由美國杜克大學與《CFO雜誌》向美國四百七十五名CFO調查所得,54%認為美國經濟已進入衰退,24%認為今年第二季將出現衰退。75%承認依家較去年第四季悲觀。大部分CFO 認為減息唔會影響佢地嘅生意,三分一認為依家信貸情況直接影響公司生意。
阿根廷中央銀行3月15日宣布,今年8月起巴西及阿根廷雙邊貿易將以兩國本身貨幣進行結算,放棄以美元作為結算單位。8月份投入運行,以巴西雷亞爾和阿根廷披索結算,而唔再係美元。
拋售美元成市場共識
上周日圓100關失守、歐羅1.56失守、金價1000美元失守。去年美元兌歐羅跌10.4%,今年至今再跌3%。弱勢美元有利美國經濟,但崩潰中嘅美元則不利美國經濟,呢D嘢响大學做研究嘅教授可能唔曉。
貝仔嘅行動已引發美元危機,投資者拋售美債,令美元長期利率上升,响呢方面聯儲局冇控制能力;短息跌、長息升係美國家陣嘅情況,愈嚟愈似九十年代日本!如果干預可阻止危機惡化,十九世紀英倫銀行早已成功,1990年日本銀行亦應該成功。干預行為好似食止痛餅醫癌,只將表徵消除,最後一定更大鑊。
以1萬元起步,利用牛眼投資法,每年皆射中牛眼(獲100%回報),幾多年可變成100萬元?答案係少於七年。歷史書內充滿「以小搏大」嘅戰役,贏家往往唔係擁有百萬大軍嘅一方,而係曉得利用時勢、策略、智謀取勝嗰一方。
例如你由去年10月30日起拋空期指,一直roll over,一張期指已可賺50萬元;上述當然係事後孔明,但並非唔可能。請學習槓桿投資法,例如窩輪及期指,入市前先制訂策略及目標,而非漫遊。每天花十五分鐘檢討自己策略係咪可行,唔好被嚇倒,亦唔好太貪心,學習以平常心處事,以及唔好讓虧損超過15%。
上一個美國Secular Bear Market由1966年開始、1982年結束,低點係1974年12月。呢一個綿綿不絕嘅熊市從2000年3月開始,2002年10月係其中一個低點, 2007年10月係其中一個高點;未來去找尋另一個低點……。真正大牛市恐怕要到2016年才再開始。
畢非德响最近巴郡年報中話,道指由1900至99年平均每年只上升5.3%,由66點開始至11497點。未來一百年如道指每年上升5.3%,到2100年道指將見2000000點,相信機會唔大;因此佢強調未來响股市中賺取5%至10%亦變得唔容易。1999年標普五百O高達四十二倍,依家已回落到二十倍,估計未來十到二十年美股純利每年只能升3-5%(2006年企業純利上升11.4%),甚至每年10%亦唔容易。
很少牛市超過二十年
美國愈來愈多住房丟空(因供唔起樓被金融機構接管)。為維修呢D被接管嘅住房,美國一年開支500億美元(平均一間管理及維修費1萬至1.2萬美元一年)。去年約一百萬間住宅被接管,較2006年上升一倍,相信今年更多。大摩報道,波士頓銀行兩年前出售一間物業,代價299000美元,由WMC Mortgage做擔保可回收。今天收回後,WMC Mortgage只能按市價54900美元出售。
換言之,樓按者一旦斷供,對樓按擔保公司而言係災難。今天被空置嘅住房已達三百五十萬間,未來何處搵三百五十萬個有能力供樓嘅新業主?Real Estate Consulting嘅John Burns認為,空置量要上升到四百萬間,樓價才可能見底,日子唔係2008年,而係2009年下半年;未來樓價可能再跌15-20%,即美國物業市場將失去50萬億至60萬億美元市值,樓價才有機會見底。
如上述分析正確,SIV、CLO、CDO、ABS或CMBS未來六個月所面對拋售壓力正不斷加重,聯儲局提供嘅2000億美元救市基金實在少得可憐。
上一次美國樓價1979年見頂,1984年才見底,要到1995年才重返1979年水平。美國呢次樓價2006年7月見頂,可能需要十六年才重見1979年高價,即下一次美國樓價高於2006年係2022年。
長遠而言,樓價可跑贏CPI升幅,因土地供應有限;反之,商品價格卻跑輸CPI升幅。例如高盛商品指數(以二十四種商品組成)今年扣除通脹,只及上一個高位(1974年)嘅40%。原材料(包括黃金)都不能保值,主因係價格一旦高企,代替品便湧現。隨着經濟發展,各國CPI中服務所佔比重漸升(例如香港CPI中超過50%同服務有關,20%同租金有關,燃料費及食品約佔30%。因此推動本港CPI上升唔係原材料價格,而係工資同租金)。
好少牛市可超過二十年,例如美股由1983年起步嘅牛市,2000年已結束;2007年高點其實係由美元滙價下跌所造成嘅假象,唔係真正新高點。
美國樓市牛市由1985年起步,到2006年下半年結束,已超過二十年(部分升幅亦因美元滙價下跌所造成)。任何項目响上升接近二十年後才投資,未來十年到十五年的表現通常令人失望。
美軍喺伊拉克用咗幾多油?去年係十一億加侖燃油,相等於五千艘運油輪載油量,才推得郁美軍响伊拉克嘅戰機及軍車。去年美軍喺伊拉克燃料開支係520億美元,由此可見殊仔幾敗家!到此大家應明白點解美軍入侵伊拉克後,油價係咁升!
今天油價、糧食價、貴重金屬價嘅牛市已十分成熟,已接近尋頂期,波幅甚大,係咪值得加入搶購行列則見仁見智。
今年北京五環外住房亦賣8000-10000元人民幣一平方米,連「海龜」亦負擔唔起。上海浦東12000元人民幣一平方米。武漢房價亦喺6000元一平方米、青島8000元一平方米、大連6500元一平方米。唔好話中國本地大學生負擔唔起,連「海龜」研究生亦負擔唔起。內地房價漲得實在太離譜,調整只喺遲早。
How we spend our days is, of course, how we spend our lives. 自强不息 勤以静心,俭以养德 天地不仁, 強者生存
Monday, March 17, 2008
Sunday, March 16, 2008
Bear Stearns Watch
Bear-Stearns, teetering on the brink of collapse from a lack of cash, got emergency funding from the Federal Reserve and JPMorgan Chase & Co. in the largest government bailout.
The central bank agreed to provide financing through JPMorgan for up to 28 days, the bank said in a statement today.
1 or 2 large and systematic brokers will go belly up
And Bear is only the first broker dealer to go belly up. Rumors had been circulating in the market for days that the exposure of Lehman to toxic ABS/MBS securities is as bad as that of Bear.
Bear Stearns had the highest toxic waste ("residual balance") exposure as percent of adjusted equity on balance sheet; the exposure of Bear was 54.5% while that of Lehman was only marginally smaller at 53.3%; that of Goldman Sachs was only 21%.
And guess what? Today LehmenBrothers received $2 billion unsecured credit line from 40 lenders. Here is another massively leveraged broker dealer that mismanaged its liquidity risk, had massive amount of toxic waste on its books and is now in trouble. Again here we have not only a situation of illiquidity but serious credit problems and losses given the reckless exposure of this second broker dealer to toxic investments.
What brought down Bear Stearns ?
Banking sources speculated that Bear Stearns could have been hit by last night’s collapse in value of so called alt-A, or low-end prime mortgage securities.
"The Alt-A market fell out of bed last night and Bear would have been completely caned by this. They hold a bunch of these securities," one investment banking source told Times Online.
"Against what you might normally expect, the sub-prime market rallied, but alt-A sold off."
Excuse me for laughing but just two days ago I cautioned everyone to Expect Everything To Be Worse Than Expected.
I do not understand how anyone could expect anything other than a complete disaster in Alt-A.
I have two systemic problems with the bailout of the Broken Bear as to why anyone, especially tax payers should want to save a failed investment strategy.
First, Broken Bear holds only investment (speculation) money so there is no genuine societal reason for their bailout.
Second, bailing out investment banks like the Broken Bear, Mother Merrill, and Golden Fleece constitutes a moral hazard that encourages continued speculation and ultimately a collapse of the dollar when the Fed comes to their rescue.
Rescuing the Bear Why and why is it this way
While the Fed, like any public institution, should support institutions and arrangements with public goods properties, like markets, it should not as a rule support private businesses. In the financial field these externalities often are through contagion effects, as in the case of the classical bank run by depositors…Deposit-taking institutions are deemed to fall into this category because they are an important part of the retail payment mechanism. Other institutions are deemed too systemically important to fail because they play a key role in the wholesale payments, clearing and settlement system.Finally, some institutions are provided with liquidity on non-market terms or bailed out when they are insolvent because it is feared that their failure would trigger a chain-reaction of contagion effects. Fear and panic would spread through the markets and first illiquidity and then insolvency would threaten institutions that would have remained both solvent and liquid but for the failure of this ‘focal institution’.
How does Bear Stearns line up according to these three criteria for special Fed attention? Bear is not a deposit-taking institution. It plays no role in the retail payment mechanism and is of no significance to the proper functioning of the wholesale payments, clearing and settlement system…
The firm could have been left to go into receivership.If the Fed fears the risk of contagion effects and financial panic, it could have requested the nationalisation of the investment bank.
The funny one from S&P:
Standard & Poor’s cut some of its credit ratings on investment bank Bear Stearns on Friday following news of the bank’s cash crisis and emergency bailout.
S&P cut its long-term counterparty rating on Bear Stearns to "BBB" from "A" and its short-term rating to "A-3" from "A-1."
S&P said Bear Stearns’ need for temporary financing to continue operating normally led to the downgrade.
The agency also placed the bank’s long- and short-term ratings on negative watch, meaning they could be downgraded in the next three months.
The central bank agreed to provide financing through JPMorgan for up to 28 days, the bank said in a statement today.
1 or 2 large and systematic brokers will go belly up
And Bear is only the first broker dealer to go belly up. Rumors had been circulating in the market for days that the exposure of Lehman to toxic ABS/MBS securities is as bad as that of Bear.
Bear Stearns had the highest toxic waste ("residual balance") exposure as percent of adjusted equity on balance sheet; the exposure of Bear was 54.5% while that of Lehman was only marginally smaller at 53.3%; that of Goldman Sachs was only 21%.
And guess what? Today LehmenBrothers received $2 billion unsecured credit line from 40 lenders. Here is another massively leveraged broker dealer that mismanaged its liquidity risk, had massive amount of toxic waste on its books and is now in trouble. Again here we have not only a situation of illiquidity but serious credit problems and losses given the reckless exposure of this second broker dealer to toxic investments.
What brought down Bear Stearns ?
Banking sources speculated that Bear Stearns could have been hit by last night’s collapse in value of so called alt-A, or low-end prime mortgage securities.
"The Alt-A market fell out of bed last night and Bear would have been completely caned by this. They hold a bunch of these securities," one investment banking source told Times Online.
"Against what you might normally expect, the sub-prime market rallied, but alt-A sold off."
Excuse me for laughing but just two days ago I cautioned everyone to Expect Everything To Be Worse Than Expected.
I do not understand how anyone could expect anything other than a complete disaster in Alt-A.
I have two systemic problems with the bailout of the Broken Bear as to why anyone, especially tax payers should want to save a failed investment strategy.
First, Broken Bear holds only investment (speculation) money so there is no genuine societal reason for their bailout.
Second, bailing out investment banks like the Broken Bear, Mother Merrill, and Golden Fleece constitutes a moral hazard that encourages continued speculation and ultimately a collapse of the dollar when the Fed comes to their rescue.
Rescuing the Bear Why and why is it this way
While the Fed, like any public institution, should support institutions and arrangements with public goods properties, like markets, it should not as a rule support private businesses. In the financial field these externalities often are through contagion effects, as in the case of the classical bank run by depositors…Deposit-taking institutions are deemed to fall into this category because they are an important part of the retail payment mechanism. Other institutions are deemed too systemically important to fail because they play a key role in the wholesale payments, clearing and settlement system.Finally, some institutions are provided with liquidity on non-market terms or bailed out when they are insolvent because it is feared that their failure would trigger a chain-reaction of contagion effects. Fear and panic would spread through the markets and first illiquidity and then insolvency would threaten institutions that would have remained both solvent and liquid but for the failure of this ‘focal institution’.
How does Bear Stearns line up according to these three criteria for special Fed attention? Bear is not a deposit-taking institution. It plays no role in the retail payment mechanism and is of no significance to the proper functioning of the wholesale payments, clearing and settlement system…
The firm could have been left to go into receivership.If the Fed fears the risk of contagion effects and financial panic, it could have requested the nationalisation of the investment bank.
The funny one from S&P:
Standard & Poor’s cut some of its credit ratings on investment bank Bear Stearns on Friday following news of the bank’s cash crisis and emergency bailout.
S&P cut its long-term counterparty rating on Bear Stearns to "BBB" from "A" and its short-term rating to "A-3" from "A-1."
S&P said Bear Stearns’ need for temporary financing to continue operating normally led to the downgrade.
The agency also placed the bank’s long- and short-term ratings on negative watch, meaning they could be downgraded in the next three months.
Citigroup sees at least 100 bps US rate cut on Tuesday
CITIGROUP believes the Federal Reserve will lower the benchmark US federal funds target rate by at least 100 basis points at its policy-setting meeting in a bid to stabilise financial markets, the bank said on Friday.
'Strong consideration ought to be given to an even larger reduction,' Citigroup economists said in research report titled 'Clear and Present Danger'.
US stocks fell sharply and bonds rallied on Friday in response to news that JPMorgan and New York Fed will offer financing to rescue Bear Stearns which has struggled under rising losses from its subprime mortgage exposure.
This move 'underscores the currently fragility of the system', Citigroup economists wrote in the report.
Wall Street widely predicted that the Federal Open Market Committee will lower the fed funds target to at least 2.50 per cent on Tuesday.
Credit Suisse economists revised their prediction on how far the Fed will cut rates. They now see the US central bank lowering its fed funds target by at least 100 basis points this year including a 75-basis-point cut next Tuesday. A week ago, they had forecast a 50-basis-point cut.
Late Friday, US interest rate futures implied traders are placing a 60 per cent chance that the Fed would lower the benchmark short-term target rate 100-basis-points by Tuesday
'Strong consideration ought to be given to an even larger reduction,' Citigroup economists said in research report titled 'Clear and Present Danger'.
US stocks fell sharply and bonds rallied on Friday in response to news that JPMorgan and New York Fed will offer financing to rescue Bear Stearns which has struggled under rising losses from its subprime mortgage exposure.
This move 'underscores the currently fragility of the system', Citigroup economists wrote in the report.
Wall Street widely predicted that the Federal Open Market Committee will lower the fed funds target to at least 2.50 per cent on Tuesday.
Credit Suisse economists revised their prediction on how far the Fed will cut rates. They now see the US central bank lowering its fed funds target by at least 100 basis points this year including a 75-basis-point cut next Tuesday. A week ago, they had forecast a 50-basis-point cut.
Late Friday, US interest rate futures implied traders are placing a 60 per cent chance that the Fed would lower the benchmark short-term target rate 100-basis-points by Tuesday
China's Citic says may not invest in Bear Stearns
Citic Securities said it might not proceed with a deal to invest about US$1 billion (S$1.4 billion) in Bear Stearns because of the United States investment bank's financial crisis.
China's largest listed brokerage said on Saturday it would 'conduct an overall evaluation' of the deal after Bear, saying its liquidity position had worsened, obtained on Friday an emergency funding arrangement with the US Federal Reserve and JPMorgan Chase.
Any cancellation of the Citic deal would be another blow to Bear, the smallest of the major New York investment banks and the most reliant on slumping US mortgage markets. It has been counting on the investment to boost its capital.
'Our company has noticed the recent financing arrangement between Bear Stearns, JPMorgan Chase and other financial institutions, and we have also considered factors including the sharp fall in Bear Stearns' share price,' Citic Securities said. 'We cannot guarantee reaching a final agreement in the future,'
Last October, Bear and Citic Securities announced plans to invest about US$1 billion in each other and form a joint banking venture in Asia. Citic Securities was to obtain a stake of about 6 per cent in Bear, with the US bank getting about 2 per cent of the Chinese firm.
But since then, Bear's share price has plunged 74 per cent.
Citic Securities' shares have tumbled 45 per cent as China's stock market has slumped, hurting the Chinese firm's earnings outlook.
'We acknowledge that the subprime mortgage crisis in the US capital markets is continuing, so we will closely monitor the impact of the crisis on the investment deal,' Citic Securities said.
'At present, the two parties are still negotiating major terms of the deal and we have not completed due diligence on Bear Stearns. We haven't signed any formal agreement and we haven't paid any money.' Citic Securities did not say when its evaluation of the Bear deal might be completed.
Global markets have been speculating that cash-rich Chinese financial institutions might take advantage of the US subprime crisis to buy big stakes in foreign companies at cheap prices.
But the uncertainty over the Bear deal suggests Chinese firms may be wary.
In early March, Citic Group chairman Kong Dan said the Chinese brokerage was renegotiating the Bear deal in light of Bear's sliding share price, and might take a bigger stake than originally envisaged.
A revised deal with an investment of US$1 billion could have given Citic Securities up to 9.9 per cent, making it the largest single shareholder in Bear.
But on Wednesday, Mr Kong suggested that Citic Securities might now take the originally planned stake of 6 per cent while paying less than US$1 billion.
On Saturday, Bank of China said it was interested in acquisitions in the Asia-Pacific region and the Middle East, but was unlikely to look for bargains among Western financial institutions hit by the subprime crisis.
'We certainly will not buy into institutions like Bear Stearns,' said Mr Xiao Gang, chairman of China's fourth largest bank by assets.
China's largest listed brokerage said on Saturday it would 'conduct an overall evaluation' of the deal after Bear, saying its liquidity position had worsened, obtained on Friday an emergency funding arrangement with the US Federal Reserve and JPMorgan Chase.
Any cancellation of the Citic deal would be another blow to Bear, the smallest of the major New York investment banks and the most reliant on slumping US mortgage markets. It has been counting on the investment to boost its capital.
'Our company has noticed the recent financing arrangement between Bear Stearns, JPMorgan Chase and other financial institutions, and we have also considered factors including the sharp fall in Bear Stearns' share price,' Citic Securities said. 'We cannot guarantee reaching a final agreement in the future,'
Last October, Bear and Citic Securities announced plans to invest about US$1 billion in each other and form a joint banking venture in Asia. Citic Securities was to obtain a stake of about 6 per cent in Bear, with the US bank getting about 2 per cent of the Chinese firm.
But since then, Bear's share price has plunged 74 per cent.
Citic Securities' shares have tumbled 45 per cent as China's stock market has slumped, hurting the Chinese firm's earnings outlook.
'We acknowledge that the subprime mortgage crisis in the US capital markets is continuing, so we will closely monitor the impact of the crisis on the investment deal,' Citic Securities said.
'At present, the two parties are still negotiating major terms of the deal and we have not completed due diligence on Bear Stearns. We haven't signed any formal agreement and we haven't paid any money.' Citic Securities did not say when its evaluation of the Bear deal might be completed.
Global markets have been speculating that cash-rich Chinese financial institutions might take advantage of the US subprime crisis to buy big stakes in foreign companies at cheap prices.
But the uncertainty over the Bear deal suggests Chinese firms may be wary.
In early March, Citic Group chairman Kong Dan said the Chinese brokerage was renegotiating the Bear deal in light of Bear's sliding share price, and might take a bigger stake than originally envisaged.
A revised deal with an investment of US$1 billion could have given Citic Securities up to 9.9 per cent, making it the largest single shareholder in Bear.
But on Wednesday, Mr Kong suggested that Citic Securities might now take the originally planned stake of 6 per cent while paying less than US$1 billion.
On Saturday, Bank of China said it was interested in acquisitions in the Asia-Pacific region and the Middle East, but was unlikely to look for bargains among Western financial institutions hit by the subprime crisis.
'We certainly will not buy into institutions like Bear Stearns,' said Mr Xiao Gang, chairman of China's fourth largest bank by assets.
Friday, March 14, 2008
Dr. Doom Speaks - An Interview with Mark Faber
With a moniker like Dr. Doom, you know Mark Faber is going to be bearish. Faber made a name for himself by predicting the crash in 1987.
To summarize his feelings, he is bearish on developed markets and bullish on emerging markets and commodities.
Faber’s biggest concern is that the Fed has been printing too much money. This leads to inflation, which is evidenced by our declining dollar. He points out that our stock market has increased in the last few years, but relative to gold or in Euros, it has declined. When asked what the U.S. should do about this, he states that all of the governors of the Federal Reserve should resign. He also says that buying long term bonds is a big mistake.
Like most people, Faber points out that Wall Street helped create the subprime mess. He points out that Wall Street managed to pay itself a record bonuses in 2007, despite shareholder’s losing 50% of their assets. America’s home mortgages outstanding equates to over 60% of GDP. This is at record levels and is one of the highest proportions in the world, only after the Netherlands. Faber predicted that the housing market would go down back in 2005—not bad timing.
Assets can decrease in price in two ways. The first is as the stock market did in the 1929 crash. The second way is in absolute terms, which is what we have scene in the past few years. U.S. assets have decreased in value relative to other assets around the world.
He is also down on the British pound and the London real estate market. He has suggested shorting the pound (against the yen) and also compares the price per meter of London real estate to other markets.
Faber feels that Japan is slowing due to its aging demographics but that it is a very wealthy society. The citizens are savers and the corporations are well diversified across the globe. He compares Japan to Switzerland in that they are mature economies but do well in that they are very well diversified. He has recommended the yen versus the dollar in the recent past.
For developing economies, he says that we are in a paradigm shift. He is bullish, long term, on Russia, China, Cambodia, Vietnam, and the Ukraine. Short term, he sees that these markets are overbought and due for a correction. The only emerging market that is doing poorly, Faber points out is the money printing Zimbabwe. He says that maybe Bernanke should go there and become a college professor. As an aside, Faber remarked that America is a great place because people are free to speak their mind, which he certainly does.
In regards to oil, and commodities, Faber thinks that the emerging markets will continue buying to build infrastructure. In the short term, he feels that commodities are overbought too. Faber sits on the board of Canadian based Ivanhoe Mines (IVH). He says that if precious metals fall by 30%, buy more. He suggested not buying precious metal futures on margin but buying hard assets.
He recommended that the analysts give up financial careers and learn how to drive tractors, as food prices go up and farms become valuable. He sees the financial markets continuing to unwind and grains to rise.
Faber showed a chart in which gold has appreciated by a large amount and wheat had hardly gone up, relative to other assets. Real assets like farms, Faber feels, should do well in an inflationary environment. Food only makes up about 10% of the CPI, yet most households spend closer to 20% of their income on food. This means that the true value of inflation is understated. The whole concept of Consumer Price Index (CPI), has been constructed deceptively, and does not reflect how people have to spend their money in the U. S.
As a Westerner who has lived in Hong Kong since the 1970s and can speak the language, Faber has a unique view on China. He compares Germany’s rise in the early part of the twentieth century as a threat to the power of the day, England. He sees that China is on the rise but has no military ambition. Faber feels that the policy of Bush and Rice has forced Russia and China into each other’s arms–something once unthinkable. He posed the question of how America would feel if China had bases in Canada or Mexico like the U.S. has bases all over Asia.
When asked about the Middle East, he wonders if the booming economies are for real. He says that when cities start building tall buildings, something bad happens. The Middle East goes through boom and bust cycles. In the 1970s, it was hot. In the 1980s, it went bust. Faber feels that the market there is more stable than it used to be but still depends on the cyclical price of oil.
So what can an investor take away from all of this? Basically, Faber feels that the American markets will continue to do poorly and after a correction, foreign currencies and commodities are where to put your life savings.
To summarize his feelings, he is bearish on developed markets and bullish on emerging markets and commodities.
Faber’s biggest concern is that the Fed has been printing too much money. This leads to inflation, which is evidenced by our declining dollar. He points out that our stock market has increased in the last few years, but relative to gold or in Euros, it has declined. When asked what the U.S. should do about this, he states that all of the governors of the Federal Reserve should resign. He also says that buying long term bonds is a big mistake.
Like most people, Faber points out that Wall Street helped create the subprime mess. He points out that Wall Street managed to pay itself a record bonuses in 2007, despite shareholder’s losing 50% of their assets. America’s home mortgages outstanding equates to over 60% of GDP. This is at record levels and is one of the highest proportions in the world, only after the Netherlands. Faber predicted that the housing market would go down back in 2005—not bad timing.
Assets can decrease in price in two ways. The first is as the stock market did in the 1929 crash. The second way is in absolute terms, which is what we have scene in the past few years. U.S. assets have decreased in value relative to other assets around the world.
He is also down on the British pound and the London real estate market. He has suggested shorting the pound (against the yen) and also compares the price per meter of London real estate to other markets.
Faber feels that Japan is slowing due to its aging demographics but that it is a very wealthy society. The citizens are savers and the corporations are well diversified across the globe. He compares Japan to Switzerland in that they are mature economies but do well in that they are very well diversified. He has recommended the yen versus the dollar in the recent past.
For developing economies, he says that we are in a paradigm shift. He is bullish, long term, on Russia, China, Cambodia, Vietnam, and the Ukraine. Short term, he sees that these markets are overbought and due for a correction. The only emerging market that is doing poorly, Faber points out is the money printing Zimbabwe. He says that maybe Bernanke should go there and become a college professor. As an aside, Faber remarked that America is a great place because people are free to speak their mind, which he certainly does.
In regards to oil, and commodities, Faber thinks that the emerging markets will continue buying to build infrastructure. In the short term, he feels that commodities are overbought too. Faber sits on the board of Canadian based Ivanhoe Mines (IVH). He says that if precious metals fall by 30%, buy more. He suggested not buying precious metal futures on margin but buying hard assets.
He recommended that the analysts give up financial careers and learn how to drive tractors, as food prices go up and farms become valuable. He sees the financial markets continuing to unwind and grains to rise.
Faber showed a chart in which gold has appreciated by a large amount and wheat had hardly gone up, relative to other assets. Real assets like farms, Faber feels, should do well in an inflationary environment. Food only makes up about 10% of the CPI, yet most households spend closer to 20% of their income on food. This means that the true value of inflation is understated. The whole concept of Consumer Price Index (CPI), has been constructed deceptively, and does not reflect how people have to spend their money in the U. S.
As a Westerner who has lived in Hong Kong since the 1970s and can speak the language, Faber has a unique view on China. He compares Germany’s rise in the early part of the twentieth century as a threat to the power of the day, England. He sees that China is on the rise but has no military ambition. Faber feels that the policy of Bush and Rice has forced Russia and China into each other’s arms–something once unthinkable. He posed the question of how America would feel if China had bases in Canada or Mexico like the U.S. has bases all over Asia.
When asked about the Middle East, he wonders if the booming economies are for real. He says that when cities start building tall buildings, something bad happens. The Middle East goes through boom and bust cycles. In the 1970s, it was hot. In the 1980s, it went bust. Faber feels that the market there is more stable than it used to be but still depends on the cyclical price of oil.
So what can an investor take away from all of this? Basically, Faber feels that the American markets will continue to do poorly and after a correction, foreign currencies and commodities are where to put your life savings.
富兰克林邓普顿基金集团十大投资法则
(一)当所有人都看好这个市场时,那么就是你该离开的时候了 --记住:赚钱的永远是少数人
这句话形象地说明了“逆向思维”的重要性。
多年资本市场的经验告诉了我们,在一个有风险的投资市场中,少数人赚钱是一条永恒的规律,多数人只是参与或者赔本。在这种情况下,如何成为少数人,成为少数的赚钱者,一个简单易行的方法就是和大多数人保持对立,采取“人弃我取,人取我弃”的操作策略。
当一波行情渐涨渐高的时候,其实也是泡沫和风险逐渐积聚的过程,但在表面的盈利效应示范之下,越来越多的投资者被眼前的收益所吸引,希望将自己全部资金投入其中,此时是资金投入最大化的阶段,往往也是行情高点和头部的所在,一旦后续资金流跟不上,不能维持不断提高的市场价格,行情就不可避免的进入调整阶段。
回顾沪深股市十多年的历程,历史反复证明了这一规律的准确性。每当行情进入高潮,此时营业部大厅人满为患,投资者汗流浃背、神情亢奋时,股指往往正面临着头部。相反,当市场陷于谷底,证券机构门庭罗雀,即便反复动员,投资者也是应之寥寥时,市场又往往正是安全的底部。
此在实际操作中,当股市持续冲高、人人都想进场的时候,作为少数者就可以逐步地分批抛出,不要等市场下跌时才恐慌性抛售。而当行情一再暴跌,所有人都失望、悲观甚至绝望的时候,你却可以分批进场,逐渐吸纳。此时,一些价值型的股票因为暴跌,矫枉过正、价值低估,这正到了中线进场的时机。
(二)“不要把所有的鸡蛋都放在一个篮子里”
俗话说“不要把所有的鸡蛋都放在一个篮子里”,它的意思是说,一旦篮子摔了,鸡蛋就可能全碎了,损失也就比较大。相反,如果把鸡蛋分散放在不同的篮子里,即使有一只篮子摔了,其他的鸡蛋仍然会完好无损。
至于什么是分散投资,从广义上讲,应该是跨市场、跨地区的投资。在全球市场中,许多国际化机构投资者,既投资欧美市场,也投资日本、香港等亚洲市场,甚至包括菲律宾、韩国等新兴市场;既投资股票市场,也投资债券、石油金属等商品期货市场。从狭义的角度将,分散投资是跨品种的投资,如股票市场中,蓝筹股、成长股相容;大盘股、小盘股兼顾;传统产业、新兴产业相错;长线投资、短线投资统筹等等。
(三)你想能获得超额投资收益吗?那你一定要选择新兴市场
怎么样才能获得超额投资收益?这是每一个投资者的“心中所想”。对他们来说,除了要有敏锐的目光、严谨的分析、独到的见解,以及对投资超强的驾驭能力外,紧紧盯住新兴国家、投资新兴市场也是一条成功的捷径。
回顾近两百年来全球经济的发展历程,不难发现经济增长最快速的地区,往往是那些正经历着由传统到现代、由愚昧到文明、发生深刻变革的新兴国家和地区,即发展中国家和地区。虽然,对于发展中国家,其制度、法规不很完善,市场的短期波动也较为频繁,但他们却是最具活力、最有创新意识,其长期成长动能也远远强于已开发国家即所谓发达国家。
就像一个人,成长最快的并不是成年阶段,而是婴幼儿和青少年阶段。因此,投资发展中国家和新兴市场,往往能够分享经济快速发展所带来的成果,获得比全球一般发展速度更高的收益。例如,上世纪七十年代以后,以韩国、新加坡、香港、台湾为代表的亚洲四小龙的崛起,作为新兴国家和地区的典范,给全球有眼光的投资家们带来了巨大的机会。
同样,中国大陆自七十年代末期改革开放以后,随着计划经济向市场经济的转轨,经济发展巨大潜能被释放,国内经济发展速度连续多年远远超过世界经济的平均水平,已经成为全球发展中国家的代表。
(四)选择股票的最终标准--了解企业的团队
投资者在投资决策之前,一般都需要对投资对象进行研究。考察一家企业,可以是多角度、多方位的。例如这家企业经营状况、产品构成、财务状况等等,但其中最重要的还是对企业经营团队进行了解和分析。
为什么说了解企业经营团队的素质、理念和文化是决定企业发展的关键因素呢?俗话说:人是决定一切的因素,世界上有了人,世界才变得精彩。每个人,由于成长环境、社会阅历各不相同,因此都有自已的脾气秉性和处事原则,一个积极向上、团结和谐、敬业守信的经营团队是企业成功的首要前提。如果这个团队变化不定、表里不一,甚至尔虞我诈、相互倾钆,那么这样的企业是很难保持平稳发展的,回顾国内A股市场,这样的例子已经屡见不鲜。
例如一些上市公司的董事长,在大量侵占上市公司资产、严重侵犯中小投资者权益后,逃到海外长期不归,使上市公司经营受到巨大影响,濒临退市。所以,“选股票就是选老板”应该成为理性投资者的座右铭。
至于如何考察企业团队,可以观察他们以前说过什么,做过什么,效果如何?经营团队是否相对稳定?有没有前科劣迹。也可以通过深入的拜访,了解他们的经营理念、营运目标、乃至人格特征、各产业所面临的挑战等,这些都是重要的观察因素。
(五)“42码的脚不能穿进37码的鞋”--用FELT选择股票
所谓FELT 就是-Fair、Efficient、Liquid、Transparent。即在投资任何股票之前,都应该审视股价是否合理(Fair),股市是否是有效率交易(Efficient),股票是否具有流动性(Liquid),上市公司财务报表是否透明(Transparent),这是选择股票的四个方面。
首先,如果这只股票的价格已经达到或者超过其现有的及未来可预期的价值的话,那么这只股票就失去了买入和投资的价值,因为投资是价值发现的过程,如果没有价值发现,投资就失去了它的意义。
其次,如果一个市场效率很低,由于制度或者监管方面的问题,不能实现有效率的交易,那么他们的投资同样得不到保障。第三,投资规模要和股票规模相称。如果某只股票盘子很小,或者规模虽大但交易活跃度很低,交易量很小,那么它同样不适合大资金的投入,因为一方面它很难吸到足够的低价筹码,同时在出货时又很难迅速的全身而退,处于进退两难的尴尬境地。所谓“42码的脚不能穿进37码的鞋”,说的就是这个道理。
此外,财务报表的真实性也是决定投资成败的关键因素。再好的业绩如果是虚假的,对于投资者来说同样是致命的。由于财务报表是反映企业经营状况、资金状况的最基本素材,如果失真,将误导投资者作出偏离企业真实状况的判断,最终造成重大投资失误。这种例子,在国内A股市场上以及国内举不胜举,值得投资者警惕。
(六)“危机”——往往蕴藏着投资机会
危机,是指因为某些市场因素的变化,破坏了原有平衡,使市场受到冲击并出现阶段性混乱和动荡。从以往看,不管是上世纪的石油危机、经济危机还是金融危机,其最终结果都是在一定的范围内、一定的阶段,出现一定的混乱和恐慌,在经济、金融、投资领域则表现为市场的持续低迷、一跌再跌。
在现实生活中,“危机”潜藏投资机会主要是指两层含义。一是在“危机”出现的后期,由于持续下跌、引发市场恐慌,在强大的作空惯性下,出现矫枉过正、价值低估的现象,一些相对价值较高的品种,在跟风作空的影响下,出现价格扭曲、价值低估,而价值低估在投资领域即意味着投资机会。其二,危机的出现能够引发人们的忧患意识、发愤意识,能够激励人们更加努力的工作,创造更多的社会财富和投资机会。
例如1998年由于泰铢贬值引爆亚洲金融风暴发生,泰国政府于是开始进行金融法规改革,人民担忧未来的生活,也开始更努力工作、存更多钱,这可看出,当大环境安然无事时,人民容易懒散;而艰困,才是促使人民向前迈进的动力,因此,当金融风暴发生时,正是这些国家开始瘦身、锻炼肌肉的时候,也就是开始出现投资机会的时候。
(七)资产净值——是投资决策的一个有效依据
投资是有风险的,而风险和收益又是相辅相成的,风险越大期望收益越高,风险越小期望收益越低。那么我们在投资时,除了要考察企业的经营团队,要运用“FELT”方法进行分析和评估以外,“资产净值”也是我们进行投资决策的一个有效依据。
所谓“资产净值”是指投资对象(上市公司)的总资产价值减去总负债所得的净值,除以企业发行在外的总股本,如果这一数值高于当前股价,说明股价处于价值低估状态,未来具有上涨潜力,值得投资,反之,则是价值高估,没有投资价值。资产净值的估值法,本质上还是Fair(合理股价)的一种方式,即通过股价和净值比较,寻找价值发现。之所以用资产净值,主要是以防万一,万一企业经营出现问题,被实施清盘的话,其实物资产还能维持在我买入的价格以上,确保投资不会出现重大损失,因此这是一种相对保守的估值方法。
使用这种方法,需要注意两个前提,一是资产评估一定要客观、准确,如果评估失真,净值不实,一旦清盘可能就无法实现原先资产净值。其对策是可以邀请多家评估机构进行评估,尽量采用公允价格进行衡量。二是以实物资产的评估为主,对品牌、商誉等无形资产尽量不要考虑,因为无形资产的波动性、不确定性很大,容易带来投资风险。
(八)了解游戏规则——是进入投资市场的前提
不同的国家、不同的市场,有着各不相同的市场制度和交易规则,这是因为各个市场有着各不相同的市场基础和人文环境。因此,对于投资者来说,在进入市场之前,首先要事先了解各国的交易机构和各项制度,正所谓适者生存。想一想,如果你连游戏规则还不了解的话,还怎么可能盈利呢!
这个原则尤其适用于新兴国家和新兴市场,因为对他们而言,虽然有着强烈的发展愿望,但是他们的制度大多仅有欧美成熟市场的雏形,法律规章不完善而且游戏规则多变,对于信息掌握不充分的投资者而言,无疑具有很大的风险。
打个比方来说,就像一个人坐在一辆高速行进而又制动不灵的汽车当中,还不时出现大幅摇摆,其所面临的风险是不言而喻的。因此,对于一个想要掌握新兴市场高爆发潜力的投资者而言,做好充分的前期调查和可行性分析,是至关重要的,它是其他投资分析和评估的一个前置性程序。
(九)金子通常是埋在沙砾下面的
这一法则是告诫大家不要被表面印象所迷惑,要善于发现在平庸表面下的闪亮个体,善于挖掘并把握他们。
坦率的说,这个命题带有很强的哲学含义,主要是阐述普遍性和特殊性的不一致性,因为我们的认识实践中,所得到的总体印象往往是多个个体的简单平均。就像学校里的考试有时候会算一个班级的平均分数,虽然这个平均分数可能会不很理想,但其中也会有一些相当优秀的成绩,只是他们被偏低的平均分所掩盖了。
同样,对于资本市场而言,限于我们的认识局限,往往对某一地区和某一市场只有一个相对模糊的总体印象,而缺乏更加深入的了解和分析,但其中却往往隐含了一些高成长的企业。因此,作为一个成功的投资者,要善于沙里淘金,发现有潜力的公司。其实,资本市场的投资本身就具有很强的辨证性,只要你不是买在绝对低点,抛在绝对高点,都会引来深深的后悔,但不久随着市场的转变,你又破涕为笑了。
如以地区为例,1998 年以前,俄罗斯的总体经济不佳,出现了高通胀、高失业等现象。以此来看,他好象并不是一个适合投资的国家。但如果你仔细观察就会发现在该国转型的过程中,仍蕴含着许多的高获利契机,如国营企业的私有化,使得有关的投资标的具有很高的成长潜力。在此情势下,通过“由下而上”的投资策略可以掌握获利契机。
(十)技术分析往往并不是最重要的
应该说,技术分析有它的优势,例如具有很强的客观性,可以进行量化判断。同时根据历史可以重复的原理,可以进行统计分析和前瞻性推导,具有较强的逻辑性。但无庸讳言,技术分析只是所有分析方法中的一部分,而不是全部,尤其在新兴市场中,技术分析方法更是一种相对次要的、辅助性的分析方法,只有当政策面、资金面、基本面等因素相对稳定的情况下,技术面才会发挥阶段性作用。
根据国内A股市场经验,作为一个新兴市场,影响行情最重要的因素无疑是政策面的变化,每次行情的重要转折,往往都和政策面息息相关。例如1994年7月上证综指325点历史底部以及2001年2245点历史头部,其转折的出现都和当时的政策面紧密相关。
但是,由于目前A股市场尚无市场趋势投资工具,投资的真正落脚点还在于具体个股上面,而个股的选择主要依赖于企业的基本面,如何准确掌握企业基本状况及动态,关键的就是做好实地调研。通过调研,了解企业的真实情况,评估股价高低和未来的发展潜力,最终作出投资建议。
目前,价值投资法已经成为全球市场普遍遵循的投资方法,在国内A股市场也日益受到机构投资者的重视,因此,做好实地调研已经成为投资选择的重要环节,现在国内的一些大券商的研究机构,都有四五十名专门从事公司调研分析的行业研究员,足以说明这项工作的重要性。
这句话形象地说明了“逆向思维”的重要性。
多年资本市场的经验告诉了我们,在一个有风险的投资市场中,少数人赚钱是一条永恒的规律,多数人只是参与或者赔本。在这种情况下,如何成为少数人,成为少数的赚钱者,一个简单易行的方法就是和大多数人保持对立,采取“人弃我取,人取我弃”的操作策略。
当一波行情渐涨渐高的时候,其实也是泡沫和风险逐渐积聚的过程,但在表面的盈利效应示范之下,越来越多的投资者被眼前的收益所吸引,希望将自己全部资金投入其中,此时是资金投入最大化的阶段,往往也是行情高点和头部的所在,一旦后续资金流跟不上,不能维持不断提高的市场价格,行情就不可避免的进入调整阶段。
回顾沪深股市十多年的历程,历史反复证明了这一规律的准确性。每当行情进入高潮,此时营业部大厅人满为患,投资者汗流浃背、神情亢奋时,股指往往正面临着头部。相反,当市场陷于谷底,证券机构门庭罗雀,即便反复动员,投资者也是应之寥寥时,市场又往往正是安全的底部。
此在实际操作中,当股市持续冲高、人人都想进场的时候,作为少数者就可以逐步地分批抛出,不要等市场下跌时才恐慌性抛售。而当行情一再暴跌,所有人都失望、悲观甚至绝望的时候,你却可以分批进场,逐渐吸纳。此时,一些价值型的股票因为暴跌,矫枉过正、价值低估,这正到了中线进场的时机。
(二)“不要把所有的鸡蛋都放在一个篮子里”
俗话说“不要把所有的鸡蛋都放在一个篮子里”,它的意思是说,一旦篮子摔了,鸡蛋就可能全碎了,损失也就比较大。相反,如果把鸡蛋分散放在不同的篮子里,即使有一只篮子摔了,其他的鸡蛋仍然会完好无损。
至于什么是分散投资,从广义上讲,应该是跨市场、跨地区的投资。在全球市场中,许多国际化机构投资者,既投资欧美市场,也投资日本、香港等亚洲市场,甚至包括菲律宾、韩国等新兴市场;既投资股票市场,也投资债券、石油金属等商品期货市场。从狭义的角度将,分散投资是跨品种的投资,如股票市场中,蓝筹股、成长股相容;大盘股、小盘股兼顾;传统产业、新兴产业相错;长线投资、短线投资统筹等等。
(三)你想能获得超额投资收益吗?那你一定要选择新兴市场
怎么样才能获得超额投资收益?这是每一个投资者的“心中所想”。对他们来说,除了要有敏锐的目光、严谨的分析、独到的见解,以及对投资超强的驾驭能力外,紧紧盯住新兴国家、投资新兴市场也是一条成功的捷径。
回顾近两百年来全球经济的发展历程,不难发现经济增长最快速的地区,往往是那些正经历着由传统到现代、由愚昧到文明、发生深刻变革的新兴国家和地区,即发展中国家和地区。虽然,对于发展中国家,其制度、法规不很完善,市场的短期波动也较为频繁,但他们却是最具活力、最有创新意识,其长期成长动能也远远强于已开发国家即所谓发达国家。
就像一个人,成长最快的并不是成年阶段,而是婴幼儿和青少年阶段。因此,投资发展中国家和新兴市场,往往能够分享经济快速发展所带来的成果,获得比全球一般发展速度更高的收益。例如,上世纪七十年代以后,以韩国、新加坡、香港、台湾为代表的亚洲四小龙的崛起,作为新兴国家和地区的典范,给全球有眼光的投资家们带来了巨大的机会。
同样,中国大陆自七十年代末期改革开放以后,随着计划经济向市场经济的转轨,经济发展巨大潜能被释放,国内经济发展速度连续多年远远超过世界经济的平均水平,已经成为全球发展中国家的代表。
(四)选择股票的最终标准--了解企业的团队
投资者在投资决策之前,一般都需要对投资对象进行研究。考察一家企业,可以是多角度、多方位的。例如这家企业经营状况、产品构成、财务状况等等,但其中最重要的还是对企业经营团队进行了解和分析。
为什么说了解企业经营团队的素质、理念和文化是决定企业发展的关键因素呢?俗话说:人是决定一切的因素,世界上有了人,世界才变得精彩。每个人,由于成长环境、社会阅历各不相同,因此都有自已的脾气秉性和处事原则,一个积极向上、团结和谐、敬业守信的经营团队是企业成功的首要前提。如果这个团队变化不定、表里不一,甚至尔虞我诈、相互倾钆,那么这样的企业是很难保持平稳发展的,回顾国内A股市场,这样的例子已经屡见不鲜。
例如一些上市公司的董事长,在大量侵占上市公司资产、严重侵犯中小投资者权益后,逃到海外长期不归,使上市公司经营受到巨大影响,濒临退市。所以,“选股票就是选老板”应该成为理性投资者的座右铭。
至于如何考察企业团队,可以观察他们以前说过什么,做过什么,效果如何?经营团队是否相对稳定?有没有前科劣迹。也可以通过深入的拜访,了解他们的经营理念、营运目标、乃至人格特征、各产业所面临的挑战等,这些都是重要的观察因素。
(五)“42码的脚不能穿进37码的鞋”--用FELT选择股票
所谓FELT 就是-Fair、Efficient、Liquid、Transparent。即在投资任何股票之前,都应该审视股价是否合理(Fair),股市是否是有效率交易(Efficient),股票是否具有流动性(Liquid),上市公司财务报表是否透明(Transparent),这是选择股票的四个方面。
首先,如果这只股票的价格已经达到或者超过其现有的及未来可预期的价值的话,那么这只股票就失去了买入和投资的价值,因为投资是价值发现的过程,如果没有价值发现,投资就失去了它的意义。
其次,如果一个市场效率很低,由于制度或者监管方面的问题,不能实现有效率的交易,那么他们的投资同样得不到保障。第三,投资规模要和股票规模相称。如果某只股票盘子很小,或者规模虽大但交易活跃度很低,交易量很小,那么它同样不适合大资金的投入,因为一方面它很难吸到足够的低价筹码,同时在出货时又很难迅速的全身而退,处于进退两难的尴尬境地。所谓“42码的脚不能穿进37码的鞋”,说的就是这个道理。
此外,财务报表的真实性也是决定投资成败的关键因素。再好的业绩如果是虚假的,对于投资者来说同样是致命的。由于财务报表是反映企业经营状况、资金状况的最基本素材,如果失真,将误导投资者作出偏离企业真实状况的判断,最终造成重大投资失误。这种例子,在国内A股市场上以及国内举不胜举,值得投资者警惕。
(六)“危机”——往往蕴藏着投资机会
危机,是指因为某些市场因素的变化,破坏了原有平衡,使市场受到冲击并出现阶段性混乱和动荡。从以往看,不管是上世纪的石油危机、经济危机还是金融危机,其最终结果都是在一定的范围内、一定的阶段,出现一定的混乱和恐慌,在经济、金融、投资领域则表现为市场的持续低迷、一跌再跌。
在现实生活中,“危机”潜藏投资机会主要是指两层含义。一是在“危机”出现的后期,由于持续下跌、引发市场恐慌,在强大的作空惯性下,出现矫枉过正、价值低估的现象,一些相对价值较高的品种,在跟风作空的影响下,出现价格扭曲、价值低估,而价值低估在投资领域即意味着投资机会。其二,危机的出现能够引发人们的忧患意识、发愤意识,能够激励人们更加努力的工作,创造更多的社会财富和投资机会。
例如1998年由于泰铢贬值引爆亚洲金融风暴发生,泰国政府于是开始进行金融法规改革,人民担忧未来的生活,也开始更努力工作、存更多钱,这可看出,当大环境安然无事时,人民容易懒散;而艰困,才是促使人民向前迈进的动力,因此,当金融风暴发生时,正是这些国家开始瘦身、锻炼肌肉的时候,也就是开始出现投资机会的时候。
(七)资产净值——是投资决策的一个有效依据
投资是有风险的,而风险和收益又是相辅相成的,风险越大期望收益越高,风险越小期望收益越低。那么我们在投资时,除了要考察企业的经营团队,要运用“FELT”方法进行分析和评估以外,“资产净值”也是我们进行投资决策的一个有效依据。
所谓“资产净值”是指投资对象(上市公司)的总资产价值减去总负债所得的净值,除以企业发行在外的总股本,如果这一数值高于当前股价,说明股价处于价值低估状态,未来具有上涨潜力,值得投资,反之,则是价值高估,没有投资价值。资产净值的估值法,本质上还是Fair(合理股价)的一种方式,即通过股价和净值比较,寻找价值发现。之所以用资产净值,主要是以防万一,万一企业经营出现问题,被实施清盘的话,其实物资产还能维持在我买入的价格以上,确保投资不会出现重大损失,因此这是一种相对保守的估值方法。
使用这种方法,需要注意两个前提,一是资产评估一定要客观、准确,如果评估失真,净值不实,一旦清盘可能就无法实现原先资产净值。其对策是可以邀请多家评估机构进行评估,尽量采用公允价格进行衡量。二是以实物资产的评估为主,对品牌、商誉等无形资产尽量不要考虑,因为无形资产的波动性、不确定性很大,容易带来投资风险。
(八)了解游戏规则——是进入投资市场的前提
不同的国家、不同的市场,有着各不相同的市场制度和交易规则,这是因为各个市场有着各不相同的市场基础和人文环境。因此,对于投资者来说,在进入市场之前,首先要事先了解各国的交易机构和各项制度,正所谓适者生存。想一想,如果你连游戏规则还不了解的话,还怎么可能盈利呢!
这个原则尤其适用于新兴国家和新兴市场,因为对他们而言,虽然有着强烈的发展愿望,但是他们的制度大多仅有欧美成熟市场的雏形,法律规章不完善而且游戏规则多变,对于信息掌握不充分的投资者而言,无疑具有很大的风险。
打个比方来说,就像一个人坐在一辆高速行进而又制动不灵的汽车当中,还不时出现大幅摇摆,其所面临的风险是不言而喻的。因此,对于一个想要掌握新兴市场高爆发潜力的投资者而言,做好充分的前期调查和可行性分析,是至关重要的,它是其他投资分析和评估的一个前置性程序。
(九)金子通常是埋在沙砾下面的
这一法则是告诫大家不要被表面印象所迷惑,要善于发现在平庸表面下的闪亮个体,善于挖掘并把握他们。
坦率的说,这个命题带有很强的哲学含义,主要是阐述普遍性和特殊性的不一致性,因为我们的认识实践中,所得到的总体印象往往是多个个体的简单平均。就像学校里的考试有时候会算一个班级的平均分数,虽然这个平均分数可能会不很理想,但其中也会有一些相当优秀的成绩,只是他们被偏低的平均分所掩盖了。
同样,对于资本市场而言,限于我们的认识局限,往往对某一地区和某一市场只有一个相对模糊的总体印象,而缺乏更加深入的了解和分析,但其中却往往隐含了一些高成长的企业。因此,作为一个成功的投资者,要善于沙里淘金,发现有潜力的公司。其实,资本市场的投资本身就具有很强的辨证性,只要你不是买在绝对低点,抛在绝对高点,都会引来深深的后悔,但不久随着市场的转变,你又破涕为笑了。
如以地区为例,1998 年以前,俄罗斯的总体经济不佳,出现了高通胀、高失业等现象。以此来看,他好象并不是一个适合投资的国家。但如果你仔细观察就会发现在该国转型的过程中,仍蕴含着许多的高获利契机,如国营企业的私有化,使得有关的投资标的具有很高的成长潜力。在此情势下,通过“由下而上”的投资策略可以掌握获利契机。
(十)技术分析往往并不是最重要的
应该说,技术分析有它的优势,例如具有很强的客观性,可以进行量化判断。同时根据历史可以重复的原理,可以进行统计分析和前瞻性推导,具有较强的逻辑性。但无庸讳言,技术分析只是所有分析方法中的一部分,而不是全部,尤其在新兴市场中,技术分析方法更是一种相对次要的、辅助性的分析方法,只有当政策面、资金面、基本面等因素相对稳定的情况下,技术面才会发挥阶段性作用。
根据国内A股市场经验,作为一个新兴市场,影响行情最重要的因素无疑是政策面的变化,每次行情的重要转折,往往都和政策面息息相关。例如1994年7月上证综指325点历史底部以及2001年2245点历史头部,其转折的出现都和当时的政策面紧密相关。
但是,由于目前A股市场尚无市场趋势投资工具,投资的真正落脚点还在于具体个股上面,而个股的选择主要依赖于企业的基本面,如何准确掌握企业基本状况及动态,关键的就是做好实地调研。通过调研,了解企业的真实情况,评估股价高低和未来的发展潜力,最终作出投资建议。
目前,价值投资法已经成为全球市场普遍遵循的投资方法,在国内A股市场也日益受到机构投资者的重视,因此,做好实地调研已经成为投资选择的重要环节,现在国内的一些大券商的研究机构,都有四五十名专门从事公司调研分析的行业研究员,足以说明这项工作的重要性。
Thursday, March 13, 2008
投资之父--约翰·邓普顿爵士
邓普顿爵士是邓普顿集团的创始人,一直被誉为全球最具智慧以及最受尊崇的投资者之一。福布斯资本家杂志称他为"全球投资之父"及"历史上最成功的基金经理之一"。虽然邓普顿爵士已经退休,不再参与基金的投资决策,但他的投资哲学已经成为邓普顿基金集团的投资团队以及许多投资人永恒的财富。
约翰·邓普顿生平简介
1912年约翰·邓普顿出生于田纳西州,家境贫寒。但凭借优异的成绩,他依靠奖学金完成在耶鲁大学的学业,并在1934年毕业是取得耶鲁大学经济学一等学位。之后,他在牛津大学继续深造,获得罗德斯奖学金,并在1936年取得法学硕士学位。重返美国后,他在纽约的Fenner & Beane工作,也就是如今美林证券公司的前身之一。
邓普顿在1937年,也就是大萧条最低迷的时候成立了自己的公司 - Templeton, Dobbrow & Vance。公司取得了相当大的成功,资产规模也迅速增长到了$3亿,旗下拥有8支共同基金。1968年,公司更名为Templeton Damroth并被转售。同年,邓普顿在巴哈马的拿骚,再次建立了自己的邓普顿成长基金。
邓普顿在上世纪50年代首开全球化投资的风气,他认为世界各国有不同的经济盛衰循环,不应将获利机会限制在单一国家内,若加上以个别公司由下而上的选股方式,发掘世界各地的投资潜力,不但可使风险分散,还可为资本创造利润。上世纪40年代他就投资经战争蹂躏的欧洲,上世纪60年代入股日本企业,上世纪 80年代初,进军亚洲及拉美市场,取得了很高的投资回报,他让美国人知道海外地区投资的好处。
国际价值投资的策略大师
20世纪60年代到70 年代,邓普顿是第一批到日本投资的美国财务经理之一。他以低于3倍收入的低价买进日本股票,而在价格收益比在30%时卖掉。邓普顿抢在其他投资者之前抓住了机会,在他买进后,日本股市一路蹿升。后来,他发觉日本的股市被高估了,而他又发现了新的投资机会——美国。实际上,邓普顿在1988年就对股东们说,日本的股市将会缩水50%,甚至更多。几年后,日本的股票指数——东京证券交易所指数下跌了60%。
1985年,由于高通货膨胀和政治因素,阿根廷的股票市场出现严重的衰退。邓普顿认为这是一个买进股票的好机会,当然他的目标是那些他认为能够恢复到正常水平的股票。国际货币基金组织在4个月内通过了一项援助阿根廷的计划,而邓普顿的股票上涨了70%。
1997年,由于投资者的投机行为和出现严重的政治经济问题,亚洲的股票市场几乎崩溃,而邓普顿抓住机会在韩国和亚洲其他地区投资。1999年,亚洲股票市场恢复时,邓普顿获得了丰厚的利润。对此,邓普顿的经验是:“当别人慌忙抛售股票时你要买进,而在别人急于买进时抛出,这需要投资者有最大的坚韧不拔,然而回报也是最大的。”
在之后的25年中,邓普顿创立了全球最大最成功的坦普顿共同基金集团,1992年他将坦普顿基金卖给富兰克林集团。1999年,美国《Money》杂志将邓普敦誉为“本世纪当之无愧的全球最伟大的选股人”。由于常年居住在巴哈马,邓普敦自然成为英国公民,并受到伊丽莎白二世的青睐,于1987授予其爵士爵位以表彰其功绩。
约翰·邓普顿的投资风格——逆向投资
作为上个世纪最著名的逆向投资者,邓普顿的投资方法被总结为:“在大萧条的低点买入,在互联网的高点抛出,并在这两者间游刃有余。”
他的投资风格可以这样归总:寻找那些价值型投资品种,也就是他说的“淘便宜货”。放眼全球,而不是只关注一点。邓普顿的投资法宝是:“在全球范围寻找低价的、长期前景良好的公司作为投资目标。”
作为逆向价值投资者,邓普顿相信,完全被忽视的股票是最让人心动的便宜货------尤其是那些投资者们都尚未研究的股票。就这点而言,他相比其他投资者的优势是,他居住在巴哈马的Lyford Cay,那里是全世界成功商务人士的俱乐部。
邓普顿发现,Lyford Cay的氛围更加轻松惬意,人们更容易交流彼此的想法、心得。相形之下,华尔街的气氛就非常功利,也限制了人们的沟通。就象传奇投资者菲利普·费雪一样,邓普顿也发现了交际的价值,他也通过这个方法来获取全球相关投资领域的信息。
约翰·邓普顿的企业分析要点
营盈成长稳定性:如果某公司的盈余有一年挫退,或许没关系。但如果连续两年表现不佳,就须抱以怀疑的态度。
弹性是中心守则:在每件事都进行的特别好时,你必须准备进行改变。当整个循环与你的估算相吻合的天衣无缝时,应是准备获利了结。
别信赖任何的原则和公式:任何定理都有可能在一夕之间被打破。
约翰·邓普顿15条投资法则
约翰·邓普顿被喻为投资之父,这不仅在于他的95岁高龄,还因为他是价值投资的模范。邓普顿自1987年退休之后,将其投资法则归纳为15条。
1、信仰有助投资:
一个有信仰的人,思维会更加清晰和敏锐,犯错的机会因而减低。要冷静和意志坚定,能够做到不受市场环境所影响。 谦虚好学是成功法宝:那些好像对什么问题都知道的人,其实真正要回答的问题都不知道。投资中,狂妄和傲慢所带来的是灾难,也是失望,聪明的投资者应该知道,成功是不断探索的过程。
2、要从错误中学习:
避免投资错误的惟一方法是不投资,但这却是你所能犯的最大错误。不要因为犯了投资错误而耿耿于怀,更不要为了弥补上次损失而孤注一掷,而应该找出原因,避免重蹈覆辙。
3、投资不是赌博:
如果你在股市不断进出,只求几个价位的利润,或是不断抛空,进行期权或期货交易,股市对你来说已成了赌场,而你就像赌徒,最终会血本无归。
4、不要听“贴士”:
小道消息听起来好像能赚快钱,但要知道“世上没有免费的午餐”。
5、投资要做功课:
买股票之前,至少要知道这家公司出类拔萃之处,如自己没有能力办到,便请专家帮忙。
6、跑赢专业机构性投资者:
要胜过市场,不单要胜过一般投资者,还要胜过专业的基金经理,要比大户更聪明,这才是最大的挑战。
7、价值投资法:
要购买物有所值的东西,而不是市场趋向或经济前景。
8、买优质股份:
优质公司是比同类好一点的公司,例如在市场中销售额领先的公司,在技术创新的行业中,科技领先的公司以及拥有优良营运记录、有效控制成本、率先进入新市场、生产高利润消费性产品而信誉卓越的公司。
9、趁低吸纳:
“低买高卖”是说易行难的法则,因为当每个人都买入时,你也跟着买,造成“货不抵价”的投资。相反,当股价低、投资者退却的时候,你也跟着出货,最终变成“高买低卖”。
10、不要惊慌:
即使周围的人都在抛售,你也不用跟随,因为卖出的最好时机是在股市崩溃之前,而并非之后。反之,你应该检视自己的投资组合,卖出现有股票的惟一理由,是有更具吸引力的股票,如没有,便应该继续持有手上的股票。
11、注意实际回报:
计算投资回报时,别忘了将税款和通胀算进去,这对长期投资者尤为重要。
12、别将所有的鸡蛋放在同一个篮子里:
要将投资分散在不同的公司、行业及国家中,还要分散在股票及债券中,因为无论你多聪明,也不能预计或控制未来。
13、对不同的投资类别抱开放态度:
要接受不同类型和不同地区的投资项目,现金在组合里的比重亦不是一成不变的,没有一种投资组合永远是最好的。
14、监控自己的投资:
没有什么投资是永远的,要对预期的改变作出适当的反应,不能买了只股票便永远放在那里,美其名为“长线投资”。
15、对投资抱正面态度:
虽然股市会回落,甚至会出现股灾,但不要对股市失去信心,因为从长远而言,股市始终是会回升的。只有乐观的投资者才能在股市中胜出。
约翰·邓普顿的名言
*An attitude of gratitude creates blessings.. Help yourself by helping others. You have the most powerful weapons on earth.. love and prayer. (天佑感恩之心,助别人就是帮助你自己,在地球上最强的武器就是爱与祈祷。)
*The main focus in my life now is to open people's minds so no one will be so conceited that they think they have the total truth. They should be eager to learn, to listen, to research and not to confine, to hurt, to kill, those who disagree with them. (我生命中专注于开启他人的心灵让人们不自满的以为他们以了解地球上所有的真理。他们应该热心于倾听、研究、而不是封闭、伤害他们不认同的人。)
* Buying when others have despaired, and selling when they are full of hope, takes fortitude.
(行情总在绝望中诞生,在半信半疑中成长,在憧憬中成熟,在希望中毁灭。)
约翰·邓普顿生平简介
1912年约翰·邓普顿出生于田纳西州,家境贫寒。但凭借优异的成绩,他依靠奖学金完成在耶鲁大学的学业,并在1934年毕业是取得耶鲁大学经济学一等学位。之后,他在牛津大学继续深造,获得罗德斯奖学金,并在1936年取得法学硕士学位。重返美国后,他在纽约的Fenner & Beane工作,也就是如今美林证券公司的前身之一。
邓普顿在1937年,也就是大萧条最低迷的时候成立了自己的公司 - Templeton, Dobbrow & Vance。公司取得了相当大的成功,资产规模也迅速增长到了$3亿,旗下拥有8支共同基金。1968年,公司更名为Templeton Damroth并被转售。同年,邓普顿在巴哈马的拿骚,再次建立了自己的邓普顿成长基金。
邓普顿在上世纪50年代首开全球化投资的风气,他认为世界各国有不同的经济盛衰循环,不应将获利机会限制在单一国家内,若加上以个别公司由下而上的选股方式,发掘世界各地的投资潜力,不但可使风险分散,还可为资本创造利润。上世纪40年代他就投资经战争蹂躏的欧洲,上世纪60年代入股日本企业,上世纪 80年代初,进军亚洲及拉美市场,取得了很高的投资回报,他让美国人知道海外地区投资的好处。
国际价值投资的策略大师
20世纪60年代到70 年代,邓普顿是第一批到日本投资的美国财务经理之一。他以低于3倍收入的低价买进日本股票,而在价格收益比在30%时卖掉。邓普顿抢在其他投资者之前抓住了机会,在他买进后,日本股市一路蹿升。后来,他发觉日本的股市被高估了,而他又发现了新的投资机会——美国。实际上,邓普顿在1988年就对股东们说,日本的股市将会缩水50%,甚至更多。几年后,日本的股票指数——东京证券交易所指数下跌了60%。
1985年,由于高通货膨胀和政治因素,阿根廷的股票市场出现严重的衰退。邓普顿认为这是一个买进股票的好机会,当然他的目标是那些他认为能够恢复到正常水平的股票。国际货币基金组织在4个月内通过了一项援助阿根廷的计划,而邓普顿的股票上涨了70%。
1997年,由于投资者的投机行为和出现严重的政治经济问题,亚洲的股票市场几乎崩溃,而邓普顿抓住机会在韩国和亚洲其他地区投资。1999年,亚洲股票市场恢复时,邓普顿获得了丰厚的利润。对此,邓普顿的经验是:“当别人慌忙抛售股票时你要买进,而在别人急于买进时抛出,这需要投资者有最大的坚韧不拔,然而回报也是最大的。”
在之后的25年中,邓普顿创立了全球最大最成功的坦普顿共同基金集团,1992年他将坦普顿基金卖给富兰克林集团。1999年,美国《Money》杂志将邓普敦誉为“本世纪当之无愧的全球最伟大的选股人”。由于常年居住在巴哈马,邓普敦自然成为英国公民,并受到伊丽莎白二世的青睐,于1987授予其爵士爵位以表彰其功绩。
约翰·邓普顿的投资风格——逆向投资
作为上个世纪最著名的逆向投资者,邓普顿的投资方法被总结为:“在大萧条的低点买入,在互联网的高点抛出,并在这两者间游刃有余。”
他的投资风格可以这样归总:寻找那些价值型投资品种,也就是他说的“淘便宜货”。放眼全球,而不是只关注一点。邓普顿的投资法宝是:“在全球范围寻找低价的、长期前景良好的公司作为投资目标。”
作为逆向价值投资者,邓普顿相信,完全被忽视的股票是最让人心动的便宜货------尤其是那些投资者们都尚未研究的股票。就这点而言,他相比其他投资者的优势是,他居住在巴哈马的Lyford Cay,那里是全世界成功商务人士的俱乐部。
邓普顿发现,Lyford Cay的氛围更加轻松惬意,人们更容易交流彼此的想法、心得。相形之下,华尔街的气氛就非常功利,也限制了人们的沟通。就象传奇投资者菲利普·费雪一样,邓普顿也发现了交际的价值,他也通过这个方法来获取全球相关投资领域的信息。
约翰·邓普顿的企业分析要点
营盈成长稳定性:如果某公司的盈余有一年挫退,或许没关系。但如果连续两年表现不佳,就须抱以怀疑的态度。
弹性是中心守则:在每件事都进行的特别好时,你必须准备进行改变。当整个循环与你的估算相吻合的天衣无缝时,应是准备获利了结。
别信赖任何的原则和公式:任何定理都有可能在一夕之间被打破。
约翰·邓普顿15条投资法则
约翰·邓普顿被喻为投资之父,这不仅在于他的95岁高龄,还因为他是价值投资的模范。邓普顿自1987年退休之后,将其投资法则归纳为15条。
1、信仰有助投资:
一个有信仰的人,思维会更加清晰和敏锐,犯错的机会因而减低。要冷静和意志坚定,能够做到不受市场环境所影响。 谦虚好学是成功法宝:那些好像对什么问题都知道的人,其实真正要回答的问题都不知道。投资中,狂妄和傲慢所带来的是灾难,也是失望,聪明的投资者应该知道,成功是不断探索的过程。
2、要从错误中学习:
避免投资错误的惟一方法是不投资,但这却是你所能犯的最大错误。不要因为犯了投资错误而耿耿于怀,更不要为了弥补上次损失而孤注一掷,而应该找出原因,避免重蹈覆辙。
3、投资不是赌博:
如果你在股市不断进出,只求几个价位的利润,或是不断抛空,进行期权或期货交易,股市对你来说已成了赌场,而你就像赌徒,最终会血本无归。
4、不要听“贴士”:
小道消息听起来好像能赚快钱,但要知道“世上没有免费的午餐”。
5、投资要做功课:
买股票之前,至少要知道这家公司出类拔萃之处,如自己没有能力办到,便请专家帮忙。
6、跑赢专业机构性投资者:
要胜过市场,不单要胜过一般投资者,还要胜过专业的基金经理,要比大户更聪明,这才是最大的挑战。
7、价值投资法:
要购买物有所值的东西,而不是市场趋向或经济前景。
8、买优质股份:
优质公司是比同类好一点的公司,例如在市场中销售额领先的公司,在技术创新的行业中,科技领先的公司以及拥有优良营运记录、有效控制成本、率先进入新市场、生产高利润消费性产品而信誉卓越的公司。
9、趁低吸纳:
“低买高卖”是说易行难的法则,因为当每个人都买入时,你也跟着买,造成“货不抵价”的投资。相反,当股价低、投资者退却的时候,你也跟着出货,最终变成“高买低卖”。
10、不要惊慌:
即使周围的人都在抛售,你也不用跟随,因为卖出的最好时机是在股市崩溃之前,而并非之后。反之,你应该检视自己的投资组合,卖出现有股票的惟一理由,是有更具吸引力的股票,如没有,便应该继续持有手上的股票。
11、注意实际回报:
计算投资回报时,别忘了将税款和通胀算进去,这对长期投资者尤为重要。
12、别将所有的鸡蛋放在同一个篮子里:
要将投资分散在不同的公司、行业及国家中,还要分散在股票及债券中,因为无论你多聪明,也不能预计或控制未来。
13、对不同的投资类别抱开放态度:
要接受不同类型和不同地区的投资项目,现金在组合里的比重亦不是一成不变的,没有一种投资组合永远是最好的。
14、监控自己的投资:
没有什么投资是永远的,要对预期的改变作出适当的反应,不能买了只股票便永远放在那里,美其名为“长线投资”。
15、对投资抱正面态度:
虽然股市会回落,甚至会出现股灾,但不要对股市失去信心,因为从长远而言,股市始终是会回升的。只有乐观的投资者才能在股市中胜出。
约翰·邓普顿的名言
*An attitude of gratitude creates blessings.. Help yourself by helping others. You have the most powerful weapons on earth.. love and prayer. (天佑感恩之心,助别人就是帮助你自己,在地球上最强的武器就是爱与祈祷。)
*The main focus in my life now is to open people's minds so no one will be so conceited that they think they have the total truth. They should be eager to learn, to listen, to research and not to confine, to hurt, to kill, those who disagree with them. (我生命中专注于开启他人的心灵让人们不自满的以为他们以了解地球上所有的真理。他们应该热心于倾听、研究、而不是封闭、伤害他们不认同的人。)
* Buying when others have despaired, and selling when they are full of hope, takes fortitude.
(行情总在绝望中诞生,在半信半疑中成长,在憧憬中成熟,在希望中毁灭。)
鄧普頓爵士(Sir John Templeton)的投資心法
投資宗師約翰·鄧普頓爵士(Sir John Templeton)多年來累積的投資智慧:
1) 信仰有助投資:一個有信仰的人,思維會更加清晰和敏銳,犯錯的機會因而減低。要冷靜和意志堅定,能夠做到不受市場環境所影響。
2) 謙遜好學是成功法寶:那些好像對什麼問題都知道的人,其實真正要回答的問題都不知道。投資中,狂妄和傲慢所帶來的是災難,也是失望,聰明的投資者應該知道,成功是不斷探索的過程。
3) 要從錯誤中學習:避免投資錯誤的惟一方法是不投資,但這卻是你所能犯的最大錯誤。不要因為犯了投資錯誤而耿耿於懷,更不要為了彌補上次損失而孤注一擲,而應該找出原因,避免重蹈覆轍。
4) 投資不是賭博:如果你在股市不斷進出,只求幾個價位的利潤,或是不斷拋空,進行期權或期貨交易,股市對你來說已成了賭場,而你就像賭徒,最終會血本無歸。
5) 投資要做功課:買股票之前,至少要知道這家公司出類拔萃之處,如自己沒有能力辦到,便請專家幫忙。不要聽「貼士」:小道消息聽起來好像能賺快錢,但要知道「世上沒有免費的午餐」。
6) 跑贏專業機構性投資者:要勝過市場,不單要勝過一般投資者,還要勝過專業的基金經理,要比大戶更聰明,這才是最大的挑戰。
7) 價值投資法:要購買物有所值的東西,而不是市場趨向或經濟前景。
8) 買優質股份:優質公司是比同類好一點的公司,例如在市場中銷售額領先的公司,在技術創新的行業中,科技領先的公司以及擁有優良營運記錄、有效控制成本、率先進入新市場、生產高利潤消費性產品而信譽卓越的公司。
9) 趁低吸納:「低買高賣」是說易行難的法則,因為當每個人都買入時,你也跟著買,造成「貨不抵價」的投資。相反,當股價低、投資者退卻的時候,你也跟著出貨,最終變成「高買低賣」。
10) 不要驚慌:即使周圍的人都在拋售,你也不用跟隨,因為賣出的最好時機是在股市崩潰之前,而並非之後。反之,你應該檢視自己的投資組合,賣出現有股票的惟一理由,是有更具吸引力的股票,如沒有,便應該繼續持有手上的股票。
11) 注意實際回報:計算投資回報時,別忘了將稅款和通脹算進去,這對長期投資者尤為重要。
12) 別將所有的雞蛋放在同一個籃子裡:要將投資分散在不同的公司、行業及國家中,還要分散在股票及債券中,因為無論你多聰明,也不能預計或控制未來。
13) 對不同的投資類別抱開放態度:要接受不同類型和不同地區的投資項目,現金在組合裡的比重亦不是一成不變的,沒有一種投資組合永遠是最好的。
14) 監控自己的投資:沒有什麼投資是永遠的,要對預期的改變作出適當的反應,不能買了只股票便永遠放在那裡,美其名為「長線投資」。
15) 對投資抱正面態度:雖然股市會回落,甚至會出現股災,但不要對股市失去信心,因為從長遠而言,股市始終是會回升的。只有樂觀的投資者才能在股市中勝出。
1) 信仰有助投資:一個有信仰的人,思維會更加清晰和敏銳,犯錯的機會因而減低。要冷靜和意志堅定,能夠做到不受市場環境所影響。
2) 謙遜好學是成功法寶:那些好像對什麼問題都知道的人,其實真正要回答的問題都不知道。投資中,狂妄和傲慢所帶來的是災難,也是失望,聰明的投資者應該知道,成功是不斷探索的過程。
3) 要從錯誤中學習:避免投資錯誤的惟一方法是不投資,但這卻是你所能犯的最大錯誤。不要因為犯了投資錯誤而耿耿於懷,更不要為了彌補上次損失而孤注一擲,而應該找出原因,避免重蹈覆轍。
4) 投資不是賭博:如果你在股市不斷進出,只求幾個價位的利潤,或是不斷拋空,進行期權或期貨交易,股市對你來說已成了賭場,而你就像賭徒,最終會血本無歸。
5) 投資要做功課:買股票之前,至少要知道這家公司出類拔萃之處,如自己沒有能力辦到,便請專家幫忙。不要聽「貼士」:小道消息聽起來好像能賺快錢,但要知道「世上沒有免費的午餐」。
6) 跑贏專業機構性投資者:要勝過市場,不單要勝過一般投資者,還要勝過專業的基金經理,要比大戶更聰明,這才是最大的挑戰。
7) 價值投資法:要購買物有所值的東西,而不是市場趨向或經濟前景。
8) 買優質股份:優質公司是比同類好一點的公司,例如在市場中銷售額領先的公司,在技術創新的行業中,科技領先的公司以及擁有優良營運記錄、有效控制成本、率先進入新市場、生產高利潤消費性產品而信譽卓越的公司。
9) 趁低吸納:「低買高賣」是說易行難的法則,因為當每個人都買入時,你也跟著買,造成「貨不抵價」的投資。相反,當股價低、投資者退卻的時候,你也跟著出貨,最終變成「高買低賣」。
10) 不要驚慌:即使周圍的人都在拋售,你也不用跟隨,因為賣出的最好時機是在股市崩潰之前,而並非之後。反之,你應該檢視自己的投資組合,賣出現有股票的惟一理由,是有更具吸引力的股票,如沒有,便應該繼續持有手上的股票。
11) 注意實際回報:計算投資回報時,別忘了將稅款和通脹算進去,這對長期投資者尤為重要。
12) 別將所有的雞蛋放在同一個籃子裡:要將投資分散在不同的公司、行業及國家中,還要分散在股票及債券中,因為無論你多聰明,也不能預計或控制未來。
13) 對不同的投資類別抱開放態度:要接受不同類型和不同地區的投資項目,現金在組合裡的比重亦不是一成不變的,沒有一種投資組合永遠是最好的。
14) 監控自己的投資:沒有什麼投資是永遠的,要對預期的改變作出適當的反應,不能買了只股票便永遠放在那裡,美其名為「長線投資」。
15) 對投資抱正面態度:雖然股市會回落,甚至會出現股災,但不要對股市失去信心,因為從長遠而言,股市始終是會回升的。只有樂觀的投資者才能在股市中勝出。
IG Markets - Free Seminars
We host regular seminars for new and prospective clients at our offices in central Singapore.
Seminars are held in our offices at:
#22-04 Chevron House, 30 Raffles Place, Singapore.
Seminar Date:
Wed 19th March 2008, 7pm.
Seminars are held in our offices at:
#22-04 Chevron House, 30 Raffles Place, Singapore.
Seminar Date:
Wed 19th March 2008, 7pm.
美股製造假雙底
聯儲局再注資2000億美元去穩定信貸市場信心危機,並首次以國庫券交換次按債券;另獲歐洲及加拿大央行協助注資450億美元入佢地自己銀行體系。上述措施令道指出現五年內最大升市,媲美1月份八天內減息1.25厘,令道指1月22日止跌回升;幕後策略員有可能係財長保爾森,佢趁住股市拋空者眾多,殺淡友一個措手不及,為美股製造「假雙底」走勢,企圖利用股市升降反過來影響美國經濟表現。上述行動類似呆壞賬將「國有化」,係咪有用?有待進一步觀察。我老曹意見係:殘酷熊市如果真係咁容易解決,1929年聯儲局及1990年日本央行係咪豬咁蠢?美股同港股已確認熊市;滬深三百指數50天線同200天線天天在接近,唔排除4月初獲確認。世界各地股市真係熊蹤處處,唔係咁易「殺牠死」。
熊 市 忌 溝 淡 博 反 彈
近來,美股出現巨大的震盪 ,急跌急升,這是很正常的,美國次級按揭貸款問題完全沒有解決 的方案,市場每隔一段時間都會因為經濟數據差而出現恐慌性拋售。每一次恐慌性的拋售,就是 向布殊政府示威抗議,此後就是美國政府出面打救,或向銀行體系注入大量資金,或大幅減息。
總之,今年是總統選舉年, 布殊政府絕不會見死不救,再大的代價也是由明年上任的新總統來承接,自己光榮離任及協助共和黨人當選最重要。因此,-陣恐慌之後就是急速的反彈 。所以,搞來搞去,美股實際上跌幅並不大,道瓊斯指數,最差的情況與去年高期比較,也只是下跌一成多罷了,反而亞太股市的跌幅普遍上比美股跌得更兇、更殘,相信部 份原因是美資基金因母公司資金短缺而被迫套現, 沽售亞太區的投資以取得現金回家救母公司。
大量現金才適合入市
最新出爐的消費物價指數上升8.7% 更嚇人,這是遠比溫總定下的4.8% 要求高得很。通脹率這麼高,怎麼辦 ?會如何辦?看來只好雙管齊下,一方面以行政手段不許加價,另一方面控制貨幣供應,加息、加銀行準備金率,這一切,對股市是不利的。
現在,短期內認同熊市中大型反彈浪的人越來越多,但是,大家依然要小心,反彈的意思就表示這不是新牛市,有了一定的升幅之後還是會再下跌。
過往不少人喜歡在反彈浪「 溝淡 」其手上已經持有高價買入的股,如果手上持有中移 就買入中移動,目的是使到手上中移動的平均價降低,將來中移動股價一反彈到自己的平均價時就可以賣掉脫身。這是錯誤的做法,我認為只有那些在之前已經大量賣股套現, 手上持有大量現金的人才適合在反彈市買股,那些在之前股價下跌時沒套現的人,不該在反彈市入市,以免增加自己的壓力與風險 。
這些人只適合當個旁觀者,耐心地等反彈幅度加大後減持 。
總之,今年是總統選舉年, 布殊政府絕不會見死不救,再大的代價也是由明年上任的新總統來承接,自己光榮離任及協助共和黨人當選最重要。因此,-陣恐慌之後就是急速的反彈 。所以,搞來搞去,美股實際上跌幅並不大,道瓊斯指數,最差的情況與去年高期比較,也只是下跌一成多罷了,反而亞太股市的跌幅普遍上比美股跌得更兇、更殘,相信部 份原因是美資基金因母公司資金短缺而被迫套現, 沽售亞太區的投資以取得現金回家救母公司。
大量現金才適合入市
最新出爐的消費物價指數上升8.7% 更嚇人,這是遠比溫總定下的4.8% 要求高得很。通脹率這麼高,怎麼辦 ?會如何辦?看來只好雙管齊下,一方面以行政手段不許加價,另一方面控制貨幣供應,加息、加銀行準備金率,這一切,對股市是不利的。
現在,短期內認同熊市中大型反彈浪的人越來越多,但是,大家依然要小心,反彈的意思就表示這不是新牛市,有了一定的升幅之後還是會再下跌。
過往不少人喜歡在反彈浪「 溝淡 」其手上已經持有高價買入的股,如果手上持有中移 就買入中移動,目的是使到手上中移動的平均價降低,將來中移動股價一反彈到自己的平均價時就可以賣掉脫身。這是錯誤的做法,我認為只有那些在之前已經大量賣股套現, 手上持有大量現金的人才適合在反彈市買股,那些在之前股價下跌時沒套現的人,不該在反彈市入市,以免增加自己的壓力與風險 。
這些人只適合當個旁觀者,耐心地等反彈幅度加大後減持 。
經紀重重盤削 投資負數遊戲
加拿大的國際資本管理公司於月初及時地發表一篇題為〈拿捏時機的困難〉(The Trouble with Timing)的短文,指出投資者莫不希望在最適時機買賣股票,但成功者並不常見;由於試圖捕捉最適時機,因而經常出出入入、買買賣賣,結果成為「經紀恩人」。
在過去十年(一九九八年二月二日至二○○八年二月一日)一共二千五百一十九個多倫多股市營業日,持有多倫多股市綜合指數基金,包括把股息再投入而不包括支付經紀佣金,投資者把之束諸高閣(unmanaged),一萬元變成一萬九千六百六十九元,平均每年獲利率百分之七。如此盈利幅度,只比債券孳息略勝一籌,有進取心即有賺大錢野心者所不屑為;然而,在這十年內經常買賣者,只要錯過十天「最大升幅」,盈利只及前者的四成四,錯過二十、三十四及四十個「最大升幅」日的投資者,依次錄得百分之五點○一、百分之二十八點六及百分之四十點七四的虧損。
在成熟股市,「時間」(Time)顯然比「時機」(Timing)重要,這即是說,只要購進藍籌股指數─藍籌公司亦會「失手」,因此持有指數較穩健─持之以「恒」,雖然利潤不算太高,亦遠較經常買賣為佳。
眾所周知,一般股民都在股價高峰或近頂時受市場亢奮氣氛感染而入貨,而在市場見底或持續下挫投資者信心崩潰沮喪時作壯士斷臂之舉(砍掉損失「止蝕」是股市「格言」之一),結果當然「有蝕無賺」;另一方面,不少經驗老到的股民,通常不致高買低賣,但錯過出貨最佳時機(升幅最大的日子)絕不罕見,一如上例,十年中只要錯過十次這樣的機會,回報便遠遜「持有不變」!
經常買賣的一項「隱性成本」即股民通常會掉以輕心的損失,是經紀佣金;經紀替客服務,收取一定「手續費」,是應得酬勞,完全合理,問題是買賣頻密佣金相應增加,不但令利潤大打折扣,無利可圖時老本還會被蠶食。同一報告的資料顯示,在迄二○○六年年底的二十年,持有華爾街標準普爾五百指數的平均回報年率百分之十一點八,投資在「英明神武的專家替你賺錢」的互惠基金,平均回報年率只有百分之四點三;按照常理,基金經理斷無跑輸指數之理,姑且估計他們的獲利與長期持有者相近,只是扣除經紀佣金(大市波幅愈劇基金經理擔心落後於大市因而作「神經性」買賣,佣金開支非同小可)和管理費,投資者所得無幾。
購進股票指數基金,長期持有,也許被大多數股民應為不進取,然而,經驗告訴大家,這是比較穩健的投資之道。三月十日「尋找最佳回報」網站(seekingalpha.com)的評論,文題便是〈第一步購進指數基金,第二步持有不放。
三月十日,《巴隆氏周刊》在一篇談論退休者如何投資最有利的特稿,指出投資者最常犯的三項錯誤,是不能精明地分散投資、試圖捕捉出入市時機和於不知不覺間支付巨額管理及手續費。
畢非德致股東書指出在投資市場中,「大家都想有高於平均回報的成績」,因此各出奇謀,頻頻買賣,而協助這些「活躍投資者」完成心願的中間人(經紀),莫不鼓勵他們這樣,因為從中他們收取可觀佣金;可是,作為一個階級,這類經常買賣的活躍投資者,其成績低於平均數,理由很簡單,交易費、管理費和顧問費把他們拖垮。
無獨有偶,三月九日《紐約時報》的「投資策略」欄介紹與芝大范瑪(E. F. Fama)齊名的達茅斯大學投資學者法蘭治(K. R. French)的學術論文〈活躍投資的代價〉(The Cost of Active Investing),指出為了跑贏大市,美股投資者每年付出的代價高達一千億美元以上(二○○六年的具體數字為九百九十二億美元,以過去二十年的平均數,○七年的代價逾千億即近萬億港元),這筆巨款令華爾街大小經紀公司盈利年年大幅增長(它們出現虧損皆因本身投資出事引致)。買賣頻仍的代價甚高,彰顯了長期持有「指數基金」才是穩健賺錢之正道。
股市交易本是一場「零和遊戲」(zero-sum game),即甲盈乙虧,任何一項交易都是盈虧相抵,可是,加上了交易過程牽涉的種種費用,股票投資便成為「負數遊戲」(negative-sum game),買賣雙方盈虧總和不均衡,「差額」流進華爾街經紀公司的戶口!
愈來愈多股民了解「協助他們發達」的中間人牟取驚人利潤而投資收益則差強人意。
無論是市場智慧或學者的研究,均指出長期持有回報較佳。這是投資者特別是活躍投資者必須三思的
在過去十年(一九九八年二月二日至二○○八年二月一日)一共二千五百一十九個多倫多股市營業日,持有多倫多股市綜合指數基金,包括把股息再投入而不包括支付經紀佣金,投資者把之束諸高閣(unmanaged),一萬元變成一萬九千六百六十九元,平均每年獲利率百分之七。如此盈利幅度,只比債券孳息略勝一籌,有進取心即有賺大錢野心者所不屑為;然而,在這十年內經常買賣者,只要錯過十天「最大升幅」,盈利只及前者的四成四,錯過二十、三十四及四十個「最大升幅」日的投資者,依次錄得百分之五點○一、百分之二十八點六及百分之四十點七四的虧損。
在成熟股市,「時間」(Time)顯然比「時機」(Timing)重要,這即是說,只要購進藍籌股指數─藍籌公司亦會「失手」,因此持有指數較穩健─持之以「恒」,雖然利潤不算太高,亦遠較經常買賣為佳。
眾所周知,一般股民都在股價高峰或近頂時受市場亢奮氣氛感染而入貨,而在市場見底或持續下挫投資者信心崩潰沮喪時作壯士斷臂之舉(砍掉損失「止蝕」是股市「格言」之一),結果當然「有蝕無賺」;另一方面,不少經驗老到的股民,通常不致高買低賣,但錯過出貨最佳時機(升幅最大的日子)絕不罕見,一如上例,十年中只要錯過十次這樣的機會,回報便遠遜「持有不變」!
經常買賣的一項「隱性成本」即股民通常會掉以輕心的損失,是經紀佣金;經紀替客服務,收取一定「手續費」,是應得酬勞,完全合理,問題是買賣頻密佣金相應增加,不但令利潤大打折扣,無利可圖時老本還會被蠶食。同一報告的資料顯示,在迄二○○六年年底的二十年,持有華爾街標準普爾五百指數的平均回報年率百分之十一點八,投資在「英明神武的專家替你賺錢」的互惠基金,平均回報年率只有百分之四點三;按照常理,基金經理斷無跑輸指數之理,姑且估計他們的獲利與長期持有者相近,只是扣除經紀佣金(大市波幅愈劇基金經理擔心落後於大市因而作「神經性」買賣,佣金開支非同小可)和管理費,投資者所得無幾。
購進股票指數基金,長期持有,也許被大多數股民應為不進取,然而,經驗告訴大家,這是比較穩健的投資之道。三月十日「尋找最佳回報」網站(seekingalpha.com)的評論,文題便是〈第一步購進指數基金,第二步持有不放。
三月十日,《巴隆氏周刊》在一篇談論退休者如何投資最有利的特稿,指出投資者最常犯的三項錯誤,是不能精明地分散投資、試圖捕捉出入市時機和於不知不覺間支付巨額管理及手續費。
畢非德致股東書指出在投資市場中,「大家都想有高於平均回報的成績」,因此各出奇謀,頻頻買賣,而協助這些「活躍投資者」完成心願的中間人(經紀),莫不鼓勵他們這樣,因為從中他們收取可觀佣金;可是,作為一個階級,這類經常買賣的活躍投資者,其成績低於平均數,理由很簡單,交易費、管理費和顧問費把他們拖垮。
無獨有偶,三月九日《紐約時報》的「投資策略」欄介紹與芝大范瑪(E. F. Fama)齊名的達茅斯大學投資學者法蘭治(K. R. French)的學術論文〈活躍投資的代價〉(The Cost of Active Investing),指出為了跑贏大市,美股投資者每年付出的代價高達一千億美元以上(二○○六年的具體數字為九百九十二億美元,以過去二十年的平均數,○七年的代價逾千億即近萬億港元),這筆巨款令華爾街大小經紀公司盈利年年大幅增長(它們出現虧損皆因本身投資出事引致)。買賣頻仍的代價甚高,彰顯了長期持有「指數基金」才是穩健賺錢之正道。
股市交易本是一場「零和遊戲」(zero-sum game),即甲盈乙虧,任何一項交易都是盈虧相抵,可是,加上了交易過程牽涉的種種費用,股票投資便成為「負數遊戲」(negative-sum game),買賣雙方盈虧總和不均衡,「差額」流進華爾街經紀公司的戶口!
愈來愈多股民了解「協助他們發達」的中間人牟取驚人利潤而投資收益則差強人意。
無論是市場智慧或學者的研究,均指出長期持有回報較佳。這是投資者特別是活躍投資者必須三思的
Wednesday, March 12, 2008
熊市二期考工夫
商品價格係另一泡沫
標普及穆雖然已downgrade一萬隻次按債券,但ABX指數內八十隻三A級債券冇一隻downgrade,上述八十隻債券由銀行大量持有,一旦評級下降,銀行又必須做更多撥備。
技術上睇,到1月22日止只完成熊市第一期,正進入熊市第二期,跌市約完成一半。如睇升降指數(A╱D Line),股市距離見底之期仍遠。熊市第二期玩上落市,但好考工夫。
美股大牛市由1983年開始。雖然利率由1981年起大幅回落,但市場競爭激烈,如無法應付競爭,高科技股一樣被淘汰出局。
八十年代、九十年代泡沫一個接一個;反之商品價格卻一浪低於一浪。2000年起科網股泡沫爆破後,商品價格卻進入一浪高於一浪期。換言之,自1971年美元唔再同黃金掛後,我地一直生活泡沫之中,理由係1971年至今美國政府不斷增加美元供應;蚊年總要搵出路也。
我老曹認為,恒指21700點有支持,但唔值得太博,因為我地處於熊市,長期展望仍欠佳。熊市中,保本乃首要責任,最多只能動用資本30%入市(70%仍現金或外幣存款)。呢次熊市低潮估計明年才出現,因為唔少企業今年純利展望將被downgrade;今年第一季業績公布時,相信將十分醜陋,尤其係金融股。推動企業股價上升唔係因為去年業績佳,而係前景展望好,呢點要緊記。熊市中,“The market wants to take your money!”股票市場從來唔係遊樂場,好多時較賭場更殘酷。熊市由去年11月才開始,斷估冇咁快完結。去年11月至今年1月只係完成熊市第一期(獲利回吐期),之後係熊市第二期(炒上落市),最後才係熊市第三期(惡性拋售)。熊市二期一般較熊市一期長(即唔止三個月)。
應減持資源股能源股
減息唔能夠解決問題。2001年1日至03年6月減息期唔能夠,2007年9月開始減息周期同樣唔能夠。2月份起美國失業率開始回升,約一百萬人失去職位,但大部分人決定暫時抖而唔急於搵工,令失業率反由1月份4.9%降至2月份4.8%。
有人擔心通脹進一步上升,我老曹唔係咁睇。經濟循環研究所估計,通脹率短期內將見頂,唔排除今年第二季開始回落。我老曹建議減持(而非增持)所有資源股同能源股,包括黃金。美國全國房地產經紀協會指出,美國新屋銷售今年估計只有五十九萬間,較去年減少23.7%。今年新屋建造估計下跌25.1%,至一百萬間;明年再下跌2.7%,至九十八萬七千間,將令大部分廉價金屬、水泥等需求下降。依家商品價格係另一泡沫。
標普及穆雖然已downgrade一萬隻次按債券,但ABX指數內八十隻三A級債券冇一隻downgrade,上述八十隻債券由銀行大量持有,一旦評級下降,銀行又必須做更多撥備。
技術上睇,到1月22日止只完成熊市第一期,正進入熊市第二期,跌市約完成一半。如睇升降指數(A╱D Line),股市距離見底之期仍遠。熊市第二期玩上落市,但好考工夫。
美股大牛市由1983年開始。雖然利率由1981年起大幅回落,但市場競爭激烈,如無法應付競爭,高科技股一樣被淘汰出局。
八十年代、九十年代泡沫一個接一個;反之商品價格卻一浪低於一浪。2000年起科網股泡沫爆破後,商品價格卻進入一浪高於一浪期。換言之,自1971年美元唔再同黃金掛後,我地一直生活泡沫之中,理由係1971年至今美國政府不斷增加美元供應;蚊年總要搵出路也。
我老曹認為,恒指21700點有支持,但唔值得太博,因為我地處於熊市,長期展望仍欠佳。熊市中,保本乃首要責任,最多只能動用資本30%入市(70%仍現金或外幣存款)。呢次熊市低潮估計明年才出現,因為唔少企業今年純利展望將被downgrade;今年第一季業績公布時,相信將十分醜陋,尤其係金融股。推動企業股價上升唔係因為去年業績佳,而係前景展望好,呢點要緊記。熊市中,“The market wants to take your money!”股票市場從來唔係遊樂場,好多時較賭場更殘酷。熊市由去年11月才開始,斷估冇咁快完結。去年11月至今年1月只係完成熊市第一期(獲利回吐期),之後係熊市第二期(炒上落市),最後才係熊市第三期(惡性拋售)。熊市二期一般較熊市一期長(即唔止三個月)。
應減持資源股能源股
減息唔能夠解決問題。2001年1日至03年6月減息期唔能夠,2007年9月開始減息周期同樣唔能夠。2月份起美國失業率開始回升,約一百萬人失去職位,但大部分人決定暫時抖而唔急於搵工,令失業率反由1月份4.9%降至2月份4.8%。
有人擔心通脹進一步上升,我老曹唔係咁睇。經濟循環研究所估計,通脹率短期內將見頂,唔排除今年第二季開始回落。我老曹建議減持(而非增持)所有資源股同能源股,包括黃金。美國全國房地產經紀協會指出,美國新屋銷售今年估計只有五十九萬間,較去年減少23.7%。今年新屋建造估計下跌25.1%,至一百萬間;明年再下跌2.7%,至九十八萬七千間,將令大部分廉價金屬、水泥等需求下降。依家商品價格係另一泡沫。
You can never get to the bottom
WAITING to catch the market bottom? It can't be done. But we'll show you a way to take the guesswork out of bottom fishing. You might not be investing at the exact bottom, but the difference is smaller than you would expect.
Stock markets in the region have fallen significantly over the past few months amid much uncertainty and negative sentiment. Yet, there is cause to believe that things will be better in a couple of years. The question is, should you wait until the market heads lower to invest?
The answer is that most people will never catch the exact bottom. Case in point: The Singapore stock market bottomed out in March 2003. Now, how many of you went out and invested all your money in March 2003? Yet, there is a way that you can more or less catch a low in anticipation of better times two to three years on.
This method requires you to divide your money into three to five portions and invest it over the next few months - perhaps once or twice each month. Let's see how this achieves the objective of going in when the market is generally low while controlling your risk if markets were to drop further.
But first, look at the prospects two to three years out. This is important since you wouldn't invest if you think that markets will be worse three years later.
The forecast earnings growth of many Asian markets are all very healthy for the next two to three years, with most Asian countries likely to show earnings growth of over 10 per cent. Asian economies are also expected to report positive gross domestic product (GDP) growth this year and next, despite the weakness in the US economy. Current valuations of various Asian markets are also looking attractive. For example, the Singapore stock market is trading at a forward 2008 price earnings ratio of just 12.5 times, which is very low by historical standards. So, with this backdrop, will negative sentiment continue into the next three years? This is unlikely, and based on fundamentals, we forecast that Asian markets will be higher by that time.
But wait, what if markets remain stable, or they suddenly rise in the meantime? In the short term, we cannot predict how markets will move. So, trying to guess the exact moment when markets have hit bottom is futile.
Let's say there is an Asian fund that is trading at $1 currently. We think Asian stocks have been partly influenced by the negative sentiment in the US and have been sold down even though there are clear signs that the Asian economies are expected to show healthy growth. So, we are pretty confident that Asian stocks are going to be higher two years on though we don't pretend to know how they will do in the next three months. Now, it is certainly low enough to buy into Asian funds if you are planning to hold them for at least two to three years, but what of your fears of markets going lower in the interim? We will show you how splitting your money over the next few months solves this problem.
Over the next few months, the market can either fall, stay stable, or rise.
Scenario One: Asian markets fall another 20 per cent in the next few months. Ouch! So our Asian fund which is currently $1 will be $0.80. But it eventually rises 50 per cent from there, in line with rising Asian markets. So in three years, its price becomes $1.50. The price of the fund falls to $0.80 over next three months before rising again. The bottom is in May.
As can be seen from the first table, in this scenario you would make a profit of over $2,000. That works out to a 68 per cent gain on your investment. You have to fight some fear, though, as your investment drops before it climbs, but you gain the most profit in this case.
Scenario Two: The price of the fund rises to $1.20 over the next three months and continues to rise. The bottom was in March (now): Your profit is much less in this scenario because the market started rising immediately. But a 37 per cent profit over three years is still pretty good. In this case, although you do not gain as much profit, you have the happiness of seeing your investment rise almost as soon as you bought it.
Scenario Three: The price of the fund stagnates at $1 over the next three months and then rises. The bottom is the entire three-month period from March to May: In this scenario, the danger is boredom. The price of the fund does not move for the three months and you may wonder if it was the right time to get in. But you eventually make a 50 per cent profit so there should be no complaints.
As you can see, if you invest part of your money over the next few months, then regardless of what happens to the markets in the short term, you will still come out with gains as long as the markets eventually recover and move up. More interestingly, would it really make that much difference if you used this method versus catching the exact bottom?
As you can see from Table 4, getting the exact bottom does best but the difference is actually not that significant in this example. Anyone who has ever tried to catch a market bottom will understand how difficult it is. If the market is going down or not moving at all, tell yourself to wait one more week, and then another week.
Then, when it rises a little, you will think that it might be temporary because it has not fallen to a low enough level for you. (Incidentally, the 'low' level at which you decide to buy tends to get shifted downwards as the market drops because you have become more and more negative.)
In the end, you will likely buy in at a higher price from the bottom. Or worse, you might never buy as you wait and wait. When the markets are higher, you want them to drop back to the level that you had originally set for buying - but they never do.
So, our view is that markets have fallen low enough such that investing with a two to three-year horizon should net us good gains. By investing over the next few months, you ensure that you get in at a generally low level and when markets rebound, you will be rewarded. Furthermore, investing this way takes the guesswork out of finding the exact bottom and gives you the psychological will to invest in spite of the prevailing negative sentiment. So while you cannot get in at the exact bottom, you can at least be sure that you did buy in low.
Stock markets in the region have fallen significantly over the past few months amid much uncertainty and negative sentiment. Yet, there is cause to believe that things will be better in a couple of years. The question is, should you wait until the market heads lower to invest?
The answer is that most people will never catch the exact bottom. Case in point: The Singapore stock market bottomed out in March 2003. Now, how many of you went out and invested all your money in March 2003? Yet, there is a way that you can more or less catch a low in anticipation of better times two to three years on.
This method requires you to divide your money into three to five portions and invest it over the next few months - perhaps once or twice each month. Let's see how this achieves the objective of going in when the market is generally low while controlling your risk if markets were to drop further.
But first, look at the prospects two to three years out. This is important since you wouldn't invest if you think that markets will be worse three years later.
The forecast earnings growth of many Asian markets are all very healthy for the next two to three years, with most Asian countries likely to show earnings growth of over 10 per cent. Asian economies are also expected to report positive gross domestic product (GDP) growth this year and next, despite the weakness in the US economy. Current valuations of various Asian markets are also looking attractive. For example, the Singapore stock market is trading at a forward 2008 price earnings ratio of just 12.5 times, which is very low by historical standards. So, with this backdrop, will negative sentiment continue into the next three years? This is unlikely, and based on fundamentals, we forecast that Asian markets will be higher by that time.
But wait, what if markets remain stable, or they suddenly rise in the meantime? In the short term, we cannot predict how markets will move. So, trying to guess the exact moment when markets have hit bottom is futile.
Let's say there is an Asian fund that is trading at $1 currently. We think Asian stocks have been partly influenced by the negative sentiment in the US and have been sold down even though there are clear signs that the Asian economies are expected to show healthy growth. So, we are pretty confident that Asian stocks are going to be higher two years on though we don't pretend to know how they will do in the next three months. Now, it is certainly low enough to buy into Asian funds if you are planning to hold them for at least two to three years, but what of your fears of markets going lower in the interim? We will show you how splitting your money over the next few months solves this problem.
Over the next few months, the market can either fall, stay stable, or rise.
Scenario One: Asian markets fall another 20 per cent in the next few months. Ouch! So our Asian fund which is currently $1 will be $0.80. But it eventually rises 50 per cent from there, in line with rising Asian markets. So in three years, its price becomes $1.50. The price of the fund falls to $0.80 over next three months before rising again. The bottom is in May.
As can be seen from the first table, in this scenario you would make a profit of over $2,000. That works out to a 68 per cent gain on your investment. You have to fight some fear, though, as your investment drops before it climbs, but you gain the most profit in this case.
Scenario Two: The price of the fund rises to $1.20 over the next three months and continues to rise. The bottom was in March (now): Your profit is much less in this scenario because the market started rising immediately. But a 37 per cent profit over three years is still pretty good. In this case, although you do not gain as much profit, you have the happiness of seeing your investment rise almost as soon as you bought it.
Scenario Three: The price of the fund stagnates at $1 over the next three months and then rises. The bottom is the entire three-month period from March to May: In this scenario, the danger is boredom. The price of the fund does not move for the three months and you may wonder if it was the right time to get in. But you eventually make a 50 per cent profit so there should be no complaints.
As you can see, if you invest part of your money over the next few months, then regardless of what happens to the markets in the short term, you will still come out with gains as long as the markets eventually recover and move up. More interestingly, would it really make that much difference if you used this method versus catching the exact bottom?
As you can see from Table 4, getting the exact bottom does best but the difference is actually not that significant in this example. Anyone who has ever tried to catch a market bottom will understand how difficult it is. If the market is going down or not moving at all, tell yourself to wait one more week, and then another week.
Then, when it rises a little, you will think that it might be temporary because it has not fallen to a low enough level for you. (Incidentally, the 'low' level at which you decide to buy tends to get shifted downwards as the market drops because you have become more and more negative.)
In the end, you will likely buy in at a higher price from the bottom. Or worse, you might never buy as you wait and wait. When the markets are higher, you want them to drop back to the level that you had originally set for buying - but they never do.
So, our view is that markets have fallen low enough such that investing with a two to three-year horizon should net us good gains. By investing over the next few months, you ensure that you get in at a generally low level and when markets rebound, you will be rewarded. Furthermore, investing this way takes the guesswork out of finding the exact bottom and gives you the psychological will to invest in spite of the prevailing negative sentiment. So while you cannot get in at the exact bottom, you can at least be sure that you did buy in low.
Asia's Growing Role in Financial Markets
China and India are expected to grow at 9% or more annually for the next two decades, with the rest of East Asia following at 7.5%. Asia is expected to produce 50% of the world's GDP by 2030, regaining the position it held at the beginning of the 19th century, when China and India produced more than one-third of global income.
Asia's recovery of its 18th-century position is on course. The people of Asia can master the science and technology needed in this high-tech digital world.
Will a U.S. Recession Spread to Asia?
The sudden drop in American investor confidence caused a dramatic decline in the NYSE, triggering selloffs in the stock markets of China and India and leading the way for huge declines in Japan, South Korea and the Asean nations. International fund managers had invested their clients' monies in all of these markets. Expecting all markets to decline, they sold down their holdings worldwide in a dramatic, synchronized fall. But China's and India's economies are no longer as dependent on exports to U.S. and EU markets as they used to be. While they may lose some percentage points in their growth rates, they still should be able to reach 6% to 8% growth annually.
This economic downturn will mark the first time that when America sneezes, Asia doesn't catch a cold. Yes, Asia will be affected, but not as severely.
Because China and India will not experience a recession, Japan,South Korea, Taiwan and the Asean countries will avoid it. Hence, Asian stock markets will rise from their lows of the selloff to reflect the real strength of their economies.
Asia's recovery of its 18th-century position is on course. The people of Asia can master the science and technology needed in this high-tech digital world.
Will a U.S. Recession Spread to Asia?
The sudden drop in American investor confidence caused a dramatic decline in the NYSE, triggering selloffs in the stock markets of China and India and leading the way for huge declines in Japan, South Korea and the Asean nations. International fund managers had invested their clients' monies in all of these markets. Expecting all markets to decline, they sold down their holdings worldwide in a dramatic, synchronized fall. But China's and India's economies are no longer as dependent on exports to U.S. and EU markets as they used to be. While they may lose some percentage points in their growth rates, they still should be able to reach 6% to 8% growth annually.
This economic downturn will mark the first time that when America sneezes, Asia doesn't catch a cold. Yes, Asia will be affected, but not as severely.
Because China and India will not experience a recession, Japan,South Korea, Taiwan and the Asean countries will avoid it. Hence, Asian stock markets will rise from their lows of the selloff to reflect the real strength of their economies.
曾渊沧@股友通讯录 - 二月份 - 2008
去年十月,根据我自创的对数线性回归线显示股市已经见顶。当时我已向大家建议得加倍小心。后来,股市果然见顶回跌,回跌的速度也很快。根据最新的对数线性回归线显示海峡时报指数已回落至中间红线位置,并开始出现小幅度的反弹。这条线表示海峡时报指数的长期平均走势线。换言之,目前的股价已属于“合理”。去年十月是严重偏高,2003 年是严重偏低。
我们再看看移动平均线图。海峡时报指数在1 月22 日已出现短期见底的现象,因为2 月22 日的新浪底已比1 月22 日高。这表示已经出现一浪高于一浪的现象已出现。
因此,从技术上而言,目前股市极可能出现一个比较大的反弹浪。当然,记着,只是比较大的反弹,而不是新的牛市。熊市才开始4 个月,不会这么快结束。现在如果有兴趣搏一搏短线反弹可以搏,长线投资仍然需要耐的等待。
除了技术上的理由说明目前有很大的机会出现反弹浪,另两个重要的原因有新加坡政府的财政预算案以还富于民为主题,大量向社会注入资金,以减低美国经济衰退带来的影响。还有,三月份是大量大企业公布业绩的时候,2007 年的业绩是良好的。好的业绩及不错的股息率对股价有一定的支持。
搏短线反弹的最佳对象是银行股。所有的银行股在之前都受到美国次级房屋贷款的打击,业绩公布后,情况也比较明朗。
另一种防守性的股市新科工程、地铁这类收入业务稳定的股。漫漫熊市,挨得过才是英雄。因此,搏反弹也不要太勇。
我们再看看移动平均线图。海峡时报指数在1 月22 日已出现短期见底的现象,因为2 月22 日的新浪底已比1 月22 日高。这表示已经出现一浪高于一浪的现象已出现。
因此,从技术上而言,目前股市极可能出现一个比较大的反弹浪。当然,记着,只是比较大的反弹,而不是新的牛市。熊市才开始4 个月,不会这么快结束。现在如果有兴趣搏一搏短线反弹可以搏,长线投资仍然需要耐的等待。
除了技术上的理由说明目前有很大的机会出现反弹浪,另两个重要的原因有新加坡政府的财政预算案以还富于民为主题,大量向社会注入资金,以减低美国经济衰退带来的影响。还有,三月份是大量大企业公布业绩的时候,2007 年的业绩是良好的。好的业绩及不错的股息率对股价有一定的支持。
搏短线反弹的最佳对象是银行股。所有的银行股在之前都受到美国次级房屋贷款的打击,业绩公布后,情况也比较明朗。
另一种防守性的股市新科工程、地铁这类收入业务稳定的股。漫漫熊市,挨得过才是英雄。因此,搏反弹也不要太勇。
Residential: Speculators have a hard time to offload their properties
According to the Business Times, subsales of the properties last year after being bought from developers in the same year indicates a steep drop in the volumes but not the price levels suggesting that speculators are holding on for higher prices.
The number of subsales dropped by 66.7%, 69.1% and 39.1% in the high end,mid tier and mass market segments respectively in 4Q07. However, the average gains made from subsales over the developer sales in 4Q07 were steady at 34% in high end (vs full year gains of 20%), 21% in mid tier ( vs full year gains of 23%) and 17% in mass market segment (vs full year gains of 16%).
We think that speculators are having a hard time to offload their properties as there are no takers. The buyers are adopting a cautious wait and watch approach resulting in a steep drop in the sales volumes. Channel checks indicate that there are cases where speculators have dropped their price expectations by 15-20% in the high end segment and yet the buyers are not purchasing.
We maintain our cautious outlook for the Singapore residential property segment especially the high end and mid tier segment. We expect the correction to be proportional to the level of subsales as a percentage of overall sales which averages to around 21.5% for the high end, 13% for the mid tier and 5.5% in the mass market in the previous two quarters.
The number of subsales dropped by 66.7%, 69.1% and 39.1% in the high end,mid tier and mass market segments respectively in 4Q07. However, the average gains made from subsales over the developer sales in 4Q07 were steady at 34% in high end (vs full year gains of 20%), 21% in mid tier ( vs full year gains of 23%) and 17% in mass market segment (vs full year gains of 16%).
We think that speculators are having a hard time to offload their properties as there are no takers. The buyers are adopting a cautious wait and watch approach resulting in a steep drop in the sales volumes. Channel checks indicate that there are cases where speculators have dropped their price expectations by 15-20% in the high end segment and yet the buyers are not purchasing.
We maintain our cautious outlook for the Singapore residential property segment especially the high end and mid tier segment. We expect the correction to be proportional to the level of subsales as a percentage of overall sales which averages to around 21.5% for the high end, 13% for the mid tier and 5.5% in the mass market in the previous two quarters.
The $34 trillion problem
Twice I have asked Alan Greenspan what he considers the greatest threat to the U.S. economy, and both times he has answered immediately with a single word: Medicare.
He isn't so worried about the trade deficit and the housing crash; he figures market forces will sort them out. But Medicare is something else - a multitrillion-dollar problem that's about to get dramatically worse, and one that nobody wants to talk about. You'd think that the greatest threat to America's economy would be Topic A for the presidential candidates. But it's actually a topic they hate to touch.
Especially now. An analysis of their speeches shows that last year Senators Hillary Clinton, John McCain, and Barack Obama would occasionally mention the Medicare mess. But recently, with the economy slowing and voters feeling insecure, all three candidates have turned more populist: Their economic talking points are about feel-good reassurances, not about facing hard realities.
Unfortunately the day of reckoning is imminent. Sometime in the next President's first term, Medicare Part A (hospital insurance) will go cash-flow-negative, and it's all downhill from there. Medicare provides a wide range of services and subsidies to more than 40 million old and disabled Americans. As the country ages, Medicare and Medicaid (for those of any age with low incomes) will devour growing chunks of U.S. economic output. So will Social Security, but its cut of GDP should stop increasing around 2030. The federal budget has averaged about 18% of GDP over the past several decades. If that average holds and if the rules of our social insurance programs don't change, then by 2070, when today's kids are retiring, Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security will consume the entire federal budget, with Medicare taking by far the largest share. No Army, no Navy, no Education Department - just those three programs.
But wait - the situation is actually much worse. Those estimates, reported in the latest Financial Report of the U.S. Government, assume that Medicare payments to doctors will be slashed drastically, by some 41% over the next nine years, as required by current law. It won't happen. Every year for the past five years, Congress has overridden the mandatory cuts. As for future cuts, the Financial Report says drily, "Reductions of this magnitude are not feasible and are very unlikely to occur fully in practice." So in reality, Medicare will go into the hole even faster than official projections reflect. And they show that if Medicare had to be accounted for like a company pension fund, it would be underfunded by $34 trillion.
Obviously those long-term scenarios won't happen, because they can't happen - we won't be shutting down the Army, Navy, and so on. But it's easy to see why the candidates don't want to discuss it. As you listen to them, keep three points in mind:
Pain-free remedies won't do the job. All three major candidates, on those rare occasions when they mention Medicare's finances, stress how they'll make the system more efficient, eliminate errors, and improve incentives. That's all wonderful, but it won't be nearly enough. Only John McCain has hinted at what else will be required, including means-testing and limits on benefits. Give him major points, but it's unlikely we'll hear much more on that theme.
Any mention of trust funds is bogus. They're too complicated to explain here, but the bottom line is that no piles of money are socked away to cover future Medicare expenses. Any money the government needs to pay out this year, it needs to take in this year, and every year.
Tax and spending plans must Include Medicare. We'll hear plenty of budget proposals over the next eight months. But without changes to Medicare, they're meaningless. Medicare will eventually overwhelm everything else in the budget, except for the interest on the mushrooming debt to pay for it.
If this is the greatest threat to the U.S. economy and the candidates haven't told us what they'd do about it, they haven't told us a thing.
He isn't so worried about the trade deficit and the housing crash; he figures market forces will sort them out. But Medicare is something else - a multitrillion-dollar problem that's about to get dramatically worse, and one that nobody wants to talk about. You'd think that the greatest threat to America's economy would be Topic A for the presidential candidates. But it's actually a topic they hate to touch.
Especially now. An analysis of their speeches shows that last year Senators Hillary Clinton, John McCain, and Barack Obama would occasionally mention the Medicare mess. But recently, with the economy slowing and voters feeling insecure, all three candidates have turned more populist: Their economic talking points are about feel-good reassurances, not about facing hard realities.
Unfortunately the day of reckoning is imminent. Sometime in the next President's first term, Medicare Part A (hospital insurance) will go cash-flow-negative, and it's all downhill from there. Medicare provides a wide range of services and subsidies to more than 40 million old and disabled Americans. As the country ages, Medicare and Medicaid (for those of any age with low incomes) will devour growing chunks of U.S. economic output. So will Social Security, but its cut of GDP should stop increasing around 2030. The federal budget has averaged about 18% of GDP over the past several decades. If that average holds and if the rules of our social insurance programs don't change, then by 2070, when today's kids are retiring, Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security will consume the entire federal budget, with Medicare taking by far the largest share. No Army, no Navy, no Education Department - just those three programs.
But wait - the situation is actually much worse. Those estimates, reported in the latest Financial Report of the U.S. Government, assume that Medicare payments to doctors will be slashed drastically, by some 41% over the next nine years, as required by current law. It won't happen. Every year for the past five years, Congress has overridden the mandatory cuts. As for future cuts, the Financial Report says drily, "Reductions of this magnitude are not feasible and are very unlikely to occur fully in practice." So in reality, Medicare will go into the hole even faster than official projections reflect. And they show that if Medicare had to be accounted for like a company pension fund, it would be underfunded by $34 trillion.
Obviously those long-term scenarios won't happen, because they can't happen - we won't be shutting down the Army, Navy, and so on. But it's easy to see why the candidates don't want to discuss it. As you listen to them, keep three points in mind:
Pain-free remedies won't do the job. All three major candidates, on those rare occasions when they mention Medicare's finances, stress how they'll make the system more efficient, eliminate errors, and improve incentives. That's all wonderful, but it won't be nearly enough. Only John McCain has hinted at what else will be required, including means-testing and limits on benefits. Give him major points, but it's unlikely we'll hear much more on that theme.
Any mention of trust funds is bogus. They're too complicated to explain here, but the bottom line is that no piles of money are socked away to cover future Medicare expenses. Any money the government needs to pay out this year, it needs to take in this year, and every year.
Tax and spending plans must Include Medicare. We'll hear plenty of budget proposals over the next eight months. But without changes to Medicare, they're meaningless. Medicare will eventually overwhelm everything else in the budget, except for the interest on the mushrooming debt to pay for it.
If this is the greatest threat to the U.S. economy and the candidates haven't told us what they'd do about it, they haven't told us a thing.
Tuesday, March 11, 2008
散户的优势在哪里?
股市中,投资者常常抱怨庄家如何如何奸诈狡猾,抱怨主力有技术的优势、有人才的优势、有信息的优势,有实力的优势。
其实散户投资者也有许多主力庄家所没有的优势,比如散户有快捷灵活的优势,有易于操作的优势、另外还有一个得天独厚的优势,那就是时间成本的优势。
主力的资金虽然强大,但都是有时间成本的,而且绝大部分资金的利息是高于同期存款利息的。这些资金在短时间内,确实能发挥强大的威力,但是,天长日久,主力就不堪重负了。市场中常会出现这样的现象,每到长假来临前,都会有部分流动性强的主力资金撤出股市,这就是时间成本造成的结果。
散户则完全不同了,散户由于资金数额小,时间成本很低,几乎可以忽略不计。即使有好事的散户自己计算时间成本,那也不过是帐面上的,用不着真的支付高息,更没有严格的期限要求。
股市投资重要的是扬长避短,要发挥自己的优势,回避自己的劣势。
没有信息优势就不要乱打听消息;
没有资金优势就不用和庄家硬拼;
没有技术优势就不要随便参与短线炒作;
静下心来,仔细研判未来行情中可能发动的主流热点,从中长线的角度,在股价被低估时择机买入,充分发挥自己的时间成本优势,誓与庄家比耐心。
其实散户投资者也有许多主力庄家所没有的优势,比如散户有快捷灵活的优势,有易于操作的优势、另外还有一个得天独厚的优势,那就是时间成本的优势。
主力的资金虽然强大,但都是有时间成本的,而且绝大部分资金的利息是高于同期存款利息的。这些资金在短时间内,确实能发挥强大的威力,但是,天长日久,主力就不堪重负了。市场中常会出现这样的现象,每到长假来临前,都会有部分流动性强的主力资金撤出股市,这就是时间成本造成的结果。
散户则完全不同了,散户由于资金数额小,时间成本很低,几乎可以忽略不计。即使有好事的散户自己计算时间成本,那也不过是帐面上的,用不着真的支付高息,更没有严格的期限要求。
股市投资重要的是扬长避短,要发挥自己的优势,回避自己的劣势。
没有信息优势就不要乱打听消息;
没有资金优势就不用和庄家硬拼;
没有技术优势就不要随便参与短线炒作;
静下心来,仔细研判未来行情中可能发动的主流热点,从中长线的角度,在股价被低估时择机买入,充分发挥自己的时间成本优势,誓与庄家比耐心。
投资心得:长而不宰 执著于“捂”
老子说:“长而不宰”(《道德经》第51章)。结合该章的“长之育之,亭之毒之,养之覆之”来看,我把这句话的意思理解为“成其生长而不是任意宰割”。
六、七年前,也就是大概在持有W股快一年时,我已有了不少赢利。是卖掉还是留着呢,我开始感到难以抉择。当时炒股已快十年了,这种情况遇到过好几次。每次遇到这种情况,我几乎都是到山上或乡下小住一段时间,想在清空思想后再理清思路,以便做出决定。毕竟这次在W股上集中了我的绝大部分资金,而且自己又完全是以股为生的职业股民,更是马虎不得。
回到城里,我仍然记着那位种竹老者的话——“成功的种竹人绝不会在播种之后,每隔几天或每隔几月就把它们挖出来看看长得怎么样,他们会让竹子自己发芽,让竹子自己生长。”这句话听起来很耳熟,仿佛在哪里见到过。我查了查,可能我记忆中的就是拉瑞·威廉姆斯在《短线交易秘诀》中的这段话——“你要学会抱紧获利的仓位,才赚得了大钱,而且你持有越久,获利的潜力就越大。成功的农夫绝不会在播种之后,每隔几分钟就把它们挖起来看看长得怎么样,他们会让谷物发芽,让它成长,交易员可以从大自然的生长过程中学到很多教训。交易员的成功也是一样,投资获利是需要时间".
这大概也是世界顶级投资大师彼得·林奇特别自信的原因吧。他说:“大多数我赚到钱的时候都是在我持有某只股票长达3、4年以后,只要公司基本面没有什么变化,吸引我买这只股票的因素没有变化,我就很自信早晚我的耐心会得到回报。”(《彼得·林奇的成功投资》第341页)
上个世纪最伟大的炒家杰西·利物莫说:“多年的华尔街经验和几百万美元的学费之后,我要告诉你的是:我赚到大钱的诀窍不在于我怎么思考,而在于我能安坐不动,坐着不动!明白吗?在股票这行,能够买对了且能安坐不动的人少之又少,我发现这是最难学的。忽略大势,执著于股票的小波动是致命的,没有人能够抓住所有的小波动。这行的秘密就在于牛市时,买进股票,安坐不动,直到你认为牛市接近结束时再脱手。”几次竹山之行使我对这段话的理解又进了一层——我有时把这称之为“坐功”,更多的时候称之为“捂功”——也就是象老子说的那样要“长而不宰”。
六、七年前,也就是大概在持有W股快一年时,我已有了不少赢利。是卖掉还是留着呢,我开始感到难以抉择。当时炒股已快十年了,这种情况遇到过好几次。每次遇到这种情况,我几乎都是到山上或乡下小住一段时间,想在清空思想后再理清思路,以便做出决定。毕竟这次在W股上集中了我的绝大部分资金,而且自己又完全是以股为生的职业股民,更是马虎不得。
回到城里,我仍然记着那位种竹老者的话——“成功的种竹人绝不会在播种之后,每隔几天或每隔几月就把它们挖出来看看长得怎么样,他们会让竹子自己发芽,让竹子自己生长。”这句话听起来很耳熟,仿佛在哪里见到过。我查了查,可能我记忆中的就是拉瑞·威廉姆斯在《短线交易秘诀》中的这段话——“你要学会抱紧获利的仓位,才赚得了大钱,而且你持有越久,获利的潜力就越大。成功的农夫绝不会在播种之后,每隔几分钟就把它们挖起来看看长得怎么样,他们会让谷物发芽,让它成长,交易员可以从大自然的生长过程中学到很多教训。交易员的成功也是一样,投资获利是需要时间".
这大概也是世界顶级投资大师彼得·林奇特别自信的原因吧。他说:“大多数我赚到钱的时候都是在我持有某只股票长达3、4年以后,只要公司基本面没有什么变化,吸引我买这只股票的因素没有变化,我就很自信早晚我的耐心会得到回报。”(《彼得·林奇的成功投资》第341页)
上个世纪最伟大的炒家杰西·利物莫说:“多年的华尔街经验和几百万美元的学费之后,我要告诉你的是:我赚到大钱的诀窍不在于我怎么思考,而在于我能安坐不动,坐着不动!明白吗?在股票这行,能够买对了且能安坐不动的人少之又少,我发现这是最难学的。忽略大势,执著于股票的小波动是致命的,没有人能够抓住所有的小波动。这行的秘密就在于牛市时,买进股票,安坐不动,直到你认为牛市接近结束时再脱手。”几次竹山之行使我对这段话的理解又进了一层——我有时把这称之为“坐功”,更多的时候称之为“捂功”——也就是象老子说的那样要“长而不宰”。
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