While the DailyFX Carry Trade Index was modestly higher over the past week, the strategy (and overall risk sentiment) is on the verge of a breakout with earnings season kicking off and signs of a deepening financial crisis popping up all over the market. Today, the carry index stood at 28,935 – 101 points above last Friday’s level. However, looking at the chart below, it is easy to grasp the pressure building behind an inevitable break in the market’s cautious stance.
Since May, the basket has cut an ascending wedge with a horizontal resistance around 29,050. Perhaps offering a bias for the eventual trend development, market condition indicators are actually working their way lower despite improvements seen this past week. USDJPY risk reversals corrected considerably from its highest levels since last October and the volatility index is holding above the critical 10 percent figure.
The rebound in risk appetite seen from the March swing low has been slowly curbed by various signs that credit conditions and a lack of liquidity are still burdening the financial markets. Recently, a Bank of England credit report forecasted that the credit market – the life blood of investment – would worsen through the third quarter.
Such a forecast is troubling considering European banks are paying the highest prices in a decade to raise capital just to meet reserve requirements, while the governmentally sponsored Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the US are paying record yields in their own efforts to fortify reserves.
In the weeks ahead, speculation that these two lenders may require a government bailout or face bankruptcy will help to define the overall direction of risk trends; and the debate is lively. St. Louis Fed President William Poole has suggested the government step in now as the companies are essentially insolvent. Another driver for risk trends and the carry trade will be banks’ second quarter earnings numbers, which start to hit the wires next week.
Monday, July 14, 2008
DJIA at make or break level
We had upgraded our support level for the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) towards 11,100 from the 10,800-10,900 range and were expecting a rebound off that level. While the index closed at 11,000 after dipping to an intra-day low of 10,977, the wave pattern did not indicate that a significant low was in place.
From a psychological perspective, the selldown on Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae is reminiscent of the steep selldown on Bear Sterns at March lows. Both were the most actively traded stocks on NYSE but rebounded substantially above their lows on record volume.
The VIX index, which measures option volatility on the S&P100, however has not spiked up in a significant manner and still remains below January and March lows. Typically, a spike in VIX coincides with a significant low. We have not seen this yet.
At this juncture, the DJIA is at a make or break level. A close below 11,100 could see the index decline towards 10,800 before any meaningful rebound ensues. Until, it is shown that the 11,100 level can be held for two consecutive days, we recommend staying on the sidelines.
For the Straits Times Index (FSSTI), it has managed to hold above the 2,880 level despite a host of bad news, so that is encouraging. However, we would prefer to take the lead from chart formations on the US and adopt a wait and see stance for the early part of the week.
From a psychological perspective, the selldown on Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae is reminiscent of the steep selldown on Bear Sterns at March lows. Both were the most actively traded stocks on NYSE but rebounded substantially above their lows on record volume.
The VIX index, which measures option volatility on the S&P100, however has not spiked up in a significant manner and still remains below January and March lows. Typically, a spike in VIX coincides with a significant low. We have not seen this yet.
At this juncture, the DJIA is at a make or break level. A close below 11,100 could see the index decline towards 10,800 before any meaningful rebound ensues. Until, it is shown that the 11,100 level can be held for two consecutive days, we recommend staying on the sidelines.
For the Straits Times Index (FSSTI), it has managed to hold above the 2,880 level despite a host of bad news, so that is encouraging. However, we would prefer to take the lead from chart formations on the US and adopt a wait and see stance for the early part of the week.
Sunday, July 13, 2008
「 曾 氏 通 道 」 图的详细内容:
http://www.editgrid.com/user/thomaswu0530/%E6%9B%BE%E6%B0%8F%E9%80%9A%E9%81%93%E6%8C%87%E6%A8%99_%28support_all-in-one%29?ro=1
自制曾渊沧教授的 曾氏通道
1. 到yahoo.com.hk的财经。
2. 找HANGSENG INDEX的过往股价。
3. 在网页右下角click”下载试算表(Spreadsheet)版本” download 恒指从1986年到即日的收市价。
4. 打开excel file，delete “Open, High,Low,Close,Volume”的column。
5. 把资料按”递增排序”。
6. 把每日的恒指收市价TAKE natutal LOG (公式为”= ln(b2)” ==> C column。
7. 绘图精灵 → XY散点图 → plot 点。
8. 按”图表” → “加上趋势线” → click “线性”，搞掂，enjoy!
自制曾渊沧教授的 曾氏通道
1. 到yahoo.com.hk的财经。
2. 找HANGSENG INDEX的过往股价。
3. 在网页右下角click”下载试算表(Spreadsheet)版本” download 恒指从1986年到即日的收市价。
4. 打开excel file，delete “Open, High,Low,Close,Volume”的column。
5. 把资料按”递增排序”。
6. 把每日的恒指收市价TAKE natutal LOG (公式为”= ln(b2)” ==> C column。
7. 绘图精灵 → XY散点图 → plot 点。
8. 按”图表” → “加上趋势线” → click “线性”，搞掂，enjoy!
曾渊沧:熊市二期是陷阱还是机会
还记得恒指升上26000点时,大摩出报告说年底前见30000点。上周五,恒指回调至25000点,大摩又出报告将多只大蓝筹股降级,其中包括汇丰、港交所、国泰。大户翻云覆雨,市场好,诱你入市;市场清淡,踏上一脚。
不过,由于恒指由2万点上升至26000点以上的过程实在太快,许多人都错失了入市的机会,更有不少人在恒指24000点左右卖掉了手中的股票,等待调整,希望在调整之后入市。这正是熊市二期的特征。
熊市二期的战略很值得讨论,不同人有不同的做法。有人认为,熊市二期是个陷阱,引诱你追货。让你在低价入货,然后趁高出货获利,或者让你手上的“蟹货”得以解套。
认为熊市二期是陷阱的理论是因为熊市一期股市狂泻时,不少人在低价沽出股票。他们忍受不住股市狂跌的恐慌情绪,只好卖股减压。一个人如果在低价时卖股,他不可能有足够的冷静和思维能力在更低价格入市。比如,你在恒指22000点的时候卖股票,就不可能有胆量在21000点,在3月18日的恐慌情绪中入市。之后,当恒指开始回升,你也不可能也不敢入市。因为你沽售股票是在22000点,当时你是在恐慌性地抛售。因此,就算恒指回升至24000点,你的恐慌心理仍未消失。只有当恒指如道氏理论所言,回升至下跌幅度50%以上时,你才会开始克服恐慌心态,但是取而代之的是贪婪。
你在22000点卖股票,且不论是赚还是亏,手上总有了点现金,有了钱就手痒,就会有贪念。这时候,大行也会出来努力唱好。一般而言,大行唱好之后的短时间,股市向上的机会是大一些的。因为大行唱好之后就入市买股,以证明他们的眼光是准确的。但是,当你以更高价追货的时候,大行就开始脱手,但是嘴上还会继续唱好。当恒指目标价一再推高,大行就会把手里的股票静悄悄地放出来,让你接货。去年,多少大行高唱恒指要到达36000点,甚至40000点?我想,大家应该还是记忆犹新吧。如果你是上述那种人,熊市二期绝对是一个陷阱。
不过,如果你有能力在恒指30000点、28000点、26000点,最差是24000点卖股票的话,你就有胆量在21000点入市捕捉熊市二期的反弹。因为你沽售的价格比较高,21000点再入市就算有足够的折扣。或者你在整个熊市一期阶段都坚守不卖,熊市二期对你来说也是个机会,是可以以较高的价格卖股票的。
无论是陷阱,还是机会,其实都靠人把握。
不过,由于恒指由2万点上升至26000点以上的过程实在太快,许多人都错失了入市的机会,更有不少人在恒指24000点左右卖掉了手中的股票,等待调整,希望在调整之后入市。这正是熊市二期的特征。
熊市二期的战略很值得讨论,不同人有不同的做法。有人认为,熊市二期是个陷阱,引诱你追货。让你在低价入货,然后趁高出货获利,或者让你手上的“蟹货”得以解套。
认为熊市二期是陷阱的理论是因为熊市一期股市狂泻时,不少人在低价沽出股票。他们忍受不住股市狂跌的恐慌情绪,只好卖股减压。一个人如果在低价时卖股,他不可能有足够的冷静和思维能力在更低价格入市。比如,你在恒指22000点的时候卖股票,就不可能有胆量在21000点,在3月18日的恐慌情绪中入市。之后,当恒指开始回升,你也不可能也不敢入市。因为你沽售股票是在22000点,当时你是在恐慌性地抛售。因此,就算恒指回升至24000点,你的恐慌心理仍未消失。只有当恒指如道氏理论所言,回升至下跌幅度50%以上时,你才会开始克服恐慌心态,但是取而代之的是贪婪。
你在22000点卖股票,且不论是赚还是亏,手上总有了点现金,有了钱就手痒,就会有贪念。这时候,大行也会出来努力唱好。一般而言,大行唱好之后的短时间,股市向上的机会是大一些的。因为大行唱好之后就入市买股,以证明他们的眼光是准确的。但是,当你以更高价追货的时候,大行就开始脱手,但是嘴上还会继续唱好。当恒指目标价一再推高,大行就会把手里的股票静悄悄地放出来,让你接货。去年,多少大行高唱恒指要到达36000点,甚至40000点?我想,大家应该还是记忆犹新吧。如果你是上述那种人,熊市二期绝对是一个陷阱。
不过,如果你有能力在恒指30000点、28000点、26000点,最差是24000点卖股票的话,你就有胆量在21000点入市捕捉熊市二期的反弹。因为你沽售的价格比较高,21000点再入市就算有足够的折扣。或者你在整个熊市一期阶段都坚守不卖,熊市二期对你来说也是个机会,是可以以较高的价格卖股票的。
无论是陷阱,还是机会,其实都靠人把握。
曹仁超畅谈三十年驰骋金融市场
曹仁超投资戒条
一、无论情况如何紧记沟上唔沟落。
二、股票市场系赚钱地方 , 因此绝对要跟红顶白而非锄强扶弱 , 几时都应吸纳强势股，沽出弱势股。
三、持有蚀本股不放有两大损失： A、股价上既损失 , B、失去将资金投资其它项目既损失。因此绝对要止蚀。
四、股市唔系低价买入高价卖出既地方 ( 冇人做得到 ) , 应该高价买入更高价卖出 , 因此宜高追不宜趁低买入。
五、牛市中错失获利机会冇有怕 , 因为下一浪更高 ; 熊市中宁可赚少D， 亦不应太迟离市。
六、股市表现可能同自己想法背驰好耐 , 所以淡市莫估底 , 旺市莫估顶。
七、第一次出现裂口上升时不妨买入 , 如出现制裂回落系时候离开。
八、旺市时不妨胆大D， 因为形势在我 , 淡市时少玩。
九、投资成功先了解基本因素 , 再利用技术分析决定买卖时机 , 只识技术分析唔了解基本因素者 , 只系花拳绣腿 ( 睇得但唔打得 ) 。
十、升市将尽小心「单日转向」或「单周转向」走势 , 通常几有用。最简单的技术分析最有用 , 太复杂的技术分析只系用黎吓初学者。
十一、 了解群众心理亦十分有用 , 因群众常常睇错市。
十二、止蚀唔止赚 , 通常卖出之后股价才大升 , 我地少赚 50% 或以上。获利回吐易 , 止蚀卖出难 , 只有克服上述心理 , 才能在股市立足。
庞 ：很多读者和我有很多客户，都一直看曹生你的专栏，你过去提出很多好建议，一直都赚了钱。目前新一代的投资多着眼于个人理财，其实，个人理财为何如此重要呢？年青一代在学校又无学习，我们应该何时开始制定个人理财计划？个人理财的范围应该怎样呢？
曹 ：在现代商业社会，如果你要生活愉快，我相信最好是拥有一定数量的金钱。譬如说，你想约女朋友渡过一个很好的烛光晚餐；或者你突然间决定暑假去海外旅行；当子女长大了，他们希望去外国读书；甚至谈婚论嫁，你都希望搞得富丽堂煌；如果你手上有笔钱，我相信，起码令你生活更加愉快。
如何发掘第一桶金
庞 ：但怎样得到第一笔钱？即所谓的第一桶金呢？
曹 ：我个人经常有个愿望，最好有父荫。如果上一代努力辛勤，留下一笔遗产给我们，这是很开心的事。不过，我相信，不是每一个人都有父荫，所以，自己努力去建立一笔财产都好重要。
庞 ：嗯。
曹 ：记得我离开中学时，看到电视上，有一间银行买广告叫人储蓄，说储蓄可以致富，储蓄有亭台楼阁，积少成多，日后富甲一方。那时候，我觉得这个是天大的笑话，因为由第二次世界大战开始之后，凯恩斯的信徒，就已经主宰全世界所有自由经济国家的决策权，他们经常利用赤字预算，去刺激经济成长，这成为了中央银行既定的政策。长期来说，存款利率一定低过通胀，以一百元为例，银行给你五厘息，你一年后收回一百零五元；但香港的通胀率有百分之八，所以你得回来的实质购买能力祇得九十六点六元。
如果你成世都希望储蓄的话，根本是参加一场永远打不赢的仗；靠储蓄致富，只是银行家的口吻，这就是个人理财慢慢兴起的最大理由。
庞 ：如果个人理财照你所讲，是希望投资能够高过通胀，当然有两种做法。有些人可能拼搏一些，拼命工作去创业，甚至主动拿出资金找投资机会；但有些人却不会那么拼搏，有多余钱才去投资，其实两种做法有甚么分别呢？
曹 ：所谓吃得苦中苦，方为人上人，很多人都想做老板。
庞 ：对呀！
曹 ：坦白说，上市公司只得五百几间，想成功，机会率不是那么高；所以，各位在做老板之前，最好自己问一问，本身是不是大富大贵的人。以普通人来讲，我都主张做「人中人」好些，「人中人」即是说做中产阶级，打份工。以现在香港人的收入来说，我相信，储蓄十万元，三几年间都应该可以达到目标，剩下来的就是福利的问题；如果你将十万元，每年希望升值百分之二十的话，十年之后已经变成六十二万、二十年后是三百八十万、三十年后就二千三百万。
庞 ：很厉害！
曹 ：换言之，我相信很多朋友，大部分在自己有生之年，都可以成为千万富翁，不过要清楚，三十年后的二千三百万元购买力，大约等于目前五百几万，数目不是很大！至于说，何时开始做投资理财，我认为越早越好，二十岁开始、五十岁已经是千万富翁；相反来说，如果你五十岁才开始的话，到八十岁才做到千万富翁。
有计划成功在握
庞 ：我自己都试过，二十岁的时候赚到一些钱，就去买架靓车，或者花掉所有钱，这样又如何储蓄得到第一笔钱？对年青人来说，有时的确很难做，又要悭、不要乱花钱、不要带女朋友去看戏、去行街、这样，年青人如何储到足够的投资本钱？
曹 ：做「人上人」就辛苦，如果你想做「人下人」的话，便很容易。我自己打开电视机，见到很多老人家靠公援金过活，内心有时都感到几闷。相信大部分的老人家，他们过去都很努力，为何如今会如此凄凉？最大的原因是他们不懂得个人理财，结果辛辛苦苦储蓄的钱，在通货膨胀蚕食之下，已经完全失去购买能力，变成年老无依，的确很可怜。我自己认为，传媒有责任告诉读者或听众，如果你越早开始捱那三几年，你这一世都会很开心；相反来说，如果你一开始的时候，便胡乱花钱，那么，我就好担心，到你六、七十岁的时候，大有可能沦为「人下人」。
庞 ：曹生、七十年代跟八十年代，九十年代比较，个人理财究竟有什么不同？其实，过往有什么经验，仍然值得我们在目前九十年代参考呢？
曹 ：七十年代，可以说经历了高通胀时代，最主要一点，我相信与一九七一年美元同黄金脱有关，所以，一切实物都成为投资对象，好像黄金、古董、名画、物业、股票，可以说整个方针是在保值方面。
作为香港人，最好的投资当然是黄金，七零年的时候，黄金二百几元一盎斯，到一九八零年已经升至四千八百元，升幅接近二十倍，可以说，除了石油之外，没有其它的投资有这么大的升幅。但是，到了八十年代，美国的货币政策改变了，美国联邦储备局利用高息去压制通胀，所以高通胀时代便告结束了。另一方面，利率亦由高峰期一步一步回落，在息口向下的情形下，当然买楼、买股票最好。记得在八四、八五时，当我叫人买楼时，那时楼价六百几元一呎，但到九四年第一季，每尺楼价已经见六千几元。
庞 ：十倍升幅！
曹 ：对。恒生指数当时是八百点，九四年时已经见万二千点，升幅十五倍。虽然比不上七十年代金价的升幅，但相信是另一个致富机会。问题是到了九十年代，香港经济亦进入了成熟期，那些有十几倍升幅的投资已很难存在，好像大家坐缆车，坐了上山顶之后，就打圈圈，望落太平山下，景色无限，但是你想更上一层楼便相当困难了！
登山远望美景无穷
庞 ：这个比喻真是很贴切！如果我整日在山顶打圈，又要做个人理财，通胀虽低但仍然存在，有百份之七左右。究竟在现时来说，应如何投资？应该投资中国，或是放眼世界呢？
曹 ：可以说，香港高速增长期已成过去，相信最后踏入稳定增长期，未来当然还有机会，但不容易把握，以香港的发展经验，我相信亚太区已经遍地开花了，如果我们用从香港获得的经验再看南韩、台湾、马来西亚，泰国，印尼，他们是正在重复过去一、二十年香港发生的事，我们以过来人的身份去到这些地方投资，相信占了很大的便宜。
庞 ：今天，很多香港人都去过星马泰旅游，经常看到这些地方，譬如过去我们去台湾的时候，当地的发展与今日比较已经不同，其它东协的市场亦一样。我想问一问，目前在个人理财方面，包括青年人、壮年同老年人、在策略上有没有什么不同呢？
曹 ：我自己就相信「少壮不努力，老大徒悲伤」的话，所以，我很鼓励年青人一离开学校的时候，省吃俭用三、几年，储蓄第一笔资金，就开始制定理财计划；因为人到壮年时，通常负担相当大，譬如结了婚、有子女、或者正在供层楼呀︰︰︰
庞 ：这样很难储蓄的？
曹 ：储蓄就很辛苦。至于老人家，到年纪大的时候再开始计划理财，我担心时间方面对他们很不利，所以，我很鼓励年青人一开始的时候，就订立自己的个人理财计划，这样到中年、老年，你就可以享受黄金岁月，当你年纪大的时候，你再将自己二、三十年的经验传给下一代，帮助他们建立正确的理财方法，一家大小的生活都好愉快。
庞 ：这就是说，我们先苦后甜，先吃少少苦头，后来的果实应该不错了！
曹 ：对。
庞 ：打工仔同创业的人有什么不同？不同性别对个人理财有没有影响和分别呢？
曹 ：打工仔同创业的人根本是两类人。一般的创业者，除了你有父荫之外，开始创业的时候，资金通常都不足够，如果在那一刻，叫他再拿一些钱作其它投资的话，便相当辛苦。所以，我唯一的忠告是希望他埋头苦干，所谓「精诚所至、金石为开」，只要努力的话，我相信创业都可以成功的。
至于男与女之间，香港基本上已经到了男女平等的阶段，所以分别不大。然而性格方面，男女始终有别，所以，我主张，最好夫妻档，以免日后为了金钱而伤脑筋，最好采用有限公司，因为香港组织一间有限公司成本不大；这样，男的性格就进取，女的性格就稳健，组合最完美。
庞 ：对。这样就有平衡的作用。
曹 ：是。
庞 ：如果有财产，即已经有一笔钱的人又应如何理财？
曹 ：这个世界上，不同的人最大的分别，就是你有钱和无钱。假设你有一千万以上的话，可以说钱的作用就越来越小。譬如你住的房屋可能大一些，或者说你坐Benz、我就驾日本车；你有游艇、我没有。至于有一亿元以上，我的感觉就只不过是数字游戏，可以说，钱能够买的东西你已经可以买到；至于钱买不到的东西，你更富有都无办法买到。
我的想法是，以普通人来讲，当你的财富打破了一千万关之后，我认为人生追求的目标，应该由金钱转移到其它的地方，例如你自己的健康、你家庭生活是不是愉快、对子女之间的关怀是否足够，对朋友之间的帮助有无做到等，以免劳碌一生，除了金钱之外，一片空白。
顺其自然可发挥潜力
庞 ：但是，目前刚刚毕业的年青人，除了你刚才讲节俭一点、储蓄多一些钱之外，怎样可以快一点赚到第一桶金呢？其实从事哪一个行业较好？或者，会不会香港目前的薪酬水平，已不像以往那十几年般，每年有十几个百份点的增长，这样，我不如去中国做事？或到一些新兴市场工作，包食包住，我们就容易储到钱？
曹 ：我在过去一、二十年常常收到读者的来信，问相同的问题，通常我的答复都认为：「有心栽花花不发；无心插柳柳成荫」。我相信，二十五年前谭咏麟先生都不知道唱歌原来可以发达的。
庞 ：有个红馆呀。
曹 ：我相信成龙都不知道，原来打功夫亦可以发达。今时今日，张德培先生的成就，已清楚告诉我们，原来打网球也可以发达的。所以我认为，不要勉强自己做一些自己不喜欢做的事。这个世界谋事在人、成事在天；至于你努力专心于自己有兴趣的事业，我想迟早都有时来运到的一天。如果你一味只望发达，一时好彩，你赚到少少钱，但我相信始终不是长远之计。
庞 ：所以最好是自己勤力些，同找到自己的兴趣，一路发挥，迟早有机会出头，所谓行行出状元。九七以后，中国已收回香港的主权，我们个人理财的策略有没有改变呢？会不会放眼中国更有作为？因为中国的经济增长每年都有百份之十，高速增长。你的看法如何呢？
曹 ：我相信，香港回归中国之后，英治时代在香港结束，大家希望见到的，是港治时代的开始。过去因为政治因素，英资在香港经济及投资方面占了不少便宜，日后这个优势肯定会失去。但是，我们希望见到香港可以建立一个公平竞争的社会，即是许家屯先生同我们写那篇文章所讲：「白晋敬酒、能者绝欢」，我不希望见到中资企业取代了英资的地位，走了一班旧人，来了一班新贵。
如果九七年香港还保持公平竞争的制度，我相信，未来香港的前途还是光明的。如果今时今日良好的公务员制度受到影响，我们坚信的法治精神受到动摇，一步一步走向金权政治，有财的人与有势的人勾结在一起，令到社会充满不公平的话，这样，我便担心九七后，香港的前途是悲观的。到目前为止，我还未确知道香港走哪个方向，所以我相信，理财策略要迟一两年后，才可以跟大家深入讨论。
善用止蚀立于不败
庞 ：暂时是不是应该按兵不动呢？
曹 ：我相信亚太区提供了很多良机，因此，大家不妨利用一两年的时间，建立自己对整个亚太区经济发展的了解，这对大家将来一定有帮助。
庞 ：个人理财有没有什么必胜的投资法？怎样做法可使到自己起码立于不败之地呢？
曹 ：必胜术我就无啦！不败之地我就有，其实做法很简单，善用止蚀。任何投资，如果说，价格跌破了百分之十或者百分之十五，你就止蚀。我自己就很喜欢利用十八日平均数，任何股票投资了后，如果股价跌破十八天平均数，通常我都会卖回出去。
庞 ：卖回出去？
曹 ：对。
庞 ：曹先生、你对大家在投资方面有什么忠告呢？
曹 ：我记得胡汉辉先生跟我说过：「能知三日事富贵万千年」，所以，这个世界是无先知的。真正成功的人都有良好策略，而不是盲目跟大队；所以，在事前对事件了解多一些，就好过事后后悔。
庞 ：大家在投资之前一定做好功课啦！
曹 ：对。
庞 ：做足功课，好的开始就是成功的一半。
曹 ：对啦、对啦！
庞 ：这个是很重要的。在个人理财方面，刚才曹生讲了，当有蚀价的时候就应该止蚀，有句说话大家都听过：「赚就赚粒糖、蚀就蚀间厂」。这一点值得大家记取。
曹 ：是。
庞 ：赚钱的时候，大家赚少少就卖出；但蚀的时候，就死持不放，于是蚀得更惨了！
曹 ：对！
庞 ：所以止蚀这个方法很重要。曹生、你觉得个人理财怎样算成功？怎样算失败呢？
曹 ：有人喜欢搵快钱，我记得以前帮香港电台做一个「雄财伟略」的节目时，在最后一辑，我对他们讲过几句说话，就是「种树与种花」。
庞 ：种树和种花又与投资有什么关系？
曹 ：一个人如果想生活愉快，拥有一棵树是会几开心的，这棵树每年能够提供很多果实，而且还源源不断，替你照顾下一代！
庞 ：有树荫了！
曹 ：对！
庞 ：但树需要很久去培育，所谓「十年树木、百年树人」；对完成短期的目标，或者说，如何运用短期的资金，赚到第一桶金呢？
曹 ：所以这就需要去种花了！种花的好处是一两个月的辛劳，你立刻见到成果，但是一场风吹雨打，又可能使你的成果一败涂地。因此，在一棵树未成长的时候，你需要种些花去帮补一下自己。
庞 ：而且还要分散投资，种植很多种花。
曹 ：对呀！
庞 ：世界上有一些著名的投资专家，譬如华伦巴菲特，他自己都强调长线投资，他的威水史就是在四十年内，赚到一百四十亿美金的资产。其实你给他一万元，一万元的投资，在四十年内赚了八十倍，已经八千万了。他觉得，每个人都可以投资致富，祇要勤力、坚毅、理性、自律！有这些性格就行！曹生个人对此有何看法？
曹 ：听你所讲好像很惊人，因为你所讲是八十倍回报。资金有几百亿！其实这不外是福利。祇要你每年令自己的财产增长百份之二十五，四十年后你就是第二个巴菲特。关键是持之以恒，不是一年，而是年年百份之廿五，四十年后，你的财富已经可以同巴菲特媲美。
庞 ：甚至比他更厉害！
曹 ：相信如此。
跟投资项目拍拖或做人世
庞 ：目前来讲，是信息的时代，好的信息就等于财富，使你很容易赚到钱。但因信息爆炸，譬如，报章又有那么多投资专家，他们之中，有些看好、有些却看淡，作为普通投资者如何拣选这些信息，帮助自己去投资？你有什么忠告？或者有什么心得？
曹 ：我觉得，太多信息反而累事。各位都有拍拖的经验，两人不见面的时候，真是天下美女何其多；但可以做你太太的，我相信祇有一个。你未结婚之前比些心机去拣，拣一个同你性格、理想方面都相当匹配；这样，你跟她／他共同生活，我相信婚姻才会愉快。另一方面，若你朝秦暮楚，我相信到今时今日，你的婚姻生活都不会愉快。
拣选信息好、拣选投资基金经理也好、或者拣股票亦好，道理一样。你面对几百只股票，信息爆炸；过千的基金，总有些是适合你的。你慢慢拣到适合自己的项目，你去与它长期相处，我相信未来二、三十年，大家会好愉快。
庞 ：即是说，自己开首的时候要花多些时间，去看一下、拣选一下、同时跟它拍一拍拖，了解清楚，然后先慢慢委托终身，长期相处。
曹 ：拍拖时就不妨多心，结了婚之后就应该一条心。
庞 ：最后，我就想问曹生一个问题，你自己在报纸上写专栏教人投资，其实同你自己的投资有什么不同？如何做到言与行一样，如出一辙，而且能够收赚钱效果呢？
曹 ：我刚刚开始写投资专栏时，犯过所有今时今日投资者应该犯的错误，经过自己痛苦的摸索后，我才知道短线与长线的分别。可以说，经过二十几年之后，我目前手上的投资，大部分都是中长线的。短线、我就已经很少涉及！经验这样的东西需要时间去累积。年青人不妨多尝试，看有哪一样东西适合自己。但经过一段时间后，你会摸索到自己的投资策略，然后持之以恒，相信到了老年阶段，各位的身家都应该不会少！
一、无论情况如何紧记沟上唔沟落。
二、股票市场系赚钱地方 , 因此绝对要跟红顶白而非锄强扶弱 , 几时都应吸纳强势股，沽出弱势股。
三、持有蚀本股不放有两大损失： A、股价上既损失 , B、失去将资金投资其它项目既损失。因此绝对要止蚀。
四、股市唔系低价买入高价卖出既地方 ( 冇人做得到 ) , 应该高价买入更高价卖出 , 因此宜高追不宜趁低买入。
五、牛市中错失获利机会冇有怕 , 因为下一浪更高 ; 熊市中宁可赚少D， 亦不应太迟离市。
六、股市表现可能同自己想法背驰好耐 , 所以淡市莫估底 , 旺市莫估顶。
七、第一次出现裂口上升时不妨买入 , 如出现制裂回落系时候离开。
八、旺市时不妨胆大D， 因为形势在我 , 淡市时少玩。
九、投资成功先了解基本因素 , 再利用技术分析决定买卖时机 , 只识技术分析唔了解基本因素者 , 只系花拳绣腿 ( 睇得但唔打得 ) 。
十、升市将尽小心「单日转向」或「单周转向」走势 , 通常几有用。最简单的技术分析最有用 , 太复杂的技术分析只系用黎吓初学者。
十一、 了解群众心理亦十分有用 , 因群众常常睇错市。
十二、止蚀唔止赚 , 通常卖出之后股价才大升 , 我地少赚 50% 或以上。获利回吐易 , 止蚀卖出难 , 只有克服上述心理 , 才能在股市立足。
庞 ：很多读者和我有很多客户，都一直看曹生你的专栏，你过去提出很多好建议，一直都赚了钱。目前新一代的投资多着眼于个人理财，其实，个人理财为何如此重要呢？年青一代在学校又无学习，我们应该何时开始制定个人理财计划？个人理财的范围应该怎样呢？
曹 ：在现代商业社会，如果你要生活愉快，我相信最好是拥有一定数量的金钱。譬如说，你想约女朋友渡过一个很好的烛光晚餐；或者你突然间决定暑假去海外旅行；当子女长大了，他们希望去外国读书；甚至谈婚论嫁，你都希望搞得富丽堂煌；如果你手上有笔钱，我相信，起码令你生活更加愉快。
如何发掘第一桶金
庞 ：但怎样得到第一笔钱？即所谓的第一桶金呢？
曹 ：我个人经常有个愿望，最好有父荫。如果上一代努力辛勤，留下一笔遗产给我们，这是很开心的事。不过，我相信，不是每一个人都有父荫，所以，自己努力去建立一笔财产都好重要。
庞 ：嗯。
曹 ：记得我离开中学时，看到电视上，有一间银行买广告叫人储蓄，说储蓄可以致富，储蓄有亭台楼阁，积少成多，日后富甲一方。那时候，我觉得这个是天大的笑话，因为由第二次世界大战开始之后，凯恩斯的信徒，就已经主宰全世界所有自由经济国家的决策权，他们经常利用赤字预算，去刺激经济成长，这成为了中央银行既定的政策。长期来说，存款利率一定低过通胀，以一百元为例，银行给你五厘息，你一年后收回一百零五元；但香港的通胀率有百分之八，所以你得回来的实质购买能力祇得九十六点六元。
如果你成世都希望储蓄的话，根本是参加一场永远打不赢的仗；靠储蓄致富，只是银行家的口吻，这就是个人理财慢慢兴起的最大理由。
庞 ：如果个人理财照你所讲，是希望投资能够高过通胀，当然有两种做法。有些人可能拼搏一些，拼命工作去创业，甚至主动拿出资金找投资机会；但有些人却不会那么拼搏，有多余钱才去投资，其实两种做法有甚么分别呢？
曹 ：所谓吃得苦中苦，方为人上人，很多人都想做老板。
庞 ：对呀！
曹 ：坦白说，上市公司只得五百几间，想成功，机会率不是那么高；所以，各位在做老板之前，最好自己问一问，本身是不是大富大贵的人。以普通人来讲，我都主张做「人中人」好些，「人中人」即是说做中产阶级，打份工。以现在香港人的收入来说，我相信，储蓄十万元，三几年间都应该可以达到目标，剩下来的就是福利的问题；如果你将十万元，每年希望升值百分之二十的话，十年之后已经变成六十二万、二十年后是三百八十万、三十年后就二千三百万。
庞 ：很厉害！
曹 ：换言之，我相信很多朋友，大部分在自己有生之年，都可以成为千万富翁，不过要清楚，三十年后的二千三百万元购买力，大约等于目前五百几万，数目不是很大！至于说，何时开始做投资理财，我认为越早越好，二十岁开始、五十岁已经是千万富翁；相反来说，如果你五十岁才开始的话，到八十岁才做到千万富翁。
有计划成功在握
庞 ：我自己都试过，二十岁的时候赚到一些钱，就去买架靓车，或者花掉所有钱，这样又如何储蓄得到第一笔钱？对年青人来说，有时的确很难做，又要悭、不要乱花钱、不要带女朋友去看戏、去行街、这样，年青人如何储到足够的投资本钱？
曹 ：做「人上人」就辛苦，如果你想做「人下人」的话，便很容易。我自己打开电视机，见到很多老人家靠公援金过活，内心有时都感到几闷。相信大部分的老人家，他们过去都很努力，为何如今会如此凄凉？最大的原因是他们不懂得个人理财，结果辛辛苦苦储蓄的钱，在通货膨胀蚕食之下，已经完全失去购买能力，变成年老无依，的确很可怜。我自己认为，传媒有责任告诉读者或听众，如果你越早开始捱那三几年，你这一世都会很开心；相反来说，如果你一开始的时候，便胡乱花钱，那么，我就好担心，到你六、七十岁的时候，大有可能沦为「人下人」。
庞 ：曹生、七十年代跟八十年代，九十年代比较，个人理财究竟有什么不同？其实，过往有什么经验，仍然值得我们在目前九十年代参考呢？
曹 ：七十年代，可以说经历了高通胀时代，最主要一点，我相信与一九七一年美元同黄金脱有关，所以，一切实物都成为投资对象，好像黄金、古董、名画、物业、股票，可以说整个方针是在保值方面。
作为香港人，最好的投资当然是黄金，七零年的时候，黄金二百几元一盎斯，到一九八零年已经升至四千八百元，升幅接近二十倍，可以说，除了石油之外，没有其它的投资有这么大的升幅。但是，到了八十年代，美国的货币政策改变了，美国联邦储备局利用高息去压制通胀，所以高通胀时代便告结束了。另一方面，利率亦由高峰期一步一步回落，在息口向下的情形下，当然买楼、买股票最好。记得在八四、八五时，当我叫人买楼时，那时楼价六百几元一呎，但到九四年第一季，每尺楼价已经见六千几元。
庞 ：十倍升幅！
曹 ：对。恒生指数当时是八百点，九四年时已经见万二千点，升幅十五倍。虽然比不上七十年代金价的升幅，但相信是另一个致富机会。问题是到了九十年代，香港经济亦进入了成熟期，那些有十几倍升幅的投资已很难存在，好像大家坐缆车，坐了上山顶之后，就打圈圈，望落太平山下，景色无限，但是你想更上一层楼便相当困难了！
登山远望美景无穷
庞 ：这个比喻真是很贴切！如果我整日在山顶打圈，又要做个人理财，通胀虽低但仍然存在，有百份之七左右。究竟在现时来说，应如何投资？应该投资中国，或是放眼世界呢？
曹 ：可以说，香港高速增长期已成过去，相信最后踏入稳定增长期，未来当然还有机会，但不容易把握，以香港的发展经验，我相信亚太区已经遍地开花了，如果我们用从香港获得的经验再看南韩、台湾、马来西亚，泰国，印尼，他们是正在重复过去一、二十年香港发生的事，我们以过来人的身份去到这些地方投资，相信占了很大的便宜。
庞 ：今天，很多香港人都去过星马泰旅游，经常看到这些地方，譬如过去我们去台湾的时候，当地的发展与今日比较已经不同，其它东协的市场亦一样。我想问一问，目前在个人理财方面，包括青年人、壮年同老年人、在策略上有没有什么不同呢？
曹 ：我自己就相信「少壮不努力，老大徒悲伤」的话，所以，我很鼓励年青人一离开学校的时候，省吃俭用三、几年，储蓄第一笔资金，就开始制定理财计划；因为人到壮年时，通常负担相当大，譬如结了婚、有子女、或者正在供层楼呀︰︰︰
庞 ：这样很难储蓄的？
曹 ：储蓄就很辛苦。至于老人家，到年纪大的时候再开始计划理财，我担心时间方面对他们很不利，所以，我很鼓励年青人一开始的时候，就订立自己的个人理财计划，这样到中年、老年，你就可以享受黄金岁月，当你年纪大的时候，你再将自己二、三十年的经验传给下一代，帮助他们建立正确的理财方法，一家大小的生活都好愉快。
庞 ：这就是说，我们先苦后甜，先吃少少苦头，后来的果实应该不错了！
曹 ：对。
庞 ：打工仔同创业的人有什么不同？不同性别对个人理财有没有影响和分别呢？
曹 ：打工仔同创业的人根本是两类人。一般的创业者，除了你有父荫之外，开始创业的时候，资金通常都不足够，如果在那一刻，叫他再拿一些钱作其它投资的话，便相当辛苦。所以，我唯一的忠告是希望他埋头苦干，所谓「精诚所至、金石为开」，只要努力的话，我相信创业都可以成功的。
至于男与女之间，香港基本上已经到了男女平等的阶段，所以分别不大。然而性格方面，男女始终有别，所以，我主张，最好夫妻档，以免日后为了金钱而伤脑筋，最好采用有限公司，因为香港组织一间有限公司成本不大；这样，男的性格就进取，女的性格就稳健，组合最完美。
庞 ：对。这样就有平衡的作用。
曹 ：是。
庞 ：如果有财产，即已经有一笔钱的人又应如何理财？
曹 ：这个世界上，不同的人最大的分别，就是你有钱和无钱。假设你有一千万以上的话，可以说钱的作用就越来越小。譬如你住的房屋可能大一些，或者说你坐Benz、我就驾日本车；你有游艇、我没有。至于有一亿元以上，我的感觉就只不过是数字游戏，可以说，钱能够买的东西你已经可以买到；至于钱买不到的东西，你更富有都无办法买到。
我的想法是，以普通人来讲，当你的财富打破了一千万关之后，我认为人生追求的目标，应该由金钱转移到其它的地方，例如你自己的健康、你家庭生活是不是愉快、对子女之间的关怀是否足够，对朋友之间的帮助有无做到等，以免劳碌一生，除了金钱之外，一片空白。
顺其自然可发挥潜力
庞 ：但是，目前刚刚毕业的年青人，除了你刚才讲节俭一点、储蓄多一些钱之外，怎样可以快一点赚到第一桶金呢？其实从事哪一个行业较好？或者，会不会香港目前的薪酬水平，已不像以往那十几年般，每年有十几个百份点的增长，这样，我不如去中国做事？或到一些新兴市场工作，包食包住，我们就容易储到钱？
曹 ：我在过去一、二十年常常收到读者的来信，问相同的问题，通常我的答复都认为：「有心栽花花不发；无心插柳柳成荫」。我相信，二十五年前谭咏麟先生都不知道唱歌原来可以发达的。
庞 ：有个红馆呀。
曹 ：我相信成龙都不知道，原来打功夫亦可以发达。今时今日，张德培先生的成就，已清楚告诉我们，原来打网球也可以发达的。所以我认为，不要勉强自己做一些自己不喜欢做的事。这个世界谋事在人、成事在天；至于你努力专心于自己有兴趣的事业，我想迟早都有时来运到的一天。如果你一味只望发达，一时好彩，你赚到少少钱，但我相信始终不是长远之计。
庞 ：所以最好是自己勤力些，同找到自己的兴趣，一路发挥，迟早有机会出头，所谓行行出状元。九七以后，中国已收回香港的主权，我们个人理财的策略有没有改变呢？会不会放眼中国更有作为？因为中国的经济增长每年都有百份之十，高速增长。你的看法如何呢？
曹 ：我相信，香港回归中国之后，英治时代在香港结束，大家希望见到的，是港治时代的开始。过去因为政治因素，英资在香港经济及投资方面占了不少便宜，日后这个优势肯定会失去。但是，我们希望见到香港可以建立一个公平竞争的社会，即是许家屯先生同我们写那篇文章所讲：「白晋敬酒、能者绝欢」，我不希望见到中资企业取代了英资的地位，走了一班旧人，来了一班新贵。
如果九七年香港还保持公平竞争的制度，我相信，未来香港的前途还是光明的。如果今时今日良好的公务员制度受到影响，我们坚信的法治精神受到动摇，一步一步走向金权政治，有财的人与有势的人勾结在一起，令到社会充满不公平的话，这样，我便担心九七后，香港的前途是悲观的。到目前为止，我还未确知道香港走哪个方向，所以我相信，理财策略要迟一两年后，才可以跟大家深入讨论。
善用止蚀立于不败
庞 ：暂时是不是应该按兵不动呢？
曹 ：我相信亚太区提供了很多良机，因此，大家不妨利用一两年的时间，建立自己对整个亚太区经济发展的了解，这对大家将来一定有帮助。
庞 ：个人理财有没有什么必胜的投资法？怎样做法可使到自己起码立于不败之地呢？
曹 ：必胜术我就无啦！不败之地我就有，其实做法很简单，善用止蚀。任何投资，如果说，价格跌破了百分之十或者百分之十五，你就止蚀。我自己就很喜欢利用十八日平均数，任何股票投资了后，如果股价跌破十八天平均数，通常我都会卖回出去。
庞 ：卖回出去？
曹 ：对。
庞 ：曹先生、你对大家在投资方面有什么忠告呢？
曹 ：我记得胡汉辉先生跟我说过：「能知三日事富贵万千年」，所以，这个世界是无先知的。真正成功的人都有良好策略，而不是盲目跟大队；所以，在事前对事件了解多一些，就好过事后后悔。
庞 ：大家在投资之前一定做好功课啦！
曹 ：对。
庞 ：做足功课，好的开始就是成功的一半。
曹 ：对啦、对啦！
庞 ：这个是很重要的。在个人理财方面，刚才曹生讲了，当有蚀价的时候就应该止蚀，有句说话大家都听过：「赚就赚粒糖、蚀就蚀间厂」。这一点值得大家记取。
曹 ：是。
庞 ：赚钱的时候，大家赚少少就卖出；但蚀的时候，就死持不放，于是蚀得更惨了！
曹 ：对！
庞 ：所以止蚀这个方法很重要。曹生、你觉得个人理财怎样算成功？怎样算失败呢？
曹 ：有人喜欢搵快钱，我记得以前帮香港电台做一个「雄财伟略」的节目时，在最后一辑，我对他们讲过几句说话，就是「种树与种花」。
庞 ：种树和种花又与投资有什么关系？
曹 ：一个人如果想生活愉快，拥有一棵树是会几开心的，这棵树每年能够提供很多果实，而且还源源不断，替你照顾下一代！
庞 ：有树荫了！
曹 ：对！
庞 ：但树需要很久去培育，所谓「十年树木、百年树人」；对完成短期的目标，或者说，如何运用短期的资金，赚到第一桶金呢？
曹 ：所以这就需要去种花了！种花的好处是一两个月的辛劳，你立刻见到成果，但是一场风吹雨打，又可能使你的成果一败涂地。因此，在一棵树未成长的时候，你需要种些花去帮补一下自己。
庞 ：而且还要分散投资，种植很多种花。
曹 ：对呀！
庞 ：世界上有一些著名的投资专家，譬如华伦巴菲特，他自己都强调长线投资，他的威水史就是在四十年内，赚到一百四十亿美金的资产。其实你给他一万元，一万元的投资，在四十年内赚了八十倍，已经八千万了。他觉得，每个人都可以投资致富，祇要勤力、坚毅、理性、自律！有这些性格就行！曹生个人对此有何看法？
曹 ：听你所讲好像很惊人，因为你所讲是八十倍回报。资金有几百亿！其实这不外是福利。祇要你每年令自己的财产增长百份之二十五，四十年后你就是第二个巴菲特。关键是持之以恒，不是一年，而是年年百份之廿五，四十年后，你的财富已经可以同巴菲特媲美。
庞 ：甚至比他更厉害！
曹 ：相信如此。
跟投资项目拍拖或做人世
庞 ：目前来讲，是信息的时代，好的信息就等于财富，使你很容易赚到钱。但因信息爆炸，譬如，报章又有那么多投资专家，他们之中，有些看好、有些却看淡，作为普通投资者如何拣选这些信息，帮助自己去投资？你有什么忠告？或者有什么心得？
曹 ：我觉得，太多信息反而累事。各位都有拍拖的经验，两人不见面的时候，真是天下美女何其多；但可以做你太太的，我相信祇有一个。你未结婚之前比些心机去拣，拣一个同你性格、理想方面都相当匹配；这样，你跟她／他共同生活，我相信婚姻才会愉快。另一方面，若你朝秦暮楚，我相信到今时今日，你的婚姻生活都不会愉快。
拣选信息好、拣选投资基金经理也好、或者拣股票亦好，道理一样。你面对几百只股票，信息爆炸；过千的基金，总有些是适合你的。你慢慢拣到适合自己的项目，你去与它长期相处，我相信未来二、三十年，大家会好愉快。
庞 ：即是说，自己开首的时候要花多些时间，去看一下、拣选一下、同时跟它拍一拍拖，了解清楚，然后先慢慢委托终身，长期相处。
曹 ：拍拖时就不妨多心，结了婚之后就应该一条心。
庞 ：最后，我就想问曹生一个问题，你自己在报纸上写专栏教人投资，其实同你自己的投资有什么不同？如何做到言与行一样，如出一辙，而且能够收赚钱效果呢？
曹 ：我刚刚开始写投资专栏时，犯过所有今时今日投资者应该犯的错误，经过自己痛苦的摸索后，我才知道短线与长线的分别。可以说，经过二十几年之后，我目前手上的投资，大部分都是中长线的。短线、我就已经很少涉及！经验这样的东西需要时间去累积。年青人不妨多尝试，看有哪一样东西适合自己。但经过一段时间后，你会摸索到自己的投资策略，然后持之以恒，相信到了老年阶段，各位的身家都应该不会少！
Orient Century undervalued?
Back some time ago, I analyzed the full year earnings of Orient Century, and i state that it has a good cashflow yield, return on investment capital and a solid balance sheet.
since then it has fallen alot. Last i check, it fell to 38.5 cts. So what went wrong?
Judging by the last quarterly report, nothing much! Most price fall nowadays can be attributed to systematic market volatility.
Lets look at the quarterly report. Relativly speaking, the profits are largely the same as last year quarter. Thats what you expect from education industry, where if you don’t price yourself out of it, business tend to be stable.
The best thing is this: Operating Cashflow have maintained at 17 mil RMB and they do not need to have much capital expenditure or capital expansion.
This adds 17 mil straight to their 190 mil of cash. So a falling market cap and a rising cash horde. What does that equate to?
Their last enterprise valeu is 114 mil RMB and if they do not grow their cashflow at an increasing pace, their terminal net operating cashflow after tax is around 47 mil RMB or so.
That means if u buy it at 38.5 cents now you are buying 2.4 years of cashflow. I think thats cheap. This business could sustain past 3 years!
since then it has fallen alot. Last i check, it fell to 38.5 cts. So what went wrong?
Judging by the last quarterly report, nothing much! Most price fall nowadays can be attributed to systematic market volatility.
Lets look at the quarterly report. Relativly speaking, the profits are largely the same as last year quarter. Thats what you expect from education industry, where if you don’t price yourself out of it, business tend to be stable.
The best thing is this: Operating Cashflow have maintained at 17 mil RMB and they do not need to have much capital expenditure or capital expansion.
This adds 17 mil straight to their 190 mil of cash. So a falling market cap and a rising cash horde. What does that equate to?
Their last enterprise valeu is 114 mil RMB and if they do not grow their cashflow at an increasing pace, their terminal net operating cashflow after tax is around 47 mil RMB or so.
That means if u buy it at 38.5 cents now you are buying 2.4 years of cashflow. I think thats cheap. This business could sustain past 3 years!
Saturday, July 12, 2008
Government shuts down mortgage lender IndyMac
IndyMac Bank's assets were seized by federal regulators on Friday after the mortgage lender succumbed to the pressures of tighter credit, tumbling home prices and rising foreclosures.
The bank is the largest regulated thrift to fail and the second largest financial institution to close in U.S. history, regulators said.
The Office of Thrift Supervision said it transferred IndyMac's operations to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation because it did not think the lender could meet its depositors' demands.
IndyMac customers with funds in the bank were limited to taking out money via automated teller machines over the weekend, debit card transactions or checks, regulators said.
Other bank services, such as online banking and phone banking were scheduled to be made available on Monday.
"This institution failed today due to a liquidity crisis," OTS Director John Reich said.
The lender's failure came the same day that financial markets plunged when investors tried to gauge whether the government would have to save mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
Shares of Fannie and Freddie dropped to 17-year lows before the stocks recovered somewhat. Wall Street is growing more convinced that the government will have to bail out the country's biggest mortgage financiers, whose failure could deal a tremendous blow to the already staggering economy.
The FDIC estimated that its takeover of IndyMac would cost between $4 billion and $8 billion.
IndyMac's collapse is second only to that of Continental Illinois National Bank, which had nearly $40 billion in assets when it failed in 1984, according to the FDIC.
News of the takeover distressed Alan Sands, who showed up at the company's headquarters in Pasadena, Calif., to find out when he could withdraw his funds.
"Hopefully the FDIC insurance will take care of it," said Sands, of El Monte, Calif. "I'm also kind of kicking myself for not taking care of this sooner, sooner as in the last couple of days."
A couple of dozen customers could be seen outside the building, reading fliers handed out by FDIC staff. The agency set up a toll-free number for bank customers to call.
IndyMac Bancorp Inc., the holding company for IndyMac Bank, has been struggling to raise capital as the housing slump deepens.
IndyMac had $32.01 billion in assets as of March 31.
The banking regulator said it closed IndyMac after customers began a run on the lender following the June 26 release of a letter by Sen. Charles Schumer, urging several bank regulatory agencies that they take steps to prevent IndyMac's collapse.
In the 11 days that followed the letter's release, depositors took out more than $1.3 billion, regulators said.
In a statement Friday, Schumer said IndyMac's failure was due to long-standing practices by the bank, not recent events.
"If OTS had done its job as regulator and not let IndyMac's poor and loose lending practices continue, we wouldn't be where we are today," Schumer said. "Instead of pointing false fingers of blame, OTS should start doing its job to prevent future IndyMacs."
The FDIC planned to reopen the bank on Monday as IndyMac Federal Bank, FSB.
Deposits are insured up to $100,000 per depositor.
As of March 31, IndyMac had total deposits of $19.06 billion.
Some 10,000 depositors had funds in excess of the insured limit, for a total of $1 billion in potentially uninsured funds, the FDIC said.
Customers with uninsured deposits could begin making appointments to file a claim with the FDIC on Monday. The agency said it would pay unsecured depositors an advance dividend equal to half of the uninsured amount.
During a conference call with reporters, FDIC Chairman Sheila C. Bair said the agency would cover all insured deposits and then try to recover its costs by selling IndyMac's assets.
"We anticipate trying to market the institution as a whole bank," Bair said. "How much money we derive from that will depend on who gets paid what."
Holders of unsecured IndyMac debt may not fully recover their investment, Bair said.
"Generally if a creditor is secured, they are at the top of the claims priority," she said. "If they are unsecured, they're pretty low on the claims priority and probably will take some type of haircut with this, but we have not had a chance to do a thorough analysis to know ... how extensive those losses will be."
IndyMac spent the last two weeks trying to reassure customers that it was not near default.
On Monday, IndyMac announced it had stopped accepting new loan submissions and planned to slash 3,800 jobs, or more than half of its work force -- the largest employee cuts in company history.
In the letter to shareholders, IndyMac Chairman and Chief Executive Michael W. Perry said the drastic measures were made in conjunction with banking regulators to improve the company's financial footing and "meet our mutual goal of keeping Indymac safe and sound through this crisis period."
The plan was supposed to generate roughly $5 billion to $10 billion per year of new loans backed by government-sponsored mortgage companies, Perry said at the time.
But the run on its deposits ultimately short-circuited the strategy, prompting regulators to take action Friday.
The bank is the largest regulated thrift to fail and the second largest financial institution to close in U.S. history, regulators said.
The Office of Thrift Supervision said it transferred IndyMac's operations to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation because it did not think the lender could meet its depositors' demands.
IndyMac customers with funds in the bank were limited to taking out money via automated teller machines over the weekend, debit card transactions or checks, regulators said.
Other bank services, such as online banking and phone banking were scheduled to be made available on Monday.
"This institution failed today due to a liquidity crisis," OTS Director John Reich said.
The lender's failure came the same day that financial markets plunged when investors tried to gauge whether the government would have to save mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
Shares of Fannie and Freddie dropped to 17-year lows before the stocks recovered somewhat. Wall Street is growing more convinced that the government will have to bail out the country's biggest mortgage financiers, whose failure could deal a tremendous blow to the already staggering economy.
The FDIC estimated that its takeover of IndyMac would cost between $4 billion and $8 billion.
IndyMac's collapse is second only to that of Continental Illinois National Bank, which had nearly $40 billion in assets when it failed in 1984, according to the FDIC.
News of the takeover distressed Alan Sands, who showed up at the company's headquarters in Pasadena, Calif., to find out when he could withdraw his funds.
"Hopefully the FDIC insurance will take care of it," said Sands, of El Monte, Calif. "I'm also kind of kicking myself for not taking care of this sooner, sooner as in the last couple of days."
A couple of dozen customers could be seen outside the building, reading fliers handed out by FDIC staff. The agency set up a toll-free number for bank customers to call.
IndyMac Bancorp Inc., the holding company for IndyMac Bank, has been struggling to raise capital as the housing slump deepens.
IndyMac had $32.01 billion in assets as of March 31.
The banking regulator said it closed IndyMac after customers began a run on the lender following the June 26 release of a letter by Sen. Charles Schumer, urging several bank regulatory agencies that they take steps to prevent IndyMac's collapse.
In the 11 days that followed the letter's release, depositors took out more than $1.3 billion, regulators said.
In a statement Friday, Schumer said IndyMac's failure was due to long-standing practices by the bank, not recent events.
"If OTS had done its job as regulator and not let IndyMac's poor and loose lending practices continue, we wouldn't be where we are today," Schumer said. "Instead of pointing false fingers of blame, OTS should start doing its job to prevent future IndyMacs."
The FDIC planned to reopen the bank on Monday as IndyMac Federal Bank, FSB.
Deposits are insured up to $100,000 per depositor.
As of March 31, IndyMac had total deposits of $19.06 billion.
Some 10,000 depositors had funds in excess of the insured limit, for a total of $1 billion in potentially uninsured funds, the FDIC said.
Customers with uninsured deposits could begin making appointments to file a claim with the FDIC on Monday. The agency said it would pay unsecured depositors an advance dividend equal to half of the uninsured amount.
During a conference call with reporters, FDIC Chairman Sheila C. Bair said the agency would cover all insured deposits and then try to recover its costs by selling IndyMac's assets.
"We anticipate trying to market the institution as a whole bank," Bair said. "How much money we derive from that will depend on who gets paid what."
Holders of unsecured IndyMac debt may not fully recover their investment, Bair said.
"Generally if a creditor is secured, they are at the top of the claims priority," she said. "If they are unsecured, they're pretty low on the claims priority and probably will take some type of haircut with this, but we have not had a chance to do a thorough analysis to know ... how extensive those losses will be."
IndyMac spent the last two weeks trying to reassure customers that it was not near default.
On Monday, IndyMac announced it had stopped accepting new loan submissions and planned to slash 3,800 jobs, or more than half of its work force -- the largest employee cuts in company history.
In the letter to shareholders, IndyMac Chairman and Chief Executive Michael W. Perry said the drastic measures were made in conjunction with banking regulators to improve the company's financial footing and "meet our mutual goal of keeping Indymac safe and sound through this crisis period."
The plan was supposed to generate roughly $5 billion to $10 billion per year of new loans backed by government-sponsored mortgage companies, Perry said at the time.
But the run on its deposits ultimately short-circuited the strategy, prompting regulators to take action Friday.
Senate passes mortgage rescue plan
A mortgage rescue to help hundreds of thousands of struggling homeowners avoid foreclosure and get more affordable, safer loans passed the Senate overwhelmingly Friday, but it faces a bumpy road amid continuing turmoil in the housing market.
The 63-5 vote reflected a keen interest by Democrats and Republicans to send election-year help to distressed homeowners with economic issues topping voters' concerns.
The plan lets homeowners buckling under mortgage payments they can't afford keep their homes and get more affordable mortgages backed by the Federal Housing Administration. Banks that agreed to take substantial losses on those distressed loans could avoid costly foreclosures and be assured of recovering at least some money.
The new program would let the FHA insure as much as $300 billion in new mortgages, helping an estimated 400,000 homeowners.
It still faces challenges, however, with the House planning to rewrite key details and the White House threatening a veto without major changes.
"It's not the final stop, but it is a major stop in getting this bill done," said Sen. Christopher Dodd, D-Conn., chairman of the Banking Committee. "For those who said this Congress cannot come together in a bipartisan fashion to do something responsible about housing, this bill does that."
Rep. Barney Frank, the Financial Services Committee chairman and an architect of the bill, says the few but significant revisions House leaders are seeking could be made in as little as one week.
Dodd said he was expecting minor "tweaks" that could be dealt with quickly.
But key players are bracing for intense negotiations to resolve the differences. They hope to smooth over disputes with the White House at the same time, with an eye toward producing a bill President Bush could sign later this month.
The White House Friday renewed its warning that Bush would veto the Senate-passed bill without revisions, citing $3.9 billion in the measure for buying and rehabilitating foreclosed properties it said would help lenders, not homeowners.
The measure includes a long-sought modernization of the FHA and would create a new regulator and tighter controls on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the government-sponsored mortgage giants. It also would provide $14.5 billion in housing tax breaks, including a credit of up to $8,000 for first-time home buyers.
Democrats are divided over important elements of the plan, including limits on loans the FHA may insure and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac may buy. The Senate measure sets them at $625,000, while House leaders — including Speaker Nancy Pelosi,— want the cap as high as $730,000.
House leaders also oppose the immediate effective date of the Senate plan, preferring to phase in the new regulations for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac over six months.
"We'd have a hard time agreeing to that," Dodd told reporters Friday. He called a Capitol Hill news conference to dispel fears about the financial health of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as their stocks plummeted on reports that the government was considering taking over one or both of them.
Another key point of dispute is the funding in the Senate measure for buying and fixing foreclosed properties. The House's band of conservative "Blue Dog" Democrats oppose the money, arguing that it would swell the deficit unless paired with cuts or tax increases to cover the cost.
But many Democrats, particularly members of the Congressional Black Caucus, are fighting to keep the funding, which they say will help prevent the communities hardest hit by the housing crisis from sliding into blight.
"There are people who tell me to ignore" that threat, Frank said in a statement Friday. "But there is too much that is important in this bill, and it has already been too long delayed by procedural problems in the Senate, for us to risk the further delay involved in a veto."
He said he was working to find a way to shift the funds to a must-pass spending bill that would be approved before lawmakers scatter for the year in September.
Dana Perino, Bush's spokeswoman, said the money should be stripped out of the measure "so that they can get a housing bill to the president that he could sign right away."
Sen. Barack Obama, the presumptive presidential nominee, said Bush should drop his opposition to the housing plan and other Democratic efforts to ease economic pain.
"I call on the administration to support this bill along with a second emergency stimulus package to jumpstart the economy and build on this important start to advance more rigorous measures to protect homeowners from foreclosure," he said. Obama was on the campaign trail Friday and did not vote on the measure, which had been expected to pass by a wide margin. He was one of 32 senators not voting.
With the administration scrambling to tamp down on investor fears about Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, Perino called the new regulations in the measure for the two mortgage giants its "most important feature."
Lawmakers and the Bush administration agree on the central concept behind the housing package: allowing the government to backstop new mortgages for struggling homeowners.
To make it more palatable to Republicans, the Senate measure would take responsibility for any losses away from taxpayers and instead cover them by diverting a newly created affordable housing fund drawn from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac profits.
The 63-5 vote reflected a keen interest by Democrats and Republicans to send election-year help to distressed homeowners with economic issues topping voters' concerns.
The plan lets homeowners buckling under mortgage payments they can't afford keep their homes and get more affordable mortgages backed by the Federal Housing Administration. Banks that agreed to take substantial losses on those distressed loans could avoid costly foreclosures and be assured of recovering at least some money.
The new program would let the FHA insure as much as $300 billion in new mortgages, helping an estimated 400,000 homeowners.
It still faces challenges, however, with the House planning to rewrite key details and the White House threatening a veto without major changes.
"It's not the final stop, but it is a major stop in getting this bill done," said Sen. Christopher Dodd, D-Conn., chairman of the Banking Committee. "For those who said this Congress cannot come together in a bipartisan fashion to do something responsible about housing, this bill does that."
Rep. Barney Frank, the Financial Services Committee chairman and an architect of the bill, says the few but significant revisions House leaders are seeking could be made in as little as one week.
Dodd said he was expecting minor "tweaks" that could be dealt with quickly.
But key players are bracing for intense negotiations to resolve the differences. They hope to smooth over disputes with the White House at the same time, with an eye toward producing a bill President Bush could sign later this month.
The White House Friday renewed its warning that Bush would veto the Senate-passed bill without revisions, citing $3.9 billion in the measure for buying and rehabilitating foreclosed properties it said would help lenders, not homeowners.
The measure includes a long-sought modernization of the FHA and would create a new regulator and tighter controls on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the government-sponsored mortgage giants. It also would provide $14.5 billion in housing tax breaks, including a credit of up to $8,000 for first-time home buyers.
Democrats are divided over important elements of the plan, including limits on loans the FHA may insure and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac may buy. The Senate measure sets them at $625,000, while House leaders — including Speaker Nancy Pelosi,— want the cap as high as $730,000.
House leaders also oppose the immediate effective date of the Senate plan, preferring to phase in the new regulations for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac over six months.
"We'd have a hard time agreeing to that," Dodd told reporters Friday. He called a Capitol Hill news conference to dispel fears about the financial health of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as their stocks plummeted on reports that the government was considering taking over one or both of them.
Another key point of dispute is the funding in the Senate measure for buying and fixing foreclosed properties. The House's band of conservative "Blue Dog" Democrats oppose the money, arguing that it would swell the deficit unless paired with cuts or tax increases to cover the cost.
But many Democrats, particularly members of the Congressional Black Caucus, are fighting to keep the funding, which they say will help prevent the communities hardest hit by the housing crisis from sliding into blight.
"There are people who tell me to ignore" that threat, Frank said in a statement Friday. "But there is too much that is important in this bill, and it has already been too long delayed by procedural problems in the Senate, for us to risk the further delay involved in a veto."
He said he was working to find a way to shift the funds to a must-pass spending bill that would be approved before lawmakers scatter for the year in September.
Dana Perino, Bush's spokeswoman, said the money should be stripped out of the measure "so that they can get a housing bill to the president that he could sign right away."
Sen. Barack Obama, the presumptive presidential nominee, said Bush should drop his opposition to the housing plan and other Democratic efforts to ease economic pain.
"I call on the administration to support this bill along with a second emergency stimulus package to jumpstart the economy and build on this important start to advance more rigorous measures to protect homeowners from foreclosure," he said. Obama was on the campaign trail Friday and did not vote on the measure, which had been expected to pass by a wide margin. He was one of 32 senators not voting.
With the administration scrambling to tamp down on investor fears about Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, Perino called the new regulations in the measure for the two mortgage giants its "most important feature."
Lawmakers and the Bush administration agree on the central concept behind the housing package: allowing the government to backstop new mortgages for struggling homeowners.
To make it more palatable to Republicans, the Senate measure would take responsibility for any losses away from taxpayers and instead cover them by diverting a newly created affordable housing fund drawn from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac profits.
怎样成为一个伟大投资者的 ? 为何你们中只有极少人敢奢望成为这样的人。
其原因是，你的智商是多少、看过多少书报杂志、拥有或者在今后的职业中将拥有多少经验，都不起作用。很多人都有这些素质，但几乎没有人在整个职业生涯中使复合回报率达到20%或25%。
你们不可能永远以20%的复合回报率让财富增值，除非你的脑子在十一二岁的时候就有某种特质。我不确定这是天生的还是后天习得的，但如果你到青少年时期还没有这种特质，那么你就再不会有了。在大脑发育完成之前，你可能有能力超过其他投资者，也可能没有。来到哈佛并不会改变这一点，读完每一本关于投资的书不会，多年的经验也不会。如果你想成为伟大投资者，那些只是必要条件，但还远远不够，因为它们都能被竞争对手复制。
现在，作为公司的CEO，什么样的优势才能使你们免受残酷的竞争？如何找到合适的点来建立起广泛的巴菲特所说的“经济护城河”（economicmoat）？
因此什么是投资者必备的竞争优势呢？就像一个公司或者一个行业，投资者的“护城河”也应该是结构性的。它们与一些心理学因素有关，而心理因素是深植在你的脑子里的，是你的一部分，即使你阅读大量相关书籍也无法改变。
我认为，至少有7个特质是伟大投资者的共同特征，是真正的优势资源，而且是你一旦成年就再无法获得的。事实上，其中几个特质甚至丝毫没有学习的可能，你必须天生具备，若无就此生难寻。
第一个特质是，在他人恐慌时果断买入股票、而在他人盲目乐观时卖掉股票的能力。每个人都认为自己能做到这一点，但是当1987年10月19日这天到来的时候（历史上著名的“黑色星期一”），市场彻底崩溃，几乎没人有胆量再买入股票。而在1999年（次年即是纳斯达克大崩盘），市场几乎每天都在上扬，你不会允许自己卖掉股票，因为你担心会落后于他人。绝大多数管理财富的人都有MBA学位和高智商，读过很多书。到1999年底，这些人也都确信股票被估值过高，但他们不能允许自己把钱撤离赌台，其原因正是巴菲特所说的“制度性强制力”（institutional imperative）。
第二个特质是，伟大投资者是那种极度着迷于此游戏，并有极强获胜欲的人。他们不只是享受投资的乐趣——投资就是他们的生命。他们清晨醒来时，即使还在半梦半醒之间，想到的第一件事情就是他们研究过的股票，或者是他们考虑要卖掉的股票，又或者是他们的投资组合将面临的最大风险是什么以及如何规避它。他们通常在个人生活上会陷入困境，尽管他们也许真的喜欢其他人，也没有太多的时间与对方交流。他们的头脑始终处在云端，梦想着股票。不幸的是，你们无法学习这种对于某种东西的执迷，这是天生的。如果你没有这样的强迫症，你就不可能成为下一个布鲁斯·博克维茨（ Fairholme Funds的创始人，选股思路深受巴菲特影响，组合集中、低换手率、很少越界）。
第三个特质是，从过去所犯错误中吸取教训的强烈意愿。这点对于人们来说是难以做到的，让伟大投资者脱颖而出的正是这种从自己过去错误中学习以避免重犯的强烈渴望。大多数人都会忽略他们曾做过的愚蠢决定，继续向前冲。我想用来形容他们的词就是“压抑”（repression）。但是如果你忽略往日的错误而不是全面分析它，毫无疑问你在将来的职业生涯中还会犯相似的错。事实上，即便你确实去分析了，重复犯错也是很难避免的。
第四个特质是，基于常识的与生俱来的风险嗅觉。大部分人都知道美国长期资本管理公司（1990年代中期的国际四大对冲基金之一，1998年因为俄罗斯金融风暴而濒临破产）的故事，一个由六七十位博士组成的团队，拥有最精妙的风险分析模型，却没能发现事后看来显见的问题：他们承担了过高的风险。他们从不停下来问自己一句：“嗨，虽然电脑认为这样可行，但在现实生活中是否真的行得通呢？”这种能力在人类中的常见度也许并不像你认为的那样高。我相信最优秀的风险控制系统就是常识，但是人们却仍会习惯听从电脑的意见，让自己安然睡去。他们忽视了常识，我看到这个错误在投资界一再上演。
第五个特质是，伟大的投资家都对于他们自己的想法怀有绝对的信心，即使是在面对批评的时候。巴菲特坚持不投身疯狂的网络热潮，尽管人们公开批评他忽略科技股。当其他人都放弃了价值投资的时候，巴菲特依然岿然不动。《巴伦周刊》为此把他做成了封面人物，标题是“沃伦，你哪儿出错了？”当然，事后这进一步证明了巴菲特的智慧，《巴伦周刊》则变成了完美的反面教材。就个人而言，我很惊讶于大多数投资者对他们所买股票的信心之微弱。根据凯利公式（Kelly Formula，一个可用于判断投资和赌博风险的数学公式），投资组合中的20%可以放在一支股票上，但很多投资人只放2%。从数学上来说，运用凯利公式，把2%的投资放在一支股票上，相当于赌它只有51%的上涨可能性，49%的可能性是下跌。为何要浪费时间去打这个赌呢？这帮人拿着100万美元的年薪，只是去寻找哪些股票有51%的上涨可能性？简直是有病。
第六个特质是，左右脑都很好用，而不仅仅是开动左脑（左脑擅长数学和组织）。在商学院，我曾经遇到过很多天资聪颖的人。不过主修金融的人，写的东西一文不值，他们也无法创造性地看待问题，对此我颇感震惊。后来我明白了，一些非常聪明的人只用一半大脑思考，这样足以让你在世上立足，可是如果要成为一个和主流人群思考方式不同的富有创新精神的企业投资家，这还远远不够。另一方面，如果你是右脑占主导的人，你很可能讨厌数学，然后通常就无法进入金融界了。所以金融人士很可能左脑极其发达，我认为这是个问题。我相信一个伟大投资家的两边大脑都发挥作用。作为一个投资家，你需要进行计算，要有逻辑合理的投资理论，这都是你的左脑做的事情。但是你也需要做一些另外的事情，比如根据微妙线索来判断该公司的管理团队。你需要静下心来，在脑中勾画出当前情势的大图景，而不是往死里去分析。你要具备幽默感、谦卑的心态和基本常识。还有最重要的，我认为你也得是一个好的写作者。看看巴菲特，他是商业世界里最杰出的写作者之一，他同时也是古往今来最好的投资家之一绝非偶然。如果你无法清晰地写作，我认为你也不能清楚地思考。如果不能清楚地思考，你就会陷入麻烦。很多人拥有天才般的智商，却不能清楚地思考问题，尽管他们心算就能得出债券或者期权的价格。
最后、最重要的，同时也是最少见的一项特质：在投资过程中，大起大落之中却丝毫不改投资思路的能力。这对于大多数人而言几乎是不可能做到的。当股票开始下跌，人们很难坚持承受损失而不抛出股票。市场整体下降时，人们很难决定买进更多股票以使成本摊薄，甚至很难决定将钱再投入股票中。人们不喜欢承受暂时性的痛苦，即便从长远来看会有更好的收益。很少有投资家能应对高回报率所必须经历的短期波动。他们将短期波动等同于风险。这是极不理性的。风险意味着你若押错了宝，就得赔钱。而相对短时期内的上下波动并不等于损失，因此也不是风险，除非你在市场跌到谷底时陷入恐慌，被损失吓得大乱阵脚。但是多数人不会以这种方式看问题，他们的大脑不容许他们这么想。恐慌本能会入侵，然后切断正常思考的能力。
我必须申明，人们一旦步入成年期就无法再学到上述特质。这个时候，你在日后成为卓越投资者的潜力已经被决定了。这种潜力经过锻炼可以获得，但是无法从头建立，因为这与你脑组织的结构以及孩童时期的经历密切相关。这不是说金融教育、阅读以及投资经验都不重要。这些很重要，但只能让你够资格进入这个游戏并玩下去。那些都是可以被任何人复制的东西，而上述7个特质却不可能。
其原因是，你的智商是多少、看过多少书报杂志、拥有或者在今后的职业中将拥有多少经验，都不起作用。很多人都有这些素质，但几乎没有人在整个职业生涯中使复合回报率达到20%或25%。
你们不可能永远以20%的复合回报率让财富增值，除非你的脑子在十一二岁的时候就有某种特质。我不确定这是天生的还是后天习得的，但如果你到青少年时期还没有这种特质，那么你就再不会有了。在大脑发育完成之前，你可能有能力超过其他投资者，也可能没有。来到哈佛并不会改变这一点，读完每一本关于投资的书不会，多年的经验也不会。如果你想成为伟大投资者，那些只是必要条件，但还远远不够，因为它们都能被竞争对手复制。
现在，作为公司的CEO，什么样的优势才能使你们免受残酷的竞争？如何找到合适的点来建立起广泛的巴菲特所说的“经济护城河”（economicmoat）？
因此什么是投资者必备的竞争优势呢？就像一个公司或者一个行业，投资者的“护城河”也应该是结构性的。它们与一些心理学因素有关，而心理因素是深植在你的脑子里的，是你的一部分，即使你阅读大量相关书籍也无法改变。
我认为，至少有7个特质是伟大投资者的共同特征，是真正的优势资源，而且是你一旦成年就再无法获得的。事实上，其中几个特质甚至丝毫没有学习的可能，你必须天生具备，若无就此生难寻。
第一个特质是，在他人恐慌时果断买入股票、而在他人盲目乐观时卖掉股票的能力。每个人都认为自己能做到这一点，但是当1987年10月19日这天到来的时候（历史上著名的“黑色星期一”），市场彻底崩溃，几乎没人有胆量再买入股票。而在1999年（次年即是纳斯达克大崩盘），市场几乎每天都在上扬，你不会允许自己卖掉股票，因为你担心会落后于他人。绝大多数管理财富的人都有MBA学位和高智商，读过很多书。到1999年底，这些人也都确信股票被估值过高，但他们不能允许自己把钱撤离赌台，其原因正是巴菲特所说的“制度性强制力”（institutional imperative）。
第二个特质是，伟大投资者是那种极度着迷于此游戏，并有极强获胜欲的人。他们不只是享受投资的乐趣——投资就是他们的生命。他们清晨醒来时，即使还在半梦半醒之间，想到的第一件事情就是他们研究过的股票，或者是他们考虑要卖掉的股票，又或者是他们的投资组合将面临的最大风险是什么以及如何规避它。他们通常在个人生活上会陷入困境，尽管他们也许真的喜欢其他人，也没有太多的时间与对方交流。他们的头脑始终处在云端，梦想着股票。不幸的是，你们无法学习这种对于某种东西的执迷，这是天生的。如果你没有这样的强迫症，你就不可能成为下一个布鲁斯·博克维茨（ Fairholme Funds的创始人，选股思路深受巴菲特影响，组合集中、低换手率、很少越界）。
第三个特质是，从过去所犯错误中吸取教训的强烈意愿。这点对于人们来说是难以做到的，让伟大投资者脱颖而出的正是这种从自己过去错误中学习以避免重犯的强烈渴望。大多数人都会忽略他们曾做过的愚蠢决定，继续向前冲。我想用来形容他们的词就是“压抑”（repression）。但是如果你忽略往日的错误而不是全面分析它，毫无疑问你在将来的职业生涯中还会犯相似的错。事实上，即便你确实去分析了，重复犯错也是很难避免的。
第四个特质是，基于常识的与生俱来的风险嗅觉。大部分人都知道美国长期资本管理公司（1990年代中期的国际四大对冲基金之一，1998年因为俄罗斯金融风暴而濒临破产）的故事，一个由六七十位博士组成的团队，拥有最精妙的风险分析模型，却没能发现事后看来显见的问题：他们承担了过高的风险。他们从不停下来问自己一句：“嗨，虽然电脑认为这样可行，但在现实生活中是否真的行得通呢？”这种能力在人类中的常见度也许并不像你认为的那样高。我相信最优秀的风险控制系统就是常识，但是人们却仍会习惯听从电脑的意见，让自己安然睡去。他们忽视了常识，我看到这个错误在投资界一再上演。
第五个特质是，伟大的投资家都对于他们自己的想法怀有绝对的信心，即使是在面对批评的时候。巴菲特坚持不投身疯狂的网络热潮，尽管人们公开批评他忽略科技股。当其他人都放弃了价值投资的时候，巴菲特依然岿然不动。《巴伦周刊》为此把他做成了封面人物，标题是“沃伦，你哪儿出错了？”当然，事后这进一步证明了巴菲特的智慧，《巴伦周刊》则变成了完美的反面教材。就个人而言，我很惊讶于大多数投资者对他们所买股票的信心之微弱。根据凯利公式（Kelly Formula，一个可用于判断投资和赌博风险的数学公式），投资组合中的20%可以放在一支股票上，但很多投资人只放2%。从数学上来说，运用凯利公式，把2%的投资放在一支股票上，相当于赌它只有51%的上涨可能性，49%的可能性是下跌。为何要浪费时间去打这个赌呢？这帮人拿着100万美元的年薪，只是去寻找哪些股票有51%的上涨可能性？简直是有病。
第六个特质是，左右脑都很好用，而不仅仅是开动左脑（左脑擅长数学和组织）。在商学院，我曾经遇到过很多天资聪颖的人。不过主修金融的人，写的东西一文不值，他们也无法创造性地看待问题，对此我颇感震惊。后来我明白了，一些非常聪明的人只用一半大脑思考，这样足以让你在世上立足，可是如果要成为一个和主流人群思考方式不同的富有创新精神的企业投资家，这还远远不够。另一方面，如果你是右脑占主导的人，你很可能讨厌数学，然后通常就无法进入金融界了。所以金融人士很可能左脑极其发达，我认为这是个问题。我相信一个伟大投资家的两边大脑都发挥作用。作为一个投资家，你需要进行计算，要有逻辑合理的投资理论，这都是你的左脑做的事情。但是你也需要做一些另外的事情，比如根据微妙线索来判断该公司的管理团队。你需要静下心来，在脑中勾画出当前情势的大图景，而不是往死里去分析。你要具备幽默感、谦卑的心态和基本常识。还有最重要的，我认为你也得是一个好的写作者。看看巴菲特，他是商业世界里最杰出的写作者之一，他同时也是古往今来最好的投资家之一绝非偶然。如果你无法清晰地写作，我认为你也不能清楚地思考。如果不能清楚地思考，你就会陷入麻烦。很多人拥有天才般的智商，却不能清楚地思考问题，尽管他们心算就能得出债券或者期权的价格。
最后、最重要的，同时也是最少见的一项特质：在投资过程中，大起大落之中却丝毫不改投资思路的能力。这对于大多数人而言几乎是不可能做到的。当股票开始下跌，人们很难坚持承受损失而不抛出股票。市场整体下降时，人们很难决定买进更多股票以使成本摊薄，甚至很难决定将钱再投入股票中。人们不喜欢承受暂时性的痛苦，即便从长远来看会有更好的收益。很少有投资家能应对高回报率所必须经历的短期波动。他们将短期波动等同于风险。这是极不理性的。风险意味着你若押错了宝，就得赔钱。而相对短时期内的上下波动并不等于损失，因此也不是风险，除非你在市场跌到谷底时陷入恐慌，被损失吓得大乱阵脚。但是多数人不会以这种方式看问题，他们的大脑不容许他们这么想。恐慌本能会入侵，然后切断正常思考的能力。
我必须申明，人们一旦步入成年期就无法再学到上述特质。这个时候，你在日后成为卓越投资者的潜力已经被决定了。这种潜力经过锻炼可以获得，但是无法从头建立，因为这与你脑组织的结构以及孩童时期的经历密切相关。这不是说金融教育、阅读以及投资经验都不重要。这些很重要，但只能让你够资格进入这个游戏并玩下去。那些都是可以被任何人复制的东西，而上述7个特质却不可能。
谢国忠:2010年油价泡沫才会破裂
近日，国际油价在剧烈波动。美国西得克萨斯中质原油即期合约(WTI)5月底涨到每桶135美元，但之后一周迅速跌回每桶126美元。价格的剧烈波动增加了对期权的需求，特别是执行价与WTI现价差距较大的期权。看涨阵营认为价格会被推高到每桶200美元。看跌的人则认为价格已经涨到峰顶，需求将减少，并带动价格下跌至每桶80美元。
我认为，油价还会继续上涨；要等到中国和印度将成品油价格放开，原油涨价才会停止。这轮泡沫破裂需等美联储将利率提高到通胀率以上或接近通胀率，这很可能是在2010年年中。
2002 年以前，油价一直在每桶20美元附近波动。2003年，强劲的全球经济推动了油价上涨。起初，油价上涨的节奏与普通经济周期毫无差异，直到2004年下半年，油价上涨速度明显快于往常。2007年上半年，美国楼市低迷加剧了原油需求减少的预期，原油泡沫处于破裂边缘。之后，为了挽救金融体系，美联储大幅降息，刺激金融资本流向原油市场。我可以肯定地说，2007年夏季伊始的原油价格快速上涨是货币现象。
认为油价无泡沫的人最重要的论据是原油存货没有增加。存货增加是泡沫发生时的常见现象，但并非必要条件。在科技股泡沫期间，许多公司会斥巨资提高计算机设备，这是一种存货；在美国楼市泡沫期间，许多家庭购买第二套住房但不常住，这也可以视作存货。但是，1997年香港楼市泡沫和目前的原油泡沫却没有上述过度建设或大量空置的情况。在这两次泡沫中，都有某种约束阻碍了供给对价格上涨作出反应。对这种供给受到约束的泡沫而言，其标志是收益率下降以及资产升值在总回报所占的比重提高。
通常情况下，价格上涨会增加供给、减少需求，于是存货成为泡沫持续的必要条件。但目前的原油供需变化非比寻常。
据国际能源机构(IEA)统计，超过80%的需求增长来自中东地区和亚太地区。中东地区的原油出口占全球总量一半以上。高油价大幅提高了它的出口收入，而收入增加又刺激了国内对原油的额外需求。推动需求的收入效应，大于压低需求的价格效应。这种不同寻常的需求变化，使得中东地区原油消费与原油价格呈正相关关系。此外，原油出口国有能力将国内成品油价格维持在较低水平上，因为它们无需付出高额成本。高收入和低成本合在一起，对刺激需求有极大的正面作用。上述分析同样适用于其他原油出口国。大约一半的原油需求可以用原油出口国的这种供需变化来解释。
在中国、印度这样的新兴市场国家，价格管制或补贴是维持原油需求的重要因素。能源在发展中国家的产品和生活成本中的比重都要高于发展国家。多数发展中国家很难在不引起政治麻烦的前提下，将上涨的原油价格传递给消费者。倾向于补贴政策的政府总相信这种政策是暂时的，希望原油价格会回落。但事与愿违，由于油价持续上涨，取消补贴的后果越来越严重，使得这些政府不愿意停止补贴。无意中，它们在维持高油价中扮演了重要角色，但同时它们又很害怕高油价。正如原油出口国的原油需求依赖于高价格，进口原油的发展中国家的需求弹性取决于政府补贴政策。此外，原油补贴使得发展中国家的出口商品价格维持在较低水平，这其实是对西方消费者的补贴，使得他们有能力应对本土的高油价。
我认为，油价还会继续上涨；要等到中国和印度将成品油价格放开，原油涨价才会停止。这轮泡沫破裂需等美联储将利率提高到通胀率以上或接近通胀率，这很可能是在2010年年中。
2002 年以前，油价一直在每桶20美元附近波动。2003年，强劲的全球经济推动了油价上涨。起初，油价上涨的节奏与普通经济周期毫无差异，直到2004年下半年，油价上涨速度明显快于往常。2007年上半年，美国楼市低迷加剧了原油需求减少的预期，原油泡沫处于破裂边缘。之后，为了挽救金融体系，美联储大幅降息，刺激金融资本流向原油市场。我可以肯定地说，2007年夏季伊始的原油价格快速上涨是货币现象。
认为油价无泡沫的人最重要的论据是原油存货没有增加。存货增加是泡沫发生时的常见现象，但并非必要条件。在科技股泡沫期间，许多公司会斥巨资提高计算机设备，这是一种存货；在美国楼市泡沫期间，许多家庭购买第二套住房但不常住，这也可以视作存货。但是，1997年香港楼市泡沫和目前的原油泡沫却没有上述过度建设或大量空置的情况。在这两次泡沫中，都有某种约束阻碍了供给对价格上涨作出反应。对这种供给受到约束的泡沫而言，其标志是收益率下降以及资产升值在总回报所占的比重提高。
通常情况下，价格上涨会增加供给、减少需求，于是存货成为泡沫持续的必要条件。但目前的原油供需变化非比寻常。
据国际能源机构(IEA)统计，超过80%的需求增长来自中东地区和亚太地区。中东地区的原油出口占全球总量一半以上。高油价大幅提高了它的出口收入，而收入增加又刺激了国内对原油的额外需求。推动需求的收入效应，大于压低需求的价格效应。这种不同寻常的需求变化，使得中东地区原油消费与原油价格呈正相关关系。此外，原油出口国有能力将国内成品油价格维持在较低水平上，因为它们无需付出高额成本。高收入和低成本合在一起，对刺激需求有极大的正面作用。上述分析同样适用于其他原油出口国。大约一半的原油需求可以用原油出口国的这种供需变化来解释。
在中国、印度这样的新兴市场国家，价格管制或补贴是维持原油需求的重要因素。能源在发展中国家的产品和生活成本中的比重都要高于发展国家。多数发展中国家很难在不引起政治麻烦的前提下，将上涨的原油价格传递给消费者。倾向于补贴政策的政府总相信这种政策是暂时的，希望原油价格会回落。但事与愿违，由于油价持续上涨，取消补贴的后果越来越严重，使得这些政府不愿意停止补贴。无意中，它们在维持高油价中扮演了重要角色，但同时它们又很害怕高油价。正如原油出口国的原油需求依赖于高价格，进口原油的发展中国家的需求弹性取决于政府补贴政策。此外，原油补贴使得发展中国家的出口商品价格维持在较低水平，这其实是对西方消费者的补贴，使得他们有能力应对本土的高油价。
Limited upside
- The Straits Times Index (STI) has continued to drift lower despite our expectations of a minor rebound. However, there are some signs pointing to a possible minor rebound in the near term. The stochastic indicator has broken above its downtrend line, suggesting that the index is poised for a rebound, and coupled with the MACD which is on the verge of cutting upward, there is a possibility of a minor rebound in the near term.
- BUT, any ascension in the index would be capped by the medium-term downtrend line, which is also within the initial resistance level around 3,000 - 3,100 that we had set in our earlier reports. The 50- and 100-day moving averages are also in proximity to this resistance level, hence the upside seems limited at this juncture.
- We anticipate the downtrend to resume after a near-term temporary relief. This would take the index down to test the recent Mar lows around 2,745. A break below this level would result in the STI falling towards our subsequent support around 2,500 - 2,600.
- BUT, any ascension in the index would be capped by the medium-term downtrend line, which is also within the initial resistance level around 3,000 - 3,100 that we had set in our earlier reports. The 50- and 100-day moving averages are also in proximity to this resistance level, hence the upside seems limited at this juncture.
- We anticipate the downtrend to resume after a near-term temporary relief. This would take the index down to test the recent Mar lows around 2,745. A break below this level would result in the STI falling towards our subsequent support around 2,500 - 2,600.
Friday, July 11, 2008
Fannie, Freddie stocks and bonds plummet
A firestorm of anxiety over the ability of U.S. mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to get the capital they need to survive sent their debt and stocks plummeting on Thursday.
Stoking concerns, former St. Louis Federal Reserve President William Poole said the two major U.S. mortgage finance companies were "insolvent" and may need a U.S. government bailout, according to Bloomberg News.
The outlook was so dire that Bush administration officials were meeting with regulators to discuss contingency plans should they be unable to raise funds and support the worst housing market since the Great Depression, according to a report in the Wall Street Journal.
Yield spread premiums for the larger Fannie Mae rose to the highest since the days before the Federal Reserve's orchestrated bailout of Bear Stearns Cos in March.
Shares in both companies plunged to their lowest since 1991.
The government-sponsored enterprises, or GSEs, are expected to need billions of dollars in capital to support their balance sheets to try to stabilize the mortgage market. They found strong demand as they raised some $20 billion since last fall, but the instability in share prices since raises doubts about new investor support.
"This is not an opportune time to have to increase liquidity with the stocks down so much," said Alan Lancz, president of investment advisory firm Alan B. Lancz & Associates in Toledo, Ohio. "These dilutive deals these companies are putting together are just increasing that downward spiral within the financials, not even to mention the confidence in the whole system."
Mounting doubts over the ability of the companies led Deutsche Bank analyst Mustafa Chowdhury, a former Freddie Mac executive, on a Wednesday conference call to float the possibility that share prices could go below $5.
For the debt, much depends on the continued support of foreign central banks that have been loading up on the companies' $1.6 trillion in outstanding debt, a Deutsche Bank trader said on the call.
"If you are going to bail out Bear Stearns, the Congress is going to support Fannie and Freddie," said Andrew Brenner, co-head of structured products at MF Global in New York.
Yields on 10-year bonds issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac ballooned 10 basis points to more than 1 percentage point above government debt. They had been quoted as much as 12 basis points wider than late Wednesday.
Five-year credit default swaps on Fannie Mae widened by about 5 basis points to nearly 82 basis points, or $82,000 a year to protect $10 million of debt, while Freddie Mac's swaps widened by about 2 basis points to about 82 basis points.
Poole's remarks intensified traders' fears about the financial soundness of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
The mortgage-backed securities issued and guaranteed by the GSEs were more insulated since payments on the issues flow directly from homeowners to investors.
Early weakness in the "agency" debt market spilled into other parts of the bond market. Interest rate swap spreads grew anywhere from 0.50 basis points to 1.50 basis points.
Stoking concerns, former St. Louis Federal Reserve President William Poole said the two major U.S. mortgage finance companies were "insolvent" and may need a U.S. government bailout, according to Bloomberg News.
The outlook was so dire that Bush administration officials were meeting with regulators to discuss contingency plans should they be unable to raise funds and support the worst housing market since the Great Depression, according to a report in the Wall Street Journal.
Yield spread premiums for the larger Fannie Mae rose to the highest since the days before the Federal Reserve's orchestrated bailout of Bear Stearns Cos in March.
Shares in both companies plunged to their lowest since 1991.
The government-sponsored enterprises, or GSEs, are expected to need billions of dollars in capital to support their balance sheets to try to stabilize the mortgage market. They found strong demand as they raised some $20 billion since last fall, but the instability in share prices since raises doubts about new investor support.
"This is not an opportune time to have to increase liquidity with the stocks down so much," said Alan Lancz, president of investment advisory firm Alan B. Lancz & Associates in Toledo, Ohio. "These dilutive deals these companies are putting together are just increasing that downward spiral within the financials, not even to mention the confidence in the whole system."
Mounting doubts over the ability of the companies led Deutsche Bank analyst Mustafa Chowdhury, a former Freddie Mac executive, on a Wednesday conference call to float the possibility that share prices could go below $5.
For the debt, much depends on the continued support of foreign central banks that have been loading up on the companies' $1.6 trillion in outstanding debt, a Deutsche Bank trader said on the call.
"If you are going to bail out Bear Stearns, the Congress is going to support Fannie and Freddie," said Andrew Brenner, co-head of structured products at MF Global in New York.
Yields on 10-year bonds issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac ballooned 10 basis points to more than 1 percentage point above government debt. They had been quoted as much as 12 basis points wider than late Wednesday.
Five-year credit default swaps on Fannie Mae widened by about 5 basis points to nearly 82 basis points, or $82,000 a year to protect $10 million of debt, while Freddie Mac's swaps widened by about 2 basis points to about 82 basis points.
Poole's remarks intensified traders' fears about the financial soundness of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
The mortgage-backed securities issued and guaranteed by the GSEs were more insulated since payments on the issues flow directly from homeowners to investors.
Early weakness in the "agency" debt market spilled into other parts of the bond market. Interest rate swap spreads grew anywhere from 0.50 basis points to 1.50 basis points.
Tuesday, July 8, 2008
The uncanny predictions of ‘Dr Doom’ Marc Faber
It seems to be entirely natural that commodity prices should move inversely to stock prices, as we’re seeing currently. After all, don’t high commodity prices lead to higher inflation, which is bad for stocks? But strangely enough, it wasn’t so long ago that both commodity and stock prices were moving up together. During the golden years of 2003-07, the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) commodity price index went up from 65.04 to 134.9, yet that was also the period of a great bull run in stocks and nobody complained of inflation.
That’s not the only mystery. Go back a few years and we find that the huge rally in global stocks in the 1990s, which lifted the MSCI Barra World Free Index from 122 as of 29 January 1993 to a peak of 350.8 on 31 March 2000, was accompanied by essentially flat commodity prices. Over the period, IMF’s commodity price index rose all of 20%. And global inflation, according to IMF’s calculations, fell from 35% in 1993 to 4.5% by 2000.
Over the last 15 years, therefore, we’ve had times when commodities were stable while stocks rose, periods when both commodities and stocks languished (2000-02) and another period when stocks as well as commodities climbed. And now we have rising commodity prices and falling stocks.
To explain this conundrum, we have to turn to none other than Marc Faber, the perma bear who revels in the sobriquet of Dr Doom. In November 2005, Faber wrote a piece for the website Whiskey and Gunpowder titled Fed Rate Hikes: A Roadmap to Financial Ruin, in which he explained that the reason lax monetary policy in the 1980s and 1990s did not result in inflation in the US was because commodity prices were falling at the time. Wrote Faber: “In the eighties and nineties, the developed world enjoyed the tailwind of declining commodity prices and the outsourcing of production and services to low-cost countries, which, despite easy monetary policies, didn’t lead to rising consumer price inflation. (Other factors contributing to disinflation were the peace dividend, privatizations and aggressive cost-cutting measures by the corporate sector, and—not to be forgotten—declining interest rates, which reduced the financing costs of companies.)”
And then he added, with uncanny prescience: “But the next time the Fed embarks on a massive liquidity creating exercise (such as the one Alan Greenspan implemented following the Nasdaq collapse in 2000), these favourable conditions may no longer be in place.” In other words, when commodity prices are low, inflation can be contained despite loose monetary policy. It’s only when the commodity cycle turns that loose monetary policy results in higher inflation, which in turn affects stocks. That’s what happened in the 1970s, when a combination of loose monetary policy and high oil prices sent inflation soaring. Small wonder that comparisons are now being made between the current situation and the oil shocks of the 1970s.
But surely, the beneficial effect of low-cost production from China and low-cost services from India continues? Observers have long argued that while the prices of manufactured goods may fall because of competition from low-cost producers, the prices of raw materials needed to make those goods will rise. Hence the market aphorism: Buy what China buys, sell what China sells. The impact of strong growth in emerging markets on commodity prices is easily seen from the fact that, while IMF’s commodity price index moved up by 18.5% in the 11 years between 1992 and 2003, it rallied by 107% in the next four years. That’s not all—Chinese producers, beset by higher raw material prices, have no alternative but to pass it on to their customers in other countries.
In 2005, Faber predicted that the US Fed would slash interest rates dramatically if it saw a threat to growth. Wrote Faber: “When the Fed realizes that the economy is weaker than expected, it will reverse its tightening bias, cut rates, and ease massively.” That is precisely what happened. Faced with the collapse of the housing bubble, the US central bank slashed the Fed funds rate from 5.25% in September 2007 to 2% by April. But the effect hasn’t really been what the Fed wanted. US mortgage rates are nearly at the level they were at a year ago, in spite of all the rate cuts.
Faber predicted that dollar weakness, rising commodity prices and rising import prices could lift the rate of consumer price increases and the yield on long-term bonds above the rate of asset and wage inflation (which means declining asset prices and wages in real terms). Wrote Faber: “If that were to occur, the economy wouldn’t benefit from the easier monetary policies at all. Moderate stagflation would follow.”
That is exactly the scenario facing the US Fed as it debates whether to call a halt to rate reductions at its meeting on Tuesday and Wednesday.
Unfortunately, Faber spoilt the effect by going on to predict an apocalypse for the world economy, with hyperinflation, war and religious strife. His final prediction: “A deflationary stabilization crisis will follow in phase four of our road to financial fiasco. Large segments of the population will be totally impoverished. Smart hedge fund managers will all have sold their businesses to banks and will have left the US to live in the Caribbean, Brazil, Singapore, or Thailand, while...Ben Bernanke will flee the US in a hurry.”
That’s not the only mystery. Go back a few years and we find that the huge rally in global stocks in the 1990s, which lifted the MSCI Barra World Free Index from 122 as of 29 January 1993 to a peak of 350.8 on 31 March 2000, was accompanied by essentially flat commodity prices. Over the period, IMF’s commodity price index rose all of 20%. And global inflation, according to IMF’s calculations, fell from 35% in 1993 to 4.5% by 2000.
Over the last 15 years, therefore, we’ve had times when commodities were stable while stocks rose, periods when both commodities and stocks languished (2000-02) and another period when stocks as well as commodities climbed. And now we have rising commodity prices and falling stocks.
To explain this conundrum, we have to turn to none other than Marc Faber, the perma bear who revels in the sobriquet of Dr Doom. In November 2005, Faber wrote a piece for the website Whiskey and Gunpowder titled Fed Rate Hikes: A Roadmap to Financial Ruin, in which he explained that the reason lax monetary policy in the 1980s and 1990s did not result in inflation in the US was because commodity prices were falling at the time. Wrote Faber: “In the eighties and nineties, the developed world enjoyed the tailwind of declining commodity prices and the outsourcing of production and services to low-cost countries, which, despite easy monetary policies, didn’t lead to rising consumer price inflation. (Other factors contributing to disinflation were the peace dividend, privatizations and aggressive cost-cutting measures by the corporate sector, and—not to be forgotten—declining interest rates, which reduced the financing costs of companies.)”
And then he added, with uncanny prescience: “But the next time the Fed embarks on a massive liquidity creating exercise (such as the one Alan Greenspan implemented following the Nasdaq collapse in 2000), these favourable conditions may no longer be in place.” In other words, when commodity prices are low, inflation can be contained despite loose monetary policy. It’s only when the commodity cycle turns that loose monetary policy results in higher inflation, which in turn affects stocks. That’s what happened in the 1970s, when a combination of loose monetary policy and high oil prices sent inflation soaring. Small wonder that comparisons are now being made between the current situation and the oil shocks of the 1970s.
But surely, the beneficial effect of low-cost production from China and low-cost services from India continues? Observers have long argued that while the prices of manufactured goods may fall because of competition from low-cost producers, the prices of raw materials needed to make those goods will rise. Hence the market aphorism: Buy what China buys, sell what China sells. The impact of strong growth in emerging markets on commodity prices is easily seen from the fact that, while IMF’s commodity price index moved up by 18.5% in the 11 years between 1992 and 2003, it rallied by 107% in the next four years. That’s not all—Chinese producers, beset by higher raw material prices, have no alternative but to pass it on to their customers in other countries.
In 2005, Faber predicted that the US Fed would slash interest rates dramatically if it saw a threat to growth. Wrote Faber: “When the Fed realizes that the economy is weaker than expected, it will reverse its tightening bias, cut rates, and ease massively.” That is precisely what happened. Faced with the collapse of the housing bubble, the US central bank slashed the Fed funds rate from 5.25% in September 2007 to 2% by April. But the effect hasn’t really been what the Fed wanted. US mortgage rates are nearly at the level they were at a year ago, in spite of all the rate cuts.
Faber predicted that dollar weakness, rising commodity prices and rising import prices could lift the rate of consumer price increases and the yield on long-term bonds above the rate of asset and wage inflation (which means declining asset prices and wages in real terms). Wrote Faber: “If that were to occur, the economy wouldn’t benefit from the easier monetary policies at all. Moderate stagflation would follow.”
That is exactly the scenario facing the US Fed as it debates whether to call a halt to rate reductions at its meeting on Tuesday and Wednesday.
Unfortunately, Faber spoilt the effect by going on to predict an apocalypse for the world economy, with hyperinflation, war and religious strife. His final prediction: “A deflationary stabilization crisis will follow in phase four of our road to financial fiasco. Large segments of the population will be totally impoverished. Smart hedge fund managers will all have sold their businesses to banks and will have left the US to live in the Caribbean, Brazil, Singapore, or Thailand, while...Ben Bernanke will flee the US in a hurry.”
Marc Faber Warns Chinese Stock Bubble Still Deflating
Not everyone is sold on a rebound in Chinese stocks. According to Bloomberg this morning, Dr. Marc Faber, aka “Dr. Doom,” won’t be first in line to buy up these battered equities. Bloomberg’s Chua Kong Ho wrote:
Investors betting on a rebound in China’s tumbling stocks are setting themselves up for more losses, according to Marc Faber, who told investors to bail out of U.S. stocks before 1987’s so-called Black Monday crash and correctly predicted last August the U.S. would enter a bear market.
Faber’s forecast contrasts with local stock analysts, who are as bullish as ever even after a 51 percent plunge in the CSI 300 Index since its October record. “Buy” calls still make up two-thirds of all recommendations for Chinese stocks, virtually unchanged from the market’s peak, according to Bloomberg data.
I just wouldn’t buy. When a bubble bursts, you only hit bottom when people totally give up and vow they’ll never buy stocks again. People are still more worried they’ll miss the next rally.
The last time Chinese stocks fell by half — from a June 2001 high — the Shanghai Composite Index took four years to reach its low.
Even so, the Swiss-born investor admitted there could be a short-term bounce after such a huge decline:
We could have rebounds of 20 to 30 percent, but I wouldn’t bet on it. I would rather use rebounds as a selling opportunity.
Marc Faber Predicts Fall In Demand For Oil, Industrial Commodities
Yesterday afternoon, Bloomberg reported that commodities finished their best first half in 35 years, as the Reuters/Jefferies CRB Index of 19 raw materials rose 29% through June 30. However, well-known contrarian investor Marc Faber told the financial news outlet that demand for industrial commodities, including oil, will fall, along with prices. Bloomberg’s Monica Bertran and Millie Munshi wrote:
“The industrial-commodity complex is vulnerable because demand will slow down,” said Faber, publisher of investment newsletter the Gloom, Boom and Doom Report. “The economy is weakening, corporate profits will disappoint, valuations are not particularly attractive, and the financial sector that serves to channel savings into investment is in disarray.”
Demand for commodities will fall after raw materials including oil, corn, copper and gold touched record highs in the first half, Faber said in an interview on Bloomberg Television. The global economic slowdown will last a “very long time,” he said.
Discussing the $400 billion in write-downs at banks and securities firms worldwide, the Swiss-born investor said:
“The financial crisis has been the appetizer. We still need the main dish.”
Marc Faber: ‘Would Rather Buy Gold At This Stage Than Oil’
When it comes to commodities, Marc Faber, know as “Dr. Doom” by the financial press, prefers gold over oil. During a conference call hosted by U.S. Global Investors last Friday, Dr. Faber, who is famous for advising clients to get out of the U.S. stock market one week before the October 1987 crash, said:
I personally would rather buy gold at this stage than oil.
Although he said he wouldn’t rule out oil prices rising to $150 or $170 a barrel, Faber said the U.S. government’s recent discussions about how to limit speculative trading in oil futures could pull the plug quickly.
“I think we could have a serious correction — to $100 or below,” he said. “To curtail speculators in commodities in the U.S. could drive people like the pension funds… to go and buy gold.”
Faber also mentioned that gold is “very, very cheap” compared with oil now and that the oil-to-gold ratio is at its highest level ever.
Cheap?
Investors should go into gold as its price did not rise as fast as that of other commodities while the central bank keeps printing money, Faber said.
The Swiss-born investor told CNBC he believes gold may continue to shine while demand for other commodities declines as the result of a slowing global economy.
Investors betting on a rebound in China’s tumbling stocks are setting themselves up for more losses, according to Marc Faber, who told investors to bail out of U.S. stocks before 1987’s so-called Black Monday crash and correctly predicted last August the U.S. would enter a bear market.
Faber’s forecast contrasts with local stock analysts, who are as bullish as ever even after a 51 percent plunge in the CSI 300 Index since its October record. “Buy” calls still make up two-thirds of all recommendations for Chinese stocks, virtually unchanged from the market’s peak, according to Bloomberg data.
I just wouldn’t buy. When a bubble bursts, you only hit bottom when people totally give up and vow they’ll never buy stocks again. People are still more worried they’ll miss the next rally.
The last time Chinese stocks fell by half — from a June 2001 high — the Shanghai Composite Index took four years to reach its low.
Even so, the Swiss-born investor admitted there could be a short-term bounce after such a huge decline:
We could have rebounds of 20 to 30 percent, but I wouldn’t bet on it. I would rather use rebounds as a selling opportunity.
Marc Faber Predicts Fall In Demand For Oil, Industrial Commodities
Yesterday afternoon, Bloomberg reported that commodities finished their best first half in 35 years, as the Reuters/Jefferies CRB Index of 19 raw materials rose 29% through June 30. However, well-known contrarian investor Marc Faber told the financial news outlet that demand for industrial commodities, including oil, will fall, along with prices. Bloomberg’s Monica Bertran and Millie Munshi wrote:
“The industrial-commodity complex is vulnerable because demand will slow down,” said Faber, publisher of investment newsletter the Gloom, Boom and Doom Report. “The economy is weakening, corporate profits will disappoint, valuations are not particularly attractive, and the financial sector that serves to channel savings into investment is in disarray.”
Demand for commodities will fall after raw materials including oil, corn, copper and gold touched record highs in the first half, Faber said in an interview on Bloomberg Television. The global economic slowdown will last a “very long time,” he said.
Discussing the $400 billion in write-downs at banks and securities firms worldwide, the Swiss-born investor said:
“The financial crisis has been the appetizer. We still need the main dish.”
Marc Faber: ‘Would Rather Buy Gold At This Stage Than Oil’
When it comes to commodities, Marc Faber, know as “Dr. Doom” by the financial press, prefers gold over oil. During a conference call hosted by U.S. Global Investors last Friday, Dr. Faber, who is famous for advising clients to get out of the U.S. stock market one week before the October 1987 crash, said:
I personally would rather buy gold at this stage than oil.
Although he said he wouldn’t rule out oil prices rising to $150 or $170 a barrel, Faber said the U.S. government’s recent discussions about how to limit speculative trading in oil futures could pull the plug quickly.
“I think we could have a serious correction — to $100 or below,” he said. “To curtail speculators in commodities in the U.S. could drive people like the pension funds… to go and buy gold.”
Faber also mentioned that gold is “very, very cheap” compared with oil now and that the oil-to-gold ratio is at its highest level ever.
Cheap?
Investors should go into gold as its price did not rise as fast as that of other commodities while the central bank keeps printing money, Faber said.
The Swiss-born investor told CNBC he believes gold may continue to shine while demand for other commodities declines as the result of a slowing global economy.
Credit Crisis Worse Than Long-Term Capital Management Collapse in ’98
Unlike all the Wall Street strategists who compare the current credit crisis to the credit crisis of 1998 (Long Term Capital Management), I believe that the ongoing credit problems will be far worse and of a longer-term nature. This will make it difficult for the market to reach new highs in the near future. Moreover, even if the 1998 comparison were to hold, we would still be looking at a much deeper stock market correction than the 22% sell-off we saw in 1998.
The stock market peaked out in July 1998, after having been in an uptrend since the 1991 lows. It then sold off on the Russian default and on the LTCM crisis by 22% to its intraday low on October 9, 1998. When it became obvious that the Fed would bail out LTCM, and it flooded the system with liquidity, the stock market took off. Between the October 9 intraday low and the year end, it rallied by 33%, to achieve a new all-time high, and then continued to rise — interrupted by a correction in 1999 — into the final March 2000 top.
Pundits who are likening today’s market rout to that of 1998, and who expect the market to rally strongly towards the end of this year and to close at a new all-time high, are failing to consider the very different economic and financial circumstances of today, compared to those of 1998. In the years leading up to the 1998 crisis the US dollar was in a bull market, and interest rates - which had peaked in September 1981 - were in the middle of a secular decline. At the same time, gold and other commodities were still deflating. Also, in the 1990s, the US stock market had significantly outperformed the emerging markets, most of which had peaked out between 1990 and 1994 and had crashed during the Asian crisis of 1997-98.
Therefore, in 1998, the emerging markets and commodity prices were very depressed (unlike today). Moreover, in 1998, house prices weren’t elevated, the subprime lending industry was in its infancy, Japan and Europe were largely stagnant, and Asia and Russia were in depression (i.e. there was no synchronised global growth). The process of securitisation existed, but was very modest when compared to the present.
Today, the key difference is that the dollar looks extremely wobbly. In 1998, the US current account deficit was 2% of GDP; today, it’s hovering around 8%. This massive deficit puts continuous pressure on the dollar. Moreover, gold and other commodities are in an uptrend. There is another reason why conditions today are very different from those in 1998: in 1998, total credit market debt to GDP was 250%; today, it’s 330%. In addition, whereas debt growth averaged 4% per anum in the 1990s, it has averaged almost 10% per annum since 2002. In particular, household debt has surged from 65% of GDP in 1998 to almost 100% in 2007. Since debt growth has been so strong in the last few years, and because the system is now far more leveraged than in 1998 (not to mention the derivatives market), a tidal wave of liquidity would be needed to bail out the system, which would have to lead to even stronger debt growth; but, obviously, it would
only lead to even larger dislocations and problems later.
Another difference: in 1998, the Fed had to deal with the bailout of just one institution — LTCM; today, who should it bail out: the subprime lending institutions (it’s too late), leveraged home owners, the US$2 trillion-plus collateralised debt obligation (CDO) market, or the financial institutions, which are now stuck with over US$200 billion of leveraged buyout (LBO) loan commitments which they cannot sell to investors? So, whereas it was relatively easy to bail out just one institution in 1998, today the task would be extremely complex and daunting. Of course, the Fed could try to bail out everybody by cutting the interest rate aggressively and taking “extraordinary measures”, such as buying up the entire CDO market. [Editor’s note: Faber wrote the words above in late August, well before the Fed’s aggressive rate cut yesterday.]
Aggressive Fed fund rate cuts may not help much for the following reason: from June 2004 to August 2006, the Fed increased its fund rate in 17 baby steps from 1% to 5-1/4%. During this period of “tightening”, no actual tightening took place because credit growth accelerated as lending standards were eased and leverage increased. Moreover, as Bridgewater Associates recently pointed out, “globally, central banks have kept interest rate levels out of line with economic growth rates”. So, even if the Fed were to cut rates massively now, it is unlikely that it would stimulate credit growth, which, as I have explained repeatedly in the past, must continuously expand at an accelerating rate in a credit- and asset-driven economy in order to keep the economic plane from losing altitude. Accelerating credit growth is most unlikely now, because I cannot see how financial intermediaries will ease lending standards any time soon after the losses they have recently endured and following their dismal stock performance.
In addition, being fairly familiar with the cowardly attitude of investors, it is most unlikely that investors will now wish to buy anything other than top-quality paper and solid companies’ shares. Therefore, I can see only one solution if the Fed really wanted to attempt to bail out the system, and that would be for it to drastically cut interest rates. Unfortunately, massive interest rate cuts at present may not help much and could potentially have very negative side-effects (an even weaker dollar, inflation, rising long-term interest rates, further widening of income and wealth inequity etc.)
The crises that build up in international financial structures always ricochet from country to country…. Boom, distress and panic are transmitted through a variety of connections between national economies: psychological infection, rising and falling prices of commodities and securities, short-term capital movements, interest rates, the rise and fall of world commodity inventories.
These connections, moreover, can take various forms, and may be interrelated in various ways…. Boom and panic in one country seem to induce boom and panic in others, often through purely psychological channels…. Just as one huge bubble breeds others in a country, so a host of bubbles in a financial market seems to inspire the production of others in other countries.
For the last several years, investors have enjoyed a massive global boom. But they should not rule out a massive global panic.
The stock market peaked out in July 1998, after having been in an uptrend since the 1991 lows. It then sold off on the Russian default and on the LTCM crisis by 22% to its intraday low on October 9, 1998. When it became obvious that the Fed would bail out LTCM, and it flooded the system with liquidity, the stock market took off. Between the October 9 intraday low and the year end, it rallied by 33%, to achieve a new all-time high, and then continued to rise — interrupted by a correction in 1999 — into the final March 2000 top.
Pundits who are likening today’s market rout to that of 1998, and who expect the market to rally strongly towards the end of this year and to close at a new all-time high, are failing to consider the very different economic and financial circumstances of today, compared to those of 1998. In the years leading up to the 1998 crisis the US dollar was in a bull market, and interest rates - which had peaked in September 1981 - were in the middle of a secular decline. At the same time, gold and other commodities were still deflating. Also, in the 1990s, the US stock market had significantly outperformed the emerging markets, most of which had peaked out between 1990 and 1994 and had crashed during the Asian crisis of 1997-98.
Therefore, in 1998, the emerging markets and commodity prices were very depressed (unlike today). Moreover, in 1998, house prices weren’t elevated, the subprime lending industry was in its infancy, Japan and Europe were largely stagnant, and Asia and Russia were in depression (i.e. there was no synchronised global growth). The process of securitisation existed, but was very modest when compared to the present.
Today, the key difference is that the dollar looks extremely wobbly. In 1998, the US current account deficit was 2% of GDP; today, it’s hovering around 8%. This massive deficit puts continuous pressure on the dollar. Moreover, gold and other commodities are in an uptrend. There is another reason why conditions today are very different from those in 1998: in 1998, total credit market debt to GDP was 250%; today, it’s 330%. In addition, whereas debt growth averaged 4% per anum in the 1990s, it has averaged almost 10% per annum since 2002. In particular, household debt has surged from 65% of GDP in 1998 to almost 100% in 2007. Since debt growth has been so strong in the last few years, and because the system is now far more leveraged than in 1998 (not to mention the derivatives market), a tidal wave of liquidity would be needed to bail out the system, which would have to lead to even stronger debt growth; but, obviously, it would
only lead to even larger dislocations and problems later.
Another difference: in 1998, the Fed had to deal with the bailout of just one institution — LTCM; today, who should it bail out: the subprime lending institutions (it’s too late), leveraged home owners, the US$2 trillion-plus collateralised debt obligation (CDO) market, or the financial institutions, which are now stuck with over US$200 billion of leveraged buyout (LBO) loan commitments which they cannot sell to investors? So, whereas it was relatively easy to bail out just one institution in 1998, today the task would be extremely complex and daunting. Of course, the Fed could try to bail out everybody by cutting the interest rate aggressively and taking “extraordinary measures”, such as buying up the entire CDO market. [Editor’s note: Faber wrote the words above in late August, well before the Fed’s aggressive rate cut yesterday.]
Aggressive Fed fund rate cuts may not help much for the following reason: from June 2004 to August 2006, the Fed increased its fund rate in 17 baby steps from 1% to 5-1/4%. During this period of “tightening”, no actual tightening took place because credit growth accelerated as lending standards were eased and leverage increased. Moreover, as Bridgewater Associates recently pointed out, “globally, central banks have kept interest rate levels out of line with economic growth rates”. So, even if the Fed were to cut rates massively now, it is unlikely that it would stimulate credit growth, which, as I have explained repeatedly in the past, must continuously expand at an accelerating rate in a credit- and asset-driven economy in order to keep the economic plane from losing altitude. Accelerating credit growth is most unlikely now, because I cannot see how financial intermediaries will ease lending standards any time soon after the losses they have recently endured and following their dismal stock performance.
In addition, being fairly familiar with the cowardly attitude of investors, it is most unlikely that investors will now wish to buy anything other than top-quality paper and solid companies’ shares. Therefore, I can see only one solution if the Fed really wanted to attempt to bail out the system, and that would be for it to drastically cut interest rates. Unfortunately, massive interest rate cuts at present may not help much and could potentially have very negative side-effects (an even weaker dollar, inflation, rising long-term interest rates, further widening of income and wealth inequity etc.)
The crises that build up in international financial structures always ricochet from country to country…. Boom, distress and panic are transmitted through a variety of connections between national economies: psychological infection, rising and falling prices of commodities and securities, short-term capital movements, interest rates, the rise and fall of world commodity inventories.
These connections, moreover, can take various forms, and may be interrelated in various ways…. Boom and panic in one country seem to induce boom and panic in others, often through purely psychological channels…. Just as one huge bubble breeds others in a country, so a host of bubbles in a financial market seems to inspire the production of others in other countries.
For the last several years, investors have enjoyed a massive global boom. But they should not rule out a massive global panic.
黄祖耀：从事银行业48年来 目前危机最为恶劣
本地资深银行家黄祖耀，对当前的世界及亚洲经济局势表示担忧。他说，美国的次贷危机、严重的信贷困境以及前所未有的通膨压力给世界经济带来了巨大的冲击，由此引发的金融危机是自己在银行界48年来经历最恶劣的一次。
需要一两年 才能稳定下来
黄祖耀是大华银行主席，他昨天在新加坡国立大学毕业典礼上接受名誉文学博士学位时，发表上述看法。他说，今年是他在大华银行第48年，这些年他见证过许多经济危机，而当前的情况在他看来是最糟糕的，估计需要一两年才能稳定下来。
他指出，当前的金融危机直接造成美国经济放缓。美元的走弱和美国经济衰退对世界经济造成的冲击不可避免。他说：“不管你是否喜欢这个事实，美国将继续是世界上最大的消费国。为此美国经济长期衰退会对包括亚洲在内的世界经济产生影响，而飞速上涨的油价和基本食品价格，更会使当前的经济局势雪上加霜。”
让投资者面临风险 更加透明化
黄祖耀呼吁，世界主要的中央银行应在解决资金紧缩（liquidity crunch）问题中扮演重要角色，加强对金融机构的监管。同时，他也期待管制债务担保凭证和其他金融衍生产品的政策能出台，让投资者面临的风险更加透明化。
陈大荣说：“作为本地资源最丰富的银行家和本地最出色的商人之一，黄祖耀是个敏锐的思想家和策划师，他知道如何快速、准确地作出正确反应。黄祖耀的成就并不单单是靠机遇。他的决策能力，在个人和专业领域的奉献精神，以及勤奋努力、对生活的热情等都是他成功的要素。”
需要一两年 才能稳定下来
黄祖耀是大华银行主席，他昨天在新加坡国立大学毕业典礼上接受名誉文学博士学位时，发表上述看法。他说，今年是他在大华银行第48年，这些年他见证过许多经济危机，而当前的情况在他看来是最糟糕的，估计需要一两年才能稳定下来。
他指出，当前的金融危机直接造成美国经济放缓。美元的走弱和美国经济衰退对世界经济造成的冲击不可避免。他说：“不管你是否喜欢这个事实，美国将继续是世界上最大的消费国。为此美国经济长期衰退会对包括亚洲在内的世界经济产生影响，而飞速上涨的油价和基本食品价格，更会使当前的经济局势雪上加霜。”
让投资者面临风险 更加透明化
黄祖耀呼吁，世界主要的中央银行应在解决资金紧缩（liquidity crunch）问题中扮演重要角色，加强对金融机构的监管。同时，他也期待管制债务担保凭证和其他金融衍生产品的政策能出台，让投资者面临的风险更加透明化。
陈大荣说：“作为本地资源最丰富的银行家和本地最出色的商人之一，黄祖耀是个敏锐的思想家和策划师，他知道如何快速、准确地作出正确反应。黄祖耀的成就并不单单是靠机遇。他的决策能力，在个人和专业领域的奉献精神，以及勤奋努力、对生活的热情等都是他成功的要素。”
投资要成功，要有“三识”，就是知识、常识和胆识。
知识就是对投资对象，有深入的认识。
首先是要对所投资行业的特征，有明晰的概念。比如买银行股就要知道银行是“薄利多销”的行业，赚率约为1.5%，管理稍为松懈，坏账增加2%，银行就会亏大本，所以选择银行股应选管理严格的银行。
其次就是银行的业务，所涉及的范围很广阔，分行的分布遍及国内外，没有可能以“亲力亲为”的方式监管，所以“制度”很重要，银行要成功，制度必须完善和严密，职员必须严格遵行，处理业务不可有“创造性”，更不可感情用事，否则的话，坏账必然增加。而坏账的高低，是银行的成败关键。
即使管理严格，制度完善，如果负责人不诚实的话，还是有可能出毛病。霸菱银行和法国一家大银行，就因为一名负责处理货币业务的交易员处理不当，而使百年基业毁于一旦。
若负责人有心要欺骗银行，则管理即使再严格，制度即使再完善，他总有办法找出漏洞挪用公款。归根究底，银行的成败，“人”才是关键所在。
所以你在买进银行股时，要知道有关银行在放贷时是“松”还是“紧”，负责批准贷款的人接受不接受“礼物”。如果借款人不符合条件也可以取得贷款，而批准人接受“礼物”，或是高层人员受政治人物影响而发出大批贷款的话，千万不要购买此类银行的股票。
对以上的情形，企业界人士其实都心里有数，不是什么秘密。所以“口碑”也是选银行股的重要准则。
知识通常是来自资料，资料不外乎数字和事实。但知识是死的，往往是过时的，或是错误的。基金依赖知识作出的判断，可能差之毫厘，失之千里。判断错误后果可能很严重，因为股票投资涉及庞大的数目，判断不准，损失可能很大。
过滤知识
所以，知识必须经过过滤，才可应用到实际的投资上，过滤的工具就是“常识”。
常识就是常理，就是“理应如此”。如果违背常理的话，就要特别小心，里面可能有古怪，或是有人居心不良，放出烟幕，企图引君入瓮，欺骗投资大众。
在这种情形之下，就要作更深入的调查，以确保所得知识都是可靠的，并无“灌水”。
譬如某个行业，大家都知道竞争激烈，同行竞相削价，这个行业的公司，根本不可能获得暴利。如果其中有一家公司突然大赚的话，就要特别小心，提防账目“灌水”，也有可能所得盈利属一次过性质，下一个财务年就恢复正常。
在评论该公司股票时，就不要以该年的盈利为标准，更不要食古不化，以为本益比低就一定值得买进。
对一只股票有了足够的认识，而且在检视后，有关公司过去5年的业绩表现都很平稳，表示这家公司的业务很稳固。
若行业的景气短期不会有转变，公司的前景“可见度”高，又符合其他衡量投资的准则，如本益比，财务上的比例(例如债务(gearing)高不高)，业务的素质(例如顾客重复需求有关服务或货物)、每股净资产价值等，就可以买进作为投资。
股票投资。需要胆识，犹豫不决会失之交臂。
胆大心细是股票投资成功必须具备的条件。
长期观察
通常当一只股票被我列入“可买”之名单内时，为谨慎起见，我会先买进1千股，使该股出现在我的组合中，然后我一面观察有关股票的市场表现，一面继续通过各种管道，包括阅读年报、文告、分析报告，甚至亲自访问有关公司，以对有关股票有更深入的认识，同时证实我早些时所作的观察是正确的，然后我会分批买进，以完成该股在我的组合中所占的比例。
胆识必须以知识和常识为基础。如果对有关股票没有认识，就大胆大量买进，那不是胆识，而是莽撞，是自取灭亡。此类投资者很难在股市长久生存。
“三识”具备，可以做到胜多败少。
首先是要对所投资行业的特征，有明晰的概念。比如买银行股就要知道银行是“薄利多销”的行业，赚率约为1.5%，管理稍为松懈，坏账增加2%，银行就会亏大本，所以选择银行股应选管理严格的银行。
其次就是银行的业务，所涉及的范围很广阔，分行的分布遍及国内外，没有可能以“亲力亲为”的方式监管，所以“制度”很重要，银行要成功，制度必须完善和严密，职员必须严格遵行，处理业务不可有“创造性”，更不可感情用事，否则的话，坏账必然增加。而坏账的高低，是银行的成败关键。
即使管理严格，制度完善，如果负责人不诚实的话，还是有可能出毛病。霸菱银行和法国一家大银行，就因为一名负责处理货币业务的交易员处理不当，而使百年基业毁于一旦。
若负责人有心要欺骗银行，则管理即使再严格，制度即使再完善，他总有办法找出漏洞挪用公款。归根究底，银行的成败，“人”才是关键所在。
所以你在买进银行股时，要知道有关银行在放贷时是“松”还是“紧”，负责批准贷款的人接受不接受“礼物”。如果借款人不符合条件也可以取得贷款，而批准人接受“礼物”，或是高层人员受政治人物影响而发出大批贷款的话，千万不要购买此类银行的股票。
对以上的情形，企业界人士其实都心里有数，不是什么秘密。所以“口碑”也是选银行股的重要准则。
知识通常是来自资料，资料不外乎数字和事实。但知识是死的，往往是过时的，或是错误的。基金依赖知识作出的判断，可能差之毫厘，失之千里。判断错误后果可能很严重，因为股票投资涉及庞大的数目，判断不准，损失可能很大。
过滤知识
所以，知识必须经过过滤，才可应用到实际的投资上，过滤的工具就是“常识”。
常识就是常理，就是“理应如此”。如果违背常理的话，就要特别小心，里面可能有古怪，或是有人居心不良，放出烟幕，企图引君入瓮，欺骗投资大众。
在这种情形之下，就要作更深入的调查，以确保所得知识都是可靠的，并无“灌水”。
譬如某个行业，大家都知道竞争激烈，同行竞相削价，这个行业的公司，根本不可能获得暴利。如果其中有一家公司突然大赚的话，就要特别小心，提防账目“灌水”，也有可能所得盈利属一次过性质，下一个财务年就恢复正常。
在评论该公司股票时，就不要以该年的盈利为标准，更不要食古不化，以为本益比低就一定值得买进。
对一只股票有了足够的认识，而且在检视后，有关公司过去5年的业绩表现都很平稳，表示这家公司的业务很稳固。
若行业的景气短期不会有转变，公司的前景“可见度”高，又符合其他衡量投资的准则，如本益比，财务上的比例(例如债务(gearing)高不高)，业务的素质(例如顾客重复需求有关服务或货物)、每股净资产价值等，就可以买进作为投资。
股票投资。需要胆识，犹豫不决会失之交臂。
胆大心细是股票投资成功必须具备的条件。
长期观察
通常当一只股票被我列入“可买”之名单内时，为谨慎起见，我会先买进1千股，使该股出现在我的组合中，然后我一面观察有关股票的市场表现，一面继续通过各种管道，包括阅读年报、文告、分析报告，甚至亲自访问有关公司，以对有关股票有更深入的认识，同时证实我早些时所作的观察是正确的，然后我会分批买进，以完成该股在我的组合中所占的比例。
胆识必须以知识和常识为基础。如果对有关股票没有认识，就大胆大量买进，那不是胆识，而是莽撞，是自取灭亡。此类投资者很难在股市长久生存。
“三识”具备，可以做到胜多败少。
Sunday, July 6, 2008
大盘价值性底部在2000点
测算大盘的点位是个非常有挑战的题目,目前市场人士判断未来大盘点位的方法主要有两种:一是基于基本面的主观判断,二是技术分析。主观判断的随意性太强,往往上涨和下跌的方向都很难看准确;技术分析预测长期点位不仅缺乏理论依据,而且实用效果并不好。我们希望从投资者的行为出发,对大盘底部的点位预测做一些有意义的探讨。
老虎:战略投资者
战略投资者是指产业投资资本或者按照产业投资思维进行投资的投资者,最著名的战略投资者应数巴菲特。现阶段国内股市的主要战略投资者有限售流通股解禁的大股东、发行新股或增发股票的上市公司,还有很多神机妙算的与上市公司关系密切者。
他们对上市公司的经营和长远发展有深刻的把握,具有长远的战略投资眼光,或具有不对称的信息;能在众人不看好或者不敢买的时候大胆买入。不过分关注短期的宏观经济形式。
市场的博弈不仅仅局限于机构和散户,机构和机构,更血腥的是产业资本与虚拟金融资本之间的博弈!资本市场上战略投资者是真正的老虎。
中国股市有可能跌到2000
为什么要说中国股市有可能跌倒2000点，有如下理由：
1、目前股市已没有理性可言，什么市盈率、什么PE都已经没有基础了，没有理性的股市还讲什么市盈率呢，但是理性的投资者还是需要理性的对待股市。
2、2000点的市盈率应该为15倍，中国在2005年一年基本上是以15倍市盈率维持的，那个时候中国的经济增速也是10％，不理性的股市就要不理性的对待。
3、中国股市是从6000点下来的，股市就像是弹簧，不压到底不会有大的反弹，虽然新华社已发出救市的言论，没有实质性的救市政策，怎么进行反弹，靠什么进行反弹，反弹的想象空间在哪里。
4、大小非没有解决问题，每天都有大小非的问题，谁来解决大小非，只有一种方法，那就是用时间来解决，用股价来解决，股票低价，低到大小非舍不得卖为止。
5、股市总是有遗留问题，只有解决每一次的遗留问题之后，股市才有更强的反弹。
6、我希望股市不要到2000点或以下，可是以上的论点就现实的存在，保留你最后一颗子弹。
经典论述
“历史经验显示，在低位买入股票，从中长期看，赚钱是大概率事件。”目前无论是PE还是PB都处于合理位置，可以寻求一些结构性机会。
自上而下来看，目前经过市场的调整，2008年沪深300指数降到了18倍，考虑到明年还有20%左右的盈利增长，2009年沪深300指数的市盈率可以降到15倍；其次，从沪深300指数的历史情况看，当市盈率在15倍以下时停留的时间非常短，只是在2005年，上证指数跌破1000点时大概停留了5个月，从那之后整个市场的上涨幅度非常大。
同时，目前A股市场的估值也与美国标普500市盈率水平接近。如果把2009年15倍的动态市盈率和20%的盈利增长放在全球的资本市场上比较，A股属于估值偏低、增长最快的市场。当然，市场短期的波动还是会存
寻底之路漫长而曲折，说白了就是熊市
与以往一旦形成底部便连续快速上升不同，本次形成和走出底部的时间可能较长。一是因为4月下旬利好组合拳构筑的2990点底部仅一个月就失陷，极大地打击了投资者的信心，人们在没有见到更大的利好之前不敢贸然追涨。二是3000点一旦失陷，便成为沉重的阻力位，不易攻克，需要在下方反复震荡、洗盘、磨底。三是市场最大主力基金6000点追顶、3000点杀底，上半年损失万亿，赎回压力很大，而新基金乏人申购，因而失去了发动行情的资金实力和话语权；大小非解禁数量巨大的大盘蓝筹股难以吸引投资者，难以担当领涨先锋的角色。四是因为基金、机构和大户都倾向于选择大小非减持压力小、防御能力强、抗通胀的高成长中小盘题材股自救，这些股票所占权重较小，不可能快速推升行情。
有鉴于此，市场要想较为流畅地走出底部，收复3000点前政策底；要想补掉3215点—3312点的跳空缺口；要想达到此前2990点—3786点26.6%的同样涨幅，甚至要想冲破3786点，向4000点进军，就必须有实质性利好配合。例如，设立平准基金，将新老划断后上市新股的大小非锁定期延长（因为它们未支付过对价，持股成本极低，极不合理，重新界定锁定期不存在违反股改契约的问题）；更多
过分悲观预期暴跌股市
目前市场上的股票可以说是“比较便宜”的。我们现在的市盈率水平和美国相仿，但中国经济的增长速度远高于美国，我们的GDP增长再低也会有9%，根据测算，目前许多上市公司的2008年的动态市盈率只有12倍、15倍，但其年盈利增长率可达30%。之所以可以买到这么“便宜”的股票，就是因为市场的恐慌心态。大小非解禁、通货膨胀、外围经济环境恶劣等一系列的利空因素造成了市场上严重的恐慌，过分悲观的预期使得股市震荡剧烈。虽然短期来看，可能体现不出这些股票的价值，但在较长一段时间来看，价值会慢慢体现。
虽然在宏观调控环境下，部分行业受宏观调控和货币紧缩负面影响较大，但仔细观察中国经济的长期趋势性变化，很多
现在远未到股市大底
目前股市的状态只是恐慌，亏损被套的现在还不想卖股票，还想着等着解套，而机构没有得到足够的筹码，它不会给你抬轿。散户现在的心情只是亏损，长期持股，还抱这样一个心里，等着机构拉抬等解套。而现实是不会的，机构要折磨你，折磨你到心里“如果你恨一个人，那么就让他炒股”这样的心里，这时才是大底，你可以入市了。
据调查，亏损50～80％的人占50％以上，这些人都是5000点以后进入的，这些人现在还在持股。只有等这些人手中的股票都卖给机构，机构得到廉价的筹码才能上涨，而这个时候也是基金没有人买的时候。
现在没有到达大底，可以从基金没有被大面积赎回看出来，因为股民还认为存有一丝希望，希望政府支持股市，希望在奥运会前股市能够大涨，而目前看来不现实。
现在只有等待，美国股市也不是一年就达到10000点的，所以中国的经济还是高速发展的，目前中国股市可以支持4000点，随着经济的发展，股市的指数也是上升的，如果是下降那就是熊市，现在就是熊市，希望大家不要卖股票，机构在市场上找不到廉价的筹码，会慢慢拉抬指数，
老虎:战略投资者
战略投资者是指产业投资资本或者按照产业投资思维进行投资的投资者,最著名的战略投资者应数巴菲特。现阶段国内股市的主要战略投资者有限售流通股解禁的大股东、发行新股或增发股票的上市公司,还有很多神机妙算的与上市公司关系密切者。
他们对上市公司的经营和长远发展有深刻的把握,具有长远的战略投资眼光,或具有不对称的信息;能在众人不看好或者不敢买的时候大胆买入。不过分关注短期的宏观经济形式。
市场的博弈不仅仅局限于机构和散户,机构和机构,更血腥的是产业资本与虚拟金融资本之间的博弈!资本市场上战略投资者是真正的老虎。
中国股市有可能跌到2000
为什么要说中国股市有可能跌倒2000点，有如下理由：
1、目前股市已没有理性可言，什么市盈率、什么PE都已经没有基础了，没有理性的股市还讲什么市盈率呢，但是理性的投资者还是需要理性的对待股市。
2、2000点的市盈率应该为15倍，中国在2005年一年基本上是以15倍市盈率维持的，那个时候中国的经济增速也是10％，不理性的股市就要不理性的对待。
3、中国股市是从6000点下来的，股市就像是弹簧，不压到底不会有大的反弹，虽然新华社已发出救市的言论，没有实质性的救市政策，怎么进行反弹，靠什么进行反弹，反弹的想象空间在哪里。
4、大小非没有解决问题，每天都有大小非的问题，谁来解决大小非，只有一种方法，那就是用时间来解决，用股价来解决，股票低价，低到大小非舍不得卖为止。
5、股市总是有遗留问题，只有解决每一次的遗留问题之后，股市才有更强的反弹。
6、我希望股市不要到2000点或以下，可是以上的论点就现实的存在，保留你最后一颗子弹。
经典论述
“历史经验显示，在低位买入股票，从中长期看，赚钱是大概率事件。”目前无论是PE还是PB都处于合理位置，可以寻求一些结构性机会。
自上而下来看，目前经过市场的调整，2008年沪深300指数降到了18倍，考虑到明年还有20%左右的盈利增长，2009年沪深300指数的市盈率可以降到15倍；其次，从沪深300指数的历史情况看，当市盈率在15倍以下时停留的时间非常短，只是在2005年，上证指数跌破1000点时大概停留了5个月，从那之后整个市场的上涨幅度非常大。
同时，目前A股市场的估值也与美国标普500市盈率水平接近。如果把2009年15倍的动态市盈率和20%的盈利增长放在全球的资本市场上比较，A股属于估值偏低、增长最快的市场。当然，市场短期的波动还是会存
寻底之路漫长而曲折，说白了就是熊市
与以往一旦形成底部便连续快速上升不同，本次形成和走出底部的时间可能较长。一是因为4月下旬利好组合拳构筑的2990点底部仅一个月就失陷，极大地打击了投资者的信心，人们在没有见到更大的利好之前不敢贸然追涨。二是3000点一旦失陷，便成为沉重的阻力位，不易攻克，需要在下方反复震荡、洗盘、磨底。三是市场最大主力基金6000点追顶、3000点杀底，上半年损失万亿，赎回压力很大，而新基金乏人申购，因而失去了发动行情的资金实力和话语权；大小非解禁数量巨大的大盘蓝筹股难以吸引投资者，难以担当领涨先锋的角色。四是因为基金、机构和大户都倾向于选择大小非减持压力小、防御能力强、抗通胀的高成长中小盘题材股自救，这些股票所占权重较小，不可能快速推升行情。
有鉴于此，市场要想较为流畅地走出底部，收复3000点前政策底；要想补掉3215点—3312点的跳空缺口；要想达到此前2990点—3786点26.6%的同样涨幅，甚至要想冲破3786点，向4000点进军，就必须有实质性利好配合。例如，设立平准基金，将新老划断后上市新股的大小非锁定期延长（因为它们未支付过对价，持股成本极低，极不合理，重新界定锁定期不存在违反股改契约的问题）；更多
过分悲观预期暴跌股市
目前市场上的股票可以说是“比较便宜”的。我们现在的市盈率水平和美国相仿，但中国经济的增长速度远高于美国，我们的GDP增长再低也会有9%，根据测算，目前许多上市公司的2008年的动态市盈率只有12倍、15倍，但其年盈利增长率可达30%。之所以可以买到这么“便宜”的股票，就是因为市场的恐慌心态。大小非解禁、通货膨胀、外围经济环境恶劣等一系列的利空因素造成了市场上严重的恐慌，过分悲观的预期使得股市震荡剧烈。虽然短期来看，可能体现不出这些股票的价值，但在较长一段时间来看，价值会慢慢体现。
虽然在宏观调控环境下，部分行业受宏观调控和货币紧缩负面影响较大，但仔细观察中国经济的长期趋势性变化，很多
现在远未到股市大底
目前股市的状态只是恐慌，亏损被套的现在还不想卖股票，还想着等着解套，而机构没有得到足够的筹码，它不会给你抬轿。散户现在的心情只是亏损，长期持股，还抱这样一个心里，等着机构拉抬等解套。而现实是不会的，机构要折磨你，折磨你到心里“如果你恨一个人，那么就让他炒股”这样的心里，这时才是大底，你可以入市了。
据调查，亏损50～80％的人占50％以上，这些人都是5000点以后进入的，这些人现在还在持股。只有等这些人手中的股票都卖给机构，机构得到廉价的筹码才能上涨，而这个时候也是基金没有人买的时候。
现在没有到达大底，可以从基金没有被大面积赎回看出来，因为股民还认为存有一丝希望，希望政府支持股市，希望在奥运会前股市能够大涨，而目前看来不现实。
现在只有等待，美国股市也不是一年就达到10000点的，所以中国的经济还是高速发展的，目前中国股市可以支持4000点，随着经济的发展，股市的指数也是上升的，如果是下降那就是熊市，现在就是熊市，希望大家不要卖股票，机构在市场上找不到廉价的筹码，会慢慢拉抬指数，
Saturday, July 5, 2008
投資四大謬論
雖然技術指標指出股市係極度超賣，短期出現反彈，但唔代表熊市已結束。極有可能只係出現夏日戀情（即無花果）。喺熊市中大部分投資者皆做出錯誤決定，唔理你係高學歷或大人物，一樣犯相同錯誤。例如喺升市中有過高期望；喺跌市中又怕得要死。好多人誤會大戶係股市贏家，喺2007年10月至今股市最大輸家係服務大戶大金融機構，例如UBS、美林、花旗、雷曼兄弟及貝爾斯登等。證明股市內無大戶或散戶之分，只有贏家同輸家。點解股市咁多輸家？因為太多謬論。
一、P/E係反映過去業績結果而唔係預測未來工具.
P/E四十倍股份應睇好定睇淡？如未來一年純利可上升100％，P/E四十倍點解唔買？相反．P/E十倍股份係唔係抵買？如果未來一年公司出現虧損，咁P/E十倍股份一D吸引力都冇。P/E高低由G（增長率）所管轄，投資者應買增長股份（Growth Stocks），而唔係低P/E股份。只講P/E唔講G者，係唔懂P/E理論，人云亦云，可能佢連P/E理論亦未睇過。其次係行業周期，例如2001年資源股P/E雖然高但唔怕買，因為資源業正進入上升周期（由1980年起，一直衰到2000年，衰足二十年）。相反，今年資源股低P/E都唔好買，因為佢地可能見頂。
二、太早止賺可令你破產。
2007年上半年，唔少人呱呱叫泡沫經濟，喺恒生指數22000點前早已放晒貨止賺。點知恒指去年8月只回落到20000點就止跌回升，9月份便到處問人好唔好高追？人地叫佢睇睇，佢就唔敢入貨。到咗10月份，股市實在太燦爛，人地叫佢唔好高追，佢亦聽唔入耳（心諗9月份你地叫我唔好高追，累我賺唔到錢）。喺10月份入飽貨後，股市卻大幅回落，由於喺30000點水平先入貨，自然唔肯止蝕。到今年3月嚇死先止蝕（50天線跌穿250天線）。4月時又心大心細，5月又再高追……。請記住投資市場只有止蝕唔止賺，從來冇止賺呢回事。相信止賺盤者永遠唔會係股市內大贏家！甚至10％到15％止蝕盤亦不宜機械式運用，例如一旦確認行業進入上升周期，或確認牛市已開始時，買入後甚至股價回落10％到15％亦唔駛止蝕。只係一般人唔知咩叫當頭起。因此，對幾時應放棄止蝕盤並唔係容易掌握。
三、投資宜集中，不宜分散。
專業投資者最多亦只可持有十隻股票，一般投資者最多只可住五隻股票。超過上述數目係自找麻煩；五隻股票中總有一、二隻跑出，嗰時更應該進一步集中（因溝上唔溝落），請賣晒蝕本貨，增持賺錢貨，而唔係賣晒賺錢貨而去買蝕本貨（平嘢冇好，好嘢冇平）。投資同生仔一樣，貴精唔貴多。
四、名氣無用論。
今年上半年巴郡股價跌咗19％（同期標普五百只跌14％），連畢非德都跑輸大市。證明過去成功，唔保證未來成功；名氣愈大，未來成功機會愈小。
一、P/E係反映過去業績結果而唔係預測未來工具.
P/E四十倍股份應睇好定睇淡？如未來一年純利可上升100％，P/E四十倍點解唔買？相反．P/E十倍股份係唔係抵買？如果未來一年公司出現虧損，咁P/E十倍股份一D吸引力都冇。P/E高低由G（增長率）所管轄，投資者應買增長股份（Growth Stocks），而唔係低P/E股份。只講P/E唔講G者，係唔懂P/E理論，人云亦云，可能佢連P/E理論亦未睇過。其次係行業周期，例如2001年資源股P/E雖然高但唔怕買，因為資源業正進入上升周期（由1980年起，一直衰到2000年，衰足二十年）。相反，今年資源股低P/E都唔好買，因為佢地可能見頂。
二、太早止賺可令你破產。
2007年上半年，唔少人呱呱叫泡沫經濟，喺恒生指數22000點前早已放晒貨止賺。點知恒指去年8月只回落到20000點就止跌回升，9月份便到處問人好唔好高追？人地叫佢睇睇，佢就唔敢入貨。到咗10月份，股市實在太燦爛，人地叫佢唔好高追，佢亦聽唔入耳（心諗9月份你地叫我唔好高追，累我賺唔到錢）。喺10月份入飽貨後，股市卻大幅回落，由於喺30000點水平先入貨，自然唔肯止蝕。到今年3月嚇死先止蝕（50天線跌穿250天線）。4月時又心大心細，5月又再高追……。請記住投資市場只有止蝕唔止賺，從來冇止賺呢回事。相信止賺盤者永遠唔會係股市內大贏家！甚至10％到15％止蝕盤亦不宜機械式運用，例如一旦確認行業進入上升周期，或確認牛市已開始時，買入後甚至股價回落10％到15％亦唔駛止蝕。只係一般人唔知咩叫當頭起。因此，對幾時應放棄止蝕盤並唔係容易掌握。
三、投資宜集中，不宜分散。
專業投資者最多亦只可持有十隻股票，一般投資者最多只可住五隻股票。超過上述數目係自找麻煩；五隻股票中總有一、二隻跑出，嗰時更應該進一步集中（因溝上唔溝落），請賣晒蝕本貨，增持賺錢貨，而唔係賣晒賺錢貨而去買蝕本貨（平嘢冇好，好嘢冇平）。投資同生仔一樣，貴精唔貴多。
四、名氣無用論。
今年上半年巴郡股價跌咗19％（同期標普五百只跌14％），連畢非德都跑輸大市。證明過去成功，唔保證未來成功；名氣愈大，未來成功機會愈小。
A Stock, by Heck, for her Dividends
以下可能是投資最重要的要點:
1) 選股是十分重要的，要知其「Business Model」、「競爭優勢」、「業務前景」、「財務狀況」、「管治質素」、「自由現金流的可持續性」、以及「派息紀錄和能力」
2) 宏觀因素的分析，包括經濟和相關行業
3) 「Market Sense」，這不能教的，是要自己從經驗中「悟」出來的
4) 「Common Sense」以及「Logical Thinking」
5) 變通，所有「Factor」係有轉變的可能性。如果制定錯的「Assumption」，後果嚴重
6) 或許「Technical Analysis」可以幫你於一個較為有利的價格做買賣，但主宰股市的因素還是「基本面」、「估值」、「風險」和「情緒」
7) 「股息率」的重要性，未到逆市之前相信大部份人當之為「耳邊風」。「John Burr Williams」於「Theory of Investment Value」一書內說過: 「A cow for her milk, A hen for her eggs, And a Stock, by heck, for her dividends 」
8) 部位控制(Position Control)的重要性，並按「風險」、「地區」和「行業」作出分類
9) 分散投資的重要性，永不能忽略。正如鄧普頓爵士(Sir John Templeton)常向人們說: 「因為無論你多聰明，也不能預計或控制未來。」
10) 唔好亂玩「Margin Trading」
1) 選股是十分重要的，要知其「Business Model」、「競爭優勢」、「業務前景」、「財務狀況」、「管治質素」、「自由現金流的可持續性」、以及「派息紀錄和能力」
2) 宏觀因素的分析，包括經濟和相關行業
3) 「Market Sense」，這不能教的，是要自己從經驗中「悟」出來的
4) 「Common Sense」以及「Logical Thinking」
5) 變通，所有「Factor」係有轉變的可能性。如果制定錯的「Assumption」，後果嚴重
6) 或許「Technical Analysis」可以幫你於一個較為有利的價格做買賣，但主宰股市的因素還是「基本面」、「估值」、「風險」和「情緒」
7) 「股息率」的重要性，未到逆市之前相信大部份人當之為「耳邊風」。「John Burr Williams」於「Theory of Investment Value」一書內說過: 「A cow for her milk, A hen for her eggs, And a Stock, by heck, for her dividends 」
8) 部位控制(Position Control)的重要性，並按「風險」、「地區」和「行業」作出分類
9) 分散投資的重要性，永不能忽略。正如鄧普頓爵士(Sir John Templeton)常向人們說: 「因為無論你多聰明，也不能預計或控制未來。」
10) 唔好亂玩「Margin Trading」
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