格雷厄姆在《聪明的投资者》开篇第一句就说，如果你所做的事与许多人一样，你赚不了钱。反过来，言外之意就是，我们必须摒弃羊群行为，保持独立的个性，才能笑到最后。现在，巴菲特连连出手，我们还恐惧什么？
9月18日，沃伦·巴菲特领导的伯克希尔公司旗下一家子公司以47亿美元现金购买股价数日暴跌的“星牌”能源集团。这一价格虽略高于公司17日收盘价，但远低于上周最后一个交易日即12日收盘价以及今年1月每股107.97美元的历史最高价。9月15日，“星牌”能源集团股票因受整体经济不确定因素影响而遭投资者大量抛售，短短3天时间跌去近60%。对于巴菲特来说，以如此价格购买“星牌”能源集团或许是一笔好买卖。
仅仅时隔5天，9月23日，伯克希尔公司又宣布，将以50亿美元购买高盛集团优先股。伯克希尔公司将获得的优先股股息率为10％。此外，公司还获得今后5年内任意时间购入50亿美元高盛普通股的认股权，价格为每股115美元。
而在此在前，美国国际集团以及已经申请破产的雷曼兄弟公司曾分别接触巴菲特，希望对方出资接手自己资产。不过巴菲特婉拒了雷曼：“如果我把钱投到你公司，我看不到有好回报。雷曼账面正在流血，而股市就像一把落下的刀。”而对于高盛公司，巴菲特情有独钟，他在一份新闻公告中表示，高盛是一家杰出的机构，拥有最优秀的全球业务、公认的管理有效的团队以及人才和财务资本，所有这些将使高盛继续保持其卓越的业绩。这是巴菲特出手的根本原因。
巴菲特是最擅长在股市的血雨腥风时买入的，因为这时往往是他“欢快得像小马驹”的时候。短短5天内的两笔交易强烈地昭示出巴菲特的投资风格，那就是“在别人贪婪的时候恐惧，而在别人恐惧的时候贪婪。”相信在不久的将来，巴菲特又将以出色的业绩称冠投资界。
格雷厄姆在《聪明的投资者》开篇第一句就说，如果你所做的事与许多人一样，你赚不了钱。反过来，言外之意就是，我们必须摒弃羊群行为，保持独立的个性，才能笑到最后。现在，巴菲特连连出手，我们还恐惧什么？
Cheap properties galore in Geylang
These days, even with the property market in the doldrums, it is almost impossible to buy a condominium for less than $500 per sq ft (psf).
Almost impossible, that is, except in Geylang.
To the ordinary homebuyer, it is not hard to see why. Even on a weekday afternoon, the red-light district is peppered with young girls wearing skin-tight skirts and the men who crowd around them.
Temples on one side of the road face dimly lit terrace houses with blatantly displayed ‘open’ signs on the other. Famous food outlets are tucked between rows of cheap, rundown hotels.
But get past the sleaze and you will find some of Singapore’s best condo buys lining the streets off Geylang Road. Many are freehold and a handful, such as Atrium Residences, are even brand new.
Properties come at a song partly because of the area’s still-squalid reputation, and partly because some banks do not offer loans to buy homes in Geylang, agents say.
But savvy buyers with cash in hand, or who are willing to pay the higher interest rates offered by some financing firms, can often pick up a good deal, they add.
Firms that offer loans for Geylang properties include Hong Leong Finance and Singapura Finance.
‘Many buyers are open-minded enough to know that there is a lot of investment potential in the area. Geylang is near the city, but even cheaper than the heartland,’ said Ms Natalie Maia Indra, an agent with DTZ Debenham Tie Leung, who has been selling homes in the area for almost a year.
The low prices mean that rental yields, calculated by dividing a property’s total rents for a year over its purchase price, can ‘easily hit 7 per cent’, especially for the newer properties. This compares with an average of 2 per cent to 4 per cent for most homes in Singapore.
Geylang is also drawing more interest from homebuyers these days because of its growing reputation as a bona fide food paradise. This has not only helped Singaporeans get a taste of the more savoury parts of the red-light district, but also spawned foodie crowds that make the area feel less dangerous.
Of course, even within Geylang, not all properties are equal. The traditional wisdom is that odd-numbered lorongs are ’safe’, while even-numbered ones are shunned.
A better guide, however, is that the area above Lorong 25 is generally quieter. Below that, a large cluster of cheap hotels and coffee shops gives rise to ribald revelry that often continues into the wee hours of the morning.
The more popular homes are those further removed from Geylang Road: nearer Aljunied MRT Station to the north, and around Guillemard Road to the south. These areas are favoured by big-name developers such as CapitaLand and Far East Organization, which jointly developed Central Grove near Aljunied MRT Station.
Between desirable streets and less preferred ones, prices can differ markedly.
Along Lorong 20, the newly completed Sunflower Regency is fetching around $550 psf. Down the road, Cosmo in Guillemard Crescent, lying just outside Geylang proper, was sold out at an average price of about $1,100 psf when it was launched in April.
A few streets west of that, Wing Fong Court and Wing Fong Mansions are hovering at about $400 psf. They are located at the heart of seedy Geylang, where the streets are dirty, the buildings old, and the noise of raucous foodies extends late into the night.
Still, potential buyers such as entrepreneur Sebastian Lim, 27, are not deterred by such details.
‘Geylang properties are really cheap and I think they will appreciate in time because the area is not too far from town,’ he said.
Almost impossible, that is, except in Geylang.
To the ordinary homebuyer, it is not hard to see why. Even on a weekday afternoon, the red-light district is peppered with young girls wearing skin-tight skirts and the men who crowd around them.
Temples on one side of the road face dimly lit terrace houses with blatantly displayed ‘open’ signs on the other. Famous food outlets are tucked between rows of cheap, rundown hotels.
But get past the sleaze and you will find some of Singapore’s best condo buys lining the streets off Geylang Road. Many are freehold and a handful, such as Atrium Residences, are even brand new.
Properties come at a song partly because of the area’s still-squalid reputation, and partly because some banks do not offer loans to buy homes in Geylang, agents say.
But savvy buyers with cash in hand, or who are willing to pay the higher interest rates offered by some financing firms, can often pick up a good deal, they add.
Firms that offer loans for Geylang properties include Hong Leong Finance and Singapura Finance.
‘Many buyers are open-minded enough to know that there is a lot of investment potential in the area. Geylang is near the city, but even cheaper than the heartland,’ said Ms Natalie Maia Indra, an agent with DTZ Debenham Tie Leung, who has been selling homes in the area for almost a year.
The low prices mean that rental yields, calculated by dividing a property’s total rents for a year over its purchase price, can ‘easily hit 7 per cent’, especially for the newer properties. This compares with an average of 2 per cent to 4 per cent for most homes in Singapore.
Geylang is also drawing more interest from homebuyers these days because of its growing reputation as a bona fide food paradise. This has not only helped Singaporeans get a taste of the more savoury parts of the red-light district, but also spawned foodie crowds that make the area feel less dangerous.
Of course, even within Geylang, not all properties are equal. The traditional wisdom is that odd-numbered lorongs are ’safe’, while even-numbered ones are shunned.
A better guide, however, is that the area above Lorong 25 is generally quieter. Below that, a large cluster of cheap hotels and coffee shops gives rise to ribald revelry that often continues into the wee hours of the morning.
The more popular homes are those further removed from Geylang Road: nearer Aljunied MRT Station to the north, and around Guillemard Road to the south. These areas are favoured by big-name developers such as CapitaLand and Far East Organization, which jointly developed Central Grove near Aljunied MRT Station.
Between desirable streets and less preferred ones, prices can differ markedly.
Along Lorong 20, the newly completed Sunflower Regency is fetching around $550 psf. Down the road, Cosmo in Guillemard Crescent, lying just outside Geylang proper, was sold out at an average price of about $1,100 psf when it was launched in April.
A few streets west of that, Wing Fong Court and Wing Fong Mansions are hovering at about $400 psf. They are located at the heart of seedy Geylang, where the streets are dirty, the buildings old, and the noise of raucous foodies extends late into the night.
Still, potential buyers such as entrepreneur Sebastian Lim, 27, are not deterred by such details.
‘Geylang properties are really cheap and I think they will appreciate in time because the area is not too far from town,’ he said.
Can't Anyone Afford My Home?
Prices have dropped. A lot. But it's still surprisingly hard to find buyers.
(Money Magazine) -- Maybe you've started thinking that now you can finally find a buyer for your house. After all, this summer the National Association of Homebuilders asserted that houses were more affordable than at any time during the previous four years. Prices have slid so far that many homes are now within the reach of people who couldn't buy during the bubble.
Other faintly cheery facts have emerged too. Sales of existing homes were 3% brisker in July than June, and in several metropolitan areas - among them Boston and Denver - the market seems to be turning around.
What about my mortgage?
When examined closely, however, those glimmers of better times ahead seem to fade. Sure, lower prices can help you sell, but you also have to know whether there are enough people who can afford to pay the price you want.
That, in turn, depends on a mix of factors including the financing that buyers can get, whether there are enough of them who want to live where you do, their other housing options and how they feel about investing so much in an asset whose future appreciation is iffy.
"Price is just one of many variables that go into a decision to buy a house," says real estate analyst Michael Larson of Weiss Research, a Jupiter, Fla. investment newsletter publisher. "Many other factors are overriding price right now. That's why the market remains challenged."
The long fall
Price, though, is still the primary measure of affordability for any buyer. And while the median price for an existing house has tumbled 8% from $230,100 to $212,400 since its peak in 2006, according to the National Association of Realtors, many potential buyers still see asking prices as expensive.
And they're not wrong. That $212,400 house, after all, costs 39% more than it did back in pre-boom 2001 when it sold for about $153,100. Prices in red-hot markets such as Miami became even more inflated during the boom and are still up about twice as high as they were in 2001.
So while homes are selling at a discount, they're not on clearance - not yet anyway. Peak to trough, the median-priced home nationwide is projected to fall as much as 20%, bottoming out around $185,000 by late 2009, according to a July report from Wachovia.
"Houses may be more affordable, but they will probably be even more affordable next year," says Nigel Gault, chief U.S. economist at Global Insight, an economic forecasting firm. "So why buy now?"
Crunched credit
The price may be right, but if buyers can't borrow enough, the house isn't affordable. Difficulty borrowing is keeping many Americans from buying. "The industry went from little or no credit standards to credit standards on steroids," says Marc Savitt, president of the National Association of Mortgage Brokers.
According to the Federal Reserve Board, about 85% of lenders, worried about falling prices and rising foreclosures, have stiffened requirements for borrowers in the past three months. Those with a credit score of 600 or lower cannot get loans at all, says Keith Gumbinger of HSH Associates, a mortgage information publisher.
The upshot: 21 million, or 13% of those who have credit records, many of whom would have qualified for mortgages during the bubble, can no longer do so.
Those whose credit scores are high enough to qualify for a mortgage will likely pay more. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which set the lending criteria for most loans, in November will require a 740 score, up from 680 for buyers to escape a surcharge that ultimately increases their interest rate.
As a result, the 33 million Americans whose scores fall between 680 and 740 (roughly 20% of adults with credit histories) may have to pay half a percentage point more to borrow. On a $300,000, 30-year loan, that would add about $100 to a buyer's monthly payment.
Adios, easy money
Back in the go-go years, lenders fell all over themselves to make no-down-payment loans. Those are gone, and lenders want some skin in the game, at least 5%. But to avoid paying extra, most buyers need the full 20% demanded in days of yore. To buy a $400,000 house, a family would now have to amass $80,000 in cash, up from $20,000 or less a few years ago.
Buyers also face higher interest rates, which allow them to borrow less. In mid-2004 a borrower with good credit could have qualified for a rate of 5.87% on a 30-year fixed $300,000 loan. That translates to a monthly payment of $1,774. Now, with the rate for the same loan at 6.57%, the same monthly payment could support a loan of just $278,500.
Back in the day, option ARMs and other exotic mortgages with low teaser rates helped struggling purchasers stretch to buy houses that they could not otherwise afford. Those deals have largely disappeared.
And while banks once allowed a homeowner's monthly principal, interest, taxes and insurance (PITI) to make up as much as 45% of a family's before-tax income, now buyers are restricted to using only 32% for a house payment. If PITI rises beyond that limit, banks consider the loan unaffordable and the family cannot receive a mortgage.
That limit boosts the amount of income a homeowner needs to purchase. Say your house has dropped from $425,000 to about $395,000. A couple of years ago a family needed an income of only $80,000 to buy. Now, even though the house costs less, a prospective buyer must have an income of $92,000.
Less expensive options
Rental prices are looking good in many areas. Christopher Mayer, a Columbia University real estate professor, recently found that in 11 of 16 top cities, renting is a better deal compared to buying than it has been historically.
The extra expense of owning was offset by rising house values - at least a few years ago. Now that new buyers can no longer count on steep appreciation, they have less incentive to buy.
And it's not as if rents are standing still while your house's price falls. "Competition from vacant houses or condos that people can't sell is driving down rental rates," says Hessam Nadji, managing director of research at Marcus & Millichap Real Estate Investment Services in Encino, Calif.
The big pinch
A house is only affordable if a homeowner can meet its monthly payment and have enough left over to live on. Incomes rose by about 5% in the first half of the year, but few people feel as though they're better off.
Americans spent an extra $165 billion, or 26% more, on gasoline and oil in the first six months than over the same period last year, and food bills rose by 7%. Without a doubt, most Americans feel pinched.
If you live in an area dominated by financial companies or car makers, two sectors shedding jobs in the current downturn, you may encounter even less appetite to buy.
If the economic turmoil continues, vacation destinations like Las Vegas or Orlando could suffer a drop-off in business that would leave prospective buyers with less in their pockets.
"Not only is the amount of money people have to spend on housing in decline but because a house is a risky asset, the amount they want to spend on it is falling too," says Michael Englund, chief economist at Action Economics, a forecasting firm.
Buyers being wary
That fear may be the biggest obstacle keeping buyers from knocking on your door. During the boom, people were willing to spend as much as they did on housing because they thought that they were putting away money for retirement or college. And they could draw on their equity for renovations or other goodies.
If homes rose in value faster than stocks, as they did for a few years, homeowners could console themselves that forgoing 401(k) contributions for high mortgage payments was a sensible strategy.
Few these days think of real estate as a safe place to invest, however. According to Gallup, only 27% of the population believe a home is their best long-term investment, down from 50% in 2002.
"Nearly a quarter of potential buyers are on the sidelines waiting for some form of encouragement," says Walter Molony, spokesman for the National Association of Realtors. Maybe they're looking for some sign that houses have truly become more affordable. The price declines haven't done that yet.
(Money Magazine) -- Maybe you've started thinking that now you can finally find a buyer for your house. After all, this summer the National Association of Homebuilders asserted that houses were more affordable than at any time during the previous four years. Prices have slid so far that many homes are now within the reach of people who couldn't buy during the bubble.
Other faintly cheery facts have emerged too. Sales of existing homes were 3% brisker in July than June, and in several metropolitan areas - among them Boston and Denver - the market seems to be turning around.
What about my mortgage?
When examined closely, however, those glimmers of better times ahead seem to fade. Sure, lower prices can help you sell, but you also have to know whether there are enough people who can afford to pay the price you want.
That, in turn, depends on a mix of factors including the financing that buyers can get, whether there are enough of them who want to live where you do, their other housing options and how they feel about investing so much in an asset whose future appreciation is iffy.
"Price is just one of many variables that go into a decision to buy a house," says real estate analyst Michael Larson of Weiss Research, a Jupiter, Fla. investment newsletter publisher. "Many other factors are overriding price right now. That's why the market remains challenged."
The long fall
Price, though, is still the primary measure of affordability for any buyer. And while the median price for an existing house has tumbled 8% from $230,100 to $212,400 since its peak in 2006, according to the National Association of Realtors, many potential buyers still see asking prices as expensive.
And they're not wrong. That $212,400 house, after all, costs 39% more than it did back in pre-boom 2001 when it sold for about $153,100. Prices in red-hot markets such as Miami became even more inflated during the boom and are still up about twice as high as they were in 2001.
So while homes are selling at a discount, they're not on clearance - not yet anyway. Peak to trough, the median-priced home nationwide is projected to fall as much as 20%, bottoming out around $185,000 by late 2009, according to a July report from Wachovia.
"Houses may be more affordable, but they will probably be even more affordable next year," says Nigel Gault, chief U.S. economist at Global Insight, an economic forecasting firm. "So why buy now?"
Crunched credit
The price may be right, but if buyers can't borrow enough, the house isn't affordable. Difficulty borrowing is keeping many Americans from buying. "The industry went from little or no credit standards to credit standards on steroids," says Marc Savitt, president of the National Association of Mortgage Brokers.
According to the Federal Reserve Board, about 85% of lenders, worried about falling prices and rising foreclosures, have stiffened requirements for borrowers in the past three months. Those with a credit score of 600 or lower cannot get loans at all, says Keith Gumbinger of HSH Associates, a mortgage information publisher.
The upshot: 21 million, or 13% of those who have credit records, many of whom would have qualified for mortgages during the bubble, can no longer do so.
Those whose credit scores are high enough to qualify for a mortgage will likely pay more. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which set the lending criteria for most loans, in November will require a 740 score, up from 680 for buyers to escape a surcharge that ultimately increases their interest rate.
As a result, the 33 million Americans whose scores fall between 680 and 740 (roughly 20% of adults with credit histories) may have to pay half a percentage point more to borrow. On a $300,000, 30-year loan, that would add about $100 to a buyer's monthly payment.
Adios, easy money
Back in the go-go years, lenders fell all over themselves to make no-down-payment loans. Those are gone, and lenders want some skin in the game, at least 5%. But to avoid paying extra, most buyers need the full 20% demanded in days of yore. To buy a $400,000 house, a family would now have to amass $80,000 in cash, up from $20,000 or less a few years ago.
Buyers also face higher interest rates, which allow them to borrow less. In mid-2004 a borrower with good credit could have qualified for a rate of 5.87% on a 30-year fixed $300,000 loan. That translates to a monthly payment of $1,774. Now, with the rate for the same loan at 6.57%, the same monthly payment could support a loan of just $278,500.
Back in the day, option ARMs and other exotic mortgages with low teaser rates helped struggling purchasers stretch to buy houses that they could not otherwise afford. Those deals have largely disappeared.
And while banks once allowed a homeowner's monthly principal, interest, taxes and insurance (PITI) to make up as much as 45% of a family's before-tax income, now buyers are restricted to using only 32% for a house payment. If PITI rises beyond that limit, banks consider the loan unaffordable and the family cannot receive a mortgage.
That limit boosts the amount of income a homeowner needs to purchase. Say your house has dropped from $425,000 to about $395,000. A couple of years ago a family needed an income of only $80,000 to buy. Now, even though the house costs less, a prospective buyer must have an income of $92,000.
Less expensive options
Rental prices are looking good in many areas. Christopher Mayer, a Columbia University real estate professor, recently found that in 11 of 16 top cities, renting is a better deal compared to buying than it has been historically.
The extra expense of owning was offset by rising house values - at least a few years ago. Now that new buyers can no longer count on steep appreciation, they have less incentive to buy.
And it's not as if rents are standing still while your house's price falls. "Competition from vacant houses or condos that people can't sell is driving down rental rates," says Hessam Nadji, managing director of research at Marcus & Millichap Real Estate Investment Services in Encino, Calif.
The big pinch
A house is only affordable if a homeowner can meet its monthly payment and have enough left over to live on. Incomes rose by about 5% in the first half of the year, but few people feel as though they're better off.
Americans spent an extra $165 billion, or 26% more, on gasoline and oil in the first six months than over the same period last year, and food bills rose by 7%. Without a doubt, most Americans feel pinched.
If you live in an area dominated by financial companies or car makers, two sectors shedding jobs in the current downturn, you may encounter even less appetite to buy.
If the economic turmoil continues, vacation destinations like Las Vegas or Orlando could suffer a drop-off in business that would leave prospective buyers with less in their pockets.
"Not only is the amount of money people have to spend on housing in decline but because a house is a risky asset, the amount they want to spend on it is falling too," says Michael Englund, chief economist at Action Economics, a forecasting firm.
Buyers being wary
That fear may be the biggest obstacle keeping buyers from knocking on your door. During the boom, people were willing to spend as much as they did on housing because they thought that they were putting away money for retirement or college. And they could draw on their equity for renovations or other goodies.
If homes rose in value faster than stocks, as they did for a few years, homeowners could console themselves that forgoing 401(k) contributions for high mortgage payments was a sensible strategy.
Few these days think of real estate as a safe place to invest, however. According to Gallup, only 27% of the population believe a home is their best long-term investment, down from 50% in 2002.
"Nearly a quarter of potential buyers are on the sidelines waiting for some form of encouragement," says Walter Molony, spokesman for the National Association of Realtors. Maybe they're looking for some sign that houses have truly become more affordable. The price declines haven't done that yet.
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