投资之道暗合太极图--盛极而衰，衰极而盛。"港股明灯"曹仁超深谙此道，把近40年来的致富之道一字以蔽之："势"，正是因为成功御"势"，他在港岛打下了2亿港元财富。"其中85%是我炒股赚来的。"4月23日，在北京丽晶酒店接受采访时老曹对《红周刊》记者说。那么，现在股市之"势"运行到哪个阶段？
A股走W，小牛可能被杀掉
《红周刊》：美股和港股已经进入了熊市二期，您判断A股目前处于什么阶段？
老曹：上证综指刚上穿了年线，按照这个理论A股牛市已经开始了。但是在港股和美股都还在熊市二期时，A股可不可以进入到牛市一期呢？我很怀疑。可能A股这波反弹行情只是"走势陷阱"，因为它是在中国政府4万亿的政策刺激下出现的。我担心两件事：一是如果A股市场很强，那么可以拉起香港乃至美国市场；二是糟糕的香港和美国市场将A股市场的估值再拉下来。
A股是否会与港股、美股分道扬镳？现在看来，美国和香港经济短期内不可能回升，仅有中国内地经济回暖，也不可能支撑A股进入真正的牛市。最后的结果可能是，A股这个小牛很轻易地就被美股和港股杀掉了。如果我的推测正确的话，那么A股市场的走势不是V形而是W形，2008年四季度已经有了第一个底，我想另一个底就在今年秋天。
《红周刊》：如果是这样的话，投资者应该采取怎样的操作策略？
老曹："half-glass water"，现在A股投资者面对的就是半杯开水，情况好不到哪里也坏不到哪里。所以，最好的策略就是"buy after dip, sell after peak"(跌了就买，涨了就卖)。这仅是一个交易机会，要不停地买进来卖出去。你可用W形思路去操作股票，如果在去年四季度买入的话，你不妨在今年4-5月份卖出，到今年秋天可以再买进来。市场会提供一个很好的投资机会，因为中国经济在全世界是好的，我相信今年秋天的第二个底部不会低于2008年11月。
《红周刊》：您在《论势》中说，2010年10月前中国将迎来下一个牛市，依据是什么？
老曹：美国牛市经历了百年繁荣后盛极而衰，而中国刚好相反，还是一个小BB，有钱的人刚刚跑步进入股市，把市场PE推高到了70多倍，这种疯狂的大牛市是任何股市走向成熟的必经过程，就像人年轻的时候，很乱很天真很疯狂。A股刚刚经历了一个少年张狂的时期，这个时期的指数图形类似于1973年的港股，1929年的美股，我一点都不陌生。不过经过这次疯狂后，从今年开始A股将成为一个更加成熟的市场。
判断熊市在明年10月前结束，是因为据我的经验，每个市场熊市一般不超过3年，香港在1974年时大约经历了12个月的熊市，美国1929年股灾时经历了28个月熊市。如果按这样算的话，A股熊市则很有可能在2010年上半年前结束。
太阳升起在中国
《红周刊》："有智慧不如趁势"浓缩了您40年的投资智慧，我们应该如何理解"势"？
老曹："势"是大气候，它不以人的主观愿望而改变。如果大气候向淡的话，不论你多么努力都难以改变命运，但是当大气候向好的时候，你就是不努力都可以赚钱。有人对我说曹先生，你很发达是因为你很聪明，错了！1967年我刚出来工作，香港经济形势很差，但是我赶上了之后30年的繁荣期，你就是瞎子也都可以赚到钱（老曹微闭双眼笑着说）。但是如果你1997年后工作，刚好赶上金融危机再怎么努力都是负资产，当你刚摆脱负资产时，雷曼兄弟又来了！大趋势对香港人都是不利的。
而从1978到2007年，中国经济"砰"的爆炸了！大陆不管炒股还是做生意只要奋斗都能赚钱。即使2008年股市大跌，放在长远的时间背景来看中国经济还是非常好的，A股也将进入一个稳定的市场，不会再跌的吓死人了。所以我要向全世界通告：if you want to make money ,please come to china, go east ！
太阳已经在东方升起来了！所有投资中国的人可能眼前吃亏，因为A股目前还看不到底部，但是从20~25年来看，当下投资的每一块钱在未来都会double，我有钱，我会投在你身上，因为你（记者）年轻，未来赚的钱一定比现在多，但是就不要投资在我身上，我今年60岁了，30年后我90岁了，投资在我身上钱可能会输光。
《红周刊》：但是就现在经济情况看，大家觉得日子很难捱。
老曹：中国经济正在痛苦转型。工业追逐的是"三低一高"，即土地成本低、工资低、税收低，流动人口高，30年后，这些因素慢慢地都消失了，你还想要点儿优惠？政府会说，先搞环保再说!工业生存的整个环境都改变了，很多企业都跑到印度等更有优势的国家，就像1980年时香港工业向珠三角转移那样。
但是赚了30年的钱后，内地的港口、金融、物流等服务业慢慢开启了，上海、深圳的港口收费比香港便宜，抢走了香港、台湾、韩国的生意。不过服务业的发展速度还是不能弥补工业快速下跌带来的负面影响，而工业对GDP的贡献约在4成，这将很难保证GDP保持从前的高速，今年一季度GDP同比增6.1%，我认为里面还是有水分的，可能里面有2~3个百分点是政府投资拉动的，GDP由高变低的过程很痛苦，这几年中国正是青黄不接的时候，但是将来是好的，关键是能不能捱过去。
避开命苦行业股票
《红周刊》：以上您都是说大气候，你也曾经对行业有过分析，看淡农业、零售类股票，还一再提醒投资者不要沾手金融股，原因是？
老曹：有些行业注定命苦，有"明星相"的农业企业少得很，我看不到有一个农夫发家致富的。我妈妈家是大地主，但是从5岁开始到20岁嫁到我家，衣服从来都有补丁的，不看好零售股因为门槛太低了，竞争得很厉害，无法长期保持高边际利润。只有你的零售店开得好，通过购并将竞争对手统统吃掉，才能做成美国的沃尔玛。但是今天呢？中国零售业还是群雄割据，还看不出谁最后会胜出。
不让沾手金融股是就中短线来说的，过去一年来不少国际银行变成了"僵尸银行"，政府敲打一下，才跳一跳，使得全球银行业前景看跌。过去汇丰银行多好啊，工商银行算老几？金融危机后不同了，汇丰投资美国亏损了，内地银行上去了！并且今天再买汇丰也失去了前30年那样的高成长了，而"六行三保"建设银行、招商银行、工商银行、中国银行、交通银行、中信银行、中国人寿、中国平安、中国财险却提供了同样的机会，银行股长线看好，但是短线会很辛苦。
《红周刊》：对"3W"（Where、When、What），您已经回答了前两个W，那么投资者交易哪只股票呢？再推荐一次吧？
老曹：我对A股不熟悉很难答复你，即使是对港股我熟悉的股票也不过50多家。在了解行业盛衰周期后，必须学习阅读上市公司年报，从一个小股东的角度去了解上市公司的情况，甚至把自己当成该公司的老板，去决定到底是该买还是该卖？
投资战，求之于势
《红周刊》：那谈谈大类资产配置吧，报道说您每月都会买一枚金币以备不虞。
老曹：我买金币是上世纪80年代的事情，已经全部获利回吐了。我现在不看好黄金，支撑金价的因素有：一是High-inflation（高通胀），二是Emergency Currency（金融危机时发行的支付手段）。这两样东西未来很难再发生了：美国的高通胀在上世纪70-80年代结束了，香港也在90年代结束了，而中国通胀2007年结束了。婴儿潮带来的消费繁荣过去了，美国人不消费了，而中国人想消费但是没有钱，所以很难再出现一个极高的通胀率了。
《红周刊》：上世纪70年代您投资房地产赚了大钱，现在您怎么看这个行业？
老曹：如果没有高通胀推动，美国房地产增长率为2.5%，你对这个数字满意的话，就可以买楼或者房地产股做只乌龟，因为这类资产很安全，而且一有风吹草动马上可以缩头。如果你中意做乌龟的话，OK，you may do it ,but stupid ！（你可以做，但是很笨）内地房地产还独有城市化这个推动力，所以相对外围来说，房地产或许还会慢慢上去。
《红周刊》：您也用了很多技术指标，最常用的是哪些？
老曹：我用的最多的技术指标是MACD、RSI、VIX，这些指标告诉我，投资大众什么时候疯狂什么时候害怕。250天移动均线决定了大趋势，也很重要。这些指标对整个大趋势的影响不大，假设你用这些指标分析走熊的日本股市还会犯大错。
《红周刊》：您也看基本面分析，两者怎么结合起来看？
老曹：技术分析和基本面分析就像李小龙把咏春拳和西洋拳合用，如果没有基本面分析去配合，你打出来拳很好看，但只是花拳绣腿，因为你身体差嘛！如果我身体好，打出来的拳又好，打你一拳你都要倒三天。很多中小投资者只看技术指标买卖股票往往失败，因为他们从来都不明白大趋势，也不了解买的股票是干什么的。这类投资者只能算作玩家，在股市里玩，是要输钱的。
后记：采访结束后，老曹再三提醒记者要执行止损，他1974年在恒指暴跌73%后入场抄底"和记"，亏了80%，只想跳海。后来他总结出"止损不止赚，加涨不加跌"，严格按照15%止损，一直活到了今天，且近40年财富增长了4万倍。老曹说，"巴菲特搭乘了美国1982年最后一班繁荣号顺风车，而现在'雪人'正在融化，他的长期持有策略不适合所有市场，任何时候投资者都应用止损保护自己的利益。"
Tuesday, April 28, 2009
是谁妨碍了你的投资致富？
股票投资致富其实道理非常简单，那就是用4毛钱的价格买到1元钱的好企业。由于买入的是那些价格很便宜、有竞争力和良好经济前景的优秀企业，所以发生投资亏损的可能性几乎为零。其实，这样的好企业就在你的身后，它们是那些在人们日常工作生活中能够接触到的企业。那么，这么简单的价值投资法为什么大部分的投资者都避而远之呢？
“股神”巴菲特50多年的投资成功已经证明了价值投资方法的有效性，中国内地的价值投资实践者们经过10多年的财富积累，身家过亿的也不在少数。但是另一个滑稽的现状是，至今鲜有成功案例的技术分析、趋势投资反而一直占据着证券投资的主体，那是因为投资者受到了很多误导而选择了错误的投资方法，下面就让我们看看究竟是谁在妨碍投资者选择正确的投资之路。
首先是证券公司。证券公司永远要高薪雇用大批证券分析师、研究员、经纪人，不厌其烦地点评股票，日复一日地重复着买入卖出建议，希望你的交易越频繁越好。他们不停地 “ 克隆 ” 着公司研究、评级报告，有时对于同一公司股票价格在10元时评级是买入，而跌倒5元时却是卖出，无论推荐正确与否，这都不影响他们永远辛勤、卖力地工作。也许在这背后有一个声音是永恒的：交易吧，我的朋友，你是我们的衣食父母！所以站在证券公司的立场上，他们当然最不欢迎也不能接受价值投资法，当然不希望每个投资人都信奉巴菲特式的价值投资，因为价值投资法的换手率通常是非常低的，而且可能持有股票长达多年。所以如果市场上都是价值投资者，恐怕很多券商都会亏损甚至倒闭。
其次是那些技术分析派在不断地侵吞你的财富。很多人只要提到股票就会想到盯盘和看K线图，如果不去做这些似乎根本就不是作股票投资。是他们让刚入市的新手错误地认为只要掌握了技术分析技巧，就可以很轻松地抓到涨停板。因为一个无可争议的事实是无论大盘涨与跌，每天几乎都有股票涨停。所以在这种看似“无懈可击”的事实面前，几乎很少有人不向技术分析派“屈服”。所以，很多技术派便以短线稳定获利为诱饵，让很多投资人相信短线是可以持续赚钱的。靠技术分析来赚钱，我只能说一定非常具有偶然性，绝对没有必然性和确定性，因为技术分析的数据只能代表过去的交易行为和历史，不能代表未来，因而你不可能每次都赢。而且，很明显的历史证据是没有一个技术分析派能够在证券市场上长期存活下来。
“随大流”思想成为投资股票的严重心理束缚。在商业领域，如果要想赚大钱，那么一定要做别人没做过的事情。如果别人做什么你也去做，那么表面上看似乎你的风险很低，但实际上你只能是一个跟随者，跟随的结果只能“喝汤”，甚至会“饿死”。这种规律在投资领域一样有效，这就是我们常说的“羊群效应”。投资者只有确确实实地看到股市已经具备了上涨的大趋势，或者在股市赚钱的神话不断上演的时候，他才开始买股票，而且自己还觉得这样风险会低一些，而最终结果是买入价格恰好是在高估区域，花费5元钱买到了只值1元钱的东西，怎么可能不亏损呢？具备这种投资思路和做事习惯的人，基本上不可能靠投资股票致富的。著名哲学导师卡耐基曾说：要想改变你的行为首先从思想开始。
金融衍生产品实际上为你提供的不是致富机会而是陷阱。虽然中国股市除了权证之外目前还没有推出那些眼花缭乱、富有魅力的交易品种（如股指期货），但是这只是时间早晚的问题。这些交易品种不具备 “ 创造价值 ” 的特点，完全是一个博弈的市场，即零和游戏。个人投资者在这场高风险的 “ 赌博游戏 ” 中面对强大的竞争对手（业内专业人士）很少会有赢家。
总而言之，世界上唯有价值投资法可以为投资人持续创造财富，而且它是我们最容易理解和掌握的方法。价值投资法是唯一能够投资成功的方法。投资人在通向正确的致富道路上，面对如此多的障碍和陷阱，只有做到保持理性和独立思考，真正的理解股票投资的本质才可能找到属于自己的致富之路！
“股神”巴菲特50多年的投资成功已经证明了价值投资方法的有效性，中国内地的价值投资实践者们经过10多年的财富积累，身家过亿的也不在少数。但是另一个滑稽的现状是，至今鲜有成功案例的技术分析、趋势投资反而一直占据着证券投资的主体，那是因为投资者受到了很多误导而选择了错误的投资方法，下面就让我们看看究竟是谁在妨碍投资者选择正确的投资之路。
首先是证券公司。证券公司永远要高薪雇用大批证券分析师、研究员、经纪人，不厌其烦地点评股票，日复一日地重复着买入卖出建议，希望你的交易越频繁越好。他们不停地 “ 克隆 ” 着公司研究、评级报告，有时对于同一公司股票价格在10元时评级是买入，而跌倒5元时却是卖出，无论推荐正确与否，这都不影响他们永远辛勤、卖力地工作。也许在这背后有一个声音是永恒的：交易吧，我的朋友，你是我们的衣食父母！所以站在证券公司的立场上，他们当然最不欢迎也不能接受价值投资法，当然不希望每个投资人都信奉巴菲特式的价值投资，因为价值投资法的换手率通常是非常低的，而且可能持有股票长达多年。所以如果市场上都是价值投资者，恐怕很多券商都会亏损甚至倒闭。
其次是那些技术分析派在不断地侵吞你的财富。很多人只要提到股票就会想到盯盘和看K线图，如果不去做这些似乎根本就不是作股票投资。是他们让刚入市的新手错误地认为只要掌握了技术分析技巧，就可以很轻松地抓到涨停板。因为一个无可争议的事实是无论大盘涨与跌，每天几乎都有股票涨停。所以在这种看似“无懈可击”的事实面前，几乎很少有人不向技术分析派“屈服”。所以，很多技术派便以短线稳定获利为诱饵，让很多投资人相信短线是可以持续赚钱的。靠技术分析来赚钱，我只能说一定非常具有偶然性，绝对没有必然性和确定性，因为技术分析的数据只能代表过去的交易行为和历史，不能代表未来，因而你不可能每次都赢。而且，很明显的历史证据是没有一个技术分析派能够在证券市场上长期存活下来。
“随大流”思想成为投资股票的严重心理束缚。在商业领域，如果要想赚大钱，那么一定要做别人没做过的事情。如果别人做什么你也去做，那么表面上看似乎你的风险很低，但实际上你只能是一个跟随者，跟随的结果只能“喝汤”，甚至会“饿死”。这种规律在投资领域一样有效，这就是我们常说的“羊群效应”。投资者只有确确实实地看到股市已经具备了上涨的大趋势，或者在股市赚钱的神话不断上演的时候，他才开始买股票，而且自己还觉得这样风险会低一些，而最终结果是买入价格恰好是在高估区域，花费5元钱买到了只值1元钱的东西，怎么可能不亏损呢？具备这种投资思路和做事习惯的人，基本上不可能靠投资股票致富的。著名哲学导师卡耐基曾说：要想改变你的行为首先从思想开始。
金融衍生产品实际上为你提供的不是致富机会而是陷阱。虽然中国股市除了权证之外目前还没有推出那些眼花缭乱、富有魅力的交易品种（如股指期货），但是这只是时间早晚的问题。这些交易品种不具备 “ 创造价值 ” 的特点，完全是一个博弈的市场，即零和游戏。个人投资者在这场高风险的 “ 赌博游戏 ” 中面对强大的竞争对手（业内专业人士）很少会有赢家。
总而言之，世界上唯有价值投资法可以为投资人持续创造财富，而且它是我们最容易理解和掌握的方法。价值投资法是唯一能够投资成功的方法。投资人在通向正确的致富道路上，面对如此多的障碍和陷阱，只有做到保持理性和独立思考，真正的理解股票投资的本质才可能找到属于自己的致富之路！
Saturday, April 25, 2009
价值投资者的思路3：短、长期的矛盾是获利的关键
前面我们已经说了，价值投资就是捡便宜。怎么捡呢？天下没有免费的午餐，我们不可能在大街上捡到钱，我们也不可能随随便便就在股市上捡到钱。
我们捡便宜的理论基础是：市场的注意力经常集中在短期，按短期的收益给公司定价，但公司价值大部分是未来长期现金流决定的。这两者的性质非常不同，经常没有什么联系，且往往有一个很大的差距，当差距足够大时，价值投资者的获利空间就来了。
捡便宜和长期是价值投资者的2个核心词汇。
我们来看一个例子。
沃尔玛1970年上市到现在，股价涨了3000倍！我认为沃尔玛是比巴菲特还伟大的公司（暂且按下不表）。显然，市场是按短期收益给沃尔玛定价的，因为如果市场在1970，1980，1990，2000年就预计到了沃尔玛今天的庞大规模，那么在1970，1980，1990，2000年，沃尔玛的股价就不会这么低了。沃尔玛的股价就不可能涨这么多了。在这里，关键是要认识到沃尔玛的强大扩张能力，也就是沃尔玛未来产生庞大现金流的能力,远远超出短期收益的能力。
我们再看一个相反的例子，招商地产，在2007年11月1日达到最高峰102块，08年7月30日的收盘价是16.5，复权价是24.75元。一年不到，股价下跌了75％。解释就是在去年房地产的狂热时期，市场认为房地产会一直热下去，未来的现金流也会象07年一样高，而造成股价的高估。08年房地产降温，市场终于清醒了，又开始用08年的现金流来代替未来的现金流了。
当我们考虑成长股的估值时，沃尔玛和招商地产是很好的例子。
先在这里总结一下价值投资者的行为模式。当然对价值投资已有很多的阐述，再总结是试图把事情说得更清楚，有了以上讨论的基础，希望能做到。
价值投资者关注基本面 —— 为了捡便宜，当然需要搞清楚东西值多少钱，基本面分析是根本。
价值投资者追求安全边际 —— 同上，捡便宜是价值投资者的中心任务，为的是主动。
价值投资者往往是长期投资者 —— 公司短、长期的估值矛盾是获利的来源，所以价值投资者要长期等待市场认识到公司的真正价值。但如果市场迅速认识到，价值投资者也是短期投资者。
价值投资者不害怕股价下跌 —— 如果花40块买了值80块的东西，现在掉到30块，那就等嘛，不急。
价值投资者对宏观经济不敏感 —— 公司的价值来源于长期，短期的经济形势影响不大。
价值投资者强调能力范围－－搞清公司的长期收益不容易，所以只能集中力量在少部分自己把握大的公司。
价值投资者逆风飞行 —— 在大家都恐惧时，公司的长期价值并不受影响，大把便宜货，买入。
我们捡便宜的理论基础是：市场的注意力经常集中在短期，按短期的收益给公司定价，但公司价值大部分是未来长期现金流决定的。这两者的性质非常不同，经常没有什么联系，且往往有一个很大的差距，当差距足够大时，价值投资者的获利空间就来了。
捡便宜和长期是价值投资者的2个核心词汇。
我们来看一个例子。
沃尔玛1970年上市到现在，股价涨了3000倍！我认为沃尔玛是比巴菲特还伟大的公司（暂且按下不表）。显然，市场是按短期收益给沃尔玛定价的，因为如果市场在1970，1980，1990，2000年就预计到了沃尔玛今天的庞大规模，那么在1970，1980，1990，2000年，沃尔玛的股价就不会这么低了。沃尔玛的股价就不可能涨这么多了。在这里，关键是要认识到沃尔玛的强大扩张能力，也就是沃尔玛未来产生庞大现金流的能力,远远超出短期收益的能力。
我们再看一个相反的例子，招商地产，在2007年11月1日达到最高峰102块，08年7月30日的收盘价是16.5，复权价是24.75元。一年不到，股价下跌了75％。解释就是在去年房地产的狂热时期，市场认为房地产会一直热下去，未来的现金流也会象07年一样高，而造成股价的高估。08年房地产降温，市场终于清醒了，又开始用08年的现金流来代替未来的现金流了。
当我们考虑成长股的估值时，沃尔玛和招商地产是很好的例子。
先在这里总结一下价值投资者的行为模式。当然对价值投资已有很多的阐述，再总结是试图把事情说得更清楚，有了以上讨论的基础，希望能做到。
价值投资者关注基本面 —— 为了捡便宜，当然需要搞清楚东西值多少钱，基本面分析是根本。
价值投资者追求安全边际 —— 同上，捡便宜是价值投资者的中心任务，为的是主动。
价值投资者往往是长期投资者 —— 公司短、长期的估值矛盾是获利的来源，所以价值投资者要长期等待市场认识到公司的真正价值。但如果市场迅速认识到，价值投资者也是短期投资者。
价值投资者不害怕股价下跌 —— 如果花40块买了值80块的东西，现在掉到30块，那就等嘛，不急。
价值投资者对宏观经济不敏感 —— 公司的价值来源于长期，短期的经济形势影响不大。
价值投资者强调能力范围－－搞清公司的长期收益不容易，所以只能集中力量在少部分自己把握大的公司。
价值投资者逆风飞行 —— 在大家都恐惧时，公司的长期价值并不受影响，大把便宜货，买入。
中级调整或已开始
本周大盘整体呈现冲高回落，先扬后抑之势。周一大盘在做多热点共同烘托下，拉出中阳。周二受美股大跌影响，大盘低开，但多头仍顽强地将抵住作空盘的抛压，收出低开阳线。但周三，在指标突然整体拉升下，大盘创出新高后，抛盘开始逐步加大。随后振荡下行，午市后，跌势加剧，于此同时，市场抛压骤然放大，汹涌的抛盘使得股指当日拉出近一个月以来最大的放量阴线。周四，周五小幅反弹。纵观全周，多空转换十分明显，多头力量随着股指的逐步走高，天平又过去多方占优逐步向空方倾斜。盘中虽然不时有个股表现，但多数是补涨类品种，脉冲式的突然启动，持续性又不佳以及前期多数强势热点开始大幅走低使得本周操作难度加大。券商、地产、有色等板块表现疲弱，银行板块多数蛰伏不动。而通信电子、水泥建材以及汽车板块。农业板块，家电表现相对较强。同时一些题材股，如核电中的部分品种也有表现。总体观察，本周多空分歧十分明显，股指振荡加剧，最终，空方取胜，大盘收阴。
仅仅从大盘走势来看，一根大阴后缀两个小阳小阴，属于下跌抵抗型，还是属于止跌型，有待下周一确认。一般来说，若下周一多方仍无力拉起大盘，则要警觉大盘出现进一步下行,若出现再度回升，也并不意味着警报解除，毕竟再上的空间实在不大。即使后面再创新高，也难以成为市场再起一轮行情的信号。
笔者倾向于目前属于下跌抵抗，这样，问题的关键不是跌不跌，而是跌多少的问题,抑或形成中级调整。如果仅仅是一次技术性调整，则理论上大盘跌幅不应该超过10％，（昨日和今日合计调整幅度最大已经达到6％。）从沪市点位来说也就是2310点附近。但如果大盘跌幅超过10％，即跌破2310点，则后市调整性质就不是简单的技术性调整。而应该归为中级调整。
目前有没有中级调整的理由呢？因为此次大盘强力反弹，属于依托国家经济刺激政策，利用信贷大投放的资金流通性宽裕而出现的“资金推动型”行情。这种行情的特点就是不管三七二十一，只要是个“票”，就被大炒，讲故事的多于讲业绩的。谈预期的大于谈实际的。但任何故事都有讲完的时候，如果故事后面并没有实际业绩支撑，留下的必定是一片残垣断壁。这是其一。
其二是估值压力和安全边际问题。整体估值压力两市按照静态市盈率如果剔除银行板块的话，已经30倍，动态市盈率既是将银行板块加上也超过30倍。安全边际几乎已经丧失。
第三，宏观经济数据虽然好于预期，但微观企业步履艰难的状况仍未改观。.虽然国家推出了出了4万亿刺激经济计划，但结构性问题不仅没有及时改善，却出现反向迹象，消费抑制越来越明显，内需拉动并不是有效的。出口的下降需要全球经济好转，但存在的一个问题是美国人开始转变过去那种“寅吃卯粮”的生活方式，那么我国外贸既是出口回升也难以达到过往几年的水平。外贸回升艰难，内需启而不动，整个中下游企业（不仅包括出口企业），都面临着产能过剩和利润下降，持续时间远远不是一年就能解决问题的。
第四 ，持续增加的M2到M1。由于市场总市值的变化，增量货币带来的边际效应越来越低。而且可以预期的是随后信贷资金不可能保持一季度那种“狂放”状况，逐步减低将成为事实。也许4，5月信贷仍可以保证，但是再往后呢？退一步将，既是信贷有保障，但信贷只能维持企业现金流，不能保证企业利润，无法消灭过剩产能。
第五，虽然市场试图将昨日下跌归为所谓的“IPO”重启以及信贷资金的收缩。但笔者并不认同此类说法，昨日市况是下跌后，人们开始找利空。找到诸如信贷收缩，重启IPO等，但实际上是下跌先，“利空”后，所以，属于市场自身需要调整。而这种调整往往具有持续性。
第六，从技术角度来看，大盘日线运行轨迹，从3月3日开始构建了一个较为陡峭的上升楔形，其三段结构十分清晰。按照楔形特点“从那来到那去”（3月3日起步位置在2037点。），谨慎一点不为过。同时从分时大盘形态来看（30分钟，60分钟），构筑的“喇叭形态”，其杀伤力也不能小觑。
总之，虽然我们还不能完全断定，此次大盘调整属于中级别调整，毕竟目前政策还在支撑市场，资金的流动性依然宽裕。但我们可以循着市场的运行轨迹，动态把握。一般来说，此次急速下跌后，如果是技术性的，则经过反弹后再跌，就不能再创第一次下跌低点。框定下限位置不能低于2310点。反之，将形成A－B－C三段结构型调整。目标将直指2050点。
总之,从估值压力和动力系统指标的表现看，下周大盘继续调整的概率偏大。
仅仅从大盘走势来看，一根大阴后缀两个小阳小阴，属于下跌抵抗型，还是属于止跌型，有待下周一确认。一般来说，若下周一多方仍无力拉起大盘，则要警觉大盘出现进一步下行,若出现再度回升，也并不意味着警报解除，毕竟再上的空间实在不大。即使后面再创新高，也难以成为市场再起一轮行情的信号。
笔者倾向于目前属于下跌抵抗，这样，问题的关键不是跌不跌，而是跌多少的问题,抑或形成中级调整。如果仅仅是一次技术性调整，则理论上大盘跌幅不应该超过10％，（昨日和今日合计调整幅度最大已经达到6％。）从沪市点位来说也就是2310点附近。但如果大盘跌幅超过10％，即跌破2310点，则后市调整性质就不是简单的技术性调整。而应该归为中级调整。
目前有没有中级调整的理由呢？因为此次大盘强力反弹，属于依托国家经济刺激政策，利用信贷大投放的资金流通性宽裕而出现的“资金推动型”行情。这种行情的特点就是不管三七二十一，只要是个“票”，就被大炒，讲故事的多于讲业绩的。谈预期的大于谈实际的。但任何故事都有讲完的时候，如果故事后面并没有实际业绩支撑，留下的必定是一片残垣断壁。这是其一。
其二是估值压力和安全边际问题。整体估值压力两市按照静态市盈率如果剔除银行板块的话，已经30倍，动态市盈率既是将银行板块加上也超过30倍。安全边际几乎已经丧失。
第三，宏观经济数据虽然好于预期，但微观企业步履艰难的状况仍未改观。.虽然国家推出了出了4万亿刺激经济计划，但结构性问题不仅没有及时改善，却出现反向迹象，消费抑制越来越明显，内需拉动并不是有效的。出口的下降需要全球经济好转，但存在的一个问题是美国人开始转变过去那种“寅吃卯粮”的生活方式，那么我国外贸既是出口回升也难以达到过往几年的水平。外贸回升艰难，内需启而不动，整个中下游企业（不仅包括出口企业），都面临着产能过剩和利润下降，持续时间远远不是一年就能解决问题的。
第四 ，持续增加的M2到M1。由于市场总市值的变化，增量货币带来的边际效应越来越低。而且可以预期的是随后信贷资金不可能保持一季度那种“狂放”状况，逐步减低将成为事实。也许4，5月信贷仍可以保证，但是再往后呢？退一步将，既是信贷有保障，但信贷只能维持企业现金流，不能保证企业利润，无法消灭过剩产能。
第五，虽然市场试图将昨日下跌归为所谓的“IPO”重启以及信贷资金的收缩。但笔者并不认同此类说法，昨日市况是下跌后，人们开始找利空。找到诸如信贷收缩，重启IPO等，但实际上是下跌先，“利空”后，所以，属于市场自身需要调整。而这种调整往往具有持续性。
第六，从技术角度来看，大盘日线运行轨迹，从3月3日开始构建了一个较为陡峭的上升楔形，其三段结构十分清晰。按照楔形特点“从那来到那去”（3月3日起步位置在2037点。），谨慎一点不为过。同时从分时大盘形态来看（30分钟，60分钟），构筑的“喇叭形态”，其杀伤力也不能小觑。
总之，虽然我们还不能完全断定，此次大盘调整属于中级别调整，毕竟目前政策还在支撑市场，资金的流动性依然宽裕。但我们可以循着市场的运行轨迹，动态把握。一般来说，此次急速下跌后，如果是技术性的，则经过反弹后再跌，就不能再创第一次下跌低点。框定下限位置不能低于2310点。反之，将形成A－B－C三段结构型调整。目标将直指2050点。
总之,从估值压力和动力系统指标的表现看，下周大盘继续调整的概率偏大。
现金仍然为王
全球股市在过去的几个月里出现了剧烈反弹—平均上涨了20%到30%。那些此前利润直线下滑的公司们，如今开始向外界传达对于未来的信心—当然，也就意味着投资者应该给他们更多的资金支持。不过我的建议是，暂时还是握紧你的现金，因为这只是一场回光返照。全球市场正在经历一轮绵延的熊市，这种形势将至少持续到2010年。如果政策制定者们将自己的注意力集中在几种刺激手段而不是改革重组上，萧条可能还会持续更长时间。
现金仍然为王。也许将来有一天，现金会由于央行们疯狂开动印钞机而变得不安全，那时候你会愿意将现金换成石油、黄金等资产。但在这样恶性通胀的情况发生之前，现金仍是安全的。
下挫的股市、房地产市场和大宗商品市场已经将很多人踢出了富豪俱乐部，但聪明的投资者在更早的时候就抽身而出，现在握有充裕的现金。在蛰伏数月之后，这些人渴望采取些行动。不过，那些难以按捺投资冲动的人们很可能在市场的反复中遭到损失。这种熊市中的反弹在接下来两年中还会出现很多次，而这会伤及那些此前躲过下跌行情的投资者。现在的股票市场已经变成现金碎纸机。
绝大部分天真的投资者仍然将股市看作财富的源泉，认为大跌之后总是伴随着买入的机会。但实际上，这样的美妙回忆恰恰成为引诱不谨慎的投资者重新入市的鸦片。过去三十年的股票市场发展，只能当作一种例外情况来考虑，而并不是常态。即使是巴菲特，也只不过是幸运地赶上了这个好时候。美国的上一次熊市持续了整整十年；日本股市如今的表现比25年前还要糟糕；韩国的股市也低于20年前。如果你相信长期而言股票市场为你创造财富，你得首先确保自己能活足够长的时间。
美国和欧洲已经陷入20年前在日本和韩国发生过的结构性熊市之中，原因有二：第一，对于之前过度消费型经济的纠偏将使经济增长持续低迷，因此可以预期经济总量在未来不会迅速变大；第二，还有诸如老龄化社会等更加紧迫的问题需要处理。
美国的银行业救助计划是本轮反弹的催化剂，而与前任财长鲍尔森相较，现在的政策并没有任何值得注意的不同之处。市场之所以出现了不同的反应，是因为此前的恐慌情绪已经持续了太长时间，市场心态已经调整到可以将这种计划向积极方面解读了。
美联储将斥资1.15万亿美元购买由政府担保的债券这一决定成为导致市场乐观主义的另一原因。它们的主要目的是保持抵押贷款的低利率，以稳定美国住房市场。但是，增发货币来保持利率低位只能在很短的时间内奏效，而最终则会导致美元崩溃。
本质上，美国正在依靠财政泡沫来保证经济的活力。正如IT、住房和抵押债券市场曾经发生过的事情一样，美元的泡沫也终将破灭。我认为美国资产的价格将随着财政泡沫的破灭而最终落入谷底，或许是在2010年。
过去二十年的市场经验告诉投资者，应该趁市场看起来将要触底的时候买入，因为此时通常伴随着一个V字反转的行情。但是如果你认为现在也会如此，那就犯了一个大错：此刻不会有V字型的复苏，甚至很可能不会有恢复行情。市场和经济将在谷底运行数年。而下次牛市的唯一希望，可能是中国拾起美国丢失的地位。中国有着将可以领导全球的经济规模和发展速度。但中国也必须改变其以出口和投资为导向的经济模式，并采取三项改革措施：
1.放开人民币汇率控制，开放资本账户并将所得税降至目前的25%的水平。这些措施将吸引全球的富豪和天才们来到中国，上海将成为超过伦敦和纽约的全球金融中心。
2.将政府所持有的国有股票还富于民。这一措施的首要影响是能够创造5000亿人民币的居民消费，并进一步促进经济的良性运行。
3.设计25座超大城市，每个能容纳3000万人口。这些城市将被允许自行发债以支持其发展，这样，这些城市就能将住房价格维持在低位，并借此吸引购买者。同时，政府应该设立相应的抵押贷款方案让城市的建造者—农民工能够买得起自己建造的住宅。
中国拥有在20年之内变成一个发达国家的巨大潜力。下一个牛市也将来临，但催化剂不是华盛顿正在采取的那些措施，而是中国。
现金仍然为王。也许将来有一天，现金会由于央行们疯狂开动印钞机而变得不安全，那时候你会愿意将现金换成石油、黄金等资产。但在这样恶性通胀的情况发生之前，现金仍是安全的。
下挫的股市、房地产市场和大宗商品市场已经将很多人踢出了富豪俱乐部，但聪明的投资者在更早的时候就抽身而出，现在握有充裕的现金。在蛰伏数月之后，这些人渴望采取些行动。不过，那些难以按捺投资冲动的人们很可能在市场的反复中遭到损失。这种熊市中的反弹在接下来两年中还会出现很多次，而这会伤及那些此前躲过下跌行情的投资者。现在的股票市场已经变成现金碎纸机。
绝大部分天真的投资者仍然将股市看作财富的源泉，认为大跌之后总是伴随着买入的机会。但实际上，这样的美妙回忆恰恰成为引诱不谨慎的投资者重新入市的鸦片。过去三十年的股票市场发展，只能当作一种例外情况来考虑，而并不是常态。即使是巴菲特，也只不过是幸运地赶上了这个好时候。美国的上一次熊市持续了整整十年；日本股市如今的表现比25年前还要糟糕；韩国的股市也低于20年前。如果你相信长期而言股票市场为你创造财富，你得首先确保自己能活足够长的时间。
美国和欧洲已经陷入20年前在日本和韩国发生过的结构性熊市之中，原因有二：第一，对于之前过度消费型经济的纠偏将使经济增长持续低迷，因此可以预期经济总量在未来不会迅速变大；第二，还有诸如老龄化社会等更加紧迫的问题需要处理。
美国的银行业救助计划是本轮反弹的催化剂，而与前任财长鲍尔森相较，现在的政策并没有任何值得注意的不同之处。市场之所以出现了不同的反应，是因为此前的恐慌情绪已经持续了太长时间，市场心态已经调整到可以将这种计划向积极方面解读了。
美联储将斥资1.15万亿美元购买由政府担保的债券这一决定成为导致市场乐观主义的另一原因。它们的主要目的是保持抵押贷款的低利率，以稳定美国住房市场。但是，增发货币来保持利率低位只能在很短的时间内奏效，而最终则会导致美元崩溃。
本质上，美国正在依靠财政泡沫来保证经济的活力。正如IT、住房和抵押债券市场曾经发生过的事情一样，美元的泡沫也终将破灭。我认为美国资产的价格将随着财政泡沫的破灭而最终落入谷底，或许是在2010年。
过去二十年的市场经验告诉投资者，应该趁市场看起来将要触底的时候买入，因为此时通常伴随着一个V字反转的行情。但是如果你认为现在也会如此，那就犯了一个大错：此刻不会有V字型的复苏，甚至很可能不会有恢复行情。市场和经济将在谷底运行数年。而下次牛市的唯一希望，可能是中国拾起美国丢失的地位。中国有着将可以领导全球的经济规模和发展速度。但中国也必须改变其以出口和投资为导向的经济模式，并采取三项改革措施：
1.放开人民币汇率控制，开放资本账户并将所得税降至目前的25%的水平。这些措施将吸引全球的富豪和天才们来到中国，上海将成为超过伦敦和纽约的全球金融中心。
2.将政府所持有的国有股票还富于民。这一措施的首要影响是能够创造5000亿人民币的居民消费，并进一步促进经济的良性运行。
3.设计25座超大城市，每个能容纳3000万人口。这些城市将被允许自行发债以支持其发展，这样，这些城市就能将住房价格维持在低位，并借此吸引购买者。同时，政府应该设立相应的抵押贷款方案让城市的建造者—农民工能够买得起自己建造的住宅。
中国拥有在20年之内变成一个发达国家的巨大潜力。下一个牛市也将来临，但催化剂不是华盛顿正在采取的那些措施，而是中国。
Thursday, April 23, 2009
Forget About Inflation... It's Deflation You Should Worry About
A consensus has formed that the government's massive money printing and debt-powered spending binge will soon destroy the destroy the dollar, crippling the remaining savings of anyone dumb enough not to buy "real" assets--like gold.
John Mauldin, president of Millennium Wave Advisors, thinks that's ridiculous. He's also author of the popular e-letter, "Thoughts from the Frontline."
The Fed is printing money, Mauldin says, but overall credit is being destroyed. The government is desperately trying to bring back inflation, so we can lessen the real burden of our huge debts, but this will take a year or two at best.
So in the meantime, Mauldin says, ignore the gold bugs. They've been wrong for 25 years and they'll keep on being wrong for the foreseeable future.
John Mauldin, president of Millennium Wave Advisors, thinks that's ridiculous. He's also author of the popular e-letter, "Thoughts from the Frontline."
The Fed is printing money, Mauldin says, but overall credit is being destroyed. The government is desperately trying to bring back inflation, so we can lessen the real burden of our huge debts, but this will take a year or two at best.
So in the meantime, Mauldin says, ignore the gold bugs. They've been wrong for 25 years and they'll keep on being wrong for the foreseeable future.
Mauldin: Don't Trust the Rally, But Don't Short, Either
In the past few weeks, as stocks have charged almost 30 percent higher, a consensus has emerged that this is the start of a great new bull market.
Stocks always rally six months ahead of the economy, this chorus goes. Today's "green shoots" of good news will soon bloom into a full-blown economic recovery.
So buy now while you still can!
Or not.
Our guest John Mauldin, president of Millennium Wave Advisors, thinks the "great new bull market" theory is. A bunch of baloney. We're not getting out of this mess so fast, he says. The idea that stocks always bottom six months before a recovery is a myth (he's right). And he'll believe it's a new bull market when he finally sees some progress on corporate earnings.
But won't that be too late to buy?
No, says Mauldin, also author of the popular e-letter, "Thoughts from the Frontline." The great bull markets last for decades, so you'll have plenty of time. Those who bought at "the bottom" in 1974 had to suffer through the rest of the 1970s. So stop sitting on the edge of your seat waiting for that perfect moment to buy and just remain cautious for a while.
And that's the key: Mauldin isn't comfortable shorting now, either. He says the environment is too unpredictable. We all must wait and see what "the new normal" turns out to be.
Stocks always rally six months ahead of the economy, this chorus goes. Today's "green shoots" of good news will soon bloom into a full-blown economic recovery.
So buy now while you still can!
Or not.
Our guest John Mauldin, president of Millennium Wave Advisors, thinks the "great new bull market" theory is. A bunch of baloney. We're not getting out of this mess so fast, he says. The idea that stocks always bottom six months before a recovery is a myth (he's right). And he'll believe it's a new bull market when he finally sees some progress on corporate earnings.
But won't that be too late to buy?
No, says Mauldin, also author of the popular e-letter, "Thoughts from the Frontline." The great bull markets last for decades, so you'll have plenty of time. Those who bought at "the bottom" in 1974 had to suffer through the rest of the 1970s. So stop sitting on the edge of your seat waiting for that perfect moment to buy and just remain cautious for a while.
And that's the key: Mauldin isn't comfortable shorting now, either. He says the environment is too unpredictable. We all must wait and see what "the new normal" turns out to be.
Monday, April 20, 2009
无为而治的罗杰斯
“无为而治”是中国道家创始人老子的核心思想，该观点告诫人们不要妄为，而要顺应客观形态，尊重自然规律。在两千多年后的今天，一位西方人在投资领域把无为思想发挥得淋漓尽致，他就是被誉为最富远见的国际投资家——吉姆·罗杰斯。
1968年，吉姆·罗杰斯怀揣600美元独闯华尔街；1970年，他与世界金融巨头索罗斯共同组建“量子基金" ，投资回报率一度高达4000%。1980年，37岁的罗杰斯出人意料地与索罗斯分道扬镳，坐拥1400万美元的他开始了全新的环球投资生涯，投资足迹遍布葡萄牙、奥地利、巴西、中国等十多个国家。人们一定以为这位大师具有非凡的投资觉悟，然而他却如此告诫投资者：“投资的法则之一是袖手旁观，除非真有重大事情发生。大部分的投资人总喜欢进进出出，找些事情做，而我更愿意坐下来等待大势的自然发展。”
罗杰斯最值得炫耀的一笔投资应该是1982年买进西德股票，之后他既不要分析报告，也不看最新评论，甚至连成交价都置若罔闻，并说:“假如告诉我成交价，我只要看到股价上涨两倍或三倍，就可能想卖出股票。其实我想持有西德股票至少3年。”事实证明罗杰斯的大势判断是正确的，他在1985年与1986年初分批卖出西德股票，获利颇丰。
众所周知，投资基金追求的是长期收益，然而又有多少人能做到对基金净值短期波动的 “ 袖手旁观 ” 。面对市场的风起云涌，大多数投资者被裹挟其中，诚惶诚恐地追随着股市的浪潮，哪怕稍有风吹草动，便忙不迭地买入或者卖出。一些人自诩为“长期投资者”，一旦股市下挫(或者是稍稍上涨)他们马上就从“长期投资”变成了短期投资，在股市大跌时宁愿损失极大也会恐慌性全部抛出，或者偶尔能够得到一点点小利时也会迫不及待地将基金赎回。由于人性中固有的恐惧和贪婪，投资者总是抵挡不住波段操作和追涨杀跌的诱惑。
连股神巴菲特都赞叹道：“我不得不承认，罗杰斯对市场大趋势的把握无人能及。"虽然普通投资者难以判断大趋势和小波澜，不妨学学罗杰斯的无为而治，选择适合自己风险承受能力的基金投资组合，保持“得意淡然，失意泰然”的心态，不盲目追逐短期波动！
1968年，吉姆·罗杰斯怀揣600美元独闯华尔街；1970年，他与世界金融巨头索罗斯共同组建“量子基金" ，投资回报率一度高达4000%。1980年，37岁的罗杰斯出人意料地与索罗斯分道扬镳，坐拥1400万美元的他开始了全新的环球投资生涯，投资足迹遍布葡萄牙、奥地利、巴西、中国等十多个国家。人们一定以为这位大师具有非凡的投资觉悟，然而他却如此告诫投资者：“投资的法则之一是袖手旁观，除非真有重大事情发生。大部分的投资人总喜欢进进出出，找些事情做，而我更愿意坐下来等待大势的自然发展。”
罗杰斯最值得炫耀的一笔投资应该是1982年买进西德股票，之后他既不要分析报告，也不看最新评论，甚至连成交价都置若罔闻，并说:“假如告诉我成交价，我只要看到股价上涨两倍或三倍，就可能想卖出股票。其实我想持有西德股票至少3年。”事实证明罗杰斯的大势判断是正确的，他在1985年与1986年初分批卖出西德股票，获利颇丰。
众所周知，投资基金追求的是长期收益，然而又有多少人能做到对基金净值短期波动的 “ 袖手旁观 ” 。面对市场的风起云涌，大多数投资者被裹挟其中，诚惶诚恐地追随着股市的浪潮，哪怕稍有风吹草动，便忙不迭地买入或者卖出。一些人自诩为“长期投资者”，一旦股市下挫(或者是稍稍上涨)他们马上就从“长期投资”变成了短期投资，在股市大跌时宁愿损失极大也会恐慌性全部抛出，或者偶尔能够得到一点点小利时也会迫不及待地将基金赎回。由于人性中固有的恐惧和贪婪，投资者总是抵挡不住波段操作和追涨杀跌的诱惑。
连股神巴菲特都赞叹道：“我不得不承认，罗杰斯对市场大趋势的把握无人能及。"虽然普通投资者难以判断大趋势和小波澜，不妨学学罗杰斯的无为而治，选择适合自己风险承受能力的基金投资组合，保持“得意淡然，失意泰然”的心态，不盲目追逐短期波动！
投资环境恶化导致股市回暖
透过我的极视官网搜集了很多网友的反馈，我讲的他们基本都听懂了，不过认为我说的都是宏观层面的东西，建议讲一些实际的，教他们应该具体怎么做，很多人也给我写信，当然基本上都是在股市被套牢的。我想说的是，我自己是金融博士、金融专家，但我的最高战略指导思想是绝对不碰金融资产，而且是越复杂的越不碰，越要签合同的越不碰，合同越厚的越不碰，只是在房地产与现金之间来回折腾，这就是我学了一辈子的结论。最近中国股市在大涨，很多人的心情很激动，就在想这是不是一个经济复苏的前兆。
股市回暖的实质意义
二月份中国股市最高涨到了2400多点，请股民注意为什么一二月份会上涨？带着这个疑问想一下2006年，你会发现股市的基本面是不变的。中国2006年开始的股市泡沫、楼市泡沫和通货膨胀，如果按照日本上世纪80、90年代的故事，我们肯定认为是流动性过剩，因为当时的日本银行降低利率水平、放松信贷规模，使得银行信贷大量的流通，造成流动性过剩。2006年学术界就发生一个争论，大部分经济学家说中国也是流动性过剩，当时我认为并不是简单的流动性过剩，而是由于企业所面临的投资营商环境开始恶化。政府的各项政策包括宏观调控像提高利率跟存款准备金率，进一步打击了我国企业的投资营商环境，因此大量的资金从制造业转到股市楼市造成泡沫现象。同样的问题到了2009年，投资环境在没有有效改善之外，加上国际金融海啸的冲击，使得企业所面临的环境更加恶劣。如果这个时候银行体系大量放松贷款，那企业能做什么？
以一月份为例，一月新增贷款1.62万亿元，名义上听起来是一个很好的数字，银行为了刺激经济，增加了1.62万亿元的信贷。1.62万亿当中有0.6万亿左右是企业的票据融资，剩下的1万亿大部分是基础建设，真正用于改善投资营商环境或者说真正用于民营企业或者讲的更具体一点用于中小企业的几乎是零，也就是说这么大的信贷规模推出来的结果一个是银行给地方政府从事基础建设，一个是银行给大型企业尤其是大型国企进行票据融资。而且票据融资的利息非常低，目前是1.5%。票据融资只能做短期周转之用，当成企业的流动资金，比如发薪水、购买原材料等。去年十二月，票据融资是5000亿，一月是6239多亿，那么当去年12月拿到了5000亿，今年一月又拿到6239亿的钱之后，由于企业面临着投资营商环境的恶化，他准备做什么，又能干什么？因为票据只能用在短期，所以不能炒楼，只能炒股。当时我在极视网回答网友问题的时候说一万多亿的资金部分会进入股市拉抬股价，而这也就是近期股市上涨的原因。
中国银监会在今年2月13号通知要查帐，股价立刻大跌，因为要赶快把钱套现放回银行。激增的流动性资金去向也引起了监管层的注意，但是和07年不一样，07年银监会调查违规资金入市的力度非常大，这一次银监会没有向各大银行严查是否有违规资金入市的情况，央行也只是提醒各大银行关注票据激增的现象，没有警告也没有查处，结果是雷声大雨点小，所以这一波的走势完全印证了我在2006年的观点。过去很多专家学者总认为中国的股市是乱七八糟不符合基本面的，中国的股市不是不符合基本面，而是他们没有搞清楚什么是基本面。依我来看，我们的股市非常符合基本面，而且符合的不得了，而股市的基本面就是我国投资营商环境迅速恶化，这个基本面太重要了，它决定了我国这么长时间的股市走向。同样的问题到了2009年，投资营商环境更加恶化的情况下，银行增加了大规模的信贷给企业，而企业在投资营商环境恶化之下找不到投资出路，而钱只能用在短期，他们能干的只是炒股，从而拉抬股市造成了股市回暖现象，但是这种回暖现象所象征的实质意义就是投资营商环境的持续恶化。
政府为了提升经济推出了很多的经济刺激方案，因此我国目前企业的资金还是比较充裕的，因为政府特意的、大量的释放资金入场。08年由于政府宏观调控的误判，银行透过提高利率和存款准备金率大量回收资金，使得所有企业缺资金，大企业缺大钱小企业缺小钱，在企业缺钱的情况下，投资营商环境又恶化，所以股市是连续下跌，但是今天投资营商环境更加恶化了，可是钱突然多了，其结果必定反映在股票市场，并且是股价大涨，可是这个能否持续就要看银行资金能否持续，只要银行资金继续宽松股价就会涨，而这个时候股民要小心了，这个叫泡沫现象，这个泡沫和06年、07年、08年完全不一样。为了给广大股民一个正确的指导方针，我把06、07、08、09这四年股市走势的资金驱动，也就是资金与环境恶化两个互动你可以非常清楚地判断出股市的走向，我希望09年能让各位股民赚回一点钱。
06年开始一直到09年整个社会的投资营商环境直线下滑，06年和07年进入股市拉抬股价的资金，就是那些制造业的资金，而且我认为是以民营企业为主的制造业资金进入股市、进入楼市。由于环境恶化，所以很多民营企业家不想干了，大量资金进入楼市与股市的结果就是从06年开始到07年年底的泡沫现象，到了08年投资营商环境持续恶化，可是政府的宏观调控从07年政府的中央经济工作会议之后，执行严格的两防政策，银行大量收回授信，所以使得大中小型企业各个缺钱，再加上投资营商环境的恶化，使得整个股市大幅走低，一直到了08年的10月，政府推出了4万亿的救市工程，这个概念推出来之后激活了股票市场的资金流入，所以形成暂时股市上升现象，但是其后还是会下跌，因这都是短期泡沫， 12月5000亿，一月的6000多亿以及后来的资金持续注入企业，而企业所面临的投资营商环境持续恶化，所以这一次的驱动力量就是大型企业，尤其是大型国企，他拿到了银行授信，部分进入股市，造成泡沫现象。那我们如何判断09年往后的股市呢？按我现在来看，投资营商环境恶化是个必然，所以大家不要期待企业会拿钱去好好的干实业，他们手上只要钱多了就开始炒楼炒股，手中有钱又不好投资又碰到十大产业振兴方案，所以这一拉抬起来很过隐。
股民如何赚钱
新概念振兴方案出来之后，我认为这个钱只会多不会少，因为政府急，希望能透过银行融资来提升企业的经营水平或经营能力，可是经济理论是改变不了的。如果有新概念出来，配合上这么庞大的资金量在社会流转，你还有一轮的机会，但那又是短期的。大家要学聪明一点，要快进快出，而且我发现这个时候是大盘掩护中小盘，连基金我都怀疑他是被动的受害者，所以股民如果想再进的话，我建议不要以基金为主体。如果实在穷极无聊有时间的话，按照我的思路，先判定银行融资够不够，如果银行融资大量放出的话，只要政府有新的利好消息一出来，就要针对有关的行业进行短期冲刺，我相信是无往不利的。而且这一波上升本身就很奇怪，像医药版块本身就没有什么道理，比如说，医药改革方案出来，医药价格会降低，所以医药公司利润也会下降，股价也应该会下跌的，这才比较合理。但是有一些股票大涨，甚至涨了当初6000点的水平，到底是为什么？这一次我判定和外资有关，因为医药版块会成为外资企业09年收购重镇，如果收购了我国的医药企业，外国的药品就顺利进入中国的医疗市场，进而合法的定价，合法的出售，而我们很多中国人需要好药，这些药品一进来，加上外资撑控一种运销渠道，一定能大赚其钱，这就有可能会使得他们在这个时候大量的进货，来控制医药版块，为下一个阶段外资大量并购预先铺路，所以我认为很可能下一波就是和外资大量并购有关的行业是一个新兴的版块。外资不但可以透过撑控企业的股权赚钱，同时通过股价的操纵利于未来的收购和资本运作。当然，我自己是不炒股的，这是我把研究之后的一点心得告诉广大股民，我也希望如果有人听了我的话赚钱了，请注意我的一句话：郎教授是金融博士，但从来不买金融产品的，越复杂的越不买，越有概念的越不买，合同越厚的越不买。
货币市场上的投资机会
除了股票市场之外我建议各位，由于美国政府需要投放大量的美元进入市场，包括以前我说的，要投资超过十万亿美元进行美国的救市，而且都知道货币印的越多越贬值，但是从去年的7月开始一直到3月，我们发现美金不跌反涨。一个政府会让这个国家的货币不跌反涨只有一个原因，那就是他要借钱。如果要借钱的话，美元涨的越高越有利，所以目前我认为美国政府为了达到借钱的目的一定要让美元涨，然而美元涨是违反市场规律的，其结果就会造成外汇市场上各种货币之间价格的大幅波动，而大幅波动就是机会。以目前美元与欧元为例，这个时刻我肯定的判断，这是欧盟与美国之间的勾结。请想一下，在目前情况之下，什么样的汇率是既有利于美国又有利于欧盟？那就是美元涨欧元跌。欧盟的大国只有德法两个，这两个国家是以出口为主要的经济动力，所以欧元跌对于德法两国的出口有利好的刺激作用，能够尽快使得欧盟经济脱离萧条；而美国政府要借钱，所以美元要涨，这也是为什么美国政府的平准基金正在大肆的抛欧元。当你了解这个原则之后，大家可以在美元与欧元之间取得一个平衡。欧元越跌你将来越要进欧元，要低价吃进，将来会反转，具体什么时候我不知道，但是一定会反转。所以今天我认为不论是在本国或在国际市场上都会有大量的机会给老百姓赚钱。在这个时候就要有新概念，要彻底的理解股市、外汇市场。
美国政府操纵黄金
投资者要买黄金要用什么币去买？黄金都是美元定价的，想买黄金一定要用美元去买，因此黄金的操纵者我认为是美国政府，黄金价格大肆拉抬的目的就是透过投资者用美元去买黄金而大量回收美元，这样有利于美元的升值。当然，美国政府不会这么说，这是我对它的判断，所以我认为美国政府一方面通过他的平准基金抛欧元，让欧元跌，美元相对涨，同时为了大量收回货币，除了在本国做一些大家不知道的包括卖国债给银行、与银行直接交易等大量收回美金的事情之外，在国际市场上拉抬黄金价格大量回收美元，使美元大量回收有利于美元升值。
通过前面的分析，指出了中国股市涨、黄金涨、美元涨、欧元跌的原因，所以，如果想投资一定要非常清楚的了解背后的四大原因：中国股市涨是寄托于不断恶化的投资营商环境，并且银行资金大量进入股市炒作有概念的股票，同时炒作外资想进入以及政府想拉抬的行业；黄金会随美元的大涨而大涨，大涨的原因是美国政府透过黄金的涨价收回美元，有助于美元的升值。美元升值是违反经济理论的，仅仅是因为美国政府的操纵，通过平准基金大量的抛欧元，使欧元贬值，有利于欧盟中德法等主要经济体的复苏。
股市回暖的实质意义
二月份中国股市最高涨到了2400多点，请股民注意为什么一二月份会上涨？带着这个疑问想一下2006年，你会发现股市的基本面是不变的。中国2006年开始的股市泡沫、楼市泡沫和通货膨胀，如果按照日本上世纪80、90年代的故事，我们肯定认为是流动性过剩，因为当时的日本银行降低利率水平、放松信贷规模，使得银行信贷大量的流通，造成流动性过剩。2006年学术界就发生一个争论，大部分经济学家说中国也是流动性过剩，当时我认为并不是简单的流动性过剩，而是由于企业所面临的投资营商环境开始恶化。政府的各项政策包括宏观调控像提高利率跟存款准备金率，进一步打击了我国企业的投资营商环境，因此大量的资金从制造业转到股市楼市造成泡沫现象。同样的问题到了2009年，投资环境在没有有效改善之外，加上国际金融海啸的冲击，使得企业所面临的环境更加恶劣。如果这个时候银行体系大量放松贷款，那企业能做什么？
以一月份为例，一月新增贷款1.62万亿元，名义上听起来是一个很好的数字，银行为了刺激经济，增加了1.62万亿元的信贷。1.62万亿当中有0.6万亿左右是企业的票据融资，剩下的1万亿大部分是基础建设，真正用于改善投资营商环境或者说真正用于民营企业或者讲的更具体一点用于中小企业的几乎是零，也就是说这么大的信贷规模推出来的结果一个是银行给地方政府从事基础建设，一个是银行给大型企业尤其是大型国企进行票据融资。而且票据融资的利息非常低，目前是1.5%。票据融资只能做短期周转之用，当成企业的流动资金，比如发薪水、购买原材料等。去年十二月，票据融资是5000亿，一月是6239多亿，那么当去年12月拿到了5000亿，今年一月又拿到6239亿的钱之后，由于企业面临着投资营商环境的恶化，他准备做什么，又能干什么？因为票据只能用在短期，所以不能炒楼，只能炒股。当时我在极视网回答网友问题的时候说一万多亿的资金部分会进入股市拉抬股价，而这也就是近期股市上涨的原因。
中国银监会在今年2月13号通知要查帐，股价立刻大跌，因为要赶快把钱套现放回银行。激增的流动性资金去向也引起了监管层的注意，但是和07年不一样，07年银监会调查违规资金入市的力度非常大，这一次银监会没有向各大银行严查是否有违规资金入市的情况，央行也只是提醒各大银行关注票据激增的现象，没有警告也没有查处，结果是雷声大雨点小，所以这一波的走势完全印证了我在2006年的观点。过去很多专家学者总认为中国的股市是乱七八糟不符合基本面的，中国的股市不是不符合基本面，而是他们没有搞清楚什么是基本面。依我来看，我们的股市非常符合基本面，而且符合的不得了，而股市的基本面就是我国投资营商环境迅速恶化，这个基本面太重要了，它决定了我国这么长时间的股市走向。同样的问题到了2009年，投资营商环境更加恶化的情况下，银行增加了大规模的信贷给企业，而企业在投资营商环境恶化之下找不到投资出路，而钱只能用在短期，他们能干的只是炒股，从而拉抬股市造成了股市回暖现象，但是这种回暖现象所象征的实质意义就是投资营商环境的持续恶化。
政府为了提升经济推出了很多的经济刺激方案，因此我国目前企业的资金还是比较充裕的，因为政府特意的、大量的释放资金入场。08年由于政府宏观调控的误判，银行透过提高利率和存款准备金率大量回收资金，使得所有企业缺资金，大企业缺大钱小企业缺小钱，在企业缺钱的情况下，投资营商环境又恶化，所以股市是连续下跌，但是今天投资营商环境更加恶化了，可是钱突然多了，其结果必定反映在股票市场，并且是股价大涨，可是这个能否持续就要看银行资金能否持续，只要银行资金继续宽松股价就会涨，而这个时候股民要小心了，这个叫泡沫现象，这个泡沫和06年、07年、08年完全不一样。为了给广大股民一个正确的指导方针，我把06、07、08、09这四年股市走势的资金驱动，也就是资金与环境恶化两个互动你可以非常清楚地判断出股市的走向，我希望09年能让各位股民赚回一点钱。
06年开始一直到09年整个社会的投资营商环境直线下滑，06年和07年进入股市拉抬股价的资金，就是那些制造业的资金，而且我认为是以民营企业为主的制造业资金进入股市、进入楼市。由于环境恶化，所以很多民营企业家不想干了，大量资金进入楼市与股市的结果就是从06年开始到07年年底的泡沫现象，到了08年投资营商环境持续恶化，可是政府的宏观调控从07年政府的中央经济工作会议之后，执行严格的两防政策，银行大量收回授信，所以使得大中小型企业各个缺钱，再加上投资营商环境的恶化，使得整个股市大幅走低，一直到了08年的10月，政府推出了4万亿的救市工程，这个概念推出来之后激活了股票市场的资金流入，所以形成暂时股市上升现象，但是其后还是会下跌，因这都是短期泡沫， 12月5000亿，一月的6000多亿以及后来的资金持续注入企业，而企业所面临的投资营商环境持续恶化，所以这一次的驱动力量就是大型企业，尤其是大型国企，他拿到了银行授信，部分进入股市，造成泡沫现象。那我们如何判断09年往后的股市呢？按我现在来看，投资营商环境恶化是个必然，所以大家不要期待企业会拿钱去好好的干实业，他们手上只要钱多了就开始炒楼炒股，手中有钱又不好投资又碰到十大产业振兴方案，所以这一拉抬起来很过隐。
股民如何赚钱
新概念振兴方案出来之后，我认为这个钱只会多不会少，因为政府急，希望能透过银行融资来提升企业的经营水平或经营能力，可是经济理论是改变不了的。如果有新概念出来，配合上这么庞大的资金量在社会流转，你还有一轮的机会，但那又是短期的。大家要学聪明一点，要快进快出，而且我发现这个时候是大盘掩护中小盘，连基金我都怀疑他是被动的受害者，所以股民如果想再进的话，我建议不要以基金为主体。如果实在穷极无聊有时间的话，按照我的思路，先判定银行融资够不够，如果银行融资大量放出的话，只要政府有新的利好消息一出来，就要针对有关的行业进行短期冲刺，我相信是无往不利的。而且这一波上升本身就很奇怪，像医药版块本身就没有什么道理，比如说，医药改革方案出来，医药价格会降低，所以医药公司利润也会下降，股价也应该会下跌的，这才比较合理。但是有一些股票大涨，甚至涨了当初6000点的水平，到底是为什么？这一次我判定和外资有关，因为医药版块会成为外资企业09年收购重镇，如果收购了我国的医药企业，外国的药品就顺利进入中国的医疗市场，进而合法的定价，合法的出售，而我们很多中国人需要好药，这些药品一进来，加上外资撑控一种运销渠道，一定能大赚其钱，这就有可能会使得他们在这个时候大量的进货，来控制医药版块，为下一个阶段外资大量并购预先铺路，所以我认为很可能下一波就是和外资大量并购有关的行业是一个新兴的版块。外资不但可以透过撑控企业的股权赚钱，同时通过股价的操纵利于未来的收购和资本运作。当然，我自己是不炒股的，这是我把研究之后的一点心得告诉广大股民，我也希望如果有人听了我的话赚钱了，请注意我的一句话：郎教授是金融博士，但从来不买金融产品的，越复杂的越不买，越有概念的越不买，合同越厚的越不买。
货币市场上的投资机会
除了股票市场之外我建议各位，由于美国政府需要投放大量的美元进入市场，包括以前我说的，要投资超过十万亿美元进行美国的救市，而且都知道货币印的越多越贬值，但是从去年的7月开始一直到3月，我们发现美金不跌反涨。一个政府会让这个国家的货币不跌反涨只有一个原因，那就是他要借钱。如果要借钱的话，美元涨的越高越有利，所以目前我认为美国政府为了达到借钱的目的一定要让美元涨，然而美元涨是违反市场规律的，其结果就会造成外汇市场上各种货币之间价格的大幅波动，而大幅波动就是机会。以目前美元与欧元为例，这个时刻我肯定的判断，这是欧盟与美国之间的勾结。请想一下，在目前情况之下，什么样的汇率是既有利于美国又有利于欧盟？那就是美元涨欧元跌。欧盟的大国只有德法两个，这两个国家是以出口为主要的经济动力，所以欧元跌对于德法两国的出口有利好的刺激作用，能够尽快使得欧盟经济脱离萧条；而美国政府要借钱，所以美元要涨，这也是为什么美国政府的平准基金正在大肆的抛欧元。当你了解这个原则之后，大家可以在美元与欧元之间取得一个平衡。欧元越跌你将来越要进欧元，要低价吃进，将来会反转，具体什么时候我不知道，但是一定会反转。所以今天我认为不论是在本国或在国际市场上都会有大量的机会给老百姓赚钱。在这个时候就要有新概念，要彻底的理解股市、外汇市场。
美国政府操纵黄金
投资者要买黄金要用什么币去买？黄金都是美元定价的，想买黄金一定要用美元去买，因此黄金的操纵者我认为是美国政府，黄金价格大肆拉抬的目的就是透过投资者用美元去买黄金而大量回收美元，这样有利于美元的升值。当然，美国政府不会这么说，这是我对它的判断，所以我认为美国政府一方面通过他的平准基金抛欧元，让欧元跌，美元相对涨，同时为了大量收回货币，除了在本国做一些大家不知道的包括卖国债给银行、与银行直接交易等大量收回美金的事情之外，在国际市场上拉抬黄金价格大量回收美元，使美元大量回收有利于美元升值。
通过前面的分析，指出了中国股市涨、黄金涨、美元涨、欧元跌的原因，所以，如果想投资一定要非常清楚的了解背后的四大原因：中国股市涨是寄托于不断恶化的投资营商环境，并且银行资金大量进入股市炒作有概念的股票，同时炒作外资想进入以及政府想拉抬的行业；黄金会随美元的大涨而大涨，大涨的原因是美国政府透过黄金的涨价收回美元，有助于美元的升值。美元升值是违反经济理论的，仅仅是因为美国政府的操纵，通过平准基金大量的抛欧元，使欧元贬值，有利于欧盟中德法等主要经济体的复苏。
Paying a High Price for a Cheery Consensus
Yes, those of you who saw the title are probably thinking it looks very familiar ! It was actually a quote from Warren Buffett when he mentioned that you “pay a very high price in the stock market for a cheery consensus”. I must admit yours truly was quite stumped when I first came across this statement and was wondering what it meant and what implications it had. Initially, I thought he was referring to paying high prices for shares of companies and thereby agreeing with what everyone thought about the company – a form of herd behaviour. Later I realized I was quite wrong when I was thinking about the stock market and the full meaning of this statement hit me like a bolt of lightning from above.
In the context of this bear market, we can be considered to be experiencing one of the worst bear markets and recessions in at least the last 70 years. In fact, economists and market experts have termed this period as “The Great Recession” as many aspects mirror the Great Depression era of the 1930’s, with the exception of more globalization now, more co-ordinated stimulus efforts and more liquidity being pumped into each economy by respective central banks. Most investors have seen their portfolios literally melting like hot candle wax since October 2007 to the troughs seen in October 2008 and more recently, March 2009. Economists and government officials have gone on record stating that the recession does not seem to be lifting any time soon and there is a lack of clarity and visibility on how things will turn out. In Singapore, the MAS revised their GDP forecasts for Singapore for FY 2009 to a range of -6% to -9% (from -2% to -5% just a few months back). Exports are falling off a cliff and year-on-year GDP growth rate for 1Q 2009 has slumped 19% to make it the worst quarter since Singapore became independent.
So what does all this news portend for the retail investor ? Well, for starters, Mr. Market has become very pessimistic and is willing to pay very low prices for most companies, be they good or bad. This is where the phrase comes in – we tend to pay high “prices” (i.e. valuations) for a cheery consensus (clarity and certainty). The words in brackets help to explain the sentence in the context of how it should be viewed. Valuations are low when there is a lack of clarity, companies are reported declining profits and analysts are scrambling to value companies based on Price-to-book, rather than Price-to-Earnings. This is because earnings have become so uncertain that a different metric must be used, they argue. Price to book is “safer” in that it assumes a more conservative stance with respect to a company’s book value, which is usually the liquidation value of a company after accounting for its assets and liabilities; rather than volatile earnings which can fluctuate from period to period due to the severe slump in consumption and lack of financing options for growing the business.
Hence, an investor cannot have the best of both worlds. I repeat, it is impossible to have the cake and eat it too ! What I mean is that one cannot have clarity and certainty on a Company’s future growth and earnings, yet expect to pay a low price for it. A “cheery consensus” means that everyone is happy and satisfied with a company’s future, and thus when this happens, we inevitably end up paying a very high “price” for it, meaning margin of safety would be lesser; as compared to when the future is cloudy and murky and uncertainty reigns.
The lessons one should take away from this is that uncertainty is the friend of the buyer of long-term values, after assessing the corporate strategies and financial fundamentals of the company in question of course. Uncertainty is the only guarantee in the stock markets and as investors, we deal with uncertainty ALL THE TIME. Every earnings report is uncertain, as is the ability of a company to continue to pay dividends and grow earnings. What investors need to realize is that instead of avoiding uncertainty, we have to manage it actively and learn to live with it. We have to learn to pay low prices for a certain tolerable level of uncertainty, and to be able to bravely invest even when the future is highly uncertain (as it is as of this writing).
How can one mitigate against the risks of being wrong about uncertainty and buying a dud company ? I for one use qualitative metrics such as Management experience, how they navigated previous downturns, their track record over 5-6 years in growing the business, their conservatism (or aggressiveness) as well as how they allocate capital. To give some pertinent examples, I will use Tat Hong and Swiber to illustrate.
Swiber recently bought back some of the company’s shares at a price above S$1.00 when it could have used the cash to fund its capex program. Now it is fervently selling off OBT and also part-ownership of its vessels (Swiber Victorious and Swiber Chai) to raise more funds as the downturn intensifies. This is what I call a “horse behind cannon” move as Management should have anticipated the global credit crunch more astutely and begun to conserve cash instead of using it on share repurchases at much higher prices than the current market price. To me, this is a classic case of poor allocation of capital on the part of Management and also an inability to properly manage a crisis, reflecting inexperience. This is not surprising since Swiber is only a 13-year old company established in 1996, and was only recently listed in 2006.
Tat Hong, by contrast, has shown much resilience in its business model as it switches from an equipment sales company to a rental company. Management has about 30years of experience in this industry and have been through crises such as the Asian Financial Crisis and the Dot.Com bust. Through such crises and economic downturns, they have learnt how to conserve cash and protect profits from eroding quickly. The experience from past recessions has served them in navigating the current rough seas, and even though they are not totally unscathed, at least I view them as being more astute in Management capital than Swiber.
So the key to investing successfully is to observe Management’s quality and to avoid paying too high a price for a “cheery consensus”. Learn to expect uncertainty and to invest because of it, as that is the only way one can lock in low valuations and achieve one’s desired margin of safety.
In the context of this bear market, we can be considered to be experiencing one of the worst bear markets and recessions in at least the last 70 years. In fact, economists and market experts have termed this period as “The Great Recession” as many aspects mirror the Great Depression era of the 1930’s, with the exception of more globalization now, more co-ordinated stimulus efforts and more liquidity being pumped into each economy by respective central banks. Most investors have seen their portfolios literally melting like hot candle wax since October 2007 to the troughs seen in October 2008 and more recently, March 2009. Economists and government officials have gone on record stating that the recession does not seem to be lifting any time soon and there is a lack of clarity and visibility on how things will turn out. In Singapore, the MAS revised their GDP forecasts for Singapore for FY 2009 to a range of -6% to -9% (from -2% to -5% just a few months back). Exports are falling off a cliff and year-on-year GDP growth rate for 1Q 2009 has slumped 19% to make it the worst quarter since Singapore became independent.
So what does all this news portend for the retail investor ? Well, for starters, Mr. Market has become very pessimistic and is willing to pay very low prices for most companies, be they good or bad. This is where the phrase comes in – we tend to pay high “prices” (i.e. valuations) for a cheery consensus (clarity and certainty). The words in brackets help to explain the sentence in the context of how it should be viewed. Valuations are low when there is a lack of clarity, companies are reported declining profits and analysts are scrambling to value companies based on Price-to-book, rather than Price-to-Earnings. This is because earnings have become so uncertain that a different metric must be used, they argue. Price to book is “safer” in that it assumes a more conservative stance with respect to a company’s book value, which is usually the liquidation value of a company after accounting for its assets and liabilities; rather than volatile earnings which can fluctuate from period to period due to the severe slump in consumption and lack of financing options for growing the business.
Hence, an investor cannot have the best of both worlds. I repeat, it is impossible to have the cake and eat it too ! What I mean is that one cannot have clarity and certainty on a Company’s future growth and earnings, yet expect to pay a low price for it. A “cheery consensus” means that everyone is happy and satisfied with a company’s future, and thus when this happens, we inevitably end up paying a very high “price” for it, meaning margin of safety would be lesser; as compared to when the future is cloudy and murky and uncertainty reigns.
The lessons one should take away from this is that uncertainty is the friend of the buyer of long-term values, after assessing the corporate strategies and financial fundamentals of the company in question of course. Uncertainty is the only guarantee in the stock markets and as investors, we deal with uncertainty ALL THE TIME. Every earnings report is uncertain, as is the ability of a company to continue to pay dividends and grow earnings. What investors need to realize is that instead of avoiding uncertainty, we have to manage it actively and learn to live with it. We have to learn to pay low prices for a certain tolerable level of uncertainty, and to be able to bravely invest even when the future is highly uncertain (as it is as of this writing).
How can one mitigate against the risks of being wrong about uncertainty and buying a dud company ? I for one use qualitative metrics such as Management experience, how they navigated previous downturns, their track record over 5-6 years in growing the business, their conservatism (or aggressiveness) as well as how they allocate capital. To give some pertinent examples, I will use Tat Hong and Swiber to illustrate.
Swiber recently bought back some of the company’s shares at a price above S$1.00 when it could have used the cash to fund its capex program. Now it is fervently selling off OBT and also part-ownership of its vessels (Swiber Victorious and Swiber Chai) to raise more funds as the downturn intensifies. This is what I call a “horse behind cannon” move as Management should have anticipated the global credit crunch more astutely and begun to conserve cash instead of using it on share repurchases at much higher prices than the current market price. To me, this is a classic case of poor allocation of capital on the part of Management and also an inability to properly manage a crisis, reflecting inexperience. This is not surprising since Swiber is only a 13-year old company established in 1996, and was only recently listed in 2006.
Tat Hong, by contrast, has shown much resilience in its business model as it switches from an equipment sales company to a rental company. Management has about 30years of experience in this industry and have been through crises such as the Asian Financial Crisis and the Dot.Com bust. Through such crises and economic downturns, they have learnt how to conserve cash and protect profits from eroding quickly. The experience from past recessions has served them in navigating the current rough seas, and even though they are not totally unscathed, at least I view them as being more astute in Management capital than Swiber.
So the key to investing successfully is to observe Management’s quality and to avoid paying too high a price for a “cheery consensus”. Learn to expect uncertainty and to invest because of it, as that is the only way one can lock in low valuations and achieve one’s desired margin of safety.
T. Boone Pickens sees oil at $75 at end-year
Texas oil billionaire T. Boone Pickens on Monday reiterated his prediction that crude oil prices would hit $75 a barrel this year as producers scale back production.
Pickens said about OPEC producers: "They told you they want $75 by the end of the year, I would count on that, I believe them."
OPEC has scaled back output to help support crude prices, which have dropped from record highs over $147 a barrel in July to around $47 a barrel on Monday.
"I think you are going to clean up the stocks because the people who have the oil are cutting supply," Pickens said at an alternative fuels and vehicles conference, referring to the nearly 19-year high on U.S. inventories of crude oil reported last week by the federal government.
The United States would likely burn through its supply overhang in three months, he told reporters.
Pickens said about OPEC producers: "They told you they want $75 by the end of the year, I would count on that, I believe them."
OPEC has scaled back output to help support crude prices, which have dropped from record highs over $147 a barrel in July to around $47 a barrel on Monday.
"I think you are going to clean up the stocks because the people who have the oil are cutting supply," Pickens said at an alternative fuels and vehicles conference, referring to the nearly 19-year high on U.S. inventories of crude oil reported last week by the federal government.
The United States would likely burn through its supply overhang in three months, he told reporters.
Saturday, April 18, 2009
Is This the Beginning of a Bull Market, or Just a Breather for the Bear?
Since sinking to a 12-year low of 676.53 on March 9, the Standard and Poor’s 500 Index had risen 24% — the best such short-term rally since 1933. But this isn’t 1933 and you shouldn’t trust the rally. Happy Days are NOT here again, at least not yet.
The 1933 rally came after a record-breaking decline. Real gross domestic product (GDP) fell by 25% during the Great Depression and the Dow Jones Industrial Index fell by almost 90%.
What is less well known, however, is that valuations remained depressed for well over a decade after 1933. In 1949, when the Dow was selling at a price-to-earnings ratio (P/E) of just 7 times, it was cheaper in terms of earnings, net asset value, and GDP than it had been at its 1932 nadir.
This time around, the S&P 500 index fell 58% from its 2007 peak to its March 9 bottom at the superstitiously significant 666. Of course, 58% is nowhere near as much as 90%. To recover from a 58% drop the stock market must rise by 138%, but it must rise by 1,000% to recover from a 90% drop.
So it is not surprising that in spite of inflation and enormous economic growth, the Dow did not reach its 1929 level until 1954.
The other difference between 2009 and 1933 is that the 2008 stock market peak was both higher and more prolonged than it was in 1929, which was a mere blip by comparison.
Radio Corporation of America - 1929’s equivalent of Cisco Systems Inc. or Google Inc. - never got above 28 times earnings in that market, and the Dow spent less than three years within 50% of its peak value of 381.17, only passing 200 in December 1927, and finally falling below that level in August 1930.
In this market, the Dow was above 7,000 - within 50% of its 14,164 peak - continually from May 1997 until February 2009. Because the 2000s market was more overvalued for longer for a longer period of time, it has further to fall, even without a “Great Depression” economically.
The current rally has been based on signs that the U.S. banking system is not about to expire - a development I wrote about in an article entitled “The Top 12 U.S. Banks: From Zombies to Hidden Gems” in late February.
Apart from the very largest banks, which gorged themselves on the most foolish and ill-designed products of the derivatives business, the banking system is suffering from a normal real estate downturn and is coping well with the high levels of loss that downturn has brought. With short-term interest rates well below long-term rates, banks’ ongoing lending business is currently exceptionally profitable.
The U.S. economy, as a whole, has stopped falling with ever-increasing velocity and may actually be beginning a lengthy “bottoming out” process. Had politicians avoided meddling with the monetary and fiscal systems of the globe, devoting trillions of dollars to bailouts and stimulus, the bottom we are approaching might well be somewhat deeper, but we could at least be sure that it was indeed the bottom, with recovery to follow.
In Asian countries such as Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, where stimulus has been modest, and in China where it has created only a modest budget deficit, the sharp recession caused by collapsing exports is already coming to an end. (China, however, has a major banking and real estate problem that could still cause trouble down the road.)
But in the United States, we can have no such assurance. Monetary policy, which was far too expansive in 1995-2008, reached expansiveness of extraordinary dimensions after last September’s crisis, with the monetary base doubling and broad money expanding at a rate of more than 15%. Fiscal policy has produced record peacetime deficits - deficits that are more than double the previous peacetime record. The Federal budget deficit in 2009 will be double the 2007 balance of payments deficit, which had previously been thought of as a critical and dangerous imbalance.
With imbalances of this size, there can be no assurance that a recessionary bottom will be followed by recovery, quite the opposite. Japan has now suffered near-recessionary conditions for almost two decades with a weak recovery in 2003-07. And that modest recovery is now being followed by a new recession as the Japanese government foolishly resorted to more wasteful public spending and debt.
Fiscal stimulus stimulates nothing in a country where public debt is already 160% of GDP; instead it increases uncertainty and crowds out risk-taking private capital.
The most likely scenario for the United States is a recession, or near-recession, that lasts for a decade with the economy unsuccessfully struggling against the twin problems of surging inflation and a budget deficit that crowds out private capital investment. Either real interest rates will be high to combat inflation or inflation will rage out of control.
In such an environment, the outlook for stocks is bleak. The high stock prices of 1996-2008 have gone, and they will not return. When the excessive monetary expansion began in the spring of 1995, the Dow was at 4,000. That is equivalent to a level of 7,800 today when you inflate it by the increase in nominal GDP since 1995.
However, 1995 was not a bear market low. It was far from it. The market had been rising for four years since its 1990 bottom and was almost 50% above its 1987 peak, just before the “Black Monday” crash.
Thus, even if the economy had the growth prospects of 1995, a level of 7,800 on the Dow would be a reasonable expectation, not for a bear market low but for an equilibrium value. If you then take into account the markedly worse expectations for the U.S. economy resulting from excessive fiscal and monetary stimulus, 7,800 is too high.
Take the 1949 P/E multiple of 7, and apply it to a recovering earnings level of say $60 on the Standard and Poor’s 500, and you get an S&P of 420 - equivalent to a Dow of around 4,000.
The market is no longer hugely overvalued with the Dow at 8,000, but any rally will be temporary, and we can expect an eventual low well below the 6,547 the Dow reached last month.
The 1933 rally came after a record-breaking decline. Real gross domestic product (GDP) fell by 25% during the Great Depression and the Dow Jones Industrial Index fell by almost 90%.
What is less well known, however, is that valuations remained depressed for well over a decade after 1933. In 1949, when the Dow was selling at a price-to-earnings ratio (P/E) of just 7 times, it was cheaper in terms of earnings, net asset value, and GDP than it had been at its 1932 nadir.
This time around, the S&P 500 index fell 58% from its 2007 peak to its March 9 bottom at the superstitiously significant 666. Of course, 58% is nowhere near as much as 90%. To recover from a 58% drop the stock market must rise by 138%, but it must rise by 1,000% to recover from a 90% drop.
So it is not surprising that in spite of inflation and enormous economic growth, the Dow did not reach its 1929 level until 1954.
The other difference between 2009 and 1933 is that the 2008 stock market peak was both higher and more prolonged than it was in 1929, which was a mere blip by comparison.
Radio Corporation of America - 1929’s equivalent of Cisco Systems Inc. or Google Inc. - never got above 28 times earnings in that market, and the Dow spent less than three years within 50% of its peak value of 381.17, only passing 200 in December 1927, and finally falling below that level in August 1930.
In this market, the Dow was above 7,000 - within 50% of its 14,164 peak - continually from May 1997 until February 2009. Because the 2000s market was more overvalued for longer for a longer period of time, it has further to fall, even without a “Great Depression” economically.
The current rally has been based on signs that the U.S. banking system is not about to expire - a development I wrote about in an article entitled “The Top 12 U.S. Banks: From Zombies to Hidden Gems” in late February.
Apart from the very largest banks, which gorged themselves on the most foolish and ill-designed products of the derivatives business, the banking system is suffering from a normal real estate downturn and is coping well with the high levels of loss that downturn has brought. With short-term interest rates well below long-term rates, banks’ ongoing lending business is currently exceptionally profitable.
The U.S. economy, as a whole, has stopped falling with ever-increasing velocity and may actually be beginning a lengthy “bottoming out” process. Had politicians avoided meddling with the monetary and fiscal systems of the globe, devoting trillions of dollars to bailouts and stimulus, the bottom we are approaching might well be somewhat deeper, but we could at least be sure that it was indeed the bottom, with recovery to follow.
In Asian countries such as Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, where stimulus has been modest, and in China where it has created only a modest budget deficit, the sharp recession caused by collapsing exports is already coming to an end. (China, however, has a major banking and real estate problem that could still cause trouble down the road.)
But in the United States, we can have no such assurance. Monetary policy, which was far too expansive in 1995-2008, reached expansiveness of extraordinary dimensions after last September’s crisis, with the monetary base doubling and broad money expanding at a rate of more than 15%. Fiscal policy has produced record peacetime deficits - deficits that are more than double the previous peacetime record. The Federal budget deficit in 2009 will be double the 2007 balance of payments deficit, which had previously been thought of as a critical and dangerous imbalance.
With imbalances of this size, there can be no assurance that a recessionary bottom will be followed by recovery, quite the opposite. Japan has now suffered near-recessionary conditions for almost two decades with a weak recovery in 2003-07. And that modest recovery is now being followed by a new recession as the Japanese government foolishly resorted to more wasteful public spending and debt.
Fiscal stimulus stimulates nothing in a country where public debt is already 160% of GDP; instead it increases uncertainty and crowds out risk-taking private capital.
The most likely scenario for the United States is a recession, or near-recession, that lasts for a decade with the economy unsuccessfully struggling against the twin problems of surging inflation and a budget deficit that crowds out private capital investment. Either real interest rates will be high to combat inflation or inflation will rage out of control.
In such an environment, the outlook for stocks is bleak. The high stock prices of 1996-2008 have gone, and they will not return. When the excessive monetary expansion began in the spring of 1995, the Dow was at 4,000. That is equivalent to a level of 7,800 today when you inflate it by the increase in nominal GDP since 1995.
However, 1995 was not a bear market low. It was far from it. The market had been rising for four years since its 1990 bottom and was almost 50% above its 1987 peak, just before the “Black Monday” crash.
Thus, even if the economy had the growth prospects of 1995, a level of 7,800 on the Dow would be a reasonable expectation, not for a bear market low but for an equilibrium value. If you then take into account the markedly worse expectations for the U.S. economy resulting from excessive fiscal and monetary stimulus, 7,800 is too high.
Take the 1949 P/E multiple of 7, and apply it to a recovering earnings level of say $60 on the Standard and Poor’s 500, and you get an S&P of 420 - equivalent to a Dow of around 4,000.
The market is no longer hugely overvalued with the Dow at 8,000, but any rally will be temporary, and we can expect an eventual low well below the 6,547 the Dow reached last month.
The “Cheap Oil Era” is Ending Soon…
Oil prices have fallen 70% since hitting a record $147.27 a barrel in July, which means in just five months, crude has given up all the price gains it made in the past four years.
After such a wrenching plunge, many analysts believe the outlook for the “black gold” remains bleak - and in the short term it certainly is. In the long run, however, dwindling supplies, resurgent demand, and a lack of investment will cause crude oil to double, triple, or even quintuple in price over the next few years.
In fact, the Paris-based International Energy Agency (IEA) - energy advisor to 28 industrialized nations - says oil will rise to $100 a barrel by 2015, as a result of a major “supply crunch,” and will ultimately soar to $200 a barrel.
But before it does, prices are likely to sink even further, perhaps falling as low as $20 a barrel in the first quarter of the New Year.
Indeed, much of Wall Street expects oil prices to average about $50 a barrel in 2009. Some of the firms and their specific forecasts include:
Deutsche Bank AG, which says oil prices will average $47.50 for all of next year.
Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc., which predicts that prices will average $50 even.
Moody’s Investors Service also says crude will average $50 a barrel in 2009, but says that average will increase to $55 a barrel for 2010.
Goldman Sachs Group Inc. is slightly more bearish, predicting that prices will average $45 for all of next year - after falling as low as $30 in the 2009 first quarter. (It’s worth noting that Goldman - just five months ago - predicted oil prices would hit $200 a barrel in 2009).
But analysts also agree on something else: When the recessionary tide finally recedes, all of the factors that drove oil to its record high last summer will once again be exposed, and crude will again soar to record highs.
“We may see prices drop lower - into the twenties, even - but there’s a better-than-average chance that they’ll be back over $70 a barrel by the end of next year,” says Money Morning Investment Director Keith Fitz-Gerald. “That’s where firms like Goldman and Merrill are getting all of these ‘middle-of-the road,’ $50-a-barrel estimates. And it’s why investors who buy in through the first quarter could enjoy compelling returns at the end of the year.”
In the meantime, however, low oil prices are crimping investment in new capacity, a reality that will lead to much higher prices down the road.
Just ask the IEA.
IEA: Rising Demand + Lack of Investment = ‘Supply Crunch’
According to widely respected energy advisor, global oil demand will slide 0.2%, or 200,000 barrels per day (bpd), this year, falling to an average of 85.8 million bpd. But the IEA also says that oil demand will advance by an annual average of 1.6% between 2006 and 2030.
The bottom line: Regardless of any short-term pullback, daily demand will rise from the current level of 86 million barrels to 106 million barrels in 2030. In other words, daily demand in 2030 will be 23%.
To meet that demand, the agency estimates that the world needs $26.3 trillion in supply-side investments over the next 21 years.
China, India and other developing countries, alone, will need investments of $360 billion a year through 2030, the agency said.
About 7 million bpd of additional capacity needs to be added to the market by 2015. And right now - because of marketplace changes - the financial incentives to make that happen just don’t exist.
Exploration costs have more than quadrupled since 2000, as oil producers have been forced to take on more complex projects, and the costs of both labor and materials have skyrocketed. At the same time, the steep drop in oil prices has put even more pressure on energy companies to curtail their investments rather than increase them.
Earlier this year, for instance, ConocoPhillips and Saudi Arabia Investment Co. were forced to postpone bidding on the construction of a 400,000 bpd export refinery at the Yanbu Industrial City.
“We see and hear about energy investments being delayed … this is a major worry and could lead to a supply crunch and much higher oil prices than we’ve seen before,” said Fatih Birol, the IEA’s chief economist.
The IEA predicts that, by 2015, a lack of investment and rising demand will create a “supply crunch” - that will once again send oil prices up into the triple digits.
“There remains a real risk that under-investment will cause an oil supply crunch in that time frame,” the IEA said in an executive summary of its “2008 World Energy Outlook.” “The gap between what is currently being built and what will be needed to keep pace with demand is set to widen sharply after 2010.”
The agency predicts that crude will average more than $100 a barrel from 2008 to 2015and rise above $200 a barrel by 2030, as demand far outpaces supply.
“While the situation facing the world is critical, it is vital we keep our eye on the medium to long-term target of a sustainable energy future,” Nobuo Tanaka, the Paris-based agency’s executive director, told reporters in London. “While market imbalances will feed instability, the era of cheap oil is over.”
While it’s probably true that the “era of cheap oil” is in our rearview mirror, a new question has arisen: Just how high do oil prices go?
According to some analysts, the IEA’s target price of $200 a barrel is far too conservative.
$500 Oil?
The lack of exploration and development is certainly a problem. But a much bigger issue is the fact that output from the world’s existing oil fields has sharply declined.
“The future rate of decline in output from producing oilfields as they mature is the single most important determinant of the amount of new capacity that will need to be built globally to meet demand,” the IEA says.
And output from the world’s oilfields is declining faster than previously thought.
In its “2007 World Energy Outlook,” the IEA estimated that output from the world’s existing oilfields was declining by 3.7% a year. But in its latest report, published in November, the IEA revised that estimate to an annual decline of 6.7%. (The November report was based on the first major study of the world’s 800 largest oil fields.)
Unfortunately, the IEA is behind the curve.
For nearly a decade, Matthew R. Simmons has said that the world’s oil production was nearing - or already at - an “inflection point.” While his book “Twilight in the Desert: The Coming Saudi Oil Shock and the World Economy,” was scoffed at when it was originally published back in 2005, Simmons is now viewed as perhaps the preeminent expert on the so-called “peak oil” movement.
“Like most people who ignore conventional wisdom, he was scoffed at, ridiculed, and denied,” commodities guru Jim Rogers told Fortune magazine. “And now, of course, people are starting to say, ‘Oh, well, I thought of that.’”
Simmons, chairman of the Houston-based investment bank Simmons & Co. International, poured through hundreds of technical documents submitted by Saudi oil geologists to the Society of Petroleum Engineers over the past 50 years.
“I finished reading the last paper on a Sunday afternoon,” Simmons told Fortune, “and I sat back and thought, ‘Holy crap, this is unbelievable. I’ve just discovered the biggest energy illusion ever in the world. We’re in big trouble. I’m going to write a book.’ “
Much of the alleged Saudi Arabia subterfuge has to do with a complete lack of transparency with respect to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. After OPEC decided to base its production quotas on reserve figures in the 1980s, several of the cartel’s producers suddenly raised their levels of “proven reserves” by 40% or more.
Back in 1988, for instance, Saudi Arabia raised its proven-reserve figure from 170 billion barrels to about 260 billion barrels. That figure has remained more or less constant since then, despite the fact that billions of barrels of oil have been pumped out of the ground.
“Saudi Arabia has announced for 20 years in a row that they have 260 billion barrels of oil in reserve,” Rogers told Money Morning during an exclusive interview in Singapore recently. “It’s astonishing. The figure never goes up and it never goes down. They have produced dozens of millions - billions - of dollars of oil in that period of time.
“Every oil country in the world has declining reserves except Saudi Arabia,” Rogers said. ”And I know that every oil company has declining reserves. So unless somebody discovers a lot of oil very quickly in very accessible areas, the surprise is going to be how high the price stays, and how high it goes.”
Simmons thinks oil prices could hit $300 a barrel - and could possibly even surge as high as $500 a barrel - during the next several years.
“Black Gold” Profit Plays
When it comes to investing, the oil sector poses some very clear risks, especially given the murky near-term outlook. However, there are a number of large-cap integrated oil companies that may offer some truly compelling values at current prices.
Exxon Mobil Corp. and Chevron Corp. are currently trading at multi-year lows, making them exceptionally cheap in both relative and absolute terms. These companies also have strong balance sheets (Exxon is “AAA”- rated and has more cash on its balance sheet than debt), generate strong cash flows, and have traditionally increased their dividends on a regular basis.
Chevron was actually recommended as a “Buy” by Money Morning Contributing Editor Horacio Marquez in his “Buy, Sell or Hold” column earlier this year.
“Chevron is the kind of company that is capable of continuing to post large profits - propelling its share higher from current levels - even if oil-and-gas prices were to drop from current levels over the next three years,” Marquez said. “That’s because Chevron’s business is well cushioned, since refining, marketing and chemicals margins would expand dramatically if market ’spot’ prices were to decline. Also, the company’s production is poised to expand strongly and Chevron uses some selective hedging that works very well in downside oil markets.”
Offshore drillers, particularly those capable of drilling in the deepest waters, also offer value at current levels. Petroleo Brasileiro (PBR), also known as Petrobras, is particularly appealing, as it recently discovered one of the largest offshore oil fields on earth off the coast of Rio de Janeiro. Known as Carioca, the field could hold 33 billion barrels of oil and gas, making the world’s largest discovery in at least 32 years.
Fitz-Gerald, the Money Morning investment director, suggests investors look at China National Offshore Oil Corporation, or CNOOC Ltd. The Hong Kong-based company recently got approval for a $29 billion exploration project in the South China Sea. The company expects to produce 50 million tons of oil equivalent per year from that region during the next 10-20 years. That would equal the production of China’s biggest project, the Daqing Oil Field.
Petrobras and CNOOC are also attractive because, as foreign companies, they will also get a boost from any devaluation in the U.S. dollar.
All of these companies have been hit hard by the combination of commodity-price weakness and credit market turmoil. But these operators do not require peak-cycle commodity prices to generate stellar results and have little or no credit-market exposure.
For a more direct play on oil prices, you might also try an exchange-traded fund (ETF), such as the United States Oil Fund LP (USO), the iPath S&P GSCI Crude Oil Total Return Fund (OIL), or the United States Gasoline Fund LP.
[Editor's Note: As the whipsaw trading patterns energy investors have endured this year have shown, the ongoing financial crisis has changed the investment game forever. Uncertainty is now the norm and that new reality alone has created a whole set of new rules that will help determine who profits and who loses. Investors who ignore this "New Reality" will struggle, and will find their financial forays to be frustrating and unrewarding. But investors who embrace this change will not only survive - they will thrive.
After such a wrenching plunge, many analysts believe the outlook for the “black gold” remains bleak - and in the short term it certainly is. In the long run, however, dwindling supplies, resurgent demand, and a lack of investment will cause crude oil to double, triple, or even quintuple in price over the next few years.
In fact, the Paris-based International Energy Agency (IEA) - energy advisor to 28 industrialized nations - says oil will rise to $100 a barrel by 2015, as a result of a major “supply crunch,” and will ultimately soar to $200 a barrel.
But before it does, prices are likely to sink even further, perhaps falling as low as $20 a barrel in the first quarter of the New Year.
Indeed, much of Wall Street expects oil prices to average about $50 a barrel in 2009. Some of the firms and their specific forecasts include:
Deutsche Bank AG, which says oil prices will average $47.50 for all of next year.
Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc., which predicts that prices will average $50 even.
Moody’s Investors Service also says crude will average $50 a barrel in 2009, but says that average will increase to $55 a barrel for 2010.
Goldman Sachs Group Inc. is slightly more bearish, predicting that prices will average $45 for all of next year - after falling as low as $30 in the 2009 first quarter. (It’s worth noting that Goldman - just five months ago - predicted oil prices would hit $200 a barrel in 2009).
But analysts also agree on something else: When the recessionary tide finally recedes, all of the factors that drove oil to its record high last summer will once again be exposed, and crude will again soar to record highs.
“We may see prices drop lower - into the twenties, even - but there’s a better-than-average chance that they’ll be back over $70 a barrel by the end of next year,” says Money Morning Investment Director Keith Fitz-Gerald. “That’s where firms like Goldman and Merrill are getting all of these ‘middle-of-the road,’ $50-a-barrel estimates. And it’s why investors who buy in through the first quarter could enjoy compelling returns at the end of the year.”
In the meantime, however, low oil prices are crimping investment in new capacity, a reality that will lead to much higher prices down the road.
Just ask the IEA.
IEA: Rising Demand + Lack of Investment = ‘Supply Crunch’
According to widely respected energy advisor, global oil demand will slide 0.2%, or 200,000 barrels per day (bpd), this year, falling to an average of 85.8 million bpd. But the IEA also says that oil demand will advance by an annual average of 1.6% between 2006 and 2030.
The bottom line: Regardless of any short-term pullback, daily demand will rise from the current level of 86 million barrels to 106 million barrels in 2030. In other words, daily demand in 2030 will be 23%.
To meet that demand, the agency estimates that the world needs $26.3 trillion in supply-side investments over the next 21 years.
China, India and other developing countries, alone, will need investments of $360 billion a year through 2030, the agency said.
About 7 million bpd of additional capacity needs to be added to the market by 2015. And right now - because of marketplace changes - the financial incentives to make that happen just don’t exist.
Exploration costs have more than quadrupled since 2000, as oil producers have been forced to take on more complex projects, and the costs of both labor and materials have skyrocketed. At the same time, the steep drop in oil prices has put even more pressure on energy companies to curtail their investments rather than increase them.
Earlier this year, for instance, ConocoPhillips and Saudi Arabia Investment Co. were forced to postpone bidding on the construction of a 400,000 bpd export refinery at the Yanbu Industrial City.
“We see and hear about energy investments being delayed … this is a major worry and could lead to a supply crunch and much higher oil prices than we’ve seen before,” said Fatih Birol, the IEA’s chief economist.
The IEA predicts that, by 2015, a lack of investment and rising demand will create a “supply crunch” - that will once again send oil prices up into the triple digits.
“There remains a real risk that under-investment will cause an oil supply crunch in that time frame,” the IEA said in an executive summary of its “2008 World Energy Outlook.” “The gap between what is currently being built and what will be needed to keep pace with demand is set to widen sharply after 2010.”
The agency predicts that crude will average more than $100 a barrel from 2008 to 2015and rise above $200 a barrel by 2030, as demand far outpaces supply.
“While the situation facing the world is critical, it is vital we keep our eye on the medium to long-term target of a sustainable energy future,” Nobuo Tanaka, the Paris-based agency’s executive director, told reporters in London. “While market imbalances will feed instability, the era of cheap oil is over.”
While it’s probably true that the “era of cheap oil” is in our rearview mirror, a new question has arisen: Just how high do oil prices go?
According to some analysts, the IEA’s target price of $200 a barrel is far too conservative.
$500 Oil?
The lack of exploration and development is certainly a problem. But a much bigger issue is the fact that output from the world’s existing oil fields has sharply declined.
“The future rate of decline in output from producing oilfields as they mature is the single most important determinant of the amount of new capacity that will need to be built globally to meet demand,” the IEA says.
And output from the world’s oilfields is declining faster than previously thought.
In its “2007 World Energy Outlook,” the IEA estimated that output from the world’s existing oilfields was declining by 3.7% a year. But in its latest report, published in November, the IEA revised that estimate to an annual decline of 6.7%. (The November report was based on the first major study of the world’s 800 largest oil fields.)
Unfortunately, the IEA is behind the curve.
For nearly a decade, Matthew R. Simmons has said that the world’s oil production was nearing - or already at - an “inflection point.” While his book “Twilight in the Desert: The Coming Saudi Oil Shock and the World Economy,” was scoffed at when it was originally published back in 2005, Simmons is now viewed as perhaps the preeminent expert on the so-called “peak oil” movement.
“Like most people who ignore conventional wisdom, he was scoffed at, ridiculed, and denied,” commodities guru Jim Rogers told Fortune magazine. “And now, of course, people are starting to say, ‘Oh, well, I thought of that.’”
Simmons, chairman of the Houston-based investment bank Simmons & Co. International, poured through hundreds of technical documents submitted by Saudi oil geologists to the Society of Petroleum Engineers over the past 50 years.
“I finished reading the last paper on a Sunday afternoon,” Simmons told Fortune, “and I sat back and thought, ‘Holy crap, this is unbelievable. I’ve just discovered the biggest energy illusion ever in the world. We’re in big trouble. I’m going to write a book.’ “
Much of the alleged Saudi Arabia subterfuge has to do with a complete lack of transparency with respect to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. After OPEC decided to base its production quotas on reserve figures in the 1980s, several of the cartel’s producers suddenly raised their levels of “proven reserves” by 40% or more.
Back in 1988, for instance, Saudi Arabia raised its proven-reserve figure from 170 billion barrels to about 260 billion barrels. That figure has remained more or less constant since then, despite the fact that billions of barrels of oil have been pumped out of the ground.
“Saudi Arabia has announced for 20 years in a row that they have 260 billion barrels of oil in reserve,” Rogers told Money Morning during an exclusive interview in Singapore recently. “It’s astonishing. The figure never goes up and it never goes down. They have produced dozens of millions - billions - of dollars of oil in that period of time.
“Every oil country in the world has declining reserves except Saudi Arabia,” Rogers said. ”And I know that every oil company has declining reserves. So unless somebody discovers a lot of oil very quickly in very accessible areas, the surprise is going to be how high the price stays, and how high it goes.”
Simmons thinks oil prices could hit $300 a barrel - and could possibly even surge as high as $500 a barrel - during the next several years.
“Black Gold” Profit Plays
When it comes to investing, the oil sector poses some very clear risks, especially given the murky near-term outlook. However, there are a number of large-cap integrated oil companies that may offer some truly compelling values at current prices.
Exxon Mobil Corp. and Chevron Corp. are currently trading at multi-year lows, making them exceptionally cheap in both relative and absolute terms. These companies also have strong balance sheets (Exxon is “AAA”- rated and has more cash on its balance sheet than debt), generate strong cash flows, and have traditionally increased their dividends on a regular basis.
Chevron was actually recommended as a “Buy” by Money Morning Contributing Editor Horacio Marquez in his “Buy, Sell or Hold” column earlier this year.
“Chevron is the kind of company that is capable of continuing to post large profits - propelling its share higher from current levels - even if oil-and-gas prices were to drop from current levels over the next three years,” Marquez said. “That’s because Chevron’s business is well cushioned, since refining, marketing and chemicals margins would expand dramatically if market ’spot’ prices were to decline. Also, the company’s production is poised to expand strongly and Chevron uses some selective hedging that works very well in downside oil markets.”
Offshore drillers, particularly those capable of drilling in the deepest waters, also offer value at current levels. Petroleo Brasileiro (PBR), also known as Petrobras, is particularly appealing, as it recently discovered one of the largest offshore oil fields on earth off the coast of Rio de Janeiro. Known as Carioca, the field could hold 33 billion barrels of oil and gas, making the world’s largest discovery in at least 32 years.
Fitz-Gerald, the Money Morning investment director, suggests investors look at China National Offshore Oil Corporation, or CNOOC Ltd. The Hong Kong-based company recently got approval for a $29 billion exploration project in the South China Sea. The company expects to produce 50 million tons of oil equivalent per year from that region during the next 10-20 years. That would equal the production of China’s biggest project, the Daqing Oil Field.
Petrobras and CNOOC are also attractive because, as foreign companies, they will also get a boost from any devaluation in the U.S. dollar.
All of these companies have been hit hard by the combination of commodity-price weakness and credit market turmoil. But these operators do not require peak-cycle commodity prices to generate stellar results and have little or no credit-market exposure.
For a more direct play on oil prices, you might also try an exchange-traded fund (ETF), such as the United States Oil Fund LP (USO), the iPath S&P GSCI Crude Oil Total Return Fund (OIL), or the United States Gasoline Fund LP.
[Editor's Note: As the whipsaw trading patterns energy investors have endured this year have shown, the ongoing financial crisis has changed the investment game forever. Uncertainty is now the norm and that new reality alone has created a whole set of new rules that will help determine who profits and who loses. Investors who ignore this "New Reality" will struggle, and will find their financial forays to be frustrating and unrewarding. But investors who embrace this change will not only survive - they will thrive.
How to Bank Real Profits by Bucking Wall Street’s Latest Fashion Trends
Investors who trade actively and are closely in touch with the ebb and flow of opinion on Wall Street have one enormous barrier to good investment performance: They will often be seduced by what’s fashionable – whether it be in terms of sectors, countries or individual stocks.
But in this market, as in all markets, it’s best to look at the unfashionable – sectors that are scorned or ignored by the market and countries whose stock markets have been beaten down by adversity. Of course, it’s difficult to do this if you constantly have an ear to Wall Street. Perhaps that’s why Warren Buffett’s bases his investment business in Omaha, Neb., not New York.
Fashionable investments can do very well in the short term. In 1998-99, you could have made a lot of money in tech stocks. In 2006-07, you could have made lots of money investing in China. If you were given perfect foresight, you could construct a successful investment philosophy around “momentum” sectors, buying whatever is currently “hot” and dumping it before the market turned. For most of us, there’s nothing more boring than an investment that just sits there.
The problem is that none of us have perfect foresight, and what’s worse is that we all have a tendency to believe what limited foresight we do have is better than it really is.
But if investing in fashionable sectors is pretty well guaranteed to give you worse returns than the market, then there must be some other strategy that will give you better returns, on average. After all, for every loser there must be a winner.
And while some of those winners are Wall Street insiders trading on privileged information – the Securities and Exchange Commission can’t catch them all – there is also reason to suppose that a winning investment strategy is to invest in sectors and countries that are actively unfashionable, in which the conventional Wall Street wisdom is to shun them, even on a “bottom-fishing” basis.
One example of this appeared in the banking sector a few weeks ago when Citigroup Inc. shares sold for less than a dollar.
During 2008, there had been innumerable attempts to rally the banking sector’s stock prices, mostly led by the same types of Wall Street operators who had caused the banks’ initial problem. But by February/March 2009, the hot money had stopped trying – either through bankruptcy or exhaustion – and Citigroup’s decline to $1, after several months languishing around the $4 to $5 level, was a pretty good sign that the pros had given up.
At that point, there were two possible routes for the unfashionable investor to take: Invest directly in the stocks that had been beaten down by buying Citigroup or Bank of America Corp; or go in the opposite direction, staying with the unfashionable banking sector but looking for the banks that were best run and had the fewest operating or asset problems.
The first strategy, if blessed with pinpoint timing, would have made the most money in the short run, no question. A buyer of Citigroup at $1 would today be sitting on a 300% profit in about six weeks.
However, that was a risky strategy. Citigroup could have been subjected to a government intervention that wiped out its shareholders. Further it was in no sense “value investing.” Even the bankrupt American International Group Inc. has risen five-fold from its nadir to $1.70, in spite of the fact that the government owns 80%, and would be due to receive no less than $150 billion before AIG shareholders got a penny in the case of a liquidation.
Indeed, investing in either would have been like gambling at a Las Vegas casino – fun when it works, but not if you might need the money.
But at the other end of the spectrum investment in banks such as U.S. Bancorp or BB&T Corp. made a lot of sense. I said as much in my late February review of the top 12 U.S. banks.
Those banks had made money even in the dire fourth quarter of 2008, and looked likely to continue making money going forward. They have powerful franchises in attractive regions of the country, and with short-term rates now much lower than medium term rates their new businesses should be exceptionally profitable. USB has risen 110% from its early March nadir and BBT is up 80%. And both were, and are, investments into which you could reasonably put a decent chunk of money.
Going forward, the banking sector is no longer unfashionable; analysts are waiting eagerly for first quarter figures and the results of the government “stress test” so they can pick winners. It is, however, more than possible that at some point in the future the current recession will once again cast a cloud over the banking sector, making it possible to invest while it is again unfashionable. If not, some other sector will be in the doghouse, and we at Money Morning will try and alert you to that event.
Another example, this time an international one.
In 1999, I was working as a banker in Croatia. NATO was engaged in its Kosovo campaign, dropping bombs on neighboring Serbia and Montenegro (with the occasional stray hitting Croatia, Bulgaria and Macedonia). Needless to say, the tiny Croatian stock market was itself “bombed out” and people were saying that the country was economically doomed.
That was obvious nonsense. Croatia has an exquisite coast and 5,000 islands, and when the neighborhood is free from explosions they attract tourists from all over Europe and beyond. So, I put my modest savings into Croatian shares – the least risky I could find; a medium-sized bank and a food company. Within a year, I had tripled my money.
Opportunities for unfashionable investment occur fairly rarely, but are more common in bleak economic environments like the present. When they occur, they can prove exceptionally rewarding.
But in this market, as in all markets, it’s best to look at the unfashionable – sectors that are scorned or ignored by the market and countries whose stock markets have been beaten down by adversity. Of course, it’s difficult to do this if you constantly have an ear to Wall Street. Perhaps that’s why Warren Buffett’s bases his investment business in Omaha, Neb., not New York.
Fashionable investments can do very well in the short term. In 1998-99, you could have made a lot of money in tech stocks. In 2006-07, you could have made lots of money investing in China. If you were given perfect foresight, you could construct a successful investment philosophy around “momentum” sectors, buying whatever is currently “hot” and dumping it before the market turned. For most of us, there’s nothing more boring than an investment that just sits there.
The problem is that none of us have perfect foresight, and what’s worse is that we all have a tendency to believe what limited foresight we do have is better than it really is.
But if investing in fashionable sectors is pretty well guaranteed to give you worse returns than the market, then there must be some other strategy that will give you better returns, on average. After all, for every loser there must be a winner.
And while some of those winners are Wall Street insiders trading on privileged information – the Securities and Exchange Commission can’t catch them all – there is also reason to suppose that a winning investment strategy is to invest in sectors and countries that are actively unfashionable, in which the conventional Wall Street wisdom is to shun them, even on a “bottom-fishing” basis.
One example of this appeared in the banking sector a few weeks ago when Citigroup Inc. shares sold for less than a dollar.
During 2008, there had been innumerable attempts to rally the banking sector’s stock prices, mostly led by the same types of Wall Street operators who had caused the banks’ initial problem. But by February/March 2009, the hot money had stopped trying – either through bankruptcy or exhaustion – and Citigroup’s decline to $1, after several months languishing around the $4 to $5 level, was a pretty good sign that the pros had given up.
At that point, there were two possible routes for the unfashionable investor to take: Invest directly in the stocks that had been beaten down by buying Citigroup or Bank of America Corp; or go in the opposite direction, staying with the unfashionable banking sector but looking for the banks that were best run and had the fewest operating or asset problems.
The first strategy, if blessed with pinpoint timing, would have made the most money in the short run, no question. A buyer of Citigroup at $1 would today be sitting on a 300% profit in about six weeks.
However, that was a risky strategy. Citigroup could have been subjected to a government intervention that wiped out its shareholders. Further it was in no sense “value investing.” Even the bankrupt American International Group Inc. has risen five-fold from its nadir to $1.70, in spite of the fact that the government owns 80%, and would be due to receive no less than $150 billion before AIG shareholders got a penny in the case of a liquidation.
Indeed, investing in either would have been like gambling at a Las Vegas casino – fun when it works, but not if you might need the money.
But at the other end of the spectrum investment in banks such as U.S. Bancorp or BB&T Corp. made a lot of sense. I said as much in my late February review of the top 12 U.S. banks.
Those banks had made money even in the dire fourth quarter of 2008, and looked likely to continue making money going forward. They have powerful franchises in attractive regions of the country, and with short-term rates now much lower than medium term rates their new businesses should be exceptionally profitable. USB has risen 110% from its early March nadir and BBT is up 80%. And both were, and are, investments into which you could reasonably put a decent chunk of money.
Going forward, the banking sector is no longer unfashionable; analysts are waiting eagerly for first quarter figures and the results of the government “stress test” so they can pick winners. It is, however, more than possible that at some point in the future the current recession will once again cast a cloud over the banking sector, making it possible to invest while it is again unfashionable. If not, some other sector will be in the doghouse, and we at Money Morning will try and alert you to that event.
Another example, this time an international one.
In 1999, I was working as a banker in Croatia. NATO was engaged in its Kosovo campaign, dropping bombs on neighboring Serbia and Montenegro (with the occasional stray hitting Croatia, Bulgaria and Macedonia). Needless to say, the tiny Croatian stock market was itself “bombed out” and people were saying that the country was economically doomed.
That was obvious nonsense. Croatia has an exquisite coast and 5,000 islands, and when the neighborhood is free from explosions they attract tourists from all over Europe and beyond. So, I put my modest savings into Croatian shares – the least risky I could find; a medium-sized bank and a food company. Within a year, I had tripled my money.
Opportunities for unfashionable investment occur fairly rarely, but are more common in bleak economic environments like the present. When they occur, they can prove exceptionally rewarding.
Thursday, April 16, 2009
美元贬值完美路线
对于"未来美元会贬值"表示疑虑的主要有两类意见。一种观点认为，去杠杆把美国的"影子银行"的信用机器彻底摧毁了，随着资产归零，包括经纪自营商、对冲基金、私人股本集团、结构投资工具和渠道、货币市场基金以及非银行抵押贷款机构将遭受灭顶之灾。
1999年克林顿的《金融服务现代化法案》通过后，美国的银行终于可以解除受《格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案》长达65年的禁闭，堂而皇之地进入市场与投资银行们一争高下了。最近5年中，多数银行表外的规模往往是表内的3-5倍。花旗危机前表内资产7000亿～8000亿美金，而表外的规模或高达3万～4万亿美元。
赚钱的时候，大家都在表外享受泡沫的狂欢，一旦大祸临头，表外的损失是必须回到表内的，于是乎，灾难就从"影子银行"体系传递到了母公司（传统银行体系），就得资产减计，债务的压缩，信贷规模的紧缩，除了还债去杠杆，什么活也干不了。
所以你看到，即便当下联储资产高速扩张了一倍多（从2008年9月的9000亿美金上升至目前的1.9万亿美元），但货币乘数也掉了一半多，所以整体上信用规模并没有扩张，或还在收缩。
我同意，在"影子银行"得到有效清理之前，还会处于紧缩之中，与基础货币发行量互相抵消。未来美国信贷市场即便恢复正常，货币乘数肯定也回不到那个虚妄的繁荣时代的水平。但是我们不能拿现在极端不正常状态的货币乘数说事，现在是传统的金融部门都出现了恐慌，机构都窖藏货币不干活，随着政府兜住毒资产计划的实施，未来应该有一个从极端回复正常的过程。
如此，一旦市场向正常回归，传统的金融机构出来干活，货币乘数反弹，短时间内就可能是滔天洪水。因为货币当局回收流动性的操作远比释放流动性要困难得多。所以说，这种以泡制泡的方式能否成功，未来美元的前景，恶性通胀的前景，会不会是以更大的萧条，来结束这一切以恢复均衡（这时候，美元可能超强势回归，但世界可能已经是满目疮痍），的确令人深忧。
第二种观点认为，"数量宽松"开始在全世界央行蔓延，我们看到，除了美联储以外，英格兰央行、日本央行、瑞士央行纷纷开闸放水，即便是风格最严谨的欧洲央行恐怕也挡不住被一群数量型放松的央行所包围的压力，如果欧元因此再度升值，困境中的欧洲经济将雪上加霜。全球外汇市场的均衡可能是各国货币竞相贬值，在大家都放水的情况下，美元是否就一定贬值呢？
在我看来，有哪国货币当局放水能超过美联储呢？一国货币当局"数量放松"的力度取决于本国主权货币被外部世界所接受的程度，因为这决定了该国本身转嫁风险的能力，如果你滥发货币以后风险转不出去的话，那就是引火烧身。欧洲大陆国家，如德国法国，敢置国内的通胀风险于不顾，去采用过激的货币手段吗？
坦率地讲，只要美联储买公债，某种程度上讲，这就是毒品，沾上了就可能摆脱不掉，不论成败只能一条道走到黑。有一点是肯定的，处于太空中的美国债务率只有通过高通胀才能最终真正被降下来，美国人所有的政策是围绕它的债务在做文章，当美元真正贬下去了造成通货膨胀的时候，吸走的是外部世界的财富，因为美国是最大的债务人。当外部世界的储蓄率和财富掉下来的时候，事实上美国的负债率也就跟从太空安全着陆，美元资产获得了支撑，通货膨胀也就止步了，一个完美的自我平衡机制。
希望在这个通胀过程的实现中，美国人能抓紧时间找到带领世界经济进入下个长周期增长的"载体"（像上世纪80年代信息革命一样），用生产效率提速来填充日益膨胀的货币，否则世界将掉入滞胀的泥潭。这也算是美联储"数量放松"的功德了。
1999年克林顿的《金融服务现代化法案》通过后，美国的银行终于可以解除受《格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案》长达65年的禁闭，堂而皇之地进入市场与投资银行们一争高下了。最近5年中，多数银行表外的规模往往是表内的3-5倍。花旗危机前表内资产7000亿～8000亿美金，而表外的规模或高达3万～4万亿美元。
赚钱的时候，大家都在表外享受泡沫的狂欢，一旦大祸临头，表外的损失是必须回到表内的，于是乎，灾难就从"影子银行"体系传递到了母公司（传统银行体系），就得资产减计，债务的压缩，信贷规模的紧缩，除了还债去杠杆，什么活也干不了。
所以你看到，即便当下联储资产高速扩张了一倍多（从2008年9月的9000亿美金上升至目前的1.9万亿美元），但货币乘数也掉了一半多，所以整体上信用规模并没有扩张，或还在收缩。
我同意，在"影子银行"得到有效清理之前，还会处于紧缩之中，与基础货币发行量互相抵消。未来美国信贷市场即便恢复正常，货币乘数肯定也回不到那个虚妄的繁荣时代的水平。但是我们不能拿现在极端不正常状态的货币乘数说事，现在是传统的金融部门都出现了恐慌，机构都窖藏货币不干活，随着政府兜住毒资产计划的实施，未来应该有一个从极端回复正常的过程。
如此，一旦市场向正常回归，传统的金融机构出来干活，货币乘数反弹，短时间内就可能是滔天洪水。因为货币当局回收流动性的操作远比释放流动性要困难得多。所以说，这种以泡制泡的方式能否成功，未来美元的前景，恶性通胀的前景，会不会是以更大的萧条，来结束这一切以恢复均衡（这时候，美元可能超强势回归，但世界可能已经是满目疮痍），的确令人深忧。
第二种观点认为，"数量宽松"开始在全世界央行蔓延，我们看到，除了美联储以外，英格兰央行、日本央行、瑞士央行纷纷开闸放水，即便是风格最严谨的欧洲央行恐怕也挡不住被一群数量型放松的央行所包围的压力，如果欧元因此再度升值，困境中的欧洲经济将雪上加霜。全球外汇市场的均衡可能是各国货币竞相贬值，在大家都放水的情况下，美元是否就一定贬值呢？
在我看来，有哪国货币当局放水能超过美联储呢？一国货币当局"数量放松"的力度取决于本国主权货币被外部世界所接受的程度，因为这决定了该国本身转嫁风险的能力，如果你滥发货币以后风险转不出去的话，那就是引火烧身。欧洲大陆国家，如德国法国，敢置国内的通胀风险于不顾，去采用过激的货币手段吗？
坦率地讲，只要美联储买公债，某种程度上讲，这就是毒品，沾上了就可能摆脱不掉，不论成败只能一条道走到黑。有一点是肯定的，处于太空中的美国债务率只有通过高通胀才能最终真正被降下来，美国人所有的政策是围绕它的债务在做文章，当美元真正贬下去了造成通货膨胀的时候，吸走的是外部世界的财富，因为美国是最大的债务人。当外部世界的储蓄率和财富掉下来的时候，事实上美国的负债率也就跟从太空安全着陆，美元资产获得了支撑，通货膨胀也就止步了，一个完美的自我平衡机制。
希望在这个通胀过程的实现中，美国人能抓紧时间找到带领世界经济进入下个长周期增长的"载体"（像上世纪80年代信息革命一样），用生产效率提速来填充日益膨胀的货币，否则世界将掉入滞胀的泥潭。这也算是美联储"数量放松"的功德了。
3到5年后不良贷款可能全面爆发
我们也许要转变观念,全球史无前例的主要央行联合发钞、联合托市的行为,扭曲了目前的资本市场价格,让大家沉醉于资产品价格短期反弹带动经济复苏的幻觉之中。而后,我们可能痛苦地从幻觉中醒来,发现必须扭转另一个观念,即违背市场有效性的价格上升,最终会让我们付出更为惨痛的代价。
金融危机是典型的例子。由于全球货币毫无节制的泛滥,一些经典理论如有效市场和股市收益好于债券等受到挑战,资本市场异常现象层出不穷:1971年至2002年美联储利率与按揭利率步调一致,到2002年至2005年期间却出现偏差,美联储从2004年开始加息以来,美国国债长期利率水平出人意料地长期低于短期利率。这是全球对于美国长期债需求过多导致,如此反常让资产证券化获得了沃土,出现高增长、低通胀的喜人局面,但最后一切归于尘土。
目前市场处于又一个异常阶段,短期的扩张政策带动资本市场反弹——上证综指今年一季度涨幅超过30%,H股略受小惠,上涨3%。美国股市从3月6日以来进入反弹区间,标普从3月6日的666.8上涨到3月26日的832.8,同期道指从6469.95反弹到8776点,黄金与美元同步涨跌更是醒目。避险资金进入任何可以避险的市场以求一逞。所有的资金都怀着矛盾的心态火中取栗,他们既不愿意放弃反弹的机会,又无法对需求不足视而不见。
这是经济滞胀出现之前令人欣快的短暂复苏,但最终我们会发现,增长的基础必须依靠企业效率的提高,市场会在短期的提振之后陷入长期的底部盘整状态。
我国股市业已被认为是稳定经济信心的基石,备受呵护,证监会两次辟谣新股IPO上市,创业板上市分流的资金被限制在最小范围之内,300家公司所吸纳的资金不及一个大盘股的说法四处流传。最让人振奋的当属3月份银行信贷增量可能超过2月份,突破万亿以上的规模。
刺激政策造成了不同的产品价格效应,由银行信贷和政策支撑的资本市场反弹市还在持续,国储收购的铜、铝等期货价格震荡上行,钢铁在短期上涨后跌回低位;为帮助大型炼化企业消化过剩产能,政府有关部门在提高油品价格后,又免征17%的出口增值税,帮助企业渡过危机。里昂证券发布的中国采购经理人指数环比下降,显示民企状况依然不佳。
两则新闻让人对于信贷扩张后的不良贷款率产生担忧。
3月末,上海液晶龙头企业上海广电集团因资不抵债被上海仪电控股集团公司托管,直接牵涉沪上至少8家银行的大额贷款安全。上广电和大小子公司的银行总贷款量已超过100亿元,两笔银团贷款超过50亿元,追逐大项目、国资项目的银行业几乎被一网打尽。技术更新跟不上、成本失控、国企效率低下、子公司关联担保等企业痼疾一一浮出水面。银行现在惟一的指望就是通过地方政府的托管、重组来盘活资产。
另一则新闻则是深圳国资委被指“封杀”兴业银行。2005年,当时兴业广州分行将深圳机场总经理崔绍先以骗贷罪告上广东省高院,深圳机场的主管部门深圳国资委据称曾对兴业银行深圳分行下了隐形封杀令,致使后者流失20余亿元国企存款。2009年3月初,深圳机场的上述官司败诉后,又使兴业流失30余亿元国企存款。不过,深圳国资委对此回应称,如有转出存款完全是企业行为,不存在所谓的“封杀令”。
如果说第一个案例印证了政府主导、支持的项目未必可靠,第二个案例则印证了在中国的信贷市场,银行面对国资处于相对弱势地位。行政主导的国有项目贷款、银行对政府信用的追逐,以及国资与银行之间剪不断、理还乱的维权关系,导致金融系统的隐性风险居高不下。银行内部人员也坦承,目前信贷结构极不合理,却无力改变。
银监会副主席蒋定之曾表示,我国GDP每降低1个百分点,银行不良贷款率将上升0.4个百分点。我国2008年GDP官方数据为9%,今年力保8%,截至2008年12月末,我国境内商业银行（包括国有商业银行、股份制商业银行、城市商业银行、农村商业银行和外资银行）不良贷款余额5681.8亿元。目前拜信贷扩张所赐,银行坏账率下降,等到三五年后贷款质量暴露之时呢？
相信到那时只有靠资产证券化来解决了,不良资产管理公司又有了大笔的生意。
金融危机是典型的例子。由于全球货币毫无节制的泛滥,一些经典理论如有效市场和股市收益好于债券等受到挑战,资本市场异常现象层出不穷:1971年至2002年美联储利率与按揭利率步调一致,到2002年至2005年期间却出现偏差,美联储从2004年开始加息以来,美国国债长期利率水平出人意料地长期低于短期利率。这是全球对于美国长期债需求过多导致,如此反常让资产证券化获得了沃土,出现高增长、低通胀的喜人局面,但最后一切归于尘土。
目前市场处于又一个异常阶段,短期的扩张政策带动资本市场反弹——上证综指今年一季度涨幅超过30%,H股略受小惠,上涨3%。美国股市从3月6日以来进入反弹区间,标普从3月6日的666.8上涨到3月26日的832.8,同期道指从6469.95反弹到8776点,黄金与美元同步涨跌更是醒目。避险资金进入任何可以避险的市场以求一逞。所有的资金都怀着矛盾的心态火中取栗,他们既不愿意放弃反弹的机会,又无法对需求不足视而不见。
这是经济滞胀出现之前令人欣快的短暂复苏,但最终我们会发现,增长的基础必须依靠企业效率的提高,市场会在短期的提振之后陷入长期的底部盘整状态。
我国股市业已被认为是稳定经济信心的基石,备受呵护,证监会两次辟谣新股IPO上市,创业板上市分流的资金被限制在最小范围之内,300家公司所吸纳的资金不及一个大盘股的说法四处流传。最让人振奋的当属3月份银行信贷增量可能超过2月份,突破万亿以上的规模。
刺激政策造成了不同的产品价格效应,由银行信贷和政策支撑的资本市场反弹市还在持续,国储收购的铜、铝等期货价格震荡上行,钢铁在短期上涨后跌回低位;为帮助大型炼化企业消化过剩产能,政府有关部门在提高油品价格后,又免征17%的出口增值税,帮助企业渡过危机。里昂证券发布的中国采购经理人指数环比下降,显示民企状况依然不佳。
两则新闻让人对于信贷扩张后的不良贷款率产生担忧。
3月末,上海液晶龙头企业上海广电集团因资不抵债被上海仪电控股集团公司托管,直接牵涉沪上至少8家银行的大额贷款安全。上广电和大小子公司的银行总贷款量已超过100亿元,两笔银团贷款超过50亿元,追逐大项目、国资项目的银行业几乎被一网打尽。技术更新跟不上、成本失控、国企效率低下、子公司关联担保等企业痼疾一一浮出水面。银行现在惟一的指望就是通过地方政府的托管、重组来盘活资产。
另一则新闻则是深圳国资委被指“封杀”兴业银行。2005年,当时兴业广州分行将深圳机场总经理崔绍先以骗贷罪告上广东省高院,深圳机场的主管部门深圳国资委据称曾对兴业银行深圳分行下了隐形封杀令,致使后者流失20余亿元国企存款。2009年3月初,深圳机场的上述官司败诉后,又使兴业流失30余亿元国企存款。不过,深圳国资委对此回应称,如有转出存款完全是企业行为,不存在所谓的“封杀令”。
如果说第一个案例印证了政府主导、支持的项目未必可靠,第二个案例则印证了在中国的信贷市场,银行面对国资处于相对弱势地位。行政主导的国有项目贷款、银行对政府信用的追逐,以及国资与银行之间剪不断、理还乱的维权关系,导致金融系统的隐性风险居高不下。银行内部人员也坦承,目前信贷结构极不合理,却无力改变。
银监会副主席蒋定之曾表示,我国GDP每降低1个百分点,银行不良贷款率将上升0.4个百分点。我国2008年GDP官方数据为9%,今年力保8%,截至2008年12月末,我国境内商业银行（包括国有商业银行、股份制商业银行、城市商业银行、农村商业银行和外资银行）不良贷款余额5681.8亿元。目前拜信贷扩张所赐,银行坏账率下降,等到三五年后贷款质量暴露之时呢？
相信到那时只有靠资产证券化来解决了,不良资产管理公司又有了大笔的生意。
为何穷人喜欢垃圾股
一项新的研究表明，彩民在进入股市之后，通常会选择像彩票一样的股票，即基本上像彩票一样只赔不赚。也许我们不应该只关注彩民，因为大部分股民中似乎都有一些这样的成份。
经典经济学是建立在理性人的假设之上的，但三十年来行为金融学的研究表明，人们并不总是做出理性决策。比如研究显示，人们从损失感受到的痛苦是从盈利感受到的快乐的两倍。这就使得股票投资者往往舍不得割肉，直到跌得不行了才割在地板上，同时获利股票又卖得太早。另外，人们倾向于给不太可能的事件赋予过高的价值，对平常事件赋予价值过低。他们欣然地飙车到机场，但却担心飞机起飞后是否会出事。
彩票中同时包含这两种倾向。损失很小而且可以提前预知，收益尽管可能性极低但金额巨大。正如纽约的彩票行销人员所提醒的，你所需要的只是一美元和一个梦想。由于人们对亏损的态度部分受其财富限定，彩票微不足道的成本对于那些经济状况不好的人尤其有吸引力。长期以来的研究结果表明，很大一部分彩票购买者都是穷人、年轻人、教育水平低的人和少数民族成员。
得克萨斯大学的阿洛克-库玛(Alok Kumar)在一篇论文中尝试将彩票和选股进行类比，该文将发表在今年的《金融杂志》上。他对彩票型股票的定义是这样的：价格低、波动大、历史回报率相当反常。利用从一家大型零售券商获得的数据，他报告了四个主要发现。
首先，机构会回避彩票性股票，但个人投资者趋之若骛。彩票型股票占整个市场权重的1.25%，占机构投资组合的0.76%，但占个人投资者持股的3.74%。
第二，库玛发现，那些生活在高收入人群附近的低收入人群更容易偏好垃圾股，似乎是攀比心理导致了他们无所顾忌地投资。
第三个发现是，彩票型股票每年收益率平均比普通股票低4个百分点。这样糟糕的结果几乎是第一点的一个必然结果。因为如果投资者配置过多的彩票型股票，这些股票就会比它们应该具有的价值更加昂贵。
第四个发现对所有投资者都很重要，尤其是现在。库玛报告说，当经济指标(比如失业率)变得糟糕，投资者就会大批买进彩票型股票。
如果说对彩票有兴趣的是那些经济上处于劣势的人，那么在道指从2007年10月高点下跌40%多以后，也许我们所有人的优势都减少了。但是要警惕那些低价投机股的诱惑，把赌博留给他人吧。价值型股票才是最有可能替我们挽回财富损失的手段，而不是那些垃圾股。
经典经济学是建立在理性人的假设之上的，但三十年来行为金融学的研究表明，人们并不总是做出理性决策。比如研究显示，人们从损失感受到的痛苦是从盈利感受到的快乐的两倍。这就使得股票投资者往往舍不得割肉，直到跌得不行了才割在地板上，同时获利股票又卖得太早。另外，人们倾向于给不太可能的事件赋予过高的价值，对平常事件赋予价值过低。他们欣然地飙车到机场，但却担心飞机起飞后是否会出事。
彩票中同时包含这两种倾向。损失很小而且可以提前预知，收益尽管可能性极低但金额巨大。正如纽约的彩票行销人员所提醒的，你所需要的只是一美元和一个梦想。由于人们对亏损的态度部分受其财富限定，彩票微不足道的成本对于那些经济状况不好的人尤其有吸引力。长期以来的研究结果表明，很大一部分彩票购买者都是穷人、年轻人、教育水平低的人和少数民族成员。
得克萨斯大学的阿洛克-库玛(Alok Kumar)在一篇论文中尝试将彩票和选股进行类比，该文将发表在今年的《金融杂志》上。他对彩票型股票的定义是这样的：价格低、波动大、历史回报率相当反常。利用从一家大型零售券商获得的数据，他报告了四个主要发现。
首先，机构会回避彩票性股票，但个人投资者趋之若骛。彩票型股票占整个市场权重的1.25%，占机构投资组合的0.76%，但占个人投资者持股的3.74%。
第二，库玛发现，那些生活在高收入人群附近的低收入人群更容易偏好垃圾股，似乎是攀比心理导致了他们无所顾忌地投资。
第三个发现是，彩票型股票每年收益率平均比普通股票低4个百分点。这样糟糕的结果几乎是第一点的一个必然结果。因为如果投资者配置过多的彩票型股票，这些股票就会比它们应该具有的价值更加昂贵。
第四个发现对所有投资者都很重要，尤其是现在。库玛报告说，当经济指标(比如失业率)变得糟糕，投资者就会大批买进彩票型股票。
如果说对彩票有兴趣的是那些经济上处于劣势的人，那么在道指从2007年10月高点下跌40%多以后，也许我们所有人的优势都减少了。但是要警惕那些低价投机股的诱惑，把赌博留给他人吧。价值型股票才是最有可能替我们挽回财富损失的手段，而不是那些垃圾股。
极度保守的投资风格并不妨碍你获得超越市场的回报
别被“最糟的一年”、“愚蠢的投资”等说法蒙蔽，2008年对于巴菲特来说绝非惨淡
当巴菲特发言，人们迷信——即使他在谈论自己的错误。
美国时间2月28日，随着这个时代最伟大的投资者发布其2008年度《致股东书》，几乎所有媒体和投资者都将目光放在了信中的两个定性之语上：这是巴菲特执掌伯克希尔·哈萨维公司以来“最糟的一年”，以及“2008年我做了一些愚蠢的投资”。
投资者和评论界似乎就此获得了宣判“股神老矣”的通行证。成功预言本轮经济危机中一系列连锁反应而被喻为“毁灭博士”的马克·法布尔在电视上称：“巴菲特买进后长期持有的方法论已经失效，这方法已经失效十年了，未来十年仍将失效。”而资本市场对于巴菲特的信任也跌至八年来最低谷：2009年伯克希尔·哈萨维的最低股价为70050美元，较之2007年底的高点148220美元跌去了53%，这一跌幅与道琼斯指数从2007年底14000点跌至今天的6544点相当。
的确，对于一名44年保持20.3%复合增长率的投资者，其公司净资产在一年间缩水9.6%（减少115亿美元），绝非佳绩。而在油价高峰时期买下了康菲石油公司5.7％的股份，致使年终时损失26亿美元，也确实堪称“重大错误”。但真到了将巴菲特请下神坛的时刻？
不妨将目光稍从巴菲特的错误上移开，随《环球企业家》一起仔细阅读最新这份《致股东书》，你会发现这很可能并非巴菲特“最糟的一年”，而且你依然能从中学到许多。
一如往常，《致股东书》的第一页是1965年以来伯克希尔哈萨维每年的净资产变化及标准普尔500指数的变化。2008年对应的两个数字都算得上难看：伯克希尔哈萨维的净资产缩水9.6%，而标准普尔500指数下跌了37%。但这意味着，巴菲特不仅在去年“跑赢大市”，其相对收益更是高达27.4%。更为有趣的是，这是过去44年中，伯克希尔·哈萨维超越标普500第七多的年份。像评判所有投资者时一样，人们衡量巴菲特的标准也并非他是否赚钱，而是他能否比整个市场赚得更多。而在过去五年，巴菲特与标普500的赛跑并未取得实质性的胜利：2003和2004年他分别落后对方7.7%和0.4%，即使2005至2007年超出了对方，也不过是1.5%、2.6%和5.5%的微弱优势。也就是说，自2003年全球经济复苏以来的本轮经济周期中，2008年是巴菲特表现最佳的一年。
历史上，巴菲特相对收益最高的年份是1977年，超出了标普500指数39.3%。接下来成绩最好的五个年份是1981（+36.4%）、1976（+35.7%）、2002（+32.1%）、1966（+32.0%）、1974（+31.9%）。值得注意的是，这些成绩通常发生于大熊市或经济危机之后的年份：2002年是美国在科网泡沫、安然丑闻和9-11事件后信心崩溃时期；1974年是上世纪仅次于“大萧条”最严重的熊市；1981年则是美国史上通胀及失业率最为失控的一年。这完全符合巴菲特在1960年对个人投资方法的一个总结：“在熊市中取得优秀的业绩，在牛市中取得平均业绩。”
不可否认，伯克希尔·哈萨维的净资产毕竟减少了115亿美元。但不妨思考下这一事实：在70年以来最严重的经济衰退中，作为一名投资者，巴菲特的损失竟然没有超过10%。当然，人们可以说，巴氏所秉承的价值投资原本就是一种轻股票价格、重真实价值的方法论，但这一成绩在所有价值投资者中仍是罕见的：在1974年的股市崩盘中，日后成为巴菲特搭档的查理·芒格当时操盘的私募基金损失过半，而另一个著名的价值投资机构红杉基金（并非风险投资公司红杉资本）则在1974年时更是险遭清盘。究其原因，无论当年的芒格还是红杉基金，都更倾向于选择那些比资本市场本身波动性更强的股票，以获得超额回报。
巴菲特的经验却证明了，极度保守的投资风格并不妨碍你获得超越市场的回报。或者说，影响你取得超常回报的并非保守的投资，而是错误的投资。
当巴菲特发言，人们迷信——即使他在谈论自己的错误。
美国时间2月28日，随着这个时代最伟大的投资者发布其2008年度《致股东书》，几乎所有媒体和投资者都将目光放在了信中的两个定性之语上：这是巴菲特执掌伯克希尔·哈萨维公司以来“最糟的一年”，以及“2008年我做了一些愚蠢的投资”。
投资者和评论界似乎就此获得了宣判“股神老矣”的通行证。成功预言本轮经济危机中一系列连锁反应而被喻为“毁灭博士”的马克·法布尔在电视上称：“巴菲特买进后长期持有的方法论已经失效，这方法已经失效十年了，未来十年仍将失效。”而资本市场对于巴菲特的信任也跌至八年来最低谷：2009年伯克希尔·哈萨维的最低股价为70050美元，较之2007年底的高点148220美元跌去了53%，这一跌幅与道琼斯指数从2007年底14000点跌至今天的6544点相当。
的确，对于一名44年保持20.3%复合增长率的投资者，其公司净资产在一年间缩水9.6%（减少115亿美元），绝非佳绩。而在油价高峰时期买下了康菲石油公司5.7％的股份，致使年终时损失26亿美元，也确实堪称“重大错误”。但真到了将巴菲特请下神坛的时刻？
不妨将目光稍从巴菲特的错误上移开，随《环球企业家》一起仔细阅读最新这份《致股东书》，你会发现这很可能并非巴菲特“最糟的一年”，而且你依然能从中学到许多。
一如往常，《致股东书》的第一页是1965年以来伯克希尔哈萨维每年的净资产变化及标准普尔500指数的变化。2008年对应的两个数字都算得上难看：伯克希尔哈萨维的净资产缩水9.6%，而标准普尔500指数下跌了37%。但这意味着，巴菲特不仅在去年“跑赢大市”，其相对收益更是高达27.4%。更为有趣的是，这是过去44年中，伯克希尔·哈萨维超越标普500第七多的年份。像评判所有投资者时一样，人们衡量巴菲特的标准也并非他是否赚钱，而是他能否比整个市场赚得更多。而在过去五年，巴菲特与标普500的赛跑并未取得实质性的胜利：2003和2004年他分别落后对方7.7%和0.4%，即使2005至2007年超出了对方，也不过是1.5%、2.6%和5.5%的微弱优势。也就是说，自2003年全球经济复苏以来的本轮经济周期中，2008年是巴菲特表现最佳的一年。
历史上，巴菲特相对收益最高的年份是1977年，超出了标普500指数39.3%。接下来成绩最好的五个年份是1981（+36.4%）、1976（+35.7%）、2002（+32.1%）、1966（+32.0%）、1974（+31.9%）。值得注意的是，这些成绩通常发生于大熊市或经济危机之后的年份：2002年是美国在科网泡沫、安然丑闻和9-11事件后信心崩溃时期；1974年是上世纪仅次于“大萧条”最严重的熊市；1981年则是美国史上通胀及失业率最为失控的一年。这完全符合巴菲特在1960年对个人投资方法的一个总结：“在熊市中取得优秀的业绩，在牛市中取得平均业绩。”
不可否认，伯克希尔·哈萨维的净资产毕竟减少了115亿美元。但不妨思考下这一事实：在70年以来最严重的经济衰退中，作为一名投资者，巴菲特的损失竟然没有超过10%。当然，人们可以说，巴氏所秉承的价值投资原本就是一种轻股票价格、重真实价值的方法论，但这一成绩在所有价值投资者中仍是罕见的：在1974年的股市崩盘中，日后成为巴菲特搭档的查理·芒格当时操盘的私募基金损失过半，而另一个著名的价值投资机构红杉基金（并非风险投资公司红杉资本）则在1974年时更是险遭清盘。究其原因，无论当年的芒格还是红杉基金，都更倾向于选择那些比资本市场本身波动性更强的股票，以获得超额回报。
巴菲特的经验却证明了，极度保守的投资风格并不妨碍你获得超越市场的回报。或者说，影响你取得超常回报的并非保守的投资，而是错误的投资。
Friday, April 10, 2009
The Problem with "Bear Market Rallies"
Of late, Mr. Market has seemingly begun to look a little more on the sunny side, instead of remaining moody and depressed which was his prevailing mood for the past 17 months. Just to remind, the Singapore Stock Market's index (STI) has risen in 4 straight weeks, with only 5 "down" days out of a total of 20 trading days (meaning 25% down, 75% up). Many may recall that it was only on March 6, 2009 when the Index hit a 5.5 year-low (of 1,456.95), after which it has so far rallied around 25% to its current level of 1,820.87. The sharp rebound has had many pundits and investors shaking their heads and rolling their eyes, and provided no end of amusement to the author of this blog (yours truly). I will proceed to explain why below, so dear readers, please be patient and read on.....
Interestingly, most analysts and economists who were interviewed were decidedly bearish and pessimistic. They pointed out (rightly so) that the economy had yet to bottom, manufacturing data was still weak, exports had fallen off a cliff and unemployment (in the USA and Singapore) was set to increase even further. Against such a bleak backdrop, how could rallies possibly sustain and how could Mr. Market be perceived as being more sunny and optimistic for an extended period of time ? The even more cynical ones point out that corporate results reporting season is due in a few weeks' time, and the probability of more companies reporting dismal earnings and lower profits would cause "reality" to sink in and give Mr. Market a blow in the face for being too exuberant. In short, there's nothing much to look forward to given that data, numbers, facts, figures and sentiment are so poor right now. Even if there was some hope that things were "bottoming out", these experts are quick to point out that more certainty needs to come along in the form of hard data to justify any cheer that the gloom is about to lift.
The above paragraph shows the distinct difficulty in what investors would term the "tricks" of Mr. Market. To quote a very over-used cliched line: "Bull Markets climb a wall of worry". This basically means that a bull market has to overcome an amazing load of negative news, all the while reaching for greater heights and overcoming adversity (and doubt). The greatest difficulty faced by pundits and seasoned experts who observe markets is in differentiating between a bear market rally (of which many occurred during The Great Depression) and the start of a genuine bull market (or even if not, at least an end to the current bear market). Understandably, the confusion often lies in the fact that no one can predict future turn of events well enough to state if economies will recover, and how soon that will be, and to what extent. Investors are also unaware if markets have priced in the most pessimistic scenario in terms of earnings growth and industry doldrums, and thus prices only have one direction to go in future which is: higher. This confusion and lack of clarity is the main reason which keeps investors from placing their money in good, high quality companies for fear that "the bottom has not been reached".
In order to adopt good value investing practices, one must identify suitable value and purchase at a price which provides a decent margin of safety. In the case of Mr. Market's moods, I have often used the STI as a rough barometer of sentiment, and thus have made my purchases on days when the Mr. Market is pessimistic, rather than when he is exuberant. The fear that "the bottom" is still out there does not make sense to me because I believe it is impossible to time the market - thus an investor should just look out for good value and purchase within his means. If we have evaluated a good company and understand its business characteristics and are confident with its prospects, we should feel comfortable buying at current depressed valuations. Too many people live with the perpetual fear that Mr Market's moods will determine if their investments will do well or badly, but then one must remember that it is his pocketbook which we have to take advantage of, and we must NOT be lulled by his schizoprehnic mood swings.
As long as one purchases with a value mindset, one does not have to care if a rally is a "bear market rally" or a "genuine rally". That is the focus and discussion for analysts, pundits and prognosticators who make a living out of predicting and commenting. They are fun to read and amusing to follow but offer no real value in terms of building wealth through the ownership of equities, as most of them are armed with a trading mindset to boot (e.g. sell into the next bear rally after prices have risen 10% etc). With the fricitonal costs relating to frequent trading, volatile market mood swings and the risk of getting whipsawed often by changing sentiments, I find it hard to see how most traders can consistently make money.
In adhering to my value investing principles, I have, of late, also learnt more about the way businesses and companies function during long periods of drought where financing dries up, as well as how companies cope with adversity (e.g. slashing selling prices, cutting costs aggressively by retrenching). It has been a good learning experience and I now understand businesses better than before and it will assist me in my evaluation of more companies to own in future. I am glad that I have managed to escape a severe permanent loss in capital through the concepts of value and margin of safety - it could have been a lot worse had I been speculating recklessly or if I had purchased "over-hyped" companies with flawed business models.
Interestingly, most analysts and economists who were interviewed were decidedly bearish and pessimistic. They pointed out (rightly so) that the economy had yet to bottom, manufacturing data was still weak, exports had fallen off a cliff and unemployment (in the USA and Singapore) was set to increase even further. Against such a bleak backdrop, how could rallies possibly sustain and how could Mr. Market be perceived as being more sunny and optimistic for an extended period of time ? The even more cynical ones point out that corporate results reporting season is due in a few weeks' time, and the probability of more companies reporting dismal earnings and lower profits would cause "reality" to sink in and give Mr. Market a blow in the face for being too exuberant. In short, there's nothing much to look forward to given that data, numbers, facts, figures and sentiment are so poor right now. Even if there was some hope that things were "bottoming out", these experts are quick to point out that more certainty needs to come along in the form of hard data to justify any cheer that the gloom is about to lift.
The above paragraph shows the distinct difficulty in what investors would term the "tricks" of Mr. Market. To quote a very over-used cliched line: "Bull Markets climb a wall of worry". This basically means that a bull market has to overcome an amazing load of negative news, all the while reaching for greater heights and overcoming adversity (and doubt). The greatest difficulty faced by pundits and seasoned experts who observe markets is in differentiating between a bear market rally (of which many occurred during The Great Depression) and the start of a genuine bull market (or even if not, at least an end to the current bear market). Understandably, the confusion often lies in the fact that no one can predict future turn of events well enough to state if economies will recover, and how soon that will be, and to what extent. Investors are also unaware if markets have priced in the most pessimistic scenario in terms of earnings growth and industry doldrums, and thus prices only have one direction to go in future which is: higher. This confusion and lack of clarity is the main reason which keeps investors from placing their money in good, high quality companies for fear that "the bottom has not been reached".
In order to adopt good value investing practices, one must identify suitable value and purchase at a price which provides a decent margin of safety. In the case of Mr. Market's moods, I have often used the STI as a rough barometer of sentiment, and thus have made my purchases on days when the Mr. Market is pessimistic, rather than when he is exuberant. The fear that "the bottom" is still out there does not make sense to me because I believe it is impossible to time the market - thus an investor should just look out for good value and purchase within his means. If we have evaluated a good company and understand its business characteristics and are confident with its prospects, we should feel comfortable buying at current depressed valuations. Too many people live with the perpetual fear that Mr Market's moods will determine if their investments will do well or badly, but then one must remember that it is his pocketbook which we have to take advantage of, and we must NOT be lulled by his schizoprehnic mood swings.
As long as one purchases with a value mindset, one does not have to care if a rally is a "bear market rally" or a "genuine rally". That is the focus and discussion for analysts, pundits and prognosticators who make a living out of predicting and commenting. They are fun to read and amusing to follow but offer no real value in terms of building wealth through the ownership of equities, as most of them are armed with a trading mindset to boot (e.g. sell into the next bear rally after prices have risen 10% etc). With the fricitonal costs relating to frequent trading, volatile market mood swings and the risk of getting whipsawed often by changing sentiments, I find it hard to see how most traders can consistently make money.
In adhering to my value investing principles, I have, of late, also learnt more about the way businesses and companies function during long periods of drought where financing dries up, as well as how companies cope with adversity (e.g. slashing selling prices, cutting costs aggressively by retrenching). It has been a good learning experience and I now understand businesses better than before and it will assist me in my evaluation of more companies to own in future. I am glad that I have managed to escape a severe permanent loss in capital through the concepts of value and margin of safety - it could have been a lot worse had I been speculating recklessly or if I had purchased "over-hyped" companies with flawed business models.
Thursday, April 9, 2009
全球通胀不可避免 股票投资是最佳出路
今天有一条新闻“联合国特别报告员说全球粮食危机尚未缓解”：联合国粮食权问题特别报告员奥利维耶·德许特6日说，尽管国际社会已采取一些措施应对全球粮食危机，但这一危机还没有缓解，今年的形势将更为严峻…他说：目前全球约有10亿人正处于饥饿状态或濒临饥饿状态边缘，平均每6秒钟就有一名儿童死于营养不良。受价格浮动以及气候变化等因素影响，2009年粮食危机将进一步加剧，其中贫穷国家受到的冲击尤为严重。
大家都知道我一直认为粮食等农产品存在危机隐患——供求紧张但价格偏低。因此，我自然觉得该联合国官员的看法是很清醒、很理智的。粮食的确是短缺的，联合国的粮食权问题专员不会欺骗我们。短缺还表现在全球的粮食储备处于30年来的最低水平。而造成粮食短缺的原因，自然气候因素当然是原因之一，但主要的还是人为因素，那就是近20年来世界各国错误的农业政策以及对粮食危机的漠视。在虚拟经济反客为主的时代，一个典型的后果就是粮食价格持续偏低，这才是粮食供给和储备不足的根源。现在，考虑人口增长、粮食生化能源生产不断扩大以及营养结构的变化等新增粮食需求因素，应该是“市场先生”奋起反击的时候了。
很多人不愿意主动承认和面对这个显而易见的事实以及已经近在眼前的危险，就象我们曾经不愿意承认过去的所有严重失衡一样。市场危机之所以屡屡发生，就是因为这个人类通病。
在今天的一个内部研讨会上，我清晰地表明了自己的观点：未来的全球通胀几乎是不可避免的！不承认这个结果，任何人都无法解释目前全球史无前例“无限量救市”资金的最终出路。这些被纯粹市场学派看来毫无意义却惊人庞大的资金注入，注定被分散沉淀在市场的各个角落，而无原则地救助本身只能延长私人经济部门本就无法有效缩短的休整和观望期。这甚至让我想起了农夫与蛇的故事。那些冻僵了的资本家们，终有一天要反咬一口，让善良的大众再次遭受致命的威胁。想想尚未过去的经济危机和以往几年资本家和资本市场的表现，我甚至敢打赌说：即使现在已经苏醒，他们也不会立即行动起来，因为贪婪的本性会驱使他们继续利用他人无知的善意隔岸观火、养精蓄锐。
在这个看似平静的阶段，一些叫做“政府”的牧羊倌们却还在极力营造祥和气氛，驱赶着牛羊们成群结队地进入猎物们的伏击圈。殊不知，那些虎视眈眈的虎狼之辈已经越聚越多，它们阴暗地躲在森林或山石的一角，虎视眈眈、蠢蠢欲动，耐心等待着人们放松最后的警惕。总有一天，虎狼们将咆哮而出，牛羊根本无所逃遁，就连牧童也奈何不得，弄不好，还会一起丢了性命。
我相信欧洲要求加强金融监管的声音发自肺腑、切中时弊，但是美国会放弃金融这个立国之本吗？欧洲的状况也比美国好不了多少，最终还不是有心无力？欧美国家为代表的无原则救助，实际上早已宣告了他们对于“市场”和“资本”的妥协，因为发达国家的政府无一例外地须要依赖资本和资本家才能得以生存和延续，还因为金融资本早已绑架了实体经济，令你不救不行，你不给他们空间，你就别无选择。
所以奥巴马鼓励别人买股票，所以奥巴马允许美联储加印美元，所以直到现在你还看到英国、澳洲等还在降息，而美国和日本的利率早已降无可降。
温家宝总理谈信心、看股市；在中国，官方实际上已经认可了经济增长高于一切，所以才会不惜代价，所以继去年12月的高增后，才有今年一季度贷款的“意外”猛增—今年1、2月份,银行业金融机构新增贷款分别达到1.6万亿元和1万亿元；票据融资则分别达到6239亿元和4870亿元，占当月新增信贷分别达到38%和45%；而3月份新增贷款或达1.8万亿元，同比增长约6.6倍。一季度贷款总额已经超过全年新增5万亿贷款的8成。即便从二季度开始控制，初步预计全年贷款增长仍有望增加到6万亿元以上(2007、2008年新增贷款分别是3.6万亿元和4.9万亿元)。实际上几乎所有官方机构都在刻意营造繁荣，当然这建立在“振兴经济和刺激消费”的共识之上。这与发达国家重点救助金融机构的思路并非一致，但制造未来流动性严重过剩的结果却殊途同归。
不出意外，未来的半年内，中国的利率仍有下降的必要——这最好赶在通胀之前，尤其是，高达15.5%的存款准备金率，会不断下行到10%以下。中期来看，则国民收入都有大幅增加的必要及可能，这是启动内需、经济转型的必要之举——光靠农民和农村市场是远远不够的。据本人了解，军队的工资最近又宣布上涨了，是近年的第二次上调。一个三级士官的月薪已经由其三、四年前的不足1千元，上涨到了目前的3千多元，而且还会发放一年的补差工资差。这说明，未来各界薪酬都有上涨的必要和可能。只能说，购买力将会越来越强，流动性还会越来越充足，曾经短暂冲击人们神经的通缩，已经大势已去了。综合来看，我们又如何能逃过未来的通胀之劫呢？
再来审视一下美元政策及其对通胀预期的影响。尽管由于弱势美元而使得美国遭遇了世界各国的一致指责，但是，我们至今几乎看不到美国有任何改弦更张的可能性。一个濒临破产的国家，必然会被迫把美元的铸币权用到极致。百年一遇金融和经济危机的客观环境，决定了“狗急跳墙”的事情随时都会发生。你站在一个饿极了的“狼”面前，还在幻想他不要吃掉你的牛羊，这似乎很不容易、很不现实。那么，美元的持续弱势和继续下跌应该是可以期待的——这取决于各国货币政策的跟进情况。而多数国际贸易品以及主要的大宗商品，中期来看，都无法改变美元标价的事实。美元已经充斥全球，还注定要继续放水。美元下跌了，商品价格不涨，这合理吗？智商最差的人，都知道买入产品和资产保值。下一轮的通胀仍然主要是美元的货币现象，其他国家的货币政策，作用有限。
有一个反对通胀预期的思路是：当经济走出低谷之时，假使各国开始回收多余的流动性，那么，通胀就会被遏制。这话看似有理，然覆水难收。我反问一句：工资上涨容易还是下降容易呢？还有一句中国的古话，叫做：“从俭入奢易，从奢入俭难”。什么意思？很明显，就是回收流动不是没有必要，但是其回收难度可想而知。即便回收，也不会像全球救市一样达成如此广泛的一致和高效。因此，个人判断，未来各国遏制流动性的任务十分艰巨，因此对未来通胀的影响很小，至少是缓慢或滞后的。
由此再反观粮食等农产品价格，你就会发现，超级流动性这个“烈火”正在无限接近总量短缺而价格偏低的粮食市场这个“干柴”，一个新的危机正在酝酿之中，形势几乎是一触即发。可怕的是，似乎没有任何因素可以阻止这一切的发生。
曾经的原油、铁矿石和有色金属，都曾经涨到了天价。遗憾的是，经济学家们不承认这是“通货膨胀”，虽然它确实是供求关系和美元货币双重因素共同引发的实实在在的通货膨胀。因为全世界研究通胀的专家们，眼睛都只盯着那个不但滞后而且本来已经很不重要的CPI。由于粮食价格低迷，加之中国廉价制造品充斥世界，导致了CPI在过去几年时间里都无法及时给这些僵化的家伙们报警，这是导致全球各国都对金融危机疏于防范的理论根源。未来的粮价一旦开涨，将成为推动CPI指数的强劲动力，所以CPI将还给这些人一个公平，让他们看到“实实在在的通货膨胀”。
粮食价格是未来通胀的先锋。所以英明的中国政府已经派员检查粮库了。李克强说：部分粮库可能存在空仓现象；而且，去冬今春以来粮食主产区遭遇50年大旱，夏季粮食生产存在不确定性。人们还在等待，等待空仓的事情被曝光，其实，有也未必曝光。为什么说有呢？因为囤粮一直就不是个“合算”的事。问题的根源在价格上、在过往20年的老观念上。夏粮到底会减产多少呢？无法定量分析，因此也不下结论。至少，增产的局面难以维持了，这就是危险的信号，足以打破脆弱的平衡。除非谎报军情，不过，那样做的危害会更大。
目前的种种迹象还表明，中国有望成为全球的投资热土，未来的外部流动性冲击对防范和抑制通胀，构成又一个不容乐观的因素。
毕竟不是一家一国的事情，粮食市场是世界性的，发令枪不知道最终会发自哪里。是福是祸，全看应对之策。不过，同样的等待，有些人习惯于为了不确定性而等待；而有些人，则为了确定性而等待。
有人说：恶性通货膨胀真的就无以逃避了吗？非也。
去看看投资大师们的忠告吧：“上帝制造了通货膨胀这个坏蛋，也留下了股票投资这条活路。历史证明，上帝庇佑了那些在灾难中持有股票的人们。”
大家都知道我一直认为粮食等农产品存在危机隐患——供求紧张但价格偏低。因此，我自然觉得该联合国官员的看法是很清醒、很理智的。粮食的确是短缺的，联合国的粮食权问题专员不会欺骗我们。短缺还表现在全球的粮食储备处于30年来的最低水平。而造成粮食短缺的原因，自然气候因素当然是原因之一，但主要的还是人为因素，那就是近20年来世界各国错误的农业政策以及对粮食危机的漠视。在虚拟经济反客为主的时代，一个典型的后果就是粮食价格持续偏低，这才是粮食供给和储备不足的根源。现在，考虑人口增长、粮食生化能源生产不断扩大以及营养结构的变化等新增粮食需求因素，应该是“市场先生”奋起反击的时候了。
很多人不愿意主动承认和面对这个显而易见的事实以及已经近在眼前的危险，就象我们曾经不愿意承认过去的所有严重失衡一样。市场危机之所以屡屡发生，就是因为这个人类通病。
在今天的一个内部研讨会上，我清晰地表明了自己的观点：未来的全球通胀几乎是不可避免的！不承认这个结果，任何人都无法解释目前全球史无前例“无限量救市”资金的最终出路。这些被纯粹市场学派看来毫无意义却惊人庞大的资金注入，注定被分散沉淀在市场的各个角落，而无原则地救助本身只能延长私人经济部门本就无法有效缩短的休整和观望期。这甚至让我想起了农夫与蛇的故事。那些冻僵了的资本家们，终有一天要反咬一口，让善良的大众再次遭受致命的威胁。想想尚未过去的经济危机和以往几年资本家和资本市场的表现，我甚至敢打赌说：即使现在已经苏醒，他们也不会立即行动起来，因为贪婪的本性会驱使他们继续利用他人无知的善意隔岸观火、养精蓄锐。
在这个看似平静的阶段，一些叫做“政府”的牧羊倌们却还在极力营造祥和气氛，驱赶着牛羊们成群结队地进入猎物们的伏击圈。殊不知，那些虎视眈眈的虎狼之辈已经越聚越多，它们阴暗地躲在森林或山石的一角，虎视眈眈、蠢蠢欲动，耐心等待着人们放松最后的警惕。总有一天，虎狼们将咆哮而出，牛羊根本无所逃遁，就连牧童也奈何不得，弄不好，还会一起丢了性命。
我相信欧洲要求加强金融监管的声音发自肺腑、切中时弊，但是美国会放弃金融这个立国之本吗？欧洲的状况也比美国好不了多少，最终还不是有心无力？欧美国家为代表的无原则救助，实际上早已宣告了他们对于“市场”和“资本”的妥协，因为发达国家的政府无一例外地须要依赖资本和资本家才能得以生存和延续，还因为金融资本早已绑架了实体经济，令你不救不行，你不给他们空间，你就别无选择。
所以奥巴马鼓励别人买股票，所以奥巴马允许美联储加印美元，所以直到现在你还看到英国、澳洲等还在降息，而美国和日本的利率早已降无可降。
温家宝总理谈信心、看股市；在中国，官方实际上已经认可了经济增长高于一切，所以才会不惜代价，所以继去年12月的高增后，才有今年一季度贷款的“意外”猛增—今年1、2月份,银行业金融机构新增贷款分别达到1.6万亿元和1万亿元；票据融资则分别达到6239亿元和4870亿元，占当月新增信贷分别达到38%和45%；而3月份新增贷款或达1.8万亿元，同比增长约6.6倍。一季度贷款总额已经超过全年新增5万亿贷款的8成。即便从二季度开始控制，初步预计全年贷款增长仍有望增加到6万亿元以上(2007、2008年新增贷款分别是3.6万亿元和4.9万亿元)。实际上几乎所有官方机构都在刻意营造繁荣，当然这建立在“振兴经济和刺激消费”的共识之上。这与发达国家重点救助金融机构的思路并非一致，但制造未来流动性严重过剩的结果却殊途同归。
不出意外，未来的半年内，中国的利率仍有下降的必要——这最好赶在通胀之前，尤其是，高达15.5%的存款准备金率，会不断下行到10%以下。中期来看，则国民收入都有大幅增加的必要及可能，这是启动内需、经济转型的必要之举——光靠农民和农村市场是远远不够的。据本人了解，军队的工资最近又宣布上涨了，是近年的第二次上调。一个三级士官的月薪已经由其三、四年前的不足1千元，上涨到了目前的3千多元，而且还会发放一年的补差工资差。这说明，未来各界薪酬都有上涨的必要和可能。只能说，购买力将会越来越强，流动性还会越来越充足，曾经短暂冲击人们神经的通缩，已经大势已去了。综合来看，我们又如何能逃过未来的通胀之劫呢？
再来审视一下美元政策及其对通胀预期的影响。尽管由于弱势美元而使得美国遭遇了世界各国的一致指责，但是，我们至今几乎看不到美国有任何改弦更张的可能性。一个濒临破产的国家，必然会被迫把美元的铸币权用到极致。百年一遇金融和经济危机的客观环境，决定了“狗急跳墙”的事情随时都会发生。你站在一个饿极了的“狼”面前，还在幻想他不要吃掉你的牛羊，这似乎很不容易、很不现实。那么，美元的持续弱势和继续下跌应该是可以期待的——这取决于各国货币政策的跟进情况。而多数国际贸易品以及主要的大宗商品，中期来看，都无法改变美元标价的事实。美元已经充斥全球，还注定要继续放水。美元下跌了，商品价格不涨，这合理吗？智商最差的人，都知道买入产品和资产保值。下一轮的通胀仍然主要是美元的货币现象，其他国家的货币政策，作用有限。
有一个反对通胀预期的思路是：当经济走出低谷之时，假使各国开始回收多余的流动性，那么，通胀就会被遏制。这话看似有理，然覆水难收。我反问一句：工资上涨容易还是下降容易呢？还有一句中国的古话，叫做：“从俭入奢易，从奢入俭难”。什么意思？很明显，就是回收流动不是没有必要，但是其回收难度可想而知。即便回收，也不会像全球救市一样达成如此广泛的一致和高效。因此，个人判断，未来各国遏制流动性的任务十分艰巨，因此对未来通胀的影响很小，至少是缓慢或滞后的。
由此再反观粮食等农产品价格，你就会发现，超级流动性这个“烈火”正在无限接近总量短缺而价格偏低的粮食市场这个“干柴”，一个新的危机正在酝酿之中，形势几乎是一触即发。可怕的是，似乎没有任何因素可以阻止这一切的发生。
曾经的原油、铁矿石和有色金属，都曾经涨到了天价。遗憾的是，经济学家们不承认这是“通货膨胀”，虽然它确实是供求关系和美元货币双重因素共同引发的实实在在的通货膨胀。因为全世界研究通胀的专家们，眼睛都只盯着那个不但滞后而且本来已经很不重要的CPI。由于粮食价格低迷，加之中国廉价制造品充斥世界，导致了CPI在过去几年时间里都无法及时给这些僵化的家伙们报警，这是导致全球各国都对金融危机疏于防范的理论根源。未来的粮价一旦开涨，将成为推动CPI指数的强劲动力，所以CPI将还给这些人一个公平，让他们看到“实实在在的通货膨胀”。
粮食价格是未来通胀的先锋。所以英明的中国政府已经派员检查粮库了。李克强说：部分粮库可能存在空仓现象；而且，去冬今春以来粮食主产区遭遇50年大旱，夏季粮食生产存在不确定性。人们还在等待，等待空仓的事情被曝光，其实，有也未必曝光。为什么说有呢？因为囤粮一直就不是个“合算”的事。问题的根源在价格上、在过往20年的老观念上。夏粮到底会减产多少呢？无法定量分析，因此也不下结论。至少，增产的局面难以维持了，这就是危险的信号，足以打破脆弱的平衡。除非谎报军情，不过，那样做的危害会更大。
目前的种种迹象还表明，中国有望成为全球的投资热土，未来的外部流动性冲击对防范和抑制通胀，构成又一个不容乐观的因素。
毕竟不是一家一国的事情，粮食市场是世界性的，发令枪不知道最终会发自哪里。是福是祸，全看应对之策。不过，同样的等待，有些人习惯于为了不确定性而等待；而有些人，则为了确定性而等待。
有人说：恶性通货膨胀真的就无以逃避了吗？非也。
去看看投资大师们的忠告吧：“上帝制造了通货膨胀这个坏蛋，也留下了股票投资这条活路。历史证明，上帝庇佑了那些在灾难中持有股票的人们。”
为什么没有人通过赌博成为富翁
“买彩票算投资吗？”提出这个问题在最初级的理财师那里，或者诸如此类的什么认证培训课程上都会被人嘲笑，因为有一大套投资理论等着你呢。为什么企图拿着彩票混入神圣的投资界？彩票赌博扔硬币这种活动是会让理财师、投资家们讨厌的，如果投资真是这样“随机漫步”，他们的职业重要性也就大大降低了。
不过管它算什么呢，还有什么比中奖这件事更值得高兴的吗？算起来，除了违法乱纪和从事天才性的工作之外，公司人获得财务自由的方法大概也只有投资和中奖两种。只是买中彩票得大奖的几率要小一些，在中国，国家彩票的返奖率在50%以下，在国外赌场上的返奖率也就是总的赔率则在80%以上，所以去赌博获得财富的概率要比买彩票大。当然这是指在合法的范围内的。投资的收益概率相对来说大得多，但是有些极端化的商品或者金融衍生品投资已经接近了赌博的风险和概率。投资、赌博和彩票就像兄弟，它们长得有点像，走近一看又千差万别，但是它们的很多数学和心理模型可以共用，这种共用对投资者来说是有趣而且有意义的，也就是说可以通过赌博的规律指导投资，用投资的规律指导赌博，这要看你更喜欢哪一种风险类型。
频繁交易中，麻将比投资有收益
如果想更多地获得收益，那么就应该频繁地交易，从投资、买彩票和赌博上看，这种频繁交易对下注者和投资人收益会有不同的影响。
从投资上看，频繁交易无疑没有给投资者带来更多的收益，因为投资者没法了解短期内的股票涨跌，而券商却从投资者频繁交易中获得了大量手续费，就像小弗雷德.施维德的《客户的游艇在哪》一书中提到的，投资者交易养肥了那些券商、经纪人，而他们还会反过来笑话你多愚蠢。
在巴菲特 1982年给股东的信中，他把交易比作一场代价相当昂贵的“听音乐抢椅子”的游戏，投资者付出的交易成本相当于他们对自己征收了重税。比如每天交易量为1亿股，那意味着相对于5000万股交易日，股东们为了“抢座椅”要付出两倍的手续费—因为要一卖一买—再假设每买卖一股的平均成本为15美分，那么一年累积下来约要花费75亿美元的代价，这相当于埃克森石油、通用动力、通用汽车与太古石油这四家全美最大企业在1982年利润的总和。这种现象在中国资本市场似乎一点也不弱，在交易最火爆的2007年，全年股票市场交易印花税达到2005亿人民币，这就已经覆盖了中国石油、工商银行和建设银行三家中国最赚钱的公司的总利润，这里还没有算各家券商的手续费用。
要是买彩票的频率加快，它的收益效果会怎样呢？前边我们已说过中国的彩票总赔率很低，这就等于买彩票的人已经被征收了重税。在此基础上，假如一个公司人每期坚持买一张彩票，也并不会增加他中奖的可能性，因为坚持很多期买一张彩票和在某一期买一张彩票的几率是一样的，彩票没有投资的熊市和牛市之说，所以频繁买彩票的赔钱效果要比频繁投资还要好。
而赌博的频繁操作其收效相对来说就要有利一些，如果是场外交易—也就是说假设赌博不是在赌场进行，而是在朋友家打麻将—那么参与次数越多，所有参与者的胜负几率将越平均，因为没有额外付出—不算时间价值—所以麻将从长期来看是不输不赢的游戏。
对喜欢频繁进出的参与者来说，也许选择赌博比选择资本市场要好。
为什么只有人通过赌博倾家荡产，而没有人通过赌博成为亿万富翁？
这里最重要的原因在于赌场的“庄家效用”，也就是说看似公平的几率竞猜其实只对“庄家”，也就是赌场的开办者有利。在很多赌博游戏中庄家都有占先规定。比如在著名的纸牌游戏21点（黑杰克）里，庄家所占的优势是5.5%，这种几率保证了在同等情况下连续进行游戏，庄家会比你多赢5.5%的局数，其实这就已经足以让长期嗜赌者血本无归。在期望价值领域大有建树的爱德华.索普在《打败发牌人》里把庄家效用描述得更加明显，由于在21点游戏中报酬数额固定，所以玩家主要的任务是评价有多大机会抽到一张对自己有利的牌。当机会有利于玩家时，最好的战略是增加下注，而在最理想的状况下，有利于玩家的概率也只有9.8%，其余90.2%都是赌场的。所以，赌场要做的就是把游戏参与者拖住，尽量地将概率的力量展现出来。
当然这里也有一些例外，比如著名的21点天才马恺文，他带领他的麻省理工21点小组在1990年代，利用算牌方式狂捞了约1000万美元。各家“大出血”的赌场纷纷通过监视画面将这些算牌人的头像存储，建立了一份黑名单。从此，马恺文等人成为美国境内近百家赌场“21点”牌桌的“拒绝往来户”。只要他们进入赌场，赌场员工便会以防贼似的眼神紧盯着他们，而他们的伟大业绩也被好莱坞拍成了《攻陷拉斯维加斯》。
马恺文运用的所谓算牌技巧需要复杂的计算和艰难的记忆，但是这种技巧只能给游戏参与者提高3%的胜率，而且这还是在那些数学和记忆天才以“非赌不可—怎么赌？”为课程目标研习了很长时间才达到的。至于为什么3%战胜了5.5%，可能只是个偶然吧。
所以根据这个道理，在高风险投资领域，投资者坚持不了解的产品不去投资也就是在回避这种资本市场上的“庄家效用”给普通投资者可能带来的资产损失。
没有办法是必胜之道
如果对于完全概率事件，也就是有效市场理论所说的“随机漫步”事件，输赢完全无法估测，改变下注技巧最著名的方法就是逐次放大下注额度。也就是第一次下注如果输掉，在第二次下注的时候把赌注放大一倍，如此类推一直等到下注成功就立刻结束下注，把赢的钱抱回家。这种方法从理论上来说可行，但是若要从反证的方式推断，它肯定存在问题，因为世界上毕竟还有那么多的赌场在运行而且赚钱。
逐次加注的方法在实际操作中会遇到两个问题，下注者本身会因为财力不足支持不住，就像一个投掷硬币者，连续五次掷出同一个面是很可能的，而对于下注者来说，连续5次压错宝也不是什么非常奇怪的事，而连续五次压错宝却导致压注者损失了31倍的起始下注资金（下注者损失的是一个基础下注金额的等比数列倍数，它们是“1+2+4+8+16”倍的启示下注资金），如果下注者即使在以前的下注过程中每次都受益，也会被这次小失败而葬送掉命，因为这种下注方法决定下注人只可能连续失败，不可能连续下注成功，这有点像那种毛利非常低的公司，一般市道只能赚小钱，而在市道不好情况下一年亏损就能把以前的盈利全部侵蚀掉。
除了这种系统风险之外，下注赌博的人很难有非常好的自控能力，可以在赢钱后就匆匆离开。如此再加上赌场的庄家效用，赌客们必然输多赢少。
这种累加下注计划的破产也向在期货投资上使用这种方法的投资者提出了警示，因为在期货投资中下的注要比赌场还大，以一千块钱为例，如果累加下注，很快投资者就可能输掉几十倍的资金，这完全能达到倾家荡产的效果。在完全概率市场没有必胜之道。
有趣的是赌场上没有傻瓜把自己的输赢记录做成K线图来分析明天的输赢和下注情况，而在同样完全概率市场的一些衍生品市场上这么做的人却大把的在。
最后一场赛马
著名的心理学家丹尼尔.卡奈曼和阿莫斯.特威尔斯基在《人们如何在管理风险和不稳定性中完成了非常有趣的工作》中提到，在赌赛马时，最后一天赛会上，前几天最不被看好的赛马上的下注会大幅度增加。这主要是因为两个原因，一是在赛马会的最后一天，大部分参与者还是亏损的，其次，那些亏损者急于要翻本。由于最不被看好的赛马赔率要高于其它，所以在最后一天出现了赌劣马的现象。
芝加哥大学教授理查德.塞勒和埃里克.约翰逊对一些MBA学生做了更具体的测试，他们对参加测试者提出以下三个问题：
实验结果表明，赌徒在有可能平抑赌场造成损失的情况下，更愿意去冒更大的风险，如果不能平抑以前的损失，则对风险的兴趣就会减小；而在此前已经获得收益的情况下，人们会以收益为限额，对风险的容忍度也相应提高，如果风险影响超出收益的界限，则人们对风险的容忍度将降低。这个原因是人们喜欢把赌博挣来的钱或者亏掉的钱在头脑中放到一个账户中，比如认为，赌赛马赢来的钱可以赌赛马输掉，但是不能把其他钱输掉。这种事先的收益或亏损状况影响到以后人们决策的情形被称为赌场资金效应。这种情况，在资本市场上很多投资者身上也同样存在。比如很多投资者会在牛市的情况下为避免以后的损失把股票卖掉，把和原来投入等额的本金取出来存到另外的定期账户中，这样可以让他们认为现在在股市中的资金是从投资股市中赚来的钱，从而对风险的容忍度也会提高。在熊市中，投资者购买股票被套牢，在一段时间后如果股票价格恢复到投资者原来购买的价位，投资者往往选择把股票卖掉，这是因为他们认为已经挽回了股市中的损失，对风险已经受够了。
令人心痛的成本
赌徒最危险的行为是什么？那就是持续不断的翻本心理，始终对于结束赌局欲罢不能，这是因为人们会对已经投入大量时间、精力、最重要的是钱财的一件事不肯轻易罢手，并倾向于将已进行的事情进行完，虽然继续下去会造成更大的损失也在所不惜。人们脑子里会出现这样的忠告：“如果现在结束，以前投入的就全白亏了。”由于这种心态，在投资市场上，很多投资者即使买入的投资品种严重亏损，而且还有可能继续下跌，投资者也不愿意把它卖掉，因为投资者希望这种投资品的投资成本应该由这种投资品的收益来承担，如果在亏损的时候卖出了，那么就会造成事实上的亏损，即使有其它的投资收益超过这个亏损，投资者也会产生强烈的损失厌恶情绪，而绝不认亏出场。
这种把成本沉没掉的心理作用，甚至影响到国家政策。例如在美国越南战争中，美国政府内一些人认为获胜机会已经非常渺茫，但是也有人反对战争的结束，这些人的反对理由就是沉没成本的原因，“难道让那些在越战中战死的士兵白白牺牲了么？”
在哈尔阿科斯关于沉没成本的研究中表明，已经在某一项目投入成本的人，对于这个项目的成功的可能性预期高于没有在这个项目上投入成本的人对项目的预期。在明明知道自己的投资是错误的情况下，仍然坚持继续投资的原因是，如果停止投资就等于承认前边的成本沦为沉没成本，而这种对错误的认可是大多数人不愿意做的，这可能与人类避免承认错误的责任本能有关。
分散投资适时下注
扑克游戏可能有稳操胜券的情况么？“即使你有99.99％的把握，你也有可能输掉。”著名的扑克世界冠军皮尔森凭他的经历说出其中的实情。因为在获胜机率大的情况下由于风险，获得的收益也小，而小机率情况下由于赔率大，这样就可能出现大损失。所以下注者不能在一次下注时就倾囊而出。和很多投资家一样，皮尔森在其从事的金钱游戏中进行分散投资。
投资者的资产分配会随着各个子市场的上涨下跌而进行配置变化，这就和玩扑克游戏一样，虽然你不能在一次发牌中下了所有的注，但在时机有利于你的时候下注是明智的，高手的区别就是懂得怎么下注。
世界上最大的债券公司Pimco Total Return管理者比尔.格雷斯说，投资者必须知道市场有无理变化的一面，应该做好充分的准备。另一方面，你应该在机会可能对你有利时下大注。
在合适的时机下大注的情况也是所有投资家想达到的一个理想状况，但是这也很可能是一个成功者的幻觉，也许在合适的时机下合适的赌注根本没人能做得到。
不过管它算什么呢，还有什么比中奖这件事更值得高兴的吗？算起来，除了违法乱纪和从事天才性的工作之外，公司人获得财务自由的方法大概也只有投资和中奖两种。只是买中彩票得大奖的几率要小一些，在中国，国家彩票的返奖率在50%以下，在国外赌场上的返奖率也就是总的赔率则在80%以上，所以去赌博获得财富的概率要比买彩票大。当然这是指在合法的范围内的。投资的收益概率相对来说大得多，但是有些极端化的商品或者金融衍生品投资已经接近了赌博的风险和概率。投资、赌博和彩票就像兄弟，它们长得有点像，走近一看又千差万别，但是它们的很多数学和心理模型可以共用，这种共用对投资者来说是有趣而且有意义的，也就是说可以通过赌博的规律指导投资，用投资的规律指导赌博，这要看你更喜欢哪一种风险类型。
频繁交易中，麻将比投资有收益
如果想更多地获得收益，那么就应该频繁地交易，从投资、买彩票和赌博上看，这种频繁交易对下注者和投资人收益会有不同的影响。
从投资上看，频繁交易无疑没有给投资者带来更多的收益，因为投资者没法了解短期内的股票涨跌，而券商却从投资者频繁交易中获得了大量手续费，就像小弗雷德.施维德的《客户的游艇在哪》一书中提到的，投资者交易养肥了那些券商、经纪人，而他们还会反过来笑话你多愚蠢。
在巴菲特 1982年给股东的信中，他把交易比作一场代价相当昂贵的“听音乐抢椅子”的游戏，投资者付出的交易成本相当于他们对自己征收了重税。比如每天交易量为1亿股，那意味着相对于5000万股交易日，股东们为了“抢座椅”要付出两倍的手续费—因为要一卖一买—再假设每买卖一股的平均成本为15美分，那么一年累积下来约要花费75亿美元的代价，这相当于埃克森石油、通用动力、通用汽车与太古石油这四家全美最大企业在1982年利润的总和。这种现象在中国资本市场似乎一点也不弱，在交易最火爆的2007年，全年股票市场交易印花税达到2005亿人民币，这就已经覆盖了中国石油、工商银行和建设银行三家中国最赚钱的公司的总利润，这里还没有算各家券商的手续费用。
要是买彩票的频率加快，它的收益效果会怎样呢？前边我们已说过中国的彩票总赔率很低，这就等于买彩票的人已经被征收了重税。在此基础上，假如一个公司人每期坚持买一张彩票，也并不会增加他中奖的可能性，因为坚持很多期买一张彩票和在某一期买一张彩票的几率是一样的，彩票没有投资的熊市和牛市之说，所以频繁买彩票的赔钱效果要比频繁投资还要好。
而赌博的频繁操作其收效相对来说就要有利一些，如果是场外交易—也就是说假设赌博不是在赌场进行，而是在朋友家打麻将—那么参与次数越多，所有参与者的胜负几率将越平均，因为没有额外付出—不算时间价值—所以麻将从长期来看是不输不赢的游戏。
对喜欢频繁进出的参与者来说，也许选择赌博比选择资本市场要好。
为什么只有人通过赌博倾家荡产，而没有人通过赌博成为亿万富翁？
这里最重要的原因在于赌场的“庄家效用”，也就是说看似公平的几率竞猜其实只对“庄家”，也就是赌场的开办者有利。在很多赌博游戏中庄家都有占先规定。比如在著名的纸牌游戏21点（黑杰克）里，庄家所占的优势是5.5%，这种几率保证了在同等情况下连续进行游戏，庄家会比你多赢5.5%的局数，其实这就已经足以让长期嗜赌者血本无归。在期望价值领域大有建树的爱德华.索普在《打败发牌人》里把庄家效用描述得更加明显，由于在21点游戏中报酬数额固定，所以玩家主要的任务是评价有多大机会抽到一张对自己有利的牌。当机会有利于玩家时，最好的战略是增加下注，而在最理想的状况下，有利于玩家的概率也只有9.8%，其余90.2%都是赌场的。所以，赌场要做的就是把游戏参与者拖住，尽量地将概率的力量展现出来。
当然这里也有一些例外，比如著名的21点天才马恺文，他带领他的麻省理工21点小组在1990年代，利用算牌方式狂捞了约1000万美元。各家“大出血”的赌场纷纷通过监视画面将这些算牌人的头像存储，建立了一份黑名单。从此，马恺文等人成为美国境内近百家赌场“21点”牌桌的“拒绝往来户”。只要他们进入赌场，赌场员工便会以防贼似的眼神紧盯着他们，而他们的伟大业绩也被好莱坞拍成了《攻陷拉斯维加斯》。
马恺文运用的所谓算牌技巧需要复杂的计算和艰难的记忆，但是这种技巧只能给游戏参与者提高3%的胜率，而且这还是在那些数学和记忆天才以“非赌不可—怎么赌？”为课程目标研习了很长时间才达到的。至于为什么3%战胜了5.5%，可能只是个偶然吧。
所以根据这个道理，在高风险投资领域，投资者坚持不了解的产品不去投资也就是在回避这种资本市场上的“庄家效用”给普通投资者可能带来的资产损失。
没有办法是必胜之道
如果对于完全概率事件，也就是有效市场理论所说的“随机漫步”事件，输赢完全无法估测，改变下注技巧最著名的方法就是逐次放大下注额度。也就是第一次下注如果输掉，在第二次下注的时候把赌注放大一倍，如此类推一直等到下注成功就立刻结束下注，把赢的钱抱回家。这种方法从理论上来说可行，但是若要从反证的方式推断，它肯定存在问题，因为世界上毕竟还有那么多的赌场在运行而且赚钱。
逐次加注的方法在实际操作中会遇到两个问题，下注者本身会因为财力不足支持不住，就像一个投掷硬币者，连续五次掷出同一个面是很可能的，而对于下注者来说，连续5次压错宝也不是什么非常奇怪的事，而连续五次压错宝却导致压注者损失了31倍的起始下注资金（下注者损失的是一个基础下注金额的等比数列倍数，它们是“1+2+4+8+16”倍的启示下注资金），如果下注者即使在以前的下注过程中每次都受益，也会被这次小失败而葬送掉命，因为这种下注方法决定下注人只可能连续失败，不可能连续下注成功，这有点像那种毛利非常低的公司，一般市道只能赚小钱，而在市道不好情况下一年亏损就能把以前的盈利全部侵蚀掉。
除了这种系统风险之外，下注赌博的人很难有非常好的自控能力，可以在赢钱后就匆匆离开。如此再加上赌场的庄家效用，赌客们必然输多赢少。
这种累加下注计划的破产也向在期货投资上使用这种方法的投资者提出了警示，因为在期货投资中下的注要比赌场还大，以一千块钱为例，如果累加下注，很快投资者就可能输掉几十倍的资金，这完全能达到倾家荡产的效果。在完全概率市场没有必胜之道。
有趣的是赌场上没有傻瓜把自己的输赢记录做成K线图来分析明天的输赢和下注情况，而在同样完全概率市场的一些衍生品市场上这么做的人却大把的在。
最后一场赛马
著名的心理学家丹尼尔.卡奈曼和阿莫斯.特威尔斯基在《人们如何在管理风险和不稳定性中完成了非常有趣的工作》中提到，在赌赛马时，最后一天赛会上，前几天最不被看好的赛马上的下注会大幅度增加。这主要是因为两个原因，一是在赛马会的最后一天，大部分参与者还是亏损的，其次，那些亏损者急于要翻本。由于最不被看好的赛马赔率要高于其它，所以在最后一天出现了赌劣马的现象。
芝加哥大学教授理查德.塞勒和埃里克.约翰逊对一些MBA学生做了更具体的测试，他们对参加测试者提出以下三个问题：
实验结果表明，赌徒在有可能平抑赌场造成损失的情况下，更愿意去冒更大的风险，如果不能平抑以前的损失，则对风险的兴趣就会减小；而在此前已经获得收益的情况下，人们会以收益为限额，对风险的容忍度也相应提高，如果风险影响超出收益的界限，则人们对风险的容忍度将降低。这个原因是人们喜欢把赌博挣来的钱或者亏掉的钱在头脑中放到一个账户中，比如认为，赌赛马赢来的钱可以赌赛马输掉，但是不能把其他钱输掉。这种事先的收益或亏损状况影响到以后人们决策的情形被称为赌场资金效应。这种情况，在资本市场上很多投资者身上也同样存在。比如很多投资者会在牛市的情况下为避免以后的损失把股票卖掉，把和原来投入等额的本金取出来存到另外的定期账户中，这样可以让他们认为现在在股市中的资金是从投资股市中赚来的钱，从而对风险的容忍度也会提高。在熊市中，投资者购买股票被套牢，在一段时间后如果股票价格恢复到投资者原来购买的价位，投资者往往选择把股票卖掉，这是因为他们认为已经挽回了股市中的损失，对风险已经受够了。
令人心痛的成本
赌徒最危险的行为是什么？那就是持续不断的翻本心理，始终对于结束赌局欲罢不能，这是因为人们会对已经投入大量时间、精力、最重要的是钱财的一件事不肯轻易罢手，并倾向于将已进行的事情进行完，虽然继续下去会造成更大的损失也在所不惜。人们脑子里会出现这样的忠告：“如果现在结束，以前投入的就全白亏了。”由于这种心态，在投资市场上，很多投资者即使买入的投资品种严重亏损，而且还有可能继续下跌，投资者也不愿意把它卖掉，因为投资者希望这种投资品的投资成本应该由这种投资品的收益来承担，如果在亏损的时候卖出了，那么就会造成事实上的亏损，即使有其它的投资收益超过这个亏损，投资者也会产生强烈的损失厌恶情绪，而绝不认亏出场。
这种把成本沉没掉的心理作用，甚至影响到国家政策。例如在美国越南战争中，美国政府内一些人认为获胜机会已经非常渺茫，但是也有人反对战争的结束，这些人的反对理由就是沉没成本的原因，“难道让那些在越战中战死的士兵白白牺牲了么？”
在哈尔阿科斯关于沉没成本的研究中表明，已经在某一项目投入成本的人，对于这个项目的成功的可能性预期高于没有在这个项目上投入成本的人对项目的预期。在明明知道自己的投资是错误的情况下，仍然坚持继续投资的原因是，如果停止投资就等于承认前边的成本沦为沉没成本，而这种对错误的认可是大多数人不愿意做的，这可能与人类避免承认错误的责任本能有关。
分散投资适时下注
扑克游戏可能有稳操胜券的情况么？“即使你有99.99％的把握，你也有可能输掉。”著名的扑克世界冠军皮尔森凭他的经历说出其中的实情。因为在获胜机率大的情况下由于风险，获得的收益也小，而小机率情况下由于赔率大，这样就可能出现大损失。所以下注者不能在一次下注时就倾囊而出。和很多投资家一样，皮尔森在其从事的金钱游戏中进行分散投资。
投资者的资产分配会随着各个子市场的上涨下跌而进行配置变化，这就和玩扑克游戏一样，虽然你不能在一次发牌中下了所有的注，但在时机有利于你的时候下注是明智的，高手的区别就是懂得怎么下注。
世界上最大的债券公司Pimco Total Return管理者比尔.格雷斯说，投资者必须知道市场有无理变化的一面，应该做好充分的准备。另一方面，你应该在机会可能对你有利时下大注。
在合适的时机下大注的情况也是所有投资家想达到的一个理想状况，但是这也很可能是一个成功者的幻觉，也许在合适的时机下合适的赌注根本没人能做得到。
Wednesday, April 8, 2009
Martin Armstrong: The Coming Great Depression
The Coming Great Depression
Why Government Is Powerless
It is frustrating to read so many comparisons of our current situation with 1929 while watching policy be set-in-motion to create spending on infrastructure. Everyone has their hand out looking for a bailout like a bunch of street burns pleading for money so they can get drunk or stay drunk. Almost nothing of what I have read is close to being accurate. The scary part is depressions are inevitably caused by politicians who may be paving the road with good intentions, but are relying upon analysis so biased, we do not stand a chance.
The stock market by no means predicts the economy. A stock market crash does not cause a Depression. The Crash of 1903 was properly titled – “The Rich Man's Panic." What has always distinguished a recession from a Depression is the stock market drop may signal a recession, but the collapse in debt signals a Depression.
This Depression was set in motion by (1)excessive leverage by the banks once more, but (2)the lifting of usury laws back in 1980 to fight inflation that opened the door to the highest consumer interest rates in thousands of years and shifted spending that created jobs into the banks as interest on things like credit cards. As a percent of GDP, household debt doubled since 1980 making the banks rich and now the clear and present danger to our economic survival. A greater proportion of spending by the consumer that use to go to savings and creating jobs, goes to interest and that has undermined the ability to avoid a major economic melt-down.
The crisis in banking has distinguished depression from recession. The very term "Black Friday" comes from the Panic of 1869 when the mob was dragging bankers out of their offices and hanging them in New York. They had to send in troops to stop the riot. A banking collapse destroys the capital formation of a nation and that is what creates the Depression. The stock market is not the problem despite the fact it is visible and measurable and may decline 40%, 60% or even 89% like in 1929-32. But the stock market decline is normally measured in months (30-37) whereas the economic decline is measured in years (23-26). Beware of schizophrenic analysis that is often mutually contradictory or often antagonistic in part or in quality for far too often people think they have to offer a reason for every daily movement.
Our fate will not be determined by the stock market performance. Neither can we stimulate the economy by increasing spending on infrastructure any more than buying your wife a mink coat, will improve the grades of your child in school. We are facing a Depression that will last 23-26 years. The response of government is going to seal our fate because they cannot learn from the past and will make the same mistakes that every politician has made before them. Even if the Dow Industrials make new highs next week (impossible), the Depression is unstoppable with current models and tools.
Stocks & Consumers vs. Investment Banks
Let us set the record straight. The Stock Market is a mere reflection of the economy like looking at yourself in a mirror. It is not the economy and does not even provide a reliable forecasting tool of what is to come economically. We are headed into the debt tsunami that is of historical proportions unheard-of in history. There have been the big debt crisis incidents that have hobbled nations, toppled kings, and set in motion economic dark ages. It is so critical to understand the difference between the economy and the stock market, for unless you comprehend this basic and root distinction between the two, survival may be impossible.
To the left I have provided the Economic Confidence Model for the immediate decline. You will notice I did not call this the "stock market model" nor a model for gold, oil, or commodities. I used the word "economic" with distinct and clear purpose. I have stressed it does not forecast the fate, of a particular market or even a particular economy. It is the global economic cycle some may call even a business cycle. Please note that what does line-up and peaks precisely with this model often even to the specific day that was calculated decades advance is the area of primary focus. Yet the US stock market reached a high precisely with this model and then rallied to a new high price 8.6 months later. In Japan, the NIKKEI 225 peaked precisely on February 26th, 2007. This is not a very good omen. But there was something profound that turned down with the February 27th, 2007 target - the S&P Case-Shiller index of housing prices in 20 cities. February 2007 was the peak for this cycle in the debt markets - not the US stock market.
The stock market always bottoms in advance of the economic low. In fact, we will see new highs in the now even in the middle of a Great Depression. At least the 1929 cycle was more of a bubble top in stocks than what we have in place currently in the US stock market. We still had the bubble top in the NASDAQ back in 2000, but this illustrates the point. There was a major explosive speculative boom. The bubble burst in 2000 and there was a moderate investment recession into 2002, but there was no appreciable economic decline that was set in motion because of that crash. Currently, we have a major high in 2007, but it was not a bubble top because it was not the focus of speculation. The real concentration of capital that created the bubble top, took place in the debt markets. This is the origin of the economic depression - not stocks and not the displacement of farmers because of a 7 year drought created by the Dust Bowl that invoked the response of the Works Progress Administration (WPA) in 1935. Keep in mind the stock market bottomed in the mid summer of 1932 when unemployment was not excessive from a historical perspective.
The 25% level of unemployment came after the major 1932 stock market low that was followed by both the banking crisis after the election of FDR and before his fateful inauguration. The Banking Crisis came about because of rumors that Roosevelt was going to confiscate gold. Herbert Hoover published his memoirs showing letters written to Roosevelt pleading with him to make a statement that the rumors were false. He did not.
It’s the Debt Level Stupid
In 1907, the excessive debt was in the stock market. Call Money Rates (the level of interest paid to support broker loans) reached 125%. Even 1929 never came close to such levels. This also illustrates that the capital markets do not have enough money to invest equally on all levels in all segments of a domestic economy or in particular nations. To create the boom-bust, it requires the concentration of capital. A bubble top is formed when the majority of those seeking to employ money to make money are focused in a particular market or even country. The 1907 Crash was a bubble top because capital invested on a highly concentrated basis in railroad stocks. The bubble top in Japan back in 1989 was caused by a concentration of both domestic and international capital that had made Japan the number one market in the World. It is this concentration of capital that creates the boom and bust cycle. If money was evenly disbursed like the socialistic & communistic philosophies argue, we would be back to the dark ages where there was no concentration of capital and no economy beyond the walls of the castle so to speak. That is why communism failed.
It is the overall level of debt that has reached a bubble top in almost every possible area. For example, in 1980, household debt was about 50% of GDP. Going into the February 2007 high, it reached about 100% of GDP. We must also realize that something profound took place back in 1980. Americans would on the first blush seem to be living it up, buying everything they can on credit and have piles of tangible assets to show for it. That is like looking at the statistics for carrots and arguing that they are lethal because every person who has ever eaten a carrot is dead or in the process of a gradual slow death. This absurd example illustrates the bias that can produce the schizophrenic analysis.
There were, once upon a time, usury laws that generally held any interest rate greater than 10% was illegal. The Federal Reserve under Paul Volker believed that interest rates needed to be raised to insane levels to stop the runaway inflation, which was the first stone that hit the water sending the shock waves that we are having to pay for today. Once the usury laws were altered so the Fed could fight inflation, it set in motion the doubling of household debt, not to mention the national debt. At 8%, the principle is doubled through interest in less than 10 years. The national debt exploded from $1 to about $10 trillion in 25 years and household debt has doubled. Some states now consider usury to be 26%. Historically, these are the interest rates paid by the very worst of all debtors - the bankrupts. In fact, in China, the worst creditors historically paid at best 10%. What we have done is the lifting of usury to fight inflation back in 1980, has resulted in usury now being so high, a larger portion of income of the common worker is spent on interest, not buying goods & services that even create jobs. This is one primary reason why jobs have been leaving as well. The consumer needs the lowest possible price and labor wants the highest wages, and to stay competitive, producers leave taking manufacturing jobs as well as service jobs. The extraordinary rise in interest rates that are historical highs since at least pre-Roman times, could not have been possible but for the lifting of usury laws back in 1980 to fight inflation. This amounted to setting a fire to try to stop a brush fire that failed. Consumers pay the highest rates in thousands of years that feed the banks at the expense of economic growth. Even the National Debt rose from $2. 1 to $8.5 trillion between 1 986 and 2006 with $6. 1 trillion being interest. We are funding the nation on a credit card and destroying the economy simultaneously.
This has been enhanced by the tremendous leverage and false position that were created in the derivative markets causing the banks to just implode. Indeed, this is the origin of the economic Depression we are facing. The $700 billion bailout might have worked if Paulson did what he said he would - buy the debt and take it out of the banks. Had the debt been segregated into a pool and managed independently by a hedge fund manager not an investment banker, we could have mitigated the problem. But that is now too late. The credit implosion is taking place on a wholesale basis around the world. The more the economy declines in housing prices, the greater the defaults, the greater the foreclosures, and the lower the economy will move. We are now in a downward spiral that cannot be fixed by indirect schemes. As I said, you cannot get your kid's test scores up by purchasing a mink coat for your wife. Everyone will have their hand out begging for infrastructure money. But the theory of just spending money that will somehow make things better, it is like handing Mexico a trillion dollars and arguing that they will buy US goods that will somehow reverse the economy.
The leveraging of debt by the Investment Banks in particular has undermined the global economy. Where household debt has doubled since 1980, the professional financial service sector has seen a rise from 21% of GDP in 1980 to 116% by February 2007. Now consider the debt that they created with the mortgages is already down by 50% and falling, the bailouts will keep coming. To help correct the problem, the commercial banks will tighten credit to make their exposure less, and in fact, their solvency ratios will require it anyway. This we can expect to see not just in business, but housing and car loans that will contract the economy as well.
The Great Depression is not the perfect model for today. It was a complete capital contraction. The stock market basis the now Dow Jones Industrials fell 89% between September 3rd, 1929 and July 1932. The contraction in debt was quite massive. Then too, the leverage in banks collapsed that reduces the velocity of money and therefore the money supply. The banks were the first real widespread failures with 608 in 1930. Between February and August 1931, the commercial banks began to bleed profusely as bank deposits fell almost $3 billion or about 9% of all deposits. As 1932 began, the number of bank failures reached 1,860. The massive amount of bank failures in the thousands took place with the rumor of Roosevelt's intention to confiscate gold. Although he denied that was his policy the night of the elections, he remained silent refusing to discuss the issue until he was sworn in. on March 6, 1933 just 2 days after taking office, Roosevelt called a bank "holiday" closing the banks from which at least another 2,500 never reopened.
All of these events are contrasted by the collapse in national debts in Europe. Other than Herbert Hoover’s memoirs, I have yet to read any analysis of the Great Depression attribute anything internationally other than the infamous US Smoot-Hawley Act setting in motion the age of protectionism in June 1930. It was the financial war between European nations attacking each other's bond markets openly shorting them that led to all of Europe defaulting on their debt. Even Britain went into a moratorium suspending debt payments. This is what put the pressure on capital flows sending waves of capital to the United States that to sane degree was kind of like the capital flow to Japan into 1989. This put tremendous pressure upon the dollar driving it to new record highs that were misread by the politicians who did not understand capital flow. They responded with Smoot-Hawley misreading the entire set of facts. (see Greatest Bull Market In History) (Herbert Hoover's memoirs).
It is true that today we have Keynesian and Monetarist theories to manage the crisis. Sad to say, neither one will now work. Bernanke has responded in force dropping the federal funds rate from 5.25% to .25%. He has also opened the Fed Window and thrown out more than $1 trillion in 13 months. However, as admirable as this may be, he has no tool that will do the job. Milton Friedman was correct! The Great Depression was not caused by the decline in the stock market. The event was set in motion by the credit and banking crisis that resulted in a one-third contraction in the money supply.
Interest rates will do nothing. The flight to quality always takes place so what happens is a two-fold punch. (1) Interest rates collapse because capital seeks preservation not yield and will accept during such times virtually a zero rate of return, and (2) the flight to quality takes more available cash from the private sector because government debt truly does compete with the private sector. We are seeing this even now. Federal debt becomes the place to go so we see higher yields in both state am municipal bonds because they are not quality and could default like any bank. This contracts the money supply. Opening the window and just throwing buckets of money into the system will never have any impact to reverse the trend.
Furthermore, we are now in a Floating-Exchange Rate system that has made the global economy far more complex than it was in 1929. We all know that China is one of the biggest holders of US government debt. With the contagion spreading to Russia, South America, and China aside from Europe, we see a steeper decline in the China stock market than we do in the United States because that is where capital had concentrated domestically. If China needs money to stimulate its own economy when exports appear to be collapsing by about 50%, then we can see that the Keynesian model is worthless. If the Fed tries to pump money into the system through buying bonds from the private sector, those bonds may be held by aliens who take the money back to their own economies. The Fed cannot be sure it is even capable of stimulating the purely domestic economy. Lower interest rates to virtually zero like Japan did during the 19905, then if capital finds a better place to invest, it can leave for a higher rate of interest as capital did from Japan to the United states, which is why their domestic economy was never stimulated by the' lower interest rates.
Leverage during the Great Depression was not even remotely close to what we have to face today. The credit-default swaps are alone worth about $60 trillion. This was a stupid product for it has so tangled the world there may be no way out. This product created the false illusion that you did not have to worry about the quality of the loan because it was insured. We have no way of covering this level of implosion. Add the unfunded entitlements and then the state and local debts who cannot print money to cover their shortfall s, and we are looking at a contraction of debt that is simply beyond all contemplation.
So What Now?
So now that we see it is not Wall Street, again, but the banks, perhaps we can separate the facts from the fantasy. We can now see that there are two separate and distinct forecasts to be made - (1) economy and (2) stock market. Economic Depressions have a duration unfortunately of generally 23 years with an outside potential of 26 years. The 1873 Panic led to a economic depression of really 23 years into 1896. There were bouts with high volatility and injection of major waves of inflation following the major silver discoveries. It was the age of the Silver Democrats who tried to create inflation by over-valuing silver relative to gold. This created a wave of European-American arbitrage where silver flowed into the US exchanging it for gold, which then flowed back to Europe. By 1896, the US Treasury was broke.
The Panic of 1873 marked the collapse of J. Cook & Co, the huge investment bank that was the 19th Century version of Goldman Sachs. They went bust because of excessive leverage in railroad stocks. It matters not what the instrument may be, it is always the leverage, which set the tone for a economic depression that lasted into 1896 where JP Morgan became famous for leading a bailout of the us Treasury organizing a loan of gold bullion. The stock market rallied and made new highs with plenty of panics between 1873 and 1896. The point is, The Panic of 1893 was quite a horrible one. The point is, the stock market is not a reflection of the economy. It often trades up in anticipation of better times, and trades down on those same perceptions of bad times. In both cases, new highs or lows unfold even contrary to economic trends.
We will see new highs in the now long before we see the final low in the economy. The ideal lows on a timing basis for the stock market will be as soon as April 2009 or by June of 2009. The more pronounced lows would be due on a timing basis between December 2009 and April 2010. The most extreme target would seem to be August 2010. The shorter the resolution to the stock market low, the sooner we will start to see much higher volatility.
The low for the Dow would be indicated by reaching the 3,500-4,000 area. A 2008 closing below 12,000 in the cash now Jones Industrials will signal that the bear market is underway into at least 2009 if not 2010. A year-end closing for 2008 below the 9,700-9,800 level, will signal higher volatility as well. The real critical level for the closing of 2008 will be the 7,200 area generally. A year-end closing beneath this general level will signal that we could see the sharp decline to test the extremes support at 3,600-4,000 by as early as April 19th, 2009 going into May /June 2009. If we were to drop so quickly into those targets, this would be most likely the major low with a significant rally into at least April 16th, 2010.
The less volatile outcome would be a prolonged decline into the December 2009 target to about April 16th, 2010. A low at that late date would tend to project out for a high as early as June 2011 or into late 2012. Nevertheless, volatility appears to be very high. Those who were at the 1985 Economic conference in Princeton, may want to review those video tapes. The volatility we were looking at 20-30 years into the future is now. As 3 of the 5 major investment bankers failed, Merrill, Lehman and Bear, the liquidity has evaporated so the swings are going to be much more dramatic.
The major support is 3,600 on the now Industrials. During '09, the support area appears to be 6,600, 5,000, and 4,000-3,600. Clearly, resistance is shaping up at 9,700-9,800. It would take a monthly close back above the 12,400 level to signal new highs are likely. If we saw a complete collapse into a low by April 2009 or June 2009 reaching the 4,000 general area, this would be the major low with most likely a hyper-inflationary spiral developing thereafter. In that case, the now Jones Industrials could be back at even new highs as early as mid 2011 or going into late 2012.
Gold has decoupled from oil as it should and has been rising on an ounce-to-barrel ratio. Here, the pivot area for 2009 seems to be the $730-$760 area with the key support being still at the $525-$540 zone. The major high intraday was on March 17th, 2008. A weekly closing below $800 warns of consolidation. Only a monthly closing below the $535 area would signal a major high is in place. The more critical support appears to be at about $680 - $705. A weekly closing beneath this area will also warn of a potential consolidation. A major high is possible as early as 2010-2011 with the potential for an exponential rally into 2015 if there is any kind of a low going into 2011.45. The key to watch will be crude Oil. The collapse of Investment Banks has removed the speculation that exaggerated the trend. A year-end close below $40 for 2008 would signal a major high and serious economic decline ahead.
There Are No Tools Left! The Emperor Has No Clothes
It is hard to explain to someone who believe he has power, that he really has nothing of any significance. This becomes the story of the Emperor Has No Clothes. No one will tell him, and if you do, it may be off-with-your-head. This is akin to the man behind the curtain in the Wizard of OZ trying to keep up the whole illusion. After all, why do we vote for people unless we believe that will somehow change our lives?
Interest Rates
When an economy is rising and the stock market is exploding, interest rates always rise because the demand for money is rising because people believe that they can make a profit. Government pretend to be raising interest rates to stop inflation, but they do not create a trend contrary to the free markets. What happened in 1980 was merely that the government over-shoots the differential between expectations and the rate of interest. If you believe the stock market will double, you will pay 20% interest. A rising interest rate does not create a bear market. Only when the rate of interest exceeds expectations of potential profit offering almost a fixed secured return, will capital leave the speculative market and run to the bond market.
In a bear market, interest rates always decline because of the flight to quality. When there is a risk of a .banking crisis as well, then the flight to quality shows that capital is willing to accept virtually zero in return for the privilege to park itself is a secure manner to preserve the future.
In both cases, the government may accelerate the trend, but by no means can they create the trend or alter the trend. Lowering interest rates to zero right now will not reverse the economic decline. People will look out the window and until they feel confident again, they will not come out from behind the castle walls. Japan lowered interest rates to virtually zero for nearly a decade. All it did was fuel the carry trade whereby yen was borrowed at 0.1 % and invested in dollars at 5-8%. There was little opportunity to invest domestically in Japan and the stock market languished in a broad consolidation with flurries the upside every-now-and-again.
Monetary Theory
The Fed has already put into the system about $1 trillion in 13 months. The real problem is they are buying back US government debt injecting cash into the system. But if those bonds are sold to the Fed by foreign holders, there can be no injection of cash into the domestic economy. This amounts to the monetization of our debt in any event. Clearly, buying bonds from the market is not a guaranteed increase in domestic money supply especially when the velocity of money is itself collapsing. Borrowing heavily all these years and depending on foreign investors to buy that debt, altered the course of economics. Of course there has always been the foreign investor, but there has not been the floating exchange rate system. The rise and fall of the dollar itself can now either attract foreign capital with an advance or repel capital with its decline. Like we needed another new variable.
Infrastructure Spending
There really is nothing left in the tool bag that can help even to mitigate the coming Economic Depression. The unemployment rate at the end of 1930 was only about 8.9% - similar to the 1975 recession. Things were very slow back then. Even housing was not moving and people took whatever offers came their way. It was the Dust Bowl that began in 1934 that sent the unemployment rising after the 1932 low in the stock market. About 40% of the work force was agrarian. Hence, Congress could not pass a law to make it rain. The real devastation was that this presented a huge portion of the work force that had to be retrained into skilled labor. It was the Great Depression that finally by force of necessity, created an industrial work force that may have taken another 200 years to unfold by gradual transformation.
The WPA was formed in 1935, 3 years after the low in the stock market (1932). It had a slow and marginal success. At best, if we attribute all improvement to this one program, very unlikely, unemployment was only reduced by about 20%.
1935 20.3%
1936 16.9%
1937 14.3%
1938 19.0%
1939 17.2%
1940 14.6%
Even if we attribute everything to the WPA, all the way into 1940, the most the unemployment declines was by 30%. However, at the end of World War II, we see an Unemployment rate of 1.9% by 1945. Any ideas that we can spend trillions on infrastructure and make it all better, forget it.
Turning to infrastructure in the middle of a debt crisis makes no sense. The idea of just spending money will somehow stimulate the economy, will not work. This is like trying to fight in the desert of Iraq using the same tactics as in Vietnam. There has to be sane connection to what we are doing. Just because FDR instituted the WPA when we had a huge displacement issue in the work force, almost 6 years after the crash began, makes no sense at all for our current problems. As I said, this is like buying your wife a mink coat to somehow influence your kid to get their grades up. The connection is tenuous at best and nonexistent in all reality.
Summary
Unless we attack the debt structure directly, there is no point in counting upon any government to help mitigate the problem and more-likely-than-not, our very future may be recast in so many ways, the level of frustration will rise, and that leads to war because war distracts the people from hanging their own politicians. The oldest trick in the book is to blame the guy next-door down. Unless we are honestly prepared to truly 1) reorganize the structure of government, 2) reorganize the entire debt structure both private and public, 3) regulate leverage, 4) restore usury laws that will free up personal income, and 5) look at just eliminating the federal income tax in combination with 6) establishing a new national heathcare system that will restructure all pension plans public and private, there is not much hope for the future from government. Our definition of money (M1) does not include bonds so we can fool ourselves by issuing $10 trillion in bonds is different than printing the cash. It is still money. Taxes are needed in a gold standard where money cannot be created. Stop competing with the states, control the budget as a percent of GDP, increase the money supply to that degree, and stop the taxing when money is created by leverage and velocity anyway. This will restore jobs and inject huge confidence as in 1964 when the payroll tax was cut permanently. One-offs never work. People save the rebates for a rainy day. We need real honest reform since the states will go broke and seek handouts as well. So, it is time to get real. It is time we restructure the entire system including the banks which always cause the problem. We don't need excessive regulation of things that did not create the problem when the real culprits always escape.
Why Government Is Powerless
It is frustrating to read so many comparisons of our current situation with 1929 while watching policy be set-in-motion to create spending on infrastructure. Everyone has their hand out looking for a bailout like a bunch of street burns pleading for money so they can get drunk or stay drunk. Almost nothing of what I have read is close to being accurate. The scary part is depressions are inevitably caused by politicians who may be paving the road with good intentions, but are relying upon analysis so biased, we do not stand a chance.
The stock market by no means predicts the economy. A stock market crash does not cause a Depression. The Crash of 1903 was properly titled – “The Rich Man's Panic." What has always distinguished a recession from a Depression is the stock market drop may signal a recession, but the collapse in debt signals a Depression.
This Depression was set in motion by (1)excessive leverage by the banks once more, but (2)the lifting of usury laws back in 1980 to fight inflation that opened the door to the highest consumer interest rates in thousands of years and shifted spending that created jobs into the banks as interest on things like credit cards. As a percent of GDP, household debt doubled since 1980 making the banks rich and now the clear and present danger to our economic survival. A greater proportion of spending by the consumer that use to go to savings and creating jobs, goes to interest and that has undermined the ability to avoid a major economic melt-down.
The crisis in banking has distinguished depression from recession. The very term "Black Friday" comes from the Panic of 1869 when the mob was dragging bankers out of their offices and hanging them in New York. They had to send in troops to stop the riot. A banking collapse destroys the capital formation of a nation and that is what creates the Depression. The stock market is not the problem despite the fact it is visible and measurable and may decline 40%, 60% or even 89% like in 1929-32. But the stock market decline is normally measured in months (30-37) whereas the economic decline is measured in years (23-26). Beware of schizophrenic analysis that is often mutually contradictory or often antagonistic in part or in quality for far too often people think they have to offer a reason for every daily movement.
Our fate will not be determined by the stock market performance. Neither can we stimulate the economy by increasing spending on infrastructure any more than buying your wife a mink coat, will improve the grades of your child in school. We are facing a Depression that will last 23-26 years. The response of government is going to seal our fate because they cannot learn from the past and will make the same mistakes that every politician has made before them. Even if the Dow Industrials make new highs next week (impossible), the Depression is unstoppable with current models and tools.
Stocks & Consumers vs. Investment Banks
Let us set the record straight. The Stock Market is a mere reflection of the economy like looking at yourself in a mirror. It is not the economy and does not even provide a reliable forecasting tool of what is to come economically. We are headed into the debt tsunami that is of historical proportions unheard-of in history. There have been the big debt crisis incidents that have hobbled nations, toppled kings, and set in motion economic dark ages. It is so critical to understand the difference between the economy and the stock market, for unless you comprehend this basic and root distinction between the two, survival may be impossible.
To the left I have provided the Economic Confidence Model for the immediate decline. You will notice I did not call this the "stock market model" nor a model for gold, oil, or commodities. I used the word "economic" with distinct and clear purpose. I have stressed it does not forecast the fate, of a particular market or even a particular economy. It is the global economic cycle some may call even a business cycle. Please note that what does line-up and peaks precisely with this model often even to the specific day that was calculated decades advance is the area of primary focus. Yet the US stock market reached a high precisely with this model and then rallied to a new high price 8.6 months later. In Japan, the NIKKEI 225 peaked precisely on February 26th, 2007. This is not a very good omen. But there was something profound that turned down with the February 27th, 2007 target - the S&P Case-Shiller index of housing prices in 20 cities. February 2007 was the peak for this cycle in the debt markets - not the US stock market.
The stock market always bottoms in advance of the economic low. In fact, we will see new highs in the now even in the middle of a Great Depression. At least the 1929 cycle was more of a bubble top in stocks than what we have in place currently in the US stock market. We still had the bubble top in the NASDAQ back in 2000, but this illustrates the point. There was a major explosive speculative boom. The bubble burst in 2000 and there was a moderate investment recession into 2002, but there was no appreciable economic decline that was set in motion because of that crash. Currently, we have a major high in 2007, but it was not a bubble top because it was not the focus of speculation. The real concentration of capital that created the bubble top, took place in the debt markets. This is the origin of the economic depression - not stocks and not the displacement of farmers because of a 7 year drought created by the Dust Bowl that invoked the response of the Works Progress Administration (WPA) in 1935. Keep in mind the stock market bottomed in the mid summer of 1932 when unemployment was not excessive from a historical perspective.
The 25% level of unemployment came after the major 1932 stock market low that was followed by both the banking crisis after the election of FDR and before his fateful inauguration. The Banking Crisis came about because of rumors that Roosevelt was going to confiscate gold. Herbert Hoover published his memoirs showing letters written to Roosevelt pleading with him to make a statement that the rumors were false. He did not.
It’s the Debt Level Stupid
In 1907, the excessive debt was in the stock market. Call Money Rates (the level of interest paid to support broker loans) reached 125%. Even 1929 never came close to such levels. This also illustrates that the capital markets do not have enough money to invest equally on all levels in all segments of a domestic economy or in particular nations. To create the boom-bust, it requires the concentration of capital. A bubble top is formed when the majority of those seeking to employ money to make money are focused in a particular market or even country. The 1907 Crash was a bubble top because capital invested on a highly concentrated basis in railroad stocks. The bubble top in Japan back in 1989 was caused by a concentration of both domestic and international capital that had made Japan the number one market in the World. It is this concentration of capital that creates the boom and bust cycle. If money was evenly disbursed like the socialistic & communistic philosophies argue, we would be back to the dark ages where there was no concentration of capital and no economy beyond the walls of the castle so to speak. That is why communism failed.
It is the overall level of debt that has reached a bubble top in almost every possible area. For example, in 1980, household debt was about 50% of GDP. Going into the February 2007 high, it reached about 100% of GDP. We must also realize that something profound took place back in 1980. Americans would on the first blush seem to be living it up, buying everything they can on credit and have piles of tangible assets to show for it. That is like looking at the statistics for carrots and arguing that they are lethal because every person who has ever eaten a carrot is dead or in the process of a gradual slow death. This absurd example illustrates the bias that can produce the schizophrenic analysis.
There were, once upon a time, usury laws that generally held any interest rate greater than 10% was illegal. The Federal Reserve under Paul Volker believed that interest rates needed to be raised to insane levels to stop the runaway inflation, which was the first stone that hit the water sending the shock waves that we are having to pay for today. Once the usury laws were altered so the Fed could fight inflation, it set in motion the doubling of household debt, not to mention the national debt. At 8%, the principle is doubled through interest in less than 10 years. The national debt exploded from $1 to about $10 trillion in 25 years and household debt has doubled. Some states now consider usury to be 26%. Historically, these are the interest rates paid by the very worst of all debtors - the bankrupts. In fact, in China, the worst creditors historically paid at best 10%. What we have done is the lifting of usury to fight inflation back in 1980, has resulted in usury now being so high, a larger portion of income of the common worker is spent on interest, not buying goods & services that even create jobs. This is one primary reason why jobs have been leaving as well. The consumer needs the lowest possible price and labor wants the highest wages, and to stay competitive, producers leave taking manufacturing jobs as well as service jobs. The extraordinary rise in interest rates that are historical highs since at least pre-Roman times, could not have been possible but for the lifting of usury laws back in 1980 to fight inflation. This amounted to setting a fire to try to stop a brush fire that failed. Consumers pay the highest rates in thousands of years that feed the banks at the expense of economic growth. Even the National Debt rose from $2. 1 to $8.5 trillion between 1 986 and 2006 with $6. 1 trillion being interest. We are funding the nation on a credit card and destroying the economy simultaneously.
This has been enhanced by the tremendous leverage and false position that were created in the derivative markets causing the banks to just implode. Indeed, this is the origin of the economic Depression we are facing. The $700 billion bailout might have worked if Paulson did what he said he would - buy the debt and take it out of the banks. Had the debt been segregated into a pool and managed independently by a hedge fund manager not an investment banker, we could have mitigated the problem. But that is now too late. The credit implosion is taking place on a wholesale basis around the world. The more the economy declines in housing prices, the greater the defaults, the greater the foreclosures, and the lower the economy will move. We are now in a downward spiral that cannot be fixed by indirect schemes. As I said, you cannot get your kid's test scores up by purchasing a mink coat for your wife. Everyone will have their hand out begging for infrastructure money. But the theory of just spending money that will somehow make things better, it is like handing Mexico a trillion dollars and arguing that they will buy US goods that will somehow reverse the economy.
The leveraging of debt by the Investment Banks in particular has undermined the global economy. Where household debt has doubled since 1980, the professional financial service sector has seen a rise from 21% of GDP in 1980 to 116% by February 2007. Now consider the debt that they created with the mortgages is already down by 50% and falling, the bailouts will keep coming. To help correct the problem, the commercial banks will tighten credit to make their exposure less, and in fact, their solvency ratios will require it anyway. This we can expect to see not just in business, but housing and car loans that will contract the economy as well.
The Great Depression is not the perfect model for today. It was a complete capital contraction. The stock market basis the now Dow Jones Industrials fell 89% between September 3rd, 1929 and July 1932. The contraction in debt was quite massive. Then too, the leverage in banks collapsed that reduces the velocity of money and therefore the money supply. The banks were the first real widespread failures with 608 in 1930. Between February and August 1931, the commercial banks began to bleed profusely as bank deposits fell almost $3 billion or about 9% of all deposits. As 1932 began, the number of bank failures reached 1,860. The massive amount of bank failures in the thousands took place with the rumor of Roosevelt's intention to confiscate gold. Although he denied that was his policy the night of the elections, he remained silent refusing to discuss the issue until he was sworn in. on March 6, 1933 just 2 days after taking office, Roosevelt called a bank "holiday" closing the banks from which at least another 2,500 never reopened.
All of these events are contrasted by the collapse in national debts in Europe. Other than Herbert Hoover’s memoirs, I have yet to read any analysis of the Great Depression attribute anything internationally other than the infamous US Smoot-Hawley Act setting in motion the age of protectionism in June 1930. It was the financial war between European nations attacking each other's bond markets openly shorting them that led to all of Europe defaulting on their debt. Even Britain went into a moratorium suspending debt payments. This is what put the pressure on capital flows sending waves of capital to the United States that to sane degree was kind of like the capital flow to Japan into 1989. This put tremendous pressure upon the dollar driving it to new record highs that were misread by the politicians who did not understand capital flow. They responded with Smoot-Hawley misreading the entire set of facts. (see Greatest Bull Market In History) (Herbert Hoover's memoirs).
It is true that today we have Keynesian and Monetarist theories to manage the crisis. Sad to say, neither one will now work. Bernanke has responded in force dropping the federal funds rate from 5.25% to .25%. He has also opened the Fed Window and thrown out more than $1 trillion in 13 months. However, as admirable as this may be, he has no tool that will do the job. Milton Friedman was correct! The Great Depression was not caused by the decline in the stock market. The event was set in motion by the credit and banking crisis that resulted in a one-third contraction in the money supply.
Interest rates will do nothing. The flight to quality always takes place so what happens is a two-fold punch. (1) Interest rates collapse because capital seeks preservation not yield and will accept during such times virtually a zero rate of return, and (2) the flight to quality takes more available cash from the private sector because government debt truly does compete with the private sector. We are seeing this even now. Federal debt becomes the place to go so we see higher yields in both state am municipal bonds because they are not quality and could default like any bank. This contracts the money supply. Opening the window and just throwing buckets of money into the system will never have any impact to reverse the trend.
Furthermore, we are now in a Floating-Exchange Rate system that has made the global economy far more complex than it was in 1929. We all know that China is one of the biggest holders of US government debt. With the contagion spreading to Russia, South America, and China aside from Europe, we see a steeper decline in the China stock market than we do in the United States because that is where capital had concentrated domestically. If China needs money to stimulate its own economy when exports appear to be collapsing by about 50%, then we can see that the Keynesian model is worthless. If the Fed tries to pump money into the system through buying bonds from the private sector, those bonds may be held by aliens who take the money back to their own economies. The Fed cannot be sure it is even capable of stimulating the purely domestic economy. Lower interest rates to virtually zero like Japan did during the 19905, then if capital finds a better place to invest, it can leave for a higher rate of interest as capital did from Japan to the United states, which is why their domestic economy was never stimulated by the' lower interest rates.
Leverage during the Great Depression was not even remotely close to what we have to face today. The credit-default swaps are alone worth about $60 trillion. This was a stupid product for it has so tangled the world there may be no way out. This product created the false illusion that you did not have to worry about the quality of the loan because it was insured. We have no way of covering this level of implosion. Add the unfunded entitlements and then the state and local debts who cannot print money to cover their shortfall s, and we are looking at a contraction of debt that is simply beyond all contemplation.
So What Now?
So now that we see it is not Wall Street, again, but the banks, perhaps we can separate the facts from the fantasy. We can now see that there are two separate and distinct forecasts to be made - (1) economy and (2) stock market. Economic Depressions have a duration unfortunately of generally 23 years with an outside potential of 26 years. The 1873 Panic led to a economic depression of really 23 years into 1896. There were bouts with high volatility and injection of major waves of inflation following the major silver discoveries. It was the age of the Silver Democrats who tried to create inflation by over-valuing silver relative to gold. This created a wave of European-American arbitrage where silver flowed into the US exchanging it for gold, which then flowed back to Europe. By 1896, the US Treasury was broke.
The Panic of 1873 marked the collapse of J. Cook & Co, the huge investment bank that was the 19th Century version of Goldman Sachs. They went bust because of excessive leverage in railroad stocks. It matters not what the instrument may be, it is always the leverage, which set the tone for a economic depression that lasted into 1896 where JP Morgan became famous for leading a bailout of the us Treasury organizing a loan of gold bullion. The stock market rallied and made new highs with plenty of panics between 1873 and 1896. The point is, The Panic of 1893 was quite a horrible one. The point is, the stock market is not a reflection of the economy. It often trades up in anticipation of better times, and trades down on those same perceptions of bad times. In both cases, new highs or lows unfold even contrary to economic trends.
We will see new highs in the now long before we see the final low in the economy. The ideal lows on a timing basis for the stock market will be as soon as April 2009 or by June of 2009. The more pronounced lows would be due on a timing basis between December 2009 and April 2010. The most extreme target would seem to be August 2010. The shorter the resolution to the stock market low, the sooner we will start to see much higher volatility.
The low for the Dow would be indicated by reaching the 3,500-4,000 area. A 2008 closing below 12,000 in the cash now Jones Industrials will signal that the bear market is underway into at least 2009 if not 2010. A year-end closing for 2008 below the 9,700-9,800 level, will signal higher volatility as well. The real critical level for the closing of 2008 will be the 7,200 area generally. A year-end closing beneath this general level will signal that we could see the sharp decline to test the extremes support at 3,600-4,000 by as early as April 19th, 2009 going into May /June 2009. If we were to drop so quickly into those targets, this would be most likely the major low with a significant rally into at least April 16th, 2010.
The less volatile outcome would be a prolonged decline into the December 2009 target to about April 16th, 2010. A low at that late date would tend to project out for a high as early as June 2011 or into late 2012. Nevertheless, volatility appears to be very high. Those who were at the 1985 Economic conference in Princeton, may want to review those video tapes. The volatility we were looking at 20-30 years into the future is now. As 3 of the 5 major investment bankers failed, Merrill, Lehman and Bear, the liquidity has evaporated so the swings are going to be much more dramatic.
The major support is 3,600 on the now Industrials. During '09, the support area appears to be 6,600, 5,000, and 4,000-3,600. Clearly, resistance is shaping up at 9,700-9,800. It would take a monthly close back above the 12,400 level to signal new highs are likely. If we saw a complete collapse into a low by April 2009 or June 2009 reaching the 4,000 general area, this would be the major low with most likely a hyper-inflationary spiral developing thereafter. In that case, the now Jones Industrials could be back at even new highs as early as mid 2011 or going into late 2012.
Gold has decoupled from oil as it should and has been rising on an ounce-to-barrel ratio. Here, the pivot area for 2009 seems to be the $730-$760 area with the key support being still at the $525-$540 zone. The major high intraday was on March 17th, 2008. A weekly closing below $800 warns of consolidation. Only a monthly closing below the $535 area would signal a major high is in place. The more critical support appears to be at about $680 - $705. A weekly closing beneath this area will also warn of a potential consolidation. A major high is possible as early as 2010-2011 with the potential for an exponential rally into 2015 if there is any kind of a low going into 2011.45. The key to watch will be crude Oil. The collapse of Investment Banks has removed the speculation that exaggerated the trend. A year-end close below $40 for 2008 would signal a major high and serious economic decline ahead.
There Are No Tools Left! The Emperor Has No Clothes
It is hard to explain to someone who believe he has power, that he really has nothing of any significance. This becomes the story of the Emperor Has No Clothes. No one will tell him, and if you do, it may be off-with-your-head. This is akin to the man behind the curtain in the Wizard of OZ trying to keep up the whole illusion. After all, why do we vote for people unless we believe that will somehow change our lives?
Interest Rates
When an economy is rising and the stock market is exploding, interest rates always rise because the demand for money is rising because people believe that they can make a profit. Government pretend to be raising interest rates to stop inflation, but they do not create a trend contrary to the free markets. What happened in 1980 was merely that the government over-shoots the differential between expectations and the rate of interest. If you believe the stock market will double, you will pay 20% interest. A rising interest rate does not create a bear market. Only when the rate of interest exceeds expectations of potential profit offering almost a fixed secured return, will capital leave the speculative market and run to the bond market.
In a bear market, interest rates always decline because of the flight to quality. When there is a risk of a .banking crisis as well, then the flight to quality shows that capital is willing to accept virtually zero in return for the privilege to park itself is a secure manner to preserve the future.
In both cases, the government may accelerate the trend, but by no means can they create the trend or alter the trend. Lowering interest rates to zero right now will not reverse the economic decline. People will look out the window and until they feel confident again, they will not come out from behind the castle walls. Japan lowered interest rates to virtually zero for nearly a decade. All it did was fuel the carry trade whereby yen was borrowed at 0.1 % and invested in dollars at 5-8%. There was little opportunity to invest domestically in Japan and the stock market languished in a broad consolidation with flurries the upside every-now-and-again.
Monetary Theory
The Fed has already put into the system about $1 trillion in 13 months. The real problem is they are buying back US government debt injecting cash into the system. But if those bonds are sold to the Fed by foreign holders, there can be no injection of cash into the domestic economy. This amounts to the monetization of our debt in any event. Clearly, buying bonds from the market is not a guaranteed increase in domestic money supply especially when the velocity of money is itself collapsing. Borrowing heavily all these years and depending on foreign investors to buy that debt, altered the course of economics. Of course there has always been the foreign investor, but there has not been the floating exchange rate system. The rise and fall of the dollar itself can now either attract foreign capital with an advance or repel capital with its decline. Like we needed another new variable.
Infrastructure Spending
There really is nothing left in the tool bag that can help even to mitigate the coming Economic Depression. The unemployment rate at the end of 1930 was only about 8.9% - similar to the 1975 recession. Things were very slow back then. Even housing was not moving and people took whatever offers came their way. It was the Dust Bowl that began in 1934 that sent the unemployment rising after the 1932 low in the stock market. About 40% of the work force was agrarian. Hence, Congress could not pass a law to make it rain. The real devastation was that this presented a huge portion of the work force that had to be retrained into skilled labor. It was the Great Depression that finally by force of necessity, created an industrial work force that may have taken another 200 years to unfold by gradual transformation.
The WPA was formed in 1935, 3 years after the low in the stock market (1932). It had a slow and marginal success. At best, if we attribute all improvement to this one program, very unlikely, unemployment was only reduced by about 20%.
1935 20.3%
1936 16.9%
1937 14.3%
1938 19.0%
1939 17.2%
1940 14.6%
Even if we attribute everything to the WPA, all the way into 1940, the most the unemployment declines was by 30%. However, at the end of World War II, we see an Unemployment rate of 1.9% by 1945. Any ideas that we can spend trillions on infrastructure and make it all better, forget it.
Turning to infrastructure in the middle of a debt crisis makes no sense. The idea of just spending money will somehow stimulate the economy, will not work. This is like trying to fight in the desert of Iraq using the same tactics as in Vietnam. There has to be sane connection to what we are doing. Just because FDR instituted the WPA when we had a huge displacement issue in the work force, almost 6 years after the crash began, makes no sense at all for our current problems. As I said, this is like buying your wife a mink coat to somehow influence your kid to get their grades up. The connection is tenuous at best and nonexistent in all reality.
Summary
Unless we attack the debt structure directly, there is no point in counting upon any government to help mitigate the problem and more-likely-than-not, our very future may be recast in so many ways, the level of frustration will rise, and that leads to war because war distracts the people from hanging their own politicians. The oldest trick in the book is to blame the guy next-door down. Unless we are honestly prepared to truly 1) reorganize the structure of government, 2) reorganize the entire debt structure both private and public, 3) regulate leverage, 4) restore usury laws that will free up personal income, and 5) look at just eliminating the federal income tax in combination with 6) establishing a new national heathcare system that will restructure all pension plans public and private, there is not much hope for the future from government. Our definition of money (M1) does not include bonds so we can fool ourselves by issuing $10 trillion in bonds is different than printing the cash. It is still money. Taxes are needed in a gold standard where money cannot be created. Stop competing with the states, control the budget as a percent of GDP, increase the money supply to that degree, and stop the taxing when money is created by leverage and velocity anyway. This will restore jobs and inject huge confidence as in 1964 when the payroll tax was cut permanently. One-offs never work. People save the rebates for a rainy day. We need real honest reform since the states will go broke and seek handouts as well. So, it is time to get real. It is time we restructure the entire system including the banks which always cause the problem. We don't need excessive regulation of things that did not create the problem when the real culprits always escape.
銀行隱憂
美國企業今年首季業績公佈潮昨日展開，去年第四季業績創下慘淡紀錄後，投資者預期企業受經濟衰退拖累，新一輪的業績報告都會好差，再加上大投機家索羅斯話美股最近的升市只係熊市的反彈，打壓投資氣氛，美股昨日走勢疲弱。
湯森路透預計標普500企業首季盈利將按年大跌約36.9%。若果然是如此的的話，將是標普500指數1998年開始有記錄以來，首次錄得連續七個季度的企業盈利負增長。Hester Capital Management嘅CEO Craig Hester話，「第一季業績差勁，應該不會令人感到意外。關鍵是看企業對未來經營情況的說法。」問題係企業對未來環境都估得好悲觀。
另一個打壓市場投資氣氛嘅係一個由多家企業的CEO組成的協會公佈其對經濟前景的看法，指標由負50至正150，低過50，表示看法悲觀。該協會對今年首季指標係負5，係七年以來最低的。去年同期係79.5，上季亦有16.5。CEO預計今年美國GDP會倒退1.9%，遠差過3個月前預測的零增長。
美國鋁業係打頭炮公布首季業績的杜指巨企，昨日在收市後率先公佈業績。因全球需求下滑和鋁價大跌，美國鋁業錄得連續第二季季度虧損，經營收入下跌37%至41億美元，淨虧損4.9億美元，合每股虧損0.61美元，上年度同期營收為65億美元，淨利潤為3億美元或每股盈利0.37美元，美鋁的業績顯示鋁業的經營環境仍然相當惡劣。
美國鋁業話，將推出全面計畫重整資產負債表和營運成本，至2010年將增加至節省20億美元，資本開支將削減50%。美國鋁業先升後回，下跌1.5%至7.79美元。
美股表面看是因為企業首季業績而跌，但銀行業的危疾亦重重壓住美股。英國泰晤士報報道，國際貨幣基金會(IMF)最新預測料顯示，環球銀行和保險商持有的有毒債務可能會攀升至4萬億美元，呢個數字遠高於各國投入金融市場消除毒債的資金。消息打壓市場人氣拖累金融股下跌。KBW銀行指數BKX下跌3.5%，摩根大通挫3.4%至27.25美元，富國銀行跌2.6%至14.85美元；美銀跌1.6%至7.36美元；而花旗集團則逆市上升，升1.5%至2.76美元，成為杜指成份股唯一上升的股份。匯控在美國的ADR股價亦跟隨下跌，收報50.01元，比香港收市價低2.3%.
我地昨日講過美國資深銀行業分析師Mike Mayo對銀行業的估評，佢在報告中有嚇人的估計，佢話「美國銀行業的貸款虧損將會增加到超過1930年大蕭條的水平，政府的新救助措施不會如預期那樣有重大作用。」佢話而家銀行只對其貸款帳簿作了2%的撥備，即係借咗1美元出街，只撥備了2美仙，仲有0.98美元在帳上，撥備仍遠低於可能的虧損。
Mike Mayo那句「大蕭條水平」可能係吸引眼球的誇張之詞，但銀行現時主要對住宅樓宇按揭做了撥備，但往後工業和商業按揭及信用咭貸款撥備，好快又殺到。
如今美國銀行股的沽空數字係近期低位，這也是銀行股大反彈的必然結果，逼到大量沽空盤平倉，但彈完之後，沽空盤慢慢多番。而家唯一要睇係金融股回吐後有無後抽，而後抽的水平又會唔會高過上一浪。
湯森路透預計標普500企業首季盈利將按年大跌約36.9%。若果然是如此的的話，將是標普500指數1998年開始有記錄以來，首次錄得連續七個季度的企業盈利負增長。Hester Capital Management嘅CEO Craig Hester話，「第一季業績差勁，應該不會令人感到意外。關鍵是看企業對未來經營情況的說法。」問題係企業對未來環境都估得好悲觀。
另一個打壓市場投資氣氛嘅係一個由多家企業的CEO組成的協會公佈其對經濟前景的看法，指標由負50至正150，低過50，表示看法悲觀。該協會對今年首季指標係負5，係七年以來最低的。去年同期係79.5，上季亦有16.5。CEO預計今年美國GDP會倒退1.9%，遠差過3個月前預測的零增長。
美國鋁業係打頭炮公布首季業績的杜指巨企，昨日在收市後率先公佈業績。因全球需求下滑和鋁價大跌，美國鋁業錄得連續第二季季度虧損，經營收入下跌37%至41億美元，淨虧損4.9億美元，合每股虧損0.61美元，上年度同期營收為65億美元，淨利潤為3億美元或每股盈利0.37美元，美鋁的業績顯示鋁業的經營環境仍然相當惡劣。
美國鋁業話，將推出全面計畫重整資產負債表和營運成本，至2010年將增加至節省20億美元，資本開支將削減50%。美國鋁業先升後回，下跌1.5%至7.79美元。
美股表面看是因為企業首季業績而跌，但銀行業的危疾亦重重壓住美股。英國泰晤士報報道，國際貨幣基金會(IMF)最新預測料顯示，環球銀行和保險商持有的有毒債務可能會攀升至4萬億美元，呢個數字遠高於各國投入金融市場消除毒債的資金。消息打壓市場人氣拖累金融股下跌。KBW銀行指數BKX下跌3.5%，摩根大通挫3.4%至27.25美元，富國銀行跌2.6%至14.85美元；美銀跌1.6%至7.36美元；而花旗集團則逆市上升，升1.5%至2.76美元，成為杜指成份股唯一上升的股份。匯控在美國的ADR股價亦跟隨下跌，收報50.01元，比香港收市價低2.3%.
我地昨日講過美國資深銀行業分析師Mike Mayo對銀行業的估評，佢在報告中有嚇人的估計，佢話「美國銀行業的貸款虧損將會增加到超過1930年大蕭條的水平，政府的新救助措施不會如預期那樣有重大作用。」佢話而家銀行只對其貸款帳簿作了2%的撥備，即係借咗1美元出街，只撥備了2美仙，仲有0.98美元在帳上，撥備仍遠低於可能的虧損。
Mike Mayo那句「大蕭條水平」可能係吸引眼球的誇張之詞，但銀行現時主要對住宅樓宇按揭做了撥備，但往後工業和商業按揭及信用咭貸款撥備，好快又殺到。
如今美國銀行股的沽空數字係近期低位，這也是銀行股大反彈的必然結果，逼到大量沽空盤平倉，但彈完之後，沽空盤慢慢多番。而家唯一要睇係金融股回吐後有無後抽，而後抽的水平又會唔會高過上一浪。
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