SMRT has entered into an agreement to acquire a 49% equity interest in Shenzhen Zona Transportation, a leading road transport company in Shenzhen. The purchase consideration of Rmb 430m (S$90m) will be paid in cash. The balance 51% continues to be held by National Express Transportation Group. Following the acquisition, Zona will be an associate company under SMRT. The investment is earnings accretive. But SMRT expects immaterial financial impact on SMRT’s FY09 results.
Separately, SMRT has signed a new 6-mth fixed-rate electricity contract effective 1 Oct 08. The rate for this new contract is 30% higher than that for the previous 6-mth contract, despite the recent softness in crude oil price. We have therefore raised our forecast of FY09 electricity expenses.
On a positive note, we have raised FY09F MRT ridership growth to 10.9% (versus earlier assumption of 9.7%). This follows the 11.6% YoY expansion for Apr-Aug08 to a MRT monthly average ridership of 42.69m. After factoring in higher electricity expenses as well, we are cutting our FY09 net profit forecast by 1.6% to S$144.5m.
SMRT share price has risen 17.9% YTD whilst the STI has fallen 31.9%. Most of the positives are already factored into SMRT share price. Though the investment in Zona is a good start to SMRT expanding overseas, the impact is seen to be marginal in the short term. We see little upside for SMRT share price going ahead. Even the FY09 dividend yield of 4.1% (based on 85% payout ratio) is only slightly higher than the 3-mth SIBOR of 1.85%. The market risk premium is now 9.46%, versus 8.68% two months ago. Consequently, our DCF valuation has been cut from S$2.08 to S$2.03.
We are downgrading SMRT from BUY to NEUTRAL.
Thursday, October 2, 2008
Finally, A Real Sense Of Urgency
Latest on the Financial Crisis :
- The US Senate has passed the US$700 bln bill, which will move back to the House of
Representatives, for a second vote after the rejection on Monday. Looks as if as it has finally dawned on the average American that the US$1 trillion loss in the US stock market is being lost by everyone, not just the rich and fat cats on Wall Street.
- The bill passed by the Senate includes the increase in federal insurance for deposits to US$250,000 from the current $100K.
- A bi-partisan committee has urged the Securities & Exchange Commission to suspend the mark-to-market (ie fair value) accounting rule to be substituted by “true value” accounting.
- The Irish parliament has approved the government standing behind all deposits and loans in Ireland.
- The governments of Germany, France, UK and Italy (European members of G7 ) have
agreed to hold a special meeting this Saturday to discuss the financial crisis.
- Warren Buffet injected capital (US$3 bln) into General Electric on the same terms as with Goldman Sachs - he bought preferred shares at 10% dividend, with free warrants exercisable at a price that is lower than the closing price, ie an immediate paper gain of US$303.4 mln. In the case of Goldman, the strike price of US$115 was 8% lower than Goldman’s closing price on Sept 23rd of US$125.05, ie an immediate paper gain of US$434.7 mln. (Note that before the Buffet deal, the credit default swap on GE had surged to a record 780 basis points (ie it costs US$780,000 to insure against default on a US$10 mln GE debt, implying a below investment grade
rating for GE!)
The US market weakened slightly yesterday with Dow down 20 points after the 485-point rebound on Tuesday, which followed Monday’s 778-point plunge.
COMMENTS
1. There is no certainty the House will not reject the Bill again as they did on Monday.
2. Even if they did, one cannot rule out doubts and skepticisms that will be raised later, eg, on True Value accounting instead of Fair Value.
3. As for governments of European countries meeting on Saturday, there is no certainty there will be a consensus on how to deal with the Crisis, with the Germans still unhappy that their proposals for more regulations were turned down by the Americans last year.
4. While Buffet’s investments are confidence-boosting, note his deals are priviledged ones not open to the average investors.
5. Meanwhile in the real economy, things are looking dismal:
- Car sales fell 26% in the latest month in the US, led by Nissan’s / Ford’s 37% / 34% plunge. The industry is the largest employers in the US, other than the government.
- The IATA reported that worldwide air travel rose 1.3% in August (vs 1.7% in July), the same pace as in Sept 2003, the worst month in that year when SARS hit. Note
however that the weakness in Asia then was more than offset by the buoyant US, Europe and rest of the world; question therefore is, will Asia offset the weakness in the west today?
- Notice how crowded our sea, off Tg Pagar / west coast, is with container ships, signaling a distinct slowdown in the shipping sector. Notice also the continued slide in the Baltic Dry Index, a barometer of the China economy, the largest consumer / importer of key commodities like iron ore, copper, aluminium and grains.
6. While a strong relief rally cannot be ruled out, caution should continue to be the by-word.
- The US Senate has passed the US$700 bln bill, which will move back to the House of
Representatives, for a second vote after the rejection on Monday. Looks as if as it has finally dawned on the average American that the US$1 trillion loss in the US stock market is being lost by everyone, not just the rich and fat cats on Wall Street.
- The bill passed by the Senate includes the increase in federal insurance for deposits to US$250,000 from the current $100K.
- A bi-partisan committee has urged the Securities & Exchange Commission to suspend the mark-to-market (ie fair value) accounting rule to be substituted by “true value” accounting.
- The Irish parliament has approved the government standing behind all deposits and loans in Ireland.
- The governments of Germany, France, UK and Italy (European members of G7 ) have
agreed to hold a special meeting this Saturday to discuss the financial crisis.
- Warren Buffet injected capital (US$3 bln) into General Electric on the same terms as with Goldman Sachs - he bought preferred shares at 10% dividend, with free warrants exercisable at a price that is lower than the closing price, ie an immediate paper gain of US$303.4 mln. In the case of Goldman, the strike price of US$115 was 8% lower than Goldman’s closing price on Sept 23rd of US$125.05, ie an immediate paper gain of US$434.7 mln. (Note that before the Buffet deal, the credit default swap on GE had surged to a record 780 basis points (ie it costs US$780,000 to insure against default on a US$10 mln GE debt, implying a below investment grade
rating for GE!)
The US market weakened slightly yesterday with Dow down 20 points after the 485-point rebound on Tuesday, which followed Monday’s 778-point plunge.
COMMENTS
1. There is no certainty the House will not reject the Bill again as they did on Monday.
2. Even if they did, one cannot rule out doubts and skepticisms that will be raised later, eg, on True Value accounting instead of Fair Value.
3. As for governments of European countries meeting on Saturday, there is no certainty there will be a consensus on how to deal with the Crisis, with the Germans still unhappy that their proposals for more regulations were turned down by the Americans last year.
4. While Buffet’s investments are confidence-boosting, note his deals are priviledged ones not open to the average investors.
5. Meanwhile in the real economy, things are looking dismal:
- Car sales fell 26% in the latest month in the US, led by Nissan’s / Ford’s 37% / 34% plunge. The industry is the largest employers in the US, other than the government.
- The IATA reported that worldwide air travel rose 1.3% in August (vs 1.7% in July), the same pace as in Sept 2003, the worst month in that year when SARS hit. Note
however that the weakness in Asia then was more than offset by the buoyant US, Europe and rest of the world; question therefore is, will Asia offset the weakness in the west today?
- Notice how crowded our sea, off Tg Pagar / west coast, is with container ships, signaling a distinct slowdown in the shipping sector. Notice also the continued slide in the Baltic Dry Index, a barometer of the China economy, the largest consumer / importer of key commodities like iron ore, copper, aluminium and grains.
6. While a strong relief rally cannot be ruled out, caution should continue to be the by-word.
又到了巴菲特被人嘲笑的时节
巴菲特在网络疯狂年代,因为没有买入网络科技股票,大幅落后于指数,被人嘲笑;
巴菲特在"中国石油"成为全亚洲最赚钱公司的时候, 全部抛售了所有的"中国石油"被人嘲笑;
2008.08.22巴菲特准备买入据说是中国的金融类股票;
2008.09.28巴菲特斥资18亿港元入股中国的比亚迪股份.
在不被看好的时节,巴菲特又要被人嘲笑了?
巴菲特被人嘲笑?
裸泳者被人嘲笑!
2008.08.22巴菲特：是的，但你也知道，除非在一些非常特殊的环境下，否则你不可能购买中国股票。我曾经一度拥有中石油的股票，就在不久前，我们还真打算买另一只中国股票，我们还做了出价，但最终没成交。不过，那里确实蕴藏着很大的机遇，在环境适合的时候，你会看到我们在那里大规模投资。我想中国的经济不会出问题。就像是美国，未来半年或一年发生了什么并不重要，重要的是未来十年会发生什么。我们会好起来的。关键在于，中国人会做得更好，因为他们的起点比较低，但在过去的20 年里，他们学会了很多商业的精髓，以及如何发挥人类的才智，虽然这些是美国早就掌握的。关键是，中国人学习的速度非常、非常、非常快。
2008.09.28股神 ” 巴菲特今日将斥资18亿港元入股内地在港上市公司比亚迪股份。这也是股神在继大手笔投资中石油之后再次出手内地在港上市公司。同时，此次投资也是巴菲特在美国次贷危机转为信贷危机之后，进行的第二笔重大投资。上周巴菲特所属的伯克希尔-哈撒韦公司刚刚宣布以至少50亿美元的代价入股美国第一大投行高盛。 “ 股神 ” 再度出手，并在此严峻形势下选择入股中资公司，意欲何为？比亚迪股份以充电电池以及汽车业务为主，在电动汽车领域的开拓亦较优秀。此番入股无疑显示了巴菲特对此行业的信心。
巴菲特在"中国石油"成为全亚洲最赚钱公司的时候, 全部抛售了所有的"中国石油"被人嘲笑;
2008.08.22巴菲特准备买入据说是中国的金融类股票;
2008.09.28巴菲特斥资18亿港元入股中国的比亚迪股份.
在不被看好的时节,巴菲特又要被人嘲笑了?
巴菲特被人嘲笑?
裸泳者被人嘲笑!
2008.08.22巴菲特：是的，但你也知道，除非在一些非常特殊的环境下，否则你不可能购买中国股票。我曾经一度拥有中石油的股票，就在不久前，我们还真打算买另一只中国股票，我们还做了出价，但最终没成交。不过，那里确实蕴藏着很大的机遇，在环境适合的时候，你会看到我们在那里大规模投资。我想中国的经济不会出问题。就像是美国，未来半年或一年发生了什么并不重要，重要的是未来十年会发生什么。我们会好起来的。关键在于，中国人会做得更好，因为他们的起点比较低，但在过去的20 年里，他们学会了很多商业的精髓，以及如何发挥人类的才智，虽然这些是美国早就掌握的。关键是，中国人学习的速度非常、非常、非常快。
2008.09.28股神 ” 巴菲特今日将斥资18亿港元入股内地在港上市公司比亚迪股份。这也是股神在继大手笔投资中石油之后再次出手内地在港上市公司。同时，此次投资也是巴菲特在美国次贷危机转为信贷危机之后，进行的第二笔重大投资。上周巴菲特所属的伯克希尔-哈撒韦公司刚刚宣布以至少50亿美元的代价入股美国第一大投行高盛。 “ 股神 ” 再度出手，并在此严峻形势下选择入股中资公司，意欲何为？比亚迪股份以充电电池以及汽车业务为主，在电动汽车领域的开拓亦较优秀。此番入股无疑显示了巴菲特对此行业的信心。
Wednesday, October 1, 2008
雷曼兄弟破产引发全球现金危机
两周前，华尔街的巨头和政府权高位重的经济官员作出了一项决定性的选择：他们没有再对有着158年历史的雷曼兄弟公司(Lehman Brothers)施以援手，而是任其走到了破产地步。
现在看来，这个决策的后果比几乎所有人想象的都更为可怕。
雷曼兄弟在9月15日（周一）一早提出了破产申请，其引发的连锁反应致使信贷市场陷入混乱。这让保险巨头美国国际集团(AIG)加速跌入深渊，也让几乎所有人都因此蒙受了损失，不论是远在挪威的退休人员，还是Reserve Primary基金的投资者都未能幸免，而后者是美国一家货币市场共同基金，曾被认为同现金一样安全。几天之内，由此引发的混乱甚至让华尔街的中流砥柱高盛集团(Goldman Sachs)和摩根士丹利(Morgan Stanley)也深陷其中。深受震慑的美国官员急忙推出了更为系统的危机解决方案，并在周日同国会领导人就7,000亿美元的金融市场救助计划达成了一致。
雷曼兄弟破产的起源和后果均凸现出决策者在应对不断加深的金融危机时所处的艰难境地。他们不愿被视为是迫不及待地要介入其中，救助那些因太过追逐风险而身陷困境的金融机构。但在当前这个时代，市场、银行和投资者都被一张复杂而无形的金融关系网联系到了一起，任由大型机构自行倒下的痛苦大得令人难以承受。
一些批评人士在事后指出，要是政府出手，那么雷曼兄弟破产之后出现的系统性风险本是可以避免的。在雷曼兄弟倒台之前，联邦官员曾在局部范围内化解了一系列金融风波，所采取的方式是让房利美(Fannie Mae)、房地美(Freddie Mac)和贝尔斯登(Bear Stearns)等陷入困境的机构生存下来。官员们认定这些机构规模太大，不能让它们倒闭，因此动用了数十亿美元纳税人的钱救助它们。但对雷曼兄弟却没有这样做。
伦敦商学院经济学教授、经济政策研究中心(Centre for Economic Policy Research)总裁波提斯(Richard Portes)说，我不理解他们为何意识不到市场将完全被此次破产所吓倒。他说，让雷曼兄弟倒下不会显示政府的决心，而只会让一年多以前金融危机爆发以来的一个核心问题更加恶化，那就是没有人知道哪家金融机构能偿还其债券。
当然，雷曼兄弟的破产在很大程度上属于咎由自取。该公司大量投资于过热的房地产市场，用大量借款增加回报率，而且比其他公司更晚认识到所出现的损失，也未在投资出现失误时抓紧时间融资。该公司在危机中陷入太深，以致于寻找有意的买家都成为艰巨任务，这也让政府基本上是无计可施。
鉴于可以利用的时间和信息有限，许多专家认为政府官员已作出了力所能及的最佳选择。
资本难求
眼见雷曼兄弟面临融资难的局面，包括财政部长鲍尔森(Henry Paulson)、美国联邦储备委员会(Fed)主席贝南克(Ben Bernanke)和纽约联邦储备委员会主席盖纳(Timothy Geithner)在内的决策者都考虑过是否应放手让雷曼兄弟倒闭。知情人士透露，一方面，出于对道德风险的担忧，他们不想出手相救，不愿让自己的行为被解读为支持金融机构不负责任地追逐高风险。另一方面，他们对雷曼兄弟能找到可行的买家持怀疑态度，同时他们认为市场和Fed会有时间准备应对大机构倒闭带来的后果。不过，一些Fed官员不愿发出Fed同华尔街合作阻止危机扩散的努力已告结束的信号。比如，盖纳就曾向其他人表示，市场仍面临着很大麻烦。
据一位与会人士称，盖纳9月12日晚同华尔街高管在纽约储备委员会总部开会就雷曼兄弟的命运讨价还价时曾向他们表示，如果你们不采取一些行动，结果将会很糟糕。
知情人士称，当时，官员们向华尔街银行家提出了成立私人企业救助基金的可能性，但这些银行家要么对救助竞争对手的想法退避三舍，要么就是没有所需的额外资金。
为市场作铺垫
周末期间，随着美国银行(Bank of America)和英国巴克莱银行(Barclays)收购雷曼兄弟的希望破灭，Fed官员将重点放在了准备如何应对美国历史上最大一项破产案上面。雷曼兄弟的总资产超过6,300亿美元，远远超过了2002年电信巨头WorldCom申请破产时1,040亿美元的资产。
官员们格外担心两个领域：信用违约掉期市场和回购市场。
Fed几个月来一直在敦促华尔街的公司成立新的信用违约掉期结算机构。这个想法的初衷是为这个透明度不高的松散的市场提供更有序的交易结算方式，让这个名义价值高达55万亿美元的市场在大交易商倒闭时不会受到很大冲击。但这一切并未就绪。因此，没有人确切知道哪家机构与雷曼兄弟进行了交易，以及交易的数量。周一，这些交易将会崩盘。在为缓解这个问题所作的最后一线努力中，纽约联邦储备委员会官员同雷曼兄弟的管理人员和该公司的主要交易伙伴共同确定哪些机构处于与雷曼兄弟交易的相反方，从而能够取消交易。比如，如果雷曼兄弟的两个交易伙伴对通用汽车(General Motors)的债券作了相反的交易，那么他们就能与雷曼兄弟取消交易，而彼此直接打交道。
Fed还从贝尔斯登的破产中看出，当贷款机构惴惴不安之际，回购市场是如何容易受到严重干扰。这个问题将有可能导致贷款机构在华尔街银行急需资金之际对它们缩减贷款规模。因为回购贷款是短期性质，少的甚至只有一天，因此资金可能突然消失，有鉴于此，Fed在贝尔斯登倒闭后设立了一项针对证券公司借贷的紧急计划。Fed官员整个周日手忙脚乱迅速扩展了上述计划，允许银行将包括股票在内的更多种类的证券作为质押。
周日当巴克莱交易落空后，决策者开始“往跑道上喷塑胶”，盖纳做此比喻指的是采取缓冲措施。Fed官员在当天夜里意识到他们所作的准备或许不足以应付所有突发情况。不过他们仍希望，借助他们周日匆忙拿出的放宽条件的贷款计划，一段时间后混乱能有所平息。他们还感到，自从贝尔斯登在3月份因危机破产后，金融机构和市场已有足够时间对重大负面事件所带来的震动作好心理准备。
但与许多人之前的预期相比，这份于周一早间提交到联邦破产法庭、编号为No. 08-1355的雷曼兄弟破产案在市场中激起了大得多的振荡，而且波及范围也要更远。破产令雷曼兄弟股东和债券持有人的大量投资迅速泡汤。利用政府石油收入盈余投资的挪威政府退休基金就是最大的受害者之一。据现有的最近数据显示，截至2007年年底，该基金持有价值超过8亿美元的雷曼兄弟债券和股票。雷曼兄弟的猝死让批评挪威政府石油收入投资方式的人士获得了有力武器。一位发言人表示，该基金的管理层“非常担心，且在密切关注势态发展。”
政府听任雷曼兄弟垮台的事实成了投资者风险评估方式的一个转折点。当Fed 3月份做主让摩根大通接管贝尔斯登时，贝尔斯登股东损失了大部分投资，但债券持有人基本全身而退。从金融风险等级来看，这个结果并不奇怪，因为债券持有人比股权持有人在收回投资方面享有更多的合约权利。但这在投资者中间造成一种错觉，人们以为，以后再有银行出问题，政府还会出手营救债券持有人。但政府让雷曼兄弟自生自灭的决定突然间让市场打消了这个想法。
大规模信贷违约掉期市场所做出的反应最为明显。周一，债券违约掉期急剧扩大，创出单日最大涨幅。据Markit CDX index的数据，在美国，1,000万美元债券的5年期违约保护成本已经从周五的152,000美元涨到了194,000美元。
当违约掉期扩大时，出售合约的一方（比如银行、对冲基金和保险公司等）将发生损失。与此同时，这些卖家必须拿出更多现金作为质押，以此保证他们能正常履约。据资产管理公司Bridgewater Associates估计，仅在周一一天，债券违约掉期的卖家不得不筹集1,400亿美元交付保证金。投资者手忙脚乱地筹集资金，被迫卖掉了可以卖的所有东西，这种变现操作给全世界金融市场带来很大冲击。
追加现金
追加现金加剧了AIG的问题。之前因为信用评级下调，它在追加140亿美元质押金的要求面前已是摇摇欲坠。AIG是违约保险市场最大的卖方之一，其存量合约涉及价值4,000亿美元的债券。
雪上加霜的是，在CDS市场的交易方试图评估他们有多少资金与雷曼兄弟有关的同时，实际交易量开始大幅萎缩。破产意味着许多原本在与雷曼兄弟的对手交易中盈利的对冲基金和银行现在可能拿不到钱了。同时，雷曼兄弟机构经纪业务的客户将不得不通过法庭讨回他们的资金或证券了。
由原雷曼兄弟交易员吉宾斯(Robert Charles Gibbins )2003年建立的对冲基金Autonomy Capital Research就是受到牵连的雷曼兄弟客户之一。据知情人士说，雷曼兄弟申请破产保护时，冻结了Autonomy大约6,000万美元资金。这个数字约占Autonomy所管理25亿美元资产额的2%。Autonomy的管理人士拒绝发表评论。
因为担心其他和自己有业务往来的证券公司可能也会倒闭，对冲基金纷纷购买针对这些公司的违约保险。但卖方很犹豫。想像一下，这就像某住宅区的所有家庭几乎在同一时间要求购买住房保险，那卖保险的人会有什么感觉。这样一来，摩根士丹利和高盛的债券违约掉期大涨，人们对这些公司的恐慌出现了恶性循环。
与此同时，对冲基金开始将资金撤出这两家公司。以摩根士丹利为例，其机构经纪业务在接下来的几天时间里就将丧失约10%的客户资产。
纽约对冲基金Institutional Credit Partners.首席执行长普莱奥(Thomas Priore)说，情况混乱极了，人们简直要被可能发生的事吓呆了。
在人们对雷曼兄弟破产会怎样影响其他金融机构尚感不确定之时，传言和混乱引起了股价疯狂波动。比如，周二一位伦敦分析师发表报告称，已因数百亿美元冲销大受打击的瑞银(UBS)可能因为与雷曼兄弟相关业务再损失40亿美元。当天瑞银股价大跌17%。瑞银随后称，其相关风险敞口不超过3亿美元。
对金融机构健康状况的担忧不断升温，且迅速传导到银行融资市场。纽约时间周二早间7点，市场受到了当天的第一次重击：伦敦的英国银行家协会(British Bankers' Association)报告说，反映银行间借贷成本的伦敦银行同业拆息(Libor)大幅上升。美元隔夜Libor从之前的3.11%骤升至6.44%，创下历史上最大升幅。但即使在如此高的利率面前，银行仍不愿出借手中资金。
几个小时之内，市场就将关注焦点转到了高盛和摩根士丹利的命运上。这两家公司发现他们也要奋力提振投资者不断下滑的信心。高盛首席财务长大卫•维尼亚(David Viniar)在收益发布会上回答了一个又一个有关该公司借款能力的问题。他承认道，我们的确没有料到雷曼兄弟所发生的事情。
与此同时，摩根士丹利股价早盘暴跌28%，投资者认为该公司将沦为雷曼兄弟破产之后的下一个牺牲品。下午4时左右，摩根士丹利决定提前一天公布第三财季业绩，希望不错的业绩能阻止股价的下滑。
摩根士丹利首席财务长柯姆•凯勒尔(Colm Kelleher)在与分析师的电话会议上称，我担心这种情况将会蔓延；市场上一片恐慌。
摩根士丹利的电话会议尚未结束，雷曼兄弟破产的后果已在另一个不同的金融领域显现了出来：那就是被普遍认为有如银行存款一般安全的货币市场基金。许多货币市场基金购买的都是商业票据，雷曼兄弟也发行了这类票据用于短期借款。不过现在，这类票据的价格仅是票面价值的20%。
在纽约时间下午5时左右，一家名为The Reserve的知名货币市场基金管理公司称，该公司旗下的主要基金Reserve Primary基金持有面值7.85亿美元的雷曼兄弟公司债券。The Reserve称，这个结果使该基金的净资产值跌到每份1美元之下，这也是14年来货币市场基金首次跌破1美元的面值。该公司过去还曾批评其竞争对手在商业票据市场上过于冒险。
商业票据市场遇到的麻烦给总体经济带来了尤为严重的威胁。全球各地的公司都依靠商业票据获得短期贷款，满足从发工资到购买原材料在内的各种用途。但随着惊恐的货币市场基金纷纷逃离，商业票据市场陷入了停滞。
上周三，贷款市场的停滞在英国也致使事态急剧变化。英国最大的抵押贷款银行HBOS PLC的股价暴跌了19%，原因在于投资者对该行严重依赖市场筹集业务资金的担忧情绪不断升温。这种情况对政府官员来说是一个危险信号。今年早些时候当他们被迫对陷入困境的抵押贷款公司Northern Rock进行国有化时曾深感尴尬。Northern Rock是英国100多年来首次遭挤兑的银行。
政府迅速采取行动，撮合英国的莱斯银行(Lloyds TSB)紧急收购了HBOS。官员们甚至修改了原本会阻止此项合并的英国反垄断规定，政府的急迫心情由此可见一斑。HBOS和莱斯银行总共控制了英国抵押贷款市场的三分之一左右。
而在纽约，摩根士丹利和高盛的情况也在迅速恶化。在当天下午大约2时，摩根士丹利首席执行长麦晋桁(John Mack)在向员工发出的一封电子邮件中称，现在到底发生了什么？我觉得很清楚：我们正处于为恐惧和传言所控制的市场当中。到周三结束时，摩根士丹利和高盛的员工都已被折腾得精疲力尽。
摩根士丹利股价下跌了24%，至每股21.75美元，而市值最大的投行高盛下跌了14%，至114.50美元。周四，鲍尔森和贝南克认为，这个结果对金融系统和经济带来了太大的威胁。在上世纪30年代以来最大规模的政府干预行动中，他们将联邦保险扩大到规模约为3.4万亿美元的货币市场基金中，并提出了用7,000亿美元接收银行资产负债表中不良资产的计划。
三天后，高盛和摩根士丹利向Fed申请成为商业银行──这个历史性的举措结束了监管松懈的华尔街证券机构以高风险换取高回报的传统。
对一些人而言，政府采取救助行动的决定其实是默认了这样一个事实：尽管官员们希望让市场自己惩罚酿成危机的冒险行径，但银行始终是处于优势地位的。日内瓦日内瓦国际研究所(Graduate Institute in Geneva)经济学教授查尔斯•韦普洛兹(Charles Wyplosz)说，雷曼兄弟的事情证明，有效处理银行的不当行为比我们想象中要困难得多；你要紧盯着魔鬼的眼睛，而这双眼睛非常可怕。
现在看来，这个决策的后果比几乎所有人想象的都更为可怕。
雷曼兄弟在9月15日（周一）一早提出了破产申请，其引发的连锁反应致使信贷市场陷入混乱。这让保险巨头美国国际集团(AIG)加速跌入深渊，也让几乎所有人都因此蒙受了损失，不论是远在挪威的退休人员，还是Reserve Primary基金的投资者都未能幸免，而后者是美国一家货币市场共同基金，曾被认为同现金一样安全。几天之内，由此引发的混乱甚至让华尔街的中流砥柱高盛集团(Goldman Sachs)和摩根士丹利(Morgan Stanley)也深陷其中。深受震慑的美国官员急忙推出了更为系统的危机解决方案，并在周日同国会领导人就7,000亿美元的金融市场救助计划达成了一致。
雷曼兄弟破产的起源和后果均凸现出决策者在应对不断加深的金融危机时所处的艰难境地。他们不愿被视为是迫不及待地要介入其中，救助那些因太过追逐风险而身陷困境的金融机构。但在当前这个时代，市场、银行和投资者都被一张复杂而无形的金融关系网联系到了一起，任由大型机构自行倒下的痛苦大得令人难以承受。
一些批评人士在事后指出，要是政府出手，那么雷曼兄弟破产之后出现的系统性风险本是可以避免的。在雷曼兄弟倒台之前，联邦官员曾在局部范围内化解了一系列金融风波，所采取的方式是让房利美(Fannie Mae)、房地美(Freddie Mac)和贝尔斯登(Bear Stearns)等陷入困境的机构生存下来。官员们认定这些机构规模太大，不能让它们倒闭，因此动用了数十亿美元纳税人的钱救助它们。但对雷曼兄弟却没有这样做。
伦敦商学院经济学教授、经济政策研究中心(Centre for Economic Policy Research)总裁波提斯(Richard Portes)说，我不理解他们为何意识不到市场将完全被此次破产所吓倒。他说，让雷曼兄弟倒下不会显示政府的决心，而只会让一年多以前金融危机爆发以来的一个核心问题更加恶化，那就是没有人知道哪家金融机构能偿还其债券。
当然，雷曼兄弟的破产在很大程度上属于咎由自取。该公司大量投资于过热的房地产市场，用大量借款增加回报率，而且比其他公司更晚认识到所出现的损失，也未在投资出现失误时抓紧时间融资。该公司在危机中陷入太深，以致于寻找有意的买家都成为艰巨任务，这也让政府基本上是无计可施。
鉴于可以利用的时间和信息有限，许多专家认为政府官员已作出了力所能及的最佳选择。
资本难求
眼见雷曼兄弟面临融资难的局面，包括财政部长鲍尔森(Henry Paulson)、美国联邦储备委员会(Fed)主席贝南克(Ben Bernanke)和纽约联邦储备委员会主席盖纳(Timothy Geithner)在内的决策者都考虑过是否应放手让雷曼兄弟倒闭。知情人士透露，一方面，出于对道德风险的担忧，他们不想出手相救，不愿让自己的行为被解读为支持金融机构不负责任地追逐高风险。另一方面，他们对雷曼兄弟能找到可行的买家持怀疑态度，同时他们认为市场和Fed会有时间准备应对大机构倒闭带来的后果。不过，一些Fed官员不愿发出Fed同华尔街合作阻止危机扩散的努力已告结束的信号。比如，盖纳就曾向其他人表示，市场仍面临着很大麻烦。
据一位与会人士称，盖纳9月12日晚同华尔街高管在纽约储备委员会总部开会就雷曼兄弟的命运讨价还价时曾向他们表示，如果你们不采取一些行动，结果将会很糟糕。
知情人士称，当时，官员们向华尔街银行家提出了成立私人企业救助基金的可能性，但这些银行家要么对救助竞争对手的想法退避三舍，要么就是没有所需的额外资金。
为市场作铺垫
周末期间，随着美国银行(Bank of America)和英国巴克莱银行(Barclays)收购雷曼兄弟的希望破灭，Fed官员将重点放在了准备如何应对美国历史上最大一项破产案上面。雷曼兄弟的总资产超过6,300亿美元，远远超过了2002年电信巨头WorldCom申请破产时1,040亿美元的资产。
官员们格外担心两个领域：信用违约掉期市场和回购市场。
Fed几个月来一直在敦促华尔街的公司成立新的信用违约掉期结算机构。这个想法的初衷是为这个透明度不高的松散的市场提供更有序的交易结算方式，让这个名义价值高达55万亿美元的市场在大交易商倒闭时不会受到很大冲击。但这一切并未就绪。因此，没有人确切知道哪家机构与雷曼兄弟进行了交易，以及交易的数量。周一，这些交易将会崩盘。在为缓解这个问题所作的最后一线努力中，纽约联邦储备委员会官员同雷曼兄弟的管理人员和该公司的主要交易伙伴共同确定哪些机构处于与雷曼兄弟交易的相反方，从而能够取消交易。比如，如果雷曼兄弟的两个交易伙伴对通用汽车(General Motors)的债券作了相反的交易，那么他们就能与雷曼兄弟取消交易，而彼此直接打交道。
Fed还从贝尔斯登的破产中看出，当贷款机构惴惴不安之际，回购市场是如何容易受到严重干扰。这个问题将有可能导致贷款机构在华尔街银行急需资金之际对它们缩减贷款规模。因为回购贷款是短期性质，少的甚至只有一天，因此资金可能突然消失，有鉴于此，Fed在贝尔斯登倒闭后设立了一项针对证券公司借贷的紧急计划。Fed官员整个周日手忙脚乱迅速扩展了上述计划，允许银行将包括股票在内的更多种类的证券作为质押。
周日当巴克莱交易落空后，决策者开始“往跑道上喷塑胶”，盖纳做此比喻指的是采取缓冲措施。Fed官员在当天夜里意识到他们所作的准备或许不足以应付所有突发情况。不过他们仍希望，借助他们周日匆忙拿出的放宽条件的贷款计划，一段时间后混乱能有所平息。他们还感到，自从贝尔斯登在3月份因危机破产后，金融机构和市场已有足够时间对重大负面事件所带来的震动作好心理准备。
但与许多人之前的预期相比，这份于周一早间提交到联邦破产法庭、编号为No. 08-1355的雷曼兄弟破产案在市场中激起了大得多的振荡，而且波及范围也要更远。破产令雷曼兄弟股东和债券持有人的大量投资迅速泡汤。利用政府石油收入盈余投资的挪威政府退休基金就是最大的受害者之一。据现有的最近数据显示，截至2007年年底，该基金持有价值超过8亿美元的雷曼兄弟债券和股票。雷曼兄弟的猝死让批评挪威政府石油收入投资方式的人士获得了有力武器。一位发言人表示，该基金的管理层“非常担心，且在密切关注势态发展。”
政府听任雷曼兄弟垮台的事实成了投资者风险评估方式的一个转折点。当Fed 3月份做主让摩根大通接管贝尔斯登时，贝尔斯登股东损失了大部分投资，但债券持有人基本全身而退。从金融风险等级来看，这个结果并不奇怪，因为债券持有人比股权持有人在收回投资方面享有更多的合约权利。但这在投资者中间造成一种错觉，人们以为，以后再有银行出问题，政府还会出手营救债券持有人。但政府让雷曼兄弟自生自灭的决定突然间让市场打消了这个想法。
大规模信贷违约掉期市场所做出的反应最为明显。周一，债券违约掉期急剧扩大，创出单日最大涨幅。据Markit CDX index的数据，在美国，1,000万美元债券的5年期违约保护成本已经从周五的152,000美元涨到了194,000美元。
当违约掉期扩大时，出售合约的一方（比如银行、对冲基金和保险公司等）将发生损失。与此同时，这些卖家必须拿出更多现金作为质押，以此保证他们能正常履约。据资产管理公司Bridgewater Associates估计，仅在周一一天，债券违约掉期的卖家不得不筹集1,400亿美元交付保证金。投资者手忙脚乱地筹集资金，被迫卖掉了可以卖的所有东西，这种变现操作给全世界金融市场带来很大冲击。
追加现金
追加现金加剧了AIG的问题。之前因为信用评级下调，它在追加140亿美元质押金的要求面前已是摇摇欲坠。AIG是违约保险市场最大的卖方之一，其存量合约涉及价值4,000亿美元的债券。
雪上加霜的是，在CDS市场的交易方试图评估他们有多少资金与雷曼兄弟有关的同时，实际交易量开始大幅萎缩。破产意味着许多原本在与雷曼兄弟的对手交易中盈利的对冲基金和银行现在可能拿不到钱了。同时，雷曼兄弟机构经纪业务的客户将不得不通过法庭讨回他们的资金或证券了。
由原雷曼兄弟交易员吉宾斯(Robert Charles Gibbins )2003年建立的对冲基金Autonomy Capital Research就是受到牵连的雷曼兄弟客户之一。据知情人士说，雷曼兄弟申请破产保护时，冻结了Autonomy大约6,000万美元资金。这个数字约占Autonomy所管理25亿美元资产额的2%。Autonomy的管理人士拒绝发表评论。
因为担心其他和自己有业务往来的证券公司可能也会倒闭，对冲基金纷纷购买针对这些公司的违约保险。但卖方很犹豫。想像一下，这就像某住宅区的所有家庭几乎在同一时间要求购买住房保险，那卖保险的人会有什么感觉。这样一来，摩根士丹利和高盛的债券违约掉期大涨，人们对这些公司的恐慌出现了恶性循环。
与此同时，对冲基金开始将资金撤出这两家公司。以摩根士丹利为例，其机构经纪业务在接下来的几天时间里就将丧失约10%的客户资产。
纽约对冲基金Institutional Credit Partners.首席执行长普莱奥(Thomas Priore)说，情况混乱极了，人们简直要被可能发生的事吓呆了。
在人们对雷曼兄弟破产会怎样影响其他金融机构尚感不确定之时，传言和混乱引起了股价疯狂波动。比如，周二一位伦敦分析师发表报告称，已因数百亿美元冲销大受打击的瑞银(UBS)可能因为与雷曼兄弟相关业务再损失40亿美元。当天瑞银股价大跌17%。瑞银随后称，其相关风险敞口不超过3亿美元。
对金融机构健康状况的担忧不断升温，且迅速传导到银行融资市场。纽约时间周二早间7点，市场受到了当天的第一次重击：伦敦的英国银行家协会(British Bankers' Association)报告说，反映银行间借贷成本的伦敦银行同业拆息(Libor)大幅上升。美元隔夜Libor从之前的3.11%骤升至6.44%，创下历史上最大升幅。但即使在如此高的利率面前，银行仍不愿出借手中资金。
几个小时之内，市场就将关注焦点转到了高盛和摩根士丹利的命运上。这两家公司发现他们也要奋力提振投资者不断下滑的信心。高盛首席财务长大卫•维尼亚(David Viniar)在收益发布会上回答了一个又一个有关该公司借款能力的问题。他承认道，我们的确没有料到雷曼兄弟所发生的事情。
与此同时，摩根士丹利股价早盘暴跌28%，投资者认为该公司将沦为雷曼兄弟破产之后的下一个牺牲品。下午4时左右，摩根士丹利决定提前一天公布第三财季业绩，希望不错的业绩能阻止股价的下滑。
摩根士丹利首席财务长柯姆•凯勒尔(Colm Kelleher)在与分析师的电话会议上称，我担心这种情况将会蔓延；市场上一片恐慌。
摩根士丹利的电话会议尚未结束，雷曼兄弟破产的后果已在另一个不同的金融领域显现了出来：那就是被普遍认为有如银行存款一般安全的货币市场基金。许多货币市场基金购买的都是商业票据，雷曼兄弟也发行了这类票据用于短期借款。不过现在，这类票据的价格仅是票面价值的20%。
在纽约时间下午5时左右，一家名为The Reserve的知名货币市场基金管理公司称，该公司旗下的主要基金Reserve Primary基金持有面值7.85亿美元的雷曼兄弟公司债券。The Reserve称，这个结果使该基金的净资产值跌到每份1美元之下，这也是14年来货币市场基金首次跌破1美元的面值。该公司过去还曾批评其竞争对手在商业票据市场上过于冒险。
商业票据市场遇到的麻烦给总体经济带来了尤为严重的威胁。全球各地的公司都依靠商业票据获得短期贷款，满足从发工资到购买原材料在内的各种用途。但随着惊恐的货币市场基金纷纷逃离，商业票据市场陷入了停滞。
上周三，贷款市场的停滞在英国也致使事态急剧变化。英国最大的抵押贷款银行HBOS PLC的股价暴跌了19%，原因在于投资者对该行严重依赖市场筹集业务资金的担忧情绪不断升温。这种情况对政府官员来说是一个危险信号。今年早些时候当他们被迫对陷入困境的抵押贷款公司Northern Rock进行国有化时曾深感尴尬。Northern Rock是英国100多年来首次遭挤兑的银行。
政府迅速采取行动，撮合英国的莱斯银行(Lloyds TSB)紧急收购了HBOS。官员们甚至修改了原本会阻止此项合并的英国反垄断规定，政府的急迫心情由此可见一斑。HBOS和莱斯银行总共控制了英国抵押贷款市场的三分之一左右。
而在纽约，摩根士丹利和高盛的情况也在迅速恶化。在当天下午大约2时，摩根士丹利首席执行长麦晋桁(John Mack)在向员工发出的一封电子邮件中称，现在到底发生了什么？我觉得很清楚：我们正处于为恐惧和传言所控制的市场当中。到周三结束时，摩根士丹利和高盛的员工都已被折腾得精疲力尽。
摩根士丹利股价下跌了24%，至每股21.75美元，而市值最大的投行高盛下跌了14%，至114.50美元。周四，鲍尔森和贝南克认为，这个结果对金融系统和经济带来了太大的威胁。在上世纪30年代以来最大规模的政府干预行动中，他们将联邦保险扩大到规模约为3.4万亿美元的货币市场基金中，并提出了用7,000亿美元接收银行资产负债表中不良资产的计划。
三天后，高盛和摩根士丹利向Fed申请成为商业银行──这个历史性的举措结束了监管松懈的华尔街证券机构以高风险换取高回报的传统。
对一些人而言，政府采取救助行动的决定其实是默认了这样一个事实：尽管官员们希望让市场自己惩罚酿成危机的冒险行径，但银行始终是处于优势地位的。日内瓦日内瓦国际研究所(Graduate Institute in Geneva)经济学教授查尔斯•韦普洛兹(Charles Wyplosz)说，雷曼兄弟的事情证明，有效处理银行的不当行为比我们想象中要困难得多；你要紧盯着魔鬼的眼睛，而这双眼睛非常可怕。
交易的一致性原则
近日接了一些朋友的电话，有抄底的，有砍仓的，有加码的，有减磅的，奇奇怪怪，但是买的人担心，卖的人也在担心，说的最多的居然是一句话：看明天了。。。
明天的涨跌，对我们很重要，其实也不重要。
有的朋友本来上周买了，刚要庆幸自己抄底成功，这周一却止损了。买入的理由是某只股票（比如，他买的是601858，一只小盘股），2008年效益应该不错，卖出的理由却是中国石油（601857）今天破位了，大盘很不好。这一切看起来都很有道理，但是不到一周的时间，他却做出了两个完全不同的判断。这是为什么呢？
风不动，幡不动，仁者心动。
然后，如果明天601857出现一根大阳，这朋友会怎么做呢？我们猜测，极大的可能是他一发现601857跌不下去了，马上动手买入他今天卖出去的601858，然后等待601858走强，到达他预期的目标。如何601857又跌了，他还是可能重新把601858给卖掉。
他心里考虑的是601858的价值，交易的依据却是601857的分时技术图表，就好比我们曾经称赞过的某著名的体育解说员，眼睛里看到的是A，心里想到的是B，嘴里说出来的却是C。这样的交易者，是不容易在市场里成功的。因为他违背了交易的一致性原则。
一致性原则简单地说：就是买入是什么理由，卖出也必须是什么理由，一个入口，一个出口，必须完全一致！
如果是基于基本面的分析来操作，那么，只要公司的经营管理没有改变，那么，你就应该一直守仓，或者一直空仓。不要因为今天这公司的价格走强了，满仓，也不要因为走弱了，空仓。走强或者走弱，不是你买卖的理由，不值得你去为这些事烦恼。甚至，对一个价值投资者，他的字典里不应该有“强”和“弱”之类的词语。
如果是基于技术面的分析来操作，那么，只要股票的价格在某个价格之上、或者某一指标在某个数字之上，你就应该持仓，只要股票的价格在某个价格之下、或者某一指标在某个数字之下，你就应该空仓。我们交易的是一只或者几只股票，不是大盘，也不是公司未来的预期收益。大盘是机构考虑的问题，个人技术交易者是不应该去考虑的。预期收益是价值投资者考虑的问题，个人技术交易者也完全可以少考虑或者不考虑。
一致性原则告诉我们要凝聚我们的热情，凝聚我们的注意力。在我们的买卖依据上，抓住最重要的的一两点就可以了，其他的细枝末节的东西，间接的东西，完全可以忽略。投资就是把复杂的事情简单化，然后不断重复这些简单的准则。只有这样，才有我们内心的宁静。这宁静支撑了我们度过未来可能来临的动荡岁月，让我们不需要眼睛看着A，心里想着B，手里交易的却是C。
什么都关注的人，反而有点玄了。他的交易系统太复杂了，而越是复杂的机器，出错的概率也越高。
永远不要抱怨自己的无知，我们不需要有太多的知识了。知识越多，越影响我们看清楚事物的本质，我们反而越容易迷失自己。从来没有见过那个伟大的投资大师是从教授讲坛上走下来，那些博学人猿在市场面前，只会充分暴露出了他们的软弱和渺小。同时，我们任何人都无法穷尽这世间的知识。整个世界就是一碗糊涂粥。如果因为世界是普遍联系，就认为股票操作也应该普遍联系，那么等于是好不容易整修了一套新房，却邀请了一大堆陌生的亲戚过来住。
我们的交易依据，也不应该有陌生的面孔。
不关心大盘，有的人一样可以成功操作股票；
不关心未来业绩预期，有的人一样可以成功操作股票；
不关心601857，我们一样可以成功买卖601858！！！！
风不动，幡不动，仁者不动。
明天的涨跌，对我们很重要，其实也不重要。
有的朋友本来上周买了，刚要庆幸自己抄底成功，这周一却止损了。买入的理由是某只股票（比如，他买的是601858，一只小盘股），2008年效益应该不错，卖出的理由却是中国石油（601857）今天破位了，大盘很不好。这一切看起来都很有道理，但是不到一周的时间，他却做出了两个完全不同的判断。这是为什么呢？
风不动，幡不动，仁者心动。
然后，如果明天601857出现一根大阳，这朋友会怎么做呢？我们猜测，极大的可能是他一发现601857跌不下去了，马上动手买入他今天卖出去的601858，然后等待601858走强，到达他预期的目标。如何601857又跌了，他还是可能重新把601858给卖掉。
他心里考虑的是601858的价值，交易的依据却是601857的分时技术图表，就好比我们曾经称赞过的某著名的体育解说员，眼睛里看到的是A，心里想到的是B，嘴里说出来的却是C。这样的交易者，是不容易在市场里成功的。因为他违背了交易的一致性原则。
一致性原则简单地说：就是买入是什么理由，卖出也必须是什么理由，一个入口，一个出口，必须完全一致！
如果是基于基本面的分析来操作，那么，只要公司的经营管理没有改变，那么，你就应该一直守仓，或者一直空仓。不要因为今天这公司的价格走强了，满仓，也不要因为走弱了，空仓。走强或者走弱，不是你买卖的理由，不值得你去为这些事烦恼。甚至，对一个价值投资者，他的字典里不应该有“强”和“弱”之类的词语。
如果是基于技术面的分析来操作，那么，只要股票的价格在某个价格之上、或者某一指标在某个数字之上，你就应该持仓，只要股票的价格在某个价格之下、或者某一指标在某个数字之下，你就应该空仓。我们交易的是一只或者几只股票，不是大盘，也不是公司未来的预期收益。大盘是机构考虑的问题，个人技术交易者是不应该去考虑的。预期收益是价值投资者考虑的问题，个人技术交易者也完全可以少考虑或者不考虑。
一致性原则告诉我们要凝聚我们的热情，凝聚我们的注意力。在我们的买卖依据上，抓住最重要的的一两点就可以了，其他的细枝末节的东西，间接的东西，完全可以忽略。投资就是把复杂的事情简单化，然后不断重复这些简单的准则。只有这样，才有我们内心的宁静。这宁静支撑了我们度过未来可能来临的动荡岁月，让我们不需要眼睛看着A，心里想着B，手里交易的却是C。
什么都关注的人，反而有点玄了。他的交易系统太复杂了，而越是复杂的机器，出错的概率也越高。
永远不要抱怨自己的无知，我们不需要有太多的知识了。知识越多，越影响我们看清楚事物的本质，我们反而越容易迷失自己。从来没有见过那个伟大的投资大师是从教授讲坛上走下来，那些博学人猿在市场面前，只会充分暴露出了他们的软弱和渺小。同时，我们任何人都无法穷尽这世间的知识。整个世界就是一碗糊涂粥。如果因为世界是普遍联系，就认为股票操作也应该普遍联系，那么等于是好不容易整修了一套新房，却邀请了一大堆陌生的亲戚过来住。
我们的交易依据，也不应该有陌生的面孔。
不关心大盘，有的人一样可以成功操作股票；
不关心未来业绩预期，有的人一样可以成功操作股票；
不关心601857，我们一样可以成功买卖601858！！！！
风不动，幡不动，仁者不动。
绊倒华尔街的“同一条绳索”
软资产-硬负债的内在矛盾,不仅是造成这次美国次贷危机和雷曼兄弟公司破产的直接原因,也是多次“绊倒”美国、日本金融体系的“同一条绳索”。
9月华尔街“金融大地震”所波及之处,一片狼藉。爆发归结起来有三大原因:软资产-硬负债的矛盾、金融资产价格过度膨胀的必然结果和国际货币体系内在冲突的体现。
软资产-硬负债的矛盾是造成这次金融危机的直接原因。现有财务评价体系和信贷体系的一个内在矛盾就是各项资产,尤其房地产和股权资产常常可以根据资产的市场价值为依据进行调整。例如一项购买成本为100万元的房产,在房地产市场上升50%时,该项房产的价值就被认定为150万元。股权资产的价值也常常以市场价值来评估,因此很多资产的价值是随着市场价值的起伏而剧烈波动的。与此相反,负债却是刚性的。也就是说,如果房产所有人以150万元的价值抵押贷款120万元,那么无论房地产价格如何变动,负债永远都是120万元。即便抵押物的价值回落到100万元,负债并不随之下调。因此,软资产-硬负债的矛盾直接导致了美国次债危机的发生和雷曼兄弟等众多金融的倒闭。随着美国金融危机的加深,雷曼兄弟公司的资产不断地随着市场价格的下降而减值,但以此进行融资形成的负债却刚性地保持不动,因此造成雷曼兄弟公司迅速陷入财务危机和流动性危机。
其实软资产-硬负债的内在矛盾,不仅是造成这次美国次贷危机和雷曼兄弟公司破产的直接原因,也是多次“绊倒”美国、日本金融体系的“同一条绳索”。1929-1932年美国的金融危机和大萧条、1990年代日本的金融危机都是如此。
其次,这次美国金融危机是前期美国金融资产膨胀的必然结果。2005年我在《金融资产膨胀与货币政策困境》一书中,就曾提出可交易金融资产市场的快速膨胀与调整固然会对金融体系形成一定的冲击。但是如果这些可交易金融资产没有与商业银行的信用创造功能相结合,其影响就常常仅限于局部市场之内。而一旦这一市场与商业银行信用创造功能相结合,其破坏力迅速得到几何级数的放大,形成金融核弹的冲击波,对于整个金融体系甚至经济体系实施毁灭性打击。这次美国金融危机之所以远比初期人们所预料的严重与持久,核心的原因就是美国的次贷市场、次贷衍生产品市场与美国的商业银行信用创造功能相互推动。商业因信用创造为前些年美国房地产市场、资本市场的非理性繁荣提供了源源不断的流动性,而雷曼、美林这些投资银行以及房地美等房地产抵押贷款机构借助于衍生产品创新不断地从商业银行和投资公众手中抽取“血液”,推动金融衍生市场走向狂热状态。而一旦金融资产膨胀发展到了极致出现反转,抵押金融资产价值出现一定幅度的下降,就造成投资机构在软资产-硬负债的矛盾下,出现资不抵债的财务危机和市场流动性快速萎缩形成的流动性危机。债务人的困境又迅速传递到商业银行资产质量下降,信用内盛行紧缩。因此,尽管美国次贷危机发生以来,美国政府多次向市场注入流动性,但是始终难以收到效果。
最后,国际货币体系的内在冲突是美国金融危机的深层次原因。国际货币体系历经金本位、金汇兑本位、布雷顿深林体系、牙买加体系等多次变化。但主线是单一本位币条件下的固定汇率制体系和多元本位币条件下的浮动汇率制体系交替。通常在单一本位币条件下的固定汇率制体系期间,国际经济、金融运行相对比较稳定,而在多元本位币条件下的浮动汇率制体系期间,国际经济、金融领域往往充满了动荡和危机。1929年-1932年的美国经济大萧条和金融危机,就是国际货币体系由英磅本位向美元本位过渡期间国际金融动荡的集中体现。
目前,随着全球经济的多极化,美国经济在全球的份额不断下降,欧元区的统一、金砖四国的崛起,对于当前美元为主要结算货币和储备货币的国际货币体系形成冲击,国际货币体系正在走向多元化。在此背景下,各国货币当局和全球投资者逐渐在减持美元资产,大量过剩的美元迫使美元出现长期的下降趋势。由于美元的持续贬值,美元大量回流美国,不仅推动美国房地产市场出现非理性繁荣,同时美国商业银行累计大量的美元资金急于贷放,又找不到优级的借款人,只好降低借款人的信用的等级要求,从而形成大量的次级房屋抵押贷款。另一方面,在国际范围内,以美元标价的国际大宗商品价格由于美元贬值而出现持续上升,国际通货膨胀压力加大。美国被迫在2006年提高利率水平,由此触发了美国房地产市场的调整和金融市场的危机。
地质学上说,地震是地壳表面各大板块含原有的力学结构受到破坏,出现严重不均衡的结果。这次的“金融大地震”也是如此。它是这些年来美国金融体系和国际货币体系内在矛盾的一个爆发式表现。在长期以来蓄积的能量没有得到充分释放之前,这次的“金融大地震”是不会停止的,还将摇撼下去。但是,“雷曼地震”带给我们的更重要的、更深层次的思索是:如何解决软资产-硬负债这一数次“绊倒”强大金融体的“同一条绳索”,和未来的国际货币体系何去何从?
9月华尔街“金融大地震”所波及之处,一片狼藉。爆发归结起来有三大原因:软资产-硬负债的矛盾、金融资产价格过度膨胀的必然结果和国际货币体系内在冲突的体现。
软资产-硬负债的矛盾是造成这次金融危机的直接原因。现有财务评价体系和信贷体系的一个内在矛盾就是各项资产,尤其房地产和股权资产常常可以根据资产的市场价值为依据进行调整。例如一项购买成本为100万元的房产,在房地产市场上升50%时,该项房产的价值就被认定为150万元。股权资产的价值也常常以市场价值来评估,因此很多资产的价值是随着市场价值的起伏而剧烈波动的。与此相反,负债却是刚性的。也就是说,如果房产所有人以150万元的价值抵押贷款120万元,那么无论房地产价格如何变动,负债永远都是120万元。即便抵押物的价值回落到100万元,负债并不随之下调。因此,软资产-硬负债的矛盾直接导致了美国次债危机的发生和雷曼兄弟等众多金融的倒闭。随着美国金融危机的加深,雷曼兄弟公司的资产不断地随着市场价格的下降而减值,但以此进行融资形成的负债却刚性地保持不动,因此造成雷曼兄弟公司迅速陷入财务危机和流动性危机。
其实软资产-硬负债的内在矛盾,不仅是造成这次美国次贷危机和雷曼兄弟公司破产的直接原因,也是多次“绊倒”美国、日本金融体系的“同一条绳索”。1929-1932年美国的金融危机和大萧条、1990年代日本的金融危机都是如此。
其次,这次美国金融危机是前期美国金融资产膨胀的必然结果。2005年我在《金融资产膨胀与货币政策困境》一书中,就曾提出可交易金融资产市场的快速膨胀与调整固然会对金融体系形成一定的冲击。但是如果这些可交易金融资产没有与商业银行的信用创造功能相结合,其影响就常常仅限于局部市场之内。而一旦这一市场与商业银行信用创造功能相结合,其破坏力迅速得到几何级数的放大,形成金融核弹的冲击波,对于整个金融体系甚至经济体系实施毁灭性打击。这次美国金融危机之所以远比初期人们所预料的严重与持久,核心的原因就是美国的次贷市场、次贷衍生产品市场与美国的商业银行信用创造功能相互推动。商业因信用创造为前些年美国房地产市场、资本市场的非理性繁荣提供了源源不断的流动性,而雷曼、美林这些投资银行以及房地美等房地产抵押贷款机构借助于衍生产品创新不断地从商业银行和投资公众手中抽取“血液”,推动金融衍生市场走向狂热状态。而一旦金融资产膨胀发展到了极致出现反转,抵押金融资产价值出现一定幅度的下降,就造成投资机构在软资产-硬负债的矛盾下,出现资不抵债的财务危机和市场流动性快速萎缩形成的流动性危机。债务人的困境又迅速传递到商业银行资产质量下降,信用内盛行紧缩。因此,尽管美国次贷危机发生以来,美国政府多次向市场注入流动性,但是始终难以收到效果。
最后,国际货币体系的内在冲突是美国金融危机的深层次原因。国际货币体系历经金本位、金汇兑本位、布雷顿深林体系、牙买加体系等多次变化。但主线是单一本位币条件下的固定汇率制体系和多元本位币条件下的浮动汇率制体系交替。通常在单一本位币条件下的固定汇率制体系期间,国际经济、金融运行相对比较稳定,而在多元本位币条件下的浮动汇率制体系期间,国际经济、金融领域往往充满了动荡和危机。1929年-1932年的美国经济大萧条和金融危机,就是国际货币体系由英磅本位向美元本位过渡期间国际金融动荡的集中体现。
目前,随着全球经济的多极化,美国经济在全球的份额不断下降,欧元区的统一、金砖四国的崛起,对于当前美元为主要结算货币和储备货币的国际货币体系形成冲击,国际货币体系正在走向多元化。在此背景下,各国货币当局和全球投资者逐渐在减持美元资产,大量过剩的美元迫使美元出现长期的下降趋势。由于美元的持续贬值,美元大量回流美国,不仅推动美国房地产市场出现非理性繁荣,同时美国商业银行累计大量的美元资金急于贷放,又找不到优级的借款人,只好降低借款人的信用的等级要求,从而形成大量的次级房屋抵押贷款。另一方面,在国际范围内,以美元标价的国际大宗商品价格由于美元贬值而出现持续上升,国际通货膨胀压力加大。美国被迫在2006年提高利率水平,由此触发了美国房地产市场的调整和金融市场的危机。
地质学上说,地震是地壳表面各大板块含原有的力学结构受到破坏,出现严重不均衡的结果。这次的“金融大地震”也是如此。它是这些年来美国金融体系和国际货币体系内在矛盾的一个爆发式表现。在长期以来蓄积的能量没有得到充分释放之前,这次的“金融大地震”是不会停止的,还将摇撼下去。但是,“雷曼地震”带给我们的更重要的、更深层次的思索是:如何解决软资产-硬负债这一数次“绊倒”强大金融体的“同一条绳索”,和未来的国际货币体系何去何从?
格雷厄姆证券分析体系 "投资"与"投机"的定义区别
本杰明·格雷厄姆所创立的证券分析理论体系的一个显著特点，就是通过对证券领域里一些重要的经济范畴的历史审视和深刻剖析，力图澄清弥漫其上的种种迷惑纷乱的表象，揭示其中所蕴含的尚未被人们所真正认识的实质，促成证券投资者树立科学、理性、安全、有效的证券投资理念。基于“投资”与“投机”在证券市场中所具有的广泛影响和突出作用，故而对其进行全面彻
底地审视和赋予确切的定义，便成为格雷厄姆构建证券分析理论体系的一项重要工作。
在格雷厄姆所处的上个世纪的三十年代里，资本市场上对于“投资”与“投机”的定义，在认识上往往存在着不同的观点。人们从不同的角度出发，对于两者之间的概念、关系、作用以至差别等，有着不相一致的、甚或是大相径庭的认识。对于认同两者之间存在着差异、属于两个不同的重要经济概念者来说，投资与投机的区别是可以从证券买卖的对象、付款的方式、持有股票的时间长短以及是否为安全收益或预期风险收益等特征来加以划分。但是，投资与投机在概念和实际运作中粘合的是如此密切，难以区分，以至于被许多伤透脑筋的市场人士干脆定论为：“投资是一种成功的投机，而投机是一次不成功的投资”，将两者合二为一，视作只是同一种行为的两种不同的表现形式或说法而已。
格雷厄姆不赞成上述肤浅的认识。通过大量的市场分析和理论研究，他形成了自己独特的见解。他认为将投资与投机等同为一的观念并不足取，因为持之者只是从两者活动的最终结果来对其加以界定，而不是在全面地分析其基本特征后加以定义。他明确地指出，“投资”与“投机”是两个截然不同的经济范畴，两者之间存在着显著的、本质上的差别。这种差别，并不是完全表现在诸如购买的对象是债券或是股票，采取的方式是现金交易还是保证金交易，持有的股票时间是长期或是短期，投资的目的是实现安全性收益或是风险性收益等表象上。
之所以如此，是因为持有上述的评判标准本身都是难以确定的、并且总是处于变化状态下或捉摸不定的。所以，上述的差别并没有触及到两者本质上的特征，不能作为确切定义的依据。例如，人们曾固执地认为债券是一种极为安全的投资对象而股票却蕴含着极大的风险。因此，购买债券便是投资而购买股票则就理应属于投机。实际上，并不是所有的债券都是投资的对象。如果一种债券没有安全的内在价值，购买其无疑就等同于是一次彻头彻尾的投机，并且是一次危险极大的投机；而如果一只具有安全性的股票，对其操作就是一次投资，而且是一次具有安全保障的、能够得到有效回报的投资。再比如，用现金足额购买股票也不能被视作为是投资，因为大多数最具投机性的股票正是被要求使用现金足额购买的，等等。总之，“购买股票可以是投资，使用保证金交易可以是投资，而怀着快速获得利润的目的进行的操作也可以是投资”。
那么，究竟“投资”与“投机”的确切定义何在呢？在格雷厄姆看来，投资的确切定义应该蕴含着三个彼此关联、密不可分的重要因素。首先，投资必须是建立在“详尽分析”基础之上。所谓详尽分析，即是指通过以既定的安全和价值标准对投资对象进行的研究工作。其次，投资应该具有“安全性”的保障。当然，证券市场上的投资始终充满着和伴随着各种风险，从来也没有绝对的安全。但经过详尽分析以后被选定的投资对象应该具有投资的“内在价值”，应该存在着相对安全的价值空间，而这正是保障其在通常和可能的情况下没有较大的风险，也是其可以避免意外损失的安全体现。第三，投资的结果是必须能够得到“满意的回报”。这种令具有理性的投资者满意的回报，具有更广泛的含义，即不仅包括了利息和股息，而且也包括了资本增值和利润。由此，格雷厄姆得出的定义是：“投资是指经过详尽分析后，本金安全且有满意回报的操作”。相反，与之不合的就是投机。
“投资”与“投机”都是证券市场交易活动的一种基本活动形式，两者之间的最基本的区别或核心，就在于能否获得安全性的收入。格雷厄姆关于投资的定义与众不同的是，他着重指出“投资”所特意强调的这种安全的保障不能建之于市场虚假的信息、毫无根据的臆断、内部小道消息的传播甚或十足的赌性之上；“投资”的安全性必须取决于投资对象是否具备真正的内在价值或存在一个价值变化的空间，而要确切地把握这一关键之处或达到“边际安全”，只有通过利用客观的标准对所能够掌握的信息进行详尽分析。格雷厄姆认为，反思 1929年前美国股票市场的过热和随之而来的大崩溃，其中的一个重要原因，就在于与投资者不能正确区分投资与投机的概念，将这两个截然不同的概念加以混淆，投资操作缺乏理性指导，最终不仅导致投资者金钱上的重大损失，而且实际上也促成了市场的整体崩溃。由此，汲取历史的教益，真正认识投资与投机的本质差别，对于投资者树立科学、理性、安全、有效的投资理念，就至关重要。
底地审视和赋予确切的定义，便成为格雷厄姆构建证券分析理论体系的一项重要工作。
在格雷厄姆所处的上个世纪的三十年代里，资本市场上对于“投资”与“投机”的定义，在认识上往往存在着不同的观点。人们从不同的角度出发，对于两者之间的概念、关系、作用以至差别等，有着不相一致的、甚或是大相径庭的认识。对于认同两者之间存在着差异、属于两个不同的重要经济概念者来说，投资与投机的区别是可以从证券买卖的对象、付款的方式、持有股票的时间长短以及是否为安全收益或预期风险收益等特征来加以划分。但是，投资与投机在概念和实际运作中粘合的是如此密切，难以区分，以至于被许多伤透脑筋的市场人士干脆定论为：“投资是一种成功的投机，而投机是一次不成功的投资”，将两者合二为一，视作只是同一种行为的两种不同的表现形式或说法而已。
格雷厄姆不赞成上述肤浅的认识。通过大量的市场分析和理论研究，他形成了自己独特的见解。他认为将投资与投机等同为一的观念并不足取，因为持之者只是从两者活动的最终结果来对其加以界定，而不是在全面地分析其基本特征后加以定义。他明确地指出，“投资”与“投机”是两个截然不同的经济范畴，两者之间存在着显著的、本质上的差别。这种差别，并不是完全表现在诸如购买的对象是债券或是股票，采取的方式是现金交易还是保证金交易，持有的股票时间是长期或是短期，投资的目的是实现安全性收益或是风险性收益等表象上。
之所以如此，是因为持有上述的评判标准本身都是难以确定的、并且总是处于变化状态下或捉摸不定的。所以，上述的差别并没有触及到两者本质上的特征，不能作为确切定义的依据。例如，人们曾固执地认为债券是一种极为安全的投资对象而股票却蕴含着极大的风险。因此，购买债券便是投资而购买股票则就理应属于投机。实际上，并不是所有的债券都是投资的对象。如果一种债券没有安全的内在价值，购买其无疑就等同于是一次彻头彻尾的投机，并且是一次危险极大的投机；而如果一只具有安全性的股票，对其操作就是一次投资，而且是一次具有安全保障的、能够得到有效回报的投资。再比如，用现金足额购买股票也不能被视作为是投资，因为大多数最具投机性的股票正是被要求使用现金足额购买的，等等。总之，“购买股票可以是投资，使用保证金交易可以是投资，而怀着快速获得利润的目的进行的操作也可以是投资”。
那么，究竟“投资”与“投机”的确切定义何在呢？在格雷厄姆看来，投资的确切定义应该蕴含着三个彼此关联、密不可分的重要因素。首先，投资必须是建立在“详尽分析”基础之上。所谓详尽分析，即是指通过以既定的安全和价值标准对投资对象进行的研究工作。其次，投资应该具有“安全性”的保障。当然，证券市场上的投资始终充满着和伴随着各种风险，从来也没有绝对的安全。但经过详尽分析以后被选定的投资对象应该具有投资的“内在价值”，应该存在着相对安全的价值空间，而这正是保障其在通常和可能的情况下没有较大的风险，也是其可以避免意外损失的安全体现。第三，投资的结果是必须能够得到“满意的回报”。这种令具有理性的投资者满意的回报，具有更广泛的含义，即不仅包括了利息和股息，而且也包括了资本增值和利润。由此，格雷厄姆得出的定义是：“投资是指经过详尽分析后，本金安全且有满意回报的操作”。相反，与之不合的就是投机。
“投资”与“投机”都是证券市场交易活动的一种基本活动形式，两者之间的最基本的区别或核心，就在于能否获得安全性的收入。格雷厄姆关于投资的定义与众不同的是，他着重指出“投资”所特意强调的这种安全的保障不能建之于市场虚假的信息、毫无根据的臆断、内部小道消息的传播甚或十足的赌性之上；“投资”的安全性必须取决于投资对象是否具备真正的内在价值或存在一个价值变化的空间，而要确切地把握这一关键之处或达到“边际安全”，只有通过利用客观的标准对所能够掌握的信息进行详尽分析。格雷厄姆认为，反思 1929年前美国股票市场的过热和随之而来的大崩溃，其中的一个重要原因，就在于与投资者不能正确区分投资与投机的概念，将这两个截然不同的概念加以混淆，投资操作缺乏理性指导，最终不仅导致投资者金钱上的重大损失，而且实际上也促成了市场的整体崩溃。由此，汲取历史的教益，真正认识投资与投机的本质差别，对于投资者树立科学、理性、安全、有效的投资理念，就至关重要。
Tuesday, September 30, 2008
风暴下的反思
华尔街金融风暴，让人们看到了山雨欲来的这一幕幕：2007年8月开始，美联储累计向金融系统注资1472．5亿美元，；9月18日决定降息0．5个百分点，进入“降息周期”； 2007年底至今年初，花旗、美林、瑞银等因次级贷款出现巨额亏损，美国政府和六大房贷商提出“救生索计划”；2008年3月，美国第五大投资银行贝尔斯登濒临破产，美联储紧急注资，并大幅降息75个基点；2008年7月23日，美国财政部宣布斥资3000亿美元救助“两房”，9月7日宣布接管“两房”； 2008年9月中下旬，6大央行联合注资，美政府7000亿金融救援计划，AIG被政府接管。
危机才刚刚开始，可全球化的金融大收购战役却在这场混乱中不断开始演绎。美国最大的银行倒闭案后不久，又一家银行可能成为被收购对象。美联银行（Wachovia）已经开始与一系列潜在收购者谈判，包括花旗(Citigroup)、西班牙国家银行(Banco Santander)、富国银行（Wells Fargo）等。与此同时，摩根大通正式（JPMorgan Chase）宣布，收购华盛顿互助银行。除此之外，其它一系列全球金融收购战开始大举进行：英国巴克莱银行以17.5亿美元收购雷曼部分资产；日本野村收购欧洲雷曼；中国银行23亿元收购法国洛希尔银行20%股权；日本三菱日联银行收购摩根士丹利20%股份；中石化136亿收购加拿大油气公司股权；法国电力集团230亿收购英国能源集团等等，让全球金融市场在这场混乱中显的更加脆弱。透过这些事件，我们发现，这场收购战有可能会让不断加剧的金融危机陷入更大的风险漩涡，全球金融市场有可能会被这场收购战导致的更加混乱。
由次贷危机引发的华尔街独立投行时代的终结，是有深刻原因的。在痛惜之余，我们不禁感慨，究竟是什么原因导致这些投行巨擘风光不再？国内投行从中可得到哪些启示？
首先，投行是一种高风险、高收益的行业。华尔街投行在博取高收益的同时，没有把风险控制放在重要位置上。在上世纪３０年代，美国通过法律将投行与商业银行相互分离，正是基于投行风险较高的考虑。经过时代的变迁，当前投行业务的风险远胜往昔。投行的高风险可以从两个方面看出：
（１）证券行业是个波动性很大、周期性很强的行业，投行的业绩波动因而很大。
（２）从华尔街的实际看，投行们对短期借款过分依赖，高的资产负债率削弱了投行的风险抵抗能力。货币市场的风吹草动往往会给投行致命一击。
其次，在利率的驱使下，投行的精英们痴迷于设计复杂的衍生品，致使投行的盈利模式不是建立在健康的实体经济和基础资产上。伴随信用链条的拉长、产品复杂度的增加，这些投行愈加脆弱。作为“人祸”，华尔街金融风暴的发生很大程度上跟投行精英们缺乏职业操守有关。他们既没有如实向客户揭示产品可能的风险，投行自身也没有采取有效措施管理风险，把风险传递给更广泛的机构和人群。次贷危机的冲击为何一波接着一波，根源在于这些机构的资产质量低劣。这些资产直接或间接与次级抵押贷款有关，是在次级抵押贷款的基础上衍生出来的。基础资产的风险如同毒瘤一样经由衍生品侵袭整个金融体系。
最后，在独立投行模式下，美国证券交易委员会作为唯一的监管主体，监管漏洞较多，客观上助长了投行们的放任自流与胆大妄为。与之形成对照的是，在美国，商业银行受到多个监管机构的监管，而且有一些保护性措施。由此不难理解为何华尔街投行在危机袭来时，要么被银行收购，要么变身为银行。
对国内投行来说，华尔街投行的失败有很多教训可资借鉴。首先，在分业经营的前提下，为了降低风险，国内投行可考虑：
（１）依托金融控股公司（投行作为控股公司的附属企业），增强抗风险能力。尽管投行风险比较大，但从整个控股公司层面看，风险或许在可控范围内。
（２）拓展业务，通过业务的多元化来分散风险。在传统的经纪、自营、承销、代客理财之外，增加直投、融资融券和股指期货业务。其次，适当增加投行的自有资本比例。再次，在条件允许的情况下，适当拓宽投行的资金来源渠道，提高资金来源的稳定性。最后，创新的步伐不能停歇。我们不能学华尔街因创新过度、过滥而因噎废食，不敢创新。但要严把基础资产的质量关，做好风险控制。对于管理层而言，如何在管制与创新之间寻求平衡是一个重大挑战。
危机才刚刚开始，可全球化的金融大收购战役却在这场混乱中不断开始演绎。美国最大的银行倒闭案后不久，又一家银行可能成为被收购对象。美联银行（Wachovia）已经开始与一系列潜在收购者谈判，包括花旗(Citigroup)、西班牙国家银行(Banco Santander)、富国银行（Wells Fargo）等。与此同时，摩根大通正式（JPMorgan Chase）宣布，收购华盛顿互助银行。除此之外，其它一系列全球金融收购战开始大举进行：英国巴克莱银行以17.5亿美元收购雷曼部分资产；日本野村收购欧洲雷曼；中国银行23亿元收购法国洛希尔银行20%股权；日本三菱日联银行收购摩根士丹利20%股份；中石化136亿收购加拿大油气公司股权；法国电力集团230亿收购英国能源集团等等，让全球金融市场在这场混乱中显的更加脆弱。透过这些事件，我们发现，这场收购战有可能会让不断加剧的金融危机陷入更大的风险漩涡，全球金融市场有可能会被这场收购战导致的更加混乱。
由次贷危机引发的华尔街独立投行时代的终结，是有深刻原因的。在痛惜之余，我们不禁感慨，究竟是什么原因导致这些投行巨擘风光不再？国内投行从中可得到哪些启示？
首先，投行是一种高风险、高收益的行业。华尔街投行在博取高收益的同时，没有把风险控制放在重要位置上。在上世纪３０年代，美国通过法律将投行与商业银行相互分离，正是基于投行风险较高的考虑。经过时代的变迁，当前投行业务的风险远胜往昔。投行的高风险可以从两个方面看出：
（１）证券行业是个波动性很大、周期性很强的行业，投行的业绩波动因而很大。
（２）从华尔街的实际看，投行们对短期借款过分依赖，高的资产负债率削弱了投行的风险抵抗能力。货币市场的风吹草动往往会给投行致命一击。
其次，在利率的驱使下，投行的精英们痴迷于设计复杂的衍生品，致使投行的盈利模式不是建立在健康的实体经济和基础资产上。伴随信用链条的拉长、产品复杂度的增加，这些投行愈加脆弱。作为“人祸”，华尔街金融风暴的发生很大程度上跟投行精英们缺乏职业操守有关。他们既没有如实向客户揭示产品可能的风险，投行自身也没有采取有效措施管理风险，把风险传递给更广泛的机构和人群。次贷危机的冲击为何一波接着一波，根源在于这些机构的资产质量低劣。这些资产直接或间接与次级抵押贷款有关，是在次级抵押贷款的基础上衍生出来的。基础资产的风险如同毒瘤一样经由衍生品侵袭整个金融体系。
最后，在独立投行模式下，美国证券交易委员会作为唯一的监管主体，监管漏洞较多，客观上助长了投行们的放任自流与胆大妄为。与之形成对照的是，在美国，商业银行受到多个监管机构的监管，而且有一些保护性措施。由此不难理解为何华尔街投行在危机袭来时，要么被银行收购，要么变身为银行。
对国内投行来说，华尔街投行的失败有很多教训可资借鉴。首先，在分业经营的前提下，为了降低风险，国内投行可考虑：
（１）依托金融控股公司（投行作为控股公司的附属企业），增强抗风险能力。尽管投行风险比较大，但从整个控股公司层面看，风险或许在可控范围内。
（２）拓展业务，通过业务的多元化来分散风险。在传统的经纪、自营、承销、代客理财之外，增加直投、融资融券和股指期货业务。其次，适当增加投行的自有资本比例。再次，在条件允许的情况下，适当拓宽投行的资金来源渠道，提高资金来源的稳定性。最后，创新的步伐不能停歇。我们不能学华尔街因创新过度、过滥而因噎废食，不敢创新。但要严把基础资产的质量关，做好风险控制。对于管理层而言，如何在管制与创新之间寻求平衡是一个重大挑战。
再思华尔街
刚刚过去的一周，一场百年不遇的金融大海啸席卷整个华尔街。
一家接一家大型金融机构轰然倒下，美国政府史无前例地动用万亿美元生死大救赎，各国央行空前一致出手救市，投资者的心随着股指剧烈波动而上下起伏。
美国投资银行经营模式的激进转变、美国金融市场过度自由的监管和发展模式以及过于“廉价”的信用，是导致华尔街金融危机的三座“冰山”。他认为，我们应该认真研讨华尔街危机给我们带来的启示，借鉴其教训，但也要充分考虑我国国情，要看到我国资本市场的发展模式和发展阶段与华尔街的不同。我国资本市场发展应该审慎推进金融创新，强化风险控制机制，走可持续发展的道路。
“海面下的三座冰山”
美国次贷危机的爆发只是“海面上的浮冰”，是华尔街金融危机的直接诱因。华尔街金融危机的根源，源自隐藏于水底的三座“冰山”，其最早的形成，在某种意义上可以追溯到上个世纪的九十年代。
第一，美国投资银行的经营模式在过去十年间发生了巨大变化，过度投机和过高的杠杆率使得投行走上了一条不归之路。传统上以赚取佣金收入为主、对资本金要求很低的投资银行，在高利润的诱惑和激烈竞争的压力下，大量从事次贷市场和复杂产品的投资，投行悄然变成了追逐高风险的对冲基金。例如，高盛公司在近年内，直接股权投资和其他投资所获占到其总收入的80％左右。出于竞争压力，其他投资银行也在做类似的转型。在对大量金融衍生品的交易中，投行赚取了大量利润，例如高盛和摩根斯坦利两家投行在过去十几年中每年的平均净资产回报率高达20％左右，远远高出商业银行12％－13％的回报率。但同时，这些投行也拆借了大量资金，“钱不够就借”，杠杆比率一再提高，从而积累了巨大的风险。雷曼兄弟宣布进入破产保护时，其负债高达6130亿美元，负债权益比是6130∶260，美林被收购前负债权益比率也超过20倍。
过高的杠杆比率，使得投行的经营风险不断上升，而投资银行在激进参与的同时，却没有对风险进行足够的控制。一方面，由于杠杆率较高，一旦投资出现问题会使其亏损程度远远超出资本金；另一方面，高杠杆使得这些投资银行对流动性要求较高，在市场较为宽松时，尚可通过货币市场融资来填补交易的资金缺口，而一旦自身财务状况恶化，评级公司降低其评级使融资成本上升，便可能造成投资银行无法通过融资维持流动性，贝尔斯登便是因此遭挤兑而倒下。同样，评级公司降低雷曼兄弟的评级，也是其彻底崩盘的重要因素。
1998年，长期资本管理公司（LTCM）一家对冲基金倒下，就掀起了金融市场的轩然大波，而现在这么多投资银行实际上在变相从事对冲基金的业务却缺乏相应的风险控制措施，潜在的风险可想而知。
第二，美国金融市场过度自由化的发展模式走到了极端，衍生品过度泛滥，监管长期缺位，直至出现系统性的崩溃。摩根斯坦利亚洲区前主席曾表示，在全球所有金融市场中，东京和纽约的金融市场可能是两个极端。东京市场是全世界最没有创新的证券市场，而纽约市场是全世界最有活力的市场。他说，两个市场迥然不同的原因可能非常小，那就是，在两个市场上对证券的定义有所不同。在东京市场，证券被定义成为“Stock or Bond”——也就是，股票或债券。如果一个金融产品不是股票或者债券，上市之前政府的审批可能长达两年。而纽约是另外一个极端，那就是“Anything Under the Sun”——太阳底下的任何东西，只要你能想到，“上午一包装，下午就能卖出去”。所以各种金融衍生品和证券化产品在美国非常多，金融机构不停地创造出各种各样眼花缭乱的复杂产品，通过柜台交易（OTC），不需要论证，也没有监管，只要有对手方买，能够成交就行，当然这些对手方大都也是金融机构。这种模式使得金融产品极大地丰富，但有时候容易走过头了，使得资产证券化产品等金融衍生品过度泛滥。“一旦系统性风险出现的时候，危机就来得很快。”
第三，从上个世纪九十年代开始，美国信用体系越来越“廉价”，不仅透支了未来，也埋下了一颗“定时炸弹”。这从申办信用卡可见一斑。九十年代初期，中国留学生到美国，大概半年后才能拿到第一张信用卡。但到九十年代末期，一个刚到美国的中国留学生一周之内就会收到几张信用卡，甚至在机场飞机刚落地就有信用卡公司主动给他办理。上个世纪九十年代以来，美国人透支未来的消费习惯愈演愈盛，而透支的利息高达17%左右，信用卡公司为了追逐这个高额利润，就疯狂地到处寻找下一个客户，甚至主动给毫无信用记录的人邮寄信用卡。同时，17%的利润，也使得信用卡公司能够承担较大比例的坏帐，所以大量信用卡公司也疏于控制信用卡使用环节中的各种风险，出现了问题就轻松地将其作为坏帐撇掉。但如果某一天这17%的高利润不能延续，风险就来了。
很大程度上，次贷的发生就和“廉价”的信用相关。格林斯潘时期，美联储不断降低利息，大量资金涌入房地产市场，推高房价。房地产市场的持续火爆，使得美国众多银行对于房地产市场的预期过于乐观，贷款条件不断放松，以至于没有任何信用记录或信用记录很差的居民也可以申请贷款。这些低质量的贷款随后通过美国发达的金融衍生品市场不断包装被销往全球，然而，复杂的金融衍生工具和漫长的销售链条，导致投资者看不到贷款质量的高低，与此同时，风险可以得到分散但却不可能消除，等到美国进入加息周期，房地产市场泡沫破裂，这些风险就会像埋藏的定时炸弹被引爆。
深刻反思华尔街危机的教训
“此次危机不会是华尔街最后一次金融危机。华尔街不断地发生这种危机，历史上已发生过很多次，这次只是又发生了一次而已。”祁斌认为，华尔街的发展历史中，大大小小的危机出现过上百次。从某种意义上来说，金融市场的发展历史就是一部不断发生危机、不断进行修正的过程，只是这次危机是最新的一次，并且在很多人看来，其涉及面之广和影响之大，是史无前例的。
首先，是要对美国投资银行运作模式的缺陷深入分析。近年来，投资银行纷纷开始由传统上以服务为主、靠赚取佣金的业务模式转向以资金交易为主的经营模式，大量涉足衍生品交易、对冲基金这些风险较高的领域，变相成为对冲基金，而在这一过程中风险控制又没有及时跟上，导致其纷纷陷入困境。
华尔街金融机构过度强调短期回报的激励机制也是危机产生的诱因之一，金融机构高管的薪酬和激励机制没有与机构的风险管理、长期业绩相挂钩，形成了较高的“道德风险”，促成管理层短期行为倾向较重，为迎合追求利润的需要，投资银行不断设计复杂的产品以至于其自身都难以对这些产品的风险加以判断，也就难以进行风险控制了。
此外，此次危机暴露出投资银行资本金不足的问题和运营模式的缺陷。未来，全能银行是否会成为投行业务的唯一“宿主”？独立的投行还会不会有存在的空间？如果有，如何修正现有的投行的经营模式，是否需要对投资银行的资本金设定更加严格的要求？是否应该考虑将高风险的投资业务剥离成为独立子公司？“高盛和大摩申请成为银行金融控股公司，并不意味着投资银行业务的结束，可能更多的是投行业务管理模式的转型，以及对过去一段时期激进风格的修正。商业银行和投资银行可以互相借鉴对方的管理模式”。但与此同时，并入或转为商业银行的投资银行如何切实做到有效监控风险？与商业银行的文化冲突如何协调？这些问题仍然需要我们深入研究。国金融市场曾出现过数次较大的危机，美联储多次采取注资、降息等方式，这在当时可能是不得已的选择，但是这也许是对未来的一种过度透支，暂时把问题掩盖下去，最后问题暴露的时候，变得不可收拾。当然，众所周知，这其中的平衡是很难把握的。
第三，如何对金融创新实施有效监管值得我们反思。此次危机表明，在证券化产品风险充分暴露前就进行大规模推广存在一定问题，也不符合审慎监管的原则。全球化和金融混业也加大了监管的难度。如何强化监管部门对创新产品的主观判断和裁量的权利，同时又能保证这种裁量的科学性及防范可能的道德风险？如何建立一个适应不断发展变化的金融市场的有效金融监管体系？这些都需要我们进一步思考。
第四，国际金融市场联系日趋紧密，如何防范或有效阻断金融风险的传递需要深入研究。此次危机表明，在国际金融市场日趋一体化的情况下，金融风险在各个不同的子市场及全球市场的传播更为迅速、更为广泛，如何对大规模的系统性金融风险有较为有效的预警措施？如何有效阻断金融风险的传递？如何建立起不同国家监管机构之间的协调机制？这些都值得我们进一步研究。
辩证看待华尔街危机
华尔街发生的危机，在我国也激起了广泛的讨论，这对于我们更加科学地推动资本市场的发展将起到非常积极的作用。但发达市场发生的风暴也给我们带来了很多疑惑，虚拟经济的利与弊、金融创新的风险与回报、资本市场发展模式的选择等，都成为讨论的焦点。
要进一步探讨美国次贷危机可以给我们提供什么经验和教训，还要求我们深刻认识华尔街和中国资本市场的不同———发展阶段的不同和发展模式的不同。祁斌表示，这场危机给我们提供了一次观察和反思金融市场发展模式和方向的机会。他认为，“需要仔细比较中美两国金融市场的异同点，才能准确解读次贷危机。不认真研究和汲取华尔街危机的教训是不负责任的，误读华尔街的危机也是十分危险的。”
在发展阶段上，美国市场经过了两百多年的发展，在一些领域中，如一些传统的投行业务，已经达到一定的饱和期，发展速度也明显放慢了。同时，我们还应该看到，尽管此次危机对其金融体系有很大的打击，但美国市场仍然是一个相对发达的市场。美国市场的金融产品高度复杂，甚至近年来高度泛滥。而我国的资本市场仍处于新兴加转轨的初级阶段，国民经济对于资本市场提供的服务还有巨大的需求，同时，我国经济的转型和自主创新经济体系的构建也需要资本市场提供有效的支持。从金融产品的角度来看，我们也处在发展的早期。两者的情况有很大的不同。因此，我们不能因为美国金融市场的危机而停止我们发展的步伐。我们应该在认真研究和汲取美国市场的教训的同时，坚定不移地推动资本市场的改革和发展，走稳健发展和可持续发展之路。不能因为美国市场犯了错误，我们也停下来，那将使我们错失良机。世界金融市场的竞争是非常激烈和残酷的，对此，我们一定要有非常清醒的认识。
从发展模式来看，美国金融市场的发展模式基本上是一个自下而上、自我演进的模式。其间有过一次重大调整是在1929年前后。两百多年前美国资本市场萌芽时，完全是放任自流的状态，政府不介入，在前100年里甚至对上市公司没有信息披露的法律要求，134年里都没有证券监管机构。到1929年股市崩溃，政府不介入不行了，才进行修正，成立了监管机构，制定了证券交易和监管的法律法规，试图寻找到政府与市场的平衡点。随后，这个过程也一直在不断地反复和摇摆中。近年的一个例子是，1998年，美国的长期资本公司造成美国市场崩溃后，很多人士都呼吁对对冲基金（hedge fund）实施监管，但是到现在美国监管机构还没有这样做。总体来说，美国反对政府干预的力量非常强。相信这次危机以后，要求加强对hedge fund监管的声音又会高起来。而我们则是自上而下的发展模式，从市场发展早期开始，一直是政府和市场力量来共同推动市场的发展。应该说，没有绝对的自由也没有绝对的管制，金融市场的健康发展需要寻找两者的平衡点。
此次危机爆发以后，美国将不可避免地从过度的自由化向中间点回归。而我国资本市场的发展，在相当长一段时间内，简化行政审批，加强监管，推动市场化改革一直是大方向和主旋律。过去三十年，中国经济社会发生了巨大的变革，按照西方经济学家的评论，“在人类历史上，还从未有过如此多的人，在如此短暂的时间里，生活水平获得了如此巨大的提高”，正是由于经济领域的市场化改革才使得中国经济成为了全世界最为亮丽的一道风景线。资本市场的发展规律也是如此，但是这一市场化改革的过程也必须是一个渐进的过程，需要我们把握节奏，不断找寻政府与市场力量的合理的平衡点，以更加有效地推动我国资本市场的发展。此次美国的危机提供了一个过犹不及、自由化泛滥、整个社会也为此支付了高昂成本的经典案例，对我们很有警示和帮助作用。
同时，此次危机也再次证明，虚拟经济的发展如果脱离了实体经济发展的实际需要就会产生灾难性的结果。资产证券化等金融创新的出现本意，是将这些贷款在证券化市场上进行分拆、打包、定价和交易，为广大投资者所持有，进而起到分散风险的作用，但是由于金融衍生工具过于复杂，销售链条过长，同时出于对高额利润的盲目追求和竞争的压力，所有参与这些过程的金融机构都忽视了必要的风险控制。加之越来越多的金融机构纯粹为了追求高利润而参加到复杂金融衍生品的创设、交易和投机中，使这些业务变成了纯粹的金钱游戏，使得很多复杂产品尤其是金融衍生品的市场交易与其分散金融市场风险的初衷差之千里，远远脱离了实体经济发展的需求，金融危机的最终降临成为必然。
但是，尽管虚拟经济的发展过程中不断有“剑走偏锋”的情况出现，我们不能由此否定虚拟经济对实体经济发展的重要推动作用。历史反复证明，资本市场在推动各国经济发展过程中起到举足轻重的作用，依然还是当今全球竞争的战略制高点。
“真正的华尔街是什么？华尔街实际上不光是指它‘物理’上的含义和它作为一个金融市场的代表，它其实还是指美国金融服务业的一批专业人才，这批人大概有30万，如果说每天傍晚，所有的这些人群都退去的时候，华尔街只是一座空城。”他表示，由于华尔街发生大规模的动荡，大量训练有素的金融专业人才失去工作，一部分华尔街的金融人才特别是我国留学生可能为我国金融机构所用，使我国资本市场在金融人才的国际竞争中获得有利地位。
在全球化时代的今天，国际竞争日趋白热化，我国资本市场要屹立于世界之林，最根本的还是要不断提升自身竞争力。为此，我们要继续强化基础性制度建设，加快我国资本市场改革和发展的步伐，推动资本市场的健康和可持续发展。
一家接一家大型金融机构轰然倒下，美国政府史无前例地动用万亿美元生死大救赎，各国央行空前一致出手救市，投资者的心随着股指剧烈波动而上下起伏。
美国投资银行经营模式的激进转变、美国金融市场过度自由的监管和发展模式以及过于“廉价”的信用，是导致华尔街金融危机的三座“冰山”。他认为，我们应该认真研讨华尔街危机给我们带来的启示，借鉴其教训，但也要充分考虑我国国情，要看到我国资本市场的发展模式和发展阶段与华尔街的不同。我国资本市场发展应该审慎推进金融创新，强化风险控制机制，走可持续发展的道路。
“海面下的三座冰山”
美国次贷危机的爆发只是“海面上的浮冰”，是华尔街金融危机的直接诱因。华尔街金融危机的根源，源自隐藏于水底的三座“冰山”，其最早的形成，在某种意义上可以追溯到上个世纪的九十年代。
第一，美国投资银行的经营模式在过去十年间发生了巨大变化，过度投机和过高的杠杆率使得投行走上了一条不归之路。传统上以赚取佣金收入为主、对资本金要求很低的投资银行，在高利润的诱惑和激烈竞争的压力下，大量从事次贷市场和复杂产品的投资，投行悄然变成了追逐高风险的对冲基金。例如，高盛公司在近年内，直接股权投资和其他投资所获占到其总收入的80％左右。出于竞争压力，其他投资银行也在做类似的转型。在对大量金融衍生品的交易中，投行赚取了大量利润，例如高盛和摩根斯坦利两家投行在过去十几年中每年的平均净资产回报率高达20％左右，远远高出商业银行12％－13％的回报率。但同时，这些投行也拆借了大量资金，“钱不够就借”，杠杆比率一再提高，从而积累了巨大的风险。雷曼兄弟宣布进入破产保护时，其负债高达6130亿美元，负债权益比是6130∶260，美林被收购前负债权益比率也超过20倍。
过高的杠杆比率，使得投行的经营风险不断上升，而投资银行在激进参与的同时，却没有对风险进行足够的控制。一方面，由于杠杆率较高，一旦投资出现问题会使其亏损程度远远超出资本金；另一方面，高杠杆使得这些投资银行对流动性要求较高，在市场较为宽松时，尚可通过货币市场融资来填补交易的资金缺口，而一旦自身财务状况恶化，评级公司降低其评级使融资成本上升，便可能造成投资银行无法通过融资维持流动性，贝尔斯登便是因此遭挤兑而倒下。同样，评级公司降低雷曼兄弟的评级，也是其彻底崩盘的重要因素。
1998年，长期资本管理公司（LTCM）一家对冲基金倒下，就掀起了金融市场的轩然大波，而现在这么多投资银行实际上在变相从事对冲基金的业务却缺乏相应的风险控制措施，潜在的风险可想而知。
第二，美国金融市场过度自由化的发展模式走到了极端，衍生品过度泛滥，监管长期缺位，直至出现系统性的崩溃。摩根斯坦利亚洲区前主席曾表示，在全球所有金融市场中，东京和纽约的金融市场可能是两个极端。东京市场是全世界最没有创新的证券市场，而纽约市场是全世界最有活力的市场。他说，两个市场迥然不同的原因可能非常小，那就是，在两个市场上对证券的定义有所不同。在东京市场，证券被定义成为“Stock or Bond”——也就是，股票或债券。如果一个金融产品不是股票或者债券，上市之前政府的审批可能长达两年。而纽约是另外一个极端，那就是“Anything Under the Sun”——太阳底下的任何东西，只要你能想到，“上午一包装，下午就能卖出去”。所以各种金融衍生品和证券化产品在美国非常多，金融机构不停地创造出各种各样眼花缭乱的复杂产品，通过柜台交易（OTC），不需要论证，也没有监管，只要有对手方买，能够成交就行，当然这些对手方大都也是金融机构。这种模式使得金融产品极大地丰富，但有时候容易走过头了，使得资产证券化产品等金融衍生品过度泛滥。“一旦系统性风险出现的时候，危机就来得很快。”
第三，从上个世纪九十年代开始，美国信用体系越来越“廉价”，不仅透支了未来，也埋下了一颗“定时炸弹”。这从申办信用卡可见一斑。九十年代初期，中国留学生到美国，大概半年后才能拿到第一张信用卡。但到九十年代末期，一个刚到美国的中国留学生一周之内就会收到几张信用卡，甚至在机场飞机刚落地就有信用卡公司主动给他办理。上个世纪九十年代以来，美国人透支未来的消费习惯愈演愈盛，而透支的利息高达17%左右，信用卡公司为了追逐这个高额利润，就疯狂地到处寻找下一个客户，甚至主动给毫无信用记录的人邮寄信用卡。同时，17%的利润，也使得信用卡公司能够承担较大比例的坏帐，所以大量信用卡公司也疏于控制信用卡使用环节中的各种风险，出现了问题就轻松地将其作为坏帐撇掉。但如果某一天这17%的高利润不能延续，风险就来了。
很大程度上，次贷的发生就和“廉价”的信用相关。格林斯潘时期，美联储不断降低利息，大量资金涌入房地产市场，推高房价。房地产市场的持续火爆，使得美国众多银行对于房地产市场的预期过于乐观，贷款条件不断放松，以至于没有任何信用记录或信用记录很差的居民也可以申请贷款。这些低质量的贷款随后通过美国发达的金融衍生品市场不断包装被销往全球，然而，复杂的金融衍生工具和漫长的销售链条，导致投资者看不到贷款质量的高低，与此同时，风险可以得到分散但却不可能消除，等到美国进入加息周期，房地产市场泡沫破裂，这些风险就会像埋藏的定时炸弹被引爆。
深刻反思华尔街危机的教训
“此次危机不会是华尔街最后一次金融危机。华尔街不断地发生这种危机，历史上已发生过很多次，这次只是又发生了一次而已。”祁斌认为，华尔街的发展历史中，大大小小的危机出现过上百次。从某种意义上来说，金融市场的发展历史就是一部不断发生危机、不断进行修正的过程，只是这次危机是最新的一次，并且在很多人看来，其涉及面之广和影响之大，是史无前例的。
首先，是要对美国投资银行运作模式的缺陷深入分析。近年来，投资银行纷纷开始由传统上以服务为主、靠赚取佣金的业务模式转向以资金交易为主的经营模式，大量涉足衍生品交易、对冲基金这些风险较高的领域，变相成为对冲基金，而在这一过程中风险控制又没有及时跟上，导致其纷纷陷入困境。
华尔街金融机构过度强调短期回报的激励机制也是危机产生的诱因之一，金融机构高管的薪酬和激励机制没有与机构的风险管理、长期业绩相挂钩，形成了较高的“道德风险”，促成管理层短期行为倾向较重，为迎合追求利润的需要，投资银行不断设计复杂的产品以至于其自身都难以对这些产品的风险加以判断，也就难以进行风险控制了。
此外，此次危机暴露出投资银行资本金不足的问题和运营模式的缺陷。未来，全能银行是否会成为投行业务的唯一“宿主”？独立的投行还会不会有存在的空间？如果有，如何修正现有的投行的经营模式，是否需要对投资银行的资本金设定更加严格的要求？是否应该考虑将高风险的投资业务剥离成为独立子公司？“高盛和大摩申请成为银行金融控股公司，并不意味着投资银行业务的结束，可能更多的是投行业务管理模式的转型，以及对过去一段时期激进风格的修正。商业银行和投资银行可以互相借鉴对方的管理模式”。但与此同时，并入或转为商业银行的投资银行如何切实做到有效监控风险？与商业银行的文化冲突如何协调？这些问题仍然需要我们深入研究。国金融市场曾出现过数次较大的危机，美联储多次采取注资、降息等方式，这在当时可能是不得已的选择，但是这也许是对未来的一种过度透支，暂时把问题掩盖下去，最后问题暴露的时候，变得不可收拾。当然，众所周知，这其中的平衡是很难把握的。
第三，如何对金融创新实施有效监管值得我们反思。此次危机表明，在证券化产品风险充分暴露前就进行大规模推广存在一定问题，也不符合审慎监管的原则。全球化和金融混业也加大了监管的难度。如何强化监管部门对创新产品的主观判断和裁量的权利，同时又能保证这种裁量的科学性及防范可能的道德风险？如何建立一个适应不断发展变化的金融市场的有效金融监管体系？这些都需要我们进一步思考。
第四，国际金融市场联系日趋紧密，如何防范或有效阻断金融风险的传递需要深入研究。此次危机表明，在国际金融市场日趋一体化的情况下，金融风险在各个不同的子市场及全球市场的传播更为迅速、更为广泛，如何对大规模的系统性金融风险有较为有效的预警措施？如何有效阻断金融风险的传递？如何建立起不同国家监管机构之间的协调机制？这些都值得我们进一步研究。
辩证看待华尔街危机
华尔街发生的危机，在我国也激起了广泛的讨论，这对于我们更加科学地推动资本市场的发展将起到非常积极的作用。但发达市场发生的风暴也给我们带来了很多疑惑，虚拟经济的利与弊、金融创新的风险与回报、资本市场发展模式的选择等，都成为讨论的焦点。
要进一步探讨美国次贷危机可以给我们提供什么经验和教训，还要求我们深刻认识华尔街和中国资本市场的不同———发展阶段的不同和发展模式的不同。祁斌表示，这场危机给我们提供了一次观察和反思金融市场发展模式和方向的机会。他认为，“需要仔细比较中美两国金融市场的异同点，才能准确解读次贷危机。不认真研究和汲取华尔街危机的教训是不负责任的，误读华尔街的危机也是十分危险的。”
在发展阶段上，美国市场经过了两百多年的发展，在一些领域中，如一些传统的投行业务，已经达到一定的饱和期，发展速度也明显放慢了。同时，我们还应该看到，尽管此次危机对其金融体系有很大的打击，但美国市场仍然是一个相对发达的市场。美国市场的金融产品高度复杂，甚至近年来高度泛滥。而我国的资本市场仍处于新兴加转轨的初级阶段，国民经济对于资本市场提供的服务还有巨大的需求，同时，我国经济的转型和自主创新经济体系的构建也需要资本市场提供有效的支持。从金融产品的角度来看，我们也处在发展的早期。两者的情况有很大的不同。因此，我们不能因为美国金融市场的危机而停止我们发展的步伐。我们应该在认真研究和汲取美国市场的教训的同时，坚定不移地推动资本市场的改革和发展，走稳健发展和可持续发展之路。不能因为美国市场犯了错误，我们也停下来，那将使我们错失良机。世界金融市场的竞争是非常激烈和残酷的，对此，我们一定要有非常清醒的认识。
从发展模式来看，美国金融市场的发展模式基本上是一个自下而上、自我演进的模式。其间有过一次重大调整是在1929年前后。两百多年前美国资本市场萌芽时，完全是放任自流的状态，政府不介入，在前100年里甚至对上市公司没有信息披露的法律要求，134年里都没有证券监管机构。到1929年股市崩溃，政府不介入不行了，才进行修正，成立了监管机构，制定了证券交易和监管的法律法规，试图寻找到政府与市场的平衡点。随后，这个过程也一直在不断地反复和摇摆中。近年的一个例子是，1998年，美国的长期资本公司造成美国市场崩溃后，很多人士都呼吁对对冲基金（hedge fund）实施监管，但是到现在美国监管机构还没有这样做。总体来说，美国反对政府干预的力量非常强。相信这次危机以后，要求加强对hedge fund监管的声音又会高起来。而我们则是自上而下的发展模式，从市场发展早期开始，一直是政府和市场力量来共同推动市场的发展。应该说，没有绝对的自由也没有绝对的管制，金融市场的健康发展需要寻找两者的平衡点。
此次危机爆发以后，美国将不可避免地从过度的自由化向中间点回归。而我国资本市场的发展，在相当长一段时间内，简化行政审批，加强监管，推动市场化改革一直是大方向和主旋律。过去三十年，中国经济社会发生了巨大的变革，按照西方经济学家的评论，“在人类历史上，还从未有过如此多的人，在如此短暂的时间里，生活水平获得了如此巨大的提高”，正是由于经济领域的市场化改革才使得中国经济成为了全世界最为亮丽的一道风景线。资本市场的发展规律也是如此，但是这一市场化改革的过程也必须是一个渐进的过程，需要我们把握节奏，不断找寻政府与市场力量的合理的平衡点，以更加有效地推动我国资本市场的发展。此次美国的危机提供了一个过犹不及、自由化泛滥、整个社会也为此支付了高昂成本的经典案例，对我们很有警示和帮助作用。
同时，此次危机也再次证明，虚拟经济的发展如果脱离了实体经济发展的实际需要就会产生灾难性的结果。资产证券化等金融创新的出现本意，是将这些贷款在证券化市场上进行分拆、打包、定价和交易，为广大投资者所持有，进而起到分散风险的作用，但是由于金融衍生工具过于复杂，销售链条过长，同时出于对高额利润的盲目追求和竞争的压力，所有参与这些过程的金融机构都忽视了必要的风险控制。加之越来越多的金融机构纯粹为了追求高利润而参加到复杂金融衍生品的创设、交易和投机中，使这些业务变成了纯粹的金钱游戏，使得很多复杂产品尤其是金融衍生品的市场交易与其分散金融市场风险的初衷差之千里，远远脱离了实体经济发展的需求，金融危机的最终降临成为必然。
但是，尽管虚拟经济的发展过程中不断有“剑走偏锋”的情况出现，我们不能由此否定虚拟经济对实体经济发展的重要推动作用。历史反复证明，资本市场在推动各国经济发展过程中起到举足轻重的作用，依然还是当今全球竞争的战略制高点。
“真正的华尔街是什么？华尔街实际上不光是指它‘物理’上的含义和它作为一个金融市场的代表，它其实还是指美国金融服务业的一批专业人才，这批人大概有30万，如果说每天傍晚，所有的这些人群都退去的时候，华尔街只是一座空城。”他表示，由于华尔街发生大规模的动荡，大量训练有素的金融专业人才失去工作，一部分华尔街的金融人才特别是我国留学生可能为我国金融机构所用，使我国资本市场在金融人才的国际竞争中获得有利地位。
在全球化时代的今天，国际竞争日趋白热化，我国资本市场要屹立于世界之林，最根本的还是要不断提升自身竞争力。为此，我们要继续强化基础性制度建设，加快我国资本市场改革和发展的步伐，推动资本市场的健康和可持续发展。
Kenneth L Fisher
Profile
Ken Fisher is the younger of Philip Fisher's two sons. After graduating from college in 1972, he worked for his father's investment firm for a year. He continued to accompany him on research visits until 1982, learning at first hand the art of interviewing management and employees.
But meanwhile, he set up and ran his own firm, based on a value investing philosophy very different to his father's. Fisher Jr preference was for "a stock that was dirt cheap because it was better than its bad image". Thus he has always bought in a similar contrarian spirit to that of his father. But he tends to sell once the reputation and the share price of his purchases have returned to normal levels.
He has also gained from his father a knowledge and understanding of the American technology sector, where he has scored many of his greatest successes. But he has been equally happy to own US and European stocks in traditional businesses like tobacco. He has set up an office in London to facilitate further investment in Europe.
Ken Fisher pioneered the Price to Sales Ratio, as documented in his 1984 book 'Super Stocks', and the small cap value category equity management and is a top-ranked market forecaster according to CXO Advisory Group.He has been published or written about in most US, British, and German financial newspapers and magazines, and his academic research has been showcased in many financial journals, including The Financial Analysts Journal and The Journal of Portfolio Management.
Long-term returns
Not known.
Biggest success
In early 1981, Ken Fisher bought around 1.5% of the shares of Verbatim Corporation, a producer of computer diskettes. The company had suffered widely-publicised problems with its products. The view on Wall Street was that it was poorly managed and financed, and likely to lose out to its rivals. But within 2 years, its shares had recovered from $3.50 to over $55 - a rise of 1,500% - at which point Fisher sold.
As chronicled in his monthly Forbes column, Fisher called the top of the tech bubble on March 6, 2000, and predicted the last 3 bear markets (’87, ’90, ‘01/’02).
Method and guidelines
First draw up a shortlist of Super Companies:
"A Super Company is a business which distinguishes itself because it can generate internally funded growth at well above average rates."
The main distinguishing features of a Super Company are:
Growth orientation - a management obsession with growth, which is also communicated to and shared with staff.
Marketing excellence - an ability to identify and satisfy customer needs.
An unfair advantage - such as being the lowest-cost producer in a sector
Creative personnel relations - especially listening to the ideas of staff
The best in financial controls - with leading-edge processes and systems.
Source: Super Stocks, K Fisher, 1984
Most companies go through product cycles, as sales of Product A start to sag before those from newly-introduced Product B have had time to grow. This often causes a 'glitch', i.e. sales fall, profits turn to losses and the share price plummets. This is the time to start considering buying the shares.
A product cycle
Lossmaking companies are hard to value. Solve this problem by using Price:Sales Ratios (PSRs):
PSR =Market capitalization ÷ Total sales
(e.g. £100m cap ÷ £200m sales = 0.5)
If you can identify a Super Company
going through a glitch
with a low PSR
with new products on the way, and hence a pickup in sales
- you may be looking at a Super Stock, and an opportunity to make 3-10 times your money in 3-5 years.
Follow these rules for buying and selling:
Rule 1: Try to avoid stocks with PSRs greater than 1.5. Don't consider buying any stock with a PSR greater than 3
Rule 2: Maybe look to seek Super Companies with PSRs of 0.75 or less
Rule 3: Consider selling stock in any Super Company when the PSR rises to between 3.0 and 6.0
Also sell when a company ceases to have the characteristics of a Super Company.
An additional check on Super Stocks is their Price:Research Ratio (PRR):
PRR = Market capitalization ÷ Research and development expenditure
(e.g. £100m cap ÷ £20m R&D = 5)
R&D is not necessarily a highly sophisticated activity. It can be quite basic product development work. The idea is to buy research that is likely to produce good profits in future while it is still cheap. To do this:
Rule 1: Don't ever buy a Super Company selling at a PRR greater than 15.
Rule 2: Find Super Companies with a PRR of 5 to 10.
Research suggests
Low PSRs work best with smaller companies. Very large companies naturally tend to have PSRs of 1.0 or less.
PSRs also work well with Super Companies in businesses unrelated to high technology.
Key sayings
"It is the glitch that makes Super Stocks out of Super Companies. If you learn how to price these correctly, you can reap the profits of a Super Stock - and get rich with the glitch."
"'Fortunes from failures' is a recurrent theme in financial history."
"The largest profits regularly result from buying stocks at low PSRs."
"As a company increases in size, it can look forward to the eventuality of its PSR being no higher than the highest PSRs for other companies of its future size."
Further information
Fisher Jr's first and most important book is Super Stocks, which describes his successes with bombed-out tech stocks in the early Eighties. His other books are Wall Street Waltz, 100 Minds That Made the Market and the NY Times Bestseller 'The Only Three Questions that Count'. You can keep up with his current thinking by reading his excellent column in Forbes magazine (he is the 4th longest running columnist in Forbes' 90-year history), or visit Fisher Investments website www.fi.com.
Fisher Investments have entered a partnership with publisher John Wiley & Sons to do the first ever publishing imprint by a money manager - Fisher Investments Press. The first title is due out late 2008, 'Ten Roads to Riches', by Ken Fisher.
Ken Fisher is the younger of Philip Fisher's two sons. After graduating from college in 1972, he worked for his father's investment firm for a year. He continued to accompany him on research visits until 1982, learning at first hand the art of interviewing management and employees.
But meanwhile, he set up and ran his own firm, based on a value investing philosophy very different to his father's. Fisher Jr preference was for "a stock that was dirt cheap because it was better than its bad image". Thus he has always bought in a similar contrarian spirit to that of his father. But he tends to sell once the reputation and the share price of his purchases have returned to normal levels.
He has also gained from his father a knowledge and understanding of the American technology sector, where he has scored many of his greatest successes. But he has been equally happy to own US and European stocks in traditional businesses like tobacco. He has set up an office in London to facilitate further investment in Europe.
Ken Fisher pioneered the Price to Sales Ratio, as documented in his 1984 book 'Super Stocks', and the small cap value category equity management and is a top-ranked market forecaster according to CXO Advisory Group.He has been published or written about in most US, British, and German financial newspapers and magazines, and his academic research has been showcased in many financial journals, including The Financial Analysts Journal and The Journal of Portfolio Management.
Long-term returns
Not known.
Biggest success
In early 1981, Ken Fisher bought around 1.5% of the shares of Verbatim Corporation, a producer of computer diskettes. The company had suffered widely-publicised problems with its products. The view on Wall Street was that it was poorly managed and financed, and likely to lose out to its rivals. But within 2 years, its shares had recovered from $3.50 to over $55 - a rise of 1,500% - at which point Fisher sold.
As chronicled in his monthly Forbes column, Fisher called the top of the tech bubble on March 6, 2000, and predicted the last 3 bear markets (’87, ’90, ‘01/’02).
Method and guidelines
First draw up a shortlist of Super Companies:
"A Super Company is a business which distinguishes itself because it can generate internally funded growth at well above average rates."
The main distinguishing features of a Super Company are:
Growth orientation - a management obsession with growth, which is also communicated to and shared with staff.
Marketing excellence - an ability to identify and satisfy customer needs.
An unfair advantage - such as being the lowest-cost producer in a sector
Creative personnel relations - especially listening to the ideas of staff
The best in financial controls - with leading-edge processes and systems.
Source: Super Stocks, K Fisher, 1984
Most companies go through product cycles, as sales of Product A start to sag before those from newly-introduced Product B have had time to grow. This often causes a 'glitch', i.e. sales fall, profits turn to losses and the share price plummets. This is the time to start considering buying the shares.
A product cycle
Lossmaking companies are hard to value. Solve this problem by using Price:Sales Ratios (PSRs):
PSR =Market capitalization ÷ Total sales
(e.g. £100m cap ÷ £200m sales = 0.5)
If you can identify a Super Company
going through a glitch
with a low PSR
with new products on the way, and hence a pickup in sales
- you may be looking at a Super Stock, and an opportunity to make 3-10 times your money in 3-5 years.
Follow these rules for buying and selling:
Rule 1: Try to avoid stocks with PSRs greater than 1.5. Don't consider buying any stock with a PSR greater than 3
Rule 2: Maybe look to seek Super Companies with PSRs of 0.75 or less
Rule 3: Consider selling stock in any Super Company when the PSR rises to between 3.0 and 6.0
Also sell when a company ceases to have the characteristics of a Super Company.
An additional check on Super Stocks is their Price:Research Ratio (PRR):
PRR = Market capitalization ÷ Research and development expenditure
(e.g. £100m cap ÷ £20m R&D = 5)
R&D is not necessarily a highly sophisticated activity. It can be quite basic product development work. The idea is to buy research that is likely to produce good profits in future while it is still cheap. To do this:
Rule 1: Don't ever buy a Super Company selling at a PRR greater than 15.
Rule 2: Find Super Companies with a PRR of 5 to 10.
Research suggests
Low PSRs work best with smaller companies. Very large companies naturally tend to have PSRs of 1.0 or less.
PSRs also work well with Super Companies in businesses unrelated to high technology.
Key sayings
"It is the glitch that makes Super Stocks out of Super Companies. If you learn how to price these correctly, you can reap the profits of a Super Stock - and get rich with the glitch."
"'Fortunes from failures' is a recurrent theme in financial history."
"The largest profits regularly result from buying stocks at low PSRs."
"As a company increases in size, it can look forward to the eventuality of its PSR being no higher than the highest PSRs for other companies of its future size."
Further information
Fisher Jr's first and most important book is Super Stocks, which describes his successes with bombed-out tech stocks in the early Eighties. His other books are Wall Street Waltz, 100 Minds That Made the Market and the NY Times Bestseller 'The Only Three Questions that Count'. You can keep up with his current thinking by reading his excellent column in Forbes magazine (he is the 4th longest running columnist in Forbes' 90-year history), or visit Fisher Investments website www.fi.com.
Fisher Investments have entered a partnership with publisher John Wiley & Sons to do the first ever publishing imprint by a money manager - Fisher Investments Press. The first title is due out late 2008, 'Ten Roads to Riches', by Ken Fisher.
巴菲特方程式
我们都懂逆向操作的道理，但没人说得比巴菲特更传神，他说：我喜欢在悲观的股市环境中操作，原因不在我喜欢那种情绪，而是我喜欢那种情绪所产生的价格！
永远只在市场价格远低於企业价值时进场！
华伦·巴菲特是30年来最出色的股市投资人之一，他採取的价值型投资策略，是根据企业的根本价值来选择投资标的，不受股价波动、整体经济气氛或者其他任何外部因素影响。他使用的投资方法，主要遵循下列四项原则：
一、绝不追赶股市每天的波动
市场存在的理由，只是为了方便买卖，不是为了订定价值。在市场上只要留意有没有人愿意以绝不容错过的价格出售股票。
二、不必尝试分析或烦恼整体的经济状况
如果你没办法预测股市每天的动向，怎样才能十拿九稳地预测经济的前景？
三、买企业，不是买公司的股票
买进股票的时候，要想成是买整家企业，必须遵守下列的原则：
' 企业原则
1.你以投资人的角度来看，这家企业是不是很简单、容易理解？
2. 这家企业过去的营运状况是不是始终如一？
3. 这家企业的长期展望是不是良好？
' 管理原则
1. 管理阶层的行事作为是否合乎理性？
2. 管理阶层对待股东是否诚信？
3. 管理团队能否力抗随波逐流？
' 财务原则
1. 重点是股东权益报酬率，不是每股盈餘。
2. 计算「业主盈余」。
3. 寻找获利率高的公司。
4. 公司每保留一块钱的盈餘，是不是能够至少多创造一块钱的市场价值？
' 市场原则
1. 这家企业的价值是多少？
2. 目前能不能以远低于企业价值的折价买进这家企业？
四、管理一套企业投资组合
买一家公司的股票时，必须了解公司的营运基本面而不只是拥有一张纸。
循巴菲特足迹，找创投业新高峰
对于投资标的，创投同业可能认为现在景气不佳，不应该只是投入资金，还要亲自介入企业管理团队。我的作法，偏向巴菲特的作法，不介入投资标的的管理问题，也无意改变原先的领导团队。其次，我也向我们产业分析师教育，要从看懂财务报表开始，接着一定要亲自拜访企业，唯有亲眼所见、亲耳所闻，才有机会找出真正优秀的标的。实践的方法上，以下进一步详述：
1. 看出财务报表的病灶：通常股权集中的公司，投资风险比较低，代理成本也低，但也有大股东独断的弊病；股权分散的公司，我会特别注意中型持股者彼此的关係。总之，我是抱持「买企业」、不是「买股票」的心态，最后的赢家必定会浮现的。巴菲特的4大原则：企业原则、管理原则、财务原则、市场原则，可以在这方面得到实证。
2. 多次亲自拜访企业：一般非科技类的企业，多数隐藏在世界各地的某个角落，已经掌握产业未来趋势的产业分析师，必须前进各地，挖掘潜在的标的企业，其中又以传统产业为最。举例来说，目前股价耀眼的帝宝在我第一次到鹿港和美拜访工厂时，今天的许董事长就住在工厂上面的阁楼，每天与生产线为伍，对车灯的模组了如指掌。有趣的是，虽然该公司在当时资金窘困，这位第一代创业家不肯轻易让外界资金注入。我们团队必须一而再、再而三地前往拜访，同时也观察该公司的核心优势，双方经过一段时间的磨合之后，才正式採取投资的行动。
「对我来说，股市根本不存在。股市存在的目的只是供我们参考，看看是不是有人愿意做出傻事。」——华伦·巴菲特
股票市场存在的目的，基本上只是为了便利股票的买卖。投资人如果想藉市场去预测未来的价格，一定会惹祸上身。一定要问这个问题：你有没有做好功课？如果你对一家公司的了解多于市场，那么何必在意市场说了些什么？其次，如果你相信一家公司的财务前景美好而买进该公司的股票，并且打算抱牢许多年，那么市场上日复一日发生的事情根本无关紧要。投资人买进任何股票之后，不须靠市场来确认他们买得没错。定期观察市场的唯一目的，是检查有没有人笨到以很便宜的价格出售好公司的股票。
永远只在市场价格远低於企业价值时进场！
华伦·巴菲特是30年来最出色的股市投资人之一，他採取的价值型投资策略，是根据企业的根本价值来选择投资标的，不受股价波动、整体经济气氛或者其他任何外部因素影响。他使用的投资方法，主要遵循下列四项原则：
一、绝不追赶股市每天的波动
市场存在的理由，只是为了方便买卖，不是为了订定价值。在市场上只要留意有没有人愿意以绝不容错过的价格出售股票。
二、不必尝试分析或烦恼整体的经济状况
如果你没办法预测股市每天的动向，怎样才能十拿九稳地预测经济的前景？
三、买企业，不是买公司的股票
买进股票的时候，要想成是买整家企业，必须遵守下列的原则：
' 企业原则
1.你以投资人的角度来看，这家企业是不是很简单、容易理解？
2. 这家企业过去的营运状况是不是始终如一？
3. 这家企业的长期展望是不是良好？
' 管理原则
1. 管理阶层的行事作为是否合乎理性？
2. 管理阶层对待股东是否诚信？
3. 管理团队能否力抗随波逐流？
' 财务原则
1. 重点是股东权益报酬率，不是每股盈餘。
2. 计算「业主盈余」。
3. 寻找获利率高的公司。
4. 公司每保留一块钱的盈餘，是不是能够至少多创造一块钱的市场价值？
' 市场原则
1. 这家企业的价值是多少？
2. 目前能不能以远低于企业价值的折价买进这家企业？
四、管理一套企业投资组合
买一家公司的股票时，必须了解公司的营运基本面而不只是拥有一张纸。
循巴菲特足迹，找创投业新高峰
对于投资标的，创投同业可能认为现在景气不佳，不应该只是投入资金，还要亲自介入企业管理团队。我的作法，偏向巴菲特的作法，不介入投资标的的管理问题，也无意改变原先的领导团队。其次，我也向我们产业分析师教育，要从看懂财务报表开始，接着一定要亲自拜访企业，唯有亲眼所见、亲耳所闻，才有机会找出真正优秀的标的。实践的方法上，以下进一步详述：
1. 看出财务报表的病灶：通常股权集中的公司，投资风险比较低，代理成本也低，但也有大股东独断的弊病；股权分散的公司，我会特别注意中型持股者彼此的关係。总之，我是抱持「买企业」、不是「买股票」的心态，最后的赢家必定会浮现的。巴菲特的4大原则：企业原则、管理原则、财务原则、市场原则，可以在这方面得到实证。
2. 多次亲自拜访企业：一般非科技类的企业，多数隐藏在世界各地的某个角落，已经掌握产业未来趋势的产业分析师，必须前进各地，挖掘潜在的标的企业，其中又以传统产业为最。举例来说，目前股价耀眼的帝宝在我第一次到鹿港和美拜访工厂时，今天的许董事长就住在工厂上面的阁楼，每天与生产线为伍，对车灯的模组了如指掌。有趣的是，虽然该公司在当时资金窘困，这位第一代创业家不肯轻易让外界资金注入。我们团队必须一而再、再而三地前往拜访，同时也观察该公司的核心优势，双方经过一段时间的磨合之后，才正式採取投资的行动。
「对我来说，股市根本不存在。股市存在的目的只是供我们参考，看看是不是有人愿意做出傻事。」——华伦·巴菲特
股票市场存在的目的，基本上只是为了便利股票的买卖。投资人如果想藉市场去预测未来的价格，一定会惹祸上身。一定要问这个问题：你有没有做好功课？如果你对一家公司的了解多于市场，那么何必在意市场说了些什么？其次，如果你相信一家公司的财务前景美好而买进该公司的股票，并且打算抱牢许多年，那么市场上日复一日发生的事情根本无关紧要。投资人买进任何股票之后，不须靠市场来确认他们买得没错。定期观察市场的唯一目的，是检查有没有人笨到以很便宜的价格出售好公司的股票。
John Neff
Investment style
Hard-core value investment, based on buying good companies with moderate growth and high dividends while out of favour, and selling once they rise to fair value.
Profile
Neff is known as 'the professional's professional', because many fund managers entrusted their money to him in the belief that it would be in safe hands. That view was justified by his remarkably consistent performance. For more than 30 years, the Windsor Fund routinely featured in the top 5 percent of all US mutual funds.
Neff studied industrial marketing at college, but attended night classes to get a degree in banking and finance. In 1954, he became a securities analyst with the National City Bank of Cleveland. Both there and at his next firm, Wellington Management, he pursued a value style of investment modelled on the writings of Ben Graham. He went on to apply this to three equity-and-income funds - Windsor, Gemini and Qualified Dividend - with spectacular results until his retirement in 1995.
An unassuming man, who always encouraged his colleagues to collaborate in his decisions, Neff never sought to publicize himself during his career in the same way as many star fund managers. But with the recent publication of his memoirs, John Neff on Investing, he is at last achieving the wider recognition he deserves.
Long-term returns
The average annual total return from the Windsor Fund during Neff's 32-year tenure was 13.7%, against a return from the S&P500 index of 10.6%.
Biggest success
Neff invested a huge proportion of his fund in Ford in 1984, when everyone feared it might go bust and the P/E ratio had sunk to 2.5! He paid an average price of under $14. Within 3 years, the price had climbed to $50, making Windsor profits of $500m.
Method and guidelines
Neff describes himself as 'a low price-earnings investor'. He hunts for stocks that are cheaply priced in relation to the total return indicated by the sum of their earnings growth plus their dividend yield. He calls this the 'terminal relationship' or, more colloquially, 'what you pay for what you get'. You might also think of it as the GYP (Growth & Yield:P/E) ratio:
(Earnings Growth + Dividend Yield) ÷ P/E ratio
Neff recommends comparing the GYP ratio on your stocks and on your whole portfolio with that on the market.
Example
Average forecast portfolio EPS growth (%)
plus average forecast portfolio dividend yield
divided by average forecast portfolio P/E
= (7 + 5) ÷ 10
= a GYP of 1.2
Average forecast market EPS growth (%)
plus average forecast market dividend yield
divided by average forecast market P/E
= (15 + 2) ÷ 28
= a GYP of 0.6
On the above figures, your portfolio would be twice as attractive as the market. (This is only an example. The actual relationship would usually be much closer.)
Consider avoiding, putting into your portfolio stocks that significantly reduce its overall attractiveness. Instead, set a target buying price that represents the GYP you are after and wait for the price to fall to that level.
If two companies offer a prospective 14% return, but Company A's consists of 14% earnings growth and no dividend, whereas Company B's consists of 7% growth plus a 7% dividend, it is better to choose Company B, because the dividend makes the outcome more certain.
Following this principle, Neff has always stuck to a simple investment style based on the following 7 selection criteria:
Low P/E ratio.
Fundamental earnings growth above 7%.
A solid, and ideally rising, dividend.
A much-better-than-average total return in relation to the P/E ratio.
No exposure to cyclical downturns without a compensatory low P/E.
Solid companies in growing fields.
A strong fundamental case for investment.
Source: John Neff on Investing, J Neff, 1999
A good place to look for ideas is the New Lows column in the back pages of the FT. Many, if not most, of the companies mentioned are generally bad investments. But shares in surprisingly good companies sometimes slide to new lows on bad news. Test these to see if they meet the 7 selection criteria. (Neff calls this the 'Hmmmph' test: "Some names I would not have expected to see on this list elicit an audible 'Hmmmph'.")
Don't chase highly recognized growth stocks. Their P/E ratios are invariably pushed up to ridiculously expensive levels. This greatly increases the risk of a sudden collapse in the share price.
Stick to a firm selling strategy, or you risk losing your profits. There are two basic reasons to sell:
Fundamentals deteriorate
The price approaches or matches your expectations.
The main fundamentals to keep an eye on are earnings estimates and 5-year growth rates. If these start to slip, sell at once.
Pay more attention to the GYP ratio of your portfolio than to the market. But if the market becomes very expensive and it is hard to find worthwhile purchases, it is permissible to hold up to 20% of your funds in cash until new opportunities emerge.
The best profits are usually made after market panics.
Key sayings
"Absent stunning growth rates, low P/E stocks can capture the wonders of P/E expansion with less risk than skittish growth stocks."
"As a low P/E investor, you have to distinguish misunderstood and overlooked stocks selling at bargain prices from many more stocks with lacklustre prospects."
"A dividend increase is one kind of 'free plus'. A free plus is the return investors enjoy over and above initial expectations. One of Ben Franklin's wise observations offers a parallel: 'He who waits upon Fortune is never sure of a dinner.' As I see it, a superior yield at least lets you snack on hors d'oeuvres while waiting for the main meal."
"An awful lot of people keep a stock too long because it gives them warm fuzzies - particularly when a contrarian stance has been vindicated. If they sell it, they lose bragging rights."
Hard-core value investment, based on buying good companies with moderate growth and high dividends while out of favour, and selling once they rise to fair value.
Profile
Neff is known as 'the professional's professional', because many fund managers entrusted their money to him in the belief that it would be in safe hands. That view was justified by his remarkably consistent performance. For more than 30 years, the Windsor Fund routinely featured in the top 5 percent of all US mutual funds.
Neff studied industrial marketing at college, but attended night classes to get a degree in banking and finance. In 1954, he became a securities analyst with the National City Bank of Cleveland. Both there and at his next firm, Wellington Management, he pursued a value style of investment modelled on the writings of Ben Graham. He went on to apply this to three equity-and-income funds - Windsor, Gemini and Qualified Dividend - with spectacular results until his retirement in 1995.
An unassuming man, who always encouraged his colleagues to collaborate in his decisions, Neff never sought to publicize himself during his career in the same way as many star fund managers. But with the recent publication of his memoirs, John Neff on Investing, he is at last achieving the wider recognition he deserves.
Long-term returns
The average annual total return from the Windsor Fund during Neff's 32-year tenure was 13.7%, against a return from the S&P500 index of 10.6%.
Biggest success
Neff invested a huge proportion of his fund in Ford in 1984, when everyone feared it might go bust and the P/E ratio had sunk to 2.5! He paid an average price of under $14. Within 3 years, the price had climbed to $50, making Windsor profits of $500m.
Method and guidelines
Neff describes himself as 'a low price-earnings investor'. He hunts for stocks that are cheaply priced in relation to the total return indicated by the sum of their earnings growth plus their dividend yield. He calls this the 'terminal relationship' or, more colloquially, 'what you pay for what you get'. You might also think of it as the GYP (Growth & Yield:P/E) ratio:
(Earnings Growth + Dividend Yield) ÷ P/E ratio
Neff recommends comparing the GYP ratio on your stocks and on your whole portfolio with that on the market.
Example
Average forecast portfolio EPS growth (%)
plus average forecast portfolio dividend yield
divided by average forecast portfolio P/E
= (7 + 5) ÷ 10
= a GYP of 1.2
Average forecast market EPS growth (%)
plus average forecast market dividend yield
divided by average forecast market P/E
= (15 + 2) ÷ 28
= a GYP of 0.6
On the above figures, your portfolio would be twice as attractive as the market. (This is only an example. The actual relationship would usually be much closer.)
Consider avoiding, putting into your portfolio stocks that significantly reduce its overall attractiveness. Instead, set a target buying price that represents the GYP you are after and wait for the price to fall to that level.
If two companies offer a prospective 14% return, but Company A's consists of 14% earnings growth and no dividend, whereas Company B's consists of 7% growth plus a 7% dividend, it is better to choose Company B, because the dividend makes the outcome more certain.
Following this principle, Neff has always stuck to a simple investment style based on the following 7 selection criteria:
Low P/E ratio.
Fundamental earnings growth above 7%.
A solid, and ideally rising, dividend.
A much-better-than-average total return in relation to the P/E ratio.
No exposure to cyclical downturns without a compensatory low P/E.
Solid companies in growing fields.
A strong fundamental case for investment.
Source: John Neff on Investing, J Neff, 1999
A good place to look for ideas is the New Lows column in the back pages of the FT. Many, if not most, of the companies mentioned are generally bad investments. But shares in surprisingly good companies sometimes slide to new lows on bad news. Test these to see if they meet the 7 selection criteria. (Neff calls this the 'Hmmmph' test: "Some names I would not have expected to see on this list elicit an audible 'Hmmmph'.")
Don't chase highly recognized growth stocks. Their P/E ratios are invariably pushed up to ridiculously expensive levels. This greatly increases the risk of a sudden collapse in the share price.
Stick to a firm selling strategy, or you risk losing your profits. There are two basic reasons to sell:
Fundamentals deteriorate
The price approaches or matches your expectations.
The main fundamentals to keep an eye on are earnings estimates and 5-year growth rates. If these start to slip, sell at once.
Pay more attention to the GYP ratio of your portfolio than to the market. But if the market becomes very expensive and it is hard to find worthwhile purchases, it is permissible to hold up to 20% of your funds in cash until new opportunities emerge.
The best profits are usually made after market panics.
Key sayings
"Absent stunning growth rates, low P/E stocks can capture the wonders of P/E expansion with less risk than skittish growth stocks."
"As a low P/E investor, you have to distinguish misunderstood and overlooked stocks selling at bargain prices from many more stocks with lacklustre prospects."
"A dividend increase is one kind of 'free plus'. A free plus is the return investors enjoy over and above initial expectations. One of Ben Franklin's wise observations offers a parallel: 'He who waits upon Fortune is never sure of a dinner.' As I see it, a superior yield at least lets you snack on hors d'oeuvres while waiting for the main meal."
"An awful lot of people keep a stock too long because it gives them warm fuzzies - particularly when a contrarian stance has been vindicated. If they sell it, they lose bragging rights."
大器晚成的莱利.海特
莱利.海特在大学时代教授上金融课时在拿期货开“玩笑”时已开始与期货结下不解之缘。但在正式投入炒家的行列，其间经过甚为曲折的途径，大器晚成，是莱利.海特的写照。学业并不突出，毕业后，什么工作都试过，每一个岗位停留时间都不长，1968年莱利.海特终于投身投机行业，第一个踏脚是股票经纪，数年后，成为全职期货经纪。
莱利.海特在刚开始接受股票培训时了解到“蓝筹”股票的来源可追溯到蒙特卡罗的赌场，最大的筹码是以蓝色印制的，因此引申出来，蓝筹股是代表第一线的大股，海特恍然大悟：哦，我明白了，这不就是赌博嘛!于是他将股票分析的书籍抛诸脑后，立即去买了一本名为《击败庄家》的书，看完后得出一个结论：“成功的投资方法就是掌握概率。只要你能算出入市成功或失败的概率，就能找到战胜市场的办法，足以克敌制胜。”莱利.海特后来研究和发展的电脑交易系统都是以此为基础的。
入行十年之后，莱利.海特开始捕捉到时常的节奏，订下进攻大计，成立了“明治投资管理公司”，先后罗致了两位人才，分别是统计学博士马菲士和电脑专家米马戴文，根据 10年下来积累了丰富的经验，形成了自己一套独特的交易体系。通过他们的科学测试来验证自己的做单体系，结果非常理想。“明治投资管理公司”的投资策略重点：在于平稳的增长，不追求超高收益，目标是稳定、持续的收益率。1981年来的七年时间，公司的收益率平均年增长超过30％，按年度结算，最低的一年也赚了13％，最高增长率为60%，连续6个月最大的亏损仅有l5％，如果以连续12个月作为结算期，亏损亦不超过计划1%。由于表现稳定而出色，公司旗下基金增长速度惊人， 1981年开始成立时只有200万美元， 10年后已累计超过8亿美元。
很多投资者都在使用电脑交易系统，但是赚钱还是少数，原因何在呢？莱利.海特在谈到电脑交易系统说，大部分投资者经常更改电脑交易系统，倘一失手，即时改用另一套系统，甚至在电脑系统发出入市信号，仍三心二意的不愿依照信号执行等等。在和许多投资者闲谈之间，经常的听到事后怨言：“我的电脑交易系统表现极为准确，可惜我并没有依计行事，否则可以赢到历年来最大的胜仗。”在使用电脑交易系统时一定要遵守交易原则，电脑系统是你的偶像，你的指挥官，神圣不可侵犯，要有像岳飞的“愚忠”，只要是有较高胜率的交易系统，长期的循规蹈矩，必会胜算在握。莱利.海特管理的基金是一直保持很低的亏损率，在高风险的期货行当是少有的。这与莱利.海特非常重视面对风险、控制风险和回避风险有密切的关系。
面对风险。在还是当经纪的时候，上司经常教导他：当你的客户出现大亏损的时候，必须立刻通知客户，否则必定有第三者代劳，破坏你与客户的关系。在某日联邦储备局FED突然改变政策，令到市场大势做一百八十度的转变，“明治投资管理公司”其中一个大客户，一间瑞士银行，净值大跌，投资经理们手足无措，向莱利.海特请示，莱利.海特立即打电话向银行解释：“类似的突变市势几年内才会出现一次，纯属意外。而敝公司作战计划，是以长期性平稳增长为主，长远开看，信心十足。”这样一来可以降低了我们的心理压力，拖延作出反应的方法，是不同炒家常用的弊病，也是产生纠纷的根源，后来该银行增加了一倍投资额，成为公司大重要客户。在控制风险方面，莱利.海特认为不管你了解多少情况，心中多么肯定，总还是有错的可能，所以随时要有准备。所以风险控制一定要严格、决不要把身家性命押上去，对最坏的结果有所准备。莱利.海特的一位现今世界上最大的咖啡炒家朋友，他清清楚楚的知道咖啡的运输过程，与主要的咖啡出产国的部长都甚有交情，可以说对基本因素及有关资料了如指掌。有一次请他到他伦敦的住所去作客，席间酒酣耳热，乘兴问莱利.海特：“海特，你怎么可能比我更懂咖啡期货呢?”海特回答说：“没错，我对咖啡一无所知，连喝都不喝。”“那你怎么做交易呢？我只看有多大风险。”那老兄不大相信，又问了不下5次，每次海特都是讲：“控制风险。”三个月后，那位朋友做咖啡期货赔掉l亿美元。看起来海特的话他没听进去。
除了面对风险和控制风险，更重要的是主动的回避风险，莱利.海特的方针是平稳中求增长，波涛汹涌的市场，虽然是很多人期待的机会，但并非理想的投资对象，当你把握不好就变成是无限的风险了。所以宁愿错过机会，亦不想去冒受不必的风险，是莱利.海特的第一教条。莱利.海特的心得归结成两句话：一，你如果不赌，就不可能赢。二、你如果把筹码全输光了，就不可能再赌。
莱利.海特在刚开始接受股票培训时了解到“蓝筹”股票的来源可追溯到蒙特卡罗的赌场，最大的筹码是以蓝色印制的，因此引申出来，蓝筹股是代表第一线的大股，海特恍然大悟：哦，我明白了，这不就是赌博嘛!于是他将股票分析的书籍抛诸脑后，立即去买了一本名为《击败庄家》的书，看完后得出一个结论：“成功的投资方法就是掌握概率。只要你能算出入市成功或失败的概率，就能找到战胜市场的办法，足以克敌制胜。”莱利.海特后来研究和发展的电脑交易系统都是以此为基础的。
入行十年之后，莱利.海特开始捕捉到时常的节奏，订下进攻大计，成立了“明治投资管理公司”，先后罗致了两位人才，分别是统计学博士马菲士和电脑专家米马戴文，根据 10年下来积累了丰富的经验，形成了自己一套独特的交易体系。通过他们的科学测试来验证自己的做单体系，结果非常理想。“明治投资管理公司”的投资策略重点：在于平稳的增长，不追求超高收益，目标是稳定、持续的收益率。1981年来的七年时间，公司的收益率平均年增长超过30％，按年度结算，最低的一年也赚了13％，最高增长率为60%，连续6个月最大的亏损仅有l5％，如果以连续12个月作为结算期，亏损亦不超过计划1%。由于表现稳定而出色，公司旗下基金增长速度惊人， 1981年开始成立时只有200万美元， 10年后已累计超过8亿美元。
很多投资者都在使用电脑交易系统，但是赚钱还是少数，原因何在呢？莱利.海特在谈到电脑交易系统说，大部分投资者经常更改电脑交易系统，倘一失手，即时改用另一套系统，甚至在电脑系统发出入市信号，仍三心二意的不愿依照信号执行等等。在和许多投资者闲谈之间，经常的听到事后怨言：“我的电脑交易系统表现极为准确，可惜我并没有依计行事，否则可以赢到历年来最大的胜仗。”在使用电脑交易系统时一定要遵守交易原则，电脑系统是你的偶像，你的指挥官，神圣不可侵犯，要有像岳飞的“愚忠”，只要是有较高胜率的交易系统，长期的循规蹈矩，必会胜算在握。莱利.海特管理的基金是一直保持很低的亏损率，在高风险的期货行当是少有的。这与莱利.海特非常重视面对风险、控制风险和回避风险有密切的关系。
面对风险。在还是当经纪的时候，上司经常教导他：当你的客户出现大亏损的时候，必须立刻通知客户，否则必定有第三者代劳，破坏你与客户的关系。在某日联邦储备局FED突然改变政策，令到市场大势做一百八十度的转变，“明治投资管理公司”其中一个大客户，一间瑞士银行，净值大跌，投资经理们手足无措，向莱利.海特请示，莱利.海特立即打电话向银行解释：“类似的突变市势几年内才会出现一次，纯属意外。而敝公司作战计划，是以长期性平稳增长为主，长远开看，信心十足。”这样一来可以降低了我们的心理压力，拖延作出反应的方法，是不同炒家常用的弊病，也是产生纠纷的根源，后来该银行增加了一倍投资额，成为公司大重要客户。在控制风险方面，莱利.海特认为不管你了解多少情况，心中多么肯定，总还是有错的可能，所以随时要有准备。所以风险控制一定要严格、决不要把身家性命押上去，对最坏的结果有所准备。莱利.海特的一位现今世界上最大的咖啡炒家朋友，他清清楚楚的知道咖啡的运输过程，与主要的咖啡出产国的部长都甚有交情，可以说对基本因素及有关资料了如指掌。有一次请他到他伦敦的住所去作客，席间酒酣耳热，乘兴问莱利.海特：“海特，你怎么可能比我更懂咖啡期货呢?”海特回答说：“没错，我对咖啡一无所知，连喝都不喝。”“那你怎么做交易呢？我只看有多大风险。”那老兄不大相信，又问了不下5次，每次海特都是讲：“控制风险。”三个月后，那位朋友做咖啡期货赔掉l亿美元。看起来海特的话他没听进去。
除了面对风险和控制风险，更重要的是主动的回避风险，莱利.海特的方针是平稳中求增长，波涛汹涌的市场，虽然是很多人期待的机会，但并非理想的投资对象，当你把握不好就变成是无限的风险了。所以宁愿错过机会，亦不想去冒受不必的风险，是莱利.海特的第一教条。莱利.海特的心得归结成两句话：一，你如果不赌，就不可能赢。二、你如果把筹码全输光了，就不可能再赌。
Winning the home run hitter's game
Investing is not only about buying the right assets at the right time. It's also about having rules that keep you from doing dumb things at the wrong time.
Of all the great fund managers who have appeared in Money Magazine over the past decades, no one proved that point better (or more entertainingly) than Ralph Wanger, the wisecracking, philosophizing manager of the Acorn Fund.
Wanger set out in 1970 to invest in small companies; through 2003 he did that and only that, with remarkable success. While the S&P 500 index climbed 12.1 percent a year, Acorn racked up an annualized 16.3 percent, one of the best records ever.
Wanger, 72 and retired, recently met with Money's Jason Zweig. As usual, Wanger asked nearly as many questions as he answered - and in the process found time to explain why life is like laundry, why focus matters and what Babe Ruth teaches us about stock picking.
Q. Why do you think you turned out to be a good investor?
A. At Acorn we had a clear philosophy - to be long-term holders of smaller companies with financial strength, entrepreneurial managers and understandable businesses - and we stuck to it.
Sticking to it is key. Richard J. Daley's one ambition was to become mayor of Chicago. Not President, not ambassador to the U.N., just mayor of Chicago. And since he already was mayor of Chicago, his life was much simpler. I thought that was worth emulating.
Q. Anything else?
A. I had always thought that to be a good investor you needed to hit a lot of singles and not strike out often. I was wrong. Investing, especially in small companies, is a home-run-hitter's game.
Q. When did you learn that?
A. Late '70s, maybe. The point is, 99 percent of what you do in life I classify as laundry. It's stuff that has to be done, but you don't do it better than anybody else, and it's not worth much.
Once in a while, though, you do something that changes your life dramatically. You decide to get married, you have a baby - or, if you're an investor, you buy a stock that goes up twentyfold.
So these rare events tend to dominate things. At Acorn, for example, I might have owned 300 stocks at any given time; most disappeared into the laundry basket.
But 10 might go up many times in value, and they made all the difference.
Look, how many home runs did Babe Ruth hit in his best year?
Q. Sixty, in 1927.
A. How many times did he strike out that year?
Q. Darn, I used to know that. I think it was...
A. Why don't you know?
Q. Uh, because when you hit that many home runs, it doesn't matter how many times you strike out.
A. Exactly. You're a great straight man.
Q. Thanks. So how many times did Babe Ruth strike out?
A. Don't know. Not interested. It's the winners that count. You want to have big positions in your winners, and the losers are trivial, eventually.
Q. But you can't just run out and find a stock that's going to rise twentyfold. No one can see that clearly into the future.
A. If you're looking for a home run - a great investment for five years or 10 years or more - then the only way to beat this enormous fog that covers the future is to identify a long-term trend that will give a particular business some sort of edge.
Q. For example?
A. A $600 PlayStation now has more computing power than you could have gotten 20 years ago for $100,000. So you don't want to invest in the computing power itself; those prices keep dropping. You want what's downstream from the technology.
Years ago I bought International Game Technology, which took a simple microprocessor, packaged it with coin slots, called it a slot machine and sold it to casinos for $8,000. It was a great stock.
Q. Are the principles of investing helpful elsewhere in life?
A. Being disciplined, being honest, having a set of rules and following them no matter what, thinking long term, controlling your emotions - these are all useful. But only so useful and only in part of life. You don't want to treat your wife or your kids like an investment.
I mean, you don't want to say, "Kid, you got a D-minus in English. I'm selling you." That doesn't work.
Of all the great fund managers who have appeared in Money Magazine over the past decades, no one proved that point better (or more entertainingly) than Ralph Wanger, the wisecracking, philosophizing manager of the Acorn Fund.
Wanger set out in 1970 to invest in small companies; through 2003 he did that and only that, with remarkable success. While the S&P 500 index climbed 12.1 percent a year, Acorn racked up an annualized 16.3 percent, one of the best records ever.
Wanger, 72 and retired, recently met with Money's Jason Zweig. As usual, Wanger asked nearly as many questions as he answered - and in the process found time to explain why life is like laundry, why focus matters and what Babe Ruth teaches us about stock picking.
Q. Why do you think you turned out to be a good investor?
A. At Acorn we had a clear philosophy - to be long-term holders of smaller companies with financial strength, entrepreneurial managers and understandable businesses - and we stuck to it.
Sticking to it is key. Richard J. Daley's one ambition was to become mayor of Chicago. Not President, not ambassador to the U.N., just mayor of Chicago. And since he already was mayor of Chicago, his life was much simpler. I thought that was worth emulating.
Q. Anything else?
A. I had always thought that to be a good investor you needed to hit a lot of singles and not strike out often. I was wrong. Investing, especially in small companies, is a home-run-hitter's game.
Q. When did you learn that?
A. Late '70s, maybe. The point is, 99 percent of what you do in life I classify as laundry. It's stuff that has to be done, but you don't do it better than anybody else, and it's not worth much.
Once in a while, though, you do something that changes your life dramatically. You decide to get married, you have a baby - or, if you're an investor, you buy a stock that goes up twentyfold.
So these rare events tend to dominate things. At Acorn, for example, I might have owned 300 stocks at any given time; most disappeared into the laundry basket.
But 10 might go up many times in value, and they made all the difference.
Look, how many home runs did Babe Ruth hit in his best year?
Q. Sixty, in 1927.
A. How many times did he strike out that year?
Q. Darn, I used to know that. I think it was...
A. Why don't you know?
Q. Uh, because when you hit that many home runs, it doesn't matter how many times you strike out.
A. Exactly. You're a great straight man.
Q. Thanks. So how many times did Babe Ruth strike out?
A. Don't know. Not interested. It's the winners that count. You want to have big positions in your winners, and the losers are trivial, eventually.
Q. But you can't just run out and find a stock that's going to rise twentyfold. No one can see that clearly into the future.
A. If you're looking for a home run - a great investment for five years or 10 years or more - then the only way to beat this enormous fog that covers the future is to identify a long-term trend that will give a particular business some sort of edge.
Q. For example?
A. A $600 PlayStation now has more computing power than you could have gotten 20 years ago for $100,000. So you don't want to invest in the computing power itself; those prices keep dropping. You want what's downstream from the technology.
Years ago I bought International Game Technology, which took a simple microprocessor, packaged it with coin slots, called it a slot machine and sold it to casinos for $8,000. It was a great stock.
Q. Are the principles of investing helpful elsewhere in life?
A. Being disciplined, being honest, having a set of rules and following them no matter what, thinking long term, controlling your emotions - these are all useful. But only so useful and only in part of life. You don't want to treat your wife or your kids like an investment.
I mean, you don't want to say, "Kid, you got a D-minus in English. I'm selling you." That doesn't work.
Ralph Wanger
Investment style
Theme-driven investment in smaller growth companies for the medium to long term.
Profile
After a brief period in insurance, Wanger joined Harris Associates in 1960 as an analyst. Later he became a portfolio manager. In 1970, he was put in charge of the Acorn Fund. He has since turned this into one of the top-performing growth funds of the last 30 years.
In the six months after its launch, the Acorn Fund lost over a third of its value in the most severe market downturn since the Thirties. Thankfully, the market recovered in the second half of the year and the fund survived. But the experience taught Wanger the value of a light-hearted approach to the vagaries of the market.
He subsequently became famous for his amusing quarterly reports:
"Some people have written to tell me they became shareholders just so they can receive the reports, which makes the quarterlies the world's most expensive literary magazine."
He recently summarized his time at the fund in his book A Zebra in Lion Country (1999).
Long-term returns
The Acorn Fund returned 17.2% annually between 1970 and 1998, against a return from the S&P500 index of 14.4%.
Biggest success
Wanger has made big money from many small companies. One is International Game Technology, the world's leading maker of slot machines. He paid $1 a share for it in 1988, when new management had just taken over and were planning a new range of electronic slot machines. In 1993, the stock hit a high of $40.
Method and guidelines
Concentrate on spotting trends that will last for at least 4-5 years.
Your life is driven by strong economic, social and technological trends. These also drive corporate sales and profits. When thinking of investing, start by looking around you and picking out those trends you think will be the most important and longest-lasting. Wanger's own favourites include:
the information revolution, and particularly its impact on costs
the expansion of world telephone and data networks
the business of leisure, boosted by affluent older baby-boomers
outsourcing, as companies strip down to their core functions
money management, essential for the future wealth of an aging world.
Think small.
Smaller companies as a group have made far more profitable investments than larger ones. Although you cannot buy large numbers of them, try to focus your research on the best prospects in this group. Consider avoiding micro companies - they can be too risky. (In the UK, this means sticking to companies with a capitalization of about £30m-£250m.)
The best small companies are those that dominate their chosen niche. Their characteristics include:
growing markets for their products
good design
efficient, low-cost manufacturing
outstanding, entrepreneurial management
skilled marketing
high profit margins.
Look downstream for the best profits.
T Rowe Price focused on the leaders in growth industries. But the best money is often to be made by the downstream beneficiaries of a growth business. To use the old cliché, it wasn't the prospectors that made the money in the Yukon gold rush, it was those who sold them the picks and shovels.
Example
Rather than investing in semiconductor companies like Intel that manufactured microchips, Wanger went for cellular telephone companies that built their products into handsets.
Insist on financial strength.
Growth can only be sustained by companies with strong finances. It will be undermined by those that have to guzzle cash to feed their growth. So
Check the balance sheet to see if there is too much debt, or rising debt
Check that other liabilities, such as pension payments, are reasonable
Look for real cash generation, not simply accounting profits
As a rule, avoid turnarounds, start-ups and new issues, which tend to be weakly financed, especially if they are blue-sky tech companies.
Insist on fundamental value.
A good company is not necessarily a good stock unless it is attractively priced. Look for companies that are cheap in relation to their earnings-growth potential.
A crude measure of potential is the PEG
A better measure is to estimate the likely earnings per share 2 years ahead and multiply that by the likely P/E to arrive at a probable value. P/E ratios will be higher if interest rates are lower, and vice versa.
(Professionals calculate this using a 'dividend discount model'.)
Sell only reluctantly.
If you have done your homework, you should be able to hold stocks for at least 4-5 years as a trend plays out. Wanger himself only turns over about one-quarter of his portfolio each year.
Sometimes, though, the P/E will rise to dangerous levels. Then you should consider selling some or all of your stock to reduce risk. Wanger sold International Game Technology when its P/E reached 40 and its estimated growth rate was 25%.
"In real-life portfolio management, sell decisions are often tough. You can't really apply hard-and-fast rules. Instead, you have to continually re-evaluate each situation."
Source: A Zebra in Lion Country
Key sayings
"First I determine themes that will be played out over the next several years. Then I identify groups of stocks that reflect those themes."
"What I don't want are me-too companies that rank fifth or sixth in their industry, because their profit margins will rarely be as good as those of the industry leaders."
"Going downstream - investing in the businesses that will benefit from new technology rather than in the technology companies themselves - is often the smarter strategy."
"Assume that one of your eccentric friends who runs a large bank has just offered to lend you a great deal of money at about 10 percent interest, with which you may tender for all the stock of the company you are studying at the current market price. If you study the company and say 'Boy, this is terrific! Give me the loan and I'll do it. I'll quit my job and go run that company. It's a tremendous bargain,' then you probably have a good stock."
Theme-driven investment in smaller growth companies for the medium to long term.
Profile
After a brief period in insurance, Wanger joined Harris Associates in 1960 as an analyst. Later he became a portfolio manager. In 1970, he was put in charge of the Acorn Fund. He has since turned this into one of the top-performing growth funds of the last 30 years.
In the six months after its launch, the Acorn Fund lost over a third of its value in the most severe market downturn since the Thirties. Thankfully, the market recovered in the second half of the year and the fund survived. But the experience taught Wanger the value of a light-hearted approach to the vagaries of the market.
He subsequently became famous for his amusing quarterly reports:
"Some people have written to tell me they became shareholders just so they can receive the reports, which makes the quarterlies the world's most expensive literary magazine."
He recently summarized his time at the fund in his book A Zebra in Lion Country (1999).
Long-term returns
The Acorn Fund returned 17.2% annually between 1970 and 1998, against a return from the S&P500 index of 14.4%.
Biggest success
Wanger has made big money from many small companies. One is International Game Technology, the world's leading maker of slot machines. He paid $1 a share for it in 1988, when new management had just taken over and were planning a new range of electronic slot machines. In 1993, the stock hit a high of $40.
Method and guidelines
Concentrate on spotting trends that will last for at least 4-5 years.
Your life is driven by strong economic, social and technological trends. These also drive corporate sales and profits. When thinking of investing, start by looking around you and picking out those trends you think will be the most important and longest-lasting. Wanger's own favourites include:
the information revolution, and particularly its impact on costs
the expansion of world telephone and data networks
the business of leisure, boosted by affluent older baby-boomers
outsourcing, as companies strip down to their core functions
money management, essential for the future wealth of an aging world.
Think small.
Smaller companies as a group have made far more profitable investments than larger ones. Although you cannot buy large numbers of them, try to focus your research on the best prospects in this group. Consider avoiding micro companies - they can be too risky. (In the UK, this means sticking to companies with a capitalization of about £30m-£250m.)
The best small companies are those that dominate their chosen niche. Their characteristics include:
growing markets for their products
good design
efficient, low-cost manufacturing
outstanding, entrepreneurial management
skilled marketing
high profit margins.
Look downstream for the best profits.
T Rowe Price focused on the leaders in growth industries. But the best money is often to be made by the downstream beneficiaries of a growth business. To use the old cliché, it wasn't the prospectors that made the money in the Yukon gold rush, it was those who sold them the picks and shovels.
Example
Rather than investing in semiconductor companies like Intel that manufactured microchips, Wanger went for cellular telephone companies that built their products into handsets.
Insist on financial strength.
Growth can only be sustained by companies with strong finances. It will be undermined by those that have to guzzle cash to feed their growth. So
Check the balance sheet to see if there is too much debt, or rising debt
Check that other liabilities, such as pension payments, are reasonable
Look for real cash generation, not simply accounting profits
As a rule, avoid turnarounds, start-ups and new issues, which tend to be weakly financed, especially if they are blue-sky tech companies.
Insist on fundamental value.
A good company is not necessarily a good stock unless it is attractively priced. Look for companies that are cheap in relation to their earnings-growth potential.
A crude measure of potential is the PEG
A better measure is to estimate the likely earnings per share 2 years ahead and multiply that by the likely P/E to arrive at a probable value. P/E ratios will be higher if interest rates are lower, and vice versa.
(Professionals calculate this using a 'dividend discount model'.)
Sell only reluctantly.
If you have done your homework, you should be able to hold stocks for at least 4-5 years as a trend plays out. Wanger himself only turns over about one-quarter of his portfolio each year.
Sometimes, though, the P/E will rise to dangerous levels. Then you should consider selling some or all of your stock to reduce risk. Wanger sold International Game Technology when its P/E reached 40 and its estimated growth rate was 25%.
"In real-life portfolio management, sell decisions are often tough. You can't really apply hard-and-fast rules. Instead, you have to continually re-evaluate each situation."
Source: A Zebra in Lion Country
Key sayings
"First I determine themes that will be played out over the next several years. Then I identify groups of stocks that reflect those themes."
"What I don't want are me-too companies that rank fifth or sixth in their industry, because their profit margins will rarely be as good as those of the industry leaders."
"Going downstream - investing in the businesses that will benefit from new technology rather than in the technology companies themselves - is often the smarter strategy."
"Assume that one of your eccentric friends who runs a large bank has just offered to lend you a great deal of money at about 10 percent interest, with which you may tender for all the stock of the company you are studying at the current market price. If you study the company and say 'Boy, this is terrific! Give me the loan and I'll do it. I'll quit my job and go run that company. It's a tremendous bargain,' then you probably have a good stock."
Learning From the Great Investors
In college, I tried to read as many books about great businesses and investors as possible. I'd regularly stagger out of the investing section of the library with more books than I could carry. But while that reading gave me a great foundation, I later discovered that I'd only taken the first few steps in my journey toward becoming a better investor.
I'm still nowhere near where I hope to be, but I thought I'd pause to reflect on the vital lessons I've learned by observing some of the world's greatest investors.
Mohnish Pabrai: Dig deeper.
Like Michael Jordan on the basketball court, Mohnish Pabrai makes investing seem so easy. Whether it owes to his experience as an information-technology entrepreneur, or simply stems from some innate talent, Pabrai seems to have unbelievable skill in finding opportunity where others see only uncertainty.
In his first book, Mosaic: Perspectives on Investing, Pabrai describes his investment in funeral-home operator Stewart Enterprises (Nasdaq: STEI), at a time when the company had a $500 million debt payment coming due in a couple of years.
"Bankrupt" is perhaps the most terrifying word in money management. A holding that goes bankrupt not only makes you look like a goat, but might even cost you your job. Stewart's looming debt payment, and the fearful uncertainty that accompanied it, became a dealbreaker for many investors.
But Pabrai saw that Stewart could simply sell some of its funeral homes to pay off the debt. That's precisely what happened, and Pabrai's fund made roughly 100% from its investment. In Pabrai's latest book, the excellent The Dhandho Investor, curious Fools can find further details about this strategy of low-risk, high-uncertainty investing.
Eddie Lampert: Capital allocation, capital allocation, capital allocation.
As a Yale undergrad, secretive hedge fund manager Eddie Lampert allegedly spent considerable time reverse-engineering Warren Buffett's investments, hoping to indirectly learn from the greatest investor of all time.
He subsequently went to Goldman Sachs, where he learned from legendary arbitrageur Robert Rubin. From there, he started his own hedge fund. Ever since, he's basically been shooting out the lights.
Although Lampert rarely speaks to the press, it's clear from his successes with K-Mart, Sears, and AutoZone -- as well as his letters to Sears shareholders -- that he holds capital allocation sacred.
With Lampert's help, the companies he owns have scoured their assets, working to deploy capital as productively as possible. It's amazing how much idle cash is locked up or wasted in real estate, inventory and working capital, and capital expenditures. From Lampert, I learned that superior capital allocation can help turn a laggard into a leader, and that investors should closely monitor how management invests its assets.
Joel Greenblatt: High earnings yields + high returns on capital = good.
Joel Greenblatt's Gotham Capital has allegedly returned a whopping 40% a year. Greenblatt is the master of the spinoff, having successfully sent former subsidiaries such as Moody's, Ameriprise, and Live Nation off on their own.
Greenblatt also wrote two delightfully short and entertaining books, titled You Can Be a Stock Market Genius and The Little Book That Beats the Market. They teach investors that investing in companies with high returns on capital and low price-to-earnings ratios (or high earnings yields) leads to superior returns. Of course, there's a lot more to it than that, but at the end of the day, this simple formula does work wonders.
Munger: Learn to learn.
Charlie Munger, Warren Buffett's intellectual partner, wrote a wonderful book called Poor Charlie's Almanack, which deals with things like mental models, biases, and methods of thinking. Most importantly, Munger counsels readers that no one can tell you how to be a superior thinker.
You can read as many books as possible about riding a bike, but nothing compares to the experience of doing it. Hopefully, if we put enough monetary and intellectual effort into learning to become better investors, we can one day kick off the training wheels.
I'm still nowhere near where I hope to be, but I thought I'd pause to reflect on the vital lessons I've learned by observing some of the world's greatest investors.
Mohnish Pabrai: Dig deeper.
Like Michael Jordan on the basketball court, Mohnish Pabrai makes investing seem so easy. Whether it owes to his experience as an information-technology entrepreneur, or simply stems from some innate talent, Pabrai seems to have unbelievable skill in finding opportunity where others see only uncertainty.
In his first book, Mosaic: Perspectives on Investing, Pabrai describes his investment in funeral-home operator Stewart Enterprises (Nasdaq: STEI), at a time when the company had a $500 million debt payment coming due in a couple of years.
"Bankrupt" is perhaps the most terrifying word in money management. A holding that goes bankrupt not only makes you look like a goat, but might even cost you your job. Stewart's looming debt payment, and the fearful uncertainty that accompanied it, became a dealbreaker for many investors.
But Pabrai saw that Stewart could simply sell some of its funeral homes to pay off the debt. That's precisely what happened, and Pabrai's fund made roughly 100% from its investment. In Pabrai's latest book, the excellent The Dhandho Investor, curious Fools can find further details about this strategy of low-risk, high-uncertainty investing.
Eddie Lampert: Capital allocation, capital allocation, capital allocation.
As a Yale undergrad, secretive hedge fund manager Eddie Lampert allegedly spent considerable time reverse-engineering Warren Buffett's investments, hoping to indirectly learn from the greatest investor of all time.
He subsequently went to Goldman Sachs, where he learned from legendary arbitrageur Robert Rubin. From there, he started his own hedge fund. Ever since, he's basically been shooting out the lights.
Although Lampert rarely speaks to the press, it's clear from his successes with K-Mart, Sears, and AutoZone -- as well as his letters to Sears shareholders -- that he holds capital allocation sacred.
With Lampert's help, the companies he owns have scoured their assets, working to deploy capital as productively as possible. It's amazing how much idle cash is locked up or wasted in real estate, inventory and working capital, and capital expenditures. From Lampert, I learned that superior capital allocation can help turn a laggard into a leader, and that investors should closely monitor how management invests its assets.
Joel Greenblatt: High earnings yields + high returns on capital = good.
Joel Greenblatt's Gotham Capital has allegedly returned a whopping 40% a year. Greenblatt is the master of the spinoff, having successfully sent former subsidiaries such as Moody's, Ameriprise, and Live Nation off on their own.
Greenblatt also wrote two delightfully short and entertaining books, titled You Can Be a Stock Market Genius and The Little Book That Beats the Market. They teach investors that investing in companies with high returns on capital and low price-to-earnings ratios (or high earnings yields) leads to superior returns. Of course, there's a lot more to it than that, but at the end of the day, this simple formula does work wonders.
Munger: Learn to learn.
Charlie Munger, Warren Buffett's intellectual partner, wrote a wonderful book called Poor Charlie's Almanack, which deals with things like mental models, biases, and methods of thinking. Most importantly, Munger counsels readers that no one can tell you how to be a superior thinker.
You can read as many books as possible about riding a bike, but nothing compares to the experience of doing it. Hopefully, if we put enough monetary and intellectual effort into learning to become better investors, we can one day kick off the training wheels.
The Greatest Investors: Thomas Rowe Price, Jr.
Personal Profile
Thomas Rowe Price spent his formative years struggling with the Depression, and the lesson he learned was not to stay out of stocks but to embrace them. Price viewed financial markets as cyclical. As a "crowd opposer," he took to investing in good companies for the long term, which was virtually unheard of at this time. His investment philosophy was that investors had to put more focus on individual stock-picking for the long term. Discipline, process consistency and fundamental research became the basis for his successful investing career. .
Price graduated from Swarthmore College with a degree in chemistry in 1919 before discovering that he liked working with numbers better than chemicals. He moved into a career in investments when he started working with the Baltimore-based brokerage firm of Mackubin Goodrich, which today is known as Legg Mason. Price eventually rose to become its chief investment officer.
Over time, Price became frustrated by the fact that "the firm did not fully comprehend his definition of growth stocks," so Price founded T. Rowe Price Associates in 1937. At that time, he defied convention by charging fees based on investments that clients had with the firm, not commissions, and always "putting the client's interests first." Price believed that as his clients prospered, the firm would too.
In 1950, he introduced his first mutual fund, the T. Rowe Price Growth Stock Fund. He was the company's CEO until his retirement in the late 1960s. He eventually sold the company in the early 1970s, but the firm retained his name and, today, one of the nation's premier investment houses.
Investment Style
Thomas Rowe Price's investment management philosophy was based on investment discipline, process consistency and fundamental analysis. He pioneered the methodology of growth investing by focusing on well-managed companies in fertile fields whose earnings and dividends were expected to grow faster than inflation and the overall economy. John Train, author of "The Money Masters", says that Price looked for these characteristics in growth companies:
Superior research to develop products and markets.
A lack of cutthroat competition.
A comparative immunity from government regulation.
Low total labor costs, but well-paid employees.
At least a 10% return on invested capital, sustained high profit margins, and a superior growth of earnings per share.
Price and his firm became extremely successful employing the growth stock approach to buying stocks. By 1965, he had spent almost thirty years as a growth advocate. At that time, many of his favorite stocks became known in the market as "T. Rowe Price stocks." However, by the late '60s, he had become wary of the market's unquestioning enthusiasm for growth stocks – he felt the time had come for investors to change their orientation. He thought price multiples had become unreasonable and decided that the long bull market was over. This is when he began to sell his interests in T. Rowe Price Associates.
By 1973-1974, what Price's forecast took shape and growth stocks fell hard and fast. Much to Price's dismay, his namesake firm barely managed to survive. Obviously, the term, "irrational exuberance" didn't exist in those days, but its destructive force was well appreciated by Thomas Rowe Price.
Quotes
"It is better to be early than too late in recognizing the passing of one era, the waning of old investment favorites and the advent of a new era affording new opportunities for the investor."
"If we do well for the client, we'll be taken care of."
"Change is the investor's only certainty."
"No one can see ahead three years, let alone five or ten. Competition, new inventions - all kinds of things - can change the situation in twelve months."
Thomas Rowe Price spent his formative years struggling with the Depression, and the lesson he learned was not to stay out of stocks but to embrace them. Price viewed financial markets as cyclical. As a "crowd opposer," he took to investing in good companies for the long term, which was virtually unheard of at this time. His investment philosophy was that investors had to put more focus on individual stock-picking for the long term. Discipline, process consistency and fundamental research became the basis for his successful investing career. .
Price graduated from Swarthmore College with a degree in chemistry in 1919 before discovering that he liked working with numbers better than chemicals. He moved into a career in investments when he started working with the Baltimore-based brokerage firm of Mackubin Goodrich, which today is known as Legg Mason. Price eventually rose to become its chief investment officer.
Over time, Price became frustrated by the fact that "the firm did not fully comprehend his definition of growth stocks," so Price founded T. Rowe Price Associates in 1937. At that time, he defied convention by charging fees based on investments that clients had with the firm, not commissions, and always "putting the client's interests first." Price believed that as his clients prospered, the firm would too.
In 1950, he introduced his first mutual fund, the T. Rowe Price Growth Stock Fund. He was the company's CEO until his retirement in the late 1960s. He eventually sold the company in the early 1970s, but the firm retained his name and, today, one of the nation's premier investment houses.
Investment Style
Thomas Rowe Price's investment management philosophy was based on investment discipline, process consistency and fundamental analysis. He pioneered the methodology of growth investing by focusing on well-managed companies in fertile fields whose earnings and dividends were expected to grow faster than inflation and the overall economy. John Train, author of "The Money Masters", says that Price looked for these characteristics in growth companies:
Superior research to develop products and markets.
A lack of cutthroat competition.
A comparative immunity from government regulation.
Low total labor costs, but well-paid employees.
At least a 10% return on invested capital, sustained high profit margins, and a superior growth of earnings per share.
Price and his firm became extremely successful employing the growth stock approach to buying stocks. By 1965, he had spent almost thirty years as a growth advocate. At that time, many of his favorite stocks became known in the market as "T. Rowe Price stocks." However, by the late '60s, he had become wary of the market's unquestioning enthusiasm for growth stocks – he felt the time had come for investors to change their orientation. He thought price multiples had become unreasonable and decided that the long bull market was over. This is when he began to sell his interests in T. Rowe Price Associates.
By 1973-1974, what Price's forecast took shape and growth stocks fell hard and fast. Much to Price's dismay, his namesake firm barely managed to survive. Obviously, the term, "irrational exuberance" didn't exist in those days, but its destructive force was well appreciated by Thomas Rowe Price.
Quotes
"It is better to be early than too late in recognizing the passing of one era, the waning of old investment favorites and the advent of a new era affording new opportunities for the investor."
"If we do well for the client, we'll be taken care of."
"Change is the investor's only certainty."
"No one can see ahead three years, let alone five or ten. Competition, new inventions - all kinds of things - can change the situation in twelve months."
T Rowe Price
Investment style
Cyclical investor in long-term growth companies, buying at the bottom of the business cycle and selling at the top. In later life, Price switched to a more value-driven style, investing in steady-growth, oil and gold stocks.
Profile
Price was a strong-willed and egotistical man. He never deviated from the daily agenda he set himself, nor from his decisions about when to buy and sell stocks. He demanded the same zeal and discipline from his employees. This unforgiving work ethic turned his firm into one of the largest asset managers of his day.
Price was very much an entrepreneur rather than a manager. He liked to start a fund, establish it and then move on to launch another one. Some of his most famous funds are still running today: T Rowe Price Growth Stock, New Horizons and New Era. His favourite companies, such as Avon Products and Black and Decker, actually became known as 'T Rowe Price stocks'.
But he sold the business to his associates when he saw that the prices of this group of companies were reaching absurd levels in the late Sixties. He himself changed to a more cautious and diversified approach, buying bonds and stocks from the energy and commodity sectors. The 1973-4 bear market proved the wisdom of this decision. His family portfolios soared, while those of his old firm collapsed.
Long-term returns
Price published a sample family portfolio to show how he had turned $1,000 invested in 1934 into $271,201 by the end of 1972 - a compound return of about 15.4% over 39 years.
Biggest success
Price's sample portfolio contained many striking successes. Among the most remarkable was pharmaceuticals firm Merck, bought for the equivalent of 37.5 cents in 1940 and still held 32 years later at $89.13 - a compound growth rate of about 18.6%, even without any reinvestment of dividends.
Method and guidelines
Like people, companies pass through three phases in their life cycle:
Growth
Maturity
Decadence
Look for companies in the earliest identifiable phase of growth. This growth is of two kinds:
Cyclical - growth in unit volumes of sales and in net earnings, which peaks at progressively higher levels at the top of each succeeding business cycle. These stocks are ideal for investors looking for capital gains during the recovery stage of the business cycle
Stable - growth in unit volumes and in net earnings, which persists through the downturn in the business cycle. These stocks are suitable for investors who need relatively stable income.
Concentrate on industry leaders. These can usually be identified by their competitive advantages, including:
Outstanding management
Leading-edge research and development
Patents, licences and other legally enforceable product rights
Relative protection from government regulation
Low labour costs, but good labour relations
These advantages usually go hand-in-hand with
A strong balance sheet
A high return on capital (at least 10%)
High profit margins
Consistently above-average earnings growth.
If these financial ratios are improving, that is often a good indicator that the company is still in its growth phase.
The best time to consider buying is when growth stocks are out of fashion. As a group, their P/E ratio will have fallen to roughly the same level as the market. Consider buying when the P/E is about 33% higher than the lowest point it has reached at the bottom of the last few cycles. Continue buying ('scaling in') until the price starts to rise strongly above this initial level.
The time to start selling is when the stock is 30% above your upper buying price limit. Sell off your stock gradually ('scale out') as the price continues to advance. (Price himself sold 10% every time the price rose 10%. Smaller investors may need to think in terms of selling 25-33% on each 20% advance.)
Also consider selling if
You can be reasonably certain the bull market has peaked
The company appears to be entering its mature phase
The company reports bad news
The stock price collapses on widespread selling.
Key sayings
"Even the amateur investor who lacks training and time to devote to managing his investments can be reasonably successful by selecting the best-managed companies in fertile fields for growth, buying their shares and retaining them until it becomes obvious that they no longer meet the definition of a growth stock."
"'Growth stocks' can be defined as shares in business enterprises that have demonstrated favourable underlying long-term growth in earnings and that, after careful research study, give indications of continued secular growth in future...Secular growth extends through several business cycles, with earnings reaching new high levels at the peak of each subsequent major business cycle..."
Cyclical investor in long-term growth companies, buying at the bottom of the business cycle and selling at the top. In later life, Price switched to a more value-driven style, investing in steady-growth, oil and gold stocks.
Profile
Price was a strong-willed and egotistical man. He never deviated from the daily agenda he set himself, nor from his decisions about when to buy and sell stocks. He demanded the same zeal and discipline from his employees. This unforgiving work ethic turned his firm into one of the largest asset managers of his day.
Price was very much an entrepreneur rather than a manager. He liked to start a fund, establish it and then move on to launch another one. Some of his most famous funds are still running today: T Rowe Price Growth Stock, New Horizons and New Era. His favourite companies, such as Avon Products and Black and Decker, actually became known as 'T Rowe Price stocks'.
But he sold the business to his associates when he saw that the prices of this group of companies were reaching absurd levels in the late Sixties. He himself changed to a more cautious and diversified approach, buying bonds and stocks from the energy and commodity sectors. The 1973-4 bear market proved the wisdom of this decision. His family portfolios soared, while those of his old firm collapsed.
Long-term returns
Price published a sample family portfolio to show how he had turned $1,000 invested in 1934 into $271,201 by the end of 1972 - a compound return of about 15.4% over 39 years.
Biggest success
Price's sample portfolio contained many striking successes. Among the most remarkable was pharmaceuticals firm Merck, bought for the equivalent of 37.5 cents in 1940 and still held 32 years later at $89.13 - a compound growth rate of about 18.6%, even without any reinvestment of dividends.
Method and guidelines
Like people, companies pass through three phases in their life cycle:
Growth
Maturity
Decadence
Look for companies in the earliest identifiable phase of growth. This growth is of two kinds:
Cyclical - growth in unit volumes of sales and in net earnings, which peaks at progressively higher levels at the top of each succeeding business cycle. These stocks are ideal for investors looking for capital gains during the recovery stage of the business cycle
Stable - growth in unit volumes and in net earnings, which persists through the downturn in the business cycle. These stocks are suitable for investors who need relatively stable income.
Concentrate on industry leaders. These can usually be identified by their competitive advantages, including:
Outstanding management
Leading-edge research and development
Patents, licences and other legally enforceable product rights
Relative protection from government regulation
Low labour costs, but good labour relations
These advantages usually go hand-in-hand with
A strong balance sheet
A high return on capital (at least 10%)
High profit margins
Consistently above-average earnings growth.
If these financial ratios are improving, that is often a good indicator that the company is still in its growth phase.
The best time to consider buying is when growth stocks are out of fashion. As a group, their P/E ratio will have fallen to roughly the same level as the market. Consider buying when the P/E is about 33% higher than the lowest point it has reached at the bottom of the last few cycles. Continue buying ('scaling in') until the price starts to rise strongly above this initial level.
The time to start selling is when the stock is 30% above your upper buying price limit. Sell off your stock gradually ('scale out') as the price continues to advance. (Price himself sold 10% every time the price rose 10%. Smaller investors may need to think in terms of selling 25-33% on each 20% advance.)
Also consider selling if
You can be reasonably certain the bull market has peaked
The company appears to be entering its mature phase
The company reports bad news
The stock price collapses on widespread selling.
Key sayings
"Even the amateur investor who lacks training and time to devote to managing his investments can be reasonably successful by selecting the best-managed companies in fertile fields for growth, buying their shares and retaining them until it becomes obvious that they no longer meet the definition of a growth stock."
"'Growth stocks' can be defined as shares in business enterprises that have demonstrated favourable underlying long-term growth in earnings and that, after careful research study, give indications of continued secular growth in future...Secular growth extends through several business cycles, with earnings reaching new high levels at the peak of each subsequent major business cycle..."
Thomas Rowe Price, Jr
Thomas Rowe Price, Jr. followed a very simple business principle: “What is good for the client is also good for the firm”. Rather than charge a commission, as was then the practice in the securities business, Mr. Price charged a fee based on the assets under management.
Mr. Price first entered the world of Wall Street Investing in the 1920’s. By 1937 he founded his investment firm, T. Rowe Price. Between 1937 and 1971, when he sold his firm to his former employees, Price gradually developed a theory that investing was superior to speculating.
Mr. Price is best known for developing the growth stock style of investing. Although he was trained as a chemist, he had a passion for investing. Mr. Price believed that investors could earn superior returns by investing in well-managed companies in fertile fields whose earnings and dividends could be expected to grow faster than inflation and the overall economy. The core of Mr. Price’s approach, proprietary research to guide investment selection and diversification to reduce risk, has remained part of the firm’s principles.
Mr. Price first entered the world of Wall Street Investing in the 1920’s. By 1937 he founded his investment firm, T. Rowe Price. Between 1937 and 1971, when he sold his firm to his former employees, Price gradually developed a theory that investing was superior to speculating.
Mr. Price is best known for developing the growth stock style of investing. Although he was trained as a chemist, he had a passion for investing. Mr. Price believed that investors could earn superior returns by investing in well-managed companies in fertile fields whose earnings and dividends could be expected to grow faster than inflation and the overall economy. The core of Mr. Price’s approach, proprietary research to guide investment selection and diversification to reduce risk, has remained part of the firm’s principles.
全球金融步入寒冬 港股短期易跌難升
市場擔心華府救市方案仍存變數，港股牛皮偏軟，觀望氣氛濃。
˙歐、美銀行業的次按及信貸業務損失巨大，滙豐亦公布裁員千多人，顯示全球金融業步入寒冬。
˙受金融及出口業放緩拖累，本港失業率明年料趨增，港股反彈動力會被削弱。
下周內地股市全周休市，而港股只有四個交易日，短期走勢料由美股主導.
相信下周初段港股表現反覆爭持，到周五才會較為明朗，由於缺乏內地股市指引，交投料較淡靜。技術上，恒指短期支持近18000，阻力近20000，短綫在此範圍上落居多。
花旗在金融危機中最傷
據資料顯示，自去年初以來，全球100多家最大型銀行和證券公司的資本減值和信貸損失總額已經達5,231億美元，金融機構並為此籌募了3,807億美元的資金。在各大金融機構中，花旗集團的資本減值和信貸損失總額最高，達551億美元，而所籌集資金491億美元；美林位居次席，分別為522億美元和299億美元；瑞士銀行名列第三，分別為442億美元和284億美元。
其他主要美國金融機構中，美聯銀行的資本減值和信貸損失總額為227億美元，籌集資金110億美元；美國銀行資本減值212億美元和籌集207億美元；摩根士丹利減值157億美元和集資56億美元；摩根大通減值143億美元和集資97億美元；雷曼兄弟減值138億美元和集資139億美元。美國以外的金融機構中，滙豐控股資本減值和信貸損失總額為274億美元，在所有金融機構中名列第四，籌集資金51億美元；蘇格蘭皇家銀行集團減值145億美元和集資238億美元；德意志銀行減值106億美元和集資62億美元；瑞士信貸減值105億美元和集資30億美元；巴克萊減值79億美元和集資183億美元。
明年失業率勢必趨升
睇完上述一大堆損手數據，歐、美銀行步入寒冬已無可避免，更可能還要面對漫長嚴寒，裁員之消息料陸續有來，其中滙豐昨天宣布本港連同海外將會裁減1,100名員工。由於裁員潮只是開始，本港失業率明年上升已可預期，而樓價下調亦無法避免，市場是買家世界，炒家只能退守，有能力又有置業需要之市民，大可以睇定些，等候低位入市之機會。事實上，自雷曼倒閉後，市民普遍對各類金融產品之風險意識提高，當見到買了迷你債券之苦主慘狀，投資者會擔心所買衍生工具是不是白紙一張，一間公司可以一夜倒閉，若是買樓，樓價或許有升有跌，但至少有層樓實物揸手。
金融股在熊市風險較高
以同樣邏輯，熊市之中，筆者一直以來是首先撇除金融股，因為銀行業講求之互信，熊市草木皆兵下通常好難估銀行股最壞情況有幾壞。相反，一些持實質資產如房產，收租物業，始終有一定實際需求支持，投資這類資產信心較強。同樣，一些石油煤炭股份，所擁有的是油田或煤礦，而油田及煤礦也是實質資產，所謂「爛船都有三斤釘」。因此，觀察到熊市中，房產股及能源股在初期往往同步隨大市下跌，但慢慢地，會隨市場信心逐漸回復，令市場重新注意其實質資產價值，股價跌勢自然放緩，股價找到支持並可進行築底工程，一旦確認底部，股價有望漸回升。
˙歐、美銀行業的次按及信貸業務損失巨大，滙豐亦公布裁員千多人，顯示全球金融業步入寒冬。
˙受金融及出口業放緩拖累，本港失業率明年料趨增，港股反彈動力會被削弱。
下周內地股市全周休市，而港股只有四個交易日，短期走勢料由美股主導.
相信下周初段港股表現反覆爭持，到周五才會較為明朗，由於缺乏內地股市指引，交投料較淡靜。技術上，恒指短期支持近18000，阻力近20000，短綫在此範圍上落居多。
花旗在金融危機中最傷
據資料顯示，自去年初以來，全球100多家最大型銀行和證券公司的資本減值和信貸損失總額已經達5,231億美元，金融機構並為此籌募了3,807億美元的資金。在各大金融機構中，花旗集團的資本減值和信貸損失總額最高，達551億美元，而所籌集資金491億美元；美林位居次席，分別為522億美元和299億美元；瑞士銀行名列第三，分別為442億美元和284億美元。
其他主要美國金融機構中，美聯銀行的資本減值和信貸損失總額為227億美元，籌集資金110億美元；美國銀行資本減值212億美元和籌集207億美元；摩根士丹利減值157億美元和集資56億美元；摩根大通減值143億美元和集資97億美元；雷曼兄弟減值138億美元和集資139億美元。美國以外的金融機構中，滙豐控股資本減值和信貸損失總額為274億美元，在所有金融機構中名列第四，籌集資金51億美元；蘇格蘭皇家銀行集團減值145億美元和集資238億美元；德意志銀行減值106億美元和集資62億美元；瑞士信貸減值105億美元和集資30億美元；巴克萊減值79億美元和集資183億美元。
明年失業率勢必趨升
睇完上述一大堆損手數據，歐、美銀行步入寒冬已無可避免，更可能還要面對漫長嚴寒，裁員之消息料陸續有來，其中滙豐昨天宣布本港連同海外將會裁減1,100名員工。由於裁員潮只是開始，本港失業率明年上升已可預期，而樓價下調亦無法避免，市場是買家世界，炒家只能退守，有能力又有置業需要之市民，大可以睇定些，等候低位入市之機會。事實上，自雷曼倒閉後，市民普遍對各類金融產品之風險意識提高，當見到買了迷你債券之苦主慘狀，投資者會擔心所買衍生工具是不是白紙一張，一間公司可以一夜倒閉，若是買樓，樓價或許有升有跌，但至少有層樓實物揸手。
金融股在熊市風險較高
以同樣邏輯，熊市之中，筆者一直以來是首先撇除金融股，因為銀行業講求之互信，熊市草木皆兵下通常好難估銀行股最壞情況有幾壞。相反，一些持實質資產如房產，收租物業，始終有一定實際需求支持，投資這類資產信心較強。同樣，一些石油煤炭股份，所擁有的是油田或煤礦，而油田及煤礦也是實質資產，所謂「爛船都有三斤釘」。因此，觀察到熊市中，房產股及能源股在初期往往同步隨大市下跌，但慢慢地，會隨市場信心逐漸回復，令市場重新注意其實質資產價值，股價跌勢自然放緩，股價找到支持並可進行築底工程，一旦確認底部，股價有望漸回升。
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