不管怎么分析，昨天晚上出台的限制大小非减持的政策指导意见从短期看也是个利好，但是，市场不为利好所动，利好政策竟然只体现在开盘然后就继续下跌，这种走法是出乎大多数投资人预料的，也证明了在熊市中每次利好都是出货机会这一经典定律。
我们分析有利好而下跌的原因不外乎以下三点：
第一，目前A股非常弱，已经在深层次对宏观调政策恐惧，这不是一两个利好所能解救的。从涨跌榜来看，跌停的股票一版都排不下，而且以地产、有色金属股为主，表明机构投资人不看好地产和有色板块的未来，每次利好都是他们卖出的机会。
第二，大小非面对减持政策而加速集中减持。
第三，部分机构故意打压，造成极端恐慌气氛，然后不明真相的散户跟风抛出，机构可以在底部接到更加廉价的筹码并且希望更多的利好政策出台。
本轮下跌暴露了A股有很多制度设计上的问题，包括下跌中没有对冲稳定市场的机制；没有应急救市机制；一级市场的高利润给二级市场带来了很大的风险；没有保护二级市场中小投资人的利益的机制；在解决国有股全流通时，没有考虑到资金的供给；股改和国有股减持的完成需要一个健康的牛市环境，投资人信心遭到打击的熊市是不可能顺利完成金融改革任务的。
作为散户永远不要去抄底，在A股没有彻底走出底部之前，我们建议继续空仓持币观望。
如何识别空头陷阱与主力出货？
所谓骗取筹码的陷阱就是空头陷阱，简单地说就是市场主流资金大力做空，通过盘面中显现出明显疲弱的形态，诱使投资者得出股市将继续大幅下跌的结论，并恐慌性抛售的市场情况。一段时间，急转直下，龙头股纷纷跳水，指数连续快速的下跌，这时投资者更要谨防空头陷阱。对于空头陷阱的判别主要是从消息面、资金面、宏观基本面、技术分析和市场人气等方面进行综合分析研判：
一、在消息面上的分析。
主力资金往往会利用宣传的优势，营造做空的氛围。所以当投资者遇到市场利空不断时，反而要格外小心。因为，正是在各种利空消息满天飞的重磅轰炸下，主流资金才可以很方便地建仓。
二、从成交量分析。
空头陷阱在成交量上的特征是随着股价的持续性下跌，量能始终处于不规则萎缩中，有时盘面上甚至会出现无量空跌或无量暴跌现象，盘中个股成交也是十分不活跃，给投资者营造出阴跌走势遥遥无期的氛围。恰恰在这种制造悲观的氛围中，主力往往可以轻松地逢低建仓，从而构成空头陷阱。
三、从宏观基本面的分析。
需要了解从根本上影响大盘走强的政策面因素和宏观基本面因素，分析是否有实质性利空因素，如果在股市政策背景方面没有特别的实质性做空因素，而股价却持续性地暴跌，这时就比较容易形成空头陷阱。
四、从技术形态上分析。
空头陷阱在K线走势上的特征往往是连续几根长阴线暴跌，贯穿各种强支撑位，有时甚至伴随向下跳空缺口。在形态分析上，空头陷阱常常会故意引发技术形态的破位，让投资者误以为后市下跌空间巨大，而纷纷抛出手中持股，从而使主力可以在低位承接大量的廉价股票。在技术指标方面，空头陷阱会导致技术指标上出现严重的背离特征，而且不是其中一两种指标的背离现象，往往是多种指标的多重周期的同步背离。
五、从市场人气方面分析。
由于股市长时间的下跌，会在市场中形成沉重的套牢盘，人气也在不断被套中被消耗殆尽。然而往往是在市场人气极度低迷的时刻，恰恰说明股市离真正的底部已经为时不远。
Monday, April 21, 2008
Friday, April 18, 2008
不可任何東西都想要
John Paulson成為去年最高薪嘅對沖基金管理人，收入共37億美元，跑贏索羅斯嘅29億美元，以及第三名James Simon嘅28億美元。
今年美國唔係進入經濟衰退期，而係進入 GDP絲路至溫巴仙增長時代！估計今年標普五百指數純利平均跌6％，O由二十倍下降到十五倍；反之，每日指數波幅可超過2％，投資策略宜保守。
熊市二期每次見底便強力反彈，第一季表現最出色係公用股，因為利率下降，4月份應係最後一次減息，即公用股上升期又差唔多矣。
2000年1月至02年10月，標普五百指數O下降咗23％；去年10月至今，指數O只下降14％，估計仍可再跌10％（加上純利回落6％，即後市美股跌幅仍有15％）。戰後至今美股熊市平均跌幅32％，日子共三百八十四個交易天。如上述有參考價值，美股熊市應响明年第一季才結束，家吓約完成一半左右。
不可任何東西都想要
一個人只有兩隻手，可以攞得住嘅實在有限，因此不能任何東西都想要。黎瑞恩曾唱過一首歌《一人有一個夢想》，事實的確係咁，一生人只做好一件事，咁就成功機會好大；反之樣樣想，但你只有兩隻手，又點可以攞得住咁多？英語亦有云：「Choice, not chance, makes life different」。人生過程中，每一個抉擇決定你嘅將來，而非所謂機緣巧合或運氣。人人所作抉擇不同，最後結果人人唔一樣。過去每一個抉擇皆影響你嘅今天，今天你嘅抉擇亦將影響你嘅將來。
例如我老曹相信依家係熊市二期，恒指响20000至25000點上上落落。上落市唔易玩，因此連放响分析股票方面嘅時間今年都減少咗。另一方面，我老曹仍偏愛美元及外幣，至今冇人民幣存款（雖然明知實賺）。上述點點滴滴，最後必影響我老曹未來所擁有嘅財富。一個人只有兩隻手，喺一生中你又攞得住幾多？
趨勢醞釀而未成形
閒話少說。2008年最頭痛嘅地方係How to make Profits in Sick Economy。2008年首季已經過去，本港基金表現平均數係負增長，至於我老曹成績亦唔比基金公司好，即係略有虧損。
响上落市中挑選跑贏大市股份，並非想像咁容易，即使睇市正確，揀唔中上升股份一樣冇錢賺。畢非德所教方法──別人恐慌你貪心，別人貪心你恐慌，就更難做到，最多只能做到別人恐慌時你唔驚，別人貪心時你唔貪已經好叻，因為we are all human，都有人性弱點。
今年不妨放開 D，因為好多趨勢仍在醞釀而未成形（潛龍勿用）。人生中失去一次機會，仍有無數機會等住你；反之，一次重大錯誤決定，往往翻唔到身。年輕時一個錯誤決定，可以損失幾十萬元；中年時一個錯誤決定，可以失去幾百萬元；踏入老年，作出一個錯誤決定代價就更大，此乃點解年紀漸大，投資策略一定傾向保守嘅理由。請唔好嘗試outsmart the market。
股市冇過去，只有將來；炒股票唔係炒過去業績，而係炒前景展望。嗰D去年10月冇及時減持者，更喺投資研討會上努力 talk up the market去抵銷個人嘅恐懼感，可惜股市從來唔因多人睇好而上升，亦唔會因多人睇淡而回落。股市上升理由係因為人人想入貨，股市回落理由係人人想出貨而未果。今天有邊個仲坐擁巨資等入貨？持貨睇好則不值一哂。
由高O走向低O
踏入2008年，全球金融面對反槓桿化（de-leverage），簡單D講就係信貸收縮。上述情況以美國影響最大，歐洲少D，亞洲區又少D。去年8月前嘅資金泛濫情況已結束，近期各國央行努力注資亦無法扭轉此大趨勢，只能讓信貸市場收縮有秩序地進行，而非無秩序式撤退。上述影響唔係一季兩季，甚至唔係一年兩年，而係未來大趨勢，可令美國同歐洲GDP長期陷入低增長期。
反而歐洲上述問題唔大，因O已喺十點七二倍水平。
從高O走向低O方法有二：
一、企業純利保持增長，而股市指數不前，例如1966至82年美股。
二、企業純利不前甚至回落，股市指數大跌，例如1990至2003年日經平均指數（依家已跌至O十五倍）。至於滬深三百指數點樣完成由高O走向低O？由於依家O仍高達二十七倍，一旦中國GDP增長率下降，股市要跌到邊個水平才有真正支持？家吓恒生指數平均O係十四點七倍。今天歐洲Dow Stock 50平均O十倍，恒指O十四點七倍，表面睇唔算貴，但純利中幾多來自物業升值重估？剔除物業升值後，恒生指數O絕對唔便宜（起碼冇歐洲及日本咁便宜）。何況抵買絕對唔係投資嘅理由。恒生指數已進入上落市，即升幅有限、波幅無限。
油價高企、食物價格高漲，歐洲同北美洲銀行及大金融機構則忙於集資，因為今年第一季虧損已令資本充足比率不足。响咁嘅環境下，後市可升幾多？去年下半年幾多股份高價被綁（以香港每天成交平均800億元計，一百二十個交易天，即有九萬六千億元股票喺市場高價易手）。大量股份高價被綁，形成今年股市進入短期供不應求，呢個拉鋸局面可維持幾耐？冇人可預知。
3月份美國新建房屋跌至十七年低點，住宅方面回落5.2%，相等於每年一百零一萬間；新批合約更少，跌至年率九十七萬間，係1991年8月以來最低。美國全國建屋商協會估計，今年建屋量將減少30%，較先前估計嘅27%更大。
今年美國唔係進入經濟衰退期，而係進入 GDP絲路至溫巴仙增長時代！估計今年標普五百指數純利平均跌6％，O由二十倍下降到十五倍；反之，每日指數波幅可超過2％，投資策略宜保守。
熊市二期每次見底便強力反彈，第一季表現最出色係公用股，因為利率下降，4月份應係最後一次減息，即公用股上升期又差唔多矣。
2000年1月至02年10月，標普五百指數O下降咗23％；去年10月至今，指數O只下降14％，估計仍可再跌10％（加上純利回落6％，即後市美股跌幅仍有15％）。戰後至今美股熊市平均跌幅32％，日子共三百八十四個交易天。如上述有參考價值，美股熊市應响明年第一季才結束，家吓約完成一半左右。
不可任何東西都想要
一個人只有兩隻手，可以攞得住嘅實在有限，因此不能任何東西都想要。黎瑞恩曾唱過一首歌《一人有一個夢想》，事實的確係咁，一生人只做好一件事，咁就成功機會好大；反之樣樣想，但你只有兩隻手，又點可以攞得住咁多？英語亦有云：「Choice, not chance, makes life different」。人生過程中，每一個抉擇決定你嘅將來，而非所謂機緣巧合或運氣。人人所作抉擇不同，最後結果人人唔一樣。過去每一個抉擇皆影響你嘅今天，今天你嘅抉擇亦將影響你嘅將來。
例如我老曹相信依家係熊市二期，恒指响20000至25000點上上落落。上落市唔易玩，因此連放响分析股票方面嘅時間今年都減少咗。另一方面，我老曹仍偏愛美元及外幣，至今冇人民幣存款（雖然明知實賺）。上述點點滴滴，最後必影響我老曹未來所擁有嘅財富。一個人只有兩隻手，喺一生中你又攞得住幾多？
趨勢醞釀而未成形
閒話少說。2008年最頭痛嘅地方係How to make Profits in Sick Economy。2008年首季已經過去，本港基金表現平均數係負增長，至於我老曹成績亦唔比基金公司好，即係略有虧損。
响上落市中挑選跑贏大市股份，並非想像咁容易，即使睇市正確，揀唔中上升股份一樣冇錢賺。畢非德所教方法──別人恐慌你貪心，別人貪心你恐慌，就更難做到，最多只能做到別人恐慌時你唔驚，別人貪心時你唔貪已經好叻，因為we are all human，都有人性弱點。
今年不妨放開 D，因為好多趨勢仍在醞釀而未成形（潛龍勿用）。人生中失去一次機會，仍有無數機會等住你；反之，一次重大錯誤決定，往往翻唔到身。年輕時一個錯誤決定，可以損失幾十萬元；中年時一個錯誤決定，可以失去幾百萬元；踏入老年，作出一個錯誤決定代價就更大，此乃點解年紀漸大，投資策略一定傾向保守嘅理由。請唔好嘗試outsmart the market。
股市冇過去，只有將來；炒股票唔係炒過去業績，而係炒前景展望。嗰D去年10月冇及時減持者，更喺投資研討會上努力 talk up the market去抵銷個人嘅恐懼感，可惜股市從來唔因多人睇好而上升，亦唔會因多人睇淡而回落。股市上升理由係因為人人想入貨，股市回落理由係人人想出貨而未果。今天有邊個仲坐擁巨資等入貨？持貨睇好則不值一哂。
由高O走向低O
踏入2008年，全球金融面對反槓桿化（de-leverage），簡單D講就係信貸收縮。上述情況以美國影響最大，歐洲少D，亞洲區又少D。去年8月前嘅資金泛濫情況已結束，近期各國央行努力注資亦無法扭轉此大趨勢，只能讓信貸市場收縮有秩序地進行，而非無秩序式撤退。上述影響唔係一季兩季，甚至唔係一年兩年，而係未來大趨勢，可令美國同歐洲GDP長期陷入低增長期。
反而歐洲上述問題唔大，因O已喺十點七二倍水平。
從高O走向低O方法有二：
一、企業純利保持增長，而股市指數不前，例如1966至82年美股。
二、企業純利不前甚至回落，股市指數大跌，例如1990至2003年日經平均指數（依家已跌至O十五倍）。至於滬深三百指數點樣完成由高O走向低O？由於依家O仍高達二十七倍，一旦中國GDP增長率下降，股市要跌到邊個水平才有真正支持？家吓恒生指數平均O係十四點七倍。今天歐洲Dow Stock 50平均O十倍，恒指O十四點七倍，表面睇唔算貴，但純利中幾多來自物業升值重估？剔除物業升值後，恒生指數O絕對唔便宜（起碼冇歐洲及日本咁便宜）。何況抵買絕對唔係投資嘅理由。恒生指數已進入上落市，即升幅有限、波幅無限。
油價高企、食物價格高漲，歐洲同北美洲銀行及大金融機構則忙於集資，因為今年第一季虧損已令資本充足比率不足。响咁嘅環境下，後市可升幾多？去年下半年幾多股份高價被綁（以香港每天成交平均800億元計，一百二十個交易天，即有九萬六千億元股票喺市場高價易手）。大量股份高價被綁，形成今年股市進入短期供不應求，呢個拉鋸局面可維持幾耐？冇人可預知。
3月份美國新建房屋跌至十七年低點，住宅方面回落5.2%，相等於每年一百零一萬間；新批合約更少，跌至年率九十七萬間，係1991年8月以來最低。美國全國建屋商協會估計，今年建屋量將減少30%，較先前估計嘅27%更大。
获准延迟付款计划下出售近三万私宅或成楼市炸弹
尽管延迟付款计划(Deferred Payment Scheme)已经在去年10月被撤销，仍有多达2万9000个获准在该计划下出售的私宅单位尚未完工。房地产分析员认为，这些只支付了一二成楼价的单位，很可能威胁到接下来的楼市走向，甚至是整体的购屋信心。
最近楼市开始走软，让市场人士担心，过去几年以延迟付款计划卖出的私宅单位，可能会在不久的将来，如“定时炸弹”一样震动市场。
特别是明后两年为私宅单位的完工高峰期，分别有1万3463个和1万8306个私宅单位完工，如果楼价明显下挫，到时必须开始供楼的买家很可能会被迫削价卖房，甚至索性悔约，让发展商把房子收回。
尽管金融管理局和市区重建局都在去年先后指出延迟付款计划对金融界和房地产市场的不利影响，市建局甚至在去年10月撤销了有关计划，但市场至今仍然不知道，近年来到底有多少个私宅单位是在延迟付款计划下卖出去的？
本地房地产上市公司向来不愿提供有关数据。本报向交易所查询，发展商是否有必要申报在延迟付款计划方面的曝险，交易所表示，根据上市守则，上市公司应该自己评估有关资料是否属于重要资讯(material informa- tion)。
金管局在受询时指示记者向市建局查询。市建局昨天回复本报的询问时说，从1997年至2007年10月，市建局批准了大约600个私宅项目(共有7万2380个私宅单位)提供延迟付款计划给买家。
当中，4万3140个单位已经取得临时入伙准证(TOP)，其余2万9250个单位预计会在2008年至2013年取得临时入伙准证——这包括2万3490个已售单位，以及5760个未售单位。
没有准确数据
市建局指出，虽然有2万9250个未完工的单位获准提供延迟付款计划，但并非所有买家都会选择延迟付款，因此真实数据相信较少。至于到底有多少单位是以延迟付款计划卖出的，市建局说，它并没有这个数据。
德意志银行(Deutsche Bank)私人财富管理首席亚洲策略师蔡学敏说：“这是我第一次看到这些数据，不过可惜它们说的不多。”
他认为，市建局或者其他政府机构，有必要收集延迟付款计划的相关数据，因为它正是本地楼价飞涨的其中一个主要原因。“既然政府已经发现了延迟付款计划令人担忧的地方，如果能够提供数据让人们了解整个大局，将有很大的帮助。”
他相信，延迟付款计划的问题可大可小，“如果不趁早应付，说不定会演变成新加坡版的次贷问题。”
卓登(Chesterton)国际研究部主管陈瑞谨也认为，了解过去几年的延迟付款概况，将能协助人们评估新加坡楼市的风险到底有多大？
“当然，如果市场景气良好，这不会带来什么问题。不过，如果经济情况继续恶化，导致人们失去工作，一些人就会被迫降价脱售手头上的单位，甚至是悔约，这不但会影响发展商的盈利，也会冲击人们的购屋信心，进一步影响整体楼价。”
他猜测，延迟付款计划的潜在风险应该是相当高，所以才会引起金管局和市建局的关注，并且将有关计划撤销。
据他所知，利用延迟付款计划来买楼的，有不少是本地人。其中一些甚至一个人扫下十多二十个单位。“他们都是有财有势的人，但尽管如此，一旦房子入伙时，要同时吞下十多个高价单位也不是简单的事。”
刚刚从花旗集团跳槽到德意志银行的蔡学敏，去年写的一系列延迟付款计划报告书，在市场上引起相当大的回响。他认为，尤其是去年在楼市最高峰，以延迟付款计划卖房子的发展商，将面对最大的风险。
他指出，实际上一些项目，包括联合工程的One Rochester、吉宝置业的Reflections，以及永泰控股的Duchess Crest，最近被买家拿到二手市场放盘的单位，叫价都已经跌破当初发展商的推出价格。
虽然过去买家因为还不起房贷而导致房子被银行收回的比例很少，但是蔡学敏不肯定这一次买家悔约的比率会有多高，特别是一些高档项目有超过半数买家是外国人，有些在新加坡完全没有任何业务或资产。
他猜测，这些买家当中，一些人可能将已经支付了一二成的首期，当成是定金，希望能够放弃定金了事，但这要看发展商是否能够向他们追回中间的价差。
最近楼市开始走软，让市场人士担心，过去几年以延迟付款计划卖出的私宅单位，可能会在不久的将来，如“定时炸弹”一样震动市场。
特别是明后两年为私宅单位的完工高峰期，分别有1万3463个和1万8306个私宅单位完工，如果楼价明显下挫，到时必须开始供楼的买家很可能会被迫削价卖房，甚至索性悔约，让发展商把房子收回。
尽管金融管理局和市区重建局都在去年先后指出延迟付款计划对金融界和房地产市场的不利影响，市建局甚至在去年10月撤销了有关计划，但市场至今仍然不知道，近年来到底有多少个私宅单位是在延迟付款计划下卖出去的？
本地房地产上市公司向来不愿提供有关数据。本报向交易所查询，发展商是否有必要申报在延迟付款计划方面的曝险，交易所表示，根据上市守则，上市公司应该自己评估有关资料是否属于重要资讯(material informa- tion)。
金管局在受询时指示记者向市建局查询。市建局昨天回复本报的询问时说，从1997年至2007年10月，市建局批准了大约600个私宅项目(共有7万2380个私宅单位)提供延迟付款计划给买家。
当中，4万3140个单位已经取得临时入伙准证(TOP)，其余2万9250个单位预计会在2008年至2013年取得临时入伙准证——这包括2万3490个已售单位，以及5760个未售单位。
没有准确数据
市建局指出，虽然有2万9250个未完工的单位获准提供延迟付款计划，但并非所有买家都会选择延迟付款，因此真实数据相信较少。至于到底有多少单位是以延迟付款计划卖出的，市建局说，它并没有这个数据。
德意志银行(Deutsche Bank)私人财富管理首席亚洲策略师蔡学敏说：“这是我第一次看到这些数据，不过可惜它们说的不多。”
他认为，市建局或者其他政府机构，有必要收集延迟付款计划的相关数据，因为它正是本地楼价飞涨的其中一个主要原因。“既然政府已经发现了延迟付款计划令人担忧的地方，如果能够提供数据让人们了解整个大局，将有很大的帮助。”
他相信，延迟付款计划的问题可大可小，“如果不趁早应付，说不定会演变成新加坡版的次贷问题。”
卓登(Chesterton)国际研究部主管陈瑞谨也认为，了解过去几年的延迟付款概况，将能协助人们评估新加坡楼市的风险到底有多大？
“当然，如果市场景气良好，这不会带来什么问题。不过，如果经济情况继续恶化，导致人们失去工作，一些人就会被迫降价脱售手头上的单位，甚至是悔约，这不但会影响发展商的盈利，也会冲击人们的购屋信心，进一步影响整体楼价。”
他猜测，延迟付款计划的潜在风险应该是相当高，所以才会引起金管局和市建局的关注，并且将有关计划撤销。
据他所知，利用延迟付款计划来买楼的，有不少是本地人。其中一些甚至一个人扫下十多二十个单位。“他们都是有财有势的人，但尽管如此，一旦房子入伙时，要同时吞下十多个高价单位也不是简单的事。”
刚刚从花旗集团跳槽到德意志银行的蔡学敏，去年写的一系列延迟付款计划报告书，在市场上引起相当大的回响。他认为，尤其是去年在楼市最高峰，以延迟付款计划卖房子的发展商，将面对最大的风险。
他指出，实际上一些项目，包括联合工程的One Rochester、吉宝置业的Reflections，以及永泰控股的Duchess Crest，最近被买家拿到二手市场放盘的单位，叫价都已经跌破当初发展商的推出价格。
虽然过去买家因为还不起房贷而导致房子被银行收回的比例很少，但是蔡学敏不肯定这一次买家悔约的比率会有多高，特别是一些高档项目有超过半数买家是外国人，有些在新加坡完全没有任何业务或资产。
他猜测，这些买家当中，一些人可能将已经支付了一二成的首期，当成是定金，希望能够放弃定金了事，但这要看发展商是否能够向他们追回中间的价差。
Monday, April 14, 2008
短线操盘八大纪律
股市里只有今天和明天，没有昨天，明末皇帝崇祯也算是个好皇帝，但是如果他知道杀了袁崇焕会亡国，打死也不会杀的，因为杀了袁崇焕不但丧失了明军精锐关宁铁骑，也让冒死来解救北京围困的援军心寒，谁救谁就要被杀，所以北京城被闯王攻破的时候，根本就没有一股援军敢来救援，谁救皇帝谁就要死当然就没有人敢来救。
目前的股市也象明末时期，场外的资金之所以不敢进场，就是目前谁进场解救谁都是被套死在里面，既然进场就被套死，为什么还要进场呢？
短线操盘八大纪律
第一， 趋势投资：
大盘是决定能否做短线的前提，大盘不好，必须坚持持币；大盘转好，结合市场热点才有可能取得良好的收益。所以只要出现大盘跳空底开2%以上，所有的操盘计划全部取消。我们的黄金线确保趋势向上，目前没有站上黄金线，继续观望为好。
第二， 周期操盘：
在上涨和下跌周期应该采取不同的操盘策略，在下跌周期，一般都会在周三形成最低点，所以最佳买进时间为周三的下午收盘前一个小时内，选择热门股介入都会有不错的收益；在上涨周期，一般都会在周五前后冲高回落，所以最佳买进时间为周五的下午收盘前一个小时内，最佳卖出时间为周二上午冲高卖出。
第三， 择机买进：
买进时间一般最佳为收盘前一个小时，选择股价维持在全天最高点附近的股票逢底介入；开盘后1个小时以内是卖出股票的好时机，15分钟以内不能买股票，但是可以按照八卦箱体的下强支撑位埋单，一般冲高后都会回落，试探支撑位。
第四， 不赚钱不补仓:
做短线绝对不能因为套住而改做长线，不管你是什么原因买入的，任何一只股票，不赚钱绝对不补仓，在任何时间亏损达到5％以上、10％以内，收盘前10－30分钟必须卖出50％！
第五， 坚持止损：
不管是机构推荐的，还是有很强的利好消息，在任何时间亏损达到10％，必须立即止损，无条件全部卖出！
第六， 控制仓位：
短线参与的资金不能过重，建议控制仓位在20%以下，并且持股不超过3只。
第七， 坚持止赢：
大盘趋势向上的时候，我们的止赢线是30%；大盘不好的时候，我们的止赢线是15%.建议赢利达到10%立即卖出一半。
第八， 现金为王：
牛短熊长，熊市中要尽量持币，不要频繁的买股，不要去抄底。严格控制仓位在半仓以下，甚至空仓。
目前的股市也象明末时期，场外的资金之所以不敢进场，就是目前谁进场解救谁都是被套死在里面，既然进场就被套死，为什么还要进场呢？
短线操盘八大纪律
第一， 趋势投资：
大盘是决定能否做短线的前提，大盘不好，必须坚持持币；大盘转好，结合市场热点才有可能取得良好的收益。所以只要出现大盘跳空底开2%以上，所有的操盘计划全部取消。我们的黄金线确保趋势向上，目前没有站上黄金线，继续观望为好。
第二， 周期操盘：
在上涨和下跌周期应该采取不同的操盘策略，在下跌周期，一般都会在周三形成最低点，所以最佳买进时间为周三的下午收盘前一个小时内，选择热门股介入都会有不错的收益；在上涨周期，一般都会在周五前后冲高回落，所以最佳买进时间为周五的下午收盘前一个小时内，最佳卖出时间为周二上午冲高卖出。
第三， 择机买进：
买进时间一般最佳为收盘前一个小时，选择股价维持在全天最高点附近的股票逢底介入；开盘后1个小时以内是卖出股票的好时机，15分钟以内不能买股票，但是可以按照八卦箱体的下强支撑位埋单，一般冲高后都会回落，试探支撑位。
第四， 不赚钱不补仓:
做短线绝对不能因为套住而改做长线，不管你是什么原因买入的，任何一只股票，不赚钱绝对不补仓，在任何时间亏损达到5％以上、10％以内，收盘前10－30分钟必须卖出50％！
第五， 坚持止损：
不管是机构推荐的，还是有很强的利好消息，在任何时间亏损达到10％，必须立即止损，无条件全部卖出！
第六， 控制仓位：
短线参与的资金不能过重，建议控制仓位在20%以下，并且持股不超过3只。
第七， 坚持止赢：
大盘趋势向上的时候，我们的止赢线是30%；大盘不好的时候，我们的止赢线是15%.建议赢利达到10%立即卖出一半。
第八， 现金为王：
牛短熊长，熊市中要尽量持币，不要频繁的买股，不要去抄底。严格控制仓位在半仓以下，甚至空仓。
Sunday, April 13, 2008
Bull, Bear, and Cowardly Lion Markets
For the next dozen years or so the US broad stock markets will be a wild roller-coaster ride. The Dow Jones Industrial Average and the S&P 500 index will go up and down (and in the process will set all-time highs and multiyear lows), stagnate, and trade in a tight range. At some point during the ride, index investors and buy and hold stock collectors will realize that their portfolios aren’t showing much of a return.
Over the last 200 years, every full-blown, long-lasting (secular) bull market (and we just had a supersized one from 1982 to 2000) was followed by a range-bound market that lasted about 15 years. Yes, this happened every time, with the exception of the Great Depression, over the last two centuries.
Though we tend to think about market cycles in binary terms - bull (rising) or bear (declining) - in the long run markets spend a lot more time in bull or range-bound (sideways) states, roughly half in each, and visit a bear cage a lot less often then we think. This distinction between bear and range-bound markets is extremely important, as you’d invest very differently in one versus the other.
Are bull markets driven by superfast economic growth? Are range-bound markets caused by subpar economic growth? Could the subpar market performance be related to high or low inflation?
The answer to all these questions is undoubtedly - "no." Though it is hard to observe in the everyday noise of the stock market, in the long run stock prices are driven by two factors: earnings growth (or decline) and/or price-to-earnings expansion (or contraction).
By taking a look at the last full 1966-2000 range-bound/bull market cycle, we can see that the Fed Model perfectly predicted the direction of equities in relation to interest rates. Long-term interest rates were rising from 1966 to 1982, while implied and actual P/Es were falling. Whereas from 1982 to 2000 interest rates were dropping, and implied and actual P/Es were rising. Intellectually that makes sense, because stocks and bonds compete for investors’ capital, and thus higher interest rates make equities less attractive and vice versa.
However, it is hard to find ANY relationship between interest rates and the animal with its name on the secular market if you look at the first 66 years of the 20th century. None!
It is difficult to dismiss the role interest rates play in stock valuations, but they seem to be a second fiddle in the orchestra conducted by economic growth and valuation. If the Fed Model worked flawlessly, how could we explain declining P/Es of Japanese stocks in the last decade of the 20th century, when interest rates declined and were scratching zero levels?
It is valuation! If earnings growth in the long run remains consistent with the past, P/E is the wild card that is responsible for future returns. Though continued economic growth appears to be a wildly optimistic assumption given the meltdown of the housing industry in particular, and job layoffs, it is not particularly unrealistic to predict that we will see economic growth overall. With the exception of the Great Depression, though it had its ups and downs, economic growth was fairly stable throughout the 20th century. Earnings, though more volatile than real GDP, grew consistently decade after decade, paying no attention to the animal (bull, bear … or cowardly lion - my pet name for range-bound markets, whose bursts of occasional bravery lead to stock appreciation, but which are ultimately overrun by fear that leads to a subsequent descent) lending its name to the stock market.
Though economic fluctuations were responsible for short-term (cyclical) market volatility, as long as economic performance was not far from the average, long-term market cycles were either bull or range-bound. Valuation - the change in price to earnings, its expansion or contraction - was the wild card that was mainly responsible for markets being in a bull or range-bound state.
During bull markets, a vibrant, peaceful combination of P/E expansion (a staple of bull markets, a great source of return) and earnings growth brings outsize returns to jubilant investors. Prolonged bull markets start with below- and end with above-average P/Es.
P/Es are some of the most mean-reverting creatures, and range-bound markets act as clean-up guys: they rid us of the mess (i.e., deflate high P/Es) caused by bull markets, taking them down towards and actually below the mean. P/E compression wipes out most if not all earnings growth, resulting in zero (or nearly) price appreciation plus dividends.
Bear markets are range-bound markets’ cousins; they share half of their DNA: high starting valuations. However, where in cowardly lion markets economic growth helps to soften the blow caused by P/E compression, during secular bear markets the economy is not there to help. Economic blues (runaway inflation, severe deflation, subpar or negative economic or earnings growth) add oil to the fire (started by high valuations) and bring devastating returns to investors.
A true secular bear market has not really taken place in the US, but one has occurred across the pond in Japan. The market decline caused by the Great Depression, though referred to as the greatest decline in US stocks in the 20th century, only lasted three years and thus doesn’t really fit the traditional "secular" requirement of lasting more than five years. Japan’s Nikkei 225 suffered through a true secular bear market: stock prices declined over 80 percent from their 1989-1991 highs until they bottomed in 2003 (the market seems to be coming back now). For more than a decade the country struggled with deflation caused by its banking system coming to a near halt on the heels of a collapsing real estate market and the bad loans that came with it. Of course, all this took place on the heels of a huge bull market, and thus very high valuations.
A unique aspect that contributed to the severity and longevity of the Japanese deflation was a cultural issue: the Japanese government intervened and did not allow structurally defunct companies to go bankrupt, thus tampering with the nucleus of capitalism (and Darwinism as well), creative destruction. I must admit, it seems that lately we’ve been importing a lot more from Japan than their cars and flat-screen TVs, as the US government steps in to "fix" our troubled financial firms.
The conclusions we can draw are:
Secular bull markets end at P/Es much above average. The 1982-2000 bull market ended at the highest valuations ever!
Secular range-bound markets ended when P/Es were below average.
Markets spent very little time at what is known to be a "fairly valued" state of 15 times 12-month trailing earnings. Historically, stocks only saw average valuations on the way from one extreme to the other. From 1900 to 2006 the S&P 500 spent less than 27% of the time between P/Es of 13 and 17.
Today, after eight years of plentiful volatility and no returns, what the WSJ called a "lost decade," stocks are not cheap. If you look at ten-year trailing earnings, they are still at levels where previous range-bound markets started. In other words, based on 10-year trailing earnings, stocks are still at 64% above their average stated valuations.
Now, if you look at historical valuations where P/Es are computed based on one-year trailing earnings, the picture is not that exciting but less grim. At about 18 times trailing earnings, US stocks don’t appear that expensive.
As a side note: The bulk of excesses in overall profit margins, 54.5% to be exact, were in "stuff" stocks (i.e., energy, materials, and industrials). Profit margins will deflate when the global economy slows down. This goes far beyond oil and commodities. Companies that make "stuff," which historically have been very cyclical (today is no different) have benefitted from tremendous operational leverage that contributed to considerable improvement in margins. However, leverage works both ways: lower sales and high fixed costs will push margins to the other extreme.
Financials were responsible for 22% of the excess in margins, as they benefitted from tremendous liquidity hosed down by the Fed over recent years; now they are drowning in it. Their margins are compressing at a faster rate than you can read this.
Finally, the "new" economy stocks are responsible for 17% of the excess. However, I’d argue that these industries have transformed substantially since 1988, so that higher-margin software and services now account for a much larger portion of technology and telecom sales. It is kind of like Microsoft vs. IBM in 1988: the hardware company vs. the new. Thus the "new" economy stocks should have higher margins than they did in 1988, but by how much? I don’t know, but they likely will face a lower margin compression than "stuff" and financials.
The bottom line: Remember those long-term double-digit returns you were promised by stock market gurus during the last bull market? Well, an average passive buy-and-hold investor will be lucky to have very low single-digit returns for the long term. In fact, during the last 1966-1982 range-bound market, investors received almost zero real total returns.
A long-lasting secular range-bound market consists of many mini (months to several years long) cycles. For instance, the last 1966-1982 range-bound market consisted of five mini bull, five bear, and one range-bound market.
Successful investing is a lonely place, as it requires an independent thought process that often goes contrary to the herd mentality. In the range-bound market, a contrarian mindset comes in especially handy, as you’ll be selling when everyone else is buying. Your stocks will be hitting their fair value, and you’ll be buying when everyone else is selling - during the mini bear markets.
This is not to suggest that you need to be a market timer, not at all. Market timing only looks easy with the benefit of hindsight, and it is very difficult to do on a consistent basis. Instead, time (price) individual stocks, one at a time. Buy when they are undervalued and sell when they are fairly valued, and repeat the process over and over again. In other words, instead of focusing on the bowling alley (the market) focus on the ball (individual stocks).
Selling is looked upon as a four-letter word, and therefore a sin, in a bull market. A buy-and-hold strategy is rewarded richly in secular bull markets - every time you made a "don’t sell" decision, stocks go higher. And though buy and hold is not dead but in a coma (waiting for the next bull market), it takes investors to a place of no returns. Forgive yourself the "sin" of selling and become a buy-and-sell investor.
The almighty US constitutes 4% of the world population, but its stock market capitalization represents more than a third of the world’s wealth. It has been comfortable for us to buy US stocks; it felt safe. However, by solely focusing on US stocks we are insulating ourselves from a greater pool of stocks to choose from.
I could be wrong but I doubt it
What if I am wrong and the range-bound market I describe is not in the cards? After all, history is prolific about the past but mute about the future. What if they find life on Venus and our economy starts growing at double digits and the secular bull market thunders upon us? Or the current credit market problems spill into a Japanese-like prolonged recession, causing a bear market? Every strategy should be evaluated not just on a "benefit of being right" basis, but at least as importantly on a "cost of being wrong" basis. An active value-investing strategy has the lowest cost of being wrong in comparison to other investment strategies, as you’ll see in Exhibit
Over the last 200 years, every full-blown, long-lasting (secular) bull market (and we just had a supersized one from 1982 to 2000) was followed by a range-bound market that lasted about 15 years. Yes, this happened every time, with the exception of the Great Depression, over the last two centuries.
Though we tend to think about market cycles in binary terms - bull (rising) or bear (declining) - in the long run markets spend a lot more time in bull or range-bound (sideways) states, roughly half in each, and visit a bear cage a lot less often then we think. This distinction between bear and range-bound markets is extremely important, as you’d invest very differently in one versus the other.
Are bull markets driven by superfast economic growth? Are range-bound markets caused by subpar economic growth? Could the subpar market performance be related to high or low inflation?
The answer to all these questions is undoubtedly - "no." Though it is hard to observe in the everyday noise of the stock market, in the long run stock prices are driven by two factors: earnings growth (or decline) and/or price-to-earnings expansion (or contraction).
By taking a look at the last full 1966-2000 range-bound/bull market cycle, we can see that the Fed Model perfectly predicted the direction of equities in relation to interest rates. Long-term interest rates were rising from 1966 to 1982, while implied and actual P/Es were falling. Whereas from 1982 to 2000 interest rates were dropping, and implied and actual P/Es were rising. Intellectually that makes sense, because stocks and bonds compete for investors’ capital, and thus higher interest rates make equities less attractive and vice versa.
However, it is hard to find ANY relationship between interest rates and the animal with its name on the secular market if you look at the first 66 years of the 20th century. None!
It is difficult to dismiss the role interest rates play in stock valuations, but they seem to be a second fiddle in the orchestra conducted by economic growth and valuation. If the Fed Model worked flawlessly, how could we explain declining P/Es of Japanese stocks in the last decade of the 20th century, when interest rates declined and were scratching zero levels?
It is valuation! If earnings growth in the long run remains consistent with the past, P/E is the wild card that is responsible for future returns. Though continued economic growth appears to be a wildly optimistic assumption given the meltdown of the housing industry in particular, and job layoffs, it is not particularly unrealistic to predict that we will see economic growth overall. With the exception of the Great Depression, though it had its ups and downs, economic growth was fairly stable throughout the 20th century. Earnings, though more volatile than real GDP, grew consistently decade after decade, paying no attention to the animal (bull, bear … or cowardly lion - my pet name for range-bound markets, whose bursts of occasional bravery lead to stock appreciation, but which are ultimately overrun by fear that leads to a subsequent descent) lending its name to the stock market.
Though economic fluctuations were responsible for short-term (cyclical) market volatility, as long as economic performance was not far from the average, long-term market cycles were either bull or range-bound. Valuation - the change in price to earnings, its expansion or contraction - was the wild card that was mainly responsible for markets being in a bull or range-bound state.
During bull markets, a vibrant, peaceful combination of P/E expansion (a staple of bull markets, a great source of return) and earnings growth brings outsize returns to jubilant investors. Prolonged bull markets start with below- and end with above-average P/Es.
P/Es are some of the most mean-reverting creatures, and range-bound markets act as clean-up guys: they rid us of the mess (i.e., deflate high P/Es) caused by bull markets, taking them down towards and actually below the mean. P/E compression wipes out most if not all earnings growth, resulting in zero (or nearly) price appreciation plus dividends.
Bear markets are range-bound markets’ cousins; they share half of their DNA: high starting valuations. However, where in cowardly lion markets economic growth helps to soften the blow caused by P/E compression, during secular bear markets the economy is not there to help. Economic blues (runaway inflation, severe deflation, subpar or negative economic or earnings growth) add oil to the fire (started by high valuations) and bring devastating returns to investors.
A true secular bear market has not really taken place in the US, but one has occurred across the pond in Japan. The market decline caused by the Great Depression, though referred to as the greatest decline in US stocks in the 20th century, only lasted three years and thus doesn’t really fit the traditional "secular" requirement of lasting more than five years. Japan’s Nikkei 225 suffered through a true secular bear market: stock prices declined over 80 percent from their 1989-1991 highs until they bottomed in 2003 (the market seems to be coming back now). For more than a decade the country struggled with deflation caused by its banking system coming to a near halt on the heels of a collapsing real estate market and the bad loans that came with it. Of course, all this took place on the heels of a huge bull market, and thus very high valuations.
A unique aspect that contributed to the severity and longevity of the Japanese deflation was a cultural issue: the Japanese government intervened and did not allow structurally defunct companies to go bankrupt, thus tampering with the nucleus of capitalism (and Darwinism as well), creative destruction. I must admit, it seems that lately we’ve been importing a lot more from Japan than their cars and flat-screen TVs, as the US government steps in to "fix" our troubled financial firms.
The conclusions we can draw are:
Secular bull markets end at P/Es much above average. The 1982-2000 bull market ended at the highest valuations ever!
Secular range-bound markets ended when P/Es were below average.
Markets spent very little time at what is known to be a "fairly valued" state of 15 times 12-month trailing earnings. Historically, stocks only saw average valuations on the way from one extreme to the other. From 1900 to 2006 the S&P 500 spent less than 27% of the time between P/Es of 13 and 17.
Today, after eight years of plentiful volatility and no returns, what the WSJ called a "lost decade," stocks are not cheap. If you look at ten-year trailing earnings, they are still at levels where previous range-bound markets started. In other words, based on 10-year trailing earnings, stocks are still at 64% above their average stated valuations.
Now, if you look at historical valuations where P/Es are computed based on one-year trailing earnings, the picture is not that exciting but less grim. At about 18 times trailing earnings, US stocks don’t appear that expensive.
As a side note: The bulk of excesses in overall profit margins, 54.5% to be exact, were in "stuff" stocks (i.e., energy, materials, and industrials). Profit margins will deflate when the global economy slows down. This goes far beyond oil and commodities. Companies that make "stuff," which historically have been very cyclical (today is no different) have benefitted from tremendous operational leverage that contributed to considerable improvement in margins. However, leverage works both ways: lower sales and high fixed costs will push margins to the other extreme.
Financials were responsible for 22% of the excess in margins, as they benefitted from tremendous liquidity hosed down by the Fed over recent years; now they are drowning in it. Their margins are compressing at a faster rate than you can read this.
Finally, the "new" economy stocks are responsible for 17% of the excess. However, I’d argue that these industries have transformed substantially since 1988, so that higher-margin software and services now account for a much larger portion of technology and telecom sales. It is kind of like Microsoft vs. IBM in 1988: the hardware company vs. the new. Thus the "new" economy stocks should have higher margins than they did in 1988, but by how much? I don’t know, but they likely will face a lower margin compression than "stuff" and financials.
The bottom line: Remember those long-term double-digit returns you were promised by stock market gurus during the last bull market? Well, an average passive buy-and-hold investor will be lucky to have very low single-digit returns for the long term. In fact, during the last 1966-1982 range-bound market, investors received almost zero real total returns.
A long-lasting secular range-bound market consists of many mini (months to several years long) cycles. For instance, the last 1966-1982 range-bound market consisted of five mini bull, five bear, and one range-bound market.
Successful investing is a lonely place, as it requires an independent thought process that often goes contrary to the herd mentality. In the range-bound market, a contrarian mindset comes in especially handy, as you’ll be selling when everyone else is buying. Your stocks will be hitting their fair value, and you’ll be buying when everyone else is selling - during the mini bear markets.
This is not to suggest that you need to be a market timer, not at all. Market timing only looks easy with the benefit of hindsight, and it is very difficult to do on a consistent basis. Instead, time (price) individual stocks, one at a time. Buy when they are undervalued and sell when they are fairly valued, and repeat the process over and over again. In other words, instead of focusing on the bowling alley (the market) focus on the ball (individual stocks).
Selling is looked upon as a four-letter word, and therefore a sin, in a bull market. A buy-and-hold strategy is rewarded richly in secular bull markets - every time you made a "don’t sell" decision, stocks go higher. And though buy and hold is not dead but in a coma (waiting for the next bull market), it takes investors to a place of no returns. Forgive yourself the "sin" of selling and become a buy-and-sell investor.
The almighty US constitutes 4% of the world population, but its stock market capitalization represents more than a third of the world’s wealth. It has been comfortable for us to buy US stocks; it felt safe. However, by solely focusing on US stocks we are insulating ourselves from a greater pool of stocks to choose from.
I could be wrong but I doubt it
What if I am wrong and the range-bound market I describe is not in the cards? After all, history is prolific about the past but mute about the future. What if they find life on Venus and our economy starts growing at double digits and the secular bull market thunders upon us? Or the current credit market problems spill into a Japanese-like prolonged recession, causing a bear market? Every strategy should be evaluated not just on a "benefit of being right" basis, but at least as importantly on a "cost of being wrong" basis. An active value-investing strategy has the lowest cost of being wrong in comparison to other investment strategies, as you’ll see in Exhibit
IMF提出五大威脅
中國改革發展基金會副秘書長湯敏係著名經濟學家，他認為美國經濟可能踏入衰退期，中國GDP增長率已見頂。理由係次按問題像雪球一樣愈滾愈大；漸變成信用危機或支付危機。過去好多金融創新工具面世，佢嘅影響到底有幾大？一開始睇得唔係咁清楚，最後影響有多大？連專家自己都唔知道。
環球化所帶來嘅衝擊力去年似乎已到高潮，雖然貸款者利息負擔去年9月起回落，但無法刺激美國經濟增長率回升。美國同時面對通脹及通縮壓力, 金價、油價及食物價格上升；股價、樓價及美元滙價卻回落。日經平均指數自 1990年起分析員有幾多次認為已見底？結果真正嘅底响2003年4月（十三年後）。呢次美股又點？九十年代日本政府企圖利用刺激經濟方案去抵銷八十年代嘅樓市泡沫，但唔成功。到2000年日本政府才肯面對現實，要求銀行大幅撥備，日經平均指數到2003年4月才止跌回升。
經濟從來唔會因為政府嘅主觀願望而改變方向；反之，經濟自由度愈高，繁榮度亦愈高。1932到66年美國經濟過去三十四年，受凱恩斯嘅貨幣政策支配下繁榮，期後出現十二年嘅調整期。1982年美國經濟透過採用供應學派理論而壓低通脹率，出現二十五年嘅繁榮期。可惜格老响2002╱03年將利率降至太低水平，而令經濟繁榮期喺2007年10月爆煲。未來調整期會幾耐？
Linens'n Things（傢俬零售公司）因房屋市場萎縮及負債太深昨天已申請破產保護令，該公司响四十六個州共有五百九十間分店，員工一萬七千人。2006年2月 Apollo Management以13億美元收購，二年過去卻面對破產，去年第四季營業額9.62億美元，損失6200萬美元（去年全年虧損2.42億美元， 2006年虧損1.54億美元）。Frontier Airlines Holdings亦申請破產保護令。去年4月至12月虧損1870萬美元，12月裁員10％後，仍然捱唔住。
IMF提出五大威脅
IMF發布《世界經濟展望》，指短期內全球經濟面臨下行風險，因面對五大威脅：
一、次按危機可能惡化，源於美國嘅次按危機，將造成全球近萬億美元損失；
二、美國GDP增長率下降至只有0.5％、內需下降令全球貿易量出現萎縮，日本、歐盟同亞洲經濟體出口將受嚴重影響；
三、美國減息令全球大宗商品市場熱錢湧入，形成資金無序流動性增加，使全球通脹加劇，新興經濟體通脹壓力則更為明顯，例如能源同食品價格高企；
四、貿易保護主義擴散，最近已成為美國總統大選熱門話題，近六成美國人認為全球化對美國不利；
五、新興經濟體所受影響可能較OECD國家更大。因為响經濟發展期更易出現狂升或暴跌。
美國財政部高級官員David McCormick認為，IMF對美國經濟估計過分悲觀（IMF估計今年GDP增長率只有0.5％、2009年0.6％），佢認為經過四年GDP每年平均上升5％後，今年GDP增長率放緩係無可避免，但原材料生產國及新興市場繼續繁榮，可以反過來帶動美國GDP保持一定增長率。
2007 年第四季美國GDP只上升0.6％（全年2.2％，係2002年以來最低），企業純利下跌3.3％，利率已由去年9月5.25厘降至2.25厘，消費信心 3月底跌至64.5，係2003年3月以來最低（2月76.4）。新興市場亦面對食物價格及燃油價格上升，世界銀行估計，今年新興市場GDP增長率只有 7.3％（去年8.7％）。IMF已修訂2008年全球GDP增長率為3.7％（1月份估計為4.1％）。睇嚟唔係IMF太悲觀而係美國財政部危機意識不足。內地壓抑通脹
本周北京容許人民幣升破7，代表中央政府打擊通脹率決心及容許GDP增長率降溫（去年估計升幅達11.9％）。
响人民幣升值下，今年首季外國直接投資仍升61％至274.1億美元，證明升值未減外資流入。人民幣升值估計最大壓力係中小製造商，佢地可能失去訂單而向中央政府訴苦……。呢次中央似乎不大理會佢地；因為中央認為引起拉薩騷動理由係通脹壓力，情況同1989年天安門事件類似。中央政府一方面鎮壓，另一方面想辦法壓抑通脹，把CPI升幅由今年2月8.7％壓下去！從呢點睇，人民幣未來升值速度只會加快而非減慢。
環球化所帶來嘅衝擊力去年似乎已到高潮，雖然貸款者利息負擔去年9月起回落，但無法刺激美國經濟增長率回升。美國同時面對通脹及通縮壓力, 金價、油價及食物價格上升；股價、樓價及美元滙價卻回落。日經平均指數自 1990年起分析員有幾多次認為已見底？結果真正嘅底响2003年4月（十三年後）。呢次美股又點？九十年代日本政府企圖利用刺激經濟方案去抵銷八十年代嘅樓市泡沫，但唔成功。到2000年日本政府才肯面對現實，要求銀行大幅撥備，日經平均指數到2003年4月才止跌回升。
經濟從來唔會因為政府嘅主觀願望而改變方向；反之，經濟自由度愈高，繁榮度亦愈高。1932到66年美國經濟過去三十四年，受凱恩斯嘅貨幣政策支配下繁榮，期後出現十二年嘅調整期。1982年美國經濟透過採用供應學派理論而壓低通脹率，出現二十五年嘅繁榮期。可惜格老响2002╱03年將利率降至太低水平，而令經濟繁榮期喺2007年10月爆煲。未來調整期會幾耐？
Linens'n Things（傢俬零售公司）因房屋市場萎縮及負債太深昨天已申請破產保護令，該公司响四十六個州共有五百九十間分店，員工一萬七千人。2006年2月 Apollo Management以13億美元收購，二年過去卻面對破產，去年第四季營業額9.62億美元，損失6200萬美元（去年全年虧損2.42億美元， 2006年虧損1.54億美元）。Frontier Airlines Holdings亦申請破產保護令。去年4月至12月虧損1870萬美元，12月裁員10％後，仍然捱唔住。
IMF提出五大威脅
IMF發布《世界經濟展望》，指短期內全球經濟面臨下行風險，因面對五大威脅：
一、次按危機可能惡化，源於美國嘅次按危機，將造成全球近萬億美元損失；
二、美國GDP增長率下降至只有0.5％、內需下降令全球貿易量出現萎縮，日本、歐盟同亞洲經濟體出口將受嚴重影響；
三、美國減息令全球大宗商品市場熱錢湧入，形成資金無序流動性增加，使全球通脹加劇，新興經濟體通脹壓力則更為明顯，例如能源同食品價格高企；
四、貿易保護主義擴散，最近已成為美國總統大選熱門話題，近六成美國人認為全球化對美國不利；
五、新興經濟體所受影響可能較OECD國家更大。因為响經濟發展期更易出現狂升或暴跌。
美國財政部高級官員David McCormick認為，IMF對美國經濟估計過分悲觀（IMF估計今年GDP增長率只有0.5％、2009年0.6％），佢認為經過四年GDP每年平均上升5％後，今年GDP增長率放緩係無可避免，但原材料生產國及新興市場繼續繁榮，可以反過來帶動美國GDP保持一定增長率。
2007 年第四季美國GDP只上升0.6％（全年2.2％，係2002年以來最低），企業純利下跌3.3％，利率已由去年9月5.25厘降至2.25厘，消費信心 3月底跌至64.5，係2003年3月以來最低（2月76.4）。新興市場亦面對食物價格及燃油價格上升，世界銀行估計，今年新興市場GDP增長率只有 7.3％（去年8.7％）。IMF已修訂2008年全球GDP增長率為3.7％（1月份估計為4.1％）。睇嚟唔係IMF太悲觀而係美國財政部危機意識不足。內地壓抑通脹
本周北京容許人民幣升破7，代表中央政府打擊通脹率決心及容許GDP增長率降溫（去年估計升幅達11.9％）。
响人民幣升值下，今年首季外國直接投資仍升61％至274.1億美元，證明升值未減外資流入。人民幣升值估計最大壓力係中小製造商，佢地可能失去訂單而向中央政府訴苦……。呢次中央似乎不大理會佢地；因為中央認為引起拉薩騷動理由係通脹壓力，情況同1989年天安門事件類似。中央政府一方面鎮壓，另一方面想辦法壓抑通脹，把CPI升幅由今年2月8.7％壓下去！從呢點睇，人民幣未來升值速度只會加快而非減慢。
Thursday, April 10, 2008
You know its not over when u get something like this
Someone posted this over at http://www.lemetropolecafe.com/. If this post is real, then fundamentally we are not cleared of the woods and gives more risk to downward break from potential big negative earnings news.
Something Big out There
I have worked retail for several years. I am in mid-level store management right now. I don’t want to say exactly what company I work for, but it is in the top 3 largest. I work at a store in a major city.
There have been some crazy things going on recently. The changes that we are being asked me make per corporates direction makes me think that the people at the top think something VERY big is going to be happening to the economy soon. I don’t think the media or the government is giving us the full details of what is actually going on, but I think the CEO’s and others at the top are fully aware and are making plans.
For one thing I check sales every day. At the store level we usually compare what sales are today compared to sales for the same day, week, month, and year last year. Sales at our store, our district, and company wide have taken a HUGE drop compared to the same time last year. When I looked at them today my store and every store in our district was down over 30% for the same time last year. The company as a whole is also in the negative for the same time last year. (but not as much, but it gets lower every day).
Honestly at my store I could say that we have done everything in our power at the store level to increase sales, but it just isn’t happening. Departments like electronics are literally almost completely empty the entire day. The only departments that actually are getting sales are consumables, health, and chemicals. Just walking the store these are the only departments I ever even see people in ever since christmas ended.
Sometimes I will cover the service desk so a team member can take a lunch/break. When I do I sometimes process peoples credit card payments which lets me see how much they owe and how much they are paying. There are tons of people with THOUSANDS of dollars on their card only making minimum payments. These balances are usually at interest rates over 20%. Then there are people bringing in checks for the full amount, but they are BALANCE TRANSFER checks…. they are just moving it to other cards. But that isn’t what really worries me. What worries me is the changes corporate is making. I have worked here for years, and in the last 4 months I have seen more changes than all that time combined.
We are getting emails all the time from corporate telling us to reduce costs anyway we can. We recently got one telling us to start pulling fluorescent light bulbs, that we don’t need all of them in order to provide illumination…. and those bulbs barely use any power. Corporate has instructed all stores to lower the AC. It has been lowered enough to the point we get complaints from team members and customers.
Corporate has sent us emails telling us to make sure we fill bags to the absolute possibly maximum. They are not even sending us large bags anymore to some stores. Corporate has recently eliminated (what I would estimate based on how many positions we lost vs the thousands of stores we have) several thousand management positions at *all levels* of management at stores.
This NEVER APPEARED ON THE NEWS! I suspect because it was not a traditional lay off. What corporate basically told us was "Your position is eliminated, but you are not laid off. Once you quit/get your self fired/whatever your position just won’t be filled again" So we are basically slowly losing jobs as people company wide quit, get fired, etc…. but the jobs are never filled again. So basically we are cutting jobs, but the way it is being done is preventing it from getting reported in the media or tracked by the government as job losses.
No non-management positions have been eliminated, instead hours have been cut for them.
Raises this year have also been lowered in amount compared to in previous years. They have been lowered enough that corporate is keeping it a secret until we have to tell team members.
The company is also buying less. Our distribution centers are sending us, for example, 3 of a certain item when normally we would get 50…. and they don’t send us more until those sell. I have not been able to keep departments full of product despite contacting corporate and asking for more because we are being sent such small amounts of product.
We have had trucks cancelled all the time now simply because we sold so little that they can’t justify sending so few items to a store.
People are simply NOT buying things. They are not buying anything that isn’t a consumable basically. I asked our pricing team to do a store mark down and lower the price on almost all of our TVs by 30-50%. We still have not sold a single one in over a week after! Our TVs were not priced very high to begin with.
Our pricing team is also being sent price increase changes from corporate in huge numbers. I am talking entire aisles of product for them to raise the prices on.[Bag here: Inflation? what Inflation?] The other day we got a STACK of pages of product to increase prices on. We thought it HAD to be a mistake because that has simply never happened before. We have emailed corporate asking if it was a mistake… we have not heard back yet, but I suspect it was not.
Many stores are now changing to non-overnight stores. They will be closed overnight and ALL power except in office areas will be cut overnight to save on costs.
There have even been changes to job descriptions recently. Corporate is basically giving job dutys to people at lower levels which used to be reserved for people at higher levels. Even some management tasks are being given to people in non-management positions. Basically they are paying people less to do what people used to get paid more to do.
Things are NOT looking pretty right now. I can tell you from a consumer spending point of view something is definantely going on…. All these changes tell me the people at the top are trying to brace for something big that is going to be happening to the economy.
Something Big out There
I have worked retail for several years. I am in mid-level store management right now. I don’t want to say exactly what company I work for, but it is in the top 3 largest. I work at a store in a major city.
There have been some crazy things going on recently. The changes that we are being asked me make per corporates direction makes me think that the people at the top think something VERY big is going to be happening to the economy soon. I don’t think the media or the government is giving us the full details of what is actually going on, but I think the CEO’s and others at the top are fully aware and are making plans.
For one thing I check sales every day. At the store level we usually compare what sales are today compared to sales for the same day, week, month, and year last year. Sales at our store, our district, and company wide have taken a HUGE drop compared to the same time last year. When I looked at them today my store and every store in our district was down over 30% for the same time last year. The company as a whole is also in the negative for the same time last year. (but not as much, but it gets lower every day).
Honestly at my store I could say that we have done everything in our power at the store level to increase sales, but it just isn’t happening. Departments like electronics are literally almost completely empty the entire day. The only departments that actually are getting sales are consumables, health, and chemicals. Just walking the store these are the only departments I ever even see people in ever since christmas ended.
Sometimes I will cover the service desk so a team member can take a lunch/break. When I do I sometimes process peoples credit card payments which lets me see how much they owe and how much they are paying. There are tons of people with THOUSANDS of dollars on their card only making minimum payments. These balances are usually at interest rates over 20%. Then there are people bringing in checks for the full amount, but they are BALANCE TRANSFER checks…. they are just moving it to other cards. But that isn’t what really worries me. What worries me is the changes corporate is making. I have worked here for years, and in the last 4 months I have seen more changes than all that time combined.
We are getting emails all the time from corporate telling us to reduce costs anyway we can. We recently got one telling us to start pulling fluorescent light bulbs, that we don’t need all of them in order to provide illumination…. and those bulbs barely use any power. Corporate has instructed all stores to lower the AC. It has been lowered enough to the point we get complaints from team members and customers.
Corporate has sent us emails telling us to make sure we fill bags to the absolute possibly maximum. They are not even sending us large bags anymore to some stores. Corporate has recently eliminated (what I would estimate based on how many positions we lost vs the thousands of stores we have) several thousand management positions at *all levels* of management at stores.
This NEVER APPEARED ON THE NEWS! I suspect because it was not a traditional lay off. What corporate basically told us was "Your position is eliminated, but you are not laid off. Once you quit/get your self fired/whatever your position just won’t be filled again" So we are basically slowly losing jobs as people company wide quit, get fired, etc…. but the jobs are never filled again. So basically we are cutting jobs, but the way it is being done is preventing it from getting reported in the media or tracked by the government as job losses.
No non-management positions have been eliminated, instead hours have been cut for them.
Raises this year have also been lowered in amount compared to in previous years. They have been lowered enough that corporate is keeping it a secret until we have to tell team members.
The company is also buying less. Our distribution centers are sending us, for example, 3 of a certain item when normally we would get 50…. and they don’t send us more until those sell. I have not been able to keep departments full of product despite contacting corporate and asking for more because we are being sent such small amounts of product.
We have had trucks cancelled all the time now simply because we sold so little that they can’t justify sending so few items to a store.
People are simply NOT buying things. They are not buying anything that isn’t a consumable basically. I asked our pricing team to do a store mark down and lower the price on almost all of our TVs by 30-50%. We still have not sold a single one in over a week after! Our TVs were not priced very high to begin with.
Our pricing team is also being sent price increase changes from corporate in huge numbers. I am talking entire aisles of product for them to raise the prices on.[Bag here: Inflation? what Inflation?] The other day we got a STACK of pages of product to increase prices on. We thought it HAD to be a mistake because that has simply never happened before. We have emailed corporate asking if it was a mistake… we have not heard back yet, but I suspect it was not.
Many stores are now changing to non-overnight stores. They will be closed overnight and ALL power except in office areas will be cut overnight to save on costs.
There have even been changes to job descriptions recently. Corporate is basically giving job dutys to people at lower levels which used to be reserved for people at higher levels. Even some management tasks are being given to people in non-management positions. Basically they are paying people less to do what people used to get paid more to do.
Things are NOT looking pretty right now. I can tell you from a consumer spending point of view something is definantely going on…. All these changes tell me the people at the top are trying to brace for something big that is going to be happening to the economy.
Approaching Investing in a Business-Like Manner
Investing is actually part and parcel of growing our wealth, albeit slowly and steadily instead of instantly. Thus, the attitude one should take when approaching this important activity should be one of utmost seriousness, which is why the title mentions "business-like manner".
So what exactly does business-like manner mean ?
This means observing a company as if you are a stakeholder who wishes to do business with the company, or acquire the company.
Think of the company as a business and examine all facets of it. First of all, one should apply what I call a "common-sense" view of a business, by examining the nature of its principal activities.
Companies which are in "commodity" businesses or those with a weird business model (a.k.a. something overtly innovative and which has no history of commercial success) should be shunned because it is unlikely that they can sustain increased earnings or ensure steady and predictable profits.
This is what I consider the “raw filter” for assessing companies for investment purpose. By using common sense to review whether a business has endearing characteristics or not, one can then make a conscious decision to pick and select the better businesses to drill down in detail.
The SGX has over 700 companies listed on it and it will be impossible to drill down into each one as it would be too onerous and impractical.
Finer filters can then be applied to assess the fundamentals and prospects of each individual company so as to ascertain its merits and demerits. One can then apply Phil Fisher’s 15 basic criteria as well to ask oneself if a particular company is investment-worthy.
By adopting a business-like attitude towards investing, one can approach companies from a more practical stand point to see if their business will be viable and sustainable in the near to medium term. Of course, any events may occur which may cause our initial assumptions to be invalid, but detailed research and in-depth reading about the company’s industry and the company’s financials should mitigate such risks.
Still, there will always be residual risk in any investment which cannot be eliminated, such as Acts of God (e.g. fires, floods, earthquakes and typhoons) and also deliberate and pervasive fraud. This is why the margin of safety concept always applies to protect the investor from massive losses, and how it will always remain a central concept in value investing.
So what exactly does business-like manner mean ?
This means observing a company as if you are a stakeholder who wishes to do business with the company, or acquire the company.
Think of the company as a business and examine all facets of it. First of all, one should apply what I call a "common-sense" view of a business, by examining the nature of its principal activities.
Companies which are in "commodity" businesses or those with a weird business model (a.k.a. something overtly innovative and which has no history of commercial success) should be shunned because it is unlikely that they can sustain increased earnings or ensure steady and predictable profits.
This is what I consider the “raw filter” for assessing companies for investment purpose. By using common sense to review whether a business has endearing characteristics or not, one can then make a conscious decision to pick and select the better businesses to drill down in detail.
The SGX has over 700 companies listed on it and it will be impossible to drill down into each one as it would be too onerous and impractical.
Finer filters can then be applied to assess the fundamentals and prospects of each individual company so as to ascertain its merits and demerits. One can then apply Phil Fisher’s 15 basic criteria as well to ask oneself if a particular company is investment-worthy.
By adopting a business-like attitude towards investing, one can approach companies from a more practical stand point to see if their business will be viable and sustainable in the near to medium term. Of course, any events may occur which may cause our initial assumptions to be invalid, but detailed research and in-depth reading about the company’s industry and the company’s financials should mitigate such risks.
Still, there will always be residual risk in any investment which cannot be eliminated, such as Acts of God (e.g. fires, floods, earthquakes and typhoons) and also deliberate and pervasive fraud. This is why the margin of safety concept always applies to protect the investor from massive losses, and how it will always remain a central concept in value investing.
Sunday, April 6, 2008
Trading takeover the job
There are many ways that an investor can choose to invest. He can be a buy and hold investor or a value investor, or he can be a momentum trader or a day trader for the matter.
Sometimes choosing the kind of methods that suits your work environment is important as well. Lets just say that if your current superior allows you to do that doesn’t mean that your future superior will.
It gets even worse if you happen to be a happy go lucky trader and you work in a bank with full disclosure policy of your trades and holdings.
Some ways of investing just becomes so much of a hassle that it disrupts your productivity. I used to spend so much time looking at the numbers jumping. Thinking back to that time, I cannot imagine what I was doing back then.
The more you look at those numbers the more you are incline to force yourself into a decision that you have not carefully evaluate. A value investor or a buy and hold investor do not need to look at it that much.
I am of the opinion that if you have done your homework right, you shouldn’t be force to watch your position EVERY DAY EVERY MINUTE. Sure, you get one of those days when the company announce a bad quarter or profit guidance but hey, by the time the news release, the market would have reverted to a lower price, whether rational or irrational.
Last but not least, the best way to profit from the economy is to perform well at work, learn new things and earn a good increment. Not alot of stock market returns will measure up to that.
Sometimes choosing the kind of methods that suits your work environment is important as well. Lets just say that if your current superior allows you to do that doesn’t mean that your future superior will.
It gets even worse if you happen to be a happy go lucky trader and you work in a bank with full disclosure policy of your trades and holdings.
Some ways of investing just becomes so much of a hassle that it disrupts your productivity. I used to spend so much time looking at the numbers jumping. Thinking back to that time, I cannot imagine what I was doing back then.
The more you look at those numbers the more you are incline to force yourself into a decision that you have not carefully evaluate. A value investor or a buy and hold investor do not need to look at it that much.
I am of the opinion that if you have done your homework right, you shouldn’t be force to watch your position EVERY DAY EVERY MINUTE. Sure, you get one of those days when the company announce a bad quarter or profit guidance but hey, by the time the news release, the market would have reverted to a lower price, whether rational or irrational.
Last but not least, the best way to profit from the economy is to perform well at work, learn new things and earn a good increment. Not alot of stock market returns will measure up to that.
Actions will lead to future inflationary condition
These past two weeks have been extraordinary in that the Federal Reserve has had to take actions that have not been used since the Great Depression and a few that heretofore have never been used.
There have been several crises in the capital markets that lead us to comment on what they appear to mean. During the last year, we have conveyed a growing concern, through several prior commentaries, as to the dangers and implications of an absence of fear toward various types of increasing risks in our financial system. We believe the culmination of these risks forced the Federal Reserve to take the recent extraordinary actions of creating two new lending facilities for primary dealers and facilitating a merger of Bear StearnsBear-Stearns-Troubles with JPMorganChase to prevent a liquidity and solvency crisis from potentially toppling the U.S. capital markets. The partners of First Pacific Advisors, LLC (FPA) discussed these events on
March 21 and came to several conclusions about what the long-term implications of these actions might be and we will share them with you in this commentary. Fortunately, over the last two years, our preparations for potential financial market disruptions have meant that FPA and most of our product areas have essentially avoided the calamitous effects of this credit crisis.
We have been in disagreement with the Federal Reserve’s policy actions since this credit crisis began. In FPA New Income’s September 2007 shareholder letter, we argued that future Fed policy actions, the lowering of the Federal Funds rate, may prove rather ineffective in dealing with the unfolding credit crisis. The Fed proceeded under the assumption that this was a liquidity crisis, whereby lowering the Fed Funds rate would resolve the credit problems and return stability to the capital markets. However, with each lowering of the Fed Funds rate, there appeared to be very few positive responses from the U.S. capital markets. Even with a record 125 basis point cut in the Fed Funds rate between January 22 and January 30, liquidity and stability in the financial markets did not return by any appreciable degree.
As the Fed Funds rate declined, a growing flight to quality, as reflected by the rush into Treasury securities and away from any security that might have credit risk, began to take hold.
Despite the decline in Treasury interest rates, these declines did not spread to other areas of the capital markets, as exemplified by the 30-year Agency mortgage-backed securities market, where yields rose while Treasury yields declined. At one point, FNMA and Freddie Mac yield spreads increased to over 300 basis points above the Treasury curve versus a more normal 150 basis point spread. Our capital markets were shutting down since participants did not trust the counter parties with whom they were trading.
There have been several crises in the capital markets that lead us to comment on what they appear to mean. During the last year, we have conveyed a growing concern, through several prior commentaries, as to the dangers and implications of an absence of fear toward various types of increasing risks in our financial system. We believe the culmination of these risks forced the Federal Reserve to take the recent extraordinary actions of creating two new lending facilities for primary dealers and facilitating a merger of Bear StearnsBear-Stearns-Troubles with JPMorganChase to prevent a liquidity and solvency crisis from potentially toppling the U.S. capital markets. The partners of First Pacific Advisors, LLC (FPA) discussed these events on
March 21 and came to several conclusions about what the long-term implications of these actions might be and we will share them with you in this commentary. Fortunately, over the last two years, our preparations for potential financial market disruptions have meant that FPA and most of our product areas have essentially avoided the calamitous effects of this credit crisis.
We have been in disagreement with the Federal Reserve’s policy actions since this credit crisis began. In FPA New Income’s September 2007 shareholder letter, we argued that future Fed policy actions, the lowering of the Federal Funds rate, may prove rather ineffective in dealing with the unfolding credit crisis. The Fed proceeded under the assumption that this was a liquidity crisis, whereby lowering the Fed Funds rate would resolve the credit problems and return stability to the capital markets. However, with each lowering of the Fed Funds rate, there appeared to be very few positive responses from the U.S. capital markets. Even with a record 125 basis point cut in the Fed Funds rate between January 22 and January 30, liquidity and stability in the financial markets did not return by any appreciable degree.
As the Fed Funds rate declined, a growing flight to quality, as reflected by the rush into Treasury securities and away from any security that might have credit risk, began to take hold.
Despite the decline in Treasury interest rates, these declines did not spread to other areas of the capital markets, as exemplified by the 30-year Agency mortgage-backed securities market, where yields rose while Treasury yields declined. At one point, FNMA and Freddie Mac yield spreads increased to over 300 basis points above the Treasury curve versus a more normal 150 basis point spread. Our capital markets were shutting down since participants did not trust the counter parties with whom they were trading.
Friday, April 4, 2008
李光耀：美国未来仍将独领风骚
内阁资政李光耀昨天在第三届俄罗斯—新加坡商业论坛上同俄罗斯商人对话时指出，美国从欧洲、中国、俄罗斯、日本、印度和韩国等地吸引最优秀的人才，并能提供优越的科研设施和发展机会去留住他们。
积极吸引和培养人才美国未来仍将独领风骚, 美国是今日的世界超级强国，未来还将独领风骚。 内阁资政李光耀认为今后四五十年惊天动地的新发明，还会继续源自美国。这是因为它是个不断物色和吸收全球精英的大国，实力得以不断壮大
“我想那些能够吸引人才和让他们施展所长的国家，就能够成就新的发明。所以，美国开发了互联网和基因学。但是这也不全由美国人发明，它们是美国人、欧洲人和亚洲人的集体成果，他们都是在美国培养起来的人才。
处于全球化时代国家需随时调整和改变世界每天都在变，国家因此也必须随时调整和改变。李光耀资政以本身的经验对世界的变化有感而发，指出当前世界处在全球化时代，没有一个国家可以自我封闭。
“我自认是个实用主义者，我想我们都必须顺应环境的改变而与时并进，更何况现在是新发现和革新不断涌现的年代，各国之间相互连接，世界也高度全球化，加上通讯与交通的便利，任何国家都不可能固步自封。”谈到本身对世界变化的观察时，他表示自己自小所经历的变化，说明世界一直都在改头换面，而且越变越快.
“他说，现在世界的改变是他所想象不到的。“我无法告诉你十年后会变成什么样子。因为我知道世界正在快速改变。”因此，政府所拟定的三年五年发展计划，每一年都得作出修改，因为情况的发展总是让计划中的一些构想变得过时
积极吸引和培养人才美国未来仍将独领风骚, 美国是今日的世界超级强国，未来还将独领风骚。 内阁资政李光耀认为今后四五十年惊天动地的新发明，还会继续源自美国。这是因为它是个不断物色和吸收全球精英的大国，实力得以不断壮大
“我想那些能够吸引人才和让他们施展所长的国家，就能够成就新的发明。所以，美国开发了互联网和基因学。但是这也不全由美国人发明，它们是美国人、欧洲人和亚洲人的集体成果，他们都是在美国培养起来的人才。
处于全球化时代国家需随时调整和改变世界每天都在变，国家因此也必须随时调整和改变。李光耀资政以本身的经验对世界的变化有感而发，指出当前世界处在全球化时代，没有一个国家可以自我封闭。
“我自认是个实用主义者，我想我们都必须顺应环境的改变而与时并进，更何况现在是新发现和革新不断涌现的年代，各国之间相互连接，世界也高度全球化，加上通讯与交通的便利，任何国家都不可能固步自封。”谈到本身对世界变化的观察时，他表示自己自小所经历的变化，说明世界一直都在改头换面，而且越变越快.
“他说，现在世界的改变是他所想象不到的。“我无法告诉你十年后会变成什么样子。因为我知道世界正在快速改变。”因此，政府所拟定的三年五年发展计划，每一年都得作出修改，因为情况的发展总是让计划中的一些构想变得过时
相反理論者
相反意見實力主義者」對投機對象比如某種貨幣或某種股票的「實力」作透徹的研究，當發現它們的「潛質」被大眾高估或忽視時，即使市勢指示價位還會再升或價位低殘成交疏落已為大眾所遺忘，他便可能採取與大眾相反的行動。
《凱恩斯全集》的編者莫格烈治在〈前言〉中說，一個「相反理論者」的最重要條件是「知識上看不起群眾（的知識）」。這即是說，他必須心底裏認為「群眾是無知和常犯錯誤」的人，才能成為成功的「相反理論者」。在這方面，在智性上高傲的凱恩斯，無疑具備此條件。
和他的治學精神一樣，凱恩斯在投機上確有獨到之見、獨得之秘，香港投機者─別再當自己是投資者了─應細味他的投機哲理，這對改進你的獲利情況，應有幫助。
凱恩斯有不少「投機心法」，值得大家借鏡。有一個時期，香港投資界流傳「音樂椅」的說法，即是說買賣股票的人如不知「收手」，「音樂」一停（回市），必然有人遭受損失。這種說法見於凱恩斯的著作中，在〈長期預期狀態〉第五節最後一段，凱恩斯用「叫停」（Game of Snap）和「音樂椅」（Musical Chairs）等英國小孩的遊戲來解說股市和期市的風險。在這些遊戲中，每一輪「賽事」中都有人佔（搶）不到座位而被罰，這是人人都知道的律規。因此，投機者都應有可能會損手的心理準備。後人據此發展出所謂「大傻理論」（Greater Fool Theory），即入市不是因為股票前景佳而是希望有人接貨，顯而易見，購入後股價下挫者便是大傻。
凱恩斯這種購進「一致叫好」的股票的論調，對於已成熟的股市來說，是行不通的，因為大家看好爭購，或正是大戶順應民情派發的時候，結果股價即使會再升，恐怕亦無法獲利回吐。最精明的做法應該在大眾未「一致叫好」之時，慢慢吸入，等到股民發覺該股「潛質優厚」時派發，這就是「相反理論」（Contrary Theory）的精粹。
有一點必須一提的是，凱恩斯堅信「購買力平價說」（Purchasing Power Parity，俗稱三Ｐ理論）對貨幣滙價的影響。一言以蔽之，它顯示通脹高低與貨幣滙價強弱成反比，即通脹率愈高滙價愈弱，反之亦然。落實三Ｐ理論，令凱恩斯在二十年代「初入賭場」時成為美元大好友、德國馬克大淡友，在買進美元沽空馬克（to bull dollar and bear marks）上大有斬獲。三Ｐ理論現在仍為學界和專家推許，但如今市場投資風氣太盛，「無招（理論）勝有招」！
《凱恩斯全集》的編者莫格烈治在〈前言〉中說，一個「相反理論者」的最重要條件是「知識上看不起群眾（的知識）」。這即是說，他必須心底裏認為「群眾是無知和常犯錯誤」的人，才能成為成功的「相反理論者」。在這方面，在智性上高傲的凱恩斯，無疑具備此條件。
和他的治學精神一樣，凱恩斯在投機上確有獨到之見、獨得之秘，香港投機者─別再當自己是投資者了─應細味他的投機哲理，這對改進你的獲利情況，應有幫助。
凱恩斯有不少「投機心法」，值得大家借鏡。有一個時期，香港投資界流傳「音樂椅」的說法，即是說買賣股票的人如不知「收手」，「音樂」一停（回市），必然有人遭受損失。這種說法見於凱恩斯的著作中，在〈長期預期狀態〉第五節最後一段，凱恩斯用「叫停」（Game of Snap）和「音樂椅」（Musical Chairs）等英國小孩的遊戲來解說股市和期市的風險。在這些遊戲中，每一輪「賽事」中都有人佔（搶）不到座位而被罰，這是人人都知道的律規。因此，投機者都應有可能會損手的心理準備。後人據此發展出所謂「大傻理論」（Greater Fool Theory），即入市不是因為股票前景佳而是希望有人接貨，顯而易見，購入後股價下挫者便是大傻。
凱恩斯這種購進「一致叫好」的股票的論調，對於已成熟的股市來說，是行不通的，因為大家看好爭購，或正是大戶順應民情派發的時候，結果股價即使會再升，恐怕亦無法獲利回吐。最精明的做法應該在大眾未「一致叫好」之時，慢慢吸入，等到股民發覺該股「潛質優厚」時派發，這就是「相反理論」（Contrary Theory）的精粹。
有一點必須一提的是，凱恩斯堅信「購買力平價說」（Purchasing Power Parity，俗稱三Ｐ理論）對貨幣滙價的影響。一言以蔽之，它顯示通脹高低與貨幣滙價強弱成反比，即通脹率愈高滙價愈弱，反之亦然。落實三Ｐ理論，令凱恩斯在二十年代「初入賭場」時成為美元大好友、德國馬克大淡友，在買進美元沽空馬克（to bull dollar and bear marks）上大有斬獲。三Ｐ理論現在仍為學界和專家推許，但如今市場投資風氣太盛，「無招（理論）勝有招」！
Tuesday, April 1, 2008
美軍耗油倍增油價升勢未盡
油價從「高峰」回落，但仍在百美元以上徘徊，筆者是油價「大好友」，現在不以為它已「轉勢」趨於下游，近日的微順，最大原因是好淡雙方爭持的結果，看好一方大獲全勝之後，看淡一方趁貝爾斯登事件引致的金融紊亂，特別是經濟衰退陰影重臨耗油量可能下降而全力反撲，把油價壓下去，令「好倉」吃一點苦頭。相信這種形勢很快便成過去，因為與石油有關的基本因素並沒有改變，尤其是美元滙價頹態未改，以之定價的石油很快便會重納上升軌跡。
油價居高不下，石油消耗者苦不堪言，美軍亦是高油價的受害者，油價上漲其開銷大幅增長，是造成美國軍事開支大增及財政赤字不斷纍增的成因之一。和民間消費者在高油價之下大都會設法「節省能源」不同，出於安全需要，在阿富汗和伊拉克的美軍，其耗油量竟然和油價同步上揚，這當然不是說美軍故意浪費汽油，其汽油消耗量在油價飛漲聲中上升，是因為動用了巨額研發費用後製成的新式安全武備耗油量愈來愈多之故！
去年駐伊美軍每天人均耗汽油量二十點五加侖，比二○○四年增一倍；伊拉克是世上石油蘊藏量第三多的國家（已知蘊藏一千一百五十多億桶，約佔世界油藏百分之九點五），不過，美軍並非就地取油，其所用點滴汽油，都是「泊來品」。據美國防部的「國防能源支援中心」（Defense Energy Support Center）的資料，「自由伊拉克行動」每天消耗三百萬加侖汽油。
美軍把巴格達和伊拉克多個市鎮炸個稀巴爛，國防部認為從該國的石油收益，興建新伊拉克並無財政問題，拉姆斯菲爾德的副手後來成為世界銀行總裁（因向女友輸送利益而落台）的沃爾福威茨在美軍攻陷巴格達後在國會說「在未來三二年，伊拉克的石油收益在五百至一千億（美元．下同）之間。」在廢墟中重建伊拉克的資金因此十分充裕，可是，如同迄今遍找不獲的「大殺傷力武器」一樣，伊拉克的石油過去五年一直處於「無主狀態」之中，今年一月的統計是日產二百四十萬桶，遠遠低於預期，美軍因此必須進口汽油。二○○六年，美國為伊拉克駐軍向科威特國營油公司購進值九億零九百三十萬的汽油，同時以運油車從土耳其進口汽油；○七年，駐伊美軍消耗十一億加侖汽油，它們大部分由五千三百多部運油車從土耳其運至伊拉克；每加侖美軍消耗汽油的運輸成本為四十二元，不計油價成本，每名美軍每天平均消耗的汽油值八百四十元，以駐伊美軍人數十五萬七千名計，每周的汽油消費達九億二千三百萬─駐伊美軍總開銷每周平均二十五億，意味汽油已佔去約三分之一。
駐伊美軍汽油消耗量大增，根本原因在防彈的「高性能多功能（軍用）汽車」（Humvee）因為鋼板裝置愈來愈重有以致之，去年美國國防部訂製二萬三千部「抗雷車」（ＭＲＡＰ），出廠價每部三百五十萬；一般重達一萬二千磅的Humvee每加侖行車八里，而重達四萬磅（迷你谷巴重二千七百磅、勞斯萊斯幻影型五千八百八十六磅、Range Rover五千八百磅）的ＭＲＡＰ每加侖只能行車三里！
非常明顯，美軍耗油日增，是造成國際油價上升的一項迄今少人提及的重要因素；美國為控制石油供應而入侵伊拉克（最初的藉口是要銷毀侯賽因的「大殺傷力武器」，無所發現後改為「為了把民主帶進中東」，中東各國婉拒美國的「好意」後，布殊總統已於二○○六年十月公開說是「為了確保中東石油不致落入恐怖分子之手」）。可是，如今美國不僅無法從其豐厚石油蘊藏中獲得半點好處，還炒高油價（得益最大的除了中東海灣諸封建小國，要算對美國不懷好意的俄羅斯），正是「偷雞不着蝕把米」的典型事例。
不過，正如筆者彈之久矣的老調，由於美國政治穩定、武力世界第一，美元滙價雖然跌至面目全非，卻仍人見人愛，百物以之定價的大形勢短期內難變（若變恐有戰禍），而美元持續下挫後必會強力反彈（美元資產相對廉宜熱錢流入購買），因此，美鈔印刷機有需要時便開動。名目油價的確升了不少，美國財赤因在伊拉克（和阿富汗）用兵而不斷上升，但受害的是非美元區的石油淨入口國。美國可以從心所欲印刷美元，高油價不是問題。
美元大量供應最終必然引發惡性通脹，等於美國政府變相充公美元資產……。有美國這個不負責任、孔武有力的「大隻佬」，真是世之大害
油價居高不下，石油消耗者苦不堪言，美軍亦是高油價的受害者，油價上漲其開銷大幅增長，是造成美國軍事開支大增及財政赤字不斷纍增的成因之一。和民間消費者在高油價之下大都會設法「節省能源」不同，出於安全需要，在阿富汗和伊拉克的美軍，其耗油量竟然和油價同步上揚，這當然不是說美軍故意浪費汽油，其汽油消耗量在油價飛漲聲中上升，是因為動用了巨額研發費用後製成的新式安全武備耗油量愈來愈多之故！
去年駐伊美軍每天人均耗汽油量二十點五加侖，比二○○四年增一倍；伊拉克是世上石油蘊藏量第三多的國家（已知蘊藏一千一百五十多億桶，約佔世界油藏百分之九點五），不過，美軍並非就地取油，其所用點滴汽油，都是「泊來品」。據美國防部的「國防能源支援中心」（Defense Energy Support Center）的資料，「自由伊拉克行動」每天消耗三百萬加侖汽油。
美軍把巴格達和伊拉克多個市鎮炸個稀巴爛，國防部認為從該國的石油收益，興建新伊拉克並無財政問題，拉姆斯菲爾德的副手後來成為世界銀行總裁（因向女友輸送利益而落台）的沃爾福威茨在美軍攻陷巴格達後在國會說「在未來三二年，伊拉克的石油收益在五百至一千億（美元．下同）之間。」在廢墟中重建伊拉克的資金因此十分充裕，可是，如同迄今遍找不獲的「大殺傷力武器」一樣，伊拉克的石油過去五年一直處於「無主狀態」之中，今年一月的統計是日產二百四十萬桶，遠遠低於預期，美軍因此必須進口汽油。二○○六年，美國為伊拉克駐軍向科威特國營油公司購進值九億零九百三十萬的汽油，同時以運油車從土耳其進口汽油；○七年，駐伊美軍消耗十一億加侖汽油，它們大部分由五千三百多部運油車從土耳其運至伊拉克；每加侖美軍消耗汽油的運輸成本為四十二元，不計油價成本，每名美軍每天平均消耗的汽油值八百四十元，以駐伊美軍人數十五萬七千名計，每周的汽油消費達九億二千三百萬─駐伊美軍總開銷每周平均二十五億，意味汽油已佔去約三分之一。
駐伊美軍汽油消耗量大增，根本原因在防彈的「高性能多功能（軍用）汽車」（Humvee）因為鋼板裝置愈來愈重有以致之，去年美國國防部訂製二萬三千部「抗雷車」（ＭＲＡＰ），出廠價每部三百五十萬；一般重達一萬二千磅的Humvee每加侖行車八里，而重達四萬磅（迷你谷巴重二千七百磅、勞斯萊斯幻影型五千八百八十六磅、Range Rover五千八百磅）的ＭＲＡＰ每加侖只能行車三里！
非常明顯，美軍耗油日增，是造成國際油價上升的一項迄今少人提及的重要因素；美國為控制石油供應而入侵伊拉克（最初的藉口是要銷毀侯賽因的「大殺傷力武器」，無所發現後改為「為了把民主帶進中東」，中東各國婉拒美國的「好意」後，布殊總統已於二○○六年十月公開說是「為了確保中東石油不致落入恐怖分子之手」）。可是，如今美國不僅無法從其豐厚石油蘊藏中獲得半點好處，還炒高油價（得益最大的除了中東海灣諸封建小國，要算對美國不懷好意的俄羅斯），正是「偷雞不着蝕把米」的典型事例。
不過，正如筆者彈之久矣的老調，由於美國政治穩定、武力世界第一，美元滙價雖然跌至面目全非，卻仍人見人愛，百物以之定價的大形勢短期內難變（若變恐有戰禍），而美元持續下挫後必會強力反彈（美元資產相對廉宜熱錢流入購買），因此，美鈔印刷機有需要時便開動。名目油價的確升了不少，美國財赤因在伊拉克（和阿富汗）用兵而不斷上升，但受害的是非美元區的石油淨入口國。美國可以從心所欲印刷美元，高油價不是問題。
美元大量供應最終必然引發惡性通脹，等於美國政府變相充公美元資產……。有美國這個不負責任、孔武有力的「大隻佬」，真是世之大害
Monday, March 31, 2008
第二季盼熊市二期大反彈
今年第一季，我提出長Put短Call的戰略，長Put者，以Put來對 手上長期持有的股，短Call 者，打游擊也，每逢股市出現恐慌性拋售的那一天，這不必驚慌，鎮定地買入Call 。之後，可以見好就收。現在，股市進入第二季，我認為短Call就不妨持久一點，從3月18日指跌到新低點20572開始，我就持續看好，期待熊市二期的反彈市來臨。熊市不可能一跌再跌永無休止的下跌，因為熊市來臨之時是無聲無息，不但小投資者察覺不到，不少經驗豐富的大戶也 察覺不到。但是，大戶比小股民優勝之處是手上彈藥依然充足，再加上忍耐性較高，大戶不會在驚慌中胡亂沽售股票。上個星期，有數隻股票股價狂跌，說是大戶基金洗倉，你以為基金經理是笨蛋，大手低價賣光股票？沒有，他們早已在期貨市場做了對 ，買Put賣Call然後才進行洗倉的行動，拿一隻兩隻股來洗倉不會影響基金的整體投資組合，但就足以將小股民嚇個半死。將不願意賣掉、挨了大半年的優質藍籌股也賣掉了，這就是震倉，把你手上的股票低價震出來，將來你必然以高價再買入.上星期我已告誡大家要防止被震倉。
Sunday, March 30, 2008
貝南奇如何名留青史
我老曹第二次提醒各位：唔好喺熊市二期拋空，因為股市隨時反彈；亦不要過分介入，因為反彈隨時結束。熊市二期大部分日子應喺2月4日（25101點之下）到3月18日（20572點之上）上落好幾個月，直到大部分購買力被消耗掉為止。
通脹影響樓市
內地高通脹加股災正令樓市向下。通脹處於唔同階段對房地產市場嘅影響唔一樣；通脹初期，企業可透過產品加價而增加利潤，公司盈利上升及加薪令整個社會出現一片繁榮景象；中央銀行亦只係溫和地加息，此時樓價及股價不斷上升。但好景不常，當通脹拖動原材料價格大升，升幅較產品價大，企業無法將成本升幅完全轉嫁，令企業利潤開始回落，央行加息幅度擴大及採取緊縮性貨幣政策，到某一水平股市便出現逆轉，但樓價仍上升，因資金由股票市場流向實物投資，時差大約三個月至九個月。即股市回落三個月至九個月後，樓價才逆轉；隨着樓市逆轉，人們減少消費，通脹率又漸回落。成熟市場如美國或英國，樓市往往走喺股市之前三至九個月出現反領導作用（即樓價走在股價之前）其他市場如日本及香港等，股市走喺樓價之前三至九個月。
周四滬深A股下跌5.4％確認熊市（50天線低於200天線），一如恒生指數進入熊市二期大反彈，理論上可重見50天線甚至250天線水平才完成反彈。响走勢學上叫做吻別（Kiss me good-bye）。熊市二期第一隻腳通常強而有力，喺出現死亡交叉後短期股市係不跌反升。
Wilbur Ross、畢非德及Bill Gross都係世上知名嘅投資家，佢地本周不約而同認為市場已到咗可以投資水平。
美國或再現大蕭條
Irving Fisher係美國著名經濟學者，雖然因睇錯市1933年接近破產，但佢所出嘅書The Debt-Deflation Theory of Great Depressions卻十分有參考作用。佢認為1929至33年美國大蕭條係聯儲局過分緊張通脹結果，反而英倫銀行因冇過分抽緊銀根，三十年代英國經濟仍然良好。佢嘅爭論點係1929年美國已負債纍纍，千萬唔好「Rock the boat」，不然一旦傾覆便不可收拾。到1933年3月美國負債減少20％，但美元購買力卻上升75％，即以商品價格計負債反而上升40％！換言之，減債行為加上價格下跌引發大蕭條。今天美國負債纍纍，如任由股票及樓價下跌，一樣可引發1929至33年嘅情況，樂觀點睇則會出現1990年日式衰退。阻止辦法係設法停止樓價及股市回落，一如1966至82年，讓美元購買力慢慢地失去；睇嚟貝南奇正採用咁嘅手法。現年五十四歲嘅貝南奇首次對貨幣政策有興趣，係三十年前閱讀佛利民得諾貝爾獎文章，當時佢剛從麻省理工畢業。其後致力研究中央銀行問題，2005年年底獲布殊委任時相信係全球對中央銀行此一項目最有研究嘅人，尤其係點樣防止「通縮恐慌」（deflationary panics）及聯儲局如何影響股市價格，喺呢方面佢曾寫過多篇討論文章，相信亦係對大蕭條最有研究嘅人，佢係阻止金融危機失控而威脅一般經濟方面嘅專家，包括如何規範銀行危機殃及正常信貸流動；似乎佢嘅一生就係為咗應付當前發生嘅次按危機一樣。只係佢無法令公眾人士對佢產生信心，而佢相信嘅現代預測模型亦未能預見樓按者大量不履行責任先兆而引發次按危機，响次按危機出現時亦低估其影響力。
阻止次按威脅經濟
佢心目中嘅英雄佛利民又點睇佢？佛利民認為貝南奇嘅優柔寡斷有如花灑內嘅傻瓜（like a fool in the shower），亂開熱水掣後又開冷水掣，總之不知所謂。美林證券北美洲分析員形容他佢係「seriously behind the curve」! 上述亦係一般學者常犯嘅錯誤，便係冇足夠證據前不作決定，不過股市往往走响證據之前。佢亦不乏同情者，認為今天樓市泡沫及次按危機係由2001年格老過分放寬銀根造成；格老在任十八年攞盡光彩卻留下爛攤子畀貝南奇去收拾。佢亦面對1972年前聯儲局主席Arthur Burns問題：當年尼克遜認為冇一屆總統因高通脹而不獲連任，卻可因高失業率而競選失敗。今年大選年佢努力阻止失業率上升而暫時忘記高通脹問題。另一前聯儲局主席伏爾克（1979至87年）認為依家聯儲局面對太多泡沫已漸失控。
格老嘅權威來自1987年10月股災嘅處理，貝南奇如能度過次按危機呢關，一樣可獲世人信任。伏爾克亦以打擊通脹而留名，佛利民認為三十年代大蕭條成因係聯儲局處理失當，冇及時提供足夠信貸協助銀行度過難關。上述係貝南奇嘅核心思想，以佢喺學識能否阻止呢次次按危機威脅正常經濟？
通脹影響樓市
內地高通脹加股災正令樓市向下。通脹處於唔同階段對房地產市場嘅影響唔一樣；通脹初期，企業可透過產品加價而增加利潤，公司盈利上升及加薪令整個社會出現一片繁榮景象；中央銀行亦只係溫和地加息，此時樓價及股價不斷上升。但好景不常，當通脹拖動原材料價格大升，升幅較產品價大，企業無法將成本升幅完全轉嫁，令企業利潤開始回落，央行加息幅度擴大及採取緊縮性貨幣政策，到某一水平股市便出現逆轉，但樓價仍上升，因資金由股票市場流向實物投資，時差大約三個月至九個月。即股市回落三個月至九個月後，樓價才逆轉；隨着樓市逆轉，人們減少消費，通脹率又漸回落。成熟市場如美國或英國，樓市往往走喺股市之前三至九個月出現反領導作用（即樓價走在股價之前）其他市場如日本及香港等，股市走喺樓價之前三至九個月。
周四滬深A股下跌5.4％確認熊市（50天線低於200天線），一如恒生指數進入熊市二期大反彈，理論上可重見50天線甚至250天線水平才完成反彈。响走勢學上叫做吻別（Kiss me good-bye）。熊市二期第一隻腳通常強而有力，喺出現死亡交叉後短期股市係不跌反升。
Wilbur Ross、畢非德及Bill Gross都係世上知名嘅投資家，佢地本周不約而同認為市場已到咗可以投資水平。
美國或再現大蕭條
Irving Fisher係美國著名經濟學者，雖然因睇錯市1933年接近破產，但佢所出嘅書The Debt-Deflation Theory of Great Depressions卻十分有參考作用。佢認為1929至33年美國大蕭條係聯儲局過分緊張通脹結果，反而英倫銀行因冇過分抽緊銀根，三十年代英國經濟仍然良好。佢嘅爭論點係1929年美國已負債纍纍，千萬唔好「Rock the boat」，不然一旦傾覆便不可收拾。到1933年3月美國負債減少20％，但美元購買力卻上升75％，即以商品價格計負債反而上升40％！換言之，減債行為加上價格下跌引發大蕭條。今天美國負債纍纍，如任由股票及樓價下跌，一樣可引發1929至33年嘅情況，樂觀點睇則會出現1990年日式衰退。阻止辦法係設法停止樓價及股市回落，一如1966至82年，讓美元購買力慢慢地失去；睇嚟貝南奇正採用咁嘅手法。現年五十四歲嘅貝南奇首次對貨幣政策有興趣，係三十年前閱讀佛利民得諾貝爾獎文章，當時佢剛從麻省理工畢業。其後致力研究中央銀行問題，2005年年底獲布殊委任時相信係全球對中央銀行此一項目最有研究嘅人，尤其係點樣防止「通縮恐慌」（deflationary panics）及聯儲局如何影響股市價格，喺呢方面佢曾寫過多篇討論文章，相信亦係對大蕭條最有研究嘅人，佢係阻止金融危機失控而威脅一般經濟方面嘅專家，包括如何規範銀行危機殃及正常信貸流動；似乎佢嘅一生就係為咗應付當前發生嘅次按危機一樣。只係佢無法令公眾人士對佢產生信心，而佢相信嘅現代預測模型亦未能預見樓按者大量不履行責任先兆而引發次按危機，响次按危機出現時亦低估其影響力。
阻止次按威脅經濟
佢心目中嘅英雄佛利民又點睇佢？佛利民認為貝南奇嘅優柔寡斷有如花灑內嘅傻瓜（like a fool in the shower），亂開熱水掣後又開冷水掣，總之不知所謂。美林證券北美洲分析員形容他佢係「seriously behind the curve」! 上述亦係一般學者常犯嘅錯誤，便係冇足夠證據前不作決定，不過股市往往走响證據之前。佢亦不乏同情者，認為今天樓市泡沫及次按危機係由2001年格老過分放寬銀根造成；格老在任十八年攞盡光彩卻留下爛攤子畀貝南奇去收拾。佢亦面對1972年前聯儲局主席Arthur Burns問題：當年尼克遜認為冇一屆總統因高通脹而不獲連任，卻可因高失業率而競選失敗。今年大選年佢努力阻止失業率上升而暫時忘記高通脹問題。另一前聯儲局主席伏爾克（1979至87年）認為依家聯儲局面對太多泡沫已漸失控。
格老嘅權威來自1987年10月股災嘅處理，貝南奇如能度過次按危機呢關，一樣可獲世人信任。伏爾克亦以打擊通脹而留名，佛利民認為三十年代大蕭條成因係聯儲局處理失當，冇及時提供足夠信貸協助銀行度過難關。上述係貝南奇嘅核心思想，以佢喺學識能否阻止呢次次按危機威脅正常經濟？
最黑暗唔係黎明前
Jim Cramer本周一响電視show Mad Money中認為熊市已經完成，次按危機發展到貝爾斯登事件已淋漓盡致，佢認為一般分析員太悲觀。
我老曹一再認為經濟並非進入滯脹期（stagfation）而係泡沫期，由黃金到小麥、由原油到黃銅。去年8月至今，聯儲局只放寬信貸，而非增加貨幣供應，因此2007年唔係七十年代。幾天之內，金價跌12％、原油跌10％、白銀跌20％……。上周係原材料市場內另一場牛熊爭霸，勝方才可企英雄地，接受下一次挑戰。
以今時今日物價，想唔節衣縮食都唔掂。雖然係咁，請唔好忘記畢非德嘅教訓：唔好蝕本！ 去年10月30 日至今年3月18日，恒指已下跌三分一，平均O跌至十四倍，已經唔算貴，但經濟正步向衰退期，即企業邊際利潤見頂，面對回落。唔算貴並唔係入市買嘢嘅理由，例如呢次次按嘅Great Unwind係咪完成？經濟係咪已進入通縮期？科網股泡沫爆破，股市十九個月後才見底；呢次次按危機，股市五個月後便見底？西方中產階級正面對身家縮水，中國年輕一代卻開始躋身中產行列，形成西方物業市場出現通縮，東方由原材料到食物卻出現通脹。西方經濟步入九十年代日式經濟，東方經濟卻類似八十年代日本。
呢次港股反彈，相信只係3月結前嘅櫥窗粉飾活動而已。
中國商務部宣布上周（3月17日至22日）食物價格回落；此乃3月份首次。內地CPI响3月份見頂機會好大。
CPI壓力雖然下降，隨着美國經濟增長率放緩，溫家寶估計2008年中國將面對艱辛嘅一年，無論內在、外在壓力都十分大。中國係一個十三億人口嘅國家，就業問題一向係大問題，亦係唔穩定嘅主要因素。中國CPI升幅將由今年2月嘅8.7％下降至年底嘅4.8％，中國GDP增長率放緩已好肯定。
人人都話黎明前嘅黑暗係最黑嘅。因此，JP摩根大通出價收購貝爾斯登係咪黎明前嘅黑暗？我老曹木宰羊，亦唔想猜測。過去四年，中美兩國GDP已佔去全球GDP增長率60％；展望2008年，兩國GDP增長率皆進入放緩期。中國經濟奇迹係建基於政府刺激出口政策及中國企業家嘅努力。2008年起中國政府對廠商嘅態度漸漸唔友善。今天東莞厚德街唔再人頭湧湧，早已變得冷冷清清。人民幣升值、勞工成本上升、柴油價上漲，電力供應更面對供電部門嘅錯峰用電預配要求，令企業每周有三至四天必須自己發電。3月份東莞缺電達三百萬千瓦，缺電情況已影響深圳、廣州、佛山甚至揭陽、潮州。因為貴州、三峽、湖南鯉魚江和橋口減送電力六百三十萬千瓦，主因係本土電力需求上升，點解要賣電畀廣東省？加上廣東省電力需求年年上升，今年未到炎夏，廣東省已出現電荒。
滿城盡是打折盤
中國房地產發展企業超過六萬家，估計幾年內將減半，最後可能十家企業中只有一家存活下來（香港1973年上市地產發展公司多達二百家，今天香港大地產商十隻手指數晒）。1998至2007年係內地房地產發展公司最賺錢嘅十年，未來十年係汰弱留強時段。大方向係咁，打小折能救得幾條命？
繼製造業之後，內地房地產亦令人擔心。北京市鏈家房地產經紀公司話「滿城盡是打折盤」。八十三個樓盤，九點八折者佔36.1％，九點六折佔33.3％，九點四折佔22.2％，即80％樓盤都打折。一線同沿海城市樓盤已到咗無法再升嘅地步，大量炒樓資金移向中西部城市「跑馬圈地」，形成東冷西熱。踏入2008年，北京、上海、深圳、廣州等一線城市不斷出現樓盤打折、中介崩盤嘅消息，但中西部省區城市房價卻不斷上漲。
美元再回落到1.5586美元兌1歐羅及1.9936美元兌1英鎊。擔心由JP摩根提升貝爾斯登收購價到10美元所引發美股反彈已完成。德國銀行估計，美國今年首季經濟已進入衰退，歐羅將睇1.6美元，然後跌至年底1.45美元。根據S&P╱Case-Shiller二十個城市住房指數，美國今年1月樓價較一年前已下跌10.5％。
另一投資界泰斗Joseph Granville今年已八十四歲。去年10月9日發出美股熊市訊號，認為道指最少下跌2200點，依家已證明準確。佢今天又再作驚人預測：道指將見9000點，低潮响今年10月左右（或年底）！Van Kampen主要投資策略員Rob Schumacher則完全唔同意上述睇法，認為年底標普五百可見1600點，升20％。一淡一好，誰對誰錯？投資市場無專家，只有贏家同輸家。 商品價格回落，油價見100.86 美元、金價見918.7美元，擔心商品泡沫上周爆破。2月份美國二手樓出售減少3％，至四百零三萬間（年率），代表九點六個月供應量，雖然較估計中嘅四百八十五萬間好，即地產放緩速度冇估計中咁快。OECD組織估計，美國、歐洲及日本今年上半年經濟進入徘徊區，美國GDP只升0.1％、歐羅區升0.5％、日本升0.3％。
所謂馬英九效應已由今年1月23日台股7384點開始，到3月22日9049點結束，升幅共22.5％。上述升幅係由希望台灣加強同中國大陸聯繫所引發。2003年7月透過自由行、 CEPA、QDII等，令香港經濟復甦，唔少人認為上述事件可以喺台灣重演一次。呢幾日我老曹踏足台灣，所有响台灣嘅朋友都告訴我老曹只要藍營贏出，台灣經濟就有救。真係咩？1949年國民黨退守台灣，蔣介石實行勵精圖治，到蔣經國時代建立一個清廉政府。1971年台灣雖然失去聯合國地位，但經濟卻蒸蒸日上，可惜漸漸又故態復萌，又出現貪污腐敗，令2000年政權落入民進黨手裏。阿扁上台後，扁嫂由一位為「民主」而搞到自己坐輪椅嘅鬥士，漸漸變成貪污嘅小婦人，民進黨又走上國民黨嘅老路。
台灣經濟由1992年走下坡，至今已十五年，前八年由國民黨掌權，結果又點？馬英九上台須面對嘅問題一籮籮，例如未來八年欲投資4萬億元新台幣响基建上（但錢從何來？不但政府已負債纍纍，如發債，台灣通脹率會狂升；連國民黨亦窮了，近年連蔣介石嘅居所亦切出八分一土地，賣畀地產商興建豪宅）。搞好金融、旅遊、醫療、文化及創新服務在在需財，但台灣政府卻十分窮。十五年不景氣，已令台灣經濟陷入低投資、低消費嘅惡性循環。過去六年台股每次當市價高出賬面值二點四倍便見頂，呢次能否例外？面對美國經濟放緩及環球經濟活動減少。大氣候、小氣候不因人嘅主觀願望而改變。呢次台灣之行，可以講滿懷希望地去、心灰意冷地回。四天觀察所得，台灣經濟有排搞，暫時睇唔到乜嘢理由可打破過去十五年嘅兜兜轉轉（假設大陸赴台遊客由去年三十六萬升至今年一百零八萬，消費一如來港自由行，亦只可令2008年台灣GDP多0.15％。2009年大陸遊客增至三百六十萬，亦只可令台灣GDP多0.5％）。周一台灣QFII證明外資响度出貨而非入貨。估計2008年台灣上市公司純利平均上升8％（因電子業走下坡），今年O十六倍，唔見得特別吸引。
馬英九上台後，可結束與北京嘅互不信任關係，進入和平發展咩？北京唔反對台灣加入東盟自由貿易區，結束經濟被邊緣化局面咩？兩岸在「九二共識」大前提下，能進一步發展咩？話易唔易。兩岸主權之爭，我老曹嘅睇法係無法解決。馬英九強調台灣係「主權國家」，以「不獨不統」為大原則（既唔獨立亦唔統一；台灣前途由台灣人民決定）。上述兩點同北京政府嘅立場有很大差距；北京政府嘅立場係响「一個中國大原則下」才能恢復談判。睇嚟兩岸距離和平統一之途十分遙遠。台灣之行，進一步證明我老曹嘅信念：經濟繁榮與衰退，同係咪實施民主制度無關。台灣已進入第四十一屆總統年代，但講經濟水平，仍唔及冇民選制度嘅香港。今天香港人均收入係台灣人一倍或以上！
我老曹一再認為經濟並非進入滯脹期（stagfation）而係泡沫期，由黃金到小麥、由原油到黃銅。去年8月至今，聯儲局只放寬信貸，而非增加貨幣供應，因此2007年唔係七十年代。幾天之內，金價跌12％、原油跌10％、白銀跌20％……。上周係原材料市場內另一場牛熊爭霸，勝方才可企英雄地，接受下一次挑戰。
以今時今日物價，想唔節衣縮食都唔掂。雖然係咁，請唔好忘記畢非德嘅教訓：唔好蝕本！ 去年10月30 日至今年3月18日，恒指已下跌三分一，平均O跌至十四倍，已經唔算貴，但經濟正步向衰退期，即企業邊際利潤見頂，面對回落。唔算貴並唔係入市買嘢嘅理由，例如呢次次按嘅Great Unwind係咪完成？經濟係咪已進入通縮期？科網股泡沫爆破，股市十九個月後才見底；呢次次按危機，股市五個月後便見底？西方中產階級正面對身家縮水，中國年輕一代卻開始躋身中產行列，形成西方物業市場出現通縮，東方由原材料到食物卻出現通脹。西方經濟步入九十年代日式經濟，東方經濟卻類似八十年代日本。
呢次港股反彈，相信只係3月結前嘅櫥窗粉飾活動而已。
中國商務部宣布上周（3月17日至22日）食物價格回落；此乃3月份首次。內地CPI响3月份見頂機會好大。
CPI壓力雖然下降，隨着美國經濟增長率放緩，溫家寶估計2008年中國將面對艱辛嘅一年，無論內在、外在壓力都十分大。中國係一個十三億人口嘅國家，就業問題一向係大問題，亦係唔穩定嘅主要因素。中國CPI升幅將由今年2月嘅8.7％下降至年底嘅4.8％，中國GDP增長率放緩已好肯定。
人人都話黎明前嘅黑暗係最黑嘅。因此，JP摩根大通出價收購貝爾斯登係咪黎明前嘅黑暗？我老曹木宰羊，亦唔想猜測。過去四年，中美兩國GDP已佔去全球GDP增長率60％；展望2008年，兩國GDP增長率皆進入放緩期。中國經濟奇迹係建基於政府刺激出口政策及中國企業家嘅努力。2008年起中國政府對廠商嘅態度漸漸唔友善。今天東莞厚德街唔再人頭湧湧，早已變得冷冷清清。人民幣升值、勞工成本上升、柴油價上漲，電力供應更面對供電部門嘅錯峰用電預配要求，令企業每周有三至四天必須自己發電。3月份東莞缺電達三百萬千瓦，缺電情況已影響深圳、廣州、佛山甚至揭陽、潮州。因為貴州、三峽、湖南鯉魚江和橋口減送電力六百三十萬千瓦，主因係本土電力需求上升，點解要賣電畀廣東省？加上廣東省電力需求年年上升，今年未到炎夏，廣東省已出現電荒。
滿城盡是打折盤
中國房地產發展企業超過六萬家，估計幾年內將減半，最後可能十家企業中只有一家存活下來（香港1973年上市地產發展公司多達二百家，今天香港大地產商十隻手指數晒）。1998至2007年係內地房地產發展公司最賺錢嘅十年，未來十年係汰弱留強時段。大方向係咁，打小折能救得幾條命？
繼製造業之後，內地房地產亦令人擔心。北京市鏈家房地產經紀公司話「滿城盡是打折盤」。八十三個樓盤，九點八折者佔36.1％，九點六折佔33.3％，九點四折佔22.2％，即80％樓盤都打折。一線同沿海城市樓盤已到咗無法再升嘅地步，大量炒樓資金移向中西部城市「跑馬圈地」，形成東冷西熱。踏入2008年，北京、上海、深圳、廣州等一線城市不斷出現樓盤打折、中介崩盤嘅消息，但中西部省區城市房價卻不斷上漲。
美元再回落到1.5586美元兌1歐羅及1.9936美元兌1英鎊。擔心由JP摩根提升貝爾斯登收購價到10美元所引發美股反彈已完成。德國銀行估計，美國今年首季經濟已進入衰退，歐羅將睇1.6美元，然後跌至年底1.45美元。根據S&P╱Case-Shiller二十個城市住房指數，美國今年1月樓價較一年前已下跌10.5％。
另一投資界泰斗Joseph Granville今年已八十四歲。去年10月9日發出美股熊市訊號，認為道指最少下跌2200點，依家已證明準確。佢今天又再作驚人預測：道指將見9000點，低潮响今年10月左右（或年底）！Van Kampen主要投資策略員Rob Schumacher則完全唔同意上述睇法，認為年底標普五百可見1600點，升20％。一淡一好，誰對誰錯？投資市場無專家，只有贏家同輸家。 商品價格回落，油價見100.86 美元、金價見918.7美元，擔心商品泡沫上周爆破。2月份美國二手樓出售減少3％，至四百零三萬間（年率），代表九點六個月供應量，雖然較估計中嘅四百八十五萬間好，即地產放緩速度冇估計中咁快。OECD組織估計，美國、歐洲及日本今年上半年經濟進入徘徊區，美國GDP只升0.1％、歐羅區升0.5％、日本升0.3％。
所謂馬英九效應已由今年1月23日台股7384點開始，到3月22日9049點結束，升幅共22.5％。上述升幅係由希望台灣加強同中國大陸聯繫所引發。2003年7月透過自由行、 CEPA、QDII等，令香港經濟復甦，唔少人認為上述事件可以喺台灣重演一次。呢幾日我老曹踏足台灣，所有响台灣嘅朋友都告訴我老曹只要藍營贏出，台灣經濟就有救。真係咩？1949年國民黨退守台灣，蔣介石實行勵精圖治，到蔣經國時代建立一個清廉政府。1971年台灣雖然失去聯合國地位，但經濟卻蒸蒸日上，可惜漸漸又故態復萌，又出現貪污腐敗，令2000年政權落入民進黨手裏。阿扁上台後，扁嫂由一位為「民主」而搞到自己坐輪椅嘅鬥士，漸漸變成貪污嘅小婦人，民進黨又走上國民黨嘅老路。
台灣經濟由1992年走下坡，至今已十五年，前八年由國民黨掌權，結果又點？馬英九上台須面對嘅問題一籮籮，例如未來八年欲投資4萬億元新台幣响基建上（但錢從何來？不但政府已負債纍纍，如發債，台灣通脹率會狂升；連國民黨亦窮了，近年連蔣介石嘅居所亦切出八分一土地，賣畀地產商興建豪宅）。搞好金融、旅遊、醫療、文化及創新服務在在需財，但台灣政府卻十分窮。十五年不景氣，已令台灣經濟陷入低投資、低消費嘅惡性循環。過去六年台股每次當市價高出賬面值二點四倍便見頂，呢次能否例外？面對美國經濟放緩及環球經濟活動減少。大氣候、小氣候不因人嘅主觀願望而改變。呢次台灣之行，可以講滿懷希望地去、心灰意冷地回。四天觀察所得，台灣經濟有排搞，暫時睇唔到乜嘢理由可打破過去十五年嘅兜兜轉轉（假設大陸赴台遊客由去年三十六萬升至今年一百零八萬，消費一如來港自由行，亦只可令2008年台灣GDP多0.15％。2009年大陸遊客增至三百六十萬，亦只可令台灣GDP多0.5％）。周一台灣QFII證明外資响度出貨而非入貨。估計2008年台灣上市公司純利平均上升8％（因電子業走下坡），今年O十六倍，唔見得特別吸引。
馬英九上台後，可結束與北京嘅互不信任關係，進入和平發展咩？北京唔反對台灣加入東盟自由貿易區，結束經濟被邊緣化局面咩？兩岸在「九二共識」大前提下，能進一步發展咩？話易唔易。兩岸主權之爭，我老曹嘅睇法係無法解決。馬英九強調台灣係「主權國家」，以「不獨不統」為大原則（既唔獨立亦唔統一；台灣前途由台灣人民決定）。上述兩點同北京政府嘅立場有很大差距；北京政府嘅立場係响「一個中國大原則下」才能恢復談判。睇嚟兩岸距離和平統一之途十分遙遠。台灣之行，進一步證明我老曹嘅信念：經濟繁榮與衰退，同係咪實施民主制度無關。台灣已進入第四十一屆總統年代，但講經濟水平，仍唔及冇民選制度嘅香港。今天香港人均收入係台灣人一倍或以上！
反彈市隨時結束
3月26日，恒指再升152.49，收22617.01。3月期指低水，升145點，收22615點；4月期指升142點，收22595點。小心反彈市隨時結束。
死貓式反彈居多
上周JP摩根大通宣布以每股2美元收購貝爾斯登而引發全球金融股大拋售；本周忽然提價到10美元，令周一金融股全面上升。不足一星期，點解變化咁大？由於貝爾斯登管理層同意將手上九千五百萬股出售畀JP摩根大通，加上已持有一億四千五百萬股，即4月8日後，摩根大通最少持有貝爾斯登39.5％控制權。分析家認為，以每股10美元收購，JP摩根大通應該冇其他對手矣。
呢次金融股上升，到底係火鳳凰抑或死貓式反彈？
一、去年10月道指金融分類指數所形成嘅下降軌至今未破。
二、成交額未見大幅上升。
三、由去年7月金融分類指數開始回落，反彈38.2％，阻力係465點，至今亦未升穿。
四、美國Broker╱Dealer指數由於過分拋離下降軌而反彈，證明只係死貓式反彈。
五、由於短息低於長息，對銀行賺取息差有利，即客觀環境在改善中。
六、經濟情況在惡化中。大部分企業上半年業績皆不理想，短息大幅低於長息，代表可見將來經濟仍在惡化，但六至十二個月後情況會改善。
1990年2月Drexel Burnham Lambert出事，六個月後金融股復甦。呢次貝爾斯登2007年3月出事，今年第四季金融股復甦？1998年9月長期資本管理出事，美國金融股亦响六個月後便復甦。
聯儲局將失減息能力
聯儲局搏命減息，令短期利率急跌，但三十年期樓按利率不跌反升！減息嘅目的係鼓勵市民借錢買樓，但三十年期樓按利率上升，卻打擊買樓欲望。睇嚟長達二十五年嘅信貸上升周期已响去年第四季結束，信貸擴張期已經完成，而信貸收縮期剛開始。投資者尋求嘅係資金安全性大於保值，寧可忍受貶值嘅代價，上述行為係引發信貸壓縮（credit crunch）嘅理由。呢個情況九十年代响日本出現，1997年8月後响香港出現，去年10月起亦响美國開始，最後必引發通縮（而非通脹）。雖然各國央行曾努力阻止通縮出現，但日本銀行唔成功，香港政府唔成功（1998年9月曾動用過千億元資金買股票，令股市上升，但一樣解決唔到香港通縮問題），美國聯儲局可以咩？地產泡沫爆破後嘅影響，可用邊個更大嘅泡沫去抵銷？金價由3月17日1032.7美元一盎斯急跌至3月20日905.53美元，係咪一葉知秋？ 4月份將係聯儲局最後一次減息（估計半厘），之後聯儲局便失去減息能力，到時美國會否開始進入通縮期？
當金融市場面對信貸壓縮，新興市場卻面對食物供應短缺！全球糧食存量跌至1970年以來新低，部分理由係新興國家人民所需嘅糧食卻被OECD國家用作生產乙醇（一架汽車耗油量相等於十六個人嘅口糧）。去年美國種植區已擴大到九千萬英畝，係1944年以來最大，但40％玉米用作生產乙醇，刺激大部分農產品價格上升，卻又無力壓抑油價。令人洩氣嘅係，烏克蘭2001年通過法例唔准農地易手（無論係本國人或外國人），目的係阻止農地流失，結果卻造成大量農地荒置。擁有農地者自己唔想耕但又不能賣出去，只有丟空。烏克蘭係世界知名嘅糧食產區之一，2001年起受制於法例，約有二千三百萬公頃農地荒廢，令人扼腕。
金價或跌穿850美元
對OECD國家人民而言，影響CPI最大因素唔係食物價格或油價，而係樓價（租金）及勞工成本！大部分OECD國家企業勞工成本佔總開支四分三，租金約佔八分一，其餘加起來才佔八分一。响環球化壓力下，OECD國家工資漲唔起來，因此CPI升幅有限。
黃金70％用於珠寶業，印度更係最大市場。去年第四季印度珠寶需求大降64％，即大量黃金自去年第四季起流入投資客手中，响上述情況下，高金價可維持幾耐？（黃金係美元嘅死敵，而非保值工具；過去七年推高金價係美元滙價下沉，而非CPI大升！）
美元可分為三段大跌期：
一、1971至78年；
二、 1986至95年；
三、2001年至今。
第一次共八年；第二次係九年；第三次至今已超過七年。1971至78年美元貶值，加上CPI大幅上升，令金價大升。1979年美元升值，但金價仍升，理由係利率低於CPI升幅。1986至95年美元滙價亦大幅回落，但CPI升幅唔大，利率高於CPI升幅2厘或以上，金價升幅有限。2001年至今美元貶值，去年CPI才大幅上升，理由係利率低於CPI升幅2厘嘅結果。
近年投資市場有大量對沖基金出現，佢地利用槓桿造成某一類項目短期供求唔平衡，例如去年8月17日恒指19386點急升上10月30日31958點，爆炸性上升引發散戶（甚至大戶）跟風，然後佢地飽食遠颺，再找尋另一目標，例如油價同金價，同樣都係製造爆炸性上升，睇嚟另一次飽食遠颺行動又開始……。佢地追求嘅唔係長期增長，而係爆炸性上升，响最短時間內賺取100％回報或止蝕離場。有人十分討厭佢地，稱佢地為國際大鱷甚至係市場操控者。金融市場唔係講道德嘅地方。小朋友可以同情小牛、小羊、小兔，討厭獅子、老虎、豺狼；年紀漸長，明白猛獸係保持生態平衡嘅方法，冇獅子、老虎及豺狼，地球上嘅草早已被吃清光；有咗獅子、老虎、豺狼，便限制咗牛、羊及兔嘅數目，達致平衡。對沖基金嘅作用亦係咁（如佢地睇錯市，付出嘅代價就係死亡）。
貝南奇未能以泡治泡
1974年12月至76年3月美股大升，然後牛皮到1977年3月，再回落到1978年初，然後連升三年，到1981年爆煲；2002年10月至07年 10月走勢亦大同小異。至於2007年10月以後表現會否同1981至82年相似？我地不妨細心觀察。美國上一次黃金歲月係1949至69年，經濟繁榮而 CPI升幅唔大，呢段日子美國由擺脫戰爭恐懼，到順利發展經濟，直到1970、71年美元出現危機才結束。
最近一次黃金歲月，由美國創新科技加上中國等國家走向改革開放經濟所引發，由1982年開始，到2000年科網股泡沫爆破結束環球化所帶來嘅繁榮為止，然後由格蛇利用流動性過剩去創造2002年10月至07年10月嘅小陽春，最後次按危機爆發而引發2007年10月起嘅股市大幅回落。貝南奇透過壓抑美元滙價同減息，希望製造另一個原材料泡沫（以石油、黃金及原材料價格為首），擔心呢個泡沫今年3月已爆破，美國黃金歲月再無法維持，因為減息只能令信貸成本下降，卻無助重建信貸信心。
1980年隨着中國將深圳變成經濟特區，香港工業開始內移；珠三角工業以香港廠商為基礎。八十年代香港經濟踏入轉型期；製造業工人（1980年超過一百萬，佔當年就業人口超過三分一）漸漸被服務業吸收。香港負責接單、保險、運輸、訂購原材料、安排財務等工作；珠三角係工廠區，負責生產。香港製造業內移，除咗初期造成工人大量失業外，後期反而成為受惠者。
中台關係唔似中港關係
1980年中國極需要香港提供各種服務，但今年中國並唔需要台灣提供任何服務。今年台灣用乜嘢條件吸引中國大陸資金投資台灣？除咗旅遊探親人數可能由2007年嘅幾十萬到2009年嘅幾百萬外，其他方面受惠唔大。如好處只局限於旅遊業，便只能令台灣GDP每年增長率多咗0.5％而已，係咁多！
馬英九上台後，中台關係會否變成中港關係？除咗地理因素（香港同珠三角只係一河之隔，台灣卻係一個海峽）、政治因素（香港要回歸，今天已係中國一部分；台灣一直拒絕統一，國民黨只主張不獨不統），仲有時間因素（1980年中國百廢待舉，只有三廉優勢：即廉價勞工、廉價土地、廉價資源；其他一切皆依賴香港。今天中國其他服務業已發展起來，反而三廉優勢漸失）。
死貓式反彈居多
上周JP摩根大通宣布以每股2美元收購貝爾斯登而引發全球金融股大拋售；本周忽然提價到10美元，令周一金融股全面上升。不足一星期，點解變化咁大？由於貝爾斯登管理層同意將手上九千五百萬股出售畀JP摩根大通，加上已持有一億四千五百萬股，即4月8日後，摩根大通最少持有貝爾斯登39.5％控制權。分析家認為，以每股10美元收購，JP摩根大通應該冇其他對手矣。
呢次金融股上升，到底係火鳳凰抑或死貓式反彈？
一、去年10月道指金融分類指數所形成嘅下降軌至今未破。
二、成交額未見大幅上升。
三、由去年7月金融分類指數開始回落，反彈38.2％，阻力係465點，至今亦未升穿。
四、美國Broker╱Dealer指數由於過分拋離下降軌而反彈，證明只係死貓式反彈。
五、由於短息低於長息，對銀行賺取息差有利，即客觀環境在改善中。
六、經濟情況在惡化中。大部分企業上半年業績皆不理想，短息大幅低於長息，代表可見將來經濟仍在惡化，但六至十二個月後情況會改善。
1990年2月Drexel Burnham Lambert出事，六個月後金融股復甦。呢次貝爾斯登2007年3月出事，今年第四季金融股復甦？1998年9月長期資本管理出事，美國金融股亦响六個月後便復甦。
聯儲局將失減息能力
聯儲局搏命減息，令短期利率急跌，但三十年期樓按利率不跌反升！減息嘅目的係鼓勵市民借錢買樓，但三十年期樓按利率上升，卻打擊買樓欲望。睇嚟長達二十五年嘅信貸上升周期已响去年第四季結束，信貸擴張期已經完成，而信貸收縮期剛開始。投資者尋求嘅係資金安全性大於保值，寧可忍受貶值嘅代價，上述行為係引發信貸壓縮（credit crunch）嘅理由。呢個情況九十年代响日本出現，1997年8月後响香港出現，去年10月起亦响美國開始，最後必引發通縮（而非通脹）。雖然各國央行曾努力阻止通縮出現，但日本銀行唔成功，香港政府唔成功（1998年9月曾動用過千億元資金買股票，令股市上升，但一樣解決唔到香港通縮問題），美國聯儲局可以咩？地產泡沫爆破後嘅影響，可用邊個更大嘅泡沫去抵銷？金價由3月17日1032.7美元一盎斯急跌至3月20日905.53美元，係咪一葉知秋？ 4月份將係聯儲局最後一次減息（估計半厘），之後聯儲局便失去減息能力，到時美國會否開始進入通縮期？
當金融市場面對信貸壓縮，新興市場卻面對食物供應短缺！全球糧食存量跌至1970年以來新低，部分理由係新興國家人民所需嘅糧食卻被OECD國家用作生產乙醇（一架汽車耗油量相等於十六個人嘅口糧）。去年美國種植區已擴大到九千萬英畝，係1944年以來最大，但40％玉米用作生產乙醇，刺激大部分農產品價格上升，卻又無力壓抑油價。令人洩氣嘅係，烏克蘭2001年通過法例唔准農地易手（無論係本國人或外國人），目的係阻止農地流失，結果卻造成大量農地荒置。擁有農地者自己唔想耕但又不能賣出去，只有丟空。烏克蘭係世界知名嘅糧食產區之一，2001年起受制於法例，約有二千三百萬公頃農地荒廢，令人扼腕。
金價或跌穿850美元
對OECD國家人民而言，影響CPI最大因素唔係食物價格或油價，而係樓價（租金）及勞工成本！大部分OECD國家企業勞工成本佔總開支四分三，租金約佔八分一，其餘加起來才佔八分一。响環球化壓力下，OECD國家工資漲唔起來，因此CPI升幅有限。
黃金70％用於珠寶業，印度更係最大市場。去年第四季印度珠寶需求大降64％，即大量黃金自去年第四季起流入投資客手中，响上述情況下，高金價可維持幾耐？（黃金係美元嘅死敵，而非保值工具；過去七年推高金價係美元滙價下沉，而非CPI大升！）
美元可分為三段大跌期：
一、1971至78年；
二、 1986至95年；
三、2001年至今。
第一次共八年；第二次係九年；第三次至今已超過七年。1971至78年美元貶值，加上CPI大幅上升，令金價大升。1979年美元升值，但金價仍升，理由係利率低於CPI升幅。1986至95年美元滙價亦大幅回落，但CPI升幅唔大，利率高於CPI升幅2厘或以上，金價升幅有限。2001年至今美元貶值，去年CPI才大幅上升，理由係利率低於CPI升幅2厘嘅結果。
近年投資市場有大量對沖基金出現，佢地利用槓桿造成某一類項目短期供求唔平衡，例如去年8月17日恒指19386點急升上10月30日31958點，爆炸性上升引發散戶（甚至大戶）跟風，然後佢地飽食遠颺，再找尋另一目標，例如油價同金價，同樣都係製造爆炸性上升，睇嚟另一次飽食遠颺行動又開始……。佢地追求嘅唔係長期增長，而係爆炸性上升，响最短時間內賺取100％回報或止蝕離場。有人十分討厭佢地，稱佢地為國際大鱷甚至係市場操控者。金融市場唔係講道德嘅地方。小朋友可以同情小牛、小羊、小兔，討厭獅子、老虎、豺狼；年紀漸長，明白猛獸係保持生態平衡嘅方法，冇獅子、老虎及豺狼，地球上嘅草早已被吃清光；有咗獅子、老虎、豺狼，便限制咗牛、羊及兔嘅數目，達致平衡。對沖基金嘅作用亦係咁（如佢地睇錯市，付出嘅代價就係死亡）。
貝南奇未能以泡治泡
1974年12月至76年3月美股大升，然後牛皮到1977年3月，再回落到1978年初，然後連升三年，到1981年爆煲；2002年10月至07年 10月走勢亦大同小異。至於2007年10月以後表現會否同1981至82年相似？我地不妨細心觀察。美國上一次黃金歲月係1949至69年，經濟繁榮而 CPI升幅唔大，呢段日子美國由擺脫戰爭恐懼，到順利發展經濟，直到1970、71年美元出現危機才結束。
最近一次黃金歲月，由美國創新科技加上中國等國家走向改革開放經濟所引發，由1982年開始，到2000年科網股泡沫爆破結束環球化所帶來嘅繁榮為止，然後由格蛇利用流動性過剩去創造2002年10月至07年10月嘅小陽春，最後次按危機爆發而引發2007年10月起嘅股市大幅回落。貝南奇透過壓抑美元滙價同減息，希望製造另一個原材料泡沫（以石油、黃金及原材料價格為首），擔心呢個泡沫今年3月已爆破，美國黃金歲月再無法維持，因為減息只能令信貸成本下降，卻無助重建信貸信心。
1980年隨着中國將深圳變成經濟特區，香港工業開始內移；珠三角工業以香港廠商為基礎。八十年代香港經濟踏入轉型期；製造業工人（1980年超過一百萬，佔當年就業人口超過三分一）漸漸被服務業吸收。香港負責接單、保險、運輸、訂購原材料、安排財務等工作；珠三角係工廠區，負責生產。香港製造業內移，除咗初期造成工人大量失業外，後期反而成為受惠者。
中台關係唔似中港關係
1980年中國極需要香港提供各種服務，但今年中國並唔需要台灣提供任何服務。今年台灣用乜嘢條件吸引中國大陸資金投資台灣？除咗旅遊探親人數可能由2007年嘅幾十萬到2009年嘅幾百萬外，其他方面受惠唔大。如好處只局限於旅遊業，便只能令台灣GDP每年增長率多咗0.5％而已，係咁多！
馬英九上台後，中台關係會否變成中港關係？除咗地理因素（香港同珠三角只係一河之隔，台灣卻係一個海峽）、政治因素（香港要回歸，今天已係中國一部分；台灣一直拒絕統一，國民黨只主張不獨不統），仲有時間因素（1980年中國百廢待舉，只有三廉優勢：即廉價勞工、廉價土地、廉價資源；其他一切皆依賴香港。今天中國其他服務業已發展起來，反而三廉優勢漸失）。
美國,中國A股踏入熊市
美國去年第四季GDP增長率只有0.6％，係五年內最差一季（第三季升4.9％），大摩估計今年第一季GDP係負增長0.7％。愈嚟愈多分析員相信美國正步入衰退期。
高盛估計，中國A股可能延續去年由高點下跌超過30％嘅趨勢，估計今年上市公司純利平均升幅只有15-20％，而非分析員估計嘅31％。去年人行六次加息、今年兩次上調銀行存款準備金率，並可能進一步加息；加上2月份貿易順差較去年同期縮減64％及人民幣短期內將升穿「七算」（估計年底見6.3元人民幣兌1美元），大大削弱中國產品出口競爭力。美國需求減弱，如中國GDP增長率由去年嘅11.2％降至今年嘅8％，可引發A股一個大熊市。
外企紛紛逃離中國
馬英九希望中國大陸帶動台灣經濟復甦；反觀中國踏入今年卻面對「三缺四漲」局面（即缺乏勞工、缺電、缺地；油價漲、原料漲、工資漲及人民幣值漲），令勞動密集型外資企業加快轉移，但唔係流向中國中西部地區，而係流向越南、老撾、柬埔寨等東南亞國家。加工貿易工業外流，造成中國產業內迴圈「斷鏈」，因為高新科技亦需要加工貿易產品協助才能完成產業鏈。中國政府希望加工貿易內移，但外資卻在外移，因呢次中國政府冇向中西部地區提供優惠去吸引外資企業轉移。响「三缺四漲」壓力下，珠三角及長三角地區產業面對「斷鏈」嘅威脅。除上述威脅外，另加兩稅合一、出口退稅率下調、勞動合同法實施及環保條例加強，令唔少台商跑去越南、緬甸、印度等建廠。响2005至07年，台商喺越南第一大投資者！鎰勝電子科技（昆山）副董事長楊登輝話，三年前已投資越南，依家利潤率係中國嘅二點五倍，亦冇興趣到中國中西部投資。假設人民幣見6.3兌1美元，相信珠三角同長三角將出現大量倒閉潮。逃離中國嘅唔止台企，仲有港企同韓企；韓企更認為，中國勞動密集型企業已進入黃昏。
中國經濟嘅外在因素同內在因素都在惡化中。今天中國經濟抗衰退能力較1997年好許多，但出口佔中國GDP 36％，亦較1997年高許多。依家中國生產全球70％ T裇、60％記事簿、45％船隻；製造業方面投資佔中國固定資產投資31％，並間接影響道路、海港、電廠、工業邨等投資。製造業共聘用一億二千萬工人，佔城市就業人口50％（其中七千萬係低薪工人）。美國、歐盟及日本佔中國總出口60％。如中國出口增幅由去年20％降至今年10％，可令GDP升幅由 11.2％降至9％，投資者宜小心。
中國A股已陷入深幅調整，系統性風險驟增。著名經濟學家巴曙松話，中國股市系統性風險上升，迫切需要推出股指期貨等風險管理工具。外在因素係美國次按危機影響下，經濟出現明顯放緩迹象，令外貿需求大幅下降，意味中國出口升幅下降，令外需拉動經濟嘅增長方式面臨嚴峻挑戰。內需方面，一場雪災暴露出基礎建設及配套設施不足，加上CPI居高不下，緊縮政策為宏觀調控嘅主要旋律，响銀行收緊信貸下，引發上市公司向股市集資，改變股票供求關係。由於中國股市唔發達、唔靈活及唔完善，一旦面對外在及內在因素衝擊，所面對嘅風險較成熟市場大得多；再加上大小非流通股解禁，而且中國股市體系十分單一（唔容許拋空），亦冇有效嘅對沖工具（如期指），好容易出現系統性風險（例如狂升或暴跌）。
今天日經平均指數收12604點，較去年6月20日18297點下跌31.11％（今年至今下跌17.66％），已成為美國次按危機嘅第二大重災區！至去年12月止，日本三菱、瑞銀等六大銀行集團响美國次按貸款中損失超過5000億日圓，業內人士估計，至3月31日止財政季度結束，未來公布嘅損失將遠高於此。3月 24日官方公布2月份破產企業多達一千一百九十四家，涉及負債36萬億日圓，較去年同期上升8.3％及26.2％。滙豐銀行估計，今年第一季日本工業生產總值將較去年同期下降2.5％。
雖然今天金價反彈，只要唔高於1036美元仲係睇淡，並形成下降軌。唔好相信滯脹論，近期金價、糧食價、原油價到銅價上升，炒賣成分好高，此乃對沖基金嘅搵食行為，正利用聯儲局減息到2.25厘（有可能進一步減至1.75厘）嘅心理因素進行投機，小心狂升之後就係暴跌。所謂「彈散彈散」，唔反彈又點可以散？
東歐醞釀金融風暴
熊市一期反映嘅係投資者失望情緒，通常跌得快且急；熊市二期反映投資者冇晒希望，通常係上落市；熊市三期投資者進入絕望嘅日子，可出現惡性拋售，然後又物極必反。股市係唔會長期停留响合理O（十二至十八倍），一定由偏高走向偏低（八至十二倍），然後又由偏低走向偏高（二十二倍或以上）。
同1997年唔同，當年美國經濟仍處繁榮期，亞洲各國貨幣貶值後，透過出口美國可重建經濟繁榮；今天連美國亦陷入衰退邊沿，如出現東歐金融風暴，真係唔知點樣打救？因為美國亦變成泥菩薩過江（自身難保）。美元滙價下跌大大打擊東歐各國出口能力，令收支赤字擴大，一旦守唔住而引發東歐金融風暴，咁就大件事。
自由經濟容易極端走向極端
政府只能為企業提供良好營商環境，卻不能隨意操控經濟。1990年日本政府唔可以，1998年香港特區政府唔可以，2007年美國政府唔可以，2008年馬英九亦唔可以。中國政府1949年成立之後花咗三十年時間，到1978年才宣布改革開放政策（有中國社會主義特色嘅市場經濟）。自由經濟嘅缺點係由一極端走向另一極端而引發泡沫，此乃避無可避嘅事，因為市場除由供求決定外，更加入心理因素，而貨幣政策及財政手段更容易將事物推向極端。
今天滬深三百指數跌4.23％，收3748.92。本周50天線已跌穿200天線；換言之，A股指數已有一隻腳跨入熊市。中石油A股已逼近發行價，中國太保更跌破發行價，係第一隻跌破發行價嘅新股；加上近日成交量不振，滬深A股牛市已於去年10月死亡。
雖然美國減息，但冰島加息1.25厘、至15厘去支持克朗；波蘭、羅馬尼亞亦宣布加息0.5厘，至9.5厘去支持列伊（Leu），仲有斯洛伐克、捷克、匈牙利、拉脫維亞、立陶苑、愛沙尼亞、土耳其等。呢D國家收支赤字大增，貨幣面對好大壓力。例如保加利亞及拉脫維亞收支赤字相等於GDP 20％，羅馬尼亞亦達14％。一旦全球流動性過剩情況改變，可引發「東歐金融風暴」（類似1997年7月亞洲金融風暴），出現貨幣大幅貶值！
高盛估計，中國A股可能延續去年由高點下跌超過30％嘅趨勢，估計今年上市公司純利平均升幅只有15-20％，而非分析員估計嘅31％。去年人行六次加息、今年兩次上調銀行存款準備金率，並可能進一步加息；加上2月份貿易順差較去年同期縮減64％及人民幣短期內將升穿「七算」（估計年底見6.3元人民幣兌1美元），大大削弱中國產品出口競爭力。美國需求減弱，如中國GDP增長率由去年嘅11.2％降至今年嘅8％，可引發A股一個大熊市。
外企紛紛逃離中國
馬英九希望中國大陸帶動台灣經濟復甦；反觀中國踏入今年卻面對「三缺四漲」局面（即缺乏勞工、缺電、缺地；油價漲、原料漲、工資漲及人民幣值漲），令勞動密集型外資企業加快轉移，但唔係流向中國中西部地區，而係流向越南、老撾、柬埔寨等東南亞國家。加工貿易工業外流，造成中國產業內迴圈「斷鏈」，因為高新科技亦需要加工貿易產品協助才能完成產業鏈。中國政府希望加工貿易內移，但外資卻在外移，因呢次中國政府冇向中西部地區提供優惠去吸引外資企業轉移。响「三缺四漲」壓力下，珠三角及長三角地區產業面對「斷鏈」嘅威脅。除上述威脅外，另加兩稅合一、出口退稅率下調、勞動合同法實施及環保條例加強，令唔少台商跑去越南、緬甸、印度等建廠。响2005至07年，台商喺越南第一大投資者！鎰勝電子科技（昆山）副董事長楊登輝話，三年前已投資越南，依家利潤率係中國嘅二點五倍，亦冇興趣到中國中西部投資。假設人民幣見6.3兌1美元，相信珠三角同長三角將出現大量倒閉潮。逃離中國嘅唔止台企，仲有港企同韓企；韓企更認為，中國勞動密集型企業已進入黃昏。
中國經濟嘅外在因素同內在因素都在惡化中。今天中國經濟抗衰退能力較1997年好許多，但出口佔中國GDP 36％，亦較1997年高許多。依家中國生產全球70％ T裇、60％記事簿、45％船隻；製造業方面投資佔中國固定資產投資31％，並間接影響道路、海港、電廠、工業邨等投資。製造業共聘用一億二千萬工人，佔城市就業人口50％（其中七千萬係低薪工人）。美國、歐盟及日本佔中國總出口60％。如中國出口增幅由去年20％降至今年10％，可令GDP升幅由 11.2％降至9％，投資者宜小心。
中國A股已陷入深幅調整，系統性風險驟增。著名經濟學家巴曙松話，中國股市系統性風險上升，迫切需要推出股指期貨等風險管理工具。外在因素係美國次按危機影響下，經濟出現明顯放緩迹象，令外貿需求大幅下降，意味中國出口升幅下降，令外需拉動經濟嘅增長方式面臨嚴峻挑戰。內需方面，一場雪災暴露出基礎建設及配套設施不足，加上CPI居高不下，緊縮政策為宏觀調控嘅主要旋律，响銀行收緊信貸下，引發上市公司向股市集資，改變股票供求關係。由於中國股市唔發達、唔靈活及唔完善，一旦面對外在及內在因素衝擊，所面對嘅風險較成熟市場大得多；再加上大小非流通股解禁，而且中國股市體系十分單一（唔容許拋空），亦冇有效嘅對沖工具（如期指），好容易出現系統性風險（例如狂升或暴跌）。
今天日經平均指數收12604點，較去年6月20日18297點下跌31.11％（今年至今下跌17.66％），已成為美國次按危機嘅第二大重災區！至去年12月止，日本三菱、瑞銀等六大銀行集團响美國次按貸款中損失超過5000億日圓，業內人士估計，至3月31日止財政季度結束，未來公布嘅損失將遠高於此。3月 24日官方公布2月份破產企業多達一千一百九十四家，涉及負債36萬億日圓，較去年同期上升8.3％及26.2％。滙豐銀行估計，今年第一季日本工業生產總值將較去年同期下降2.5％。
雖然今天金價反彈，只要唔高於1036美元仲係睇淡，並形成下降軌。唔好相信滯脹論，近期金價、糧食價、原油價到銅價上升，炒賣成分好高，此乃對沖基金嘅搵食行為，正利用聯儲局減息到2.25厘（有可能進一步減至1.75厘）嘅心理因素進行投機，小心狂升之後就係暴跌。所謂「彈散彈散」，唔反彈又點可以散？
東歐醞釀金融風暴
熊市一期反映嘅係投資者失望情緒，通常跌得快且急；熊市二期反映投資者冇晒希望，通常係上落市；熊市三期投資者進入絕望嘅日子，可出現惡性拋售，然後又物極必反。股市係唔會長期停留响合理O（十二至十八倍），一定由偏高走向偏低（八至十二倍），然後又由偏低走向偏高（二十二倍或以上）。
同1997年唔同，當年美國經濟仍處繁榮期，亞洲各國貨幣貶值後，透過出口美國可重建經濟繁榮；今天連美國亦陷入衰退邊沿，如出現東歐金融風暴，真係唔知點樣打救？因為美國亦變成泥菩薩過江（自身難保）。美元滙價下跌大大打擊東歐各國出口能力，令收支赤字擴大，一旦守唔住而引發東歐金融風暴，咁就大件事。
自由經濟容易極端走向極端
政府只能為企業提供良好營商環境，卻不能隨意操控經濟。1990年日本政府唔可以，1998年香港特區政府唔可以，2007年美國政府唔可以，2008年馬英九亦唔可以。中國政府1949年成立之後花咗三十年時間，到1978年才宣布改革開放政策（有中國社會主義特色嘅市場經濟）。自由經濟嘅缺點係由一極端走向另一極端而引發泡沫，此乃避無可避嘅事，因為市場除由供求決定外，更加入心理因素，而貨幣政策及財政手段更容易將事物推向極端。
今天滬深三百指數跌4.23％，收3748.92。本周50天線已跌穿200天線；換言之，A股指數已有一隻腳跨入熊市。中石油A股已逼近發行價，中國太保更跌破發行價，係第一隻跌破發行價嘅新股；加上近日成交量不振，滬深A股牛市已於去年10月死亡。
雖然美國減息，但冰島加息1.25厘、至15厘去支持克朗；波蘭、羅馬尼亞亦宣布加息0.5厘，至9.5厘去支持列伊（Leu），仲有斯洛伐克、捷克、匈牙利、拉脫維亞、立陶苑、愛沙尼亞、土耳其等。呢D國家收支赤字大增，貨幣面對好大壓力。例如保加利亞及拉脫維亞收支赤字相等於GDP 20％，羅馬尼亞亦達14％。一旦全球流動性過剩情況改變，可引發「東歐金融風暴」（類似1997年7月亞洲金融風暴），出現貨幣大幅貶值！
Improving on Value Investing Techniques
After reading a few books on value investing, I realized that my framework, though sound, was not water-proof enough in the sense that I did not have a quantitativ framework for computing the intrinsic value of companies. Though it is good to get a rough idea of a company's intrinsic value in terms of its customers, market share, margins, competitors etc., it will be even better still to follow this up with a proper framework and template for assessing a company, so as to make appropriate comparisons with other companies within the same industry or companies which may share the same ratio comparisons (e.g. same store sales growth standards). Such quantitative methods may seem tedious at first but they do add a useful dimension when assessing the suitability of a company for long-term investment.
While reading "Value Investing for Dummies" by Peter J. Sander and Janet Haley, I came across templates which the book advocated that value investors make use of, in order to enhance understanding of a company and also to have a more systematic approach to valuation. Thus far, I have been assessing companies based on many qualitative aspects as well as simple metrics such as margins, earnings growth and earnings per share. In order to constantly improve and grow as a value investor, one must incorporate new models or knowledge which will enhance his assessment of companies suitable for investment; and these templates and spreadsheets really do assist in giving me a better picture of various aspects of a company. I will just briefly list the key areas I wish to look into to give myself an added dimension, as I have yet to design my own customized template. Once I have the templates ready, I will proceed to use them in future posts to evaluate companies which I deem suitable and worth investigating.
First of all, the book talks about "running the numbers" in order to arrive at an intrinsic value computation. Essentially, this estimates the number of years of growth of the company at a certain rate, discounted using an appropriate discount rate. Suffice to say the worksheet is comprehensive enough to cover most aspects of the assumptions but the growth and discount rate assumptions are the most important in order to arrive at a conservative value. It is this conservative value which value investors seek to establish a margin of safety against. I will go into more detail in subsequent posts when I design the spreadsheet for this.
The next section talks about "Strategic Financials", which seeks to examine three aspects of a company - profitability, productivity and capital structure. Again, a template is provided for assessing these three key traits of a company using a 5-year comparison (to look for trends and to see if things are improving). It is a pretty rigorous exercise and it is not easy to fill in the numbers, but it definitely provides a lot of useful information about a company.
Finally, an ROE figure is computed based on these three aspects, and I will again provide more details of the ROE equation in a subsequent post.
The final section is the one without numbers, as it focuses on Strategic Intangibles. This area is the most difficult to ascertain and may be "grey" in certain instances due to subjective assessments of a company's brand power and management effectiveness. The characteristics given in the book which are evaluated include brand power, market share (and leadership), special competencies (if any), management effectiveness in terms of candour and independence, ownership, asset productivity and credit rating (less important factor). It will be extremely tedious to go through each and every one of these to obtain a "holistic" view of the company, thus even the book recommends skipping the less important and focusing on what makes the company worthwhile to consider. This is also the most interesting part of the analysis as it can provide insights into many qualitative aspects of a company which I frequently discuss on my blog.
Ultimately, these three aspects of analysis are just based on numbers and ratios. It is up to the astute value investors to MAKE SENSE of all the information and churn it into something useful and insightful. In a way, I have to admit that is the most difficult part of value investing - applying common sense and logic to a bunch of numbers and facts. But this is where the challenge comes in: if we do our homework properly and adopt a disciplined approach to investing, there is very little chance for failure and very little reason for losing money.
Phil Fisher's "Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits"
I managed to purchase this classic book from Phil Fisher which I had been eyeing for very long. Warren Buffett's style had evolved from being almost 100% Graham to being part Graham and part Fisher, which signifies the start of Buffett looking at businesses for the quality and intangibles instead of just plainly numbers. My investing style has long incorporated aspects of Phil Fisher's style in that he also enjoys talking to Management and also the company's stakeholders to get a more balanced view of the company outside of simply the numbers.
While reading "Value Investing for Dummies" by Peter J. Sander and Janet Haley, I came across templates which the book advocated that value investors make use of, in order to enhance understanding of a company and also to have a more systematic approach to valuation. Thus far, I have been assessing companies based on many qualitative aspects as well as simple metrics such as margins, earnings growth and earnings per share. In order to constantly improve and grow as a value investor, one must incorporate new models or knowledge which will enhance his assessment of companies suitable for investment; and these templates and spreadsheets really do assist in giving me a better picture of various aspects of a company. I will just briefly list the key areas I wish to look into to give myself an added dimension, as I have yet to design my own customized template. Once I have the templates ready, I will proceed to use them in future posts to evaluate companies which I deem suitable and worth investigating.
First of all, the book talks about "running the numbers" in order to arrive at an intrinsic value computation. Essentially, this estimates the number of years of growth of the company at a certain rate, discounted using an appropriate discount rate. Suffice to say the worksheet is comprehensive enough to cover most aspects of the assumptions but the growth and discount rate assumptions are the most important in order to arrive at a conservative value. It is this conservative value which value investors seek to establish a margin of safety against. I will go into more detail in subsequent posts when I design the spreadsheet for this.
The next section talks about "Strategic Financials", which seeks to examine three aspects of a company - profitability, productivity and capital structure. Again, a template is provided for assessing these three key traits of a company using a 5-year comparison (to look for trends and to see if things are improving). It is a pretty rigorous exercise and it is not easy to fill in the numbers, but it definitely provides a lot of useful information about a company.
Finally, an ROE figure is computed based on these three aspects, and I will again provide more details of the ROE equation in a subsequent post.
The final section is the one without numbers, as it focuses on Strategic Intangibles. This area is the most difficult to ascertain and may be "grey" in certain instances due to subjective assessments of a company's brand power and management effectiveness. The characteristics given in the book which are evaluated include brand power, market share (and leadership), special competencies (if any), management effectiveness in terms of candour and independence, ownership, asset productivity and credit rating (less important factor). It will be extremely tedious to go through each and every one of these to obtain a "holistic" view of the company, thus even the book recommends skipping the less important and focusing on what makes the company worthwhile to consider. This is also the most interesting part of the analysis as it can provide insights into many qualitative aspects of a company which I frequently discuss on my blog.
Ultimately, these three aspects of analysis are just based on numbers and ratios. It is up to the astute value investors to MAKE SENSE of all the information and churn it into something useful and insightful. In a way, I have to admit that is the most difficult part of value investing - applying common sense and logic to a bunch of numbers and facts. But this is where the challenge comes in: if we do our homework properly and adopt a disciplined approach to investing, there is very little chance for failure and very little reason for losing money.
Phil Fisher's "Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits"
I managed to purchase this classic book from Phil Fisher which I had been eyeing for very long. Warren Buffett's style had evolved from being almost 100% Graham to being part Graham and part Fisher, which signifies the start of Buffett looking at businesses for the quality and intangibles instead of just plainly numbers. My investing style has long incorporated aspects of Phil Fisher's style in that he also enjoys talking to Management and also the company's stakeholders to get a more balanced view of the company outside of simply the numbers.
Friday, March 28, 2008
STI- limited upside in the near term. Take profit
On Monday, we had issued a report indicating that the index will very likely stage the best rally since January 22 and potentially head uptowards 3140.
As of today, the index has already rallied to a high of 3057,with banks leading the way. We now lower our immediate target to 3070-3090as the range matches a trendline resistance and a fibonacci projection zone.
Additionally, we see no indication for either that a lasting bottom is in place or even a pattern indicating that the index has completed an initial corrective phase for both the STI and the HSI. Several stocks had registered some 20-30% gains in the past 4-5 trading days.
Our recommendation is to lock in some of these gains and switch into defensive stocks like SingTel, ST Engineering, SPH and SMRT or even into defensive shipping trusts.So long as the index fails to cross 3090, our working assumption is that the index is in a consolidation phase. As such a further decline towards the 2800 level cannot be ruled out.
As of today, the index has already rallied to a high of 3057,with banks leading the way. We now lower our immediate target to 3070-3090as the range matches a trendline resistance and a fibonacci projection zone.
Additionally, we see no indication for either that a lasting bottom is in place or even a pattern indicating that the index has completed an initial corrective phase for both the STI and the HSI. Several stocks had registered some 20-30% gains in the past 4-5 trading days.
Our recommendation is to lock in some of these gains and switch into defensive stocks like SingTel, ST Engineering, SPH and SMRT or even into defensive shipping trusts.So long as the index fails to cross 3090, our working assumption is that the index is in a consolidation phase. As such a further decline towards the 2800 level cannot be ruled out.
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