某翁逝世，留下财富100万令吉。未立遗嘱，儿女10人争夺遗产。
假如由1人独得，他得到100万令吉。
假如由5人均分，每人得到20万令吉。
假如由10人均分，每人得到10万令吉。
100 万令吉财产，数目保持不变。分享的人越多，所得数目越少。
同样的情况，一家公司的盈利保持不变，股票数目越多，每股所分得的盈利、股息和资产就越少。
有了这个概念，你就会对公司发红股、拆细面值和股票回购对股票价值的影响，一目了然。
我常常劝告投资者，养成“反向”思维的习惯。在股价暴跌（例如在次贷金融海啸期间）买进，但大部分投资者都做不到，不敢买进。是因为他们不了解股票的价值，以当时的股价，无法判断股票到底是便宜还是昂贵。
如果他们了解股票的价值的话，他们会发现股价暴跌后，股票的价值已被严重低估，是一个难得的投资机会。这样，他们就有胆识买进，并在较后大赚特赚。
面值小股票多
了解股票价值是“做功课”的终极目的。
股票价值与公司的股票数目，息息相关。而红股、拆细和股票回购，影响股票数目。所以，要了解股票的价值必须对红股、拆细和回购，有深入的了解。
公司的股票数目，跟每股的面值息息相关。通常是面值越小，股票越多。
为了方便说明，我把红股、拆细和回购对股票价值的影响，以确实的数字说明。
假设一家上市公司在发红股、拆细和回购前的资本为6000万令吉，每股面值为1令吉，故股票总数为6000万股。此公司每年净赚 3000万令吉，等于每股净利为50仙（计算方法：RM30÷60m股=RM0.50），每股净有形资产价值为6令吉。股价为8令吉。
该公司以一股送一股发红股后，股票数目增至1亿2000万股，但公司的盈利还是3000万令吉，每股净利由50仙降至25仙，股息由原来的20仙降至10 仙，每股净有形资产价值由6令吉降至3令吉，股价也由8令吉调整至4令吉。
本益比没改变
假如你拥有1000股，发红股后增至2000股，但无论是股价，每股净利、每股股息或每股净有形资产价值，也相应减半。所以，你手中的财富，跟发红股前没有两样。
更明显的是，本益比保持不变。
这说明了发红股并没有增加股票的价值，也没有增加你的财富。
故发红股不能制造财富。
股票拆细 财富不增
同样的情形，在股票面值由1令吉拆细为10仙之后，你原本拥有1000股的，现在变成拥有1万股，你沾沾自喜，以为自己 “发”了。实际上你的财富并没有增加。
由于股票数目增加了十倍，由6000万股增至6亿股，但每年盈利保持不变，故股价、每股净利、股息、资产也相应的减少十倍。1万股的市值还是8000令吉（RM0.80×10,000=RM8,000），本益比十六倍也原封不动。
这说明了，股票拆细并没有增加股票的价值，因为拆细不能创造财富。
其实，股票拆细就是发红股，原来面值1令吉的股票，拆细为10仙，原本的 1股，现在变为10股，这其实跟以1股送9股的比例发红股没有两样。
惟一的区别是，发红股后面值保持1令吉，股票数目增至6亿股，故实收资本为6亿令吉。
假如是将面值由1令吉拆细为10仙的话，股票数目增至6亿股，故实收资本仍为6000万令吉。
发红股使实收资本增加十倍至6亿令吉，而拆细后实收资本仍为6000万令吉。表面上看起来股票的价值也增加了十倍，实际上没有。
理由是每股的盈利、股息、资产，是以股票的数目计算出来，与面值无关。实收资本6亿令吉（面值1令吉）和实收资本6000万令吉（面值10仙），股票数目同为6亿股。
美国没红股
实际上，美国的股票多数是没有面值的，因为每股的价值是以股票数目计算出来，与面值无关，故面值不重要，重要的是股数，这种情形就好像本文开始时的例子，无论是1人独得或是10人均分，遗产的价值都是100万令吉。遗产的价值并不随人数而增减。美国根本没人说“红股”，只有“拆细”。
所以，红股=拆细。两者都没有增加股票的价值。
Monday, March 1, 2010
Sunday, February 28, 2010
股市短期好不了 看空房地產等四大行業
獨立經濟學家謝國忠在接受理財一週報記者採訪時表示，由於受政府信貸調控影響，今年金融、房地產、IT、鋼鐵四大行業可能遭遇寒流。但使用率較高的能源、能夠抵禦通脹的黃金則將成為今年的投資熱點。
中國經濟的兩大問題：地產過大和產能過剩
理財一週報：2010年您對中國經濟發展勢頭怎麼看？
謝國忠：經濟增長應該還可以，出口也會有所反彈，但投資這一塊，就不會像去年那麼快了；房地產也不會快。
總體來說，今年出口這塊會稍微好些，從經濟層面來說，相對穩定。
理財一週報：中國經濟目前的主要問題出在哪？
謝國忠：我覺得，現在最大的問題是出現在經濟結構上，這是一個很大的問題。我們國家的很多問題都跟結構有關係，一個是房地產過大，一個是行業生產能力過剩，這兩個問題都還是比較明顯的。
我經常說中國的經濟增長，其實就意味著把銀行裏的錢扔出去，但是還要看結果是否有效。去年房地產銷售過熱，整個GDP都增加了。
現在的問題是，你談什麼都不重要，重要的是，我們的錢從哪來？針對這個問題，我認為，無非就是房地產過大、過熱了。國家於是就開始調控地產，因為中國房地產裏的資金都是流動的，你要是調控房地產的話，錢就不流動了。
經濟結構本來就有問題，現在政府這樣一調控，如果能夠維持一年的話，政府對房地產的調控可能又會變化。這個誰都說不準。
理財一週報：如果信貸這一塊持續收緊的話，資本市場流動性將會受到哪些影響？
謝國忠：因為錢都是從房地產市場流出來的，房地產一調控，市場需求馬上就沒有了。然後呢，銀行的錢就轉不出來了。最終的結果就是，開發商還有底下很多的關聯公司大家都等著，等著政策再作新的調整。
而且，國內的房地產開發商已經習慣了這樣的日子——基本上就是，輪到政府調控前夕，他就拼命賣房子，收攏資金。過去兩年就是這樣的，所以大家都不信政府調控是真心的。
中國的房地產市場也不像美國，美國的房價在漲得很高的時候，可以通過增值的部分拿去銀行抵押借錢，但在中國還沒有出現這樣的情況。
中國的房地產就是炒，說白了，就是把銀行的錢卷出來，卷到地產市場，然後再卷到地方政府，最後變成地方政府的財政收入。地方房地產市場的存在，就是為政府融資的，在中國買房子，跟繳稅沒啥區別。
股市短期好不了
理財一週報：2010年資本市場更趨複雜，您對於整年的資本市場如何展望？
謝國忠：我覺得短期內好不了。因為中國的股市不是基本面決定的，它是由銀根來決定的。銀根一旦收緊的話，股市就不好了。
目前國內的銀根還沒有收得很緊，但是今年至今中國的信貸還是增長了很多。以前銀行放貸比現在少很多，所以看到現在這麼龐大的信貸數字，政府開始緊張了。就是因為信貸盤子做得太大，房地產市場也顯得過大了。房地產市場去年全年就投資了4萬億元左右，漲了70%，撐得太大了，你說這樣的盤子還怎麼撐呢？
如果房地產市場調控政策能夠維持一年左右的時間，那它的銷售就可能掉一半左右。我統計了一下，掉一半銷售額的話，那這個數字就是在2萬多億元，你想想看，這會掉多少？！
理財一週報：除了房地產之外，出口這一塊會拉動中國的經濟嗎？
謝國忠：這個應該比較難，現在美國失業率這麼高，日本的也不好，歐洲現在又出現危機。出口會很火嗎？我覺得不太可能低位反彈。美國去年下滑了6000多億美元的出口額，縮得很緊，今年要反彈的話也是理所應當。但是，出口數據再怎麼反彈，也彈不到原來的那個高位。
理財一週報：那就您來看，中國未來經濟增長的突破口在哪？
謝國忠：現在中國經濟有一個突破結構的問題，老是出事兒。出事兒之後，就是讓政府出手相救。所以，結構問題不解決，中國經濟也就只能這麼維持，最近這幾年就是這樣子。
理財一週報：今年初始，股指期貨等新金融業務宣佈推出，從您的個人角度來看，這對股市投資會產生哪些影響？
謝國忠：如果股市的股指期貨是政府想把錢朝裏面砸，搞個基金什麼的，我認為這是有可能的。但是，總的來說，股指期貨的推出應該對股市投資不會產生太大的影響。因為中國股市的核心問題，還是銀根。銀根收緊的話，整體股市就好不了。因為中國的股市跟銀根連得非常緊。
我覺得，中國經濟到了今年第二季度，就是明顯不好的時候。因為房子賣不出去，一連串的問題都會出來。可能去年地方政府還藏了不少錢，能夠混個幾個月。但是，過段時候投資一熱，這些錢又沒了，政府壓力也就來了。
反正，房地產一松的話，你就應該知道股市要漲了，因為這牽涉到信貸的投放量問題。
看空四大行業
理財一週報：去年您自己投資了哪些領域，今年還會投資哪些板塊？
謝國忠：我有投過能源，比較看好它。也想投黃金，但是最終沒有投資它。因為黃金就是通脹的概念，既有通脹，又有短缺。大部分的情況下，像石油這種能源是天天要用的，還比較實用。黃金是貨幣的替代品，可能就不像能源這樣靠得住。
總的來說，貨幣政策還是很寬鬆的，通貨膨脹會來。黃金的話，兩年內還是不錯的。黃金會炒起來，也容易炒起來，但不一定像能源那麼好。
理財一週報：今年您看好哪些領域的投資？
謝國忠：我覺得今年股市會來來回回波動，因為A股從6000多點掉到1600點，然後反彈至3000點左右，一直在曲線波動。現在也還沒有脫離這樣的局面。
我原來比較看好能源和黃金，中國的黃金過去很貴，都是在海外購買。因為概念好，很多國內投資者就炒作這些了。我是看中了能源和黃金，但是香港這邊很貴，價格高一倍左右。
水泥的成長性也已經不錯了，但是前段時間因為產能過剩很嚴重，今年可能也還可以，但是明後年肯定會有問題的。
理財一週報：那您今年不看好的是哪些領域？
謝國忠：今年的金融業肯定不好，銀行業是金融巨頭，今年肯定要大量配股補充資本金，再加上信貸投放的速度要放慢，成本又大幅上升，所以，今年的金融業不會很好。
成本大幅上升是因為中國勞動力短缺，雖然金融行業的薪水很高，但是它要慣性地增長。成本要繼續大幅的上升，今年肯定會上升20%左右。另外，銀行息差還會繼續收窄，信貸速度也不會超過20%。再加上要配那麼多新股，今年銀行不會太好。
保險公司也跟股市連得很緊，股市不好的話，保險公司也會受影響。因為國內保險公司是從股市裏投資賺錢的，今年可能會受壓。
今年，地產也會受壓。去年地產市場漲得那麼高，地皮比較貴，現在房價肯定要往下掉。目前來看，二級市場的房價已經在開始往下掉了。
如果國家再不改政策的話，房地產市場會出問題。本來房地產商是預期房價漲四成，但是現在房價不漲反跌的話，那他們豈不是會很慘。去年買了很多地的開發商，今年的問題就會很大。
IT的話，雖然科技對經濟的影響很大，但是我不看好IT，大多都是炒一把，然後賺了就跑。像物聯網，成功的話就變得很大，不成功的話，就變得很糟糕。科技行業的公司，即使一家公司做得再好，總有另一家公司會比你做得更好。
像微軟做得這麼成功的公司，現在也開始有倒的趨勢了。科技股的話，只能炒一把。如果是製造硬體產品的公司股，就更不能進去了，有些就是搞晶片很難長久賺錢，短期內一會兒賺錢，一會兒虧錢，通過波動吸引大家。
另外，鋼鐵業面臨產能過剩的問題，鋼鐵業今年很難好。我看到建築鋼就是這樣的局面，一般的板材生產能力都是過剩的。鐵礦石的價格又相對較高，而且澳大利亞必和必拓和力拓又合併了，鐵礦石的價格要上漲的可能性要比下降的可能性大很多。這些我都不看好。
中國經濟的兩大問題：地產過大和產能過剩
理財一週報：2010年您對中國經濟發展勢頭怎麼看？
謝國忠：經濟增長應該還可以，出口也會有所反彈，但投資這一塊，就不會像去年那麼快了；房地產也不會快。
總體來說，今年出口這塊會稍微好些，從經濟層面來說，相對穩定。
理財一週報：中國經濟目前的主要問題出在哪？
謝國忠：我覺得，現在最大的問題是出現在經濟結構上，這是一個很大的問題。我們國家的很多問題都跟結構有關係，一個是房地產過大，一個是行業生產能力過剩，這兩個問題都還是比較明顯的。
我經常說中國的經濟增長，其實就意味著把銀行裏的錢扔出去，但是還要看結果是否有效。去年房地產銷售過熱，整個GDP都增加了。
現在的問題是，你談什麼都不重要，重要的是，我們的錢從哪來？針對這個問題，我認為，無非就是房地產過大、過熱了。國家於是就開始調控地產，因為中國房地產裏的資金都是流動的，你要是調控房地產的話，錢就不流動了。
經濟結構本來就有問題，現在政府這樣一調控，如果能夠維持一年的話，政府對房地產的調控可能又會變化。這個誰都說不準。
理財一週報：如果信貸這一塊持續收緊的話，資本市場流動性將會受到哪些影響？
謝國忠：因為錢都是從房地產市場流出來的，房地產一調控，市場需求馬上就沒有了。然後呢，銀行的錢就轉不出來了。最終的結果就是，開發商還有底下很多的關聯公司大家都等著，等著政策再作新的調整。
而且，國內的房地產開發商已經習慣了這樣的日子——基本上就是，輪到政府調控前夕，他就拼命賣房子，收攏資金。過去兩年就是這樣的，所以大家都不信政府調控是真心的。
中國的房地產市場也不像美國，美國的房價在漲得很高的時候，可以通過增值的部分拿去銀行抵押借錢，但在中國還沒有出現這樣的情況。
中國的房地產就是炒，說白了，就是把銀行的錢卷出來，卷到地產市場，然後再卷到地方政府，最後變成地方政府的財政收入。地方房地產市場的存在，就是為政府融資的，在中國買房子，跟繳稅沒啥區別。
股市短期好不了
理財一週報：2010年資本市場更趨複雜，您對於整年的資本市場如何展望？
謝國忠：我覺得短期內好不了。因為中國的股市不是基本面決定的，它是由銀根來決定的。銀根一旦收緊的話，股市就不好了。
目前國內的銀根還沒有收得很緊，但是今年至今中國的信貸還是增長了很多。以前銀行放貸比現在少很多，所以看到現在這麼龐大的信貸數字，政府開始緊張了。就是因為信貸盤子做得太大，房地產市場也顯得過大了。房地產市場去年全年就投資了4萬億元左右，漲了70%，撐得太大了，你說這樣的盤子還怎麼撐呢？
如果房地產市場調控政策能夠維持一年左右的時間，那它的銷售就可能掉一半左右。我統計了一下，掉一半銷售額的話，那這個數字就是在2萬多億元，你想想看，這會掉多少？！
理財一週報：除了房地產之外，出口這一塊會拉動中國的經濟嗎？
謝國忠：這個應該比較難，現在美國失業率這麼高，日本的也不好，歐洲現在又出現危機。出口會很火嗎？我覺得不太可能低位反彈。美國去年下滑了6000多億美元的出口額，縮得很緊，今年要反彈的話也是理所應當。但是，出口數據再怎麼反彈，也彈不到原來的那個高位。
理財一週報：那就您來看，中國未來經濟增長的突破口在哪？
謝國忠：現在中國經濟有一個突破結構的問題，老是出事兒。出事兒之後，就是讓政府出手相救。所以，結構問題不解決，中國經濟也就只能這麼維持，最近這幾年就是這樣子。
理財一週報：今年初始，股指期貨等新金融業務宣佈推出，從您的個人角度來看，這對股市投資會產生哪些影響？
謝國忠：如果股市的股指期貨是政府想把錢朝裏面砸，搞個基金什麼的，我認為這是有可能的。但是，總的來說，股指期貨的推出應該對股市投資不會產生太大的影響。因為中國股市的核心問題，還是銀根。銀根收緊的話，整體股市就好不了。因為中國的股市跟銀根連得非常緊。
我覺得，中國經濟到了今年第二季度，就是明顯不好的時候。因為房子賣不出去，一連串的問題都會出來。可能去年地方政府還藏了不少錢，能夠混個幾個月。但是，過段時候投資一熱，這些錢又沒了，政府壓力也就來了。
反正，房地產一松的話，你就應該知道股市要漲了，因為這牽涉到信貸的投放量問題。
看空四大行業
理財一週報：去年您自己投資了哪些領域，今年還會投資哪些板塊？
謝國忠：我有投過能源，比較看好它。也想投黃金，但是最終沒有投資它。因為黃金就是通脹的概念，既有通脹，又有短缺。大部分的情況下，像石油這種能源是天天要用的，還比較實用。黃金是貨幣的替代品，可能就不像能源這樣靠得住。
總的來說，貨幣政策還是很寬鬆的，通貨膨脹會來。黃金的話，兩年內還是不錯的。黃金會炒起來，也容易炒起來，但不一定像能源那麼好。
理財一週報：今年您看好哪些領域的投資？
謝國忠：我覺得今年股市會來來回回波動，因為A股從6000多點掉到1600點，然後反彈至3000點左右，一直在曲線波動。現在也還沒有脫離這樣的局面。
我原來比較看好能源和黃金，中國的黃金過去很貴，都是在海外購買。因為概念好，很多國內投資者就炒作這些了。我是看中了能源和黃金，但是香港這邊很貴，價格高一倍左右。
水泥的成長性也已經不錯了，但是前段時間因為產能過剩很嚴重，今年可能也還可以，但是明後年肯定會有問題的。
理財一週報：那您今年不看好的是哪些領域？
謝國忠：今年的金融業肯定不好，銀行業是金融巨頭，今年肯定要大量配股補充資本金，再加上信貸投放的速度要放慢，成本又大幅上升，所以，今年的金融業不會很好。
成本大幅上升是因為中國勞動力短缺，雖然金融行業的薪水很高，但是它要慣性地增長。成本要繼續大幅的上升，今年肯定會上升20%左右。另外，銀行息差還會繼續收窄，信貸速度也不會超過20%。再加上要配那麼多新股，今年銀行不會太好。
保險公司也跟股市連得很緊，股市不好的話，保險公司也會受影響。因為國內保險公司是從股市裏投資賺錢的，今年可能會受壓。
今年，地產也會受壓。去年地產市場漲得那麼高，地皮比較貴，現在房價肯定要往下掉。目前來看，二級市場的房價已經在開始往下掉了。
如果國家再不改政策的話，房地產市場會出問題。本來房地產商是預期房價漲四成，但是現在房價不漲反跌的話，那他們豈不是會很慘。去年買了很多地的開發商，今年的問題就會很大。
IT的話，雖然科技對經濟的影響很大，但是我不看好IT，大多都是炒一把，然後賺了就跑。像物聯網，成功的話就變得很大，不成功的話，就變得很糟糕。科技行業的公司，即使一家公司做得再好，總有另一家公司會比你做得更好。
像微軟做得這麼成功的公司，現在也開始有倒的趨勢了。科技股的話，只能炒一把。如果是製造硬體產品的公司股，就更不能進去了，有些就是搞晶片很難長久賺錢，短期內一會兒賺錢，一會兒虧錢，通過波動吸引大家。
另外，鋼鐵業面臨產能過剩的問題，鋼鐵業今年很難好。我看到建築鋼就是這樣的局面，一般的板材生產能力都是過剩的。鐵礦石的價格又相對較高，而且澳大利亞必和必拓和力拓又合併了，鐵礦石的價格要上漲的可能性要比下降的可能性大很多。這些我都不看好。
Dividends
Stocks that pay dividends, or will eventually pay dividends, make perfect sense to me. I pay some money to gain partial ownership of this company, which will in turn share its profits with me in the form of dividends. If the company is doing well, other people will want to buy in, and as a result, the share price will increase. Now I can sell my shares for a profit.
If the company isn't paying dividends now, but chooses to reinvest its money, this is fine; it only means that the dividends in the future will be even larger. I might not stick around with the company long enough to receive any of those dividends. But because of the company's growth, people realize that the eventual dividends will be even larger, and demand for the stock goes up, resulting in a higher share price. Now I can sell my stock to somebody else, who will eventually sell it to somebody else, and so on, and so forth, until somebody gets the dividends. It might be 25, 50, or 100 years from now, but as long as somebody eventually gets dividends, it makes sense to me, because the shares have an intrinsic value: present or future profit from the company itself.
Now, suppose we take dividends out entirely. This is how I see it. Suppose companies are actually sealed boxes with cash inside of them. These boxes have the magic power of generating money at varying rates. The boxes are indestructible, so there is no way of breaking them open and getting the money. The magic boxes, just like companies, have their IPO and people can put money into the box to buy shares of stock, which represent partial ownership of everything in the box. The only catch is that you can't actually use the cash that you own, since it's sealed inside the box.
Every year, Box A spits out (just for you) a portion of the money it generated that year, based on how much of the box you own. Since the boxes are always guaranteed to generate money, other people are interested in buying shares, and as a result of high demand, you can sell your shares to them for a profit.
Box B generates money faster than box A, but it won't spit out any money for the next ten years. This is OK, because by the time it spits out money, it'll spit out way more money than box A will. So there's still demand for the stock, and shares appreciate in value.
Box C generates money even faster than box B, but it will never, ever spit out any money to anyone for the rest of eternity. Again, you have no way of breaking open this box and getting the cash that you supposedly own. The cash is legally yours, but you can't use it. Your only hope of making any usable money is selling off your shares to somebody else. The amount of cash each share represents goes up a tremendous amount every day, but again, there is no way of actually getting that cash.
Now, why on earth would anyone put money into box C in the first place, and why would anyone in their right mind want to buy shares of box C?! Do shares of box C have any intrinsic value beyond the paper they're printed on?! If there's never any chance of getting any REAL money from box C, then are the shares really worth anything? Why are people willing to trade with each other for a piece of the pie that nobody will actually get? What happens when the company gets so big that they just can't grow anymore, no matter how much they reinvest?
If the company isn't paying dividends now, but chooses to reinvest its money, this is fine; it only means that the dividends in the future will be even larger. I might not stick around with the company long enough to receive any of those dividends. But because of the company's growth, people realize that the eventual dividends will be even larger, and demand for the stock goes up, resulting in a higher share price. Now I can sell my stock to somebody else, who will eventually sell it to somebody else, and so on, and so forth, until somebody gets the dividends. It might be 25, 50, or 100 years from now, but as long as somebody eventually gets dividends, it makes sense to me, because the shares have an intrinsic value: present or future profit from the company itself.
Now, suppose we take dividends out entirely. This is how I see it. Suppose companies are actually sealed boxes with cash inside of them. These boxes have the magic power of generating money at varying rates. The boxes are indestructible, so there is no way of breaking them open and getting the money. The magic boxes, just like companies, have their IPO and people can put money into the box to buy shares of stock, which represent partial ownership of everything in the box. The only catch is that you can't actually use the cash that you own, since it's sealed inside the box.
Every year, Box A spits out (just for you) a portion of the money it generated that year, based on how much of the box you own. Since the boxes are always guaranteed to generate money, other people are interested in buying shares, and as a result of high demand, you can sell your shares to them for a profit.
Box B generates money faster than box A, but it won't spit out any money for the next ten years. This is OK, because by the time it spits out money, it'll spit out way more money than box A will. So there's still demand for the stock, and shares appreciate in value.
Box C generates money even faster than box B, but it will never, ever spit out any money to anyone for the rest of eternity. Again, you have no way of breaking open this box and getting the cash that you supposedly own. The cash is legally yours, but you can't use it. Your only hope of making any usable money is selling off your shares to somebody else. The amount of cash each share represents goes up a tremendous amount every day, but again, there is no way of actually getting that cash.
Now, why on earth would anyone put money into box C in the first place, and why would anyone in their right mind want to buy shares of box C?! Do shares of box C have any intrinsic value beyond the paper they're printed on?! If there's never any chance of getting any REAL money from box C, then are the shares really worth anything? Why are people willing to trade with each other for a piece of the pie that nobody will actually get? What happens when the company gets so big that they just can't grow anymore, no matter how much they reinvest?
The Importance of Dividends
Dividends are very important to the investor. Every young investment student learns of the "greater fool theory" when their professor or mentor asks whether dividends are important. If the answer is "not really, if the share price increases", the professor then goes on to explain that without eventual dividends to the investor, the share is worthless. Consider, in the extreme, the purchase of a share that guaranteed not to pay any dividends or other payouts to the holder. What would be the worth of this share to the holder? Simply, it would be a "promise not to pay". Ever. The holder might get some psychographic thrill from saying they owned the share, but they would in reality have the same claim to its assets and cashflows as anyone else. Their claim would be worthless, except if they sold it to someone who hadn't figured this out. Hence the "greater fool theory".
The annualized dividend divided by the market price of a common share is called the "dividend yield" and forms an important component of the valuation process. Even though many companies don't pay dividends, they have the potential to pay dividends in the future. If they invest their earnings in new assets which will earn future cashflows, we have a claim on these future cashflows. This is why many "growth companies" in an expanding phase don't pay dividends. The shareholders hope the company reinvests their share of profits at a high return. If the company fails to make profits on these reinvestments, they would be better to pay out the profits as dividends to shareholders who could do a better job of reinvestment on their own.
Long term studies have shown that reinvested dividends are very important to the returns that investors make. They form a very important component in securities valuation and should have a very important place in the investor's analysis of a company. Well managed and excellent companies like General Electric have a history of increasing dividends. An investor should be very wary of a company that doesn't seem to want to pay dividends. If the analysis shows the earnings are reinvested in profitable projects rather than paid in dividends, this is a very good thing. If the analysis shows the projects are unprofitable or that excessive corporate expenses have eaten up the potential dividends, this is a very bad sign. Absence of a corporate dividend with stories of the corporate jet flying the President's poodle around the globe should not be taken lightly.
High dividends is not always a sign of good management. A company that needs to reinvest should not pay out all of its accounting profits in dividends. This will cause the productive capacity of the company to diminish and the company to eventually fall into bankruptcy. This actually is a technique of "corporate vultures". They buy a large controlling position in a fine company and purposefully pay far more dividends than they should. This causes the competitive position and productive capacity of the company to falter. This all takes a long time to happen and the company can rest on its laurels for a while. It takes outside analysts a long time to figure all this out. Accounting rules offer lots of scope to obscure what's going on The company is usually able to borrow money to pay dividends for quite a while before the market refuses to offer more credit. Then the inevitable day
The annualized dividend divided by the market price of a common share is called the "dividend yield" and forms an important component of the valuation process. Even though many companies don't pay dividends, they have the potential to pay dividends in the future. If they invest their earnings in new assets which will earn future cashflows, we have a claim on these future cashflows. This is why many "growth companies" in an expanding phase don't pay dividends. The shareholders hope the company reinvests their share of profits at a high return. If the company fails to make profits on these reinvestments, they would be better to pay out the profits as dividends to shareholders who could do a better job of reinvestment on their own.
Long term studies have shown that reinvested dividends are very important to the returns that investors make. They form a very important component in securities valuation and should have a very important place in the investor's analysis of a company. Well managed and excellent companies like General Electric have a history of increasing dividends. An investor should be very wary of a company that doesn't seem to want to pay dividends. If the analysis shows the earnings are reinvested in profitable projects rather than paid in dividends, this is a very good thing. If the analysis shows the projects are unprofitable or that excessive corporate expenses have eaten up the potential dividends, this is a very bad sign. Absence of a corporate dividend with stories of the corporate jet flying the President's poodle around the globe should not be taken lightly.
High dividends is not always a sign of good management. A company that needs to reinvest should not pay out all of its accounting profits in dividends. This will cause the productive capacity of the company to diminish and the company to eventually fall into bankruptcy. This actually is a technique of "corporate vultures". They buy a large controlling position in a fine company and purposefully pay far more dividends than they should. This causes the competitive position and productive capacity of the company to falter. This all takes a long time to happen and the company can rest on its laurels for a while. It takes outside analysts a long time to figure all this out. Accounting rules offer lots of scope to obscure what's going on The company is usually able to borrow money to pay dividends for quite a while before the market refuses to offer more credit. Then the inevitable day
Saturday, February 27, 2010
股票投资 快进快出赚钱更少
买入并持有的方式最近不太管用，但频繁交易也不比它好。
股票比以前流动地更快也更便宜了。只要7.95美元甚至更少，你就能上网进行交易。据Rosenblatt Securities公司称，纽约证券交易所每天的交易量近20亿股，这还不包括竞争市场中的交易。全都算上，交易量有如滔天巨浪，2月份迄今为止平均达94亿股，比1月份的91亿股有所上升。
冲进股市之前先暂停一下。交易耗费资金，增加纳税额，并能助长不良习惯。正如格雷厄姆(Benjamin Graham)所述，投资需要全面分析并保证本金的安全和充足的回报。基于传言、预感或恐惧的交易与投资的含义有天壤之别。
格雷厄姆坚持认为普通的个人投资者与大型机构相比有一个巨大的优势。主要是个人与机构不同，不需要进行荒谬的短期业绩评测。因此，交易越频繁，就越浪费这一优势。
咨询公司Mercer和投资智库IRRC Institute进行的最新调查中询问了800多家机构基金的经理的交易频率。
三分之二的人的交易量高于预期；他们的交易率平均被自己低估了26%。尽管大多数人的业绩均以三年为周期进行评判，但他们的平均持股时间约为17个月，其中19%的基金经理一般持股时间仅为一年或更短。
一位基金经理强烈否认自己过于关注短期业务，抱怨说对冲基金导致市场流通量增加，散户倾向于关注短期业绩，并且过快的买进和卖出基金。
自身有短，莫笑他人；据Mercer公司调查显示，这名基金经理一般每次持股时间约为27周。
这些专家们一边抱怨市场过于以短期为导向，一边又认为他们自己能够通过更为短期的方式跑赢市场。该研究报告的合着者盖耶特(Danyelle Guyatt)说，这是非常严重的过于自负的表现。
更多的交易并不确保更高的回报，这对个人和专业投资者都一样。
对折扣经纪券商客户近200万笔交易进行分析后发现，交易最频繁者所赚取的收益并不比交易最少者的收益高。扣除经纪业务成本后，交易最快者远远落后于交易最慢者。
据晨星公司(Morningstar)称，投资组合交易率最高的共同基金在过去十年间的年平均业绩比交易最慢的基金低1.8个百分点。对退休基金股票投资组合的研究发现，平均而言，如果基金经理休假12个月、不做一单交易，基金年回报率将增加近一个百分点。
这可能是因为许多投资者倾向于过快地卖出赚钱的股票，直到后来才发现用不太好的股票代替了赚钱的股票。同时，锁定收益让人有一种成就感。
Mercer/IRRC研究的合着者卢孔尼克(Jon Lukomnik)说，不采取行动就很难证明一位资金管理人存在的正当性。他还说，如果市场上下波动，要很有把握的人才敢说，我用不着交易。
巴菲特的话仍然值得记取：1992年2月道指位于3200点时，他写道，股市就是一个再交换中心，资金从积极人士之手流向有耐心之人手中。
股票比以前流动地更快也更便宜了。只要7.95美元甚至更少，你就能上网进行交易。据Rosenblatt Securities公司称，纽约证券交易所每天的交易量近20亿股，这还不包括竞争市场中的交易。全都算上，交易量有如滔天巨浪，2月份迄今为止平均达94亿股，比1月份的91亿股有所上升。
冲进股市之前先暂停一下。交易耗费资金，增加纳税额，并能助长不良习惯。正如格雷厄姆(Benjamin Graham)所述，投资需要全面分析并保证本金的安全和充足的回报。基于传言、预感或恐惧的交易与投资的含义有天壤之别。
格雷厄姆坚持认为普通的个人投资者与大型机构相比有一个巨大的优势。主要是个人与机构不同，不需要进行荒谬的短期业绩评测。因此，交易越频繁，就越浪费这一优势。
咨询公司Mercer和投资智库IRRC Institute进行的最新调查中询问了800多家机构基金的经理的交易频率。
三分之二的人的交易量高于预期；他们的交易率平均被自己低估了26%。尽管大多数人的业绩均以三年为周期进行评判，但他们的平均持股时间约为17个月，其中19%的基金经理一般持股时间仅为一年或更短。
一位基金经理强烈否认自己过于关注短期业务，抱怨说对冲基金导致市场流通量增加，散户倾向于关注短期业绩，并且过快的买进和卖出基金。
自身有短，莫笑他人；据Mercer公司调查显示，这名基金经理一般每次持股时间约为27周。
这些专家们一边抱怨市场过于以短期为导向，一边又认为他们自己能够通过更为短期的方式跑赢市场。该研究报告的合着者盖耶特(Danyelle Guyatt)说，这是非常严重的过于自负的表现。
更多的交易并不确保更高的回报，这对个人和专业投资者都一样。
对折扣经纪券商客户近200万笔交易进行分析后发现，交易最频繁者所赚取的收益并不比交易最少者的收益高。扣除经纪业务成本后，交易最快者远远落后于交易最慢者。
据晨星公司(Morningstar)称，投资组合交易率最高的共同基金在过去十年间的年平均业绩比交易最慢的基金低1.8个百分点。对退休基金股票投资组合的研究发现，平均而言，如果基金经理休假12个月、不做一单交易，基金年回报率将增加近一个百分点。
这可能是因为许多投资者倾向于过快地卖出赚钱的股票，直到后来才发现用不太好的股票代替了赚钱的股票。同时，锁定收益让人有一种成就感。
Mercer/IRRC研究的合着者卢孔尼克(Jon Lukomnik)说，不采取行动就很难证明一位资金管理人存在的正当性。他还说，如果市场上下波动，要很有把握的人才敢说，我用不着交易。
巴菲特的话仍然值得记取：1992年2月道指位于3200点时，他写道，股市就是一个再交换中心，资金从积极人士之手流向有耐心之人手中。
不合时宜且老掉牙的花旗故事－－－丑即美
温莎基金管理人聂夫的忍耐力（聂夫自传中的一段）
花旗再度粉碎了我们的希望。1991年温莎投资的银行股票中，只有花旗的盈利不如预期。我们做了一些似乎很有道理的事，我们买进花旗银行的平均持股成本是33美元／股，而当时花旗的股价是14美元／股，因此我们又买进了更多的花旗股票。1991年，股价继续下跌，媒体一再痛责花旗。《商业周刊》（Business Week）1991年10月号一则刺眼的标题说，“花旗的噩梦愈来愈糟”。12月，《机构投资人》（Instiutional Investor）杂志用一篇特别报道配上全页的死鱼照片，表达出华尔街的感受。不少人认为花旗即将破产，据说罗斯·裴洛(Ross Perot)正在放空花旗股票。市场上传说的实际情况比花旗的财务报表所呈现的更糟，这引起了新闻媒体的恐慌性骚动。为了平息谣言，花旗银行不得不公开宣布：主管机关还没有判它死刑。
温莎此时持有2,300万股花旗，受益人的资产有5亿美元身置险境。与此同时，众议院银行委员会主席约翰·丁格尔（John Dingle）暗示花旗可能会技术性破产，花旗一家亚洲分行遭挤兑的报道也在传开。1991年年底，花旗股价一路下滑到8美元／股左右。
我不能说这是叫人欢欣鼓舞的时光，但我们坚持自己的信念，我压根没想过在报酬率令人满意之前卖出股票。即使在大量失血之后，我们仍然觉得这家公司的价值大致上毫发无损。由于成本大幅下降，盈利转好的画面清楚地呈现在我们眼前。依我们的看法，随着不动产问题烟消云散，1991年之后盈利将止跌回升。我们发现花旗的处境和1987年的美国银行（America Bank）有些相似。美国银行后来枯木逢春，股价涨了8倍以上。
我们忍受着枪林弹雨的袭击，最后终于尝到了甜美的果实，获得了非常高的报酬。1992年年初，花旗盈利和股价都明显回升，这一年结束之前，我们的持股已经获得了利润，温莎敢于为人不敢为的做法终有所获，值得等待那么长的时间。
温莎投资花旗忽上忽下的经验说明了很重要的一点：投资要成功，不需靠光彩夺目的股票和多头市场，正确判断和坚持信念是我们之所以获胜的先决条件。利用判断力，可以找到好机会；坚持信念，可以在别人争先恐后往某个方向跑时毫不动摇。花旗的例子生动地证明了这一点。对我们来说，丑股票往往是美丽的。
花旗再度粉碎了我们的希望。1991年温莎投资的银行股票中，只有花旗的盈利不如预期。我们做了一些似乎很有道理的事，我们买进花旗银行的平均持股成本是33美元／股，而当时花旗的股价是14美元／股，因此我们又买进了更多的花旗股票。1991年，股价继续下跌，媒体一再痛责花旗。《商业周刊》（Business Week）1991年10月号一则刺眼的标题说，“花旗的噩梦愈来愈糟”。12月，《机构投资人》（Instiutional Investor）杂志用一篇特别报道配上全页的死鱼照片，表达出华尔街的感受。不少人认为花旗即将破产，据说罗斯·裴洛(Ross Perot)正在放空花旗股票。市场上传说的实际情况比花旗的财务报表所呈现的更糟，这引起了新闻媒体的恐慌性骚动。为了平息谣言，花旗银行不得不公开宣布：主管机关还没有判它死刑。
温莎此时持有2,300万股花旗，受益人的资产有5亿美元身置险境。与此同时，众议院银行委员会主席约翰·丁格尔（John Dingle）暗示花旗可能会技术性破产，花旗一家亚洲分行遭挤兑的报道也在传开。1991年年底，花旗股价一路下滑到8美元／股左右。
我不能说这是叫人欢欣鼓舞的时光，但我们坚持自己的信念，我压根没想过在报酬率令人满意之前卖出股票。即使在大量失血之后，我们仍然觉得这家公司的价值大致上毫发无损。由于成本大幅下降，盈利转好的画面清楚地呈现在我们眼前。依我们的看法，随着不动产问题烟消云散，1991年之后盈利将止跌回升。我们发现花旗的处境和1987年的美国银行（America Bank）有些相似。美国银行后来枯木逢春，股价涨了8倍以上。
我们忍受着枪林弹雨的袭击，最后终于尝到了甜美的果实，获得了非常高的报酬。1992年年初，花旗盈利和股价都明显回升，这一年结束之前，我们的持股已经获得了利润，温莎敢于为人不敢为的做法终有所获，值得等待那么长的时间。
温莎投资花旗忽上忽下的经验说明了很重要的一点：投资要成功，不需靠光彩夺目的股票和多头市场，正确判断和坚持信念是我们之所以获胜的先决条件。利用判断力，可以找到好机会；坚持信念，可以在别人争先恐后往某个方向跑时毫不动摇。花旗的例子生动地证明了这一点。对我们来说，丑股票往往是美丽的。
股市真正的赢家是谁？
中国今天的股市又变成了一个世界上最大的赌场，真正的赢家是政府、证券公司、机构和庄家及跑的快的散户。因此，对于自己不会办企业也没有投资入股机会的人而言，在选购上市公司的股票时应该慎之又慎。
鉴于中国的股市还很不成熟，在我国还没有像美国那样严格保护中小投资者利益的法律，对违规者的惩处力度还过于疲软，有法不依的状况还很严重。需要国家不断完善法律，加强监管力度，才能使股市的信息逐渐趋于公开、公正和透明。所以在当前的情况下，一般的中小投资者在中国参与炒股是非常危险的（尤其是在3000点以上时）。为了尽量减少风险并且不因购买股票而耽误自己太多的时间和精力，最好的方式就是理性地选购股票进行“价值投资”。
股票投资有可能获得利润，但利润决不是炒出来的。股票的利润来自两个方面：一是企业当前可以分给股东的红利，这部分利润的高低取决于该企业的经营业绩；二是来自对企业前景的正确判断（未来的利润）。
比方说有一家资源稀缺型企业，由于管理不善造成当前盈利水平很低，因而股票价格很低。但它的产品销路很好，而且预计到价格会因资源的进一步稀缺而越来越高。所以，只要改善管理，盈利水平很快就可以上去。如果基于这种对企业前景的正确判断而买进它的股票，以后就很可能实现较高的利润。如果股票价格真的上升，股民就可以真的得到更多的利润。除了上面这两个利润来源，再也没有别的因素可以为整个股市的股民提供利润了。所以，理智的股民要作“价值投资”，要去关心企业经营的实际业绩和未来的发展前景，从而决定去买哪些企业的股票。
股票的合理价格由三部分组成：上市公司的每股净资产、现实收益水平和未来预期的收益水平的贴现。超过这个合理的价值水平的股价，就是泡沫。
当然，股市是允许有一定的泡沫存在的。如果企业未来经营得很好，泡沫就会慢慢被充实。但如果没有任何理由能估计到企业泡沫被充实的迹象，那参与炒股就相当于赌博。虽然赌博也有赢家，但他赢的钱就等于另一部分人输的钱减去交易费用，并且赌博浪费的时间也是没有人给你付工资的。所以，赌博只能使社会的财富越来越少。
当然，影响股市的原因还有很多，能否在股票市场获利，另一个根本的因素在于对信息的掌握是否及时和充分，因为股市的交易本身就是围绕着信息展开的。但目前的信息对于机构和散户来说是严重不对称的。比方说，许多上市公司在限售股解禁前后突然出台利好消息，以便让自己手中的股票卖个好价钱；有些机构收买某些股评家按自己的愿望做股评或者推荐个股，引诱散户进入圈套；而散户却没有这种制造虚假信息左右股价走势的能力。许多散户亏钱往往都是亏在股评家的嘴上。
以2007年和2008年的中国股市为例，上市公司能分给流通股股民的利润还不足以交纳交易费用。但很多股评家天天在喊“中国股市还会牛下去”，导致很多小股民血本无归。所以大家最好不要相信股评家的荐股，既然在股市是充满竞争的，人家凭什么把好股票推荐给你呢？也许有人会说，有些股评家有时也说对了。其实这不是他说对了，而是如果多数人上当受骗去跟风购买，就会造成这只股票真的上涨甚至涨停，结果大家误以为他说对了。只要大家误以为他说对了，就对他下次骗人形成“利好”。但只要企业没有利润，即使股票价格被哄抬，也一定是要跌下去的。
所以就股票投资而言，理性地选择股票是第一位的。只要你选择的股票是真正有投资价值的，它总会给你带来利润。如果在持有的过程中运气很好遇到特别的“牛市”，你在高点抛出的话还有意外收获。但如果盲目地选购股票去炒作，即使赚了钱也是其他股民亏的钱。并且，谁又能保证自己不会成为最大的傻瓜呢？如果只做“价值投资”，不因股市的大起大落而随波逐流，虽然很难获得暴利，但收益是比较安全稳健的。因为即使在大跌势中依然有股票保持强势，大涨势中依然有股票持续下跌。如果你决定入市，最重要的是选股，而选股最重要的是看价格。因为任何好东西只要价格太高就不算好东西。如果选对了股，就用不着天天去盯盘看股市行情。
按著名财经评论家时寒冰的话说：“除了职业炒股的投机家，他们才有精力有必要天天去盯着股市行情。否则，天天盯盘是非常愚蠢的做法。因为，盘面所有的陷阱都是机构和庄家给盯盘者量身定做的，机构最不喜欢那些买了股票就去干他自己的正事的人，因为他们很多招儿都用不上了！另外，无论盈亏，如果你天天浪费那么多时间和精力本身就已经是亏了！倘若因亏损而动怒，因盈利而狂喜，那么，你亏得就更大了，因为你把健康也陪进去了！倘若因亏损而把怒火释放在家人或同事身上，那么，你已经亏得血本无归了，因为你连家庭、单位的和睦都葬送了！”
要做好“价值投资”，就应该多花点时间去选择有投资价值的股票，而不是天天去盯着股市行情和胡乱听消息。只要选好了一只股票，买好放在那里等待着
企业给你去分享红利，它几乎是没有多大风险的。万一整个股市行情差，你照样能得到利润；万一股市行情特别好，你就可以乘机抛掉获得额外的投机收益。好股票就是你可以长时间持有的股票。
在目前这样一个信息严重不对称的市场上，机构和庄家不仅能看着散户的牌博弈，甚至在某种程度上还可以决定散户能拿什么牌。散户唯有做“价值投资”才能最大限度地规避风险，否则除了极少数人因运气好而获利外，大部分人将被玩弄于股掌之中。
做“价值投资”要看重的是企业过去和现在的盈利水平、在同行业的竞争力、国家政策对企业未来的潜在影响、企业的品牌和市场占有率以及企业的发展前景等。考虑这些因素去买它的股票，投资的安全性就相对有保障了。
如果兼职股民实在不知道如何选股，就要么离开股市，要么参考一些值得信赖的炒股行家的理性选择。
国外和国内的股票投资经验告诉我们，市场的唯一主旋律就是“价值投资”。但股市也有其自身的规律，同一只股票在不同的时期往往存在着价值低估、价值挖掘、价值实现和价值高估（过度投机）四个阶段的周而复始。“价值投资”指的是投资于目前已具有投资价值，或者目前价值尚被低估、但已经体现出成长性，在可预期的时间里将实现业绩增长的投资对象。
兼职股民要做好“价值投资”，以下的几点经验可供参考：
1.买股票一定要有充分的理由，决不要做没有道理的交易。任何时候都不要用“或许”作为你选择股票的理由。
2、绝大多数有关股票的小道消息都是不可信的。“价值投资”是你真正的朋友，思考一下每一笔交易的“风险收益比”是很有必要的。
3、不要一路追涨杀跌，贪婪与恐惧等于死亡。
4、你不需要每天都炒股，不要像嫁给股票似的粘住不肯离场，不要因为炒股而严重影响你正常的工作和生活。
5、注意大势，要顺势而为，不要逆势而行，控制你的“博傻”心理，进行有效的风险管理。
6、当今中国股市真正的赢家是政府、证券公司、机构和庄家及少部分经验丰富的老股民，如果你今天才开始学炒股，我建议你远离股市，否则绝大部分是没有好下场的。
鉴于中国的股市还很不成熟，在我国还没有像美国那样严格保护中小投资者利益的法律，对违规者的惩处力度还过于疲软，有法不依的状况还很严重。需要国家不断完善法律，加强监管力度，才能使股市的信息逐渐趋于公开、公正和透明。所以在当前的情况下，一般的中小投资者在中国参与炒股是非常危险的（尤其是在3000点以上时）。为了尽量减少风险并且不因购买股票而耽误自己太多的时间和精力，最好的方式就是理性地选购股票进行“价值投资”。
股票投资有可能获得利润，但利润决不是炒出来的。股票的利润来自两个方面：一是企业当前可以分给股东的红利，这部分利润的高低取决于该企业的经营业绩；二是来自对企业前景的正确判断（未来的利润）。
比方说有一家资源稀缺型企业，由于管理不善造成当前盈利水平很低，因而股票价格很低。但它的产品销路很好，而且预计到价格会因资源的进一步稀缺而越来越高。所以，只要改善管理，盈利水平很快就可以上去。如果基于这种对企业前景的正确判断而买进它的股票，以后就很可能实现较高的利润。如果股票价格真的上升，股民就可以真的得到更多的利润。除了上面这两个利润来源，再也没有别的因素可以为整个股市的股民提供利润了。所以，理智的股民要作“价值投资”，要去关心企业经营的实际业绩和未来的发展前景，从而决定去买哪些企业的股票。
股票的合理价格由三部分组成：上市公司的每股净资产、现实收益水平和未来预期的收益水平的贴现。超过这个合理的价值水平的股价，就是泡沫。
当然，股市是允许有一定的泡沫存在的。如果企业未来经营得很好，泡沫就会慢慢被充实。但如果没有任何理由能估计到企业泡沫被充实的迹象，那参与炒股就相当于赌博。虽然赌博也有赢家，但他赢的钱就等于另一部分人输的钱减去交易费用，并且赌博浪费的时间也是没有人给你付工资的。所以，赌博只能使社会的财富越来越少。
当然，影响股市的原因还有很多，能否在股票市场获利，另一个根本的因素在于对信息的掌握是否及时和充分，因为股市的交易本身就是围绕着信息展开的。但目前的信息对于机构和散户来说是严重不对称的。比方说，许多上市公司在限售股解禁前后突然出台利好消息，以便让自己手中的股票卖个好价钱；有些机构收买某些股评家按自己的愿望做股评或者推荐个股，引诱散户进入圈套；而散户却没有这种制造虚假信息左右股价走势的能力。许多散户亏钱往往都是亏在股评家的嘴上。
以2007年和2008年的中国股市为例，上市公司能分给流通股股民的利润还不足以交纳交易费用。但很多股评家天天在喊“中国股市还会牛下去”，导致很多小股民血本无归。所以大家最好不要相信股评家的荐股，既然在股市是充满竞争的，人家凭什么把好股票推荐给你呢？也许有人会说，有些股评家有时也说对了。其实这不是他说对了，而是如果多数人上当受骗去跟风购买，就会造成这只股票真的上涨甚至涨停，结果大家误以为他说对了。只要大家误以为他说对了，就对他下次骗人形成“利好”。但只要企业没有利润，即使股票价格被哄抬，也一定是要跌下去的。
所以就股票投资而言，理性地选择股票是第一位的。只要你选择的股票是真正有投资价值的，它总会给你带来利润。如果在持有的过程中运气很好遇到特别的“牛市”，你在高点抛出的话还有意外收获。但如果盲目地选购股票去炒作，即使赚了钱也是其他股民亏的钱。并且，谁又能保证自己不会成为最大的傻瓜呢？如果只做“价值投资”，不因股市的大起大落而随波逐流，虽然很难获得暴利，但收益是比较安全稳健的。因为即使在大跌势中依然有股票保持强势，大涨势中依然有股票持续下跌。如果你决定入市，最重要的是选股，而选股最重要的是看价格。因为任何好东西只要价格太高就不算好东西。如果选对了股，就用不着天天去盯盘看股市行情。
按著名财经评论家时寒冰的话说：“除了职业炒股的投机家，他们才有精力有必要天天去盯着股市行情。否则，天天盯盘是非常愚蠢的做法。因为，盘面所有的陷阱都是机构和庄家给盯盘者量身定做的，机构最不喜欢那些买了股票就去干他自己的正事的人，因为他们很多招儿都用不上了！另外，无论盈亏，如果你天天浪费那么多时间和精力本身就已经是亏了！倘若因亏损而动怒，因盈利而狂喜，那么，你亏得就更大了，因为你把健康也陪进去了！倘若因亏损而把怒火释放在家人或同事身上，那么，你已经亏得血本无归了，因为你连家庭、单位的和睦都葬送了！”
要做好“价值投资”，就应该多花点时间去选择有投资价值的股票，而不是天天去盯着股市行情和胡乱听消息。只要选好了一只股票，买好放在那里等待着
企业给你去分享红利，它几乎是没有多大风险的。万一整个股市行情差，你照样能得到利润；万一股市行情特别好，你就可以乘机抛掉获得额外的投机收益。好股票就是你可以长时间持有的股票。
在目前这样一个信息严重不对称的市场上，机构和庄家不仅能看着散户的牌博弈，甚至在某种程度上还可以决定散户能拿什么牌。散户唯有做“价值投资”才能最大限度地规避风险，否则除了极少数人因运气好而获利外，大部分人将被玩弄于股掌之中。
做“价值投资”要看重的是企业过去和现在的盈利水平、在同行业的竞争力、国家政策对企业未来的潜在影响、企业的品牌和市场占有率以及企业的发展前景等。考虑这些因素去买它的股票，投资的安全性就相对有保障了。
如果兼职股民实在不知道如何选股，就要么离开股市，要么参考一些值得信赖的炒股行家的理性选择。
国外和国内的股票投资经验告诉我们，市场的唯一主旋律就是“价值投资”。但股市也有其自身的规律，同一只股票在不同的时期往往存在着价值低估、价值挖掘、价值实现和价值高估（过度投机）四个阶段的周而复始。“价值投资”指的是投资于目前已具有投资价值，或者目前价值尚被低估、但已经体现出成长性，在可预期的时间里将实现业绩增长的投资对象。
兼职股民要做好“价值投资”，以下的几点经验可供参考：
1.买股票一定要有充分的理由，决不要做没有道理的交易。任何时候都不要用“或许”作为你选择股票的理由。
2、绝大多数有关股票的小道消息都是不可信的。“价值投资”是你真正的朋友，思考一下每一笔交易的“风险收益比”是很有必要的。
3、不要一路追涨杀跌，贪婪与恐惧等于死亡。
4、你不需要每天都炒股，不要像嫁给股票似的粘住不肯离场，不要因为炒股而严重影响你正常的工作和生活。
5、注意大势，要顺势而为，不要逆势而行，控制你的“博傻”心理，进行有效的风险管理。
6、当今中国股市真正的赢家是政府、证券公司、机构和庄家及少部分经验丰富的老股民，如果你今天才开始学炒股，我建议你远离股市，否则绝大部分是没有好下场的。
Citigroup: The New Greatest Trade Ever?
John Paulson, the subject of Gregory Zuckerman’s recently published book, “The Greatest Trade Ever” (see my recent review of the book) posted his new 13F filing on Friday. The 13F filing is the listing of all of the firm’s stocks that it owns as of the most recent quarter-end. I’ve traded very successfully for hedge funds based on the idea of buying positions that the super-investors own - but, ideally, at discounts to where they bought their positions.
It’s important to point out that Paulson not only guessed way in advance that the housing boom was going to completely implode but he invested billions of dollars on that thesis despite the fact that most of the investment community was laughing at him — including me, I might add (and as mentioned in Greg Zuckerman’s book). I met with his firm but declined to invest in the Paulson Fund despite the enormous evidence it presented that the housing bubble was about to go bust.
Should I make the mistake again? Or follow the new positions listed in the recent filing?
Paulson’s newest position is in Citigroup, the largest bank on the planet. A few months ago, Citigroup share price had fallen to less than a dollar when investors were making the bet that the bank was insolvent. He bought 300 million shares in the last quarter. That’s not chump change even though the stock, at $4.05 as of the close Friday, is more than 90% off of its June 2007 high of $54.75. This is not a standalone bet but part of a broader bet on the return of the banking industry. For instance, he also started a new position in JP Morgan. He sold his 2 million-share stake in Goldman Sachs but I don’t think this is a bet against the broker-dealer model but more of a reflection that he’s probably taking profits on significant gains and reallocating into the banks that haven’t moved as fast as Goldman.
New positions in Cemex (a bet that the housing industry is coming back, not to mention infrastructure build-up triggered by the stimulus package) and Starwood Hotels, Starwood Property Trust, Ashford Hospitality Trust, and Felcor Lodging Trust. (all bets on real estate and the hotel industry) all reflect bets that Paulson thinks the worst is behind us and the economy is going to roar back.
With a roaring economy and money flooding the system, one thing worth being wary about is a weakening dollar. Paulson’s largest position: GLD, the ETF that tracks the price of gold.
I’ve made the mistake once before not to bet on Paulson. I’m probably not going to do it again.
It’s important to point out that Paulson not only guessed way in advance that the housing boom was going to completely implode but he invested billions of dollars on that thesis despite the fact that most of the investment community was laughing at him — including me, I might add (and as mentioned in Greg Zuckerman’s book). I met with his firm but declined to invest in the Paulson Fund despite the enormous evidence it presented that the housing bubble was about to go bust.
Should I make the mistake again? Or follow the new positions listed in the recent filing?
Paulson’s newest position is in Citigroup, the largest bank on the planet. A few months ago, Citigroup share price had fallen to less than a dollar when investors were making the bet that the bank was insolvent. He bought 300 million shares in the last quarter. That’s not chump change even though the stock, at $4.05 as of the close Friday, is more than 90% off of its June 2007 high of $54.75. This is not a standalone bet but part of a broader bet on the return of the banking industry. For instance, he also started a new position in JP Morgan. He sold his 2 million-share stake in Goldman Sachs but I don’t think this is a bet against the broker-dealer model but more of a reflection that he’s probably taking profits on significant gains and reallocating into the banks that haven’t moved as fast as Goldman.
New positions in Cemex (a bet that the housing industry is coming back, not to mention infrastructure build-up triggered by the stimulus package) and Starwood Hotels, Starwood Property Trust, Ashford Hospitality Trust, and Felcor Lodging Trust. (all bets on real estate and the hotel industry) all reflect bets that Paulson thinks the worst is behind us and the economy is going to roar back.
With a roaring economy and money flooding the system, one thing worth being wary about is a weakening dollar. Paulson’s largest position: GLD, the ETF that tracks the price of gold.
I’ve made the mistake once before not to bet on Paulson. I’m probably not going to do it again.
John Paulson Buys Citigroup Inc., Varian Inc., Cemex, Sells Centex Corp., State Street Corp., Goldman Sachs
Hedge fund giant John Paulson made money shorting financials in 2007 and 2008. Now he is buying heavily into the big banks. He also bought a lot of hotels. This is his Q3 portfolio update.
John Paulson buys Citigroup Inc., Varian Inc., Cemex S.a.b. De C.v., Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide Inc., The Hartford Financial Services Group In, Sunstone Hotel Investors Inc., Starwood Property Trust Inc., Conseco Inc., Old National Bancorp, Felcor Lodging Trust Inc., Ashford Hospitality Trust Inc., sells Centex Corp., State Street Corp., Petrocanada, Kimco Realty Corp., Humana Inc., Goldman Sachs Group Inc. The, Market Vectors - Gold Miners Etf, Data Domain, Inc., Centennial Communications Corp., At&t Inc. during the 3-months ended 09/30/2009, according to the most recent filings of his investment company, Paulson & Co.. John Paulson owns 39 stocks with a total value of $20.5 billion. These are the details of the buys and sells.
New Purchase: Citigroup Inc. (C)
John Paulson initiated holdings in Citigroup Inc.. His purchase prices were between $2.59 and $5.23, with an estimated average price of $3.85. The impact to his portfolio due to this purchase was 7.1%. His holdings were 300,000,000 shares as of 09/30/2009.
Citigroup Inc. has a market cap of $92.6 billion; its shares were traded at around $4.05 with and P/S ratio of 1.8. Citigroup Inc. had an annual average earning growth of 5.1% over the past 10 years.
John Paulson buys Citigroup Inc., Varian Inc., Cemex S.a.b. De C.v., Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide Inc., The Hartford Financial Services Group In, Sunstone Hotel Investors Inc., Starwood Property Trust Inc., Conseco Inc., Old National Bancorp, Felcor Lodging Trust Inc., Ashford Hospitality Trust Inc., sells Centex Corp., State Street Corp., Petrocanada, Kimco Realty Corp., Humana Inc., Goldman Sachs Group Inc. The, Market Vectors - Gold Miners Etf, Data Domain, Inc., Centennial Communications Corp., At&t Inc. during the 3-months ended 09/30/2009, according to the most recent filings of his investment company, Paulson & Co.. John Paulson owns 39 stocks with a total value of $20.5 billion. These are the details of the buys and sells.
New Purchase: Citigroup Inc. (C)
John Paulson initiated holdings in Citigroup Inc.. His purchase prices were between $2.59 and $5.23, with an estimated average price of $3.85. The impact to his portfolio due to this purchase was 7.1%. His holdings were 300,000,000 shares as of 09/30/2009.
Citigroup Inc. has a market cap of $92.6 billion; its shares were traded at around $4.05 with and P/S ratio of 1.8. Citigroup Inc. had an annual average earning growth of 5.1% over the past 10 years.
What Does John Paulson See in Citigroup?
It is likely that one metric in John Paulson’s analysis of the financial sector in 2008, and his decision to bet against it, had much to do with his recent $1.4 billion Q-3 investment in Citigroup (C). In his 2008 end of the year letter to investors Paulson said that “the problem with many banks is that they don’t have enough tangible common equity to absorb anticipated losses.”
Tangible common equity is a subset of shareholder equity that does not include preferred shares or intangible managed assets. It is a measure of what common shareholders would receive if the company were liquidated. A similar metric is tier one common equity. It is a more arbitrary figure and is calculated using risk weighted assets.
There is a difficulty in interpreting bank evaluations of shareholder equity. The Federal Reserve used tier one common equity in their stress test analysis and many of the money center banks now highlight a tier one common ratio in their reporting. That metric, as we have said, is open to interpretation and does allow banks wiggle room to write down asset value. The basic tangible common equity ratio is the best indicator of shareholder value but banks have their own way of computing that ratio. (TCE, as defined by Citigroup, represents Common equity less goodwill and intangible assets, excluding mortgage servicing revenue, net of related deferred tax liabilities.)
In February of this year Citigroup C.E.O. Vikram Pandit said that his goal was to increase the company’s tangible common equity by an exchange of preferred shares for common stock. He hoped to increase TCE in the 4th quarter from $29.7 billion to $81 billion with the exchange of 27.5 billion preferred shares. He has achieved his goal and then some with TCE in the 3rd quarter reported at $100 billion and the TCE ratio at 10.3%. The third quarter ratio number is a substantial gain over a previously reported 2nd quarter TCE ratio of 2.2%.
The Paulson team has to have looked carefully at this metric and arrived at their independent estimation of Citigroup tangible common equity. They are, no doubt, in some agreement with the company’s impressive 3rd quarter figure.
An equally important issue for Citigroup is their “off balance sheet” assets and this is another area that Paulson and Company must have given very close attention.
In May of 2008 C.E.O. Pandit said that trimming the company’s $2.2 trillion in assets was a priority. At the time it was speculated that Citigroup had another trillion dollars in “Qualifying Special Purpose Entities” (QSPE’s). These are the trusts and financing vehicles that are home to the “shadow assets” and are not subject to capital reserve requirements. This releases funds and allows the banks to put more money to work. It is a way of leveraging their capital. The Federal Accounting Standards Board (FASB) wants these “shadow assets” to be properly accounted for and has set and, subsequently, extended several deadlines for the banks to meet new and more transparent standards. The next deadline is January of 2010 but the banks may, as they have in the past, protest and FASB may give them a Christmas present in the form of another extension.
Citigroup has been the most vocal protester regarding the implementation of the new FASB requirements. It holds securitized credit card debt estimated at $92 billion and that debt is the most likely to suffer delinquencies. The addition of any assets to the balance sheet, however, whether toxic or not, would require increased loan loss provisions.
It follows that Citigroup will be faced with loan losses and increased loan reserve requirements in the future and, considering the amount of repatriated assets, may require an infusion of additional capital. This would dilute shareholder value. Potential dilution of share value is an important issue when considering the purchase of 300 million shares only one quarter before the new FASB rules are to go into effect. The fact that the shares were purchased implies that the Paulson team believes that Citigroup has had some success in liquidating, selling or transferring those “off balance sheet” assets.
The two issues we highlighted are important ones but it is speculation as to their priority in the Paulson and Company due diligence process. The money center bank balance sheets and earnings reports, no doubt, hold many interesting secrets revealed to only the most heroic in the “grail quest” that is, understanding the workings of the financial sector.
(Citigroup has lagged the performance of its peers since the March 2009 low in the stock market).
Tangible common equity is a subset of shareholder equity that does not include preferred shares or intangible managed assets. It is a measure of what common shareholders would receive if the company were liquidated. A similar metric is tier one common equity. It is a more arbitrary figure and is calculated using risk weighted assets.
There is a difficulty in interpreting bank evaluations of shareholder equity. The Federal Reserve used tier one common equity in their stress test analysis and many of the money center banks now highlight a tier one common ratio in their reporting. That metric, as we have said, is open to interpretation and does allow banks wiggle room to write down asset value. The basic tangible common equity ratio is the best indicator of shareholder value but banks have their own way of computing that ratio. (TCE, as defined by Citigroup, represents Common equity less goodwill and intangible assets, excluding mortgage servicing revenue, net of related deferred tax liabilities.)
In February of this year Citigroup C.E.O. Vikram Pandit said that his goal was to increase the company’s tangible common equity by an exchange of preferred shares for common stock. He hoped to increase TCE in the 4th quarter from $29.7 billion to $81 billion with the exchange of 27.5 billion preferred shares. He has achieved his goal and then some with TCE in the 3rd quarter reported at $100 billion and the TCE ratio at 10.3%. The third quarter ratio number is a substantial gain over a previously reported 2nd quarter TCE ratio of 2.2%.
The Paulson team has to have looked carefully at this metric and arrived at their independent estimation of Citigroup tangible common equity. They are, no doubt, in some agreement with the company’s impressive 3rd quarter figure.
An equally important issue for Citigroup is their “off balance sheet” assets and this is another area that Paulson and Company must have given very close attention.
In May of 2008 C.E.O. Pandit said that trimming the company’s $2.2 trillion in assets was a priority. At the time it was speculated that Citigroup had another trillion dollars in “Qualifying Special Purpose Entities” (QSPE’s). These are the trusts and financing vehicles that are home to the “shadow assets” and are not subject to capital reserve requirements. This releases funds and allows the banks to put more money to work. It is a way of leveraging their capital. The Federal Accounting Standards Board (FASB) wants these “shadow assets” to be properly accounted for and has set and, subsequently, extended several deadlines for the banks to meet new and more transparent standards. The next deadline is January of 2010 but the banks may, as they have in the past, protest and FASB may give them a Christmas present in the form of another extension.
Citigroup has been the most vocal protester regarding the implementation of the new FASB requirements. It holds securitized credit card debt estimated at $92 billion and that debt is the most likely to suffer delinquencies. The addition of any assets to the balance sheet, however, whether toxic or not, would require increased loan loss provisions.
It follows that Citigroup will be faced with loan losses and increased loan reserve requirements in the future and, considering the amount of repatriated assets, may require an infusion of additional capital. This would dilute shareholder value. Potential dilution of share value is an important issue when considering the purchase of 300 million shares only one quarter before the new FASB rules are to go into effect. The fact that the shares were purchased implies that the Paulson team believes that Citigroup has had some success in liquidating, selling or transferring those “off balance sheet” assets.
The two issues we highlighted are important ones but it is speculation as to their priority in the Paulson and Company due diligence process. The money center bank balance sheets and earnings reports, no doubt, hold many interesting secrets revealed to only the most heroic in the “grail quest” that is, understanding the workings of the financial sector.
(Citigroup has lagged the performance of its peers since the March 2009 low in the stock market).
What John Paulson could teach us
Risk, but potential reward, comes from breaking away from the herd mentality that surrounds Wall Street.
If it wasn't clear already that John Paulson had reached the zenith of his hedge fund profession, one only had to watch how fervently the media and blogosphere digested the news of Paulson & Co.'s quarterly holdings which was released last Friday.
Market commentators immediately pounced on how the one-time housing bear had loaded up on 300 million shares in Citigroup (C-N3.400.010.29%) during the quarter, while dumping his entire holdings in Goldman Sachs (GS-N156.35-0.09-0.06%). Similar 13-F holdings of other hedge fund managers like David Einhorn and George Soros filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission in recent days have been summarily ignored compared to the reaction to Paulson's. (Citi shares jumped 3.2 per cent the day after Paulson's announcement, far outpacing the S&P and Financial index that day.)
As far as hedge fund managers go today, John Paulson is the man. Ken Griffin, Stevie Cohen, and Eddie Lampert and others are afterthoughts.
In Gregory Zuckerman's new book, The Greatest Trade Ever, the Wall Street Journal reporter chronicles how Paulson mounted his ascent from nobody to this industry's seer of the moment.
Seven years ago, Mr. Paulson was relatively unknown. He was a merger-arbitrage guy running $300-million (U.S.). The former Baker Scholar from Harvard Business School couldn't help but feel that - in his mid-40s - he had under-achieved his career potential.
“ As a fund manager, I often ponder the challenge of balancing between (1) trusting yourself and your investment thesis completely even when no one else does and (2) being aware enough to know when you're being too stubborn and 'not seeing the facts' or when the trade is going against you. ”
A key analyst alongside Mr. Paulson was Paolo Pellegrini. A failed Lazard banker with two divorces and zero net worth at the time he joined Paulson, Mr. Pellegrini had to make this last career chance work.
He lived in a one bedroom apartment up in Westchester and would arrive at work at 6:30 am in order to get the cheapest parking lot rate nearby. No one seemed to like him at first. He was a bit of a hot-head and talked too much. Yet, eventually he helped identify the housing bubble that Mr. Paulson would turn into a $16-billion winning trade for his firm and $4-billion for Mr. Paulson.
Beyond the interesting outsider-type characters working at Paulson, Mr. Zuckerman's book offers many lessons for small and large investors. One is the risk, but potential reward, that comes from breaking away from the herd mentality that surrounds Wall Street.
Nobody on Wall Street gave these guys a chance, when they started betting against housing. In fact, Mr. Paulson was routinely laughed at. Because the banking infrastructure was making so much money off of housing in 2004 - 2006, there was no reason for so many people to imagine it would end.
“ For Mr. Paulson, it all boiled down to one chart which Mr. Pellegrini produced showing the inflation-adjusted growth in housing prices over time divided by wage growth. The data clearly showed a rapid explosion upward away from the general trend starting in 2000. ”
Even among hedge funds -- who are paid handsomely to anticipate and invest in where the puck is going, not where it's been -- precious few made this bearish trade. At the time, wise managers saw only the obstacles to the trade working out (like the federal government bailing out sub-prime borrowers and "containing" the problem from other parts of housing) and they clung to a misplaced blind trust in "their models" which showed housing couldn't decrease in value.
For Mr. Paulson, it all boiled down to one chart which Mr. Pellegrini produced showing the inflation-adjusted growth in housing prices over time divided by wage growth. The data clearly showed a rapid explosion upward away from the general trend starting in 2000.
Even after he makes the bet, Mr. Zuckerman points out how there are so many times that people tell Mr. Paulson to take the bet off or cash in his profits too early. His own investors complained. Complaints also came from brokers from Bear Stearns and others who helped sell him the credit default swaps on the toxic tranches of mortgage bonds, as well as the most troubled sub-prime lenders and banks holding the troubled securities.
Even his own staff complained that he wasn't taking money off the table. They told him to sell when he was down in his trade and they told him to sell when he was up on the trade after New Century reported its first blown quarter in early 2007. Through it all, Mr. Paulson stuck to his guns because he foresaw even bigger profits ahead - and he was proved right.
As a fund manager, I often ponder the challenge of balancing between (1) trusting yourself and your investment thesis completely even when no one else does and (2) being aware enough to know when you're being too stubborn and "not seeing the facts" or when the trade is going against you.
In Mr. Paulson's case, every new bit of data which came to light and possibly contradicted his investment thesis was always scrutinized by him and his team to see if they had "missed something." He always stuck with the trade because he felt confident in the depth of research they had invested in understanding the problem/investment opportunity.
“ There are several lessons in The Greatest Trade Ever for investors: believe in yourself, be skeptical of others' free opinions and assumptions, persist, and take the long view and don't take profits too early. ”
For Mr. Paulson, it all boiled down to one chart which Mr. Pellegrini produced showing the inflation-adjusted growth in housing prices over time divided by wage growth. The data clearly showed a rapid explosion upward away from the general trend starting in 2000. He assumed this trend would not continue indefinitely and revert (even overshoot). He was right.
The Greatest Trade Ever isn't just about John Paulson. It describes some smaller players who also bet against housing. Their stories are also very interesting and some of the characters are really colorful and interesting. Some run into the problem of not having enough capital to implement the trade to the degree they want to. Some wait too long.
One investor, Michael Burry, got his break as a fund manager when well-known value investor Joel Greenblatt made a big investment in him. Later, after taking a big bet against housing early on, Mr. Burry faced Mr. Greenblatt's wrath. In no uncertain terms, Mr. Greenblatt told him to get out of the trade. Mr. Burry didn't, but taking a huge mental and physical toll on himself. Put yourself in Mr. Burry's shoes. What must it have felt like to tell your maker to take a hike?
There are several lessons in The Greatest Trade Ever for investors: believe in yourself (assuming you've done your homework), be skeptical of others' free opinions and assumptions, persist, and take the long view and don't take profits too early. Every investor involved in this bearish housing trade early on referred to it as their potential "Soros trade" - referring to the famous 1992 bet against the British pound which netted George Soros' fund $1-billion.
Mr. Paulson used this line himself, but he also remembered another Soros comment that stuck in his mind as he executed his trade. When you see the perfect trade set-up in front of you, Mr. Soros advised to "go for the jugular." Mr. Paulson did and it paid off big-time. Some of us will never see a trade like that for the rest of our lives. When opportunity knocks, you have to answer.
If it wasn't clear already that John Paulson had reached the zenith of his hedge fund profession, one only had to watch how fervently the media and blogosphere digested the news of Paulson & Co.'s quarterly holdings which was released last Friday.
Market commentators immediately pounced on how the one-time housing bear had loaded up on 300 million shares in Citigroup (C-N3.400.010.29%) during the quarter, while dumping his entire holdings in Goldman Sachs (GS-N156.35-0.09-0.06%). Similar 13-F holdings of other hedge fund managers like David Einhorn and George Soros filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission in recent days have been summarily ignored compared to the reaction to Paulson's. (Citi shares jumped 3.2 per cent the day after Paulson's announcement, far outpacing the S&P and Financial index that day.)
As far as hedge fund managers go today, John Paulson is the man. Ken Griffin, Stevie Cohen, and Eddie Lampert and others are afterthoughts.
In Gregory Zuckerman's new book, The Greatest Trade Ever, the Wall Street Journal reporter chronicles how Paulson mounted his ascent from nobody to this industry's seer of the moment.
Seven years ago, Mr. Paulson was relatively unknown. He was a merger-arbitrage guy running $300-million (U.S.). The former Baker Scholar from Harvard Business School couldn't help but feel that - in his mid-40s - he had under-achieved his career potential.
“ As a fund manager, I often ponder the challenge of balancing between (1) trusting yourself and your investment thesis completely even when no one else does and (2) being aware enough to know when you're being too stubborn and 'not seeing the facts' or when the trade is going against you. ”
A key analyst alongside Mr. Paulson was Paolo Pellegrini. A failed Lazard banker with two divorces and zero net worth at the time he joined Paulson, Mr. Pellegrini had to make this last career chance work.
He lived in a one bedroom apartment up in Westchester and would arrive at work at 6:30 am in order to get the cheapest parking lot rate nearby. No one seemed to like him at first. He was a bit of a hot-head and talked too much. Yet, eventually he helped identify the housing bubble that Mr. Paulson would turn into a $16-billion winning trade for his firm and $4-billion for Mr. Paulson.
Beyond the interesting outsider-type characters working at Paulson, Mr. Zuckerman's book offers many lessons for small and large investors. One is the risk, but potential reward, that comes from breaking away from the herd mentality that surrounds Wall Street.
Nobody on Wall Street gave these guys a chance, when they started betting against housing. In fact, Mr. Paulson was routinely laughed at. Because the banking infrastructure was making so much money off of housing in 2004 - 2006, there was no reason for so many people to imagine it would end.
“ For Mr. Paulson, it all boiled down to one chart which Mr. Pellegrini produced showing the inflation-adjusted growth in housing prices over time divided by wage growth. The data clearly showed a rapid explosion upward away from the general trend starting in 2000. ”
Even among hedge funds -- who are paid handsomely to anticipate and invest in where the puck is going, not where it's been -- precious few made this bearish trade. At the time, wise managers saw only the obstacles to the trade working out (like the federal government bailing out sub-prime borrowers and "containing" the problem from other parts of housing) and they clung to a misplaced blind trust in "their models" which showed housing couldn't decrease in value.
For Mr. Paulson, it all boiled down to one chart which Mr. Pellegrini produced showing the inflation-adjusted growth in housing prices over time divided by wage growth. The data clearly showed a rapid explosion upward away from the general trend starting in 2000.
Even after he makes the bet, Mr. Zuckerman points out how there are so many times that people tell Mr. Paulson to take the bet off or cash in his profits too early. His own investors complained. Complaints also came from brokers from Bear Stearns and others who helped sell him the credit default swaps on the toxic tranches of mortgage bonds, as well as the most troubled sub-prime lenders and banks holding the troubled securities.
Even his own staff complained that he wasn't taking money off the table. They told him to sell when he was down in his trade and they told him to sell when he was up on the trade after New Century reported its first blown quarter in early 2007. Through it all, Mr. Paulson stuck to his guns because he foresaw even bigger profits ahead - and he was proved right.
As a fund manager, I often ponder the challenge of balancing between (1) trusting yourself and your investment thesis completely even when no one else does and (2) being aware enough to know when you're being too stubborn and "not seeing the facts" or when the trade is going against you.
In Mr. Paulson's case, every new bit of data which came to light and possibly contradicted his investment thesis was always scrutinized by him and his team to see if they had "missed something." He always stuck with the trade because he felt confident in the depth of research they had invested in understanding the problem/investment opportunity.
“ There are several lessons in The Greatest Trade Ever for investors: believe in yourself, be skeptical of others' free opinions and assumptions, persist, and take the long view and don't take profits too early. ”
For Mr. Paulson, it all boiled down to one chart which Mr. Pellegrini produced showing the inflation-adjusted growth in housing prices over time divided by wage growth. The data clearly showed a rapid explosion upward away from the general trend starting in 2000. He assumed this trend would not continue indefinitely and revert (even overshoot). He was right.
The Greatest Trade Ever isn't just about John Paulson. It describes some smaller players who also bet against housing. Their stories are also very interesting and some of the characters are really colorful and interesting. Some run into the problem of not having enough capital to implement the trade to the degree they want to. Some wait too long.
One investor, Michael Burry, got his break as a fund manager when well-known value investor Joel Greenblatt made a big investment in him. Later, after taking a big bet against housing early on, Mr. Burry faced Mr. Greenblatt's wrath. In no uncertain terms, Mr. Greenblatt told him to get out of the trade. Mr. Burry didn't, but taking a huge mental and physical toll on himself. Put yourself in Mr. Burry's shoes. What must it have felt like to tell your maker to take a hike?
There are several lessons in The Greatest Trade Ever for investors: believe in yourself (assuming you've done your homework), be skeptical of others' free opinions and assumptions, persist, and take the long view and don't take profits too early. Every investor involved in this bearish housing trade early on referred to it as their potential "Soros trade" - referring to the famous 1992 bet against the British pound which netted George Soros' fund $1-billion.
Mr. Paulson used this line himself, but he also remembered another Soros comment that stuck in his mind as he executed his trade. When you see the perfect trade set-up in front of you, Mr. Soros advised to "go for the jugular." Mr. Paulson did and it paid off big-time. Some of us will never see a trade like that for the rest of our lives. When opportunity knocks, you have to answer.
巴菲特、索羅斯持股大公開
股神巴菲特旗下投資公司波克夏向美國證券主管機關申報最新持股顯示，去年第四季持股加碼富國銀行、Wal-Mart等公司的股票，同時減持康菲石油和艾克森美孚石油等能源股的股票，顯示巴菲特看好美國經濟景氣復甦，同時看淡未來能源股後市表現。
另一位投資大師索羅斯透過索羅斯基金公司加碼ＳＰＤＲ黃金信託基金，看好未來黃金漲勢，卻也暗示索羅斯看空美元後市，但索羅斯大幅加碼花旗銀行、ＳＰＤＲ的金融信託基金、孟山都和福特汽車等股票。
巴菲特看好美國景氣復甦
從巴菲特加碼最多的股票看來，巴菲特對今年美國經濟景氣復甦有很大的信心。他同時加碼Wal-Mart一二０萬股，持股超過三九０萬股。去年第三季波克夏即大幅買進Wal-Mart股票，第四季持續加碼，顯示看好未來Wal-mart的獲利成長。
波克夏去年第四季大幅加碼的股票，還包括廢棄物處理公司的Public Services，文字儲存媒體的Iron Mountain，和南韓浦項鋼鐵等股票，浦項鋼鐵也是波克夏持股中唯一的鋼鐵股。
波克夏減碼能源、醫療股
巴菲特大幅減碼能源股，卻持續看好鐵路股。過去一直都是巴菲特大量持有的北方柏靈頓鐵路公司，波克夏在二月十二日完成對該公司股權的收購，並納入巴菲特旗下子公司，是不是意味著歐巴馬政府為了振興美國經濟要興建高速鐵路，而讓巴菲特看好鐵路股後市，值得玩味。
波克夏減碼醫療相關廠商的寶鹼公司、嬌生公司、健保福利公司的Wellpoint和UnitedHealth集團，減碼張數從二０五萬股到超過八、九百萬股都有，這可能和歐巴馬總統目前正大幅推動健保改革政策有關。
投資大師索羅斯透過旗下投資公司索羅斯基金公司，在去年第四季加碼ＳＰＤＲ的黃金信託基金ＥＴＦ三七三萬股，ＳＰＤＲ黃金信託基金的持股市值增加到六．七六億美元，是索羅斯基金公司旗下最高市值的持股，比第三季結束時僅持有二五０萬股的數量相比增加超過一倍。
索羅斯增持黃金ＥＴＦ
美元指數從去年十一月底的七四．一七點觸底反彈，目前已經反彈到八０．八四點，這波行情市場普遍以反彈波視之，是否會從反彈變成回升行情目前還很難論斷。索羅斯仍持續看空美元的後市，預期美元在短暫反彈後便會回跌，所以利用美元指數反彈與黃金呈現弱勢格局期間，回頭加碼黃金ＥＴＦ，以因應未來美元可能的貶值與黃金的漲勢。
雖然看空美元後市，但索羅斯卻看好美國金融股表現，利用去年第四季花旗銀行股價回檔時，大幅加碼九四七０萬股，讓該基金公司持有花旗銀行的持股市值上揚到三．二四億美元，是索羅斯基金公司第二大持股市值。去年第三季結束時，索羅斯基金公司並未持有花旗銀行的股票。
加碼金融股有志一同
索羅斯基金公司同時加碼ＳＰＤＲ的金融信託基金一一九八萬股，持股市值也上揚到一．七四億美元。不僅索羅斯看好美國金融股後市，這和波克夏去年第四季持續加碼富國銀行股票的情況雷同。在金融海嘯放空大賺二００億美元的華爾街避險基金經理人鮑爾森和明迪奇，也都在去年第四季透過旗下對沖基金買進五億股的花旗銀行股票。市場分析師認為，從巴菲特、索羅斯和其他知名基金經理人透過旗下投資公司買進金融股股票，凸顯美國金融股已經走出金融風暴的陰霾，長期投資金融股未來有利可圖。
索羅斯基金公司去年第四季增加持有全球最大種子與農藥公司孟山都持股二七五萬股，總股數增加到將近三九０萬股，持股市值也上揚到三．０二億美元。有別於巴菲特減碼醫藥股，索羅斯基金公司去年第四季增加輝瑞藥廠九０九萬股，加碼幅度相對偏多，持股市值增加到二．０八億美元。再者，索羅斯加碼綜合性能源開發商Suncor能源公司，並增加持股四五二萬股，這也和巴菲特大砍能源股的操作策略不同。
另一位投資大師索羅斯透過索羅斯基金公司加碼ＳＰＤＲ黃金信託基金，看好未來黃金漲勢，卻也暗示索羅斯看空美元後市，但索羅斯大幅加碼花旗銀行、ＳＰＤＲ的金融信託基金、孟山都和福特汽車等股票。
巴菲特看好美國景氣復甦
從巴菲特加碼最多的股票看來，巴菲特對今年美國經濟景氣復甦有很大的信心。他同時加碼Wal-Mart一二０萬股，持股超過三九０萬股。去年第三季波克夏即大幅買進Wal-Mart股票，第四季持續加碼，顯示看好未來Wal-mart的獲利成長。
波克夏去年第四季大幅加碼的股票，還包括廢棄物處理公司的Public Services，文字儲存媒體的Iron Mountain，和南韓浦項鋼鐵等股票，浦項鋼鐵也是波克夏持股中唯一的鋼鐵股。
波克夏減碼能源、醫療股
巴菲特大幅減碼能源股，卻持續看好鐵路股。過去一直都是巴菲特大量持有的北方柏靈頓鐵路公司，波克夏在二月十二日完成對該公司股權的收購，並納入巴菲特旗下子公司，是不是意味著歐巴馬政府為了振興美國經濟要興建高速鐵路，而讓巴菲特看好鐵路股後市，值得玩味。
波克夏減碼醫療相關廠商的寶鹼公司、嬌生公司、健保福利公司的Wellpoint和UnitedHealth集團，減碼張數從二０五萬股到超過八、九百萬股都有，這可能和歐巴馬總統目前正大幅推動健保改革政策有關。
投資大師索羅斯透過旗下投資公司索羅斯基金公司，在去年第四季加碼ＳＰＤＲ的黃金信託基金ＥＴＦ三七三萬股，ＳＰＤＲ黃金信託基金的持股市值增加到六．七六億美元，是索羅斯基金公司旗下最高市值的持股，比第三季結束時僅持有二五０萬股的數量相比增加超過一倍。
索羅斯增持黃金ＥＴＦ
美元指數從去年十一月底的七四．一七點觸底反彈，目前已經反彈到八０．八四點，這波行情市場普遍以反彈波視之，是否會從反彈變成回升行情目前還很難論斷。索羅斯仍持續看空美元的後市，預期美元在短暫反彈後便會回跌，所以利用美元指數反彈與黃金呈現弱勢格局期間，回頭加碼黃金ＥＴＦ，以因應未來美元可能的貶值與黃金的漲勢。
雖然看空美元後市，但索羅斯卻看好美國金融股表現，利用去年第四季花旗銀行股價回檔時，大幅加碼九四七０萬股，讓該基金公司持有花旗銀行的持股市值上揚到三．二四億美元，是索羅斯基金公司第二大持股市值。去年第三季結束時，索羅斯基金公司並未持有花旗銀行的股票。
加碼金融股有志一同
索羅斯基金公司同時加碼ＳＰＤＲ的金融信託基金一一九八萬股，持股市值也上揚到一．七四億美元。不僅索羅斯看好美國金融股後市，這和波克夏去年第四季持續加碼富國銀行股票的情況雷同。在金融海嘯放空大賺二００億美元的華爾街避險基金經理人鮑爾森和明迪奇，也都在去年第四季透過旗下對沖基金買進五億股的花旗銀行股票。市場分析師認為，從巴菲特、索羅斯和其他知名基金經理人透過旗下投資公司買進金融股股票，凸顯美國金融股已經走出金融風暴的陰霾，長期投資金融股未來有利可圖。
索羅斯基金公司去年第四季增加持有全球最大種子與農藥公司孟山都持股二七五萬股，總股數增加到將近三九０萬股，持股市值也上揚到三．０二億美元。有別於巴菲特減碼醫藥股，索羅斯基金公司去年第四季增加輝瑞藥廠九０九萬股，加碼幅度相對偏多，持股市值增加到二．０八億美元。再者，索羅斯加碼綜合性能源開發商Suncor能源公司，並增加持股四五二萬股，這也和巴菲特大砍能源股的操作策略不同。
投資豈能無所求？
話說日前在一次演講會後，我碰到個慈眉善目的太太，拉著我，悄悄問了個問題：「我們投資股票，一定是有所求的，這樣以有所求的心態來投資股市，好嗎？對嗎？不會有煩惱嗎？」
嘿！這位朋友真是說中了許多良善投資人的大問題。
許許多多有宗教信仰的人，不論是學佛的、信基督的、一貫道的、法輪功的與回教徒等等，內心都會有一個想法，人生應該越單純越好，何必去股票市場裡攪動那一團渾水，去祈求那自私自利的金錢回報，最後卻換來一場虛空呢？
嘿！誰說宗教有禁絕人們去賺取正當財富呢？任何一個宗教的經典，都沒告訴我們，不該正當營生吧？所以，以有所求之心去賺取錢財，有何不對呢？
我多年來不斷的寫文章、分享正確的投資觀念，正是想要幫助這群在社會上兢兢業業工作，但卻常不善理財的一群善良人。我很希望這些朋友能與時俱進，內心不但要有正確信仰之餘，在投資理財的領域裡，也請down-load一套正確的理財觀念，以正確的有所求之心來創造個人應得的財富。
正確的有所求之心是什麼呢？
我認為是既能獨善其身，又能兼善天下的錢財。
當股市跌至谷底時，眾股民們哀號遍野，企業家因股價重挫而對公司經營哀愁不已時，投資人如果能以有所求之心，拿出一筆錢來，好好幫助這些企業家走出谷底，正是大功德一件。只要投資對象正確，則日後股市上漲，這個投資人能獲得股價價差或股利盈餘的回報，絕對獲利不菲。這個日後回報，一開始絕對是有所求的，不是無所求的。
但個人有所求的小利，若卻也能兼善其他股民、企業家與整個經濟社會，這豈非所求乎大的美事一樁呢？
當然，換個角度來說，當股市眾生都起貪念時，許多人爭相拿著現金要進入股市錦上添花時，一個心地善良的投資人卻不應該起大貪婪心，而應該是順勢拿回應得的利潤，退出這個喧囂的市場，好好享受手握現金之樂。這個現金，是要幫助家人生活更好的現金，也是持盈保泰，以備將來能逢低入市的下一輪投資準備金。
許多良善投資人不明白的道理是，在股票市場上要能立於不敗之地，不是無求，而是無貪。
求，是求一個正確的投資報酬率，一旦預設報酬率已經達到了，則落袋為安，這個有所求的獲利主控權將是落在我手上。
貪，則是隨著眾人的腳步一起執著，所以預設報酬率達到了仍不滿足，總希望再跟著眾人一起去撈一票、賺一把。這個獲利主控權，就因為這一念貪心而不知不覺跑到市場手上了。
沒人能知道股票市場會漲多久的，也沒人知道會跌多深。所以，與其將獲利希望寄託於市場的浮沉，不如寄託於自己的安步當車。
既然要寄託獲利於自己，則必然有所求。一個無所求的人，又何必泛舟而行，冒險到海上打魚呢？
投資絕對要有所求，但「求」字與「貪」字，一線之隔，卻決定了投資層次的高低之別與長期獲利能否保守之別。這個慈眉善目的太太，真的是問了一個好問題，我希望她聽了我的分析後，將能小舟從此去，股海上從此都有豐富的正財收入。
嘿！這位朋友真是說中了許多良善投資人的大問題。
許許多多有宗教信仰的人，不論是學佛的、信基督的、一貫道的、法輪功的與回教徒等等，內心都會有一個想法，人生應該越單純越好，何必去股票市場裡攪動那一團渾水，去祈求那自私自利的金錢回報，最後卻換來一場虛空呢？
嘿！誰說宗教有禁絕人們去賺取正當財富呢？任何一個宗教的經典，都沒告訴我們，不該正當營生吧？所以，以有所求之心去賺取錢財，有何不對呢？
我多年來不斷的寫文章、分享正確的投資觀念，正是想要幫助這群在社會上兢兢業業工作，但卻常不善理財的一群善良人。我很希望這些朋友能與時俱進，內心不但要有正確信仰之餘，在投資理財的領域裡，也請down-load一套正確的理財觀念，以正確的有所求之心來創造個人應得的財富。
正確的有所求之心是什麼呢？
我認為是既能獨善其身，又能兼善天下的錢財。
當股市跌至谷底時，眾股民們哀號遍野，企業家因股價重挫而對公司經營哀愁不已時，投資人如果能以有所求之心，拿出一筆錢來，好好幫助這些企業家走出谷底，正是大功德一件。只要投資對象正確，則日後股市上漲，這個投資人能獲得股價價差或股利盈餘的回報，絕對獲利不菲。這個日後回報，一開始絕對是有所求的，不是無所求的。
但個人有所求的小利，若卻也能兼善其他股民、企業家與整個經濟社會，這豈非所求乎大的美事一樁呢？
當然，換個角度來說，當股市眾生都起貪念時，許多人爭相拿著現金要進入股市錦上添花時，一個心地善良的投資人卻不應該起大貪婪心，而應該是順勢拿回應得的利潤，退出這個喧囂的市場，好好享受手握現金之樂。這個現金，是要幫助家人生活更好的現金，也是持盈保泰，以備將來能逢低入市的下一輪投資準備金。
許多良善投資人不明白的道理是，在股票市場上要能立於不敗之地，不是無求，而是無貪。
求，是求一個正確的投資報酬率，一旦預設報酬率已經達到了，則落袋為安，這個有所求的獲利主控權將是落在我手上。
貪，則是隨著眾人的腳步一起執著，所以預設報酬率達到了仍不滿足，總希望再跟著眾人一起去撈一票、賺一把。這個獲利主控權，就因為這一念貪心而不知不覺跑到市場手上了。
沒人能知道股票市場會漲多久的，也沒人知道會跌多深。所以，與其將獲利希望寄託於市場的浮沉，不如寄託於自己的安步當車。
既然要寄託獲利於自己，則必然有所求。一個無所求的人，又何必泛舟而行，冒險到海上打魚呢？
投資絕對要有所求，但「求」字與「貪」字，一線之隔，卻決定了投資層次的高低之別與長期獲利能否保守之別。這個慈眉善目的太太，真的是問了一個好問題，我希望她聽了我的分析後，將能小舟從此去，股海上從此都有豐富的正財收入。
John Paulson, Carl Icahn, George Soros and Eddie Lampert ups Financial Stocks
John Paulson, Edward Lampert and Carl Icahn were among those who raised their bets on financial stocks during the last three months of 2009, regulatory filings released on Tuesday and last week show.
Large investors are required to report holdings of U.S.-listed equities at the end of each quarter, but not short positions or holdings of other securities like bonds and over-the-counter derivatives contracts. Investors are also allowed to file some holdings on confidential reports if they are trading into or out of a position at the end of a quarter.
The reports, issued by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, are studied by investors for tips on how some of the savviest minds see the investment horizon.
CIT Group Inc, a provider of loans to small businesses and middle market companies, received a vote of confidence from several hedge fund managers for its emergence from bankruptcy in December.
Lampert’s RBS Partners LP reported a holding of 4.5 million shares in CIT as of December 31, and Paulson held 4.4 million shares at the end of the quarter.
CIT appointed John Thain, who helped engineer Merrill Lynch’s sale to Bank of America and then lost his job, as its new chief executive last week.
Paulson, the fund manager who made billions betting against the U.S. housing industry shortly before its collapse, now counts Citigroup and Bank of America among his largest holdings.
In the fourth quarter alone Paulson bought more than 200 million shares in Citi, raising his stake to $1.67 billion from $954 million, or about 8 percent of the fund’s total value.
Large stakes in Citi and Bank of America account for about 11 percent of almost $20 billion Paulson reported.
In the quarter, Paulson’s New York-based firm made fresh bets or raised existing ones on a number of financial firms, from JPMorgan Chase to Marshall & Isley, headquartered in Milwaukee.
Edward Lampert, long considered a savvy investor, has been a long-time holder of Citigroup. In the fourth quarter he significantly raised his stake in the bank to 31.3 million shares from the 18.8 million owned at the end of the third quarter.
Lampert’s Greenwich, Connecticut-based fund firm also placed new bets on Bank of America by buying 453,512 shares. He bought 1.5 million shares of Wells Fargo & Co during the fourth quarter as well.
Billionaire hedge fund manager George Soros also bought almost 95 million shares of Citigroup during the quarter, worth $313 million at year-end. Soros had reported no holdings in the troubled bank at the end of Q3.
Large investors are required to report holdings of U.S.-listed equities at the end of each quarter, but not short positions or holdings of other securities like bonds and over-the-counter derivatives contracts. Investors are also allowed to file some holdings on confidential reports if they are trading into or out of a position at the end of a quarter.
The reports, issued by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, are studied by investors for tips on how some of the savviest minds see the investment horizon.
CIT Group Inc, a provider of loans to small businesses and middle market companies, received a vote of confidence from several hedge fund managers for its emergence from bankruptcy in December.
Lampert’s RBS Partners LP reported a holding of 4.5 million shares in CIT as of December 31, and Paulson held 4.4 million shares at the end of the quarter.
CIT appointed John Thain, who helped engineer Merrill Lynch’s sale to Bank of America and then lost his job, as its new chief executive last week.
Paulson, the fund manager who made billions betting against the U.S. housing industry shortly before its collapse, now counts Citigroup and Bank of America among his largest holdings.
In the fourth quarter alone Paulson bought more than 200 million shares in Citi, raising his stake to $1.67 billion from $954 million, or about 8 percent of the fund’s total value.
Large stakes in Citi and Bank of America account for about 11 percent of almost $20 billion Paulson reported.
In the quarter, Paulson’s New York-based firm made fresh bets or raised existing ones on a number of financial firms, from JPMorgan Chase to Marshall & Isley, headquartered in Milwaukee.
Edward Lampert, long considered a savvy investor, has been a long-time holder of Citigroup. In the fourth quarter he significantly raised his stake in the bank to 31.3 million shares from the 18.8 million owned at the end of the third quarter.
Lampert’s Greenwich, Connecticut-based fund firm also placed new bets on Bank of America by buying 453,512 shares. He bought 1.5 million shares of Wells Fargo & Co during the fourth quarter as well.
Billionaire hedge fund manager George Soros also bought almost 95 million shares of Citigroup during the quarter, worth $313 million at year-end. Soros had reported no holdings in the troubled bank at the end of Q3.
晉身富豪的最後機會 35歲學投資
35 歲是人生分水嶺——35 歲以後想轉職，可能沒公司要你；想生小孩變得很吃力；自由了幾十年，單身的人更懶得嫁娶；沒買房子難免感到壓力；爬樓梯開始喘到不行。最可怕的是，工作應該滿10 年了，但存款數字卻可能讓人感到同情。
35 歲的各種難題，也許都有補救之道，但是只有財富沒辦法走捷徑。調查了周遭朋友一輪，希望什麼時候擁有財富自由，不再被工作壓得喘不過氣來？答案普遍落在50 ? 55 歲。我們知道，投資需要一段時間的複利累積，如果是個收入一般的上班族，想要達到所謂的財富自由，至少要花上15 ?20年。
所以，答案很明顯。35歲之後，生理上的優勢開始往下降，心理上的壓力卻開始往上增加，時間更是現實的提醒：只剩20 年了，如果不把握最後時機好好學投資，想要在55 歲時到處遊山玩水，或是希望妥善照顧家人，隨心所欲享受人生，根本不可能。
最長的青春期 35歲繼續「啃老」
台灣的6 年級生（30 ? 40 歲）不是很早熟、就是很晚熟。早熟的6 年級生，有人危機意識強，從學生時代就急著學習投資賺錢或創業，35 歲時已有千萬身價。但是更多的人則是晚熟一族，因此6年級生也被形容為「青春期最長的一個世代」——因為有超過三分之一的人不結婚，結婚了也不想生小孩，外表看起來遠比實際年輕，父母還健在，甚至還供應吃住，心態上仍把自己當個大孩子，沒什麼責任感，所以經常被形容為「啃老族」或「尼特族」（指無所事事的年輕人）。
但是同樣的世代，在一切向「錢」看的中國社會，卻是另一種景況。根據統計，中國擁有100 萬美元資產以上的富人，平均年齡僅34 歲，換句話說，這群人在35 歲之前已經取得富豪門票；而資產在1000 萬美元以上的富豪，平均年齡僅39 歲。中國的崛起，和人民追求財富的企圖心密不可分。
其實只要懷抱企圖心，35歲才開始想學投資並不晚，因為比起社會新鮮人，應該已經有機會存下第1 桶金在手，這第1 桶金的複利威力無窮。而就算還沒有第1 桶金，只要願意開始，都還來得及當上富豪。再晚，恐怕就只能平庸過一生。
大環境給壓力 35歲變成關卡
即使自己不給壓力，外在大環境也會很自然的讓人感覺35歲是個「關卡」。
根據人力銀行調查，近幾年經濟不景氣，不但新鮮人起薪到退回10 年前水準，失業率逐年攀升，許多企業更表示，錄用一般員工的年齡上限平均僅38歲，高達4成6的企業將上限定在35歲以下。如果35 歲前沒有在職場上站穩一席之地，隨著年齡漸長，要面對競爭力下降的問題，甚至淪為「窮忙族」，很忙，但很窮。
35歲也是離開固定職，出走創業的高峰期。經濟部中小企業處創業諮詢服務中心統計過，創業者平均年齡層介於31 ? 35 歲之間；美國哈佛商學院也做過調查，能夠建立高潛力企業的創業者，平均年齡就落在35歲。
此外，35歲同樣是生理與心理的關卡。根據醫學統計，大家知道女性過35 歲就是高齡產婦，台中榮總婦產部生殖醫學科主任陳明哲強調，男性也一樣。過了35 歲還想「做人」，精子已經開始有稀少和游不動的跡象，身體會自動發出提醒：「快喔，你要老化了。」
而荷蘭菲力普斯健康福祉中心最近剛做完研究，結果發現，35 歲的受訪者中，將近80% 擔心經濟狀況，75% 有健康保險方面的煩惱，這些壓力使原本40 歲才該有的中年危機，提前在35 歲到來。也就是現代人壽命雖長，卻又流失了5年的「青春」。
中年想過得好 35歲時要突破
星座專家星星王子表示，就星象的角度來看，35 歲會感到「該做什麼突破」的壓力，確實事出有因。「在星座命盤中，每隔12 年是一個大轉折，所以24 歲、36 歲、48 歲是關鍵數字。青年時代想過得好，要看24 歲時做到了什麼；中年時代想過得好，要看36 歲時做到了什麼；晚年時代想過的好，是看48歲時做到了什麼。」
在36 歲轉折年來臨之前，35 歲的人會不由自主感覺躁動，因為若沒在此時準備好、或是突破原來的窠臼，那中年時代可能就很普通了。這樣的說法，與日本管理學大師大前研一在《後50 歲的選擇》這本書中，描繪的如出一轍。
大前研一主要是針對日本高齡化社會來臨，大量人口年齡已經來到50 歲，之後還有很長的歲月要過，該怎麼過得精彩、甚至再度創造高峰？提出必須要看35 歲到50 歲之間，是否做出突破和創新的看法。根據大前延一的說法，35 歲到50 歲這15年，稱之為「魔?時期」。
這「魔?時期」中，習慣用傳統模式上班、過生活，卻無法創新的人，到了50 歲會發覺沒有任何成就，不知要怎麼面對剩下約30年的歲月。
累積財富亦是如此！願意開始的人，將享有財富不斷累加的「魔?時期」，等你到50 歲的時候，會發現可以達到的成果、可以享受的事物，遠比年輕時多太多。
如果35歲時有100萬元，假設每年報酬率20%，22 年後就能達到5000 萬元；如果35 歲時有300 萬元，同樣以每年報酬率20% 計算，20 年後就能有1 億元；如果35 歲時什麼積蓄都沒有，報酬率也不敢要求這麼高，沒關係，只要願意每個月扣3 萬元，每年報酬率有9%，20年後也有2000萬元。
提高財富自覺 搶領富豪門票
再從置產來看，由於房價拼命漲，全台灣的平均購屋年齡已是往上提高的趨勢，2008 年全台平均購屋年齡37.7歲，台北市為39.2歲，比起上一代多半工作幾年就買房，現在35 歲買得起房子的人，已愈來愈少。
我們要闡述的，不是一個「愈來愈難致富」的現象，相反的，我們認為現代人並非缺乏累積財富的能力，而是因為從小生活較優渥，比上一輩缺少累積財富的動力，最後輸給了時間。
後續篇章有侯秀靜、陳揚明、陳聖儀3 人的現身說法，他們開始學投資的時間，都超過35 歲，陳聖儀甚至遲至46 歲才開始投資，但是憑著工作、投資雙管齊下的努力，有人退休時，累積資產已經達到1.5億元！
他們的故事，想必能帶給讀者許多啟發與鼓勵，35歲開始學投資，有錢人俱樂部的最後門票等著發給你。如果超過35 歲的人也不需要氣餒，就算不當富豪，也絕對有機會達到安穩退休的門檻。
你，35歲了嗎？走吧，一起去領門票！
35 歲的各種難題，也許都有補救之道，但是只有財富沒辦法走捷徑。調查了周遭朋友一輪，希望什麼時候擁有財富自由，不再被工作壓得喘不過氣來？答案普遍落在50 ? 55 歲。我們知道，投資需要一段時間的複利累積，如果是個收入一般的上班族，想要達到所謂的財富自由，至少要花上15 ?20年。
所以，答案很明顯。35歲之後，生理上的優勢開始往下降，心理上的壓力卻開始往上增加，時間更是現實的提醒：只剩20 年了，如果不把握最後時機好好學投資，想要在55 歲時到處遊山玩水，或是希望妥善照顧家人，隨心所欲享受人生，根本不可能。
最長的青春期 35歲繼續「啃老」
台灣的6 年級生（30 ? 40 歲）不是很早熟、就是很晚熟。早熟的6 年級生，有人危機意識強，從學生時代就急著學習投資賺錢或創業，35 歲時已有千萬身價。但是更多的人則是晚熟一族，因此6年級生也被形容為「青春期最長的一個世代」——因為有超過三分之一的人不結婚，結婚了也不想生小孩，外表看起來遠比實際年輕，父母還健在，甚至還供應吃住，心態上仍把自己當個大孩子，沒什麼責任感，所以經常被形容為「啃老族」或「尼特族」（指無所事事的年輕人）。
但是同樣的世代，在一切向「錢」看的中國社會，卻是另一種景況。根據統計，中國擁有100 萬美元資產以上的富人，平均年齡僅34 歲，換句話說，這群人在35 歲之前已經取得富豪門票；而資產在1000 萬美元以上的富豪，平均年齡僅39 歲。中國的崛起，和人民追求財富的企圖心密不可分。
其實只要懷抱企圖心，35歲才開始想學投資並不晚，因為比起社會新鮮人，應該已經有機會存下第1 桶金在手，這第1 桶金的複利威力無窮。而就算還沒有第1 桶金，只要願意開始，都還來得及當上富豪。再晚，恐怕就只能平庸過一生。
大環境給壓力 35歲變成關卡
即使自己不給壓力，外在大環境也會很自然的讓人感覺35歲是個「關卡」。
根據人力銀行調查，近幾年經濟不景氣，不但新鮮人起薪到退回10 年前水準，失業率逐年攀升，許多企業更表示，錄用一般員工的年齡上限平均僅38歲，高達4成6的企業將上限定在35歲以下。如果35 歲前沒有在職場上站穩一席之地，隨著年齡漸長，要面對競爭力下降的問題，甚至淪為「窮忙族」，很忙，但很窮。
35歲也是離開固定職，出走創業的高峰期。經濟部中小企業處創業諮詢服務中心統計過，創業者平均年齡層介於31 ? 35 歲之間；美國哈佛商學院也做過調查，能夠建立高潛力企業的創業者，平均年齡就落在35歲。
此外，35歲同樣是生理與心理的關卡。根據醫學統計，大家知道女性過35 歲就是高齡產婦，台中榮總婦產部生殖醫學科主任陳明哲強調，男性也一樣。過了35 歲還想「做人」，精子已經開始有稀少和游不動的跡象，身體會自動發出提醒：「快喔，你要老化了。」
而荷蘭菲力普斯健康福祉中心最近剛做完研究，結果發現，35 歲的受訪者中，將近80% 擔心經濟狀況，75% 有健康保險方面的煩惱，這些壓力使原本40 歲才該有的中年危機，提前在35 歲到來。也就是現代人壽命雖長，卻又流失了5年的「青春」。
中年想過得好 35歲時要突破
星座專家星星王子表示，就星象的角度來看，35 歲會感到「該做什麼突破」的壓力，確實事出有因。「在星座命盤中，每隔12 年是一個大轉折，所以24 歲、36 歲、48 歲是關鍵數字。青年時代想過得好，要看24 歲時做到了什麼；中年時代想過得好，要看36 歲時做到了什麼；晚年時代想過的好，是看48歲時做到了什麼。」
在36 歲轉折年來臨之前，35 歲的人會不由自主感覺躁動，因為若沒在此時準備好、或是突破原來的窠臼，那中年時代可能就很普通了。這樣的說法，與日本管理學大師大前研一在《後50 歲的選擇》這本書中，描繪的如出一轍。
大前研一主要是針對日本高齡化社會來臨，大量人口年齡已經來到50 歲，之後還有很長的歲月要過，該怎麼過得精彩、甚至再度創造高峰？提出必須要看35 歲到50 歲之間，是否做出突破和創新的看法。根據大前延一的說法，35 歲到50 歲這15年，稱之為「魔?時期」。
這「魔?時期」中，習慣用傳統模式上班、過生活，卻無法創新的人，到了50 歲會發覺沒有任何成就，不知要怎麼面對剩下約30年的歲月。
累積財富亦是如此！願意開始的人，將享有財富不斷累加的「魔?時期」，等你到50 歲的時候，會發現可以達到的成果、可以享受的事物，遠比年輕時多太多。
如果35歲時有100萬元，假設每年報酬率20%，22 年後就能達到5000 萬元；如果35 歲時有300 萬元，同樣以每年報酬率20% 計算，20 年後就能有1 億元；如果35 歲時什麼積蓄都沒有，報酬率也不敢要求這麼高，沒關係，只要願意每個月扣3 萬元，每年報酬率有9%，20年後也有2000萬元。
提高財富自覺 搶領富豪門票
再從置產來看，由於房價拼命漲，全台灣的平均購屋年齡已是往上提高的趨勢，2008 年全台平均購屋年齡37.7歲，台北市為39.2歲，比起上一代多半工作幾年就買房，現在35 歲買得起房子的人，已愈來愈少。
我們要闡述的，不是一個「愈來愈難致富」的現象，相反的，我們認為現代人並非缺乏累積財富的能力，而是因為從小生活較優渥，比上一輩缺少累積財富的動力，最後輸給了時間。
後續篇章有侯秀靜、陳揚明、陳聖儀3 人的現身說法，他們開始學投資的時間，都超過35 歲，陳聖儀甚至遲至46 歲才開始投資，但是憑著工作、投資雙管齊下的努力，有人退休時，累積資產已經達到1.5億元！
他們的故事，想必能帶給讀者許多啟發與鼓勵，35歲開始學投資，有錢人俱樂部的最後門票等著發給你。如果超過35 歲的人也不需要氣餒，就算不當富豪，也絕對有機會達到安穩退休的門檻。
你，35歲了嗎？走吧，一起去領門票！
Rules That Warren Buffett Lives By
Warren Buffett is arguably the world's greatest stock investor. He's also a bit of a philosopher. He pares down his investment ideas into simple, memorable sound bites. Do you know what his homespun sayings really mean? Does his philosophy hold up in today's difficult environment? Find out below.
"Rule No. 1: Never Lose Money. Rule No. 2: Never Forget Rule No. 1."
Buffett personally lost about $23 billion in the financial crisis of 2008, and his company, Berkshire Hathaway, lost its revered AAA ratings. So how can he tell us to never lose money?
He's referring to the mindset of a sensible investor. Don't be frivolous. Don't gamble. Don't go into an investment with a cavalier attitude that it's OK to lose. Be informed. Do your homework. Buffett invests only in companies he thoroughly researches and understands. He doesn't go into an investment prepared to lose, and neither should you.
Buffett believes the most important quality for an investor is temperament, not intellect. A successful investor doesn't focus on being with or against the crowd.
The stock market will swing up and down. But in good times and bad, Buffett stays focused on his goals. So should we. (This esteemed investor rarely changes his long-term investing strategy no matter what the market does.
"If The Business Does Well, the Stock Eventually Follows"
The Intelligent Investor by Benjamin Graham convinced Buffett that investing in a stock equates to owning a piece of the business. So when he searches for a stock to invest in, Buffett seeks out businesses that exhibit favorable long-term prospects. Does the company have a consistent operating history? Does it have a dominant business franchise? Is the business generating high and sustainable profit margins? If the company's share price is trading below expectations for its future growth, then it's a stock Buffett may want to own.
Buffett never buys anything unless he can write down his reasons why he'll pay a specific price per share for a particular company. Do you do the same?
"It's Far Better to Buy a Wonderful Company at a Fair Price Than a Fair Company at a Wonderful Price"
Buffett is a value investor who likes to buy quality stocks at rock-bottom prices. His real goal is to build more and more operating power for Berkshire Hathaway by owning stocks that will generate solid profits and capital appreciation for years to come. When the markets reeled during the recent financial crisis, Buffett was stockpiling great long-term investments by investing billions in names like General Electric and Goldman Sachs.
To pick stocks well, investors must set down criteria for uncovering good businesses, and stick to their discipline. You might, for example, seek companies that offer a durable product or service and also have solid operating earnings and the germ for future profits. You might establish a minimum market capitalization you're willing to accept, and a maximum P/E ratio or debt level. Finding the right company at the right price -- with a margin for safety against unknown market risk -- is the ultimate goal.
Remember, the price you pay for a stock isn't the same as the value you get. Successful investors know the difference.
"Our Favorite Holding Period Is Forever"
How long should you hold a stock? Buffett says if you don't feel comfortable owning a stock for 10 years, you shouldn't own it for 10 minutes. Even during the period he called the "Financial Pearl Harbor," Buffett loyally held on to the bulk of his portfolio.
Unless a company has suffered a sea change in prospects, such as impossible labor problems or product obsolescence, a long holding period will keep an investor from acting too human. That is, being too fearful or too greedy can cause investors to sell stocks at the bottom or buy at the peak -- and destroy portfolio appreciation for the long run.
You may think the recent financial meltdown changed things, but don't be fooled: those unfussy sayings from the Oracle of Omaha still RULE!
"Rule No. 1: Never Lose Money. Rule No. 2: Never Forget Rule No. 1."
Buffett personally lost about $23 billion in the financial crisis of 2008, and his company, Berkshire Hathaway, lost its revered AAA ratings. So how can he tell us to never lose money?
He's referring to the mindset of a sensible investor. Don't be frivolous. Don't gamble. Don't go into an investment with a cavalier attitude that it's OK to lose. Be informed. Do your homework. Buffett invests only in companies he thoroughly researches and understands. He doesn't go into an investment prepared to lose, and neither should you.
Buffett believes the most important quality for an investor is temperament, not intellect. A successful investor doesn't focus on being with or against the crowd.
The stock market will swing up and down. But in good times and bad, Buffett stays focused on his goals. So should we. (This esteemed investor rarely changes his long-term investing strategy no matter what the market does.
"If The Business Does Well, the Stock Eventually Follows"
The Intelligent Investor by Benjamin Graham convinced Buffett that investing in a stock equates to owning a piece of the business. So when he searches for a stock to invest in, Buffett seeks out businesses that exhibit favorable long-term prospects. Does the company have a consistent operating history? Does it have a dominant business franchise? Is the business generating high and sustainable profit margins? If the company's share price is trading below expectations for its future growth, then it's a stock Buffett may want to own.
Buffett never buys anything unless he can write down his reasons why he'll pay a specific price per share for a particular company. Do you do the same?
"It's Far Better to Buy a Wonderful Company at a Fair Price Than a Fair Company at a Wonderful Price"
Buffett is a value investor who likes to buy quality stocks at rock-bottom prices. His real goal is to build more and more operating power for Berkshire Hathaway by owning stocks that will generate solid profits and capital appreciation for years to come. When the markets reeled during the recent financial crisis, Buffett was stockpiling great long-term investments by investing billions in names like General Electric and Goldman Sachs.
To pick stocks well, investors must set down criteria for uncovering good businesses, and stick to their discipline. You might, for example, seek companies that offer a durable product or service and also have solid operating earnings and the germ for future profits. You might establish a minimum market capitalization you're willing to accept, and a maximum P/E ratio or debt level. Finding the right company at the right price -- with a margin for safety against unknown market risk -- is the ultimate goal.
Remember, the price you pay for a stock isn't the same as the value you get. Successful investors know the difference.
"Our Favorite Holding Period Is Forever"
How long should you hold a stock? Buffett says if you don't feel comfortable owning a stock for 10 years, you shouldn't own it for 10 minutes. Even during the period he called the "Financial Pearl Harbor," Buffett loyally held on to the bulk of his portfolio.
Unless a company has suffered a sea change in prospects, such as impossible labor problems or product obsolescence, a long holding period will keep an investor from acting too human. That is, being too fearful or too greedy can cause investors to sell stocks at the bottom or buy at the peak -- and destroy portfolio appreciation for the long run.
You may think the recent financial meltdown changed things, but don't be fooled: those unfussy sayings from the Oracle of Omaha still RULE!
Think Like Warren Buffett
Back in 1999, Robert G. Hagstrom wrote a book about the legendary investor Warren Buffett, entitled "The Warren Buffett Portfolio". What's so great about the book, and what makes it different from the countless other books and articles written about the "Oracle of Omaha" is that it offers the reader valuable insight into how Buffett actually thinks about investments. In other words, the book delves into the psychological mindset that has made Buffett so fabulously wealthy.
Although investors could benefit from reading the entire book, we've selected a bite-sized sampling of the tips and suggestions regarding the investor mindset and ways that an investor can improve their stock selection that will help you get inside Buffett's head.
1. Think of Stocks as a Business
Many investors think of stocks and the stock market in general as nothing more than little pieces of paper being traded back and forth among investors, which might help prevent investors from becoming too emotional over a given position but it doesn't necessarily allow them to make the best possible investment decisions.
That's why Buffett has stated he believes stockholders should think of themselves as "part owners" of the business in which they are investing. By thinking that way, both Hagstrom and Buffett argue that investors will tend to avoid making off-the-cuff investment decisions, and become more focused on the longer term. Furthermore, longer-term "owners" also tend to analyze situations in greater detail and then put a great eal of thought into buy and sell decisions. Hagstrom says this increased thought and analysis tends to lead to improved investment returns.
2. Increase the Size of Your Investment
While it rarely - if ever - makes sense for investors to "put all of their eggs in one basket," putting all your eggs in too many baskets may not be a good thing either. Buffett contends that over-diversification can hamper returns as much as a lack of diversification. That's why he doesn't invest in mutual funds. It's also why he prefers to make significant investments in just a handful of companies.
Buffett is a firm believer that an investor must first do his or her homework before investing in any security. But after that due diligence process is completed, an investor should feel comfortable enough to dedicate a sizable portion of assets to that stock. They should also feel comfortable in winnowing down their overall investment portfolio to a handful of good companies with excellent growth prospects.
Buffett's stance on taking time to properly allocate your funds is furthered with his comment that it's not just about the best company, but how you feel about the company. If the best business you own presents the least financial risk and has the most favorable long-term prospects, why would you put money into your 20th favorite business rather than add money to the top choices?
3. Reduce Portfolio Turnover
Rapidly trading in and out of stocks can potentially make an individual a lot of money, but according to Buffett this trader is actually hampering his or her investment returns. That's because portfolio turnover increases the amount of taxes that must be paid on capital gains and boosts the total amount of commission dollars that must be paid in a given year.
The "Oracle" contends that what makes sense in business also makes sense in stocks: An investor should ordinarily hold a small piece of an outstanding business with the same tenacity that an owner would exhibit if he owned all of that business.
Investors must think long term. By having that mindset, they can avoid paying huge commission fees and lofty short-term capital gains taxes. They'll also be more apt to ride out any short-term fluctuations in the business, and to ultimately reap the rewards of increased earnings and/or dividends over time.
4. Develop Alternative Benchmarks
While stock prices may be the ultimate barometer of the success or failure of a given investment choice, Buffett does not focus on this metric. Instead, he analyzes and pores over the underlying economics of a given business or group of businesses. If a company is doing what it takes to grow itself on a profitable basis, then the share price will ultimately take care of itself.
Successful investors must look at the companies they own and study their true earnings potential. If the fundamentals are solid and the company is enhancing shareholder value by generating consistent bottom-line growth, the share price, in the long term, should reflect that.
5. Learn to Think in Probabilities
Bridge is a card game in which the most successful players are able to judge mathematical probabilities to beat their opponents. Perhaps not surprisingly, Buffett loves and actively plays the game, and he takes the strategies beyond the game into the investing world.
Buffett suggests that investors focus on the economics of the companies they own (in other words the underlying businesses), and then try to weigh the probability that certain events will or will not transpire, much like a Bridge player checking the probabilities of his opponents' hands. He adds that by focusing on the economic aspect of the equation and not the stock price, an investor will be more accurate in his or her ability to judge probability.
Thinking in probabilities has its advantages. For example, an investor that ponders the probability that a company will report a certain rate of earnings growth over a period of five or 10 years is much more apt to ride out short-term fluctuations in the share price. By extension, this means that his investment returns are likely to be superior and that he will also realize fewer transaction and/or capital gains costs.
6. Recognize the Psychological Aspects of Investing
Very simply, this means that individuals must understand that there is a psychological mindset that the successful investor tends to have. More specifically, the successful investor will focus on probabilities and economic issues and let decisions be ruled by rational, as opposed to emotional, thinking.
More than anything, investors' own emotions can be their worst enemy. Buffett contends that the key to overcoming emotions is being able to "retain your belief in the real fundamentals of the business and to not get too concerned about the stock market."
Investors should realize that there is a certain psychological mindset that they should have if they want to be successful and try to implement that mindset.
7. Ignore Market Forecasts
There is an old saying that the Dow "climbs a wall of worry". In other words, in spite of the negativity in the marketplace, and those who perpetually contend that a recession is "just around the corner", the markets have fared quite well over time. Therefore, doomsayers should be ignored.
On the other side of the coin, there are just as many eternal optimists who argue that the stock market is headed perpetually higher. These should be ignored as well.
In all this confusion, Buffett suggests that investors should focus their efforts of isolating and investing in shares that are not currently being accurately valued by the market. The logic here is that as the stock market begins to realize the company's intrinsic value (through higher prices and greater demand), the investor will stand to make a lot of money.
8. Wait for the Fat Pitch
Hagstrom's book uses the model of legendary baseball player Ted Williams as an example of a wise investor. Williams would wait for a specific pitch (in an area of the plate where he knew he had a high probability of making contact with the ball) before swinging. It is said that this discipline enabled Williams to have a higher lifetime batting average than the average player.
Buffett, in the same way, suggests that all investors act as if they owned a lifetime decision card with only 20 investment choice punches in it. The logic is that this should prevent them from making mediocre investment choices and hopefully, by extension, enhance the overall returns of their respective portfolios.
Bottom Line
"The Warren Buffett Portfolio" is a timeless book that offers valuable insight into the psychological mindset of the legendary investor Warren Buffett. Of course, if learning how to invest like Warren Buffett were as easy as reading a book, everyone would be rich! But if you take that time and effort to implement some of Buffett's proven strategies, you could be on your way to better stock selection and greater returns.
Although investors could benefit from reading the entire book, we've selected a bite-sized sampling of the tips and suggestions regarding the investor mindset and ways that an investor can improve their stock selection that will help you get inside Buffett's head.
1. Think of Stocks as a Business
Many investors think of stocks and the stock market in general as nothing more than little pieces of paper being traded back and forth among investors, which might help prevent investors from becoming too emotional over a given position but it doesn't necessarily allow them to make the best possible investment decisions.
That's why Buffett has stated he believes stockholders should think of themselves as "part owners" of the business in which they are investing. By thinking that way, both Hagstrom and Buffett argue that investors will tend to avoid making off-the-cuff investment decisions, and become more focused on the longer term. Furthermore, longer-term "owners" also tend to analyze situations in greater detail and then put a great eal of thought into buy and sell decisions. Hagstrom says this increased thought and analysis tends to lead to improved investment returns.
2. Increase the Size of Your Investment
While it rarely - if ever - makes sense for investors to "put all of their eggs in one basket," putting all your eggs in too many baskets may not be a good thing either. Buffett contends that over-diversification can hamper returns as much as a lack of diversification. That's why he doesn't invest in mutual funds. It's also why he prefers to make significant investments in just a handful of companies.
Buffett is a firm believer that an investor must first do his or her homework before investing in any security. But after that due diligence process is completed, an investor should feel comfortable enough to dedicate a sizable portion of assets to that stock. They should also feel comfortable in winnowing down their overall investment portfolio to a handful of good companies with excellent growth prospects.
Buffett's stance on taking time to properly allocate your funds is furthered with his comment that it's not just about the best company, but how you feel about the company. If the best business you own presents the least financial risk and has the most favorable long-term prospects, why would you put money into your 20th favorite business rather than add money to the top choices?
3. Reduce Portfolio Turnover
Rapidly trading in and out of stocks can potentially make an individual a lot of money, but according to Buffett this trader is actually hampering his or her investment returns. That's because portfolio turnover increases the amount of taxes that must be paid on capital gains and boosts the total amount of commission dollars that must be paid in a given year.
The "Oracle" contends that what makes sense in business also makes sense in stocks: An investor should ordinarily hold a small piece of an outstanding business with the same tenacity that an owner would exhibit if he owned all of that business.
Investors must think long term. By having that mindset, they can avoid paying huge commission fees and lofty short-term capital gains taxes. They'll also be more apt to ride out any short-term fluctuations in the business, and to ultimately reap the rewards of increased earnings and/or dividends over time.
4. Develop Alternative Benchmarks
While stock prices may be the ultimate barometer of the success or failure of a given investment choice, Buffett does not focus on this metric. Instead, he analyzes and pores over the underlying economics of a given business or group of businesses. If a company is doing what it takes to grow itself on a profitable basis, then the share price will ultimately take care of itself.
Successful investors must look at the companies they own and study their true earnings potential. If the fundamentals are solid and the company is enhancing shareholder value by generating consistent bottom-line growth, the share price, in the long term, should reflect that.
5. Learn to Think in Probabilities
Bridge is a card game in which the most successful players are able to judge mathematical probabilities to beat their opponents. Perhaps not surprisingly, Buffett loves and actively plays the game, and he takes the strategies beyond the game into the investing world.
Buffett suggests that investors focus on the economics of the companies they own (in other words the underlying businesses), and then try to weigh the probability that certain events will or will not transpire, much like a Bridge player checking the probabilities of his opponents' hands. He adds that by focusing on the economic aspect of the equation and not the stock price, an investor will be more accurate in his or her ability to judge probability.
Thinking in probabilities has its advantages. For example, an investor that ponders the probability that a company will report a certain rate of earnings growth over a period of five or 10 years is much more apt to ride out short-term fluctuations in the share price. By extension, this means that his investment returns are likely to be superior and that he will also realize fewer transaction and/or capital gains costs.
6. Recognize the Psychological Aspects of Investing
Very simply, this means that individuals must understand that there is a psychological mindset that the successful investor tends to have. More specifically, the successful investor will focus on probabilities and economic issues and let decisions be ruled by rational, as opposed to emotional, thinking.
More than anything, investors' own emotions can be their worst enemy. Buffett contends that the key to overcoming emotions is being able to "retain your belief in the real fundamentals of the business and to not get too concerned about the stock market."
Investors should realize that there is a certain psychological mindset that they should have if they want to be successful and try to implement that mindset.
7. Ignore Market Forecasts
There is an old saying that the Dow "climbs a wall of worry". In other words, in spite of the negativity in the marketplace, and those who perpetually contend that a recession is "just around the corner", the markets have fared quite well over time. Therefore, doomsayers should be ignored.
On the other side of the coin, there are just as many eternal optimists who argue that the stock market is headed perpetually higher. These should be ignored as well.
In all this confusion, Buffett suggests that investors should focus their efforts of isolating and investing in shares that are not currently being accurately valued by the market. The logic here is that as the stock market begins to realize the company's intrinsic value (through higher prices and greater demand), the investor will stand to make a lot of money.
8. Wait for the Fat Pitch
Hagstrom's book uses the model of legendary baseball player Ted Williams as an example of a wise investor. Williams would wait for a specific pitch (in an area of the plate where he knew he had a high probability of making contact with the ball) before swinging. It is said that this discipline enabled Williams to have a higher lifetime batting average than the average player.
Buffett, in the same way, suggests that all investors act as if they owned a lifetime decision card with only 20 investment choice punches in it. The logic is that this should prevent them from making mediocre investment choices and hopefully, by extension, enhance the overall returns of their respective portfolios.
Bottom Line
"The Warren Buffett Portfolio" is a timeless book that offers valuable insight into the psychological mindset of the legendary investor Warren Buffett. Of course, if learning how to invest like Warren Buffett were as easy as reading a book, everyone would be rich! But if you take that time and effort to implement some of Buffett's proven strategies, you could be on your way to better stock selection and greater returns.
Friday, February 26, 2010
高盛与希腊政府对赌合同曝光 曾建议中国救急
虽然市场传闻德国正在考虑要求欧元区政府帮助希腊提供价值200亿-250亿欧元（340亿美元）贷款和担保，德国也将提供20%的援助。但2月20日，德国财长表示，没有具体救助希腊的计划。
这让绵延数月的希腊政府债务危机还将雾里看花——2月16日，欧洲曾开会，给希腊政府债务危机一个月时间周旋。
如果欧洲也不是那么善于遗忘的话，他们或许还曾记得，造成希腊这次可能动摇欧洲的债务危机，正是9年前高盛掀起的那场“影子业务”所赐。
它将不动用高盛资产负债表，仅以一张张合同形式存在的衍生品交易，互换这些希腊债务中获利。
这些本质上就是一份份“对赌合同”。在金融市场发生波动的时候，可能会给高盛集团带来超高的“意外收益”。但是也有可能给高盛带来超高的“意外损失”。
对于高盛来说，这笔新的国家生意似乎志在必得。但对于关系世界时局的公众来说，还有些容易被忽视的细节，对未来中国的选择具有意义。
欧洲影子帝国
2月18日，希腊财政部宣布克里斯特多罗（Petros Christodoulou）将取代帕帕尼科拉乌(Spyros Papanicolaou)成为新的希腊公共债务管理局局长。
这位新上任的“救火队员”迅速引起外界关注，原因是他过去的工作经历里有着一个显赫的名字——高盛。在1998年加入希腊国民银行之前，克里斯特多罗曾为瑞信、高盛以及JP摩根这些国际金融巨头效力。
希腊财政部宣布这次人事调动的时机也很耐人寻味，根据欧盟的要求，希腊政府需要在2月19日之前解释希腊政府和高盛集团之间曾经作出的货币互换交易。
在这场舆论漩涡中，任何一个和高盛沾上关系的欧洲财政官员都被不可避免地接受了舆论的审查。2005年12月底接受任命担任意大利央行行长的德拉吉(Mario Draghi)，也因为曾经是高盛副总裁的身份而遭到了质疑。
在希腊公债局换帅前一天，2月17日，意大利央行发言人不得不为德拉吉辩护，“德拉吉获高盛任命是在高盛与希腊达成互换协议之前，他和这些交易毫无关系。”
但是高盛在这场债务风波中的身份已经掀起波澜。法国、意大利都加入到了希腊人的队伍里，把指责的枪口对准了高盛以及在他们国家身居要位的“高盛毕业生”。
英国的《每日电 信报》甚至刊登文章，表示意大利人已经怀疑高盛才是这个国家的真正统治者——因为意大利前总理罗马诺·普罗迪(Romano Prodi)，央行行长德拉吉，前副财长托诺尼（Massimo Tononi.）都曾经是高盛的员工。
而这一次，正在崛起的中国，出现在高盛和希腊的视线里。
根据《金融时报》的消息，高盛集团首席运营官盖瑞·柯恩于去年11月和今年1月两次前往希腊会见希腊总理乔治·帕潘德里欧和其他希腊高级官员，而他将代表希腊政府向中国政府和中国国家外汇管理局推介大约250亿欧元的希腊债券，希望能依靠中国的资金为希腊解债务之急。
此前高盛曾建议中国银行入股希腊国民银行，并对中投公司也提出过类似的建议。
债务加减法：互换魔术
当希腊债务危机爆发，有席卷欧元区之势时，欧洲才猛然想起9年前高盛在希腊的那笔国家生意。
2001年，希腊加入欧元区之后不久，高盛和希腊政府进行了一系列货币互换协议来帮助希腊掩盖其日益增长的赤字问题。
事实上，希腊并不是唯一一个这么做的国家，意大利也是其中之一。
在2001年至2002年之间，高盛给希腊政府献出了“货币互换”的计策：高盛通过货币掉期交易，替希腊政府借到了数10亿美元。
这个消息并没有对外公布，这个款项也没有列入到希腊的主权债务表上。
从技术层面上说，高盛的这种做法并不违法。希腊政府采取了高盛的建议。但两者间的协议并没有向投资者公布。
根据彭博社对希腊债券发行公开说明书的审查，高盛在给希腊政府安排货币互换交易之后，为希腊政府承销了10次债券发行，但至少6次都未提及该互换事宜。欧盟金融监管机构对此表示一无所知，直到最近才有所了解。
希腊政府只是在2002年之前采用过互换的方法减少债务。就这样时间就静悄悄地过去了，直到最近希腊债务危机爆发，很快希腊政府和高盛当年的协议成为所有人关注的焦点。
影子业务
在做希腊的这笔国家生意时，这项业务也同样难以在高盛的报告中寻觅踪影。
“谁也无法估量这一块处于监管之外的‘影子业务’，会给高盛，以及其它华尔街的其它投行，带来多大的风险。”
这些不动用高盛资产负债表，仅以一张张合同形式存在的衍生品交易，本质上就是一份份“对赌合同”。在金融市场发生波动的时候，可能会给高盛集团带来超高的“意外收益”。但是也有可能给高盛带来超高的“意外损失”。
“其实高盛以及其它投行最大的问题，还在那些非现金的衍生品交易合同上”，一位高盛内部人士这样告诉记者。
仅信用违约互换产品（CDS）一项产品，据衍生品交易游说机构ISBA统计，仅美国市场上CDS名义交易量就已经高达15..5万亿美元之巨。如果按实际交易仅占名义交量额1%估计，实际交易额也高达1550亿美元左右。
这一块“影子业务”所带来的潜在巨大风险或者巨大利润，带给高盛和华尔街大行的，是一个充满不确定性的未来。
作为全球大行，高盛并非只主导了美国的市场。在远在欧洲的希腊，高盛也深深的卷入这场主权债务中。
直至现在，希腊债务危机带来的漩涡里，发现了高盛的影子。
等待中国？
希腊债务危机已经引发欧洲列国复杂的政治较量。
拯救一个国家的支付危机本应是国际货币基金组织。在本轮经济危机中，国际货币基金组织已经为45个深陷危机的国家提供了贷款。但在希腊一案，欧洲大陆国家却强力阻拦国际货币基金组织插手。德国财政部长Wolfgang Schaeuble上周表示：“希腊显然不是国际货币基金组织的问题。”
德国是欧洲最大的经济体和鼎力支持欧盟的国家。希腊危机爆发以后，德国总理默克尔（Angela Markel）俨然担起保护欧元免遭市场狙击的责任。
而欧盟中的非欧元成员国则更愿意看到IMF向希腊伸出援手。瑞典就是其中典型。瑞典财政部长Ander Borg日前针锋相对地指出：“在希腊债务问题上谈IMF不应该被视作禁语。”瑞典至今没有加入欧元区。
让形势变得更加复杂的是法国政局。如今的国际货币基金组织总裁卡恩是法国最受欢迎的政治家之一，被认为有希望在2012年竞选法国总统。他本人曾在2007年法国总统选举中挑战过萨科齐。“如由IMF出手救助希腊，将增加卡恩的政治资本。”路透社驻华盛顿记者Lesley Wroughton写道。
希腊债务危机也牵扯着美国总统的神经。据白宫新闻发言人吉布斯透露，2月16日，奥巴马总统在例行经济工作会议上，要求财政部长盖特纳等人向他汇报了希腊支付危机的最新情况。
吉布斯表示十分支持欧洲对希腊展开救援。
但对于关系世界时局的公众来说，还有些容易被忽视的细节。
2月11日夜晚，雅典虽然仍有寒意，希腊总统帕普利亚斯亲自到中国驻希腊大使官邸做客，与中国朋友一起庆祝中国农历新年。他说，在现在这样一个需要平衡的社会里，他非常看重中国在当今世界上的重要作用。
在希腊债务危局还进行时，这似乎耐人寻味。希腊财政部曾经发表声明，否认试图向中国出售债券。但是，希腊财长乔治·帕帕康斯坦丁同时又表示将在今年2月将率团访问美国和亚洲，并在北京、上海和香港停留。
这让绵延数月的希腊政府债务危机还将雾里看花——2月16日，欧洲曾开会，给希腊政府债务危机一个月时间周旋。
如果欧洲也不是那么善于遗忘的话，他们或许还曾记得，造成希腊这次可能动摇欧洲的债务危机，正是9年前高盛掀起的那场“影子业务”所赐。
它将不动用高盛资产负债表，仅以一张张合同形式存在的衍生品交易，互换这些希腊债务中获利。
这些本质上就是一份份“对赌合同”。在金融市场发生波动的时候，可能会给高盛集团带来超高的“意外收益”。但是也有可能给高盛带来超高的“意外损失”。
对于高盛来说，这笔新的国家生意似乎志在必得。但对于关系世界时局的公众来说，还有些容易被忽视的细节，对未来中国的选择具有意义。
欧洲影子帝国
2月18日，希腊财政部宣布克里斯特多罗（Petros Christodoulou）将取代帕帕尼科拉乌(Spyros Papanicolaou)成为新的希腊公共债务管理局局长。
这位新上任的“救火队员”迅速引起外界关注，原因是他过去的工作经历里有着一个显赫的名字——高盛。在1998年加入希腊国民银行之前，克里斯特多罗曾为瑞信、高盛以及JP摩根这些国际金融巨头效力。
希腊财政部宣布这次人事调动的时机也很耐人寻味，根据欧盟的要求，希腊政府需要在2月19日之前解释希腊政府和高盛集团之间曾经作出的货币互换交易。
在这场舆论漩涡中，任何一个和高盛沾上关系的欧洲财政官员都被不可避免地接受了舆论的审查。2005年12月底接受任命担任意大利央行行长的德拉吉(Mario Draghi)，也因为曾经是高盛副总裁的身份而遭到了质疑。
在希腊公债局换帅前一天，2月17日，意大利央行发言人不得不为德拉吉辩护，“德拉吉获高盛任命是在高盛与希腊达成互换协议之前，他和这些交易毫无关系。”
但是高盛在这场债务风波中的身份已经掀起波澜。法国、意大利都加入到了希腊人的队伍里，把指责的枪口对准了高盛以及在他们国家身居要位的“高盛毕业生”。
英国的《每日电 信报》甚至刊登文章，表示意大利人已经怀疑高盛才是这个国家的真正统治者——因为意大利前总理罗马诺·普罗迪(Romano Prodi)，央行行长德拉吉，前副财长托诺尼（Massimo Tononi.）都曾经是高盛的员工。
而这一次，正在崛起的中国，出现在高盛和希腊的视线里。
根据《金融时报》的消息，高盛集团首席运营官盖瑞·柯恩于去年11月和今年1月两次前往希腊会见希腊总理乔治·帕潘德里欧和其他希腊高级官员，而他将代表希腊政府向中国政府和中国国家外汇管理局推介大约250亿欧元的希腊债券，希望能依靠中国的资金为希腊解债务之急。
此前高盛曾建议中国银行入股希腊国民银行，并对中投公司也提出过类似的建议。
债务加减法：互换魔术
当希腊债务危机爆发，有席卷欧元区之势时，欧洲才猛然想起9年前高盛在希腊的那笔国家生意。
2001年，希腊加入欧元区之后不久，高盛和希腊政府进行了一系列货币互换协议来帮助希腊掩盖其日益增长的赤字问题。
事实上，希腊并不是唯一一个这么做的国家，意大利也是其中之一。
在2001年至2002年之间，高盛给希腊政府献出了“货币互换”的计策：高盛通过货币掉期交易，替希腊政府借到了数10亿美元。
这个消息并没有对外公布，这个款项也没有列入到希腊的主权债务表上。
从技术层面上说，高盛的这种做法并不违法。希腊政府采取了高盛的建议。但两者间的协议并没有向投资者公布。
根据彭博社对希腊债券发行公开说明书的审查，高盛在给希腊政府安排货币互换交易之后，为希腊政府承销了10次债券发行，但至少6次都未提及该互换事宜。欧盟金融监管机构对此表示一无所知，直到最近才有所了解。
希腊政府只是在2002年之前采用过互换的方法减少债务。就这样时间就静悄悄地过去了，直到最近希腊债务危机爆发，很快希腊政府和高盛当年的协议成为所有人关注的焦点。
影子业务
在做希腊的这笔国家生意时，这项业务也同样难以在高盛的报告中寻觅踪影。
“谁也无法估量这一块处于监管之外的‘影子业务’，会给高盛，以及其它华尔街的其它投行，带来多大的风险。”
这些不动用高盛资产负债表，仅以一张张合同形式存在的衍生品交易，本质上就是一份份“对赌合同”。在金融市场发生波动的时候，可能会给高盛集团带来超高的“意外收益”。但是也有可能给高盛带来超高的“意外损失”。
“其实高盛以及其它投行最大的问题，还在那些非现金的衍生品交易合同上”，一位高盛内部人士这样告诉记者。
仅信用违约互换产品（CDS）一项产品，据衍生品交易游说机构ISBA统计，仅美国市场上CDS名义交易量就已经高达15..5万亿美元之巨。如果按实际交易仅占名义交量额1%估计，实际交易额也高达1550亿美元左右。
这一块“影子业务”所带来的潜在巨大风险或者巨大利润，带给高盛和华尔街大行的，是一个充满不确定性的未来。
作为全球大行，高盛并非只主导了美国的市场。在远在欧洲的希腊，高盛也深深的卷入这场主权债务中。
直至现在，希腊债务危机带来的漩涡里，发现了高盛的影子。
等待中国？
希腊债务危机已经引发欧洲列国复杂的政治较量。
拯救一个国家的支付危机本应是国际货币基金组织。在本轮经济危机中，国际货币基金组织已经为45个深陷危机的国家提供了贷款。但在希腊一案，欧洲大陆国家却强力阻拦国际货币基金组织插手。德国财政部长Wolfgang Schaeuble上周表示：“希腊显然不是国际货币基金组织的问题。”
德国是欧洲最大的经济体和鼎力支持欧盟的国家。希腊危机爆发以后，德国总理默克尔（Angela Markel）俨然担起保护欧元免遭市场狙击的责任。
而欧盟中的非欧元成员国则更愿意看到IMF向希腊伸出援手。瑞典就是其中典型。瑞典财政部长Ander Borg日前针锋相对地指出：“在希腊债务问题上谈IMF不应该被视作禁语。”瑞典至今没有加入欧元区。
让形势变得更加复杂的是法国政局。如今的国际货币基金组织总裁卡恩是法国最受欢迎的政治家之一，被认为有希望在2012年竞选法国总统。他本人曾在2007年法国总统选举中挑战过萨科齐。“如由IMF出手救助希腊，将增加卡恩的政治资本。”路透社驻华盛顿记者Lesley Wroughton写道。
希腊债务危机也牵扯着美国总统的神经。据白宫新闻发言人吉布斯透露，2月16日，奥巴马总统在例行经济工作会议上，要求财政部长盖特纳等人向他汇报了希腊支付危机的最新情况。
吉布斯表示十分支持欧洲对希腊展开救援。
但对于关系世界时局的公众来说，还有些容易被忽视的细节。
2月11日夜晚，雅典虽然仍有寒意，希腊总统帕普利亚斯亲自到中国驻希腊大使官邸做客，与中国朋友一起庆祝中国农历新年。他说，在现在这样一个需要平衡的社会里，他非常看重中国在当今世界上的重要作用。
在希腊债务危局还进行时，这似乎耐人寻味。希腊财政部曾经发表声明，否认试图向中国出售债券。但是，希腊财长乔治·帕帕康斯坦丁同时又表示将在今年2月将率团访问美国和亚洲，并在北京、上海和香港停留。
Thursday, February 25, 2010
Barry Ritholtz: Still Bullish After All These Gains
In his semi-annual monetary report to Congress Wednesday, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke reiterated the Fed's plans to keep interest rates low "for an extended period."
Investors responded by buying stocks: the Dow rose 0.9% Wednesday while the S&P and Nasdaq each climbed 1%.
Rallying was the right response, says FusionIQ CEO Barry Ritholtz: "As long as the Fed is going to make money free…it’s hard to find a short."
Though not as bullish as he was last March when he called the market bottom, Ritholtz is sticking with stocks. "The easy thing to do now would be to go to cash," he says, a reference to Robert Precther's recommendation here. "[But] I rarely find that the easy trade is the one that makes you money."
Instead the money manager and blogger has turned more bullish on the emerging market economies that have withstood a weak American economy. His favorites are South Korea, Brazil, Taiwan, and Singapore.
Investors responded by buying stocks: the Dow rose 0.9% Wednesday while the S&P and Nasdaq each climbed 1%.
Rallying was the right response, says FusionIQ CEO Barry Ritholtz: "As long as the Fed is going to make money free…it’s hard to find a short."
Though not as bullish as he was last March when he called the market bottom, Ritholtz is sticking with stocks. "The easy thing to do now would be to go to cash," he says, a reference to Robert Precther's recommendation here. "[But] I rarely find that the easy trade is the one that makes you money."
Instead the money manager and blogger has turned more bullish on the emerging market economies that have withstood a weak American economy. His favorites are South Korea, Brazil, Taiwan, and Singapore.
Wednesday, February 24, 2010
分享集:买油棕股留子孙
股票投资要成功，其中一个主要的因素，是对你所购买的股票，具有充足的信心。
有信心，你才有胆识买进；有信心，你才有胆识在股价大跌，股票价值被严重低估时买进更多，以拉低成本；有信心，你才会进行长期投资，惟有长期投资，才有可能取得丰厚的回酬。
股票企业股份证书
大量买进，股价暴跌时买进更多，加上长期持有，是累积财富的不二法门。
累积财富，使你在退休后财务自主，是投资股票的终极目标；累积财富不能靠投机达致，所以，戒绝投机！
信心，必须来自对有关股票的认识，有认识才有胆识。
对有关股票所代表的企业，有深入的认识，就是对你所持有的股票，有深入的认识。
因为股票就是企业股份的证书，买股票，不是买一张纸，而是购买一项企业的资产和业务，目的在於分享企业的盈利。
投资油棕业2途径
认识企业，必须始於认识有关企业所属的行业。如果这个行业是有前途的，从事这个行业的企业，就有前途。
你选购这个行业中管理良好的企业的股票，就能助你累积财富。
例如你想投资油棕种植业，首先你必须对棕油的前景有基本的认识。
有了认识，才有信心，而信心为成功之母。
投资油棕业，有两条途径。
一条是购买土地，亲力亲为，种植油棕。
作为受薪阶级，不易做到。因为土地难求，即使有，价格不菲，本大利小，不划算。你也没有种植和管理油棕园的知识技术和时间，也分身乏术。
所以，此路不通。
退而求其次，是购买上市油棕股。购买油棕股，就是购买油棕园的股份。
也就是投资於油棕业，惟一不同的是你把油棕园交给别人去管，你不过问，只分享油棕园的利润。
例如你买进IOI集团（IOICorp，1961，主板种植股）的股票，你其实是把油棕园交给丹斯里李深静所率领的团队去管，你不必去烦油棕园的事，只坐而分享利润。
这样，你可以继续做上班族，有固定的薪金收入，又可以分享IOI的盈利（股息），何等轻松写意？
但在买进IOI或其他油棕股之前，你必须做一点功课，认识棕油业。
这样，可以增加你对所持油棕股的信心，有了这份信心，就不会因油棕股价格的波动而担心，情绪不会受到影响，对太太孩子才会常挂笑脸。
棕油资料
要认识一个行业，需从大处着手：这个行业在世界经济中的地位。
让我们看一些有关棕油的资料：
●在2008年，世界植物油脂的总产量为1亿5970万公吨。棕油占4310万公吨，大豆油占3690万公吨，这两种油脂占世界产量的50%。
●棕油在2005年首次超越大豆油，跃居世界植物油脂第一位。
如果把棕仁油计算在内，棕油占世界总产量的30%。
●各国所产棕油，部份供国内消费（作为食油和工业用途），77%供出口，是有关国家的主要外汇来源，包括大马。
用途广市场大
●棕油的用途越来越广，市场在扩大中。
●世界油脂消耗量，25年来，年年增加。在过去5年，平均每年增加4.9%，在此之前的10年，每年增加3.9%。植物燃油采用植物油制造，是过去5年消耗量增长更快的主要原因。
增长在持续中。
●过去10年，世界人均油脂消耗量为
1999：每人18.1公斤。
2008：每人23.7公斤。
将来肯定会消耗得更多。
●人均收入，直接影响人均油脂消耗量，2008年各国油脂消耗量为：
美国：每人每年54公斤。
欧盟：每人每年59公斤。
印度：每人每年13公斤。
中国：每人每年22公斤。
消耗量将跟着人均收入的增加而上升。
●过去10年，世界植物油脂产量增加了56%。
但棕油增产：145%。
棕仁油增产：124%。
大豆油增产：63%。
这是棕油在2005年超越大豆油的原因。
●油棕业发展史：
油棕原产地为非洲。
荷兰人於1840年将4棵油棕苗移植至爪哇茂物植物园，这是油棕首次东渡。当时是作为观赏植物。
1870年，油棕植根於新加坡植物园。
1911年，比利时农业经济学家M. Adrian Hallet在苏门答腊开辟东方第一个油棕园丘。
1911至12年，法国人Henri Fauconnier由苏门答腊运来一批油棕苗，种在通往他在雪兰莪的咖啡园的道路两旁。
1917年，Fauconnier在雪兰莪八丁燕带开辟大马第1个油棕园。
1925年：大马油棕园面积为3,350公顷，第2次世界大战前增至 20,000公顷。
政府积极推广
60年代中期，大马政府积极推动以油棕代替树胶，从此油棕业突飞猛进。
现仍在扩大中。
在2008年时，大马拥有450万公顷油棕园，占大马土地面积的10%。年产量17万7000公吨，60%输往中国、印度、巴基斯坦、欧盟和美国。人口多国家是主要市场，不受经济强国操纵。
●大马油棕业直接雇用57万人，每年创汇500亿令吉。
● 过去40年，世界棕油产量增加近30倍。
1963年：150万公吨。
2008年：4,310万公吨。
在世界植物油总产量中，
1963年：棕油占4%。
2008年：棕油占30%。
棕油股前景亮丽
大马为世界提供了最优良最廉价的植物油，贡献最大。
油棕种植业，是大马一个成功的故事，我们应引以为荣。
作为大马公民，我们理应分享这成功的果实。
购买油棕股，就是购买油棕园。
购买油棕园，就是从事油棕业，就是分享这个黄金作物的成果。
购买油棕股，就是参与一个前途亮丽的行业。
购买油棕园，就是购买土地。
投资於油棕股，就是分享大马肥沃土地的恩赐。
这使我想起一则逸事：
25年前当我在《南洋商报》担任经济组主任的时候，常常出席重要上市公司的常年大会。
记得有一次，我出席哈里逊（牙直利种植公司的年会），该公司董事主席敦莫哈末阿里（即前国家银行总裁，退休后担任PNB主席，PNB控制哈里逊），他在会后举行记者招待会，说过几句话，至今仍不忘。
他说：“购买种植股，锁在保险箱，留给子孙。”
你也可以购买油棕股，分享股息，过有尊严的晚年，股票则不妨留给子孙。
有信心，你才有胆识买进；有信心，你才有胆识在股价大跌，股票价值被严重低估时买进更多，以拉低成本；有信心，你才会进行长期投资，惟有长期投资，才有可能取得丰厚的回酬。
股票企业股份证书
大量买进，股价暴跌时买进更多，加上长期持有，是累积财富的不二法门。
累积财富，使你在退休后财务自主，是投资股票的终极目标；累积财富不能靠投机达致，所以，戒绝投机！
信心，必须来自对有关股票的认识，有认识才有胆识。
对有关股票所代表的企业，有深入的认识，就是对你所持有的股票，有深入的认识。
因为股票就是企业股份的证书，买股票，不是买一张纸，而是购买一项企业的资产和业务，目的在於分享企业的盈利。
投资油棕业2途径
认识企业，必须始於认识有关企业所属的行业。如果这个行业是有前途的，从事这个行业的企业，就有前途。
你选购这个行业中管理良好的企业的股票，就能助你累积财富。
例如你想投资油棕种植业，首先你必须对棕油的前景有基本的认识。
有了认识，才有信心，而信心为成功之母。
投资油棕业，有两条途径。
一条是购买土地，亲力亲为，种植油棕。
作为受薪阶级，不易做到。因为土地难求，即使有，价格不菲，本大利小，不划算。你也没有种植和管理油棕园的知识技术和时间，也分身乏术。
所以，此路不通。
退而求其次，是购买上市油棕股。购买油棕股，就是购买油棕园的股份。
也就是投资於油棕业，惟一不同的是你把油棕园交给别人去管，你不过问，只分享油棕园的利润。
例如你买进IOI集团（IOICorp，1961，主板种植股）的股票，你其实是把油棕园交给丹斯里李深静所率领的团队去管，你不必去烦油棕园的事，只坐而分享利润。
这样，你可以继续做上班族，有固定的薪金收入，又可以分享IOI的盈利（股息），何等轻松写意？
但在买进IOI或其他油棕股之前，你必须做一点功课，认识棕油业。
这样，可以增加你对所持油棕股的信心，有了这份信心，就不会因油棕股价格的波动而担心，情绪不会受到影响，对太太孩子才会常挂笑脸。
棕油资料
要认识一个行业，需从大处着手：这个行业在世界经济中的地位。
让我们看一些有关棕油的资料：
●在2008年，世界植物油脂的总产量为1亿5970万公吨。棕油占4310万公吨，大豆油占3690万公吨，这两种油脂占世界产量的50%。
●棕油在2005年首次超越大豆油，跃居世界植物油脂第一位。
如果把棕仁油计算在内，棕油占世界总产量的30%。
●各国所产棕油，部份供国内消费（作为食油和工业用途），77%供出口，是有关国家的主要外汇来源，包括大马。
用途广市场大
●棕油的用途越来越广，市场在扩大中。
●世界油脂消耗量，25年来，年年增加。在过去5年，平均每年增加4.9%，在此之前的10年，每年增加3.9%。植物燃油采用植物油制造，是过去5年消耗量增长更快的主要原因。
增长在持续中。
●过去10年，世界人均油脂消耗量为
1999：每人18.1公斤。
2008：每人23.7公斤。
将来肯定会消耗得更多。
●人均收入，直接影响人均油脂消耗量，2008年各国油脂消耗量为：
美国：每人每年54公斤。
欧盟：每人每年59公斤。
印度：每人每年13公斤。
中国：每人每年22公斤。
消耗量将跟着人均收入的增加而上升。
●过去10年，世界植物油脂产量增加了56%。
但棕油增产：145%。
棕仁油增产：124%。
大豆油增产：63%。
这是棕油在2005年超越大豆油的原因。
●油棕业发展史：
油棕原产地为非洲。
荷兰人於1840年将4棵油棕苗移植至爪哇茂物植物园，这是油棕首次东渡。当时是作为观赏植物。
1870年，油棕植根於新加坡植物园。
1911年，比利时农业经济学家M. Adrian Hallet在苏门答腊开辟东方第一个油棕园丘。
1911至12年，法国人Henri Fauconnier由苏门答腊运来一批油棕苗，种在通往他在雪兰莪的咖啡园的道路两旁。
1917年，Fauconnier在雪兰莪八丁燕带开辟大马第1个油棕园。
1925年：大马油棕园面积为3,350公顷，第2次世界大战前增至 20,000公顷。
政府积极推广
60年代中期，大马政府积极推动以油棕代替树胶，从此油棕业突飞猛进。
现仍在扩大中。
在2008年时，大马拥有450万公顷油棕园，占大马土地面积的10%。年产量17万7000公吨，60%输往中国、印度、巴基斯坦、欧盟和美国。人口多国家是主要市场，不受经济强国操纵。
●大马油棕业直接雇用57万人，每年创汇500亿令吉。
● 过去40年，世界棕油产量增加近30倍。
1963年：150万公吨。
2008年：4,310万公吨。
在世界植物油总产量中，
1963年：棕油占4%。
2008年：棕油占30%。
棕油股前景亮丽
大马为世界提供了最优良最廉价的植物油，贡献最大。
油棕种植业，是大马一个成功的故事，我们应引以为荣。
作为大马公民，我们理应分享这成功的果实。
购买油棕股，就是购买油棕园。
购买油棕园，就是从事油棕业，就是分享这个黄金作物的成果。
购买油棕股，就是参与一个前途亮丽的行业。
购买油棕园，就是购买土地。
投资於油棕股，就是分享大马肥沃土地的恩赐。
这使我想起一则逸事：
25年前当我在《南洋商报》担任经济组主任的时候，常常出席重要上市公司的常年大会。
记得有一次，我出席哈里逊（牙直利种植公司的年会），该公司董事主席敦莫哈末阿里（即前国家银行总裁，退休后担任PNB主席，PNB控制哈里逊），他在会后举行记者招待会，说过几句话，至今仍不忘。
他说：“购买种植股，锁在保险箱，留给子孙。”
你也可以购买油棕股，分享股息，过有尊严的晚年，股票则不妨留给子孙。
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