美国东部时间3月8日，《纽约时报》援引匿名政府官员消息称，美国联邦调查局(FBI)正在就全国金融公司(Countrywide Financial Corporation)在次按危机中可能存在的证券欺诈行为展开调查。
FBI怀疑全国金融公司职员在证券信息披露中对公司金融状况和贷款偿付能力“表述不正确”。但由于目前调查仍处于初步阶段，全国金融公司是否会面临指控目前仍不明朗。
由于消息披露之日正值周末，因此尚还不知道这将对CFC的股价造成影响的程度。但自去年次按危机以来，CFC股价一路下挫。美国东部时间3月7日，CFC股价报收于5.07美元，较一年前3月9日的36.1美元整整跌去了86%。
这也是继对14家公司展开调查之后，FBI对于麻烦缠身的抵押行业进行的更广范围的检视。而纳入FBI调查范围的内容包括，可能存在的会计欺诈、内部人交易或者其他违规行为——这种行为主要发生在将贷款出借给受次债危机影响的借款人环节。
但逆转的市场让CFC的贷款违约率不断上升，这意味着美国银行的并购交易不断面临缩水的危险。于是，在宣布交易的同时，CFC也表示将通过调整贷款条件，制定长期还款计划和其他措施来处理越来越多的违约案件。但此后违约数量仍在急速上升，CFC本月初发布的数据显示，该公司发放的284.2亿美元变息抵押贷款违约率年比攀升逾9倍，从上一年的0.6%升至5.4%。
而这次遭遇调查事件，也使得CFC的声誉更加蒙羞，此前，于CFC不合理的高管薪酬备受公众苛责。公司董事会主席兼首席执行官安吉罗·莫兹罗2006年通过行使股票期权拿到了1.19亿美元，这还不包括他270万美元的薪水、1960万美元的奖金以及其他各种收入。
事实上，2007年春天，次按危机爆发初期FBI即对对于上述公司的展开调查，目前卷入“调查门”的公司遍布金融行业，包括抵押贷款机构、贷款经纪人以及将抵押贷款打包成证券化产品的华尔街银行机构。
此次调查，FBI将与美国证券交易委员会展开合作，后者将主要负责调查次级债贷款是如何打包设计以及由这些贷款支持的证券产品如何进行估值的。目前已有若干州的检察官开始着手进行调查。
Tuesday, March 11, 2008
宋鸿兵预言：次债高峰或在四五月发生
因为以前对美国次级债做过研究和预测，此次宋鸿兵就更留心次债危机对老百姓日常生活的影响。
争吵的店员
2月3日左右，宋鸿兵去了位于华盛顿白宫附近的一家名为Macy's服装连锁店，这是美国最大的一家服装专卖店之一，档次较高。宋鸿兵 选好了一件衣服，突然听见争吵声，原来跟随他的店员与另外一个店员争吵起来。
宋鸿兵很震惊，他知道，在美国，当着客户面，一般店员是不会争吵的。
但此时，只见两个店员相互指着鼻子，第二个店员厉声喝斥第一个店员：“以后不要到我的专卖区来。”
原来，在美国，专卖店的店员也是靠卖衣服提成的，要在以前经济景气时，店员之间根本不会发生争抢客户的情况，但现在，由于次级债影响，美国零售行业开始不景气，专卖店也开始发生几个店员争一个客户的情况。
之前，宋鸿兵已经从朋友处间接了解一些美国消费下滑的事实。
2007年12月24日也是美国的平安夜，每年这个时候，美国各大商场全是人山人海，那天宋鸿兵的朋友偶然去逛了一下商场，却发现多数商场都是冷冷清清的。
次级债危机如何会影响到老百姓的日常消费？
就此，宋鸿兵做过分析，美国人喜欢借债，尤其在房地产上，不管是居住还是投资，几乎所有的美国人都是通过抵押贷款来购买的。
从1999年到2007年，美国的房地产都在增值，如果一个家庭在1999年买了一栋房子，当时价格是30万美元，到2001年房子价格会涨到60万。而美国的银行会通过各种创新，给自己客户各种方式去套现，让美国人放大消费。
“对于30万增值部分，给客户30万的抵押属于极端情况，实际上，银行会对房地产增值打一定的折扣，一般大约是7折，30万元增值，客户一般拿到20万左右。”宋鸿兵补充。
美国人拿到这20万美元会干什么？
宋鸿兵观察到，大多数美国人一般比较喜欢花钱，而不太喜欢投资，一旦有现金，就会花掉，这样，美国家庭整个负债率进一步增高。而危机也在增加，这与美国房贷利率重设有很大关系。
利率重设引发危机
美国房地产贷款绝大多数到了两年就要进行利率重设，利率重设大部分是跟随银行利率走。
到了2008年，房贷利率开始重设，这时银行利率为4.75%，如果是优质客户，银行在基础利率上会加3个百分点，如果不是优质客户，房贷利率会到8-9%，有些客户会到10%、甚至12%左右。
对于多数美国家庭来说，虽然看起来住宅很大、开很好的车、每年去度假，但实际上，这些家庭并没有创造很好的财富，而是在透支消费，所以当房贷支出增大时，很多家庭就还不了款，不少人就把房屋钥匙邮寄回银行。
此时，银行体系的风险开始暴露。
2007年初，宋鸿兵还在美国房地产公司工作，能够跟第一手信息接触，他观察到一些数据开始透露出问题，2007年1月以来，美国房地产贷款的拖欠率同比增加了19%，2月16日公布的1月新屋开工数剧减了14.3%，在10万亿美元的美国房贷金额中，次级市场占13%。
2007年2月28日，第一次次级债危机爆发，当时全球股市暴跌，很多人将其归结为中国股市的爆跌，但宋鸿兵在自己博客上发表一个文章，指出“震中”正是美国的房地产贷款市场在发生的内爆！当时他还预测，2007年8月、10月、11月，同样会因为房贷利率重设，房贷市场危机会继续引爆。
除了房地产贷款，还有一些现象更让人不安。
2008年2月初，宋鸿兵收到美洲银行一封信，通知他信用卡利率从18.8%调整到28.8%。随后他在一周之内收到三封一样内容的信，这让他很生气，于是他随手抄起电话就给银行打过去，“我没有欠债记录，一般都是当月还息，也无其他欠债记录，你凭什么调整我利率，而且从18%调整到28%？”
银行查了宋鸿兵信用卡记录，发现的确无懈可击。银行的经理解释，美洲银行每年都会随机挑选一些人，把这些人的利率调整一下。
很多美国人碰到过这样的问题，美国加州一些银行甚至停止了对学生的贷款。宋鸿兵分析，目前美国人信用卡余额为9000多亿，随着次级债危机，违约率达到30%，银行出现较大的亏损，可能要用信用记录比较好的人的利息收入来弥补一些亏空，因为很多信用记录比较好的人也会经常忘记当月还钱。
“即使这样，由次级债引发的危机还没有结束，由于2008年3、4、5、6月将是美国历史上利率重设高峰，也可能发生最严重的一轮次级债危机。”宋鸿兵判断。
对于美国次级债对中国有什么借鉴，宋鸿兵说，国内房地产业存在较大的泡沫。虽然银行公布的房地产贷款占整个贷款比例为25%左右，实际上很多银行可能达到50%。目前国内房地产市场投资性购买也是大量存在，未来如果出现流动性紧缩，同样会导致国内房地产市场的泡沫破裂。
至于美国次级债会持续多长时间？
“可能会持续到2011年。”宋鸿兵说，同样跟利率重设相关，因为2009年、2010年、2011年同样是高峰，只有到2011年后此问题才逐渐淡去。
争吵的店员
2月3日左右，宋鸿兵去了位于华盛顿白宫附近的一家名为Macy's服装连锁店，这是美国最大的一家服装专卖店之一，档次较高。宋鸿兵 选好了一件衣服，突然听见争吵声，原来跟随他的店员与另外一个店员争吵起来。
宋鸿兵很震惊，他知道，在美国，当着客户面，一般店员是不会争吵的。
但此时，只见两个店员相互指着鼻子，第二个店员厉声喝斥第一个店员：“以后不要到我的专卖区来。”
原来，在美国，专卖店的店员也是靠卖衣服提成的，要在以前经济景气时，店员之间根本不会发生争抢客户的情况，但现在，由于次级债影响，美国零售行业开始不景气，专卖店也开始发生几个店员争一个客户的情况。
之前，宋鸿兵已经从朋友处间接了解一些美国消费下滑的事实。
2007年12月24日也是美国的平安夜，每年这个时候，美国各大商场全是人山人海，那天宋鸿兵的朋友偶然去逛了一下商场，却发现多数商场都是冷冷清清的。
次级债危机如何会影响到老百姓的日常消费？
就此，宋鸿兵做过分析，美国人喜欢借债，尤其在房地产上，不管是居住还是投资，几乎所有的美国人都是通过抵押贷款来购买的。
从1999年到2007年，美国的房地产都在增值，如果一个家庭在1999年买了一栋房子，当时价格是30万美元，到2001年房子价格会涨到60万。而美国的银行会通过各种创新，给自己客户各种方式去套现，让美国人放大消费。
“对于30万增值部分，给客户30万的抵押属于极端情况，实际上，银行会对房地产增值打一定的折扣，一般大约是7折，30万元增值，客户一般拿到20万左右。”宋鸿兵补充。
美国人拿到这20万美元会干什么？
宋鸿兵观察到，大多数美国人一般比较喜欢花钱，而不太喜欢投资，一旦有现金，就会花掉，这样，美国家庭整个负债率进一步增高。而危机也在增加，这与美国房贷利率重设有很大关系。
利率重设引发危机
美国房地产贷款绝大多数到了两年就要进行利率重设，利率重设大部分是跟随银行利率走。
到了2008年，房贷利率开始重设，这时银行利率为4.75%，如果是优质客户，银行在基础利率上会加3个百分点，如果不是优质客户，房贷利率会到8-9%，有些客户会到10%、甚至12%左右。
对于多数美国家庭来说，虽然看起来住宅很大、开很好的车、每年去度假，但实际上，这些家庭并没有创造很好的财富，而是在透支消费，所以当房贷支出增大时，很多家庭就还不了款，不少人就把房屋钥匙邮寄回银行。
此时，银行体系的风险开始暴露。
2007年初，宋鸿兵还在美国房地产公司工作，能够跟第一手信息接触，他观察到一些数据开始透露出问题，2007年1月以来，美国房地产贷款的拖欠率同比增加了19%，2月16日公布的1月新屋开工数剧减了14.3%，在10万亿美元的美国房贷金额中，次级市场占13%。
2007年2月28日，第一次次级债危机爆发，当时全球股市暴跌，很多人将其归结为中国股市的爆跌，但宋鸿兵在自己博客上发表一个文章，指出“震中”正是美国的房地产贷款市场在发生的内爆！当时他还预测，2007年8月、10月、11月，同样会因为房贷利率重设，房贷市场危机会继续引爆。
除了房地产贷款，还有一些现象更让人不安。
2008年2月初，宋鸿兵收到美洲银行一封信，通知他信用卡利率从18.8%调整到28.8%。随后他在一周之内收到三封一样内容的信，这让他很生气，于是他随手抄起电话就给银行打过去，“我没有欠债记录，一般都是当月还息，也无其他欠债记录，你凭什么调整我利率，而且从18%调整到28%？”
银行查了宋鸿兵信用卡记录，发现的确无懈可击。银行的经理解释，美洲银行每年都会随机挑选一些人，把这些人的利率调整一下。
很多美国人碰到过这样的问题，美国加州一些银行甚至停止了对学生的贷款。宋鸿兵分析，目前美国人信用卡余额为9000多亿，随着次级债危机，违约率达到30%，银行出现较大的亏损，可能要用信用记录比较好的人的利息收入来弥补一些亏空，因为很多信用记录比较好的人也会经常忘记当月还钱。
“即使这样，由次级债引发的危机还没有结束，由于2008年3、4、5、6月将是美国历史上利率重设高峰，也可能发生最严重的一轮次级债危机。”宋鸿兵判断。
对于美国次级债对中国有什么借鉴，宋鸿兵说，国内房地产业存在较大的泡沫。虽然银行公布的房地产贷款占整个贷款比例为25%左右，实际上很多银行可能达到50%。目前国内房地产市场投资性购买也是大量存在，未来如果出现流动性紧缩，同样会导致国内房地产市场的泡沫破裂。
至于美国次级债会持续多长时间？
“可能会持续到2011年。”宋鸿兵说，同样跟利率重设相关，因为2009年、2010年、2011年同样是高峰，只有到2011年后此问题才逐渐淡去。
Banks face "systemic margin call," $325 billion hit
Wall Street banks are facing a "systemic margin call" that may deplete banks of $325 billion of capital due to deteriorating subprime U.S. mortgages, JPMorgan Chase & Co, said in a report late on Friday.
JPMorgan, which sent a default notice to Thornburg Mortgage Inc. after the lender missed a $28 million margin call, said more default notices and margin calls were likely. The Carlyle Group's mortgage fund also failed to meet $37 million in margin calls this week.
"A systemic credit crunch is underway, driven primarily by bank writedowns for subprime mortgages," according to the report co-authored by analyst Christopher Flanagan. "We would characterize this situation as a systemic margin call."
The credit crisis that began about a year ago will likely intensify after Friday's weak February U.S. employment report "that most definitely signals recession," JPMorgan said.
Indeed, corporate bond spreads widened to a new record on Friday, surpassing levels seen in October 2002 during a boom in bankruptcies following the dot-com crash. U.S. employers cut payrolls in February for a second consecutive month, slashing 63,000 jobs, the biggest monthly job decline in nearly five years, the U.S. Labor Department reported on Friday.
"The weak February employment report points to an economy in recession," JPMorgan said.
The JPMorgan report included a revised bleaker forecast for subprime-related home prices. The bank now sees prices falling 30 percent, from its prior 25 percent forecast. Those prices have declined 14 percent since mid-2006, JPMorgan said.
The U.S. jobs results also came after the Federal Reserve expanded the amount of its short-term auctions to $100 billion in total in the central bank's latest effort to ease credit concerns. Ongoing concerns about bond insurers, known as monolines, and their effort to save their top ratings also are weighing on market sentiment.
JPMorgan, which sent a default notice to Thornburg Mortgage Inc. after the lender missed a $28 million margin call, said more default notices and margin calls were likely. The Carlyle Group's mortgage fund also failed to meet $37 million in margin calls this week.
"A systemic credit crunch is underway, driven primarily by bank writedowns for subprime mortgages," according to the report co-authored by analyst Christopher Flanagan. "We would characterize this situation as a systemic margin call."
The credit crisis that began about a year ago will likely intensify after Friday's weak February U.S. employment report "that most definitely signals recession," JPMorgan said.
Indeed, corporate bond spreads widened to a new record on Friday, surpassing levels seen in October 2002 during a boom in bankruptcies following the dot-com crash. U.S. employers cut payrolls in February for a second consecutive month, slashing 63,000 jobs, the biggest monthly job decline in nearly five years, the U.S. Labor Department reported on Friday.
"The weak February employment report points to an economy in recession," JPMorgan said.
The JPMorgan report included a revised bleaker forecast for subprime-related home prices. The bank now sees prices falling 30 percent, from its prior 25 percent forecast. Those prices have declined 14 percent since mid-2006, JPMorgan said.
The U.S. jobs results also came after the Federal Reserve expanded the amount of its short-term auctions to $100 billion in total in the central bank's latest effort to ease credit concerns. Ongoing concerns about bond insurers, known as monolines, and their effort to save their top ratings also are weighing on market sentiment.
Monday, March 10, 2008
巴菲特如何应对大牛市
最近中国股市非常牛，牛得让许多投资人感到困惑和迷惘。
也许经历过好几次大牛市的巴菲特会给我们一些启迪。
巴菲特第一次碰到大牛市，他的决定是退出股市。
1968年，美国股票的交易达到了疯狂的地步，日平均成交量达到了1300万股，比1967年的最高记录还要多30％。股票交易所被大量的买卖单据忙得喘不过气来，这在它的历史上是破天荒第一次。而且如此这般持续了许多天。在1968年12月，道·琼斯指数爬升到990点，1969年又升到1000点以上。
在1969年5月，巴菲特担心自己陷入对苦难不幸的哀叹，同时也担心所得的盈利付之东流，他最终拿定了主意，做了一件非同寻常的决定，宣布解散他的私募基金。当市场正在牛市的高潮中时，他却宣布退出：“我无法适应这种市场环境，同时我也不希望试图去参加一种我不理解的游戏而使自己像样的业绩遭到损害。”
事实证明巴菲特的决定是无比明智的。到1970年5月，股票交易所的平均每一种股票都比1969年初下降50％，
巴菲特第二次碰到大牛市，他的选择是卖出大部分股票。
1972年，美国股市又是一个大牛市，股价大幅上涨。当时几乎所有投资基金都集中投资到一群市值规模大的、企业声名显赫的成长股上，如施乐、柯达、宝丽来、雅芳和得克萨斯仪器等等，它们被称为“漂亮50股”，平均市盈率上涨到天文数字般的80倍。
由于股价太高，巴菲特无法买到股价合理的股票，非常苦恼。1972年时，伯克希尔公司证券组合资产规模有1亿多美元，巴菲特却大量抛出股票，只保留了16%的资金投资于股票，把84%的资金都投资于债券。
1973年，“漂亮50股”的股价大幅下跌，道·琼斯指数也不断回落，市场摇摇欲坠。那些1969年上市的公司眼睁睁地看着自己的股票市值跌了一半。
1974年10月初道·琼斯指数从1000点狂跌到580点，美国几乎每只股票的市盈率都是个位数，这在华尔街非常少见，没有人想再继续持有股票，每个人都在抛售股票。
在市场一片悲观声中巴菲特却高声欢呼。他在接受《福布斯》的记者访问时说：“我觉得我就像一个非常好色的小伙子来到了女儿国。投资的时候到了。”
巴菲特上一次碰到大牛市是1999年，标准普尔500指数上涨21%，而巴菲特却亏损20%，不但输给了市场，而且输得非常惨，相差41%，这是巴菲特40多年间业绩最差的一年。
从1995年到1999年美国股市上涨近150%，是一个前所未有的大牛市。最重要的推动力是网络和高科技股票的猛涨。而巴菲特却拒绝投资高科技股票，继续坚决持有可口可乐、美国运通、吉列等传统行业公司股票，结果在1999年牛市达到最高峰时大败给市场。
但巴菲特不为所动：“1999年我们的股票投资组合几乎没有什么变动。这一年有几家我们重仓拥有的公司经营业绩十分令人失望，尽管如此，我们仍然相信这些公司拥有十分出众的竞争优势，而且这种优势能够长期持续保持，而这种特质是取得长期良好投资业绩的保证。偶尔有些时候我和芒格相信我们可以分辨出一家公司到底有没有长期持续的竞争优势。但在大多数情况下，我们根本无法，起码是无法百分之百断定。这正是为什么我们从来不投资高科技公司股票的原因。尽管我们也同意高科技公司所提供的产品与服务将会改变整个社会这种普遍观点。但在投资中我们根本无法解决的一个问题是，我们没有能力判断出，在高科技行业中，到底是哪些公司拥有真正长期可持续的竞争优势。”
在1999年度大会上，股东们纷纷指责巴菲特，几乎所有的报刊传媒都说股神巴菲特的投资策略过时了，但巴菲特仍然不为所动。
其实巴菲特早在伯克希尔1986年报中就清楚地表达了他对大牛市的看法：“还有什么比参与一场牛市更令人振奋的，在牛市中公司股东得到的回报变得与公司本身缓慢增长的业绩完全脱节。然而，不幸的是，股票价格绝对不可能无限期地超出公司本身的价值。实际上由于股票持有者频繁地买进卖出以及他们承担的投资管理成本，在很长一段时期内他们总体的投资回报必定低于他们所拥有的上市公司的业绩。如果美国公司总体上实现约12%的年净资产收益，那么投资者最终的收益必定低得多。牛市能使数学定律黯淡无光，但却不能废除它们。”
结果证明，股神巴菲特是正确的。
2000、2001、2003
三年美国股市大跌9.1%、11.9%、22.1%，累计跌幅超过一半，而同期巴菲特业绩却上涨 30%以上。
不得不佩服巴菲特的长远眼光，也不得不承认长期而言价值投资策略能够战胜市场。
因为大牛市不可能一直持续，过高的股价最终必然回归于价值。
要知道如何正确应对大牛市，请牢记巴菲特与众不同的投资信条：“在别人贪婪时恐惧，在别人恐惧时贪婪。”
也许经历过好几次大牛市的巴菲特会给我们一些启迪。
巴菲特第一次碰到大牛市，他的决定是退出股市。
1968年，美国股票的交易达到了疯狂的地步，日平均成交量达到了1300万股，比1967年的最高记录还要多30％。股票交易所被大量的买卖单据忙得喘不过气来，这在它的历史上是破天荒第一次。而且如此这般持续了许多天。在1968年12月，道·琼斯指数爬升到990点，1969年又升到1000点以上。
在1969年5月，巴菲特担心自己陷入对苦难不幸的哀叹，同时也担心所得的盈利付之东流，他最终拿定了主意，做了一件非同寻常的决定，宣布解散他的私募基金。当市场正在牛市的高潮中时，他却宣布退出：“我无法适应这种市场环境，同时我也不希望试图去参加一种我不理解的游戏而使自己像样的业绩遭到损害。”
事实证明巴菲特的决定是无比明智的。到1970年5月，股票交易所的平均每一种股票都比1969年初下降50％，
巴菲特第二次碰到大牛市，他的选择是卖出大部分股票。
1972年，美国股市又是一个大牛市，股价大幅上涨。当时几乎所有投资基金都集中投资到一群市值规模大的、企业声名显赫的成长股上，如施乐、柯达、宝丽来、雅芳和得克萨斯仪器等等，它们被称为“漂亮50股”，平均市盈率上涨到天文数字般的80倍。
由于股价太高，巴菲特无法买到股价合理的股票，非常苦恼。1972年时，伯克希尔公司证券组合资产规模有1亿多美元，巴菲特却大量抛出股票，只保留了16%的资金投资于股票，把84%的资金都投资于债券。
1973年，“漂亮50股”的股价大幅下跌，道·琼斯指数也不断回落，市场摇摇欲坠。那些1969年上市的公司眼睁睁地看着自己的股票市值跌了一半。
1974年10月初道·琼斯指数从1000点狂跌到580点，美国几乎每只股票的市盈率都是个位数，这在华尔街非常少见，没有人想再继续持有股票，每个人都在抛售股票。
在市场一片悲观声中巴菲特却高声欢呼。他在接受《福布斯》的记者访问时说：“我觉得我就像一个非常好色的小伙子来到了女儿国。投资的时候到了。”
巴菲特上一次碰到大牛市是1999年，标准普尔500指数上涨21%，而巴菲特却亏损20%，不但输给了市场，而且输得非常惨，相差41%，这是巴菲特40多年间业绩最差的一年。
从1995年到1999年美国股市上涨近150%，是一个前所未有的大牛市。最重要的推动力是网络和高科技股票的猛涨。而巴菲特却拒绝投资高科技股票，继续坚决持有可口可乐、美国运通、吉列等传统行业公司股票，结果在1999年牛市达到最高峰时大败给市场。
但巴菲特不为所动：“1999年我们的股票投资组合几乎没有什么变动。这一年有几家我们重仓拥有的公司经营业绩十分令人失望，尽管如此，我们仍然相信这些公司拥有十分出众的竞争优势，而且这种优势能够长期持续保持，而这种特质是取得长期良好投资业绩的保证。偶尔有些时候我和芒格相信我们可以分辨出一家公司到底有没有长期持续的竞争优势。但在大多数情况下，我们根本无法，起码是无法百分之百断定。这正是为什么我们从来不投资高科技公司股票的原因。尽管我们也同意高科技公司所提供的产品与服务将会改变整个社会这种普遍观点。但在投资中我们根本无法解决的一个问题是，我们没有能力判断出，在高科技行业中，到底是哪些公司拥有真正长期可持续的竞争优势。”
在1999年度大会上，股东们纷纷指责巴菲特，几乎所有的报刊传媒都说股神巴菲特的投资策略过时了，但巴菲特仍然不为所动。
其实巴菲特早在伯克希尔1986年报中就清楚地表达了他对大牛市的看法：“还有什么比参与一场牛市更令人振奋的，在牛市中公司股东得到的回报变得与公司本身缓慢增长的业绩完全脱节。然而，不幸的是，股票价格绝对不可能无限期地超出公司本身的价值。实际上由于股票持有者频繁地买进卖出以及他们承担的投资管理成本，在很长一段时期内他们总体的投资回报必定低于他们所拥有的上市公司的业绩。如果美国公司总体上实现约12%的年净资产收益，那么投资者最终的收益必定低得多。牛市能使数学定律黯淡无光，但却不能废除它们。”
结果证明，股神巴菲特是正确的。
2000、2001、2003
三年美国股市大跌9.1%、11.9%、22.1%，累计跌幅超过一半，而同期巴菲特业绩却上涨 30%以上。
不得不佩服巴菲特的长远眼光，也不得不承认长期而言价值投资策略能够战胜市场。
因为大牛市不可能一直持续，过高的股价最终必然回归于价值。
要知道如何正确应对大牛市，请牢记巴菲特与众不同的投资信条：“在别人贪婪时恐惧，在别人恐惧时贪婪。”
巴菲特：在别人贪婪的时候恐惧
新一轮牛市以其巨大的财富效应一举刷新了中国股市16年来的纪录。历史从来不过是惊人地重复自己，与其放纵自己对于牛市的想像，还不如静下心来，从投资大师巴菲特的智慧中汲取理性的力量，积极备战牛市。
巴菲特则认为，如果投资者能够了解公司的经营状况，并能够发现5到10家具有长期竞争优势、价格合理的公司，那么分散投资就毫无意义，只会降低投资的收益率并增加风险。巴菲特还引用了著名经济学家凯恩斯的话佐证自己的观点：“随着时间的流逝，我越来越确信，正确的投资方法是将大笔的钱投入到有所了解的企业以及完全信任的管理人员中。认为一个人可以通过将资金分散在大量他一无所知或毫无信心的企业中就可以限制风险，完全是错误的……一个人的知识和经验绝对是有限的，因此在任何特定的时间里，很少有超过2或3家的企业我认为值得完全信任。”
巴菲特建议，投资收费低廉的指数基金，肯定能战胜大多数投资专家创造的净收益。如果自己投资，只需学习两门课程：如何评估一家公司，以及考虑市场价格。
他说，投资界偶尔会爆发恐惧和贪婪这两种传染性极强的灾难。这些流行病的发生时间难以预料，而且由于它们引起的市场错乱，无论是持续时间还是传染程度都难以预测。因此，我们永远预料不到灾难的降临或离去。我们的目标很简单：在别人贪婪的时候恐惧，在别人恐惧的时候贪婪。如果我们拥有管理优秀的杰出公司的股份，我们喜爱的持股期是永远。我们反对在公司表现良好时忙于抛售股票，兑现盈利，却死抱住令人失望的公司的人。彼得·林奇曾恰如其分地形容这种行为，是在铲除鲜花，浇灌杂草。
巴菲特则认为，如果投资者能够了解公司的经营状况，并能够发现5到10家具有长期竞争优势、价格合理的公司，那么分散投资就毫无意义，只会降低投资的收益率并增加风险。巴菲特还引用了著名经济学家凯恩斯的话佐证自己的观点：“随着时间的流逝，我越来越确信，正确的投资方法是将大笔的钱投入到有所了解的企业以及完全信任的管理人员中。认为一个人可以通过将资金分散在大量他一无所知或毫无信心的企业中就可以限制风险，完全是错误的……一个人的知识和经验绝对是有限的，因此在任何特定的时间里，很少有超过2或3家的企业我认为值得完全信任。”
巴菲特建议，投资收费低廉的指数基金，肯定能战胜大多数投资专家创造的净收益。如果自己投资，只需学习两门课程：如何评估一家公司，以及考虑市场价格。
他说，投资界偶尔会爆发恐惧和贪婪这两种传染性极强的灾难。这些流行病的发生时间难以预料，而且由于它们引起的市场错乱，无论是持续时间还是传染程度都难以预测。因此，我们永远预料不到灾难的降临或离去。我们的目标很简单：在别人贪婪的时候恐惧，在别人恐惧的时候贪婪。如果我们拥有管理优秀的杰出公司的股份，我们喜爱的持股期是永远。我们反对在公司表现良好时忙于抛售股票，兑现盈利，却死抱住令人失望的公司的人。彼得·林奇曾恰如其分地形容这种行为，是在铲除鲜花，浇灌杂草。
巴菲特成功的秘密
看着昨天股市的大涨，相信又诞生了不少民间“股神”，而这几天有不少这样的故事，主角既有出租车司机，也有70岁的老人，赚几倍的故事已经不再稀奇，赚十几倍的似乎大有人在，这让我不禁想起了全球公认的股神巴菲特，一个年平均收益只有30％左右的老人，但却因为能常年保持这一收益率，最终雄踞股神宝座多年。
他老人家上个月登了一个招聘广告，想找人接替他担任公司的投资总监。一时间，应聘的简历像雪片般飞来，在大约600名申请者中，很有一些有趣的人物，比如自己在家选股的犹太法典学者、经常做瑜珈的加拿大经济学家，甚至还有一位四岁的孩子，但是他幸亏没有在中国刊登招聘广告，说不定会被应聘者的收益率吓坏。
但就是这600人也让巴菲特头痛，据说他这次准备采取类似“超级女声”那样的选秀程序，而他在3月1日给公司股东的信中描述了他对接班人的要求，一些很有意思的选人标准－－
独立思考、
情绪稳定、
对人性和机构的行为特点有敏锐的洞察力。
不管以前别人写了多少本关于巴菲特的传记，但他从没有亲口透露过自己成功的秘诀，而这一次的标准相信就是他对自己的总结了，没有对经济学领域的要求，也没有什么神秘高深的技巧，最重要的却是个性和对人性的把握，而A股市场运行到目前这个阶段，恰恰正是需要把握这两点的时候了，其他的分析只是表象而已。
他老人家上个月登了一个招聘广告，想找人接替他担任公司的投资总监。一时间，应聘的简历像雪片般飞来，在大约600名申请者中，很有一些有趣的人物，比如自己在家选股的犹太法典学者、经常做瑜珈的加拿大经济学家，甚至还有一位四岁的孩子，但是他幸亏没有在中国刊登招聘广告，说不定会被应聘者的收益率吓坏。
但就是这600人也让巴菲特头痛，据说他这次准备采取类似“超级女声”那样的选秀程序，而他在3月1日给公司股东的信中描述了他对接班人的要求，一些很有意思的选人标准－－
独立思考、
情绪稳定、
对人性和机构的行为特点有敏锐的洞察力。
不管以前别人写了多少本关于巴菲特的传记，但他从没有亲口透露过自己成功的秘诀，而这一次的标准相信就是他对自己的总结了，没有对经济学领域的要求，也没有什么神秘高深的技巧，最重要的却是个性和对人性的把握，而A股市场运行到目前这个阶段，恰恰正是需要把握这两点的时候了，其他的分析只是表象而已。
Sunday, March 9, 2008
Personal Finance - Car
Tha latest news in the almost never-ending series on "inflationary" price increases includes new adjusted pump prices from Caltex for all three classes of petrol. Regular 95 now costs S$2.046 per litre, Regular 98 at S$2.12 and Premium 98 at S$2.286 per litre. As Singaporeans may know by now, there is a worldwide commodities "boom" which had led to prices of everything from steel, oil, pork and flour rising quite a bit. This has inadvertently resulted in an inflation rate of 6.6% which was recently reported in the news. Yet, when I recently passed by a car road show at Suntec City atrium (open area near Carrefour), there were scores of people literally lining up to purchase cars !
Well, this post is about cars and the cost, benefits and disadvantages of owning one. Readers should be aware by now that I do NOT own a car and have no intention of owning one in the near future. It is in my interest to evaluate the real cost of owning a car, both in monetary terms and social terms; and today's Business Times has a good article on the approximate costs of owning a car which I shall proceed to list down. Singapore is basically one of the most expensive places to purchase a car (yeah, even a second-hand one !), yet it is a fact that more and more Singaporeans are owning cars as the total car population has actually increased about 6%, such that the government has to resort to measures to limit the car population by increasing ERP charges on road usage. Sounds like a pretty drastic measure to me.....as I do not see a big problem with our current public transport system (I take buses all over the place), except for the occasional long wait and over-crowded buses.
Anyhow, let me break down the numbers according to BT and comment on them. According to the article, if you spend S$50K on a car with a 70% loan at 3% p.a interest for 7 years, then you will end up paying close to S$130K after 10 years. The breakdown is as follows:-
Cost of Car including COE - S$50K (assume a medium size car with average horsepower, though I think most families seem to like the MPV, while youngsters love the sports car variety with 2 doors)
Car Loan (70% of purchase price at 3% p.a. for 7 years) - S$7,350 >> I guess 3% per annum is a reasonable rate though I've never enquired.
Insurance (S$1,500 per year for 10 years) - S$15K >> This seems like a hefty cost to me because S$1,500 per year is S$125 per month which is quite a high fixed cost. Just to provide a comparison, my monthly transport bills come up to at most S$80 to S$100 using buses.
Road Tax (S$500 per yearfor 10 years) - S$5K >> This is basially the "cost" of using roads. It's something like a TV licence fee which you have to pay even if you don't watch the TV ! So take it that this is the tax you pay just to put your car on the road (not to use the road !).
Parking Charges for Home and Office (S$250 per month x 12 x 10 years) - S$30K >> Wow, another very hefty bill to pay just to park your car ! The problem with parking is that it can be a real nuisance when car parks are full, there are insufficient spaces or it's hard to maneouvre. I personally disliked parking when I took my driving test, though I never knew that season parking charges could be so high. The author assumes S$90 per month for HDB parking I guess, while the rest of the S$160 is to park at the season lots at your office block. If you don't drive to work (which sort of defeats the purpose in having a car eh ?), then you can just assume S$90 per month in car park charges, which means S$10.8K instead of S$30K after 10 years. Still a pretty large sum by any standards.
ERP Charges (S$3 per day x 240 working days x 10 years) - S$7.2K >> OK, maybe it's my imagination, but I think most people will spend more than S$3 per day to get to and from work, especially those using CTE tunnels and hitting MULTIPLE gantries. I think some people could end up paying as much as S$6 to S$9 per day if they are "unlucky". So this cost can balloon into something of a nightmare, especially since the government is considering implementing GPS-based ERP charging. This means that you can literally be charged per kilometre of travel instead of just passing through certain roads. A scary thought, and ERP will certainly be the bane of many drivers as time passes. This is the main reason why I do not own a car; the usage of the car per month (assuming S$5 per day in ERP) easily comes up to S$100 and that's not counting petrol costs yet.
Petrol Costs (S$200 per month x 12 x 10 years) - S$24K >> Now we come to the ultimate money-drainer, which is petrol costs. The author assumes a petrol cost of S$200 per month; but this cost may vary significantly depending on your frequency of use, model of car (whether it drinks petrol like you drink water) as well as, of course, oil prices. I would say that larger cars probably need about S$80 for a full tank and if the family/individual drives often, then he needs to pump once a week which comes up to about S$320 per month. Thus, using this figure, this expense may come up to S$38.4K in 10 years time using a pessimistic scenario.
Maintenance and Repairs (S$300 per annum x 10 years) - S$3K >> Somehow I find it hard to believe that one only spends S$300 per year servicing their car. I would think a regular spare parts check would cost at least S$50 to S$100 each time, and for the total to be much higher. But I shall leave the figure as it is for now.
The rest of the assumptions are for fines and accidents, which I assume one should and would not incur unless one was driving recklesly, or drink driving ! The BT article totals up the figures to give an approximate S$132,550, which boils down to about S$1,105 per month. If you take into account the "additional" potential extra costs, the cost per month is about S$1,360. Thus, for a person who takes home about S$3K (median income level per individual), this makes owning a car very challenging indeed !
To end off, all I can say is that if one forgoes a car, he can hope to achieve financial freedom sooner. But the material comforts and convenience of a car cannot be under-stated, and those who seek this or who require a car because of an infirmed member of the family or young children should ensure they work out the numbers as I had, to see if they have sufficient funds to sustain a car. As I always say, it's easy to own a car, but darn hard to maintain one !
Well, this post is about cars and the cost, benefits and disadvantages of owning one. Readers should be aware by now that I do NOT own a car and have no intention of owning one in the near future. It is in my interest to evaluate the real cost of owning a car, both in monetary terms and social terms; and today's Business Times has a good article on the approximate costs of owning a car which I shall proceed to list down. Singapore is basically one of the most expensive places to purchase a car (yeah, even a second-hand one !), yet it is a fact that more and more Singaporeans are owning cars as the total car population has actually increased about 6%, such that the government has to resort to measures to limit the car population by increasing ERP charges on road usage. Sounds like a pretty drastic measure to me.....as I do not see a big problem with our current public transport system (I take buses all over the place), except for the occasional long wait and over-crowded buses.
Anyhow, let me break down the numbers according to BT and comment on them. According to the article, if you spend S$50K on a car with a 70% loan at 3% p.a interest for 7 years, then you will end up paying close to S$130K after 10 years. The breakdown is as follows:-
Cost of Car including COE - S$50K (assume a medium size car with average horsepower, though I think most families seem to like the MPV, while youngsters love the sports car variety with 2 doors)
Car Loan (70% of purchase price at 3% p.a. for 7 years) - S$7,350 >> I guess 3% per annum is a reasonable rate though I've never enquired.
Insurance (S$1,500 per year for 10 years) - S$15K >> This seems like a hefty cost to me because S$1,500 per year is S$125 per month which is quite a high fixed cost. Just to provide a comparison, my monthly transport bills come up to at most S$80 to S$100 using buses.
Road Tax (S$500 per yearfor 10 years) - S$5K >> This is basially the "cost" of using roads. It's something like a TV licence fee which you have to pay even if you don't watch the TV ! So take it that this is the tax you pay just to put your car on the road (not to use the road !).
Parking Charges for Home and Office (S$250 per month x 12 x 10 years) - S$30K >> Wow, another very hefty bill to pay just to park your car ! The problem with parking is that it can be a real nuisance when car parks are full, there are insufficient spaces or it's hard to maneouvre. I personally disliked parking when I took my driving test, though I never knew that season parking charges could be so high. The author assumes S$90 per month for HDB parking I guess, while the rest of the S$160 is to park at the season lots at your office block. If you don't drive to work (which sort of defeats the purpose in having a car eh ?), then you can just assume S$90 per month in car park charges, which means S$10.8K instead of S$30K after 10 years. Still a pretty large sum by any standards.
ERP Charges (S$3 per day x 240 working days x 10 years) - S$7.2K >> OK, maybe it's my imagination, but I think most people will spend more than S$3 per day to get to and from work, especially those using CTE tunnels and hitting MULTIPLE gantries. I think some people could end up paying as much as S$6 to S$9 per day if they are "unlucky". So this cost can balloon into something of a nightmare, especially since the government is considering implementing GPS-based ERP charging. This means that you can literally be charged per kilometre of travel instead of just passing through certain roads. A scary thought, and ERP will certainly be the bane of many drivers as time passes. This is the main reason why I do not own a car; the usage of the car per month (assuming S$5 per day in ERP) easily comes up to S$100 and that's not counting petrol costs yet.
Petrol Costs (S$200 per month x 12 x 10 years) - S$24K >> Now we come to the ultimate money-drainer, which is petrol costs. The author assumes a petrol cost of S$200 per month; but this cost may vary significantly depending on your frequency of use, model of car (whether it drinks petrol like you drink water) as well as, of course, oil prices. I would say that larger cars probably need about S$80 for a full tank and if the family/individual drives often, then he needs to pump once a week which comes up to about S$320 per month. Thus, using this figure, this expense may come up to S$38.4K in 10 years time using a pessimistic scenario.
Maintenance and Repairs (S$300 per annum x 10 years) - S$3K >> Somehow I find it hard to believe that one only spends S$300 per year servicing their car. I would think a regular spare parts check would cost at least S$50 to S$100 each time, and for the total to be much higher. But I shall leave the figure as it is for now.
The rest of the assumptions are for fines and accidents, which I assume one should and would not incur unless one was driving recklesly, or drink driving ! The BT article totals up the figures to give an approximate S$132,550, which boils down to about S$1,105 per month. If you take into account the "additional" potential extra costs, the cost per month is about S$1,360. Thus, for a person who takes home about S$3K (median income level per individual), this makes owning a car very challenging indeed !
To end off, all I can say is that if one forgoes a car, he can hope to achieve financial freedom sooner. But the material comforts and convenience of a car cannot be under-stated, and those who seek this or who require a car because of an infirmed member of the family or young children should ensure they work out the numbers as I had, to see if they have sufficient funds to sustain a car. As I always say, it's easy to own a car, but darn hard to maintain one !
Saturday, March 8, 2008
Warren Buffett to CNBC: Dollar May Become "Worth Less" .. Not "Worthless"
Warren Buffett generated some headlines during his visit to Toronto yesterday. But one in particular generated some extra attention.
Buffett has been negative on the U.S. dollar for some time now, so the "worthless" comment may have sounded a bit extreme, although in keeping with his general bearishness on the greenback.
Extreme ... and inaccurate. He really said the dollar would be "worth less" if the nation's current account deficit isn't brought under control.
"Insanity consists of doing the same thing over and over again and expecting a different result. In the United States, the cause of, in my view, of the declining dollar in very major part, is the current account deficit, the trade deficit being the biggest factor in that.
Our trade deficit has decreased a little bit in terms of GDP in the last year, not so much by the trade deficit going down, but GDP going up. But we still are sending about, the United States, about two billion dollars a day to the rest of the world. And if you keep force-feeding two billion a day to the rest of the world, even as big as the U.S. is, with all the assets we have, people become a little reluctant, more reluctant over time, to hold those dollars, or dollar-denominated assets.
And if we keep doing that over time in the future, and it looks like we will, I would predict that the U.S. dollar will decline. Not next month, not next year, I don't know what it will look like in the short term. But I would say that force-feeding a couple of billion a day to the rest of the world is inconsistent with a stable dollar.
Interestingly enough, (former Federal Reserve Chairman) Alan Greenspan in 2003, and you can look it up on the internet on a search engine, said that such a course of action was unsustainable. And (current Federal Reserve Chairman) Ben Bernankeabout four or five months ago made a speech where he said it was unsustainable.
But that was sort of it. After they say it is unsustainable, everybody goes to lunch.
If something is unsustainable, you know, it's going to have consequences. So far, the consequences have been a general decline in the dollar against major currencies. And I would expect that ... If we continue the same policies, we're going to get the same result in the next five or ten years. That's not a short term forecast on currencies, because a lot of things govern whether the Canadian dollar goes up or down against the U.S. dollar tomorrow.
But, if we keep, if our current account deficit keeps running at present levels, the dollar, I think, is almost certain to be worth less five or ten years from now compared to other major currencies."
Buffett has been negative on the U.S. dollar for some time now, so the "worthless" comment may have sounded a bit extreme, although in keeping with his general bearishness on the greenback.
Extreme ... and inaccurate. He really said the dollar would be "worth less" if the nation's current account deficit isn't brought under control.
"Insanity consists of doing the same thing over and over again and expecting a different result. In the United States, the cause of, in my view, of the declining dollar in very major part, is the current account deficit, the trade deficit being the biggest factor in that.
Our trade deficit has decreased a little bit in terms of GDP in the last year, not so much by the trade deficit going down, but GDP going up. But we still are sending about, the United States, about two billion dollars a day to the rest of the world. And if you keep force-feeding two billion a day to the rest of the world, even as big as the U.S. is, with all the assets we have, people become a little reluctant, more reluctant over time, to hold those dollars, or dollar-denominated assets.
And if we keep doing that over time in the future, and it looks like we will, I would predict that the U.S. dollar will decline. Not next month, not next year, I don't know what it will look like in the short term. But I would say that force-feeding a couple of billion a day to the rest of the world is inconsistent with a stable dollar.
Interestingly enough, (former Federal Reserve Chairman) Alan Greenspan in 2003, and you can look it up on the internet on a search engine, said that such a course of action was unsustainable. And (current Federal Reserve Chairman) Ben Bernankeabout four or five months ago made a speech where he said it was unsustainable.
But that was sort of it. After they say it is unsustainable, everybody goes to lunch.
If something is unsustainable, you know, it's going to have consequences. So far, the consequences have been a general decline in the dollar against major currencies. And I would expect that ... If we continue the same policies, we're going to get the same result in the next five or ten years. That's not a short term forecast on currencies, because a lot of things govern whether the Canadian dollar goes up or down against the U.S. dollar tomorrow.
But, if we keep, if our current account deficit keeps running at present levels, the dollar, I think, is almost certain to be worth less five or ten years from now compared to other major currencies."
巴菲特教你怎样成为世界首富
选股起点：了解企业优势
我们始终在寻找那样业务清晰易懂、业绩持续优异、由能力非凡并且为股东着想的管理层来经营的大公司。这种目标公司并不能充分保证我们投资盈利，我们不仅在合理的价格上买入，而且我们买入的公司的未来业绩还要与我们的估计相符，但是这种投资方法——寻找明星股——给我们提供了走向真正成功的惟一机会。
投资股票就是投资人
现在我们买入公司或股票时，不但会坚持寻找一流的公司，同时我们坚持这些一流的公司还要有一流的管理。
公司管理层衡量标准：
高尚的品德：管理层值得股东喜欢、信任和敬佩。
出众的能力：能够为公司创造一流的业绩，具有高超的资本配置能力，能够排除机构强制力的影响。
赚钱才是硬道理
我想买入企业的基本标准之一是：显示出有持续稳定的盈利能力。
对公司经营管理业绩的最佳衡量标准，是能否取得较高的权益资本收益率，而不是每股收益的增加。我宁愿要一个收益率为15%的资本规模1000万美元的中小企业，也不愿要一个收益率为5%的资本规模1亿美元的大企业
选择股票要学会三个诀窍
第一，去学会计，做一个聪明的投资人，而不要做一个冲动的投资人。因为会计是一种通用的商务语言，通过会计财务报表，聪明的投资人会发现企业的内部价值，而冲动的投资人看重的只是股票的外部价格.
第二是阅读技能，只投资自己看得明白的公司，如果一个公司的年报让你看不明白，很自然就会怀疑这家公司的诚信度，或者该公司在刻意掩藏什么信息，故意不让投资者明白。
第三是耐心等待，一个人一生中真正投资的股票也就四五只，一旦发现了，就要大量买入。
巴菲特“2008年来信”
关于中国石油
2002和2003年，伯克希尔以4.88亿美元购入中国石油1.3%的股份。按这个价格计算，中石油的市值约为370亿美元。而在去年下半年，中石油的市值涨到了2750亿美元，我们认为这个估值水平和其他大型石油公司相当，所以我们将手中的股票以40亿美元全部卖出。 由于出售中石油带来了投资收益，我们支付了12亿美元的税。这一金额相当于整个美国政府运作4个小时的所有支出，包括国防、社会保障等等。
关于美国楼市
你可能记得2003年的时候，硅谷很流行一个车贴：“神啊，救救我吧，再给一个泡沫吧”。很不幸，这个愿望很快就实现了：几乎每个美国人都认为房价会永远上涨。这种看法令贷款机构无视买房人的实际经济状况随意放贷，认为房价的上涨会解决一切问题。而今天，美国正为此付出惨痛代价。
随着房价下跌，大量无法想象的错误被曝光了。只有在退潮的时候，你才能看出哪些人是在裸泳。对于美国最大的一些金融机构，我只能用“惨不忍睹”来形容。
关于对股市的期望
先做个简单的数学题，假设你指望你本世纪的股市年收益率达到10%，而你的收益中，2%来自分红，8%来自股价上涨，那么你就是在假设道指在2100年达到24000000点(目前是13000点)。如果你的财务顾问向你保证每年两位数的股市收益率，你可以和他讲讲这个题目。要当心那些油嘴滑舌的所谓专家顾问，当你被他们的夸夸其谈骗得头脑发热，就是他们填满自己腰包的时候。
关于生活和工作
我和我的好搭档查理今年一个84岁，一个77岁。我们生于美国，获得了良好的教育，家庭和睦幸福，身体健康。许多人对社会的贡献和我们一样多，甚至更多。但是由于我们具备一些所谓“商业基因”，因此获得了与自己的贡献不成比例的巨大财富。
另外，我们一直都热爱自己的工作，也得到了许多有才华、有激情的人帮助。我们每天都是激情四溢，踩着舞步上班去的。
牛人都有些相似之处
童年的巴菲特与洛克菲勒和摩根有惊人相似之处。与洛克菲勒一样，巴菲特从小渴望发财。并且毫不遮掩这一梦想。年少的洛克菲特对金钱怀有狂热，激动之时，会拍着别人的大腿大声说道：“我将来一定会成为亿万富翁的，一定会的！”巴菲特基本上也这德性。
像摩根一样，巴菲特从小每到一个地方，都要用商业的眼光去观察一切事情：哪里有发财机会，一件事情怎么做可以赚更多钱。年少的巴菲特通过拣饮料瓶盖来确定哪种饮料好卖。他总是想将东西卖给任何人。无论是二手的角子游戏机，还是二手的汽车，他都要变为赢利工具。赚钱意识，深刻溶进他的血液里。这样的人，要想不发财，难。他一边读中学一边当报童。通过研究送报线路和改善送报纸方式提高效率，赚到了更多的钱。大学没读完，他已经通过琢磨这些小生意拥有了上万美元的储蓄。
人人都会高唱“价值投资”高调，可究竟怎样才是价值投资，却并非人人都懂。
作为投资者的巴菲特秉承他老师格雷厄姆的理念：买“便宜货”，即在股市上买进那些价格远低于其内在价值的股票，然后持有，直到它的价格翻倍。巴菲特惊人的记忆力和心算能力使他远离计算机和一切现代股票投资工具。
在投资界，巴菲特完全是个另类。是与华尔街气质截然相反的一类人。
他远离纽约这个金融信息中心，蜗居在偏远的故乡小镇奥马哈，房间里只有两种东西：各种年报和报纸资料，以及电话。没有计算机。也没有成群的专业研究人员。
巴菲特阅读大量的企业年报，从年报信息中判断哪是“便宜货”，然后打电话委托经纪商买进。
这个连续几十年在股市上从未亏损过的投资奇人，生活方式和做事风格完全像个现代隐士。他的能量完全源自个人的内在。他不需要太复杂的外部措施。简单就是他的力量。
他的生活也简单朴素，从少年到暮年，从一文不名到富可敌国，他都不改朴素本色，无论在何种场合，他永远都只爱喝可口可乐，吃爆米花和汉堡包。这是一个喜欢稳定，怀旧情结浓重，内心永远也长不大的资本奇人。
赚钱而不要赔钱
这是巴菲特经常被引用的一句话：“投资的第一条准则是不要赔钱；第二条准则是永远不要忘记第一条。”因为如果投资一美元，赔了50美分，手上只剩一半的钱，除非有百分之百的收益，才能回到起点。
巴菲特最大的成就莫过于在1965年到2006年间，历经3个熊市，而他的伯克希尔哈撒韦公司只有一年(2001年)出现亏损。
别被收益蒙骗
巴菲特更喜欢用股本收益率来衡量企业的盈利状况。股本收益率是用公司净收入除以股东的股本，它衡量的是公司利润占股东资本的百分比，能够更有效地反映公司的盈利增长状况。
根据他的价值投资原则，公司的股本收益率应该不低于15％。在巴菲特持有的上市公司股票中，可口可乐的股本收益率超过30％，美国运通公司达到37％。
要看未来
人们把巴菲特称为“奥马哈的先知”，因为他总是有意识地去辨别公司是否有好的发展前途，能不能在今后25年里继续保持成功。巴菲特常说，要透过窗户向前看，不能看后视镜。
预测公司未来发展的一个办法，是计算公司未来的预期现金收入在今天值多少钱。这是巴菲特评估公司内在价值的办法。然后他会寻找那些严重偏离这一价值、低价出售的公司。
坚持投资能对竞争者构成巨大“屏障”的公司
预测未来必定会有风险，因此巴菲特偏爱那些能对竞争者构成巨大“经济屏障”的公司。这不一定意味着他所投资的公司一定独占某种产品或某个市场。例如，可口可乐公司从来就不缺竞争对手。但巴菲特总是寻找那些具有长期竞争优势、使他对公司价值的预测更安全的公司。
20世纪90年代末，巴菲特不愿投资科技股的一个原因就是：他看不出哪个公司具有足够的长期竞争优势。
要赌就赌大的
绝大多数价值投资者天性保守。但巴菲特不是。他投资股市的620亿美元集中在45只股票上。他的投资战略甚至比这个数字更激进。在他的投资组合中，前10只股票占了投资总量的90％。晨星公司的高级股票分析师贾斯廷富勒说：“这符合巴菲特的投资理念。不要犹豫不定，为什么不把钱投资到你最看好的投资对象上呢？”
要有耐心等待
如果你在股市里换手，那么可能错失良机。巴菲特的原则是：不要频频换手，直到有好的投资对象才出手。
巴菲特常引用传奇棒球击球手特德威廉斯的话：“要做一个好的击球手，你必须有好球可打。”如果没有好的投资对象，那么他宁可持有现金。据晨星公司统计，现金在伯克希尔哈撒韦公司的投资配比中占18％以上，而大多数基金公司只有4％的现金。
我们始终在寻找那样业务清晰易懂、业绩持续优异、由能力非凡并且为股东着想的管理层来经营的大公司。这种目标公司并不能充分保证我们投资盈利，我们不仅在合理的价格上买入，而且我们买入的公司的未来业绩还要与我们的估计相符，但是这种投资方法——寻找明星股——给我们提供了走向真正成功的惟一机会。
投资股票就是投资人
现在我们买入公司或股票时，不但会坚持寻找一流的公司，同时我们坚持这些一流的公司还要有一流的管理。
公司管理层衡量标准：
高尚的品德：管理层值得股东喜欢、信任和敬佩。
出众的能力：能够为公司创造一流的业绩，具有高超的资本配置能力，能够排除机构强制力的影响。
赚钱才是硬道理
我想买入企业的基本标准之一是：显示出有持续稳定的盈利能力。
对公司经营管理业绩的最佳衡量标准，是能否取得较高的权益资本收益率，而不是每股收益的增加。我宁愿要一个收益率为15%的资本规模1000万美元的中小企业，也不愿要一个收益率为5%的资本规模1亿美元的大企业
选择股票要学会三个诀窍
第一，去学会计，做一个聪明的投资人，而不要做一个冲动的投资人。因为会计是一种通用的商务语言，通过会计财务报表，聪明的投资人会发现企业的内部价值，而冲动的投资人看重的只是股票的外部价格.
第二是阅读技能，只投资自己看得明白的公司，如果一个公司的年报让你看不明白，很自然就会怀疑这家公司的诚信度，或者该公司在刻意掩藏什么信息，故意不让投资者明白。
第三是耐心等待，一个人一生中真正投资的股票也就四五只，一旦发现了，就要大量买入。
巴菲特“2008年来信”
关于中国石油
2002和2003年，伯克希尔以4.88亿美元购入中国石油1.3%的股份。按这个价格计算，中石油的市值约为370亿美元。而在去年下半年，中石油的市值涨到了2750亿美元，我们认为这个估值水平和其他大型石油公司相当，所以我们将手中的股票以40亿美元全部卖出。 由于出售中石油带来了投资收益，我们支付了12亿美元的税。这一金额相当于整个美国政府运作4个小时的所有支出，包括国防、社会保障等等。
关于美国楼市
你可能记得2003年的时候，硅谷很流行一个车贴：“神啊，救救我吧，再给一个泡沫吧”。很不幸，这个愿望很快就实现了：几乎每个美国人都认为房价会永远上涨。这种看法令贷款机构无视买房人的实际经济状况随意放贷，认为房价的上涨会解决一切问题。而今天，美国正为此付出惨痛代价。
随着房价下跌，大量无法想象的错误被曝光了。只有在退潮的时候，你才能看出哪些人是在裸泳。对于美国最大的一些金融机构，我只能用“惨不忍睹”来形容。
关于对股市的期望
先做个简单的数学题，假设你指望你本世纪的股市年收益率达到10%，而你的收益中，2%来自分红，8%来自股价上涨，那么你就是在假设道指在2100年达到24000000点(目前是13000点)。如果你的财务顾问向你保证每年两位数的股市收益率，你可以和他讲讲这个题目。要当心那些油嘴滑舌的所谓专家顾问，当你被他们的夸夸其谈骗得头脑发热，就是他们填满自己腰包的时候。
关于生活和工作
我和我的好搭档查理今年一个84岁，一个77岁。我们生于美国，获得了良好的教育，家庭和睦幸福，身体健康。许多人对社会的贡献和我们一样多，甚至更多。但是由于我们具备一些所谓“商业基因”，因此获得了与自己的贡献不成比例的巨大财富。
另外，我们一直都热爱自己的工作，也得到了许多有才华、有激情的人帮助。我们每天都是激情四溢，踩着舞步上班去的。
牛人都有些相似之处
童年的巴菲特与洛克菲勒和摩根有惊人相似之处。与洛克菲勒一样，巴菲特从小渴望发财。并且毫不遮掩这一梦想。年少的洛克菲特对金钱怀有狂热，激动之时，会拍着别人的大腿大声说道：“我将来一定会成为亿万富翁的，一定会的！”巴菲特基本上也这德性。
像摩根一样，巴菲特从小每到一个地方，都要用商业的眼光去观察一切事情：哪里有发财机会，一件事情怎么做可以赚更多钱。年少的巴菲特通过拣饮料瓶盖来确定哪种饮料好卖。他总是想将东西卖给任何人。无论是二手的角子游戏机，还是二手的汽车，他都要变为赢利工具。赚钱意识，深刻溶进他的血液里。这样的人，要想不发财，难。他一边读中学一边当报童。通过研究送报线路和改善送报纸方式提高效率，赚到了更多的钱。大学没读完，他已经通过琢磨这些小生意拥有了上万美元的储蓄。
人人都会高唱“价值投资”高调，可究竟怎样才是价值投资，却并非人人都懂。
作为投资者的巴菲特秉承他老师格雷厄姆的理念：买“便宜货”，即在股市上买进那些价格远低于其内在价值的股票，然后持有，直到它的价格翻倍。巴菲特惊人的记忆力和心算能力使他远离计算机和一切现代股票投资工具。
在投资界，巴菲特完全是个另类。是与华尔街气质截然相反的一类人。
他远离纽约这个金融信息中心，蜗居在偏远的故乡小镇奥马哈，房间里只有两种东西：各种年报和报纸资料，以及电话。没有计算机。也没有成群的专业研究人员。
巴菲特阅读大量的企业年报，从年报信息中判断哪是“便宜货”，然后打电话委托经纪商买进。
这个连续几十年在股市上从未亏损过的投资奇人，生活方式和做事风格完全像个现代隐士。他的能量完全源自个人的内在。他不需要太复杂的外部措施。简单就是他的力量。
他的生活也简单朴素，从少年到暮年，从一文不名到富可敌国，他都不改朴素本色，无论在何种场合，他永远都只爱喝可口可乐，吃爆米花和汉堡包。这是一个喜欢稳定，怀旧情结浓重，内心永远也长不大的资本奇人。
赚钱而不要赔钱
这是巴菲特经常被引用的一句话：“投资的第一条准则是不要赔钱；第二条准则是永远不要忘记第一条。”因为如果投资一美元，赔了50美分，手上只剩一半的钱，除非有百分之百的收益，才能回到起点。
巴菲特最大的成就莫过于在1965年到2006年间，历经3个熊市，而他的伯克希尔哈撒韦公司只有一年(2001年)出现亏损。
别被收益蒙骗
巴菲特更喜欢用股本收益率来衡量企业的盈利状况。股本收益率是用公司净收入除以股东的股本，它衡量的是公司利润占股东资本的百分比，能够更有效地反映公司的盈利增长状况。
根据他的价值投资原则，公司的股本收益率应该不低于15％。在巴菲特持有的上市公司股票中，可口可乐的股本收益率超过30％，美国运通公司达到37％。
要看未来
人们把巴菲特称为“奥马哈的先知”，因为他总是有意识地去辨别公司是否有好的发展前途，能不能在今后25年里继续保持成功。巴菲特常说，要透过窗户向前看，不能看后视镜。
预测公司未来发展的一个办法，是计算公司未来的预期现金收入在今天值多少钱。这是巴菲特评估公司内在价值的办法。然后他会寻找那些严重偏离这一价值、低价出售的公司。
坚持投资能对竞争者构成巨大“屏障”的公司
预测未来必定会有风险，因此巴菲特偏爱那些能对竞争者构成巨大“经济屏障”的公司。这不一定意味着他所投资的公司一定独占某种产品或某个市场。例如，可口可乐公司从来就不缺竞争对手。但巴菲特总是寻找那些具有长期竞争优势、使他对公司价值的预测更安全的公司。
20世纪90年代末，巴菲特不愿投资科技股的一个原因就是：他看不出哪个公司具有足够的长期竞争优势。
要赌就赌大的
绝大多数价值投资者天性保守。但巴菲特不是。他投资股市的620亿美元集中在45只股票上。他的投资战略甚至比这个数字更激进。在他的投资组合中，前10只股票占了投资总量的90％。晨星公司的高级股票分析师贾斯廷富勒说：“这符合巴菲特的投资理念。不要犹豫不定，为什么不把钱投资到你最看好的投资对象上呢？”
要有耐心等待
如果你在股市里换手，那么可能错失良机。巴菲特的原则是：不要频频换手，直到有好的投资对象才出手。
巴菲特常引用传奇棒球击球手特德威廉斯的话：“要做一个好的击球手，你必须有好球可打。”如果没有好的投资对象，那么他宁可持有现金。据晨星公司统计，现金在伯克希尔哈撒韦公司的投资配比中占18％以上，而大多数基金公司只有4％的现金。
Property Market - Up or Down?
The Singapore Property Market has gone quiet of late - thanks to the spillover effect from the stock market - with current property transactions having fallen drastically as compared to last year.
Naturally, most prospective buyers are hoping for property prices to fall so that their dream home purchase would be more affordable.
These people are going to be disappointed if they are expecting prices to fall significantly below current prices in the near term.
Current demand is subdued only because of the twin illusions of hope and fear (that prices will fall further), when in truth, current prices are actually fundamentally well supported.
Without mentioning the Integrated Resorts, F1, or even the Youth Olympics, these are the factors that support my opinion:
Mass market demand is still strong, albeit for now:
There were 3,500 applicants for the recent DBSS public housing project City View @ Boon Keng, meaning that it was 4x oversubscribed despite initial reservations that it was overpriced.
Property developers unprepared to lower their launch prices:
Mr. Kwek Leng Joo, Managing Director of City Development, remarked on 28 February 2008 that even if the market recovery should take place a little bit later than expected, it will be OK.
In short, the group can afford to delay launches of new residential projects if necessary to ride out the current weak sentiment.
Clearly, Mr. Kwek's opinion is that the current weak sentiment will be short-lived. That is not to say that he cannot be wrong.
Rental Yield remains strong at 4% to 5%:
As Singapore's population continues to grow, many residential landlords continue to enjoy high rental yields.
At the same time, housing loan interest rates have fallen to below 2.5% currently.
This creates a situation whereby the mortgage repayment would probably be lower than the potential rental, which will ultimately lead to an increase in demand for properties for existing and prospective landlords.
Construction and land costs are still high:
This means that new property launches will definitely have a high minimum price in order for the developers to earn a minimum profit.
On the other hand:
There is of course the possibility that property prices will start to fall.
That will happen if some of the smaller property developers or retail speculators who are over leveraged, start to lose their nerve and decide to sell their properties are whatever offer price.
However, once that starts to happen, because I feel that current demand has not disappeared as much as that it is just apprehensive, it is more likely than not that buyers will then start to slowly trickle back into the market.
This will then provide the price support once again.
At $1000 psf, an average size condo of 1000 sqf cost S$1 million.
Rental yield of 5% implies a yearly rental of $50k, in order to pay for that kind of rental, household income has to be around $200k per yr, example, more than $16k per month.
I would estimate less than 5% of Singapore workforce earns more than $16k and personally even if my household earns this much, I will not fork out $50k on rental. ie would rather downgrade to live in some ulu places etc. By the way $50k would probably be the average income for Singaporean workers.
I guess the bottomline is that rental at $50k per year or $4k per month is not sustainable without significant income growth.
Similarly I guess the same argument goes for expats. Expats may enjoy a higher average income say maybe $100k or something (just guessing here) but it's a stretch still for companies to fork out $50k on for rental to hire someone with a salary of $100-200k per year.
The property market is on precarious grounds. It rallied too high and too fast. The sad part is that HDB, instead of standing by its objective to provide affordable housing, joined in the fun thereby squeezing lots of would be buyers.
The people who bought the new City View @ Boon Keng must have a combined income of under $8k in order to qualify for it.
Yet some of these people are willing to pay $700k for a flat, and take on a huge mortgage loan that would probably be beyond their means.
It seems our new generation has gotten used to the idea of living in debt, and idea no doubt supported by the HDB.
Naturally, most prospective buyers are hoping for property prices to fall so that their dream home purchase would be more affordable.
These people are going to be disappointed if they are expecting prices to fall significantly below current prices in the near term.
Current demand is subdued only because of the twin illusions of hope and fear (that prices will fall further), when in truth, current prices are actually fundamentally well supported.
Without mentioning the Integrated Resorts, F1, or even the Youth Olympics, these are the factors that support my opinion:
Mass market demand is still strong, albeit for now:
There were 3,500 applicants for the recent DBSS public housing project City View @ Boon Keng, meaning that it was 4x oversubscribed despite initial reservations that it was overpriced.
Property developers unprepared to lower their launch prices:
Mr. Kwek Leng Joo, Managing Director of City Development, remarked on 28 February 2008 that even if the market recovery should take place a little bit later than expected, it will be OK.
In short, the group can afford to delay launches of new residential projects if necessary to ride out the current weak sentiment.
Clearly, Mr. Kwek's opinion is that the current weak sentiment will be short-lived. That is not to say that he cannot be wrong.
Rental Yield remains strong at 4% to 5%:
As Singapore's population continues to grow, many residential landlords continue to enjoy high rental yields.
At the same time, housing loan interest rates have fallen to below 2.5% currently.
This creates a situation whereby the mortgage repayment would probably be lower than the potential rental, which will ultimately lead to an increase in demand for properties for existing and prospective landlords.
Construction and land costs are still high:
This means that new property launches will definitely have a high minimum price in order for the developers to earn a minimum profit.
On the other hand:
There is of course the possibility that property prices will start to fall.
That will happen if some of the smaller property developers or retail speculators who are over leveraged, start to lose their nerve and decide to sell their properties are whatever offer price.
However, once that starts to happen, because I feel that current demand has not disappeared as much as that it is just apprehensive, it is more likely than not that buyers will then start to slowly trickle back into the market.
This will then provide the price support once again.
At $1000 psf, an average size condo of 1000 sqf cost S$1 million.
Rental yield of 5% implies a yearly rental of $50k, in order to pay for that kind of rental, household income has to be around $200k per yr, example, more than $16k per month.
I would estimate less than 5% of Singapore workforce earns more than $16k and personally even if my household earns this much, I will not fork out $50k on rental. ie would rather downgrade to live in some ulu places etc. By the way $50k would probably be the average income for Singaporean workers.
I guess the bottomline is that rental at $50k per year or $4k per month is not sustainable without significant income growth.
Similarly I guess the same argument goes for expats. Expats may enjoy a higher average income say maybe $100k or something (just guessing here) but it's a stretch still for companies to fork out $50k on for rental to hire someone with a salary of $100-200k per year.
The property market is on precarious grounds. It rallied too high and too fast. The sad part is that HDB, instead of standing by its objective to provide affordable housing, joined in the fun thereby squeezing lots of would be buyers.
The people who bought the new City View @ Boon Keng must have a combined income of under $8k in order to qualify for it.
Yet some of these people are willing to pay $700k for a flat, and take on a huge mortgage loan that would probably be beyond their means.
It seems our new generation has gotten used to the idea of living in debt, and idea no doubt supported by the HDB.
Friday, March 7, 2008
巴菲特的投資觀念
＠ 華倫巴菲強調成功投資的重要因素，取決於企業的實質價值，和支付一個合理划算的交易價格，他不在意最近或未來一般股市將會如何運作．
＠ 華倫巴菲特從不投資他不了解的企業，他四十年的投資職業生涯裡，只有十二個投資決策，造成他今日與眾不同的成功地位．
＠ 當大企業有暫時性的麻煩或股市下跌，並創造出有利可圖的交易股價，應進場買下這些大企業的股票，不要再試著預測股票市場的方向，經濟情勢，利率或選舉結果，並停止浪費金錢在以此糊口的人身上．研究公司的現況和財務情形，並評估公司將來的展望，當一切都合你意的時候，就買下它 .
＠ 許多人盲目投資，從某方面來說，這就像通宵玩牌，卻不曾看清手中的牌一樣．
＠ 投資人謹慎透徹地做好投資研究，只要專注於持有少數幾種股票，便可大大降低投資風險．通常巴菲特持普通股持股，僅由五種不同的股資組合．
＠ 巴菲特的投資策略核心是（買進ˍ持有）Buy and hold， 買進優良企業，擁有這個投資數年，然後根據企業經營之收益獲利，這個觀念簡單又直接，投資人容易明瞭這個方式的原理．
＠ 多數人都受到現有的股票交易方式所影嚮和限制，只知在買進與賣出間追逐價差而忘了買賣股票原本只是轉移股權，持有股權原本是做為股東的權益則來自於企業營運所獲的利潤．
＠ 做為股東原本是希望能從企業獲利不斷成長，及源源不斷的收取成功的經營成果股票市場只是方便股東的移轉股權．
＠ 巴菲特投資決策依據的基本原則：
一．企業原則：這家企業簡單且可以了解嗎?
這家企業的經營歷史是否穩定?
這家企業的長期發展遠景是否看好?
二．經營原則：經營者是否理性?
經營者對股東是誠實坦白的嗎?
經營者是否會盲從其他法人權構的行為?
三．財務原則：把重點集中在股東權益報酬率，而不是每股盈餘．計算（出股東盈餘）尋找毛利率高的公司．對於保留的每一塊錢盈餘，確定公司主少己經創造了一塊錢的市場價值．
四．市場原則：這家企業有多少實質價值?
這家企業能否以顯著的價值折扣購得?
＠ 巴菲特的投資策略很簡單，那就是：
１． 不理會股票市場每日的漲跌．
2． 不擔心經濟情勢．
3． 買下一家公司而不是股票．
4． 管理企業投資組合．
＠ 從投資一百美元起家，至今華倫巴菲特己創造百億美元的財富，這位被喻為當今(最偉大的投資者），以簡單的投資策略及原則，不做短線進出，不理會股市每日的漲跌，不擔心經濟情勢，妥善管理手上的投資組合，創造另一種不同於投機客的投資典型．
＠ 巴菲特擁有淨值百億美元，名列美國最富有人榜首多年 . 近年被比爾．蓋茲趕過變成第二名），是美國百人富翁唯一自股票市場獲得財富的人．
＠ 巴菲特１９３０年生於內布拉斯加州的奧瑪哈(Omaha City)，進入哥倫比亞大學商研究所就讀，受教於班哲明．葛拉罕（一向鼓吹了解一公司實質價值的重要性）,１９５６年帶著葛拉罕得到的知識與來自親朋好友的財力支持 , 在奧瑪哈開始他的有限合夥投資事業經就是後來的波克夏哈薩威公公）．合夥公司開始時，由七個有限責任合夥人，一起出資十萬五仟美元．主要合夥人巴菲特，從一百元開始投資，那些有限合夥人每年回收他們投資的６％，和超過此固定利潤以上之總利潤的７５％，巴菲特的酬勞則是另外的２５％．往的十三年，巴菲特的金錢以每年２９．５％的複利持續成長，合夥體的資產己達二千六百萬美元．
＠ 兩位智者ˍ班哲明．葛拉罕給予巴菲特投資的思考基礎： 安全邊際．並協助巴菲特學習掌握他的情緒，以便於在市價的漲落中獲利．而菲利普．費雪則給予巴菲特最新的可行的方法學，使他能夠判定出好的長期投資． 巴菲特說：我有1５％像費雪，８５％葛拉罕．
＠ 費雪的著作：Common Stock and Uncommon Profits，葛拉罕的著作：
The Intelligent Investor ，是二本影嚮巴菲特最深遠的投資學巨著．他說每位投資人至少要讀它們２０遍以上，才能真正瞭解投資的真諦．
＠ 投貣就是在經過完整的分析研究之後，認為可以確保本金的安全，並能得到令人滿意的報酬．不符合這些要求的操作便是在投機．
＠ 雖然葛拉罕（價值理論）與費雪（成長理論）的投資方法不同，但是巴菲特說道：他們在投資界是同等重要的．
＠ 價值理論：指出一個經謹慎選擇，且己分散風險，合理價格的普通投資組合，才可能是聰明的股資．葛拉罕推測如因股票的價格低於它的價值，則股票在一個安全邊際．葛拉罕表示．
投資有二個法則：
一．嚴禁損失．
二．不要忘記第一個法則．
他相信市場經常給予股票不適當的價格，這種錯誤的標價往往是因為人類懼怕和貪婪的情緒而引起的．
＠ 成長理論：超額利潤的創造是經由：
１．投資那些潛力在平均水準之上的公司
２．向那些最有能力的經營階層看齊．
＠ 費雪相信，即使有能力使銷售成長，如果公司無法為股東賺取利潤，就不宜投資該公司．如果多年來利潤不能夠相對地成長，則所有的銷售成長都不代表公司股票是正確的投資工具．
＠ 巴菲持主張投資人學習如何獨立思考，如因你己經由深思熟慮的判斷，獲得合平邏輯的結論，絕不要因為別人的不同意而被勸阻退縮不前，（你不會因為這些人的不同意，而判斷正確或錯誤，你之所以正確．是因為你的資料和推理是正確的 ）.
＠ 巴菲特：當人們因貪婪或者受了驚嚇的時候，他們時常會以愚蠢的價格買進或賣出股票．股票的長期價值是取決於企業的經濟發展，而不是每日的市場行情．
＠ 投資人Investor 和投機客Speculator 之間的基本差是，在於他們對股價的看法．投機客試圖在價格的起伏之間獲益，相反地，投資人是尋求以合理的價格取得公司的股票．
＠ 投資人最大的敵人不是股票市場，而是自己．投資人無論在數學，財務或價計上有多麼優秀的能力，若不能掌握自己的情緒，還是無法從投資過程中獲利．
＠ 巴菲特不相信所謂市場預測，無法預知短期內股價的變動，也不相信有誰可以做到這一點．他長久以來的感覺是（股市預測專家存在的唯一價值，是使算命先生更有面子而已）．
＠ 巴菲特不預期股票市場的漲跌，只是設法在別人貪心的時候保持戒慎恐懼的態度，唯有在所有的人都小心謹慎的時候才會勇往直前．
＠ 只要對你持有之股票的公司深具信心，就應該對股價下跌抱持歡迎的態 度，並藉著這個機會增加你的持股．
＠ 股票市場並不是一個指標，它只是一個可以讓你買賣股票的地方而已．
＠ 巴菲特表示，因為他做的都是長期投資，所以短期的市場波動對他根本沒有影嚮．他相信自己比市場更有能力評估一個公司的真正價值，做不到這一點你就沒有資格玩這個遊戲．他解釋說：這就好像打樸克牌，如果你在玩了一陣子之後，還看不出這場牌局裡的凱子是誰，那麼那個凱子就是你.
＠ 巴菲特學習到優良的企業能讓投資人很容易地做決定，但是那些狀況不佳的公司，即使投資人猶豫不決．如果他不能輕易地說服自己做下購買的決定，那麼他就得放棄那間公司．巴菲特有這種說不的精神，只有在所有的因素都對他有利的情況下才肯購買股票，而這個說（不）的能力，正是使投資能夠獲利的最大因素．
＠ 巴菲特之所以能夠成功的管理龐大地投資組合，多半歸功於他（以靜制動）的能力．大部份的投資人都很難抵抗誘惑，不斷地在股市裡搶進搶出．
＠ 巴菲特表示，投資人總是想要買進太多的股票，卻不願意耐心等待一家有真正值得投資的好公司．買進一間頂尖企業股票然後長期持有，比一天到晚在那些不怎麼樣的股票裡忙地暈頭轉向，絕對容易得多了．有很多投資人一天不買賣就渾身不對勁，他卻可以一年都不去動手中的股票．近乎怠惰地按兵不動，正是他一貫的投資風格．
＠ 根據巴菲特的意見，投資人絕對應該好好守住幾支前途看好的股票，而不是三心二意地在一堆體質欠佳的股票裡搶進搶出．事實上，巴菲特的成功主要是建立在幾宗成功的大宗投資上．
＠ 投資人應該假設自己手中只有一張可以打個２０個的投資決策卡，每作一次投資，就在卡片上打一個洞，相對地能夠作投資決定的次數也就滅少一次．巴菲特相信，假如投資人真的受到這樣的限制，他們就會耐心地等待最佳的投資機會出現，而不會輕率地作決定．
＠ 巴菲特從經驗中得知，體質優良且經營得當的企業通常價格都不便宜．一旦見到價格低廉的績優企業，他一定毫不疑地大量收購，完全不受經濟景氣低迷，或是市場悲觀氣氛的影嚮．
＠ 隨著年歲增長，巴菲特越來越相信，正確的投資方式是把大量的資金，投入到那些你了解，而且對其經營深具信心的企業．有人把資金分散在一些他們所知有限，又缺令任何賣點的投資上，以為可以藉此降低風險，這樣的觀點其實是錯誤的．每個人知識和經驗必然是有限的，而也很少能夠同時在市場上發現三家以上可以讓人深具信心的企業．
＠ 巴菲特對於他手中持股的漲跌與市場股價指數表現，可說毫不關心．他是以營業的實績來判斷股票的好壞，而不是短期的成交價格．他知道，只要企業本身擁有傑出的營運績效，總有一天這樣的績效會反映到股票的價格上．
＠ 巴菲特承認，他的長期持有策略與機構投資人的基金經理人之思考模式有很大的落差．很大多數的基金經理人總是在華爾街出現新寵之後，迅速更改手中的持股．他們的投資組合不斷地在那些主要的大企業之間進行多角化風險分散，這樣作的目的多半是為了保護自己，以免跟不上市場的腳步，極少是因為他們感覺那些公司有良好的經濟價值．在巴菲特的想法裡，（ 法人）這個名詞正代表著矛盾．他說，把基金經理人稱為投資人，就像把追求一夜風流稱為浪漫是一樣的．
＠ 巴菲特說：因為我把自己當成是企業經營者，所以我成為更優秀的投資人．因為我把自己當成投資人，所以我成為更優秀的企業經營者．
＠ 全面收購一個企業與購買該企業的股票，基本上是沒有差別的．無論是收購個企業，或者只是持有該企業部份的投票，巴菲特都遵守同樣的投資策略：尋找他所瞭解的，且利於長期投資的公司．同時該公司的管理階層必須誠實且具備了管理的才能，最重要的是價格要吸引人．
＠ 巴菲特說：我們在投資的時候，要將自己看成是企業分析家，而不是市場分析師 , 更不是有價証券分析師．巴菲特在評估一項潛在交易或是買進股票的時候，他會先以企業主的觀點出發，衡量該公司經營體系所有質與量的層面，財務況以及收購價格．
＠ 巴菲特四大投資決策基本原則：
1. 企業原則：企業本身的三個基本特性．
2. 經營原則：高級主管必須展現出來的三個重要特質．
3. 財務原則：公司必須依循的四項重要財務政策．
4. 市場原則：相關的二個成本指導方針．
＠ 企業原則：１）該企業是否簡單且易於瞭解．
２）該企業過去的經營狀況是否穩定．
３）該企業長期發展的遠景是否被看好．
＠ 以巴菲特的觀點，投資人財務上的成功，和他對自己所做之投資的了解程度成正比．因為只在他了解的範圍內選擇企業，所以他對所投資的企業一直有高度的了解．
＠ 根據巴菲特的觀察，投資的成功與否並非取決於你了解的有多少，而是在於你能否老老實實地承認自己所不知道的東西．投資人並不需要做對很多事情，重要的是要能不犯重的過錯．在巴菲特的經驗裡，以一些平凡的方法就能夠得到平均以上的投資成果．重點是你如何把一些平凡的事，做得極不平凡．
＠ 巴菲特不碰複雜的企業，對於那些正因面臨難題而苦惱，或因為先前的計劃失敗，而打算徹底改變營運方向的企業，他也敬而遠之．巴菲特相信，重大的變革和高額報酬率是沒有交集的．許多投資人拼命搶購那些正在進行組織變革的公司，往往被一些企業將來可能帶來的好處之假象所迷惑，而忽略了眼前的企
業現實．
＠ 巴菲特從經營與投資的經驗中學到，鹹魚很少能夠大翻身．學會去避開它們，能夠成功並不是因為我們有能力清除所有障礙，而是在於我們專注地尋找可以跨越的障礙．
＠ 經營原則：
１）管理階層是否理性?
２）整個管理階層對股東是否坦白?
３）管理階層是否能夠對抗（法人機構盲從的行為）?
＠ 管理人員把自己看成是公司負責人，不會忘了公司最主要的目標 － 增加股東持股的價值．同時他們會為了進一步達成這個目標做出理性的決定．
＠ 巴菲特對於那些能看重自己的責任，完整而詳實地向股東公開所有營運狀況，以及有勇氣抵抗所謂（盲從法人機構）， 而不盲目地追隨別人的行為管理人才，抱著極為敬佩的態度．
＠ 分配公司的資本是最重要的經營行為，因為一段時間之后，資本的分配將決定股東股權的價值．根據巴菲特的觀點，決定如何處理公司的盈餘（轉投資或者是分股利給股東）是一個非常重要的理性思考課題．
＠ 巴菲特極為看重那些完整且詳實報告公司營運狀況的管理人，尤其尊敬那些不會藉著一般公認的會計原則，隱瞞公司營運狀況的管理者．他們把成功分享給他人，同時也勇於承認錯誤，並且永遠向股東保持坦誠的態度．
＠ 如果資本支出的配置是如此簡單而合乎邏輯，怎麼會有那麼多資金運用不當的情事發生呢 ?巴菲特所得到的答案是一種他稱之為（盲從法人機構）的無形力量．企業的管理者自然而然地模仿其他管理人員的行為，不管那些行為是多麼愚蠢違反理性．
＠ 財務原則：
１）將注意力集中在股東權益報酬率，而不是每股盈餘．
２）計算（股東盈餘）＜Owner Earnings＞，得出正確的價值．
３）尋求擁有高毛利的公司．
４）每保留一塊錢的盈餘，公司至少得增加一塊錢的市場價值．
＠ 巴菲特說：好的企業應該能夠不靠舉債，就可以賺取不錯股東權益報酬率．對於那些必須藉由相當程度的負債才能達成良好股東權益報酬率的公司，應該抱持懷疑的態度．
＠ 巴菲特是出警告：會計上的每股盈餘只是評估企業經濟價值的起點，絕不是終點；並非所有的盈餘都代表相同的意義．
＠ 巴菲特喜歡採用〔股東權益〕Owner earningsˍ公司淨所得加上折舊，耗損，分期償還的費用，減去資本支出以及其他額外所需的營運資本，來代替現金流量計算．寧願對得迷迷糊糊，也不要錯得清清楚楚．
＠ 巴菲特指出，如果管理當局無法將銷售額轉換成利潤，任何再好的投資都是枉然．需要靠高成本營運企業的經營管理者常會不斷增加經常性支出，巴菲特很討厭那些不斷增加開銷的經營管理者．
＠ 巴菲特選擇公司的標準是：長期發展遠景看好，且公司由一群有能力和以股東利益為第一優先的管理者所經營，它們將隨著日後公司市場價值的增加而獲得証明．每一塊錢保留盈餘，確實轉換成至少有一塊錢的市場價值．
＠ 市場原則：
一．企業的實質價值如何 ?
二．是否可以在企業的股價遠低於其實質價值時，買進該企業的股票 ?
＠ 投資人應該衡量兩項因素：這間公司是否有好的實質價值，以及現在是否為購買的好時機（也就是說，價格是不是吸引人 ?）
＠ 巴菲特使用約翰．威廉斯（ John Williams ） 的〔投資價值理論〕｛ Theory of Investment Value ｝所提出：企業的價值等於運用適當的貼現率，折算預期在企業生命週期內，可能產生的淨現金流量．企業價值的計算非常類似評估債券價值的模式．債券未來的現金流量可分成每期息票支付的利息，以及未來債券到期發回的本金兩部份．
＠ 使用適當的變數：現金流量和預期的貼現率，決定公司的價值就很簡單．如果他對預估企業未來的現金流量沒有十足的把握，他就不會試著去評估一家公司的價值．如果企業簡單且能了解；並擁有穩定的盈餘，巴菲特就能夠以適度的確定性來決定未來的現金流量．
＠ 一旦巴菲特決定了企業未來的現金流量，接著就是應由貼現率將其折現．巴菲特使用的貼現率，是美國政府的長期債券利率．
＠ 巴菲特拒絕購買那些具有負債問題的公司，將注意力集中在盈餘穩定且可預測的公司上．他說：我將確定性看得很重，所有造成風險的因素對我而言都沒有意義，風險來自於你不知道自己在做什麼．
＠ 持續購買低本益比 和價值比 以及高股利的人，通常被稱為〔價值投資人〕 . 主張以選擇在盈餘上有高平均成長的公司．來辨認公司價值的人，則稱為 [ 成長投資人 ]．一般來講，成長中的公司通常具有高的本益比和低的股利，而這些財務特值與價值投資人所希望尋找的剛好相反．
＠ 尋找購買價值的投資人，通常必須在〔價值〕與〔成長〕之間來選擇股票．巴菲特說：成長與價值的投資其實是相通的．價值是一項投資其未來現金流量的折現值，而成長只是用來決定價值的一項預測過程．
＠ 在投資資本報酬率高於平均水準的時候，成長可以增加投資的價值．確保每投資一塊錢，至少就能增加一塊錢的市場價值．而成長對於一家資本報酬率不高的公司股東而言，可能反受其害．
＠ 巴菲特指出：將注意力集中在容易了解，和具有持久的經濟力量基礎，且把股東放在第一位的管理者所管理的公司上，並不能保証成功．首先，他先須以合理的價格購買，同時公司必須符合他對企業的期望．
＠ 巴菲特承認，如果犯錯則是因為下面三個地方出了問題：
１）我們所支付的價格．
２）我們所參與的經營管理．
３）企業未來的經濟狀況．他指出，錯誤的估計最常發生在第三個原因上．
＠ 巴菲特的意圖，不但要辨認出可以賺得高於平均收益的公司，還可以在價格遠低於其實質價值時購買這些企業．
＠ 葛拉罕：＜最聰明的投資方式，就是把自己當成持股公司的老闆＞，巴菲特說：
＜這是有史以來關於投資理財最重要的一句話＞．
＠ 巴菲特說：只要企業的股東權益報酬率充滿希望並令人滿意，或管理者能勝任其職務而且誠實，同時市場價格也沒有高估此企業，那麼他相當滿足於長期持有任何証券．
＠ 短期來看市場是個投票機器，但長期來看則是個秤重器，他樂於忍耐．你手上握有的股票一定要比現金好，否則它就不是一個好的投資．
＠ 如果股票市場確實過份高估某一家企業，他就會將其股票賣出 . 如果他需要現金以購買別家可能被過份低估或是有同樣價值，但他更了解之企業的股份，巴菲特將會出售價值公道或被低估的証券以變現．
＠ 當人們對一些大環境事件的憂慮升到最高點時，事實上也就是我們做成最佳交易的時機．恐懼是追趕流行者的大敵，卻是看重基本面的財經分析者的密友．
＠ 當巴菲特從事投資的時候，他觀察一家公司的全貌，而大多數的投資人只觀察其股價而己．
＠ 世故者改變自己來適應這個世界，而特立獨行者卻堅持嘗試要改著世界來適應自己．因此所有的進步都仰賴後者來促成．巴菲特自始至終，都將投資視為一種企業經營活動，而以一般常識作為他的投資哲學．
＠ 依照巴菲特的理論，投資人企業家應該以同樣的方法來觀察一家公司，因為他們實際上想要的東西是相同的，企業家希望買下整個公司，而投資人希望購買公司部份的股票．如果你問一個企業家，當他購買一家公司的時候，他所想要的是什麼，答案經常是：這家企業能產生多少現金 ?公司的價值和它的現金產生能力之間有直接的關聯，理論上，企業家與投資人為了要獲利，應該要注意到相同的變數．
＠ 委託人要求專業投資人報告績效，在等候他們的投資組合達到某一價格時，經常顯得不耐煩．如果他們的投資組合並未出現短期的價格上漲，委託人將表現出不滿和懹疑他們在投資上的專業能力．專業投資者知道他們必須在改善短期績效，或冒著損失客戶的風險之間作一選擇，於是開始陷入追漲殺跑的旋渦中．
＠ 巴菲特相信使用短期價格來判斷一家公司的成功與否是愚蠢的，取而代之他要公司向他報告因經濟實力成長所獲得的價值．一年一次他固定檢查幾個變數：
１） 初始的股東權益報酬率
２） 營運毛利，負債水準與資本支出而求的變化
３） 該公司現金產生能力
＠ 華倫巴菲特的投資策略：
步驟一：不理會股票市場每日的漲跌．
步驟二：不擔心經濟情勢．
步驟三：買下一家公司，而不是股票．
步驟四：管理企業的投資組合．
＠ 股票市場是狂熱與抑鬱交替發作的場所，有的時候它對未來的期望感到興奮，而在其他時候，又顯出不合理的沮喪．這樣的市場行為創造出投資機價，特別是傑出企業的股價跌到不合理的低價時．股票市場並不是投資顧問，它存在只是為了幫助買進或賣出股票吧了．
＠ 如果你打算擁有一家傑出企業的股份並長期持有，但又去注每一日股市的變動是不合邏輯的．你將會驚訝地發現，不去持續注意市場變化，你的投資組合反而變得更有價值．
＠ 巴菲特較喜歡購買在任何經濟情勢中都有機價獲益的企業．選擇並擁有能力在任何經濟環境中獲利的企業，時間將被更聰明地運用．而不定期地短期持有股票，只能在正確預測經濟景氣時，才可以獲利．
＠ 你無法對企業的未來作出聰明的預測，除非你了解它如何賺錢．投資人在投資股票時，經常對於一家公司如何產生銷售，費用，利潤私沒有任何線索．
＠ 最值得擁有的企業，是在長期有最佳遠景，且擁有市場特許權（產品有獨占性及差異性）．市場特許權是指銷售產品或者顧客而要想要的服務，市場中沒有類似的替代品，持有大量經濟上的商譽．
＠ 企業產生現金的能力決定了它的價值，巴菲特找出那些產生超過營運所需現金的公司，而將不斷消耗現金的公司排除在外．
＠ 巴菲特提供一份較正確的計算方式，他稱之為〔股東盈餘〕．決定股東盈餘的方法是將折舊，耗損和分期攤銷的費用加上淨利，然後減去那些公司用以維持其經濟狀況和銷售量的資本支出．
＠ 高毛利率反映出經營者控制成本的精神，巴菲特欣賞注意成本觀念的經營者，而憎惡放任成本不斷擴大的經營者．
＠ 推動巴菲特投資策略的主力，在於資金的理性分配，決定如何配置一家公司的盈餘，是經營者要做的最重要決定．做投資選擇時展現的理性是巴菲特最推崇的特質．
＠ 華倫巴菲特從不投資他不了解的企業，他四十年的投資職業生涯裡，只有十二個投資決策，造成他今日與眾不同的成功地位．
＠ 當大企業有暫時性的麻煩或股市下跌，並創造出有利可圖的交易股價，應進場買下這些大企業的股票，不要再試著預測股票市場的方向，經濟情勢，利率或選舉結果，並停止浪費金錢在以此糊口的人身上．研究公司的現況和財務情形，並評估公司將來的展望，當一切都合你意的時候，就買下它 .
＠ 許多人盲目投資，從某方面來說，這就像通宵玩牌，卻不曾看清手中的牌一樣．
＠ 投資人謹慎透徹地做好投資研究，只要專注於持有少數幾種股票，便可大大降低投資風險．通常巴菲特持普通股持股，僅由五種不同的股資組合．
＠ 巴菲特的投資策略核心是（買進ˍ持有）Buy and hold， 買進優良企業，擁有這個投資數年，然後根據企業經營之收益獲利，這個觀念簡單又直接，投資人容易明瞭這個方式的原理．
＠ 多數人都受到現有的股票交易方式所影嚮和限制，只知在買進與賣出間追逐價差而忘了買賣股票原本只是轉移股權，持有股權原本是做為股東的權益則來自於企業營運所獲的利潤．
＠ 做為股東原本是希望能從企業獲利不斷成長，及源源不斷的收取成功的經營成果股票市場只是方便股東的移轉股權．
＠ 巴菲特投資決策依據的基本原則：
一．企業原則：這家企業簡單且可以了解嗎?
這家企業的經營歷史是否穩定?
這家企業的長期發展遠景是否看好?
二．經營原則：經營者是否理性?
經營者對股東是誠實坦白的嗎?
經營者是否會盲從其他法人權構的行為?
三．財務原則：把重點集中在股東權益報酬率，而不是每股盈餘．計算（出股東盈餘）尋找毛利率高的公司．對於保留的每一塊錢盈餘，確定公司主少己經創造了一塊錢的市場價值．
四．市場原則：這家企業有多少實質價值?
這家企業能否以顯著的價值折扣購得?
＠ 巴菲特的投資策略很簡單，那就是：
１． 不理會股票市場每日的漲跌．
2． 不擔心經濟情勢．
3． 買下一家公司而不是股票．
4． 管理企業投資組合．
＠ 從投資一百美元起家，至今華倫巴菲特己創造百億美元的財富，這位被喻為當今(最偉大的投資者），以簡單的投資策略及原則，不做短線進出，不理會股市每日的漲跌，不擔心經濟情勢，妥善管理手上的投資組合，創造另一種不同於投機客的投資典型．
＠ 巴菲特擁有淨值百億美元，名列美國最富有人榜首多年 . 近年被比爾．蓋茲趕過變成第二名），是美國百人富翁唯一自股票市場獲得財富的人．
＠ 巴菲特１９３０年生於內布拉斯加州的奧瑪哈(Omaha City)，進入哥倫比亞大學商研究所就讀，受教於班哲明．葛拉罕（一向鼓吹了解一公司實質價值的重要性）,１９５６年帶著葛拉罕得到的知識與來自親朋好友的財力支持 , 在奧瑪哈開始他的有限合夥投資事業經就是後來的波克夏哈薩威公公）．合夥公司開始時，由七個有限責任合夥人，一起出資十萬五仟美元．主要合夥人巴菲特，從一百元開始投資，那些有限合夥人每年回收他們投資的６％，和超過此固定利潤以上之總利潤的７５％，巴菲特的酬勞則是另外的２５％．往的十三年，巴菲特的金錢以每年２９．５％的複利持續成長，合夥體的資產己達二千六百萬美元．
＠ 兩位智者ˍ班哲明．葛拉罕給予巴菲特投資的思考基礎： 安全邊際．並協助巴菲特學習掌握他的情緒，以便於在市價的漲落中獲利．而菲利普．費雪則給予巴菲特最新的可行的方法學，使他能夠判定出好的長期投資． 巴菲特說：我有1５％像費雪，８５％葛拉罕．
＠ 費雪的著作：Common Stock and Uncommon Profits，葛拉罕的著作：
The Intelligent Investor ，是二本影嚮巴菲特最深遠的投資學巨著．他說每位投資人至少要讀它們２０遍以上，才能真正瞭解投資的真諦．
＠ 投貣就是在經過完整的分析研究之後，認為可以確保本金的安全，並能得到令人滿意的報酬．不符合這些要求的操作便是在投機．
＠ 雖然葛拉罕（價值理論）與費雪（成長理論）的投資方法不同，但是巴菲特說道：他們在投資界是同等重要的．
＠ 價值理論：指出一個經謹慎選擇，且己分散風險，合理價格的普通投資組合，才可能是聰明的股資．葛拉罕推測如因股票的價格低於它的價值，則股票在一個安全邊際．葛拉罕表示．
投資有二個法則：
一．嚴禁損失．
二．不要忘記第一個法則．
他相信市場經常給予股票不適當的價格，這種錯誤的標價往往是因為人類懼怕和貪婪的情緒而引起的．
＠ 成長理論：超額利潤的創造是經由：
１．投資那些潛力在平均水準之上的公司
２．向那些最有能力的經營階層看齊．
＠ 費雪相信，即使有能力使銷售成長，如果公司無法為股東賺取利潤，就不宜投資該公司．如果多年來利潤不能夠相對地成長，則所有的銷售成長都不代表公司股票是正確的投資工具．
＠ 巴菲持主張投資人學習如何獨立思考，如因你己經由深思熟慮的判斷，獲得合平邏輯的結論，絕不要因為別人的不同意而被勸阻退縮不前，（你不會因為這些人的不同意，而判斷正確或錯誤，你之所以正確．是因為你的資料和推理是正確的 ）.
＠ 巴菲特：當人們因貪婪或者受了驚嚇的時候，他們時常會以愚蠢的價格買進或賣出股票．股票的長期價值是取決於企業的經濟發展，而不是每日的市場行情．
＠ 投資人Investor 和投機客Speculator 之間的基本差是，在於他們對股價的看法．投機客試圖在價格的起伏之間獲益，相反地，投資人是尋求以合理的價格取得公司的股票．
＠ 投資人最大的敵人不是股票市場，而是自己．投資人無論在數學，財務或價計上有多麼優秀的能力，若不能掌握自己的情緒，還是無法從投資過程中獲利．
＠ 巴菲特不相信所謂市場預測，無法預知短期內股價的變動，也不相信有誰可以做到這一點．他長久以來的感覺是（股市預測專家存在的唯一價值，是使算命先生更有面子而已）．
＠ 巴菲特不預期股票市場的漲跌，只是設法在別人貪心的時候保持戒慎恐懼的態度，唯有在所有的人都小心謹慎的時候才會勇往直前．
＠ 只要對你持有之股票的公司深具信心，就應該對股價下跌抱持歡迎的態 度，並藉著這個機會增加你的持股．
＠ 股票市場並不是一個指標，它只是一個可以讓你買賣股票的地方而已．
＠ 巴菲特表示，因為他做的都是長期投資，所以短期的市場波動對他根本沒有影嚮．他相信自己比市場更有能力評估一個公司的真正價值，做不到這一點你就沒有資格玩這個遊戲．他解釋說：這就好像打樸克牌，如果你在玩了一陣子之後，還看不出這場牌局裡的凱子是誰，那麼那個凱子就是你.
＠ 巴菲特學習到優良的企業能讓投資人很容易地做決定，但是那些狀況不佳的公司，即使投資人猶豫不決．如果他不能輕易地說服自己做下購買的決定，那麼他就得放棄那間公司．巴菲特有這種說不的精神，只有在所有的因素都對他有利的情況下才肯購買股票，而這個說（不）的能力，正是使投資能夠獲利的最大因素．
＠ 巴菲特之所以能夠成功的管理龐大地投資組合，多半歸功於他（以靜制動）的能力．大部份的投資人都很難抵抗誘惑，不斷地在股市裡搶進搶出．
＠ 巴菲特表示，投資人總是想要買進太多的股票，卻不願意耐心等待一家有真正值得投資的好公司．買進一間頂尖企業股票然後長期持有，比一天到晚在那些不怎麼樣的股票裡忙地暈頭轉向，絕對容易得多了．有很多投資人一天不買賣就渾身不對勁，他卻可以一年都不去動手中的股票．近乎怠惰地按兵不動，正是他一貫的投資風格．
＠ 根據巴菲特的意見，投資人絕對應該好好守住幾支前途看好的股票，而不是三心二意地在一堆體質欠佳的股票裡搶進搶出．事實上，巴菲特的成功主要是建立在幾宗成功的大宗投資上．
＠ 投資人應該假設自己手中只有一張可以打個２０個的投資決策卡，每作一次投資，就在卡片上打一個洞，相對地能夠作投資決定的次數也就滅少一次．巴菲特相信，假如投資人真的受到這樣的限制，他們就會耐心地等待最佳的投資機會出現，而不會輕率地作決定．
＠ 巴菲特從經驗中得知，體質優良且經營得當的企業通常價格都不便宜．一旦見到價格低廉的績優企業，他一定毫不疑地大量收購，完全不受經濟景氣低迷，或是市場悲觀氣氛的影嚮．
＠ 隨著年歲增長，巴菲特越來越相信，正確的投資方式是把大量的資金，投入到那些你了解，而且對其經營深具信心的企業．有人把資金分散在一些他們所知有限，又缺令任何賣點的投資上，以為可以藉此降低風險，這樣的觀點其實是錯誤的．每個人知識和經驗必然是有限的，而也很少能夠同時在市場上發現三家以上可以讓人深具信心的企業．
＠ 巴菲特對於他手中持股的漲跌與市場股價指數表現，可說毫不關心．他是以營業的實績來判斷股票的好壞，而不是短期的成交價格．他知道，只要企業本身擁有傑出的營運績效，總有一天這樣的績效會反映到股票的價格上．
＠ 巴菲特承認，他的長期持有策略與機構投資人的基金經理人之思考模式有很大的落差．很大多數的基金經理人總是在華爾街出現新寵之後，迅速更改手中的持股．他們的投資組合不斷地在那些主要的大企業之間進行多角化風險分散，這樣作的目的多半是為了保護自己，以免跟不上市場的腳步，極少是因為他們感覺那些公司有良好的經濟價值．在巴菲特的想法裡，（ 法人）這個名詞正代表著矛盾．他說，把基金經理人稱為投資人，就像把追求一夜風流稱為浪漫是一樣的．
＠ 巴菲特說：因為我把自己當成是企業經營者，所以我成為更優秀的投資人．因為我把自己當成投資人，所以我成為更優秀的企業經營者．
＠ 全面收購一個企業與購買該企業的股票，基本上是沒有差別的．無論是收購個企業，或者只是持有該企業部份的投票，巴菲特都遵守同樣的投資策略：尋找他所瞭解的，且利於長期投資的公司．同時該公司的管理階層必須誠實且具備了管理的才能，最重要的是價格要吸引人．
＠ 巴菲特說：我們在投資的時候，要將自己看成是企業分析家，而不是市場分析師 , 更不是有價証券分析師．巴菲特在評估一項潛在交易或是買進股票的時候，他會先以企業主的觀點出發，衡量該公司經營體系所有質與量的層面，財務況以及收購價格．
＠ 巴菲特四大投資決策基本原則：
1. 企業原則：企業本身的三個基本特性．
2. 經營原則：高級主管必須展現出來的三個重要特質．
3. 財務原則：公司必須依循的四項重要財務政策．
4. 市場原則：相關的二個成本指導方針．
＠ 企業原則：１）該企業是否簡單且易於瞭解．
２）該企業過去的經營狀況是否穩定．
３）該企業長期發展的遠景是否被看好．
＠ 以巴菲特的觀點，投資人財務上的成功，和他對自己所做之投資的了解程度成正比．因為只在他了解的範圍內選擇企業，所以他對所投資的企業一直有高度的了解．
＠ 根據巴菲特的觀察，投資的成功與否並非取決於你了解的有多少，而是在於你能否老老實實地承認自己所不知道的東西．投資人並不需要做對很多事情，重要的是要能不犯重的過錯．在巴菲特的經驗裡，以一些平凡的方法就能夠得到平均以上的投資成果．重點是你如何把一些平凡的事，做得極不平凡．
＠ 巴菲特不碰複雜的企業，對於那些正因面臨難題而苦惱，或因為先前的計劃失敗，而打算徹底改變營運方向的企業，他也敬而遠之．巴菲特相信，重大的變革和高額報酬率是沒有交集的．許多投資人拼命搶購那些正在進行組織變革的公司，往往被一些企業將來可能帶來的好處之假象所迷惑，而忽略了眼前的企
業現實．
＠ 巴菲特從經營與投資的經驗中學到，鹹魚很少能夠大翻身．學會去避開它們，能夠成功並不是因為我們有能力清除所有障礙，而是在於我們專注地尋找可以跨越的障礙．
＠ 經營原則：
１）管理階層是否理性?
２）整個管理階層對股東是否坦白?
３）管理階層是否能夠對抗（法人機構盲從的行為）?
＠ 管理人員把自己看成是公司負責人，不會忘了公司最主要的目標 － 增加股東持股的價值．同時他們會為了進一步達成這個目標做出理性的決定．
＠ 巴菲特對於那些能看重自己的責任，完整而詳實地向股東公開所有營運狀況，以及有勇氣抵抗所謂（盲從法人機構）， 而不盲目地追隨別人的行為管理人才，抱著極為敬佩的態度．
＠ 分配公司的資本是最重要的經營行為，因為一段時間之后，資本的分配將決定股東股權的價值．根據巴菲特的觀點，決定如何處理公司的盈餘（轉投資或者是分股利給股東）是一個非常重要的理性思考課題．
＠ 巴菲特極為看重那些完整且詳實報告公司營運狀況的管理人，尤其尊敬那些不會藉著一般公認的會計原則，隱瞞公司營運狀況的管理者．他們把成功分享給他人，同時也勇於承認錯誤，並且永遠向股東保持坦誠的態度．
＠ 如果資本支出的配置是如此簡單而合乎邏輯，怎麼會有那麼多資金運用不當的情事發生呢 ?巴菲特所得到的答案是一種他稱之為（盲從法人機構）的無形力量．企業的管理者自然而然地模仿其他管理人員的行為，不管那些行為是多麼愚蠢違反理性．
＠ 財務原則：
１）將注意力集中在股東權益報酬率，而不是每股盈餘．
２）計算（股東盈餘）＜Owner Earnings＞，得出正確的價值．
３）尋求擁有高毛利的公司．
４）每保留一塊錢的盈餘，公司至少得增加一塊錢的市場價值．
＠ 巴菲特說：好的企業應該能夠不靠舉債，就可以賺取不錯股東權益報酬率．對於那些必須藉由相當程度的負債才能達成良好股東權益報酬率的公司，應該抱持懷疑的態度．
＠ 巴菲特是出警告：會計上的每股盈餘只是評估企業經濟價值的起點，絕不是終點；並非所有的盈餘都代表相同的意義．
＠ 巴菲特喜歡採用〔股東權益〕Owner earningsˍ公司淨所得加上折舊，耗損，分期償還的費用，減去資本支出以及其他額外所需的營運資本，來代替現金流量計算．寧願對得迷迷糊糊，也不要錯得清清楚楚．
＠ 巴菲特指出，如果管理當局無法將銷售額轉換成利潤，任何再好的投資都是枉然．需要靠高成本營運企業的經營管理者常會不斷增加經常性支出，巴菲特很討厭那些不斷增加開銷的經營管理者．
＠ 巴菲特選擇公司的標準是：長期發展遠景看好，且公司由一群有能力和以股東利益為第一優先的管理者所經營，它們將隨著日後公司市場價值的增加而獲得証明．每一塊錢保留盈餘，確實轉換成至少有一塊錢的市場價值．
＠ 市場原則：
一．企業的實質價值如何 ?
二．是否可以在企業的股價遠低於其實質價值時，買進該企業的股票 ?
＠ 投資人應該衡量兩項因素：這間公司是否有好的實質價值，以及現在是否為購買的好時機（也就是說，價格是不是吸引人 ?）
＠ 巴菲特使用約翰．威廉斯（ John Williams ） 的〔投資價值理論〕｛ Theory of Investment Value ｝所提出：企業的價值等於運用適當的貼現率，折算預期在企業生命週期內，可能產生的淨現金流量．企業價值的計算非常類似評估債券價值的模式．債券未來的現金流量可分成每期息票支付的利息，以及未來債券到期發回的本金兩部份．
＠ 使用適當的變數：現金流量和預期的貼現率，決定公司的價值就很簡單．如果他對預估企業未來的現金流量沒有十足的把握，他就不會試著去評估一家公司的價值．如果企業簡單且能了解；並擁有穩定的盈餘，巴菲特就能夠以適度的確定性來決定未來的現金流量．
＠ 一旦巴菲特決定了企業未來的現金流量，接著就是應由貼現率將其折現．巴菲特使用的貼現率，是美國政府的長期債券利率．
＠ 巴菲特拒絕購買那些具有負債問題的公司，將注意力集中在盈餘穩定且可預測的公司上．他說：我將確定性看得很重，所有造成風險的因素對我而言都沒有意義，風險來自於你不知道自己在做什麼．
＠ 持續購買低本益比 和價值比 以及高股利的人，通常被稱為〔價值投資人〕 . 主張以選擇在盈餘上有高平均成長的公司．來辨認公司價值的人，則稱為 [ 成長投資人 ]．一般來講，成長中的公司通常具有高的本益比和低的股利，而這些財務特值與價值投資人所希望尋找的剛好相反．
＠ 尋找購買價值的投資人，通常必須在〔價值〕與〔成長〕之間來選擇股票．巴菲特說：成長與價值的投資其實是相通的．價值是一項投資其未來現金流量的折現值，而成長只是用來決定價值的一項預測過程．
＠ 在投資資本報酬率高於平均水準的時候，成長可以增加投資的價值．確保每投資一塊錢，至少就能增加一塊錢的市場價值．而成長對於一家資本報酬率不高的公司股東而言，可能反受其害．
＠ 巴菲特指出：將注意力集中在容易了解，和具有持久的經濟力量基礎，且把股東放在第一位的管理者所管理的公司上，並不能保証成功．首先，他先須以合理的價格購買，同時公司必須符合他對企業的期望．
＠ 巴菲特承認，如果犯錯則是因為下面三個地方出了問題：
１）我們所支付的價格．
２）我們所參與的經營管理．
３）企業未來的經濟狀況．他指出，錯誤的估計最常發生在第三個原因上．
＠ 巴菲特的意圖，不但要辨認出可以賺得高於平均收益的公司，還可以在價格遠低於其實質價值時購買這些企業．
＠ 葛拉罕：＜最聰明的投資方式，就是把自己當成持股公司的老闆＞，巴菲特說：
＜這是有史以來關於投資理財最重要的一句話＞．
＠ 巴菲特說：只要企業的股東權益報酬率充滿希望並令人滿意，或管理者能勝任其職務而且誠實，同時市場價格也沒有高估此企業，那麼他相當滿足於長期持有任何証券．
＠ 短期來看市場是個投票機器，但長期來看則是個秤重器，他樂於忍耐．你手上握有的股票一定要比現金好，否則它就不是一個好的投資．
＠ 如果股票市場確實過份高估某一家企業，他就會將其股票賣出 . 如果他需要現金以購買別家可能被過份低估或是有同樣價值，但他更了解之企業的股份，巴菲特將會出售價值公道或被低估的証券以變現．
＠ 當人們對一些大環境事件的憂慮升到最高點時，事實上也就是我們做成最佳交易的時機．恐懼是追趕流行者的大敵，卻是看重基本面的財經分析者的密友．
＠ 當巴菲特從事投資的時候，他觀察一家公司的全貌，而大多數的投資人只觀察其股價而己．
＠ 世故者改變自己來適應這個世界，而特立獨行者卻堅持嘗試要改著世界來適應自己．因此所有的進步都仰賴後者來促成．巴菲特自始至終，都將投資視為一種企業經營活動，而以一般常識作為他的投資哲學．
＠ 依照巴菲特的理論，投資人企業家應該以同樣的方法來觀察一家公司，因為他們實際上想要的東西是相同的，企業家希望買下整個公司，而投資人希望購買公司部份的股票．如果你問一個企業家，當他購買一家公司的時候，他所想要的是什麼，答案經常是：這家企業能產生多少現金 ?公司的價值和它的現金產生能力之間有直接的關聯，理論上，企業家與投資人為了要獲利，應該要注意到相同的變數．
＠ 委託人要求專業投資人報告績效，在等候他們的投資組合達到某一價格時，經常顯得不耐煩．如果他們的投資組合並未出現短期的價格上漲，委託人將表現出不滿和懹疑他們在投資上的專業能力．專業投資者知道他們必須在改善短期績效，或冒著損失客戶的風險之間作一選擇，於是開始陷入追漲殺跑的旋渦中．
＠ 巴菲特相信使用短期價格來判斷一家公司的成功與否是愚蠢的，取而代之他要公司向他報告因經濟實力成長所獲得的價值．一年一次他固定檢查幾個變數：
１） 初始的股東權益報酬率
２） 營運毛利，負債水準與資本支出而求的變化
３） 該公司現金產生能力
＠ 華倫巴菲特的投資策略：
步驟一：不理會股票市場每日的漲跌．
步驟二：不擔心經濟情勢．
步驟三：買下一家公司，而不是股票．
步驟四：管理企業的投資組合．
＠ 股票市場是狂熱與抑鬱交替發作的場所，有的時候它對未來的期望感到興奮，而在其他時候，又顯出不合理的沮喪．這樣的市場行為創造出投資機價，特別是傑出企業的股價跌到不合理的低價時．股票市場並不是投資顧問，它存在只是為了幫助買進或賣出股票吧了．
＠ 如果你打算擁有一家傑出企業的股份並長期持有，但又去注每一日股市的變動是不合邏輯的．你將會驚訝地發現，不去持續注意市場變化，你的投資組合反而變得更有價值．
＠ 巴菲特較喜歡購買在任何經濟情勢中都有機價獲益的企業．選擇並擁有能力在任何經濟環境中獲利的企業，時間將被更聰明地運用．而不定期地短期持有股票，只能在正確預測經濟景氣時，才可以獲利．
＠ 你無法對企業的未來作出聰明的預測，除非你了解它如何賺錢．投資人在投資股票時，經常對於一家公司如何產生銷售，費用，利潤私沒有任何線索．
＠ 最值得擁有的企業，是在長期有最佳遠景，且擁有市場特許權（產品有獨占性及差異性）．市場特許權是指銷售產品或者顧客而要想要的服務，市場中沒有類似的替代品，持有大量經濟上的商譽．
＠ 企業產生現金的能力決定了它的價值，巴菲特找出那些產生超過營運所需現金的公司，而將不斷消耗現金的公司排除在外．
＠ 巴菲特提供一份較正確的計算方式，他稱之為〔股東盈餘〕．決定股東盈餘的方法是將折舊，耗損和分期攤銷的費用加上淨利，然後減去那些公司用以維持其經濟狀況和銷售量的資本支出．
＠ 高毛利率反映出經營者控制成本的精神，巴菲特欣賞注意成本觀念的經營者，而憎惡放任成本不斷擴大的經營者．
＠ 推動巴菲特投資策略的主力，在於資金的理性分配，決定如何配置一家公司的盈餘，是經營者要做的最重要決定．做投資選擇時展現的理性是巴菲特最推崇的特質．
AM Fraser Research
Lack of knee-jerk rebound this time could lead to sideways market and dwindling turnovers.
Massive plunges in January/February had led to strong technical rebounds with gains of over 400 points from 2747 to 3161 within a week in late Jan and nearly 270 points in mid-Feb from 2859 to 3126, also in a span of just over a week.
This time having lost about 230 points with a 100-point plunge on Monday, there is no sign that a knee jerk rally is coming soon. Not only that but the tendency for the STI to stay below 3000 for only 3-4 days in the last 2 instances may not be repeated again. In fact we are in a new strange situation that is getting harder to gauge.
On hindsight, there seems to be a blessing in disguise in a plunging market for nimble players as strong technical rebounds ensued. But with the STI now sticking to 2900 implies that the frequent experiences of bear traps from 3050 to 3150 have left bruised traders unwilling to take another risk.
While a lengthier consolidation may be badly needed after the big 100-day downtrend starting from Oct 11’s peak of 3831 to 2747on Jan 22, down 1084 points or 28.3%, the outcome may not be a strong rally.
It could even be another downleg to test 2850 and 2750. And no one can be sure that these precarious support areas can hold as the major support actually lies closer to 2600 or even 2500 if the STI goes for a complete 50% retracement of its 5-year bull run from 1170 in early 2003 to 3831.
History shows that once previous super bull markets in 1987, 1993 and 1999 ended, the index would definitely fall back to the earlier peaks and at times plunged even deeper like in 1997-98 when the Asian crisis bottomed out at 800 on the old index from high of 2163 in 1996.
Similarly the 2000 dot.com crash left the old STI more than halved from 2583 in Jan 2000 to 1205 by March 2003, even below the 1987 peak of 1288, prior to the infamous Oct 19 Black Monday on Wall Street. (NB there is a 1 to 3 percentage point difference between old and new STI).
While we do not expect the current bear phase to wipe out all the gains from the 2003-07 longest bull market in history, it cannot be denied that the STI has lost nearly 1100 points from its peak and another 150-250 point loss from 2750 to a strong bottom at 2500-2600 is not like the end of the world.
In fact traders and investors would prefer a selling climax with the STI testing these support levels quickly as for sure an equally strong rebound will take place instead of a sideways boring market with narrowing trading ranges.
But again history is not on the side of a quick bottom except for the Oct 1987 crash when the old STI bottomed out at end of year and steadily moved up. However its then 1288 peak was only briefly tested in 1990 and it was not until early 1993 that a new peak was recorded, more than 5 years later.
Similarly the Jan 1994 peak of 2138 was only briefly overcome 2 years later and no breakout to new highs was seen until mid-1999, also a time gap of over 5 years.
The Jan 2000 peak of 2583 or 2608 on the new STI was finally overcome in May 2006, again a 5 ½ year distance. So does this mean that the current 3831 peak could only be seen again only after 5 ½ years ie in 2013?
However if there is a repeat of the 1994-96 market when the STI tested the highs of 2140-60 in 2 years before the Asian crisis, we could see the 3800 level tested again at end 2009.
Most current year-end targets of the STI continue to be in the upper ranges between 3500-4000. In view of the steep consecutive plunges in January with end-2007 STI of 3466 it would be a great feat if we can see this level again by end-2008.
We have seen strong resistances at 3100 and 3200 and it will take time to get back to 3300-3400. Last year’s 2915 low and the recent lowest closings of 2866 and 2868 have become the ballpark area for support but until these 2750-2850 levels are tested again, the index is unlikely to break 3100 decisively.
A quick test of 2850 and 2750 should produce a good technical rebound to 3050-3100 but it is uncertain this will take place in March as the market seems to be aiming for a consolidation around 2900-3000.
Massive plunges in January/February had led to strong technical rebounds with gains of over 400 points from 2747 to 3161 within a week in late Jan and nearly 270 points in mid-Feb from 2859 to 3126, also in a span of just over a week.
This time having lost about 230 points with a 100-point plunge on Monday, there is no sign that a knee jerk rally is coming soon. Not only that but the tendency for the STI to stay below 3000 for only 3-4 days in the last 2 instances may not be repeated again. In fact we are in a new strange situation that is getting harder to gauge.
On hindsight, there seems to be a blessing in disguise in a plunging market for nimble players as strong technical rebounds ensued. But with the STI now sticking to 2900 implies that the frequent experiences of bear traps from 3050 to 3150 have left bruised traders unwilling to take another risk.
While a lengthier consolidation may be badly needed after the big 100-day downtrend starting from Oct 11’s peak of 3831 to 2747on Jan 22, down 1084 points or 28.3%, the outcome may not be a strong rally.
It could even be another downleg to test 2850 and 2750. And no one can be sure that these precarious support areas can hold as the major support actually lies closer to 2600 or even 2500 if the STI goes for a complete 50% retracement of its 5-year bull run from 1170 in early 2003 to 3831.
History shows that once previous super bull markets in 1987, 1993 and 1999 ended, the index would definitely fall back to the earlier peaks and at times plunged even deeper like in 1997-98 when the Asian crisis bottomed out at 800 on the old index from high of 2163 in 1996.
Similarly the 2000 dot.com crash left the old STI more than halved from 2583 in Jan 2000 to 1205 by March 2003, even below the 1987 peak of 1288, prior to the infamous Oct 19 Black Monday on Wall Street. (NB there is a 1 to 3 percentage point difference between old and new STI).
While we do not expect the current bear phase to wipe out all the gains from the 2003-07 longest bull market in history, it cannot be denied that the STI has lost nearly 1100 points from its peak and another 150-250 point loss from 2750 to a strong bottom at 2500-2600 is not like the end of the world.
In fact traders and investors would prefer a selling climax with the STI testing these support levels quickly as for sure an equally strong rebound will take place instead of a sideways boring market with narrowing trading ranges.
But again history is not on the side of a quick bottom except for the Oct 1987 crash when the old STI bottomed out at end of year and steadily moved up. However its then 1288 peak was only briefly tested in 1990 and it was not until early 1993 that a new peak was recorded, more than 5 years later.
Similarly the Jan 1994 peak of 2138 was only briefly overcome 2 years later and no breakout to new highs was seen until mid-1999, also a time gap of over 5 years.
The Jan 2000 peak of 2583 or 2608 on the new STI was finally overcome in May 2006, again a 5 ½ year distance. So does this mean that the current 3831 peak could only be seen again only after 5 ½ years ie in 2013?
However if there is a repeat of the 1994-96 market when the STI tested the highs of 2140-60 in 2 years before the Asian crisis, we could see the 3800 level tested again at end 2009.
Most current year-end targets of the STI continue to be in the upper ranges between 3500-4000. In view of the steep consecutive plunges in January with end-2007 STI of 3466 it would be a great feat if we can see this level again by end-2008.
We have seen strong resistances at 3100 and 3200 and it will take time to get back to 3300-3400. Last year’s 2915 low and the recent lowest closings of 2866 and 2868 have become the ballpark area for support but until these 2750-2850 levels are tested again, the index is unlikely to break 3100 decisively.
A quick test of 2850 and 2750 should produce a good technical rebound to 3050-3100 but it is uncertain this will take place in March as the market seems to be aiming for a consolidation around 2900-3000.
Thursday, March 6, 2008
Built to Make Billions? Emotional IQ just as important as brainpower for Buffett
To the legions of wannabes hoping to replicate, or at least aspire to, Warren Buffett's success as the world's greatest stock market investor, it's a depressing thought, indeed.
What if the Oracle of Omaha's brain is simply a freak of nature—a wondrous but ultimately inimitable web of neurons that somehow allows him to deduce profits like no one else? What if Buffett's $52 billion fortune is all thanks to a rarefied double helix strung with the genes of the resolute Scandinavian forebears on his dad's side and the brainy Estonians and arithmetically inclined Iberians on his mom's?
Consider Buffett's typical day at the offices of Berkshire Hathaway, the company he has run for the past 42 years, and you might throw in the towel right now. The spry 76-year-old arrives on the early side—usually about 8:30 a.m.—not to prepare for meetings (he rarely takes them) or check his E-mail (he has no work computer) or even to tally his stock portfolio (there's no Bloomberg terminal or even a calculator on his desk). He doesn't read progress reports from his managers (he discourages them) or study the latest research from the top stock market analysts (he shuns them completely). He doesn't even talk on the phone much, save for the occasional call to his stockbroker, when he might give the nod to buy tens of millions of a company's shares in a single day—all without pumping its CEO for information or getting approval from Berkshire's directors or from anyone else except, maybe, a few words from his longtime confidant and Berkshire vice chairman, Charles Munger.
More than luck. Despite—or, quite possibly, thanks to—the dearth of input, Buffett's results are as impressive as they are his alone. His stock picks beat the Standard & Poor's 500 index in 20 out of 24 years, according to one recent study, and by a margin so wide that its authors conclude that even the rarest of lucky streaks can't explain how $1,000 invested with Buffett in 1956 was worth $27.6 million at the end of 2006.
So what can? To be sure, Buffett possesses one of the keenest intellects in business, with a knack for crunching numbers in his head. "His neurons are really good at thinking in a purely abstract, rational way," says law professor Lawrence Cunningham, author of How to Think Like Benjamin Graham and Invest Like Warren Buffett. "It's a way of thinking in terms of calculations, of instantly recognizing if a company generates profits at a given cost over time. It's something businessmen learn to do before making a capital allocation. But for him, it's an innate apparatus."
Cunningham and other Buffettologists nonetheless doubt that the superinvestor possesses some sort of superhuman intelligence. "If you think he's got different chemicals flowing around in his cranium, you've got it all wrong," says journalist Roger Lowenstein, author of Buffett: The Making of an American Capitalist, in which he makes the case that it's Buffett's strength of character, as much as his smarts, that has made him so successful. "It's a combination of hard work and good judgment, and having the disposition to go with your call whether it's popular or not."
For his part, Buffett has repeatedly discounted the importance of a big brain. "Investing is not a game where the guy with the 160 IQ beats the guy with a 130 IQ," he says. "Once you have ordinary intelligence, what you need is the temperament to control the urges that get other people into trouble in investing."
Indeed, Buffett picks stocks not according to some inscrutable, savantlike intuition or some secret set of complex equations. ("Don't do equations with Greek letters in them," he jokingly warns of Wall Street-style derivatives.) Instead, he uses basic arithmetic to help analyze some 300 file-cabinet drawers full of annual reports, 10-Ks, and other readily available company financial documents. Fluent in accounting, Buffett pores over financials in search of the mostly obvious: a track record of high returns on equity capital, low debt, and a consistent, predictable business with sustainable advantages—like Coca Cola's soft-drink franchise.
Staying focused. But it's not just financial intelligence at play here. Buffett has plenty of behavioral intelligence as well, most notably a Zen-like patience to sit on the sidelines while other investors are greedily buying and then to pounce on bargains only after the rest have lost their heads and sold. Indeed, a group of academics called "behavioral economists" points to Buffett as the ultimate example of how a properly trained mind can overcome the sorts of emotions and flawed reasoning that can derail even the brainiest investors. "They buy a stock just because everyone else is but think they can get out before everyone else does, or they get stuck on a price in their head and refuse to budge," says Whitney Tilson, a longtime Buffett disciple and fund manager, of misjudgments like the classic "anchoring" mistake Buffett himself made when he first invested in Wal-Mart stock in the 1980s.
"I set out to buy up 100 million shares, pre-split, at $23," Buffett has said of his strategy. "We bought a little, and it moved up a bit [to $23 1/8], and I thought it might come back [down] a bit." But it never did. And because of what he calls his "thumb-sucking" reluctance to pay even a little more, he figures he lost out on $10 billion in profits.
So how does Buffett avoid repeating such mistakes? First and foremost, says Tilson, "he has the enormous humility to admit when he's wrong, and learn from it, and the enormous self-confidence to recognize that the crowd is almost always right. So you have to wait for the few times that the crowd isn't right to make your move."
And where does all that leave the rest of us? Well, perhaps not as bad off as one might think. For starters, Buffett's straightforward methods for evaluating companies are easy enough to ape—if not in one's head, then with the help of a computer. "You just press a button," mathematics professor John Price explains of software he designed to mimic Buffett's criteria for sizing up companies, such as a high return on equity, low levels of debt, and a strong probability of earning at least 10 percent pretax returns. Price readily admits that there are some things his program can't do, like sizing up company management or persuading a gun-shy investor to pull the trigger the day after the market crashes. "But it gives you an extra degree of confidence," he says, "to keep you on the path and stop yourself from getting drawn into the behavioral stuff."
Of course, those who don't trust themselves can still harness Buffett's brainpower by plunking down a mere $110,000 a share for Berkshire Hathaway Class A stock, a bet that value investors like Tilson believe is a sure thing. Using the same standards the master uses to pick stocks, he estimates that Berkshire shares are currently about 30 percent undervalued. "And that isn't even including what Warren Buffett adds to the business," Tilson says. "So having him there is just gravy."
Sounds like a no-brainer.
What if the Oracle of Omaha's brain is simply a freak of nature—a wondrous but ultimately inimitable web of neurons that somehow allows him to deduce profits like no one else? What if Buffett's $52 billion fortune is all thanks to a rarefied double helix strung with the genes of the resolute Scandinavian forebears on his dad's side and the brainy Estonians and arithmetically inclined Iberians on his mom's?
Consider Buffett's typical day at the offices of Berkshire Hathaway, the company he has run for the past 42 years, and you might throw in the towel right now. The spry 76-year-old arrives on the early side—usually about 8:30 a.m.—not to prepare for meetings (he rarely takes them) or check his E-mail (he has no work computer) or even to tally his stock portfolio (there's no Bloomberg terminal or even a calculator on his desk). He doesn't read progress reports from his managers (he discourages them) or study the latest research from the top stock market analysts (he shuns them completely). He doesn't even talk on the phone much, save for the occasional call to his stockbroker, when he might give the nod to buy tens of millions of a company's shares in a single day—all without pumping its CEO for information or getting approval from Berkshire's directors or from anyone else except, maybe, a few words from his longtime confidant and Berkshire vice chairman, Charles Munger.
More than luck. Despite—or, quite possibly, thanks to—the dearth of input, Buffett's results are as impressive as they are his alone. His stock picks beat the Standard & Poor's 500 index in 20 out of 24 years, according to one recent study, and by a margin so wide that its authors conclude that even the rarest of lucky streaks can't explain how $1,000 invested with Buffett in 1956 was worth $27.6 million at the end of 2006.
So what can? To be sure, Buffett possesses one of the keenest intellects in business, with a knack for crunching numbers in his head. "His neurons are really good at thinking in a purely abstract, rational way," says law professor Lawrence Cunningham, author of How to Think Like Benjamin Graham and Invest Like Warren Buffett. "It's a way of thinking in terms of calculations, of instantly recognizing if a company generates profits at a given cost over time. It's something businessmen learn to do before making a capital allocation. But for him, it's an innate apparatus."
Cunningham and other Buffettologists nonetheless doubt that the superinvestor possesses some sort of superhuman intelligence. "If you think he's got different chemicals flowing around in his cranium, you've got it all wrong," says journalist Roger Lowenstein, author of Buffett: The Making of an American Capitalist, in which he makes the case that it's Buffett's strength of character, as much as his smarts, that has made him so successful. "It's a combination of hard work and good judgment, and having the disposition to go with your call whether it's popular or not."
For his part, Buffett has repeatedly discounted the importance of a big brain. "Investing is not a game where the guy with the 160 IQ beats the guy with a 130 IQ," he says. "Once you have ordinary intelligence, what you need is the temperament to control the urges that get other people into trouble in investing."
Indeed, Buffett picks stocks not according to some inscrutable, savantlike intuition or some secret set of complex equations. ("Don't do equations with Greek letters in them," he jokingly warns of Wall Street-style derivatives.) Instead, he uses basic arithmetic to help analyze some 300 file-cabinet drawers full of annual reports, 10-Ks, and other readily available company financial documents. Fluent in accounting, Buffett pores over financials in search of the mostly obvious: a track record of high returns on equity capital, low debt, and a consistent, predictable business with sustainable advantages—like Coca Cola's soft-drink franchise.
Staying focused. But it's not just financial intelligence at play here. Buffett has plenty of behavioral intelligence as well, most notably a Zen-like patience to sit on the sidelines while other investors are greedily buying and then to pounce on bargains only after the rest have lost their heads and sold. Indeed, a group of academics called "behavioral economists" points to Buffett as the ultimate example of how a properly trained mind can overcome the sorts of emotions and flawed reasoning that can derail even the brainiest investors. "They buy a stock just because everyone else is but think they can get out before everyone else does, or they get stuck on a price in their head and refuse to budge," says Whitney Tilson, a longtime Buffett disciple and fund manager, of misjudgments like the classic "anchoring" mistake Buffett himself made when he first invested in Wal-Mart stock in the 1980s.
"I set out to buy up 100 million shares, pre-split, at $23," Buffett has said of his strategy. "We bought a little, and it moved up a bit [to $23 1/8], and I thought it might come back [down] a bit." But it never did. And because of what he calls his "thumb-sucking" reluctance to pay even a little more, he figures he lost out on $10 billion in profits.
So how does Buffett avoid repeating such mistakes? First and foremost, says Tilson, "he has the enormous humility to admit when he's wrong, and learn from it, and the enormous self-confidence to recognize that the crowd is almost always right. So you have to wait for the few times that the crowd isn't right to make your move."
And where does all that leave the rest of us? Well, perhaps not as bad off as one might think. For starters, Buffett's straightforward methods for evaluating companies are easy enough to ape—if not in one's head, then with the help of a computer. "You just press a button," mathematics professor John Price explains of software he designed to mimic Buffett's criteria for sizing up companies, such as a high return on equity, low levels of debt, and a strong probability of earning at least 10 percent pretax returns. Price readily admits that there are some things his program can't do, like sizing up company management or persuading a gun-shy investor to pull the trigger the day after the market crashes. "But it gives you an extra degree of confidence," he says, "to keep you on the path and stop yourself from getting drawn into the behavioral stuff."
Of course, those who don't trust themselves can still harness Buffett's brainpower by plunking down a mere $110,000 a share for Berkshire Hathaway Class A stock, a bet that value investors like Tilson believe is a sure thing. Using the same standards the master uses to pick stocks, he estimates that Berkshire shares are currently about 30 percent undervalued. "And that isn't even including what Warren Buffett adds to the business," Tilson says. "So having him there is just gravy."
Sounds like a no-brainer.
Six Keys to Investing Buffett Style
The Warren Buffett the world has come to know is a plain-spoken, avuncular figure who seems more at home at a Dairy Queen in his hometown of Omaha than in a boardroom in midtown Manhattan. Think popcorn's Orville Redenbacher, not Wall Street's Gordon Gekko.
And that same homespun charm extends to his investing persona. Indeed, the mystique of Buffett is that this small-town stock picker managed to become America's second-wealthiest man largely by keeping things simple and sticking to his knitting. In Buffett-speak, he stayed within his "circle of competence." For instance, in the late 1990s, Buffett avoided the technology sector altogether, saying, "It's beyond me." But the man who downs five Cherry Cokes a day seems at ease investing in Coca-Cola (Buffett's Berkshire Hathaway owns $9.7 billion in Coke stock).
Yet in reality, Buffett's approach to picking stocks—and businesses to buy outright—has always been far more complicated than Buffett's public image as a "buy 'em at a big discount" value investor lets on. That's because Buffett has never been afraid to deviate from the classic definition of value investing.
As a graduate student at Columbia University in the early 1950s, Buffett learned value investing at the feet of Benjamin Graham, whose 1934 Security Analysis (written with David Dodd) is a value-investing bible. Like Graham, Buffett believes the best way to build a portfolio is to look for stocks trading at discounts to their true worth. Simple enough. But Buffett has made "some adjustments to the teachings of Ben Graham," says Jean-Marie Eveillard, a famed value investor who heads the portfolio management team at First Eagle Funds in New York. Eveillard adds that "there are a few Buffett pronouncements where Ben must be turning over in his grave."
Graham, for instance, never cared much about the quality of the stocks he invested in as long as they were trading at a deep discount to their "intrinsic" value (based on a company's assets and other considerations, as opposed to a stock's market value). Graham described himself as a "cigar butt" investor—willing to buy stocks that Wall Street tossed aside if they had a puff or two of value left in them.
For his part, Buffett is much more concerned about the quality of the companies he searches for in Wall Street's bargain-basement bin, which may explain his reported recent investment in Kraft Foods. "Buffett has said that he would rather own comfortable businesses at a questionable price rather than questionable businesses at a comfortable price," Eveillard says. Or as Buffett has put it: "It's far better to own a significant portion of the Hope diamond than 100 percent of a rhinestone."
Many of today's value managers have come around to Buffett's thinking. "Graham and Dodd wrote the bible of value investing, but there've been other people since who've interpreted that bible," says David Winters, founder of Wintergreen Advisers in Mountain Lakes, N.J. "And Buffett's interpretation has been globally the most influential."
What other attributes define the Buffett school of value investing—and might make you a better stock picker? Here are a half dozen that any do-it-yourselfer will find valuable:
Make money by not losing money.
It's an oft-quoted Buffettism: "The first rule of investing is don't lose money; the second rule is don't forget Rule No. 1." Buffett's greatest achievement may be that between 1965 and 2006, through three bear markets, Berkshire Hathaway lost value in only one calendar year, 2001. Even then, it still bested the Standard & Poor's 500 index.
Buffett understood this math foible: If you start with a dollar and lose 50 percent of your money, you'll be left with 50 cents. But then it takes a 100 percent return just to get back to your original dollar. So it's best not to fall into a hole.
Don't get fooled by earnings.
Buffett has noted that "most companies define 'record' earnings as a new high in earnings per share." But he says the fact that earnings per share are rising in itself tells you little, because it does not take into account how much shareholders have invested. The more that shareholders invest in a company, the greater its earnings should be.
That's why Buffett favors a different measure of profitability—return on equity. ROE is calculated by taking a company's net income and dividing it by shareholders' equity. Since ROE measures profits as a percentage of what investors actually own, it reveals how efficiently a company's profits are growing.
It's unclear if Buffett demands a minimum ROE among his stocks, but some of his value-investing disciples look for companies with a return on equity of at least 15 percent. Within Buffett's basket of publicly traded stocks, his top holding, Coca-Cola, sports an ROE of greater than 30 percent, Anheuser-Busch tops 51 percent, and American Express 37 percent.
Look to the future.
They don't call Buffett the Oracle of Omaha for nothing. While Graham was always reluctant to predict the health of a business, Buffett makes a conscious attempt to identify companies with a good chance of continuing their success 25 years into the future. "Buffett talks a lot about looking through the front window and not through the rearview mirror," says John Rogers, chairman of Ariel Capital Management in Chicago.
Buffett peers into the future partly by attempting to calculate the current value of a company's expected future cash flows. It's his way of assessing a company's intrinsic value. Then Buffett looks for companies selling at a deep discount to that value. Often, Wall Street—or "Mr. Market," as Buffett says, echoing Graham—realizes its error only after Buffett steps in. For example, Burlington Northern and Union Pacific, two plodding railroad stocks that Buffett recently disclosed owning, saw their shares shoot up more than 18 percent and 34 percent, respectively, so far this year.
But he also has admitted that "anyone calculating intrinsic value necessarily comes up with a highly subjective figure that will change both as estimates of future cash flows are revised and as interest rates move." Some investors use Buffett-inspired Web calculators to try to emulate the Oracle, including Stick with companies with wide "moats." Since it's risky to predict the future, Buffett always talks about favoring companies with wide "economic moats." This doesn't necessarily mean that a company has to have a lock on a product or a market. Coca-Cola, for instance, certainly has competition. But Buffett always looks for companies with long-term competitive advantages that make forecasting safer.
A big reason that Buffett avoided technology stocks in the late 1990s was that he could not identify any firms with a wide enough moat. So when Buffett said the tech sector was "beyond me," he wasn't claiming ignorance. What he really meant was that technological advances in this sector were coming so rapidly that it was impossible to gauge with any clarity which companies and platforms would have a competitive advantage 18 months down the road. This would explain why even blue-chip companies like the networking giant Cisco Systems or the microchip manufacturer Intel never made it into Berkshire Hathaway's portfolio even after their shares took a big hit in the 2000 bear market.
When you bet, bet big.
Most value investors are conservative by nature. The average manager of a value stock fund spreads his or her bets among 146 different stocks, according to fund tracker Morningstar. Not Buffett. The $62 billion that he has invested in publicly traded stocks is concentrated in only about 45 names.
His strategy is even more aggressive than this statistic would suggest. His top 10 stock picks account for a stunning 90 percent of his publicly traded portfolio. "This concentration is consistent with what Mr. Buffett has said in the past: 'Don't swing a lot, but if you do swing, swing for the fences,'" says Justin Fuller, a Morningstar senior equity analyst. Or, asks Bruce Berkowitz, comanager of the Buffett-loving Fairholme Fund in Short Hills, N.J.: "Why in the world would you want to invest in your 30th-best idea, as opposed to your best idea?"
Of course, this type of thinking takes moxie. You have to be totally confident that your best ideas will outperform the field. In the right hands, though, this risky approach can work: A quick analysis by U.S. News using data from Morningstar shows that value-oriented stock funds with fewer than 50 stocks have outperformed the average value portfolio with more than 50 holdings over the past one-, three-, five-, 10-, and 15-year periods.
Don't be afraid to wait.
If you take big swings in the stock market, as Buffett does, there's a big risk of striking out. Buffett's rule: Don't swing that often. And don't swing at bad pitches.
Buffett has quoted legendary Red Sox slugger Ted Williams: "To be a good hitter, you've got to get a good ball to hit." And until Buffett gets such an investing pitch, he's more than willing to hold cash. "He's understood something that people don't appreciate: Having large amounts of cash doesn't have to hurt your performance," Berkowitz says. "Cash can be a strategic asset." Cash currently represents more than 18 percent of Berkshire Hathaway's investment allocation, according to Morningstar, versus just 4 percent for the typical value stock fund.
This doesn't mean that Buffett doesn't want to maximize his gains at all times. Like Gordon Gekko, he believes "greed is good." But like the quintessential value investor he is, Buffett believes that you have to be patient when exercising that greed. As he has often said, "Be greedy when others are fearful and fearful when others are greedy."
And that same homespun charm extends to his investing persona. Indeed, the mystique of Buffett is that this small-town stock picker managed to become America's second-wealthiest man largely by keeping things simple and sticking to his knitting. In Buffett-speak, he stayed within his "circle of competence." For instance, in the late 1990s, Buffett avoided the technology sector altogether, saying, "It's beyond me." But the man who downs five Cherry Cokes a day seems at ease investing in Coca-Cola (Buffett's Berkshire Hathaway owns $9.7 billion in Coke stock).
Yet in reality, Buffett's approach to picking stocks—and businesses to buy outright—has always been far more complicated than Buffett's public image as a "buy 'em at a big discount" value investor lets on. That's because Buffett has never been afraid to deviate from the classic definition of value investing.
As a graduate student at Columbia University in the early 1950s, Buffett learned value investing at the feet of Benjamin Graham, whose 1934 Security Analysis (written with David Dodd) is a value-investing bible. Like Graham, Buffett believes the best way to build a portfolio is to look for stocks trading at discounts to their true worth. Simple enough. But Buffett has made "some adjustments to the teachings of Ben Graham," says Jean-Marie Eveillard, a famed value investor who heads the portfolio management team at First Eagle Funds in New York. Eveillard adds that "there are a few Buffett pronouncements where Ben must be turning over in his grave."
Graham, for instance, never cared much about the quality of the stocks he invested in as long as they were trading at a deep discount to their "intrinsic" value (based on a company's assets and other considerations, as opposed to a stock's market value). Graham described himself as a "cigar butt" investor—willing to buy stocks that Wall Street tossed aside if they had a puff or two of value left in them.
For his part, Buffett is much more concerned about the quality of the companies he searches for in Wall Street's bargain-basement bin, which may explain his reported recent investment in Kraft Foods. "Buffett has said that he would rather own comfortable businesses at a questionable price rather than questionable businesses at a comfortable price," Eveillard says. Or as Buffett has put it: "It's far better to own a significant portion of the Hope diamond than 100 percent of a rhinestone."
Many of today's value managers have come around to Buffett's thinking. "Graham and Dodd wrote the bible of value investing, but there've been other people since who've interpreted that bible," says David Winters, founder of Wintergreen Advisers in Mountain Lakes, N.J. "And Buffett's interpretation has been globally the most influential."
What other attributes define the Buffett school of value investing—and might make you a better stock picker? Here are a half dozen that any do-it-yourselfer will find valuable:
Make money by not losing money.
It's an oft-quoted Buffettism: "The first rule of investing is don't lose money; the second rule is don't forget Rule No. 1." Buffett's greatest achievement may be that between 1965 and 2006, through three bear markets, Berkshire Hathaway lost value in only one calendar year, 2001. Even then, it still bested the Standard & Poor's 500 index.
Buffett understood this math foible: If you start with a dollar and lose 50 percent of your money, you'll be left with 50 cents. But then it takes a 100 percent return just to get back to your original dollar. So it's best not to fall into a hole.
Don't get fooled by earnings.
Buffett has noted that "most companies define 'record' earnings as a new high in earnings per share." But he says the fact that earnings per share are rising in itself tells you little, because it does not take into account how much shareholders have invested. The more that shareholders invest in a company, the greater its earnings should be.
That's why Buffett favors a different measure of profitability—return on equity. ROE is calculated by taking a company's net income and dividing it by shareholders' equity. Since ROE measures profits as a percentage of what investors actually own, it reveals how efficiently a company's profits are growing.
It's unclear if Buffett demands a minimum ROE among his stocks, but some of his value-investing disciples look for companies with a return on equity of at least 15 percent. Within Buffett's basket of publicly traded stocks, his top holding, Coca-Cola, sports an ROE of greater than 30 percent, Anheuser-Busch tops 51 percent, and American Express 37 percent.
Look to the future.
They don't call Buffett the Oracle of Omaha for nothing. While Graham was always reluctant to predict the health of a business, Buffett makes a conscious attempt to identify companies with a good chance of continuing their success 25 years into the future. "Buffett talks a lot about looking through the front window and not through the rearview mirror," says John Rogers, chairman of Ariel Capital Management in Chicago.
Buffett peers into the future partly by attempting to calculate the current value of a company's expected future cash flows. It's his way of assessing a company's intrinsic value. Then Buffett looks for companies selling at a deep discount to that value. Often, Wall Street—or "Mr. Market," as Buffett says, echoing Graham—realizes its error only after Buffett steps in. For example, Burlington Northern and Union Pacific, two plodding railroad stocks that Buffett recently disclosed owning, saw their shares shoot up more than 18 percent and 34 percent, respectively, so far this year.
But he also has admitted that "anyone calculating intrinsic value necessarily comes up with a highly subjective figure that will change both as estimates of future cash flows are revised and as interest rates move." Some investors use Buffett-inspired Web calculators to try to emulate the Oracle, including Stick with companies with wide "moats." Since it's risky to predict the future, Buffett always talks about favoring companies with wide "economic moats." This doesn't necessarily mean that a company has to have a lock on a product or a market. Coca-Cola, for instance, certainly has competition. But Buffett always looks for companies with long-term competitive advantages that make forecasting safer.
A big reason that Buffett avoided technology stocks in the late 1990s was that he could not identify any firms with a wide enough moat. So when Buffett said the tech sector was "beyond me," he wasn't claiming ignorance. What he really meant was that technological advances in this sector were coming so rapidly that it was impossible to gauge with any clarity which companies and platforms would have a competitive advantage 18 months down the road. This would explain why even blue-chip companies like the networking giant Cisco Systems or the microchip manufacturer Intel never made it into Berkshire Hathaway's portfolio even after their shares took a big hit in the 2000 bear market.
When you bet, bet big.
Most value investors are conservative by nature. The average manager of a value stock fund spreads his or her bets among 146 different stocks, according to fund tracker Morningstar. Not Buffett. The $62 billion that he has invested in publicly traded stocks is concentrated in only about 45 names.
His strategy is even more aggressive than this statistic would suggest. His top 10 stock picks account for a stunning 90 percent of his publicly traded portfolio. "This concentration is consistent with what Mr. Buffett has said in the past: 'Don't swing a lot, but if you do swing, swing for the fences,'" says Justin Fuller, a Morningstar senior equity analyst. Or, asks Bruce Berkowitz, comanager of the Buffett-loving Fairholme Fund in Short Hills, N.J.: "Why in the world would you want to invest in your 30th-best idea, as opposed to your best idea?"
Of course, this type of thinking takes moxie. You have to be totally confident that your best ideas will outperform the field. In the right hands, though, this risky approach can work: A quick analysis by U.S. News using data from Morningstar shows that value-oriented stock funds with fewer than 50 stocks have outperformed the average value portfolio with more than 50 holdings over the past one-, three-, five-, 10-, and 15-year periods.
Don't be afraid to wait.
If you take big swings in the stock market, as Buffett does, there's a big risk of striking out. Buffett's rule: Don't swing that often. And don't swing at bad pitches.
Buffett has quoted legendary Red Sox slugger Ted Williams: "To be a good hitter, you've got to get a good ball to hit." And until Buffett gets such an investing pitch, he's more than willing to hold cash. "He's understood something that people don't appreciate: Having large amounts of cash doesn't have to hurt your performance," Berkowitz says. "Cash can be a strategic asset." Cash currently represents more than 18 percent of Berkshire Hathaway's investment allocation, according to Morningstar, versus just 4 percent for the typical value stock fund.
This doesn't mean that Buffett doesn't want to maximize his gains at all times. Like Gordon Gekko, he believes "greed is good." But like the quintessential value investor he is, Buffett believes that you have to be patient when exercising that greed. As he has often said, "Be greedy when others are fearful and fearful when others are greedy."
How to Make Money The Buffett Way
What if the bottom was falling out of the stock market, and your portfolio had plunged by 10 percent in a week?
And what if one stock, in particular, had seemed like a sure bet when you bought it last month. The company sells something everyone needs, is well managed, and has a consistent track record of growth—that is, until it missed Wall Street earnings expectations by a penny and got pounded down by 15 percent in a single day.
Would you:
a) Sell it and curse yourself for buying it in the first place?
b) Sit tight and do nothing until you recover your loss, then sell?
c) Smile and buy more, sure that everyone else is dead wrong?
d) Study and reconfirm your assessment of the company, then smile and buy more?
If you answered "d," you may have a future at Berkshire Hathaway, the financial juggernaut whose 76-year-old chief executive and godhead, Warren Buffett, is searching for a successor. That's because, in addition to the requisite financial smarts, you'll need the sort of temperament to do what the "Oracle of Omaha" has long done best: take advantage of the market's temporary insanity to stock up on sure things at bargain prices.
It's a strategy that has not only helped Buffett become the second-richest man in America, with a net worth of $52 billion, but has also made him the most watched—and copied—investor on Wall Street. Politicians from Arnold Schwarzenegger to Hillary Clinton seek to hobnob with him. And no wonder. Whether through Berkshire's spiraling stock price, mutual funds that mimic his strategy, or investors aping his stock picks, Buffett has probably made more money for more stock market investors than anyone else in history. Each year thousands of those winners and devotees make the pilgrimage to Berkshire Hathaway's shareholder meeting in Omaha, turning the event into a celebration of the man and his financial mastery.
Of course, if you're not one of those people (or you answered "a," "b," or "c" to the above question), fear not. In the following pages, we tell you what it takes to invest like Buffett, whose strategy goes far beyond the simplistic "buy and hold" approach for which he is famous. For example, although he has described derivatives as "financial weapons of mass destruction" and has bashed hedge funds, Buffett has invested in both over the short term and has made hundreds of millions of dollars in the process.
And while he is perhaps the world's leading expert on managing risk—a talent honed through his investments in insurance companies—he scoffs at the idea of spreading around your bets. "Diversification is a protection against ignorance," Buffett says of index funds that hold hundreds of stocks—a sharp contrast with Berkshire's portfolio, in which the top 10 stocks account for more than 90 percent of its assets. "It makes very little sense if you know what you're doing."
You'll better know "what you're doing" after digesting the following pages, in which we plumb not only Buffett's investing style but also those of fund managers who have learned to tweak it to their own—and their shareholders'—advantage. This investing guide marks half a century of Buffett investing and records the ideas of a man whose acumen seems undiminished. Yet even though Buffett says he's in excellent health ("It's amazing what Cherry Coke and hamburgers will do for a fellow," he jokes), Buffett of course admits that he isn't getting any younger. And with no obvious heir apparent in place as Berkshire's next investor-in-chief, it's clear that even longtime Berkshire stockholders will eventually need to start thinking for themselves.
Which, after all, is what made their beloved leader so successful in the first place. And learning to think the Buffett way might even help you land a new job.
And what if one stock, in particular, had seemed like a sure bet when you bought it last month. The company sells something everyone needs, is well managed, and has a consistent track record of growth—that is, until it missed Wall Street earnings expectations by a penny and got pounded down by 15 percent in a single day.
Would you:
a) Sell it and curse yourself for buying it in the first place?
b) Sit tight and do nothing until you recover your loss, then sell?
c) Smile and buy more, sure that everyone else is dead wrong?
d) Study and reconfirm your assessment of the company, then smile and buy more?
If you answered "d," you may have a future at Berkshire Hathaway, the financial juggernaut whose 76-year-old chief executive and godhead, Warren Buffett, is searching for a successor. That's because, in addition to the requisite financial smarts, you'll need the sort of temperament to do what the "Oracle of Omaha" has long done best: take advantage of the market's temporary insanity to stock up on sure things at bargain prices.
It's a strategy that has not only helped Buffett become the second-richest man in America, with a net worth of $52 billion, but has also made him the most watched—and copied—investor on Wall Street. Politicians from Arnold Schwarzenegger to Hillary Clinton seek to hobnob with him. And no wonder. Whether through Berkshire's spiraling stock price, mutual funds that mimic his strategy, or investors aping his stock picks, Buffett has probably made more money for more stock market investors than anyone else in history. Each year thousands of those winners and devotees make the pilgrimage to Berkshire Hathaway's shareholder meeting in Omaha, turning the event into a celebration of the man and his financial mastery.
Of course, if you're not one of those people (or you answered "a," "b," or "c" to the above question), fear not. In the following pages, we tell you what it takes to invest like Buffett, whose strategy goes far beyond the simplistic "buy and hold" approach for which he is famous. For example, although he has described derivatives as "financial weapons of mass destruction" and has bashed hedge funds, Buffett has invested in both over the short term and has made hundreds of millions of dollars in the process.
And while he is perhaps the world's leading expert on managing risk—a talent honed through his investments in insurance companies—he scoffs at the idea of spreading around your bets. "Diversification is a protection against ignorance," Buffett says of index funds that hold hundreds of stocks—a sharp contrast with Berkshire's portfolio, in which the top 10 stocks account for more than 90 percent of its assets. "It makes very little sense if you know what you're doing."
You'll better know "what you're doing" after digesting the following pages, in which we plumb not only Buffett's investing style but also those of fund managers who have learned to tweak it to their own—and their shareholders'—advantage. This investing guide marks half a century of Buffett investing and records the ideas of a man whose acumen seems undiminished. Yet even though Buffett says he's in excellent health ("It's amazing what Cherry Coke and hamburgers will do for a fellow," he jokes), Buffett of course admits that he isn't getting any younger. And with no obvious heir apparent in place as Berkshire's next investor-in-chief, it's clear that even longtime Berkshire stockholders will eventually need to start thinking for themselves.
Which, after all, is what made their beloved leader so successful in the first place. And learning to think the Buffett way might even help you land a new job.
金 融 教 授 點 揀 股 ？
周 日 無 事 ， 在 書 房 中 漫 無 目 的 地 翻 看 財 經 書 籍 及 研 究 報 告 ， 剛 巧 閱 讀 一 篇 頗 為 有 趣 的 研 究 報 告 ， 頗 值 得 與 大 家 一 談 。
該 研 究 報 告 是 向 美 國 642 名 大 學 金 融 系 授 所 作 的 調 查 ， 試 圖 研 究 這 些 金 融 系 授 的 投 資 策 略 ， 尤 其 是 當 他 們 揀 選 股 份 時 ， 會 採 用 那 一 種 投 資 方 法 及 指 標 。
這 批 金 融 系 授 ， 經 常 在 大 學 中 講 述 很 多 複 雜 而 深 奧 的 投 資 公 式 ， 導 學 生 如 何 對 、 套 戥 、 分 散 投 資 ， 以 及 如 何 運 用 大 量 衍 生 工 具 來 減 低 風 險 及 增 加 回 報 ， 有 些 更 講 述 如 何 以 「 火 箭 」 升 空 方 法 的 計 算 模 式 運 用 於 衍 生 工 具 及 股 市 投 資 上 （ 註 ： 早 前 某 外 資 銀 行 確 實 聘 請 了 數 名 美 國 的 火 箭 工 程 博 士 ， 試 圖 以 預 測 火 箭 升 空 後 在 太 空 運 行 之 軌 來 預 測 股 市 方 向 ） 。
回 說 上 述 研 究 調 查 ， 結 果 頗 令 人 意 外 ， 雖 然 這 些 授 對 很 多 複 雜 而 深 奧 的 投 資 策 略 極 之 熟 悉 ， 可 是 當 他 們 處 理 自 己 的 投 資 時 ， 卻 極 之 保 守 ， 他 們 大 多 只 投 資 一 些 「 大 路 」 及 簡 單 的 股 票 基 金 ， 例 如 環 球 股 票 基 金 、 美 國 股 票 基 金 、 歐 洲 股 票 基 金 等 簡 單 而 容 易 明 白 及 具 分 散 風 險 作 用 的 基 金 。
分 析 方 法 棄 繁 取 簡
調 查 又 發 現 ， 基 金 管 理 年 費 及 其 他 經 常 性 的 成 本 費 用 （ 不 包 括 首 次 認 購 費 ） 等 ， 是 他 們 最 為 關 注 的 項 目 。 至 於 其 他 類 別 的 基 金 ， 例 如 能 源 、 金 磚 四 國 、 對 基 金 等 則 不 太 受 他 們 歡 迎 ， 並 沒 有 投 資 。
期 指 、 期 權 、 期 貨 及 備 兌 認 股 證 等 衍 生 工 具 ， 雖 然 是 這 些 授 經 常 授 的 項 目 ， 可 是 他 們 卻 絕 少 沾 手 這 些 工 具 。 此 外 ， 當 被 問 到 在 揀 選 股 份 時 ， 他 們 會 採 用 Discounted Cash Flow 、 CAPM 、 Arbitrage Pricing Theory 或 Fama and French 那 一 種 投 資 模 式 時 ， 他 們 竟 然 回 答 最 常 採 用 極 之 簡 單 的 PE 、 股 息 率 、 股 價 過 去 6 個 月 、 一 年 回 報 ， 以 及 現 時 股 價 相 對 過 去 一 年 高 位 等 ， 都 是 一 些 頗 為 一 般 而 平 凡 的 指 標 ， 這 與 他 們 在 課 堂 中 授 之 深 奧 投 資 理 論 大 為 不 同 。
該 研 究 報 告 是 向 美 國 642 名 大 學 金 融 系 授 所 作 的 調 查 ， 試 圖 研 究 這 些 金 融 系 授 的 投 資 策 略 ， 尤 其 是 當 他 們 揀 選 股 份 時 ， 會 採 用 那 一 種 投 資 方 法 及 指 標 。
這 批 金 融 系 授 ， 經 常 在 大 學 中 講 述 很 多 複 雜 而 深 奧 的 投 資 公 式 ， 導 學 生 如 何 對 、 套 戥 、 分 散 投 資 ， 以 及 如 何 運 用 大 量 衍 生 工 具 來 減 低 風 險 及 增 加 回 報 ， 有 些 更 講 述 如 何 以 「 火 箭 」 升 空 方 法 的 計 算 模 式 運 用 於 衍 生 工 具 及 股 市 投 資 上 （ 註 ： 早 前 某 外 資 銀 行 確 實 聘 請 了 數 名 美 國 的 火 箭 工 程 博 士 ， 試 圖 以 預 測 火 箭 升 空 後 在 太 空 運 行 之 軌 來 預 測 股 市 方 向 ） 。
回 說 上 述 研 究 調 查 ， 結 果 頗 令 人 意 外 ， 雖 然 這 些 授 對 很 多 複 雜 而 深 奧 的 投 資 策 略 極 之 熟 悉 ， 可 是 當 他 們 處 理 自 己 的 投 資 時 ， 卻 極 之 保 守 ， 他 們 大 多 只 投 資 一 些 「 大 路 」 及 簡 單 的 股 票 基 金 ， 例 如 環 球 股 票 基 金 、 美 國 股 票 基 金 、 歐 洲 股 票 基 金 等 簡 單 而 容 易 明 白 及 具 分 散 風 險 作 用 的 基 金 。
分 析 方 法 棄 繁 取 簡
調 查 又 發 現 ， 基 金 管 理 年 費 及 其 他 經 常 性 的 成 本 費 用 （ 不 包 括 首 次 認 購 費 ） 等 ， 是 他 們 最 為 關 注 的 項 目 。 至 於 其 他 類 別 的 基 金 ， 例 如 能 源 、 金 磚 四 國 、 對 基 金 等 則 不 太 受 他 們 歡 迎 ， 並 沒 有 投 資 。
期 指 、 期 權 、 期 貨 及 備 兌 認 股 證 等 衍 生 工 具 ， 雖 然 是 這 些 授 經 常 授 的 項 目 ， 可 是 他 們 卻 絕 少 沾 手 這 些 工 具 。 此 外 ， 當 被 問 到 在 揀 選 股 份 時 ， 他 們 會 採 用 Discounted Cash Flow 、 CAPM 、 Arbitrage Pricing Theory 或 Fama and French 那 一 種 投 資 模 式 時 ， 他 們 竟 然 回 答 最 常 採 用 極 之 簡 單 的 PE 、 股 息 率 、 股 價 過 去 6 個 月 、 一 年 回 報 ， 以 及 現 時 股 價 相 對 過 去 一 年 高 位 等 ， 都 是 一 些 頗 為 一 般 而 平 凡 的 指 標 ， 這 與 他 們 在 課 堂 中 授 之 深 奧 投 資 理 論 大 為 不 同 。
Sunday, March 2, 2008
Jim Rogers view of the world
Below are a couple of bullet points that highlight some of the themescovered on the CLSA Conference with Jim Rogers. Interesting views.
a) The Chairman of the US Federal Reserve is an idiot who will print money until he runs out of trees. As a result, inflation will accelerate dramatically, the dollar will likely collapse and we will enter a longer-term bear market for bonds.
b) Commodities, hard & soft, will remain in a secular bull market until 2020. Quit your job as a bond trader and try to open a lead mine (only one has been opened in the last 25 years). Commodity prices are determined by changes in supply and demand.
c) Jim did not offer numbers, but it was clear he believes that the commodities themes is going to GET CRAZY - so fill your boots NOW.
Agricultural prices are set to EXPLODE - with food stocks at a 40 year low and a 40 year sustained drop in acreage dedicated to wheat. Start hoarding sugar now -starting with the lumps placed on you coffee saucer at dinner this evening.
d) Equity markets in most western/advanced countries will remain range bound over the medium-term. It is no surprise that the S&P 500 is below 2000 levels. Japan is probably a better place that the USA for equities, as there is less room to fall. Jim's daughter has also been buying Yen as a directional bet against the carry trade. He is buying "baby stocks"
e) China is absolutely not a bubble for equity markets ... as you need to look at the percent of the local population with money invested in equities(small at 7%) and the extent of the run-up in prices since 2000, rather than just the last two years. Buy infrastructure plays, power plants, environmental themes, tourism, companies levered into agriculture. Chinese currency could go up 4x vs the USD over the next 30years. Sounds crazy, but think of the Yen:USD over the 1960 to 1990 period.
f) Russia is not an investment opportunity despite the commodity base.
Jim's wife is opposed to the corruption and is generally not impressed by the"bandit capitalism". Russia will eventually be 50 to 100 countries.
h) Jim and his family are keen on Singapore - the only Chinese city with a passable environment. The casinos and population growth will probably work.
i) Bullish on Africa due to commodities. I am guessing there is less corruption and violence on the continent than there is in Russia.
j) Most of China's neighbours will be dragged along by the growth the giant... but Taiwan is probably the best placed. This is the big winner among regional China plays.
a) The Chairman of the US Federal Reserve is an idiot who will print money until he runs out of trees. As a result, inflation will accelerate dramatically, the dollar will likely collapse and we will enter a longer-term bear market for bonds.
b) Commodities, hard & soft, will remain in a secular bull market until 2020. Quit your job as a bond trader and try to open a lead mine (only one has been opened in the last 25 years). Commodity prices are determined by changes in supply and demand.
c) Jim did not offer numbers, but it was clear he believes that the commodities themes is going to GET CRAZY - so fill your boots NOW.
Agricultural prices are set to EXPLODE - with food stocks at a 40 year low and a 40 year sustained drop in acreage dedicated to wheat. Start hoarding sugar now -starting with the lumps placed on you coffee saucer at dinner this evening.
d) Equity markets in most western/advanced countries will remain range bound over the medium-term. It is no surprise that the S&P 500 is below 2000 levels. Japan is probably a better place that the USA for equities, as there is less room to fall. Jim's daughter has also been buying Yen as a directional bet against the carry trade. He is buying "baby stocks"
e) China is absolutely not a bubble for equity markets ... as you need to look at the percent of the local population with money invested in equities(small at 7%) and the extent of the run-up in prices since 2000, rather than just the last two years. Buy infrastructure plays, power plants, environmental themes, tourism, companies levered into agriculture. Chinese currency could go up 4x vs the USD over the next 30years. Sounds crazy, but think of the Yen:USD over the 1960 to 1990 period.
f) Russia is not an investment opportunity despite the commodity base.
Jim's wife is opposed to the corruption and is generally not impressed by the"bandit capitalism". Russia will eventually be 50 to 100 countries.
h) Jim and his family are keen on Singapore - the only Chinese city with a passable environment. The casinos and population growth will probably work.
i) Bullish on Africa due to commodities. I am guessing there is less corruption and violence on the continent than there is in Russia.
j) Most of China's neighbours will be dragged along by the growth the giant... but Taiwan is probably the best placed. This is the big winner among regional China plays.
Saturday, March 1, 2008
价值投资是股市真正的王道
1. 技术分析的赢利模式：技术分析师的祖师爷江恩，建立了江恩时间法则,江恩价格法则,江恩线等。江恩说：他发现何时价格会发生回调和将回调到什么价。但是江恩最后留下财产也是寥寥无几！还有波浪理论的发明者艾略特，你见过其在股市中赚大钱的记载了吗？技术分析者，写书成为的作家很多，由作家转化投资家极为罕见！
2. 投机为主的赢利模式：投机者的教父是：杰西*利弗莫尔，他写的那本自传的确十分精彩，但大家有所不知写自传那时这个天才投机家已经穷困潦倒了，用自己的自传换取一点微薄的稿费！空手赚来的巨大财富全部输完了！ 最后利弗莫尔结局十分具有悲剧色彩：最后他开枪自杀了。我认为利弗莫尔的投机天才毋庸置疑，大家可以读他的作品，如果您对投机的认识不如利弗莫尔深刻，如果您以投机为主，请要更小心控制风险。
3. 价值投资的赢利模式：价值投资者他们分享了优秀公司的成长，在公司价值不断提升中，所有投资者都得到收益，这是一种多盈的赢利模式，这种模式造就了巴菲特这样的股神！这个世界没有傻瓜，或者说傻瓜是极为有限的，没有多盈的赢利模式，是必败的！价值投资者股市真正的王道，正是这个王道成就了股王巴菲特！价值投资的成功者不止造就了巴菲特这个世界第二富豪，还有林奇这样连续成功的基金经理，其实国内外价值投资的成功者还有非常多例子，不胜枚举！因此价值投资是股市真正的王道！现在的中国股市我认为：现在价值投资者还有最后一桶白金！
4. 其它赢利模式没有看到真正成功的范例：如依靠期货成为真正顶级富豪的在历史上没有，将来也不会有，期货的赢家的赢利全部来自输家的亏损，本质是零和游戏。
5.为何说现在价值投资者在中国还有最后一桶白金？我的基本观点如下： A股是正在快速和成熟的市场接轨，在成熟市场其实象巴菲特一样每年有20％的收益那已经是超级高手了，因为大家都是价值投资高手，高手过招，赢20％已经非常不容易了！在A股由于大量投资者对价值投资还有怀疑，因此近年有些普通投资者可以挖掘到大牛股。我认为如果哪天A股全面和成熟的市场接轨了，投资者全面成熟，大家都用价值投资眼光来投资股票。呵呵已经没有暴利了，现在是价值投资者的最后一桶金！
2. 投机为主的赢利模式：投机者的教父是：杰西*利弗莫尔，他写的那本自传的确十分精彩，但大家有所不知写自传那时这个天才投机家已经穷困潦倒了，用自己的自传换取一点微薄的稿费！空手赚来的巨大财富全部输完了！ 最后利弗莫尔结局十分具有悲剧色彩：最后他开枪自杀了。我认为利弗莫尔的投机天才毋庸置疑，大家可以读他的作品，如果您对投机的认识不如利弗莫尔深刻，如果您以投机为主，请要更小心控制风险。
3. 价值投资的赢利模式：价值投资者他们分享了优秀公司的成长，在公司价值不断提升中，所有投资者都得到收益，这是一种多盈的赢利模式，这种模式造就了巴菲特这样的股神！这个世界没有傻瓜，或者说傻瓜是极为有限的，没有多盈的赢利模式，是必败的！价值投资者股市真正的王道，正是这个王道成就了股王巴菲特！价值投资的成功者不止造就了巴菲特这个世界第二富豪，还有林奇这样连续成功的基金经理，其实国内外价值投资的成功者还有非常多例子，不胜枚举！因此价值投资是股市真正的王道！现在的中国股市我认为：现在价值投资者还有最后一桶白金！
4. 其它赢利模式没有看到真正成功的范例：如依靠期货成为真正顶级富豪的在历史上没有，将来也不会有，期货的赢家的赢利全部来自输家的亏损，本质是零和游戏。
5.为何说现在价值投资者在中国还有最后一桶白金？我的基本观点如下： A股是正在快速和成熟的市场接轨，在成熟市场其实象巴菲特一样每年有20％的收益那已经是超级高手了，因为大家都是价值投资高手，高手过招，赢20％已经非常不容易了！在A股由于大量投资者对价值投资还有怀疑，因此近年有些普通投资者可以挖掘到大牛股。我认为如果哪天A股全面和成熟的市场接轨了，投资者全面成熟，大家都用价值投资眼光来投资股票。呵呵已经没有暴利了，现在是价值投资者的最后一桶金！
投资成功的秘笈--坚持理性和耐心的方法
实战中不少投资者在业绩不佳的时候往往把原因归咎于运气，“为什么我的运气这么差，一买股票就下跌！”而真正的投资大师，从来就不承认运气对投资有作用。很多投资者眼看着别人赚钱忍不住扑进市场，然而缺少信息和技能往往使得投资放弃自己的独立判断，转而任由市场的摆布，将自己的资金交托给“运气”，结果在市场里投资亏了钱。
成功含有运气的成分，但不是主要的。投资成功靠的是以下：
理性。在市场面前投资者要保持理性的决策是一件非常困难的事情，人之所以会被命运戏弄，更多时候是被人性中贪婪、恐惧或愚蠢的想法所误。如今异常火爆的行情，很多人是被5月份前先进者动辄50%以上的收益率所吸引，却忘记了前几年股市连跌4年半的教训。中国的投资者很少有人能容忍自己的年收益率不到30%，恨不得股票明天便翻番，殊不知全世界投资业绩最好的投资大师巴菲特年均复合收益率也不过区区23%。在不合理的预期下，投资人必然一步步走入陷阱。而大师们给人们的第一个教训便是：战胜市场之前必须要战胜自己，必须要抵抗人性的弱点。
研究。彼得林奇说：“不做研究就投资跟不看牌就玩纸牌游戏一样危险。”本届世界杯，德国队守门员教练科普克为了战胜阿根廷队，在赛前分析了所掌握的阿根廷队的所有信息，专门配备了几名助手专门负责搜集阿根廷球员的情报，他们为此还搜集了厚厚的阿根廷球员射点球的数据库。做足了这些准备功夫，也难怪德国队守门员在扑点球时如有神助。同德国队一样，投资大师们不断地研究市场和上市公司，学习相关的财务、金融、行业专业知识，阅读大量的公司年报、相关报道分析，对上市公司作精确的价值分析和判断，这才是他们在市场上战无不胜的基础。
方法。成功的投资者总是在分析和总结市场的规律，找到战胜市场的方法。格雷厄姆的资产价值评估方法、费雪和彼得林奇的市盈率价值评估方法、巴菲特的现金流量价值评估方法都是在市场行之有效的投资方法，这些方法和理念是成功投资者长期的实践摸索获得的，是成功投资者战胜市场的思想宝库。投资者完全可以在总结前人经验的基础之上，摸索总结出适合自己投资方法，让这些方法引导自己走向胜利的彼岸。
坚持。让时间来战胜市场几乎是每一个投资大师的不二选择，没有哪个大师会指望第二天便获利。巴菲特在网络股盛行的90年代是孤独的，但网络泡沫的破灭成就了他一代股王的美誉。股票价格短期内经常偏离证券的内在价值，但长期内会逐渐向价值回归，股票市场从短期来看是一部投票机，但从长期来看是一台称重机。坚持正确的理念、深入的研究和正确的方法，时间一定会给你加倍的回报。
成功含有运气的成分，但不是主要的。投资成功靠的是以下：
理性。在市场面前投资者要保持理性的决策是一件非常困难的事情，人之所以会被命运戏弄，更多时候是被人性中贪婪、恐惧或愚蠢的想法所误。如今异常火爆的行情，很多人是被5月份前先进者动辄50%以上的收益率所吸引，却忘记了前几年股市连跌4年半的教训。中国的投资者很少有人能容忍自己的年收益率不到30%，恨不得股票明天便翻番，殊不知全世界投资业绩最好的投资大师巴菲特年均复合收益率也不过区区23%。在不合理的预期下，投资人必然一步步走入陷阱。而大师们给人们的第一个教训便是：战胜市场之前必须要战胜自己，必须要抵抗人性的弱点。
研究。彼得林奇说：“不做研究就投资跟不看牌就玩纸牌游戏一样危险。”本届世界杯，德国队守门员教练科普克为了战胜阿根廷队，在赛前分析了所掌握的阿根廷队的所有信息，专门配备了几名助手专门负责搜集阿根廷球员的情报，他们为此还搜集了厚厚的阿根廷球员射点球的数据库。做足了这些准备功夫，也难怪德国队守门员在扑点球时如有神助。同德国队一样，投资大师们不断地研究市场和上市公司，学习相关的财务、金融、行业专业知识，阅读大量的公司年报、相关报道分析，对上市公司作精确的价值分析和判断，这才是他们在市场上战无不胜的基础。
方法。成功的投资者总是在分析和总结市场的规律，找到战胜市场的方法。格雷厄姆的资产价值评估方法、费雪和彼得林奇的市盈率价值评估方法、巴菲特的现金流量价值评估方法都是在市场行之有效的投资方法，这些方法和理念是成功投资者长期的实践摸索获得的，是成功投资者战胜市场的思想宝库。投资者完全可以在总结前人经验的基础之上，摸索总结出适合自己投资方法，让这些方法引导自己走向胜利的彼岸。
坚持。让时间来战胜市场几乎是每一个投资大师的不二选择，没有哪个大师会指望第二天便获利。巴菲特在网络股盛行的90年代是孤独的，但网络泡沫的破灭成就了他一代股王的美誉。股票价格短期内经常偏离证券的内在价值，但长期内会逐渐向价值回归，股票市场从短期来看是一部投票机，但从长期来看是一台称重机。坚持正确的理念、深入的研究和正确的方法，时间一定会给你加倍的回报。
玩转股指期货需要注意的五大要素
对沪深300股指期货进行投机，必须对现货——沪深300股票指数可能的走势进行判断。一般来讲，对股指走势有影响的因素主要包括：
（1）宏观经济状况
当国内经济处于快速发展期时，企业的效益普遍较好，作为经济晴雨表的股市也会节节上升，反之，当经济步入低谷时，股市也会陷入萧条。因此，一国宏观经济状况将在很大程度上左右大盘——股指的走势。另外，对我国这样一个对外依存度高、开放程度日益增强的国家来说，除了关注国内经济外，还必须关注世界经济整体形势。
（2）经济政策
即使在宏观经济运行良好的情况下，如果行业结构发展不合理，或者出于经济市场化改革的需要等等，国家往往会出台一些政策，比如提高利率，增加汇率变动幅度等，这些会对整个经济特别是某些行业板块造成较大的冲击。即使这些行业板块中每一家企业规模较小，在沪深300指数成分股中所占的市值比重并不大，但是板块内股票的联动则足以对股指走势产生较大的影响。
（3）成分股的分红派息等
企业分红派息等方式中，现金分红会降低个股价格，也会降低流通市值；股票分红会降低个股价格，但不会影响流通市值；公积金转赠会降低股价而不会减少市值；增发、配股虽然会增加流通市值，但是在新增股份上市时指数一般会相应作出调整，以避免股指失真，不过对此也应给予关注，因为新增股份上市会导致该股权重增加，其走势对股指的影响会加大。需要特别关注沪深300指数成分股尤其是其中权重较大股票的现金分红、增发、配售等活动，对其数量、时间甚至可能性有较好的把握。
（4）权重较大个股的走势
权重个股由于在股指中所占比重较大，当所代表的企业经营状况发生变化时或者与投资者预期不符时，价格可能发生明显波动，这必然导致其流通市值进而股指流通市值发生波动，从而影响股指走势。
（5）成分股的替换
根据沪深300指数的编制原则，成分股的替换原则是半年一次，而对于流通市值较大的股票则不同。比如中行上市第10个交易日结束后第二天进入沪深300指数。成分股的更换当日一般说来不会对股指造成影响，但需要及时留意并对更换后新的成分股权重、经营状况等方面进行跟踪、评估。
（1）宏观经济状况
当国内经济处于快速发展期时，企业的效益普遍较好，作为经济晴雨表的股市也会节节上升，反之，当经济步入低谷时，股市也会陷入萧条。因此，一国宏观经济状况将在很大程度上左右大盘——股指的走势。另外，对我国这样一个对外依存度高、开放程度日益增强的国家来说，除了关注国内经济外，还必须关注世界经济整体形势。
（2）经济政策
即使在宏观经济运行良好的情况下，如果行业结构发展不合理，或者出于经济市场化改革的需要等等，国家往往会出台一些政策，比如提高利率，增加汇率变动幅度等，这些会对整个经济特别是某些行业板块造成较大的冲击。即使这些行业板块中每一家企业规模较小，在沪深300指数成分股中所占的市值比重并不大，但是板块内股票的联动则足以对股指走势产生较大的影响。
（3）成分股的分红派息等
企业分红派息等方式中，现金分红会降低个股价格，也会降低流通市值；股票分红会降低个股价格，但不会影响流通市值；公积金转赠会降低股价而不会减少市值；增发、配股虽然会增加流通市值，但是在新增股份上市时指数一般会相应作出调整，以避免股指失真，不过对此也应给予关注，因为新增股份上市会导致该股权重增加，其走势对股指的影响会加大。需要特别关注沪深300指数成分股尤其是其中权重较大股票的现金分红、增发、配售等活动，对其数量、时间甚至可能性有较好的把握。
（4）权重较大个股的走势
权重个股由于在股指中所占比重较大，当所代表的企业经营状况发生变化时或者与投资者预期不符时，价格可能发生明显波动，这必然导致其流通市值进而股指流通市值发生波动，从而影响股指走势。
（5）成分股的替换
根据沪深300指数的编制原则，成分股的替换原则是半年一次，而对于流通市值较大的股票则不同。比如中行上市第10个交易日结束后第二天进入沪深300指数。成分股的更换当日一般说来不会对股指造成影响，但需要及时留意并对更换后新的成分股权重、经营状况等方面进行跟踪、评估。
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