抢购私宅的结果是房价只有上没有下，买家以为自己买到便宜货，其实不然。因为买家所付出的价格是他们愿意付出的，而不是真正的便宜价格。如果这些人指望在一两年后自己所买的公寓会增值，并将它卖掉套现赚钱，或许不容易如愿以偿。现在的房价已经接近2007年高峰的价格，有的甚至比高峰期的价格还高出30％。
自今年2月发展商星狮地产以比周边私人公寓转售价低20％的价格推出“水之轩”(Caspian)后，本地私宅市场的温度就像中暑似的持续发烧。
其他发展商应该感谢星狮地产，如果不是它当时敢敢在淡静的市场“削价”，以每平方英尺580元的诱人价格推出水之轩私人公寓而引发购房热，本地私宅，特别是大众化私宅近期也不会“烧不退”。
一周前，宏茂桥组屋区内的99年地契公寓“中景峰”（Centro Residences）卖到千元以上的尺价。对这个比地点更靠近市区、永久地契的公寓卖得还贵的组屋区项目，竟然还有人抢购，朋友感到不可思议。近日他又接到另一个看楼的VVIP邀请函，那是在大巴窑组屋区内的公寓项目Trevista@Tao Payoh，尺价也在千元以上。他说，这一回他很“光火”，因为“房市已离了谱”，让他没有信心进场。
这名真正有意买房自住的朋友说，自己控制不了的“购房焦灼症”再次来袭，让他备感苦恼，还夸张到说：“简直看不下去了”。
曾几何时，“尺价过千”还是乌节路或武吉知马黄金地段高级公寓的价码，才没多久的事，组屋区大众化公寓的尺价也过千了。是通货膨胀了？还是供需的问题？
令人匪夷所思的是，为了抢购过千尺价的组屋区私人公寓，买家还生怕抢购不到，甘愿排队等上数十小时，为的就是能够抢先交上空白支票。现场“抢”房的场面令人惊叹，堪比新加坡大热卖时的劲头，人潮汹涌，仿佛大家是在买衣服而不是买房子。抢购不到的，还真搥胸顿足，哀叹自己迟人一步。
买家以为买到便宜货
这一波的房市“抢购”热潮，是大众化公寓热卖引爆，买家既不是大富豪，也非外国大买家，主要是本地一些投资“初哥”，很多是住组屋，想买间小单位的公寓来投资的组屋居民。姑且不论这些投资者手中握有多少现金，他们的那种“抢购”心态，感觉就像是股市低潮时抢着进场拣便宜货，然后期待股市上涨时抛售套利一样。
这些人真的拣到便宜货吗？抢购的结果是价格只有上没有下，买家以为自己买到的是便宜货，其实不然。因为买家所付出的价格是他们愿意付出的，而不是真正的便宜价格。如果这些人指望在一两年后自己所买的公寓会增值，并将它卖掉套现赚钱，或许不容易如愿以偿。房子能增值多少呢？他们可知道现在买的房价已经接近2007年高峰的价格，有的甚至比高峰期的价格还高出30％。期望未来一两年房价涨个30％或更高，那只是一厢情愿的“算命”想法。
目前房价只能算虚高
如果是当作收租来投资，那也有一定的风险。目前的租金走势已在往下跌，一两年后还有市场吗？如果须要贷款来进行这项投资，可要三思了。再说，我国实体经济还未取得实质性的复苏，目前的房价只能算是虚高，终要回到根本价值上。
买了房子，就期望房价大涨，没买的无不盼望大跌。这就是购房者的死穴：买涨不买跌。在这一波私宅涨潮中，我们看到的似乎只是新推出公寓项目的价格涨得厉害，现楼和二手房市场仍然淡静，有些转手价甚至还比新楼价低了20％以上。显然整体的本地房地产市场还没有真正进入炎热的夏天。
还有个现象是，手中握有巨额现金的“真正买家”却没有在这一波的房市抢购热潮中进场。例如一个朋友是两年前集体出售的受惠者，手中握有两百多万元的现金，至今仍租房住。从2007年的房市高峰到去年低潮，到现在的热潮，他都不为所动，原因在于他“仍找不到地点好、价格合理”的房子。像他那样“保守”的态度又有点“太超过”了。
我认为，如果你手中握有300万元现金，反正银行利率又低，赚不了多少利息，就拿出150万元来买间房子，应该还算是明智的投资。否则左观望，右观望，千挑万选仍然“千帆过尽皆不是”，眼睁睁看着房价从高到低，从低到高，仍不出手，最终只有感叹“missed the boat”， 没赶上船——坐失良机了！
什么时候才是进场最佳时机？这个谁也说不准。买房应该是根据自己的经济承受能力来决定。如果你有300万元，拿一半的钱来买房子，那是很合理的做法。如果你连100万元都没有，却要向银行贷款购买近百万元的房子，这就是不理性的购房了。近期看到的情况是，该进场的没进场，不该进场的反而争相进场。
房价会继续上涨吗？在房市，永远没有顶和底，也没有哪个人能像算命师那样算出未来跌多少涨多少。“涨就是跌的开始，而跌就是涨的先兆”，这套过去用在股市的定律，似乎也用不上了，更何况是用在目前被形容为“不可思议”的房市上。
今年2月以近乎半价的580元尺价买下“水之轩”的买家，现在回头看，是不是拣到一块“天上掉下的馅饼”？而那些最近以1200元以上尺价买下“中景峰”的买家，相比之下，是不是买了贵货？
Monday, August 10, 2009
ROBERT STONE reaping the rewards of 3 decades of investing
Note: Over the last 11 years, Robert Stone's portfolio gained 29.6% compounded a year. That means every $100,000 has grown to $1.73 million.
Robert Stone in Hanoi and excited to find a place selling the brew made by an unlisted Cantho company he has a stake in. Photo courtesy of Robert Stone
ASIDE FROM the small army of retirees who usually descend on annual general meetings (AGM), you can sometimes run into the occasional high net-worth investor who is not only younger but also very knowledgeable about the company's business.
At a recent AGM, I met one such investor: 51-year-old Robert Stone, a full-time investor with substantial investments in stocks listed on bourses ranging from Vietnam to Hong Kong to Indonesia and, of course, Singapore.
He also has an interesting career history, at least in this part of the world.
“I started working as a roughneck in the oilfields of Western Canada in 1978,” he began. An oilfield roughneck is a manual worker on the drill floor of oil rigs. At that time, he was taking a break from his university studies in New Zealand.
“It was the midst of the oil boom in the late 1970’s and although the work was hard physically and dangerous with long hours, I loved it.”
He eventually finished his degree in economics but stayed on in the oil industry. In 1980 the oilfield shut down in Canada due to a change in government policy. The business was still booming everywhere else and he decided Southeast Asia had the best prospects.
Canada-born Mr Stone has lived in Singapore for nearly 30 years, and is now a permanent resident and married to a Singaporean. The couple have three daughters aged seven, nine and 13.
Over the years, with the money he saved, he had invested in stocks ranging from high-tech (such as Singapore-listed Anwell Technologies, which is emerging as one of China’s largest manufacturers of solar panels) to conservative (such as Merck KGaA, a global pharmaceutical company).
Revealing a salient feature of his investing approach, Mr Stone said: “In my own personal life, I have zero debt and don’t buy on margin. I like companies that are similarly conservative. One of the reasons that Merck has survived for 341 years is the Germans running it are extremely conservative. It is the best example of a company that I want to own.”
He expends far more than the usual effort put in by individual investors to check out companies he wants to put money into.
“Generally I won’t make more than a small initial investment in a company without meeting the management and usually visiting the facilities of the company. If for any reason the management makes me feel that they are not trustworthy or unconcerned for the interests of minority shareholders, that will terminate any interest I had in that company,” he said. “When I haven’t done this, I’ve usually lived to regret it.”
A downturn hit the oil industry worldwide in 1982 and for the next 23 years that I remained in the industry it was tough going. I was fortunate as I always remained employed despite the oil exploration business losing about 85% of its workforce from the early 1980’s to the late 1990’s. For ten years from 1995 I worked as a consultant Drilling Supervisor on offshore rigs which paid very well and gave me a lot of time off to pursue my own interests.
How did you become a full-time investor?
I’ve been investing in shares since I was about 17 years old. By the year 2000 the income from my investments was exceeding my income from working as a consultant. I had a great deal of flexibility in the amount of time I worked as a consultant so from 2000 to 2005, I progressively increased the time I spent on my investments until it became a full time job.
What are the companies you have invested in?
Twenty years ago it seemed obvious that Asia would continue to grow and as these societies became wealthier and older the proportion of income spent on health care would rise dramatically. In the early 1990’s I invested in the listed local entities of four foreign controlled pharmaceutical companies in Indonesia.
These companies when they entered Indonesia were required to list and sell some shares. I figured that I could be more confident investing in foreign-run companies and that proved to be a good strategy. Two of these companies Pfizer and Bayer privatized turned out to be a windfall due to the Jakarta Stock Exchange rules that protect the interests of minority shareholders.
Pfizer was particularly generous. It offered nearly 10 times the last traded price to minority shareholders to ensure there would not be any objections. I’m still holding the other two - PT Merck, a subsidiary of Merck KGaA founded in 1668, the oldest pharmaceutical company in the world, and Schering Plough. My other long term holding in Indonesia is Delta Djakarta which is controlled by San Miguel and is one of only three licensed beer manufacturers there.
I am the only foreign individual shareholder of that company and own about 1 per cent of the listed shares.
Any stakes in companies listed in other stock exchanges?
In Sri Lanka I am holding just one company now - Chevron Sri Lanka which I own 2 per cent of. In Thailand, I own 3 ½ per cent of Aikchol, one of the listed hospital operators and a smaller shareholding in Furukawa a Japanese controlled copper tube manufacturer. In Vietnam I sold most of the shares I’d accumulated since 2003 in 2007 but I’m still holding 9 per cent of Hacisco and a smaller shareholding in Hau Giang United Pharmaceutical, the largest domestic pharmaceutical manufacturer which are both listed on the HCMC Exchange.
I have some fond feelings for Hau Giang United. In December 2004 I bought 2 per cent of the shares on the OTC market several years before it listed. I expected to hold it for many years but by November of 2007 the valuation was so outrageous that I had to sell it, making some 30 times my original investment. The share price dropped about 75 per cent after I got out so I bought back a much smaller holding last year.
And in Singapore?
Here I have just shy of 8 per cent of Singapore Windsor, between 2 ½ and 3 per cent of Sunmart, Darco Water, Dutech and about 1 per cent of three or four other companies, a couple of which I wish didn't have my name on the list of shareholders (Suneast and Reyphon). Most of these I bought within the last year.
Prior to last year, you weren’t invested in Singapore-listed stocks?
In recent years and prior to last year, the only company I owned a significant number of shares was Singapore Windsor. I started buying into that after visiting the factory in Shenzhen in December 2006. I was impressed by the two brothers who run the company, the way they ran their business and their long term record of profitability in an industry that I normally would not consider investing in.
In 2007 I thought markets everywhere were over valued so I was mostly selling, especially in Vietnam. At the start of 2008 I had about 30% of my assets in cash. I started buying into mostly S-chips, which is where I saw the best value, from the time of the first big market swoon in January 2008. Since then I’ve been buying continuously at a steady pace.
To my way of thinking the market values of some of these companies are so ridiculously low that whichever companies survive will ultimately turn out to have been very good investments. In retrospect, I started buying too early. I bought into two companies, Suneast and Reyphon, which are now among the walking wounded
You and I first met at the Anwell Technologies AGM a couple of weeks ago. I was there to interview the CEO. How did you come to own 3.2 million shares of the company, as stated in the company’s annual report?
I now have 4 million shares. I visited Anwell’s facilities in Dongguan and Anyang early last July and met chairman Franky Fan and the other prime movers behind the company. I guess I had the same tour of the Dongguan plant that Chinese Premier Wen got two weeks later and was similarly impressed.
But what really enthused me about the company was seeing the optical disc factory in Anyang. The efficiency of the process and the way the Anwell team has refined these machines to be the most productive in the world convinced me they would be able to achieve the same result in the thin film solar industry.
Anwell chairman Franky Fan (right) greeting Premier Wen Jiabao to his Dongguan factory. Photo: Anwell
I believe this industry will develop much like the optical disc industry where only the most cost efficient manufacturers will survive in the longer term. I have followed the solar industry for 30 years and I now believe solar will soon be able to compete against traditional forms of energy without massive government subsidies. For Anwell I see the greatest potential in the replication equipment segment of the solar venture.
They have only three major competitors, all based in developed countries with less productive machines. I think Anwell will do the same thing they’ve done with the competition in the optical disc replication machinery business. As a result of that trip I was the first to pony up funds for the convertible notes deal last year although I felt then, when Anwell’s market cap was about $150 million, that the shares were a much better investment. Now the market cap is $45 million, and there is less uncertainty for the prospects of the solar venture in my opinion.
I understand you also own a chunk of Dawnrays Pharmaceuticals which is listed in Hong Kong. How did you come to own the stock?
I approached the management of Dawnrays in 2004 after buying a few million shares. The CFO at the time, Kehan Xu, who is now their strategic advisor responded so positively that I was encouraged after visiting the plants in Suzhou to keep buying
I've been buying Dawnrays since 2004 and now own 4.25 per cent of the company. It's one company I feel most comfortable owning as I know and trust the management. Also I think the pharma industry in China has some long term trends in its favor and Dawnrays is one company that I think will benefit
You emailed me a picture of yourself in Hanoi and wrote about an unlisted company that you have an interest in. Can you elaborate on that investment?
The company is a subsidiary of Saigon Beer. It is based in Cantho in the Mekong Delta and supplies two types of beer on a fixed long-term contract to Saigon Beer. I bid for shares in the IPO of this company back in January 2005 and ended up with a bit more than 1 per cent of the shares. I’ve visited the factory twice since then but otherwise get almost no news of it.
Every year I receive dividends amounting to about a 10 per cent yield on my initial investment. They had plans to list but now the market has collapsed that has been put on hold. Whenever I’m in Vietnam I always have one of their brews in whatever restaurant I’m in. I was surprised to find their beer also selling in Hanoi which is why I got the picture taken.
Can you tell us more about your investing approach?
1. I like companies that are conservative. Merck is the best example of a company that I want to own. Despite Merck being conservatively run, I have been paid several times my original investment in dividends over the 18 years since I started buying it. It is also perfectly positioned for the future if Indonesia ever comes to realizing its economic potential. If all my other investments were to get wiped out but Merck survives, I’ll still be in good shape.
2. Being an individual has some advantages versus a fund manager who has to consider the liquidity of any counter as he may need to retain the option of selling out quickly. As liquidity is not an issue for me, (it took me 10 years to build my position in Merck) and being a long term investor, investing in small-cap companies is relatively attractive as the valuations tend to be very good and the growth prospects better than larger ones.
3. In theory, my main source of income is dividends not capital gains so I look for companies that have a track record of paying out good dividends. Both Merck and Chevron are companies that usually pay out all their earnings in dividends. It’s been my experience that companies with a serious commitment to pay dividends reliably are also the ones that tend to do better in the long term. They have to be more focused on costs if all capital expenditures are planned from what remains after the dividend is paid. This is one aspect I particularly like about Dawnrays which is making major capital expenditures to further its expansion plans without taking on debt but still paying out 40 per cent of its earnings in dividends.
4. I also think it’s important to invest in companies that have some significant barriers to entry. This is especially important in China as every investor is aware. This is one reason why I like the pharmaceutical business in China as not only does it have great growth prospects, the business is one of the few which regulation can benefit in the sense that it prevents the sudden entry of numerous competitors who will sell the same products at a lower price.
5. I like to feel that companies I’m a shareholder of are making a positive contribution to society in some way. For instance, with Anwell I think of that as being an ideological investment as much as a financial one. If they are successful in contributing to the process of driving down the dollar-per-watt cost of solar energy, they will have made a positive contribution in the process of reducing the emission of greenhouse gases. I believe this the biggest long term problem that the world faces.
Obviously these principles have not been applied in all the SGX companies I’ve invested in the last year or so. However, my thinking with these investments is they are somewhat speculative and opportunistic in nature. Only a few of them need to survive the current crisis and I think I’ll be well rewarded.
Some analysts reckon the stock market has bottomed and there are reasons to expect a sustained recovery. What do you think?
I more inclined to think we’re in the midst of a bear market rally. Until real estate prices stop falling in the US and elsewhere, there is going to be more bad news on banks needing capital to survive. I’m not impressed with the way that the new administration in the US has handled the crisis.
The emphasis seems to be on quickly trying to restore things to the way they were before and to worry about the longer-term consequences in the longer term. I read recently a piece titled ‘Ten principles for a Black Swan proof world’ by Nassim Taleb. I don’t normally pay much attention to these sorts of gurus but when I read that I thought he describes the way forward exactly as I think but expressed it much better than I could.
The interview for this article was done in May, and was published in the July edition of Pulses magazine and is reproduced here with permission.
Robert Stone in Hanoi and excited to find a place selling the brew made by an unlisted Cantho company he has a stake in. Photo courtesy of Robert Stone
ASIDE FROM the small army of retirees who usually descend on annual general meetings (AGM), you can sometimes run into the occasional high net-worth investor who is not only younger but also very knowledgeable about the company's business.
At a recent AGM, I met one such investor: 51-year-old Robert Stone, a full-time investor with substantial investments in stocks listed on bourses ranging from Vietnam to Hong Kong to Indonesia and, of course, Singapore.
He also has an interesting career history, at least in this part of the world.
“I started working as a roughneck in the oilfields of Western Canada in 1978,” he began. An oilfield roughneck is a manual worker on the drill floor of oil rigs. At that time, he was taking a break from his university studies in New Zealand.
“It was the midst of the oil boom in the late 1970’s and although the work was hard physically and dangerous with long hours, I loved it.”
He eventually finished his degree in economics but stayed on in the oil industry. In 1980 the oilfield shut down in Canada due to a change in government policy. The business was still booming everywhere else and he decided Southeast Asia had the best prospects.
Canada-born Mr Stone has lived in Singapore for nearly 30 years, and is now a permanent resident and married to a Singaporean. The couple have three daughters aged seven, nine and 13.
Over the years, with the money he saved, he had invested in stocks ranging from high-tech (such as Singapore-listed Anwell Technologies, which is emerging as one of China’s largest manufacturers of solar panels) to conservative (such as Merck KGaA, a global pharmaceutical company).
Revealing a salient feature of his investing approach, Mr Stone said: “In my own personal life, I have zero debt and don’t buy on margin. I like companies that are similarly conservative. One of the reasons that Merck has survived for 341 years is the Germans running it are extremely conservative. It is the best example of a company that I want to own.”
He expends far more than the usual effort put in by individual investors to check out companies he wants to put money into.
“Generally I won’t make more than a small initial investment in a company without meeting the management and usually visiting the facilities of the company. If for any reason the management makes me feel that they are not trustworthy or unconcerned for the interests of minority shareholders, that will terminate any interest I had in that company,” he said. “When I haven’t done this, I’ve usually lived to regret it.”
A downturn hit the oil industry worldwide in 1982 and for the next 23 years that I remained in the industry it was tough going. I was fortunate as I always remained employed despite the oil exploration business losing about 85% of its workforce from the early 1980’s to the late 1990’s. For ten years from 1995 I worked as a consultant Drilling Supervisor on offshore rigs which paid very well and gave me a lot of time off to pursue my own interests.
How did you become a full-time investor?
I’ve been investing in shares since I was about 17 years old. By the year 2000 the income from my investments was exceeding my income from working as a consultant. I had a great deal of flexibility in the amount of time I worked as a consultant so from 2000 to 2005, I progressively increased the time I spent on my investments until it became a full time job.
What are the companies you have invested in?
Twenty years ago it seemed obvious that Asia would continue to grow and as these societies became wealthier and older the proportion of income spent on health care would rise dramatically. In the early 1990’s I invested in the listed local entities of four foreign controlled pharmaceutical companies in Indonesia.
These companies when they entered Indonesia were required to list and sell some shares. I figured that I could be more confident investing in foreign-run companies and that proved to be a good strategy. Two of these companies Pfizer and Bayer privatized turned out to be a windfall due to the Jakarta Stock Exchange rules that protect the interests of minority shareholders.
Pfizer was particularly generous. It offered nearly 10 times the last traded price to minority shareholders to ensure there would not be any objections. I’m still holding the other two - PT Merck, a subsidiary of Merck KGaA founded in 1668, the oldest pharmaceutical company in the world, and Schering Plough. My other long term holding in Indonesia is Delta Djakarta which is controlled by San Miguel and is one of only three licensed beer manufacturers there.
I am the only foreign individual shareholder of that company and own about 1 per cent of the listed shares.
Any stakes in companies listed in other stock exchanges?
In Sri Lanka I am holding just one company now - Chevron Sri Lanka which I own 2 per cent of. In Thailand, I own 3 ½ per cent of Aikchol, one of the listed hospital operators and a smaller shareholding in Furukawa a Japanese controlled copper tube manufacturer. In Vietnam I sold most of the shares I’d accumulated since 2003 in 2007 but I’m still holding 9 per cent of Hacisco and a smaller shareholding in Hau Giang United Pharmaceutical, the largest domestic pharmaceutical manufacturer which are both listed on the HCMC Exchange.
I have some fond feelings for Hau Giang United. In December 2004 I bought 2 per cent of the shares on the OTC market several years before it listed. I expected to hold it for many years but by November of 2007 the valuation was so outrageous that I had to sell it, making some 30 times my original investment. The share price dropped about 75 per cent after I got out so I bought back a much smaller holding last year.
And in Singapore?
Here I have just shy of 8 per cent of Singapore Windsor, between 2 ½ and 3 per cent of Sunmart, Darco Water, Dutech and about 1 per cent of three or four other companies, a couple of which I wish didn't have my name on the list of shareholders (Suneast and Reyphon). Most of these I bought within the last year.
Prior to last year, you weren’t invested in Singapore-listed stocks?
In recent years and prior to last year, the only company I owned a significant number of shares was Singapore Windsor. I started buying into that after visiting the factory in Shenzhen in December 2006. I was impressed by the two brothers who run the company, the way they ran their business and their long term record of profitability in an industry that I normally would not consider investing in.
In 2007 I thought markets everywhere were over valued so I was mostly selling, especially in Vietnam. At the start of 2008 I had about 30% of my assets in cash. I started buying into mostly S-chips, which is where I saw the best value, from the time of the first big market swoon in January 2008. Since then I’ve been buying continuously at a steady pace.
To my way of thinking the market values of some of these companies are so ridiculously low that whichever companies survive will ultimately turn out to have been very good investments. In retrospect, I started buying too early. I bought into two companies, Suneast and Reyphon, which are now among the walking wounded
You and I first met at the Anwell Technologies AGM a couple of weeks ago. I was there to interview the CEO. How did you come to own 3.2 million shares of the company, as stated in the company’s annual report?
I now have 4 million shares. I visited Anwell’s facilities in Dongguan and Anyang early last July and met chairman Franky Fan and the other prime movers behind the company. I guess I had the same tour of the Dongguan plant that Chinese Premier Wen got two weeks later and was similarly impressed.
But what really enthused me about the company was seeing the optical disc factory in Anyang. The efficiency of the process and the way the Anwell team has refined these machines to be the most productive in the world convinced me they would be able to achieve the same result in the thin film solar industry.
Anwell chairman Franky Fan (right) greeting Premier Wen Jiabao to his Dongguan factory. Photo: Anwell
I believe this industry will develop much like the optical disc industry where only the most cost efficient manufacturers will survive in the longer term. I have followed the solar industry for 30 years and I now believe solar will soon be able to compete against traditional forms of energy without massive government subsidies. For Anwell I see the greatest potential in the replication equipment segment of the solar venture.
They have only three major competitors, all based in developed countries with less productive machines. I think Anwell will do the same thing they’ve done with the competition in the optical disc replication machinery business. As a result of that trip I was the first to pony up funds for the convertible notes deal last year although I felt then, when Anwell’s market cap was about $150 million, that the shares were a much better investment. Now the market cap is $45 million, and there is less uncertainty for the prospects of the solar venture in my opinion.
I understand you also own a chunk of Dawnrays Pharmaceuticals which is listed in Hong Kong. How did you come to own the stock?
I approached the management of Dawnrays in 2004 after buying a few million shares. The CFO at the time, Kehan Xu, who is now their strategic advisor responded so positively that I was encouraged after visiting the plants in Suzhou to keep buying
I've been buying Dawnrays since 2004 and now own 4.25 per cent of the company. It's one company I feel most comfortable owning as I know and trust the management. Also I think the pharma industry in China has some long term trends in its favor and Dawnrays is one company that I think will benefit
You emailed me a picture of yourself in Hanoi and wrote about an unlisted company that you have an interest in. Can you elaborate on that investment?
The company is a subsidiary of Saigon Beer. It is based in Cantho in the Mekong Delta and supplies two types of beer on a fixed long-term contract to Saigon Beer. I bid for shares in the IPO of this company back in January 2005 and ended up with a bit more than 1 per cent of the shares. I’ve visited the factory twice since then but otherwise get almost no news of it.
Every year I receive dividends amounting to about a 10 per cent yield on my initial investment. They had plans to list but now the market has collapsed that has been put on hold. Whenever I’m in Vietnam I always have one of their brews in whatever restaurant I’m in. I was surprised to find their beer also selling in Hanoi which is why I got the picture taken.
Can you tell us more about your investing approach?
1. I like companies that are conservative. Merck is the best example of a company that I want to own. Despite Merck being conservatively run, I have been paid several times my original investment in dividends over the 18 years since I started buying it. It is also perfectly positioned for the future if Indonesia ever comes to realizing its economic potential. If all my other investments were to get wiped out but Merck survives, I’ll still be in good shape.
2. Being an individual has some advantages versus a fund manager who has to consider the liquidity of any counter as he may need to retain the option of selling out quickly. As liquidity is not an issue for me, (it took me 10 years to build my position in Merck) and being a long term investor, investing in small-cap companies is relatively attractive as the valuations tend to be very good and the growth prospects better than larger ones.
3. In theory, my main source of income is dividends not capital gains so I look for companies that have a track record of paying out good dividends. Both Merck and Chevron are companies that usually pay out all their earnings in dividends. It’s been my experience that companies with a serious commitment to pay dividends reliably are also the ones that tend to do better in the long term. They have to be more focused on costs if all capital expenditures are planned from what remains after the dividend is paid. This is one aspect I particularly like about Dawnrays which is making major capital expenditures to further its expansion plans without taking on debt but still paying out 40 per cent of its earnings in dividends.
4. I also think it’s important to invest in companies that have some significant barriers to entry. This is especially important in China as every investor is aware. This is one reason why I like the pharmaceutical business in China as not only does it have great growth prospects, the business is one of the few which regulation can benefit in the sense that it prevents the sudden entry of numerous competitors who will sell the same products at a lower price.
5. I like to feel that companies I’m a shareholder of are making a positive contribution to society in some way. For instance, with Anwell I think of that as being an ideological investment as much as a financial one. If they are successful in contributing to the process of driving down the dollar-per-watt cost of solar energy, they will have made a positive contribution in the process of reducing the emission of greenhouse gases. I believe this the biggest long term problem that the world faces.
Obviously these principles have not been applied in all the SGX companies I’ve invested in the last year or so. However, my thinking with these investments is they are somewhat speculative and opportunistic in nature. Only a few of them need to survive the current crisis and I think I’ll be well rewarded.
Some analysts reckon the stock market has bottomed and there are reasons to expect a sustained recovery. What do you think?
I more inclined to think we’re in the midst of a bear market rally. Until real estate prices stop falling in the US and elsewhere, there is going to be more bad news on banks needing capital to survive. I’m not impressed with the way that the new administration in the US has handled the crisis.
The emphasis seems to be on quickly trying to restore things to the way they were before and to worry about the longer-term consequences in the longer term. I read recently a piece titled ‘Ten principles for a Black Swan proof world’ by Nassim Taleb. I don’t normally pay much attention to these sorts of gurus but when I read that I thought he describes the way forward exactly as I think but expressed it much better than I could.
The interview for this article was done in May, and was published in the July edition of Pulses magazine and is reproduced here with permission.
Achieva
Date: 08-Aug-2009
Here's my take on the situation:
If one looks back at the events in the last few weeks. it is interesting.
1. Just 1 day before the dividend pay out June 26th, there was a run on the counter with 22m shares done with the price movig up from 7.5c to a intraday high and close of 9.5c.
Prior that, ex-div date of 3 June, over 79m shares was traded from price price of 9.5c to a low of 7c and then a run on June 25th to 9.5c
One can only conclude there was a lot of trading and accumualation of the stock going on during June 3 to June 26th after Ex-Dividend.
2. From June 27 to 17th July, the stock started to drift form 9.5c back down to 8c with just 2 days of 7.5c lows on 7 and 8th of July and then back to 8.5c on 17th July
Volume was extremely during this period. About 19m shares in a tight trading range.
3. 23th July marked the start of hurried accumulation and trading till 7th August.
This is where things are very interesting in the choices of dates of announcemnts of profit warning and the early release of the 2rd quarter results.
23 July, 19.9m shares was traded with price range of 8.5c to 9.5c closing at 9c.
thereafter, the stock traded in a T+4/5 fashion. Classic BB accumulation patterns of pump and dump and reaccumulate within a tight rage of 8.5c to 9.5 and some at 10c.
the 2rd quarter results would have been known and finanlised by this period as 2nd quarter ends in June 2009.
Profit warning was issued on 30 July: 31July, 10.3m shares was done mostly at 9c.
Prior to the profit warning, 21m shares was done between 8.5c to 9.5 with mostly done at 9c in 5 trading days.
Before we know it, suddenly on 7th August (Friday), market closes and the 2Q results comes out. In just these5 trading days after the profit warning was issued, an amazing 61m shares was done with huge buy ups at the buyer price in just these 5 trading days.
4. My point:
a. Funny concidence??? after dividend...quiet periodand low prices.
b. after23th July.......things seem to really start coming alive.
c. profit warning on 30 July...still high volume and higher prices
d. 5th day clsoing August 7th, early announcement of 2Q results
Prediction for next week:
Panicky retail /weak holders are going to start selling down the stock from 9.5c to either back to NTA price of 8.5 or 9c or who knows... stillat 9.5c
BB is going to have a field day collecting.
My only conslusion is that BB has not cornered the stock so no dividend annucned. From my calculations, the remaining retained earnings will allow coy to distribute another max 3-4c so the wait will be another 2 .3mths for 3rd quarter in November but there is good amount of time to continue collecting the stock.
There is still alot of shares out inthe market held by significant shareholders so BB have to pay higher to take out htese people.
For some of us......I see the results as being overplayed. Coy is clearly still profitbale and cashflow positive barring forex losses on existing money in the bank.
there is still 8.5c cash/NTA so any further discount to this price represents good opp to contiue adding position.
So call me sick... there is light in this set of results.....I got more time like the BB to add position if the price goes below NTA in the weeks to come.
This stock is not for contra players as I keep emphasising.
well cheemeng, it all depends on your holding power and horizon. For me and some others (not on SJ), we have holding power for this baby.
For other stocks, we don't have so much holding power as we trade them a little more than we like but we've been handsomely rewarded before for holding power.
One of my best one was singapore Ship 5years ago. steady accumulation of it over 8 months before it doubled in 5mths.
Achieva to me is no different from Singapore Ship. It's Month 14 for me for this stock.
For us,we've reaped 10c of dividend. Made tradnig profit on some contra positions but made the most from adding postions from 4.5c to10c before ex-div. So now some of us are back into the quiet hunt from day 1 of since 26th June for the 2nd phase of this baby.
I've identified 4 phases of this stock so we are now in phase 2.
This stock is not for the faint hearted who live for fast action. It's for those who appreciate a slow easy ride that can suddenly turn really violent
Here's my take on the situation:
If one looks back at the events in the last few weeks. it is interesting.
1. Just 1 day before the dividend pay out June 26th, there was a run on the counter with 22m shares done with the price movig up from 7.5c to a intraday high and close of 9.5c.
Prior that, ex-div date of 3 June, over 79m shares was traded from price price of 9.5c to a low of 7c and then a run on June 25th to 9.5c
One can only conclude there was a lot of trading and accumualation of the stock going on during June 3 to June 26th after Ex-Dividend.
2. From June 27 to 17th July, the stock started to drift form 9.5c back down to 8c with just 2 days of 7.5c lows on 7 and 8th of July and then back to 8.5c on 17th July
Volume was extremely during this period. About 19m shares in a tight trading range.
3. 23th July marked the start of hurried accumulation and trading till 7th August.
This is where things are very interesting in the choices of dates of announcemnts of profit warning and the early release of the 2rd quarter results.
23 July, 19.9m shares was traded with price range of 8.5c to 9.5c closing at 9c.
thereafter, the stock traded in a T+4/5 fashion. Classic BB accumulation patterns of pump and dump and reaccumulate within a tight rage of 8.5c to 9.5 and some at 10c.
the 2rd quarter results would have been known and finanlised by this period as 2nd quarter ends in June 2009.
Profit warning was issued on 30 July: 31July, 10.3m shares was done mostly at 9c.
Prior to the profit warning, 21m shares was done between 8.5c to 9.5 with mostly done at 9c in 5 trading days.
Before we know it, suddenly on 7th August (Friday), market closes and the 2Q results comes out. In just these5 trading days after the profit warning was issued, an amazing 61m shares was done with huge buy ups at the buyer price in just these 5 trading days.
4. My point:
a. Funny concidence??? after dividend...quiet periodand low prices.
b. after23th July.......things seem to really start coming alive.
c. profit warning on 30 July...still high volume and higher prices
d. 5th day clsoing August 7th, early announcement of 2Q results
Prediction for next week:
Panicky retail /weak holders are going to start selling down the stock from 9.5c to either back to NTA price of 8.5 or 9c or who knows... stillat 9.5c
BB is going to have a field day collecting.
My only conslusion is that BB has not cornered the stock so no dividend annucned. From my calculations, the remaining retained earnings will allow coy to distribute another max 3-4c so the wait will be another 2 .3mths for 3rd quarter in November but there is good amount of time to continue collecting the stock.
There is still alot of shares out inthe market held by significant shareholders so BB have to pay higher to take out htese people.
For some of us......I see the results as being overplayed. Coy is clearly still profitbale and cashflow positive barring forex losses on existing money in the bank.
there is still 8.5c cash/NTA so any further discount to this price represents good opp to contiue adding position.
So call me sick... there is light in this set of results.....I got more time like the BB to add position if the price goes below NTA in the weeks to come.
This stock is not for contra players as I keep emphasising.
well cheemeng, it all depends on your holding power and horizon. For me and some others (not on SJ), we have holding power for this baby.
For other stocks, we don't have so much holding power as we trade them a little more than we like but we've been handsomely rewarded before for holding power.
One of my best one was singapore Ship 5years ago. steady accumulation of it over 8 months before it doubled in 5mths.
Achieva to me is no different from Singapore Ship. It's Month 14 for me for this stock.
For us,we've reaped 10c of dividend. Made tradnig profit on some contra positions but made the most from adding postions from 4.5c to10c before ex-div. So now some of us are back into the quiet hunt from day 1 of since 26th June for the 2nd phase of this baby.
I've identified 4 phases of this stock so we are now in phase 2.
This stock is not for the faint hearted who live for fast action. It's for those who appreciate a slow easy ride that can suddenly turn really violent
Sunday, August 9, 2009
我所亲历的五次经济泡沫的破灭
从千万富翁到街边小贩
1986年，我在深圳见到了十几年没见的小学老师。他是出生在印尼的广东华侨，上个世纪50年代他刚从雅加达大学金融系毕业，响应祖国号召，同一大批东南亚华侨的知识青年跑到中国来参加社会主义建设。于是，他成了我在长春市安达小学读书时的语文和数学老师。
经历了中国的反右、大跃进、人民公社、“文化大革命”，这个老师从爱国青年变成了三个孩子的父亲。为了孩子能吃饱饭，1977年他带着老婆和孩子来到香港。不愧是学金融的，他先从建筑工人开始，几年后就开始自己在家里装电子表往大陆卖，后来深圳开放了，他跑到深圳办了手表厂。
在深圳第一次见面，他给我一张名片，上面写着深圳(香港)环亚电子集团公司董事长，他在深圳的工厂有一千多名工人，是深圳当时最大的电子装配工厂之一。
之后三年，我们没再联系。1990年我在香港油麻地逛街，突然听到一个很熟悉的声音：十元两件啦！十元两件啦！我一回头，有些不敢相信我的眼睛，我的老师站在三轮车上在大声叫卖日本的二手衣服。怕他尴尬，更怕自己尴尬，不知怎的我没敢上去跟他打招呼。正在一边犹豫，突然有人大叫：“走鬼啦！”只见我的老师和其他几个同样卖东西的人，像疯了一样把衣服用任何人类都想像不到的速度塞进包里，推着车子跑了。原来是市政管理人员来了，香港无照小贩专门请人给他们把风放哨。
从油麻地回来后，连忙找名片给老师打电话，所有电话都变成别人的了。第二个星期天我又去了，那天没有市政的人来，老师的生意也很冷清，我鼓着勇气上前跟他打招呼，本以为他会尴尬，可是老师毕竟是老师。老师跟我说：“我破产了，现在只能做这个生意了。见到你真好，如果没事陪我聊聊天。”
我问：“那么大的工厂，是怎么破产的？”
老师说：“嗨！都是一个贪字。(19)86年香港股市疯了，我看不少人赚钱，我这个学金融的虽然知道股市风险大，但还是忍不住进去了，结果越炒越大，最多一天能赚一千万，我把工厂也抵押给银行借钱炒股，哪承想(19)87年股灾一来，我的资金一下子转不动，房子和工厂都给了银行。”
我问：“师母怎么样？”
“她现在在新蒲岗的一件制衣厂剪线头，我们还借了一部分私人钱，这个钱总是要还的。好在这是香港，人只要勤劳就饿不死；只要饿不死，总会有机会。这就是人生。”快60岁的老师说。
老师永远是老师。从此我明白香港人说的：马死落地行是什么意思了。
1987年的股灾是香港人经历的第一次股灾，那是由美国股灾引起的。1987年10月19日，星期一，美国股市一天跌了22%，年轻的香港股市一个跟头倒下了，连关了四天市，当香港股市重新开始后，香港股民的钱少了三分之二。有一大批香港股民像我的老师一样破了产，其中大部分人永远也没有机会再回到股市。
1992年日本股灾：跳楼的野村证券员工
1990年，我到日本公出，顺便去日本最大的证券公司——野村证券参观。由于当时日本股市和楼市如日中天，股市比2007年中国股市还火，市盈率到了100倍，一些日本和世界的经济学家纷纷说，传统经济理论对日本不实用，日本正在创造新的经济规律。日本房地产更是不可一世，一个东京市的地价就可以买一个半美国。日本商人在全世界可牛了，到哪儿都像阔佬逛菜市场，想买什么就买什么。于是，日本人买了美国金融帝国的象征——洛克菲勒大厦，买了美国电影的象征——哥伦比亚电影公司，买了加拿大的森林，买了澳洲铁矿，买了香港半山上最贵的房子，日本女人买了70%法国生产的LV手袋，日本男人成群结队飞去泰国打高尔夫……
接待我的是一个野村证券的年轻经理，他把我送出野村大楼时，站在大厦旁边的台阶上，指着那座新落成的60多层的花岗岩大厦，不无骄傲地说：“当今世界已进入信息经济，这个大楼里储存着全球客户的经济信息，野村证券为了保证这些信息的安全，在这个楼下100米处有一个发电站，它可以保证野村证券在世界上发生任何事情都能正常运作。”
可是不知怎么回事，到了1992年日本经济就不能正常运作了。日本股市从33000点，不到两年跌到了11000点。房地产更是一落千丈，1990年还能卖一个半美国的东京，1993年竟然连一个纽约都买不起了。于是，日本企业纷纷从海外抽钱回国救急，不仅把洛克菲勒大楼折了一半价卖回给美国人，还把日本好几个大银行和保险公司也卖给了外国人。
1995年，那位接待我的野村证券经理到香港出差，我请他喝酒，他很沉重地告诉我：现在日本企业也开始裁员了，自杀的人很多，特别是证券界，他手下一个前年才从早稻田毕业的人上个月跳楼了。电视台现在最热门的电视节目是教人们如何省钱，比如教日本家庭主妇如何用烧饭的余热煮鸡蛋。
那一段时间，香港大街上的日本游客少了，到高档餐馆吃饭的日本商人也少了。“经济泡沫”这个词第一次在我脑袋里有了真实的感受。从此，这泡沫就经常跟着我了。
1997年香港股灾：成为负资产的女秘书
1997年亚洲金融风暴来了，香港哀声一片。本来1997年上半年形势还好好的，楼市股市不断创新高，人们排着队去酒楼吃饭。我们公司开发的一个楼盘开盘卖楼花，买房的人需要前一天晚上去排队。国内一个家喻户晓的大歌星为了走后门买我们公司的房子，陪我们唱了一晚上卡拉OK。我公司两个秘书近水楼台，不用去排队，每人花80万港元交了三分之一首期买一栋房子，可是房子还没住进去，泡沫就来了。楼价一口气跌了三分之二，这两位小姐那几个月脸色难看得很，眉头之间总挤出一个大疙瘩。原因是她们把已交了80万首期的房子白白送给了银行，为什么？因为市场上同样的房子，只值80万；如果她们继续供当时买的房子，就要再付160万。
那个刚来香港还不大懂香港规矩的明星火急火燎地找我退房，我说：“你看到门外那两个小姐了吗？她们是我们公司的秘书，在这个公司已工作10年。她们跟你一样，也买了我们公司的房子，因此她们这10年算给公司做义工了。”
我看大明星有点不明白，就解释说：“她们工作10年，除去吃喝也就攒了80万，交了这套房子首期后什么都没剩下，可是现在房子又没了，这不等于白白给公司干了10年。如果能退房，她们早退了。你没看这几天报纸讨论吗，很多人卖了李嘉诚的房子，现在变成负资产。有人说在这种特殊时期作为香港首富的李嘉诚应该网开一面，不要再追这些负资产的人所欠的房子余款了。你猜这位首富李先生怎么说？他说：香港是个重合同守信用、风险自担的社会，你没看到金融泡沫只能自认倒霉，因为所有人都没看到。如果这个泡沫不破，你的房子赚一倍，我也没理由跟你分利润。”
2000年互联网泡沫：从3亿元到有行无市的总经理
亚洲金融风暴还没过去，互联网又来了。1999年末和2000年初，全香港的商人都好像疯了。这次不同于以往，越是大商人越疯狂，不管是搞地产，还是搞百货；不管是生产电子，还是生产水泥的；不管是办学校的，还是开夜总会的；总之全同互联网干上了，纷纷办起了网站，纷纷注册了名字带有Cyber.com、Information.net的公司，纷纷向那些常青藤大学毕业生发出高薪聘书，纷纷与IT公司联姻。我当时打工的华润创业公司自然也不能免俗，虽然公司每年有十几亿净收入，但因为同互联网没有关系，股价还不如一个刚创办两年的互联网公司高。股东不干了，说：如果你们再不进入IT，就要找人收购。于是，我们只能绞尽脑汁往互联网上靠，先是付了一笔天文数字的咨询费，请世界最大的咨询公司出主意，可是那些从美国飞来的高级脑袋除了给我们写了两大本资料外，任何问题也没解决；其实他们也解决不了我们的问题，因为我们不是互联网里的虫，我作为公司总经理当时连上网都不会。
可是商场是个逆水行舟、不进则退的游戏。当时许多如雷贯耳的经济专家都说：互联网技术会创造一个全新的经济，谁跟不上，谁就会被淘汰。想想看，谁不害怕呀？于是，我们也拼命想找一家美国技术公司“结婚”。经过投资银行的朋友介绍，美国一家大公司的副总裁来香港，期间可以跟我们谈谈。可是时间约到早上8 点，这在香港是非常罕见的商务见面时间。我当时有点纳闷：看来互联网的人就是不一样，可能都是超人!第二天早上，7点50赶到人家香港分公司，一进接待室我差点晕了，原来在我们前面已有两批人，一批人正在会议室里同那个副总裁谈着，另外一批人还在会议室里等着。8点45分，轮到我们，30分钟谈完，结果就不用说了。
2000年初正当我被互联网搞得晕头转向时，一个朋友找到我，他与一个美国基金创办了一个互联网公司，在香港买了一个上市公司的壳，市值一下子升到 200亿。他请我加盟。我说：我可不懂互联网。他说：你只要懂上市公司运作就行。于是，他开出了我不可拒绝的条件——3亿元的公司股票，外加7位数的年薪。做着亿万富翁的美梦，我在新公司上班了。可是上班的第一个天，互联网泡沫破了，第一个月我的3亿元变成2亿元，第二个月变成了1亿元，第三个月……。第10个月，我的股票变成3000万，而且有行无市了
骂“基金经理都是骗子”的基民
互联网泡沫灭了。金砖四国又冒出来了，特别是中国，进入21世纪后，雄起得不得了。中国转眼之间成了世界的加工厂、世界第一大钢铁生产国、第二大汽车生产国、世界第三大经济发展国。2007年中国这头昏睡的狮子，终于彻底醒了。深圳的楼市开始超过香港的新界，上海北京的写字楼也开始赶纽约，开户炒股的人到了1亿。于是，一下子创造了世界第一大银行、第一大石油公司、第一大房地产公司、第一大保险公司……这一年全世界500强排名乱了，因为那些老牌500强纷纷被突然变大的中国公司挤出去了。中国商人在世界上开始扬眉吐气了，腰里揣着大把股民的钱，也能想买谁就买谁了。于是，中亚和非洲的油田，拉美的铜矿和铝矿、澳洲的铁矿和煤矿频频被来自中国的买家问价。澳洲有些人小心眼，看中国人要收购澳洲最大矿业公司，竟提出将会威胁本国民族经济。中国外长婉转讲话了：“中国对澳洲的投资，还不及澳洲对中国投资的一半，我们希望澳洲继续对中国增大投资。” 真是富国风范，以柔克刚。
2007年世界经济的焦点放到了中国，全球的经济天才都在讨论中国股市和楼市，一派说泡沫太大了，另一派说中国正在改写世界经济，潜力远远还没发挥出来。
可惜世界经济还没改写完，美国那边次贷泡沫又碎了。中国股市进入2008年，少了近三分之一。记得2007年9月我回长春度假，碰到我母亲一位老同事。一个当了一辈子会计的75岁老头，成了中国第一代“基迷”。他把报纸上所有有关基金的报道用剪子剪下来，钉成三本半大书，还跟人学会了在坐标纸上画图表。他把家里所有闲钱都买了基金。我问他现在买股票是不是风险太大？老头说，他买的不是股票，是基金，基金是由金融专业人士管理、抗风险能力最强的综合投资工具。他刚买的QDII是走了银行后门才买到的，现在不到一个月就赚了5%。春节后母亲打电话告诉我：老头投到基金的20万元，只剩了10万元，现在有些精神不正常。老伴治病需要病，他捂着就是不卖，整天到银行管人家要钱。见谁跟谁说：基金经理都是骗子。
后记
我是1955年出生的，以上是我活到现在亲身经历的经济泡沫。其实，所有学经济的人都知道人类历史上这样的泡沫比比皆是，比如：19世纪英国的南海金矿泡沫、荷兰的郁金香股票泡沫，20世纪初的美国铁路泡沫、造船泡沫、杠杆并购和垃圾债券泡沫……
我奇怪的是：人类怎么一点都没有学聪明？尽管每一次泡沫都有过去的影子，可是人类还是重蹈覆辙。诺贝尔经济学奖快有一个世纪了，那么多聪明过人的脑袋得了这个奖；计算机在百万里的星空中，就能算出你把钥匙藏在家门口的第几块砖头下；人类也能把羊变成人、把人变成羊，怎么人类就是不能避免这些如此相似的泡沫？
一些历史上的泡沫故事往往让我们匪夷所思。比如在英国南海泡沫中，一个骗子注册了一个叫南海投资的公司，在他的招股书上写道“本公司在拉美有一个诱人的投资项目，现在需要融资，这个项目的具体内容暂时不能透露”。第二天，当他打开办公司的大门时，外边挤满了给他送支票的股民。第三天，这个骗子拿了钱就消失了。
我认为“以史为诫”和“读史明志”对人类不灵，人类是不能从历史中吸取教训的。就像公元前欧洲种族之间的屠杀在二战犹太人的集中营依然上演、秦始皇的焚书坑儒在“文化大革命”中完整复制一样，不论发生过多少次泡沫，泡沫还会再发生。
为什么？
因为人类就是人，人类就是由每一代的你和我组成的。尽管我们的父母都会告诫我们，不要玩火，火会烫手！可是有哪个人没有被火烫过？！人只有被烫过，才成熟；人成熟了，就是离开舞台的时候了；舞台永远是新一代人玩火的地方；每一代人只能从自己的经历中长大；每一代人都要创造自己的泡沫和体验它的破碎。
这就是黑格尔说的：历史能给我们提供的惟一借鉴就是我们从历史不能得到任何借鉴。
有人可能说：经济泡沫中损失的是不太懂经济的大众，经济领域的专业精英——经济学家、银行家、基金经理……他们是应该能比一般人更早知道泡沫的，从而更多地避免损失。可是大量统计研究证明：这些精英作为一个整体，他们在预测泡沫的水平上一点也不比老百姓强，因为他们在股市中的平均收益同股民大众一样，他们比普通股民惟一多赚的只是手续费。
难怪诚实的格林斯潘一再说：“泡沫是很难确定的，除非它破了。”
1986年，我在深圳见到了十几年没见的小学老师。他是出生在印尼的广东华侨，上个世纪50年代他刚从雅加达大学金融系毕业，响应祖国号召，同一大批东南亚华侨的知识青年跑到中国来参加社会主义建设。于是，他成了我在长春市安达小学读书时的语文和数学老师。
经历了中国的反右、大跃进、人民公社、“文化大革命”，这个老师从爱国青年变成了三个孩子的父亲。为了孩子能吃饱饭，1977年他带着老婆和孩子来到香港。不愧是学金融的，他先从建筑工人开始，几年后就开始自己在家里装电子表往大陆卖，后来深圳开放了，他跑到深圳办了手表厂。
在深圳第一次见面，他给我一张名片，上面写着深圳(香港)环亚电子集团公司董事长，他在深圳的工厂有一千多名工人，是深圳当时最大的电子装配工厂之一。
之后三年，我们没再联系。1990年我在香港油麻地逛街，突然听到一个很熟悉的声音：十元两件啦！十元两件啦！我一回头，有些不敢相信我的眼睛，我的老师站在三轮车上在大声叫卖日本的二手衣服。怕他尴尬，更怕自己尴尬，不知怎的我没敢上去跟他打招呼。正在一边犹豫，突然有人大叫：“走鬼啦！”只见我的老师和其他几个同样卖东西的人，像疯了一样把衣服用任何人类都想像不到的速度塞进包里，推着车子跑了。原来是市政管理人员来了，香港无照小贩专门请人给他们把风放哨。
从油麻地回来后，连忙找名片给老师打电话，所有电话都变成别人的了。第二个星期天我又去了，那天没有市政的人来，老师的生意也很冷清，我鼓着勇气上前跟他打招呼，本以为他会尴尬，可是老师毕竟是老师。老师跟我说：“我破产了，现在只能做这个生意了。见到你真好，如果没事陪我聊聊天。”
我问：“那么大的工厂，是怎么破产的？”
老师说：“嗨！都是一个贪字。(19)86年香港股市疯了，我看不少人赚钱，我这个学金融的虽然知道股市风险大，但还是忍不住进去了，结果越炒越大，最多一天能赚一千万，我把工厂也抵押给银行借钱炒股，哪承想(19)87年股灾一来，我的资金一下子转不动，房子和工厂都给了银行。”
我问：“师母怎么样？”
“她现在在新蒲岗的一件制衣厂剪线头，我们还借了一部分私人钱，这个钱总是要还的。好在这是香港，人只要勤劳就饿不死；只要饿不死，总会有机会。这就是人生。”快60岁的老师说。
老师永远是老师。从此我明白香港人说的：马死落地行是什么意思了。
1987年的股灾是香港人经历的第一次股灾，那是由美国股灾引起的。1987年10月19日，星期一，美国股市一天跌了22%，年轻的香港股市一个跟头倒下了，连关了四天市，当香港股市重新开始后，香港股民的钱少了三分之二。有一大批香港股民像我的老师一样破了产，其中大部分人永远也没有机会再回到股市。
1992年日本股灾：跳楼的野村证券员工
1990年，我到日本公出，顺便去日本最大的证券公司——野村证券参观。由于当时日本股市和楼市如日中天，股市比2007年中国股市还火，市盈率到了100倍，一些日本和世界的经济学家纷纷说，传统经济理论对日本不实用，日本正在创造新的经济规律。日本房地产更是不可一世，一个东京市的地价就可以买一个半美国。日本商人在全世界可牛了，到哪儿都像阔佬逛菜市场，想买什么就买什么。于是，日本人买了美国金融帝国的象征——洛克菲勒大厦，买了美国电影的象征——哥伦比亚电影公司，买了加拿大的森林，买了澳洲铁矿，买了香港半山上最贵的房子，日本女人买了70%法国生产的LV手袋，日本男人成群结队飞去泰国打高尔夫……
接待我的是一个野村证券的年轻经理，他把我送出野村大楼时，站在大厦旁边的台阶上，指着那座新落成的60多层的花岗岩大厦，不无骄傲地说：“当今世界已进入信息经济，这个大楼里储存着全球客户的经济信息，野村证券为了保证这些信息的安全，在这个楼下100米处有一个发电站，它可以保证野村证券在世界上发生任何事情都能正常运作。”
可是不知怎么回事，到了1992年日本经济就不能正常运作了。日本股市从33000点，不到两年跌到了11000点。房地产更是一落千丈，1990年还能卖一个半美国的东京，1993年竟然连一个纽约都买不起了。于是，日本企业纷纷从海外抽钱回国救急，不仅把洛克菲勒大楼折了一半价卖回给美国人，还把日本好几个大银行和保险公司也卖给了外国人。
1995年，那位接待我的野村证券经理到香港出差，我请他喝酒，他很沉重地告诉我：现在日本企业也开始裁员了，自杀的人很多，特别是证券界，他手下一个前年才从早稻田毕业的人上个月跳楼了。电视台现在最热门的电视节目是教人们如何省钱，比如教日本家庭主妇如何用烧饭的余热煮鸡蛋。
那一段时间，香港大街上的日本游客少了，到高档餐馆吃饭的日本商人也少了。“经济泡沫”这个词第一次在我脑袋里有了真实的感受。从此，这泡沫就经常跟着我了。
1997年香港股灾：成为负资产的女秘书
1997年亚洲金融风暴来了，香港哀声一片。本来1997年上半年形势还好好的，楼市股市不断创新高，人们排着队去酒楼吃饭。我们公司开发的一个楼盘开盘卖楼花，买房的人需要前一天晚上去排队。国内一个家喻户晓的大歌星为了走后门买我们公司的房子，陪我们唱了一晚上卡拉OK。我公司两个秘书近水楼台，不用去排队，每人花80万港元交了三分之一首期买一栋房子，可是房子还没住进去，泡沫就来了。楼价一口气跌了三分之二，这两位小姐那几个月脸色难看得很，眉头之间总挤出一个大疙瘩。原因是她们把已交了80万首期的房子白白送给了银行，为什么？因为市场上同样的房子，只值80万；如果她们继续供当时买的房子，就要再付160万。
那个刚来香港还不大懂香港规矩的明星火急火燎地找我退房，我说：“你看到门外那两个小姐了吗？她们是我们公司的秘书，在这个公司已工作10年。她们跟你一样，也买了我们公司的房子，因此她们这10年算给公司做义工了。”
我看大明星有点不明白，就解释说：“她们工作10年，除去吃喝也就攒了80万，交了这套房子首期后什么都没剩下，可是现在房子又没了，这不等于白白给公司干了10年。如果能退房，她们早退了。你没看这几天报纸讨论吗，很多人卖了李嘉诚的房子，现在变成负资产。有人说在这种特殊时期作为香港首富的李嘉诚应该网开一面，不要再追这些负资产的人所欠的房子余款了。你猜这位首富李先生怎么说？他说：香港是个重合同守信用、风险自担的社会，你没看到金融泡沫只能自认倒霉，因为所有人都没看到。如果这个泡沫不破，你的房子赚一倍，我也没理由跟你分利润。”
2000年互联网泡沫：从3亿元到有行无市的总经理
亚洲金融风暴还没过去，互联网又来了。1999年末和2000年初，全香港的商人都好像疯了。这次不同于以往，越是大商人越疯狂，不管是搞地产，还是搞百货；不管是生产电子，还是生产水泥的；不管是办学校的，还是开夜总会的；总之全同互联网干上了，纷纷办起了网站，纷纷注册了名字带有Cyber.com、Information.net的公司，纷纷向那些常青藤大学毕业生发出高薪聘书，纷纷与IT公司联姻。我当时打工的华润创业公司自然也不能免俗，虽然公司每年有十几亿净收入，但因为同互联网没有关系，股价还不如一个刚创办两年的互联网公司高。股东不干了，说：如果你们再不进入IT，就要找人收购。于是，我们只能绞尽脑汁往互联网上靠，先是付了一笔天文数字的咨询费，请世界最大的咨询公司出主意，可是那些从美国飞来的高级脑袋除了给我们写了两大本资料外，任何问题也没解决；其实他们也解决不了我们的问题，因为我们不是互联网里的虫，我作为公司总经理当时连上网都不会。
可是商场是个逆水行舟、不进则退的游戏。当时许多如雷贯耳的经济专家都说：互联网技术会创造一个全新的经济，谁跟不上，谁就会被淘汰。想想看，谁不害怕呀？于是，我们也拼命想找一家美国技术公司“结婚”。经过投资银行的朋友介绍，美国一家大公司的副总裁来香港，期间可以跟我们谈谈。可是时间约到早上8 点，这在香港是非常罕见的商务见面时间。我当时有点纳闷：看来互联网的人就是不一样，可能都是超人!第二天早上，7点50赶到人家香港分公司，一进接待室我差点晕了，原来在我们前面已有两批人，一批人正在会议室里同那个副总裁谈着，另外一批人还在会议室里等着。8点45分，轮到我们，30分钟谈完，结果就不用说了。
2000年初正当我被互联网搞得晕头转向时，一个朋友找到我，他与一个美国基金创办了一个互联网公司，在香港买了一个上市公司的壳，市值一下子升到 200亿。他请我加盟。我说：我可不懂互联网。他说：你只要懂上市公司运作就行。于是，他开出了我不可拒绝的条件——3亿元的公司股票，外加7位数的年薪。做着亿万富翁的美梦，我在新公司上班了。可是上班的第一个天，互联网泡沫破了，第一个月我的3亿元变成2亿元，第二个月变成了1亿元，第三个月……。第10个月，我的股票变成3000万，而且有行无市了
骂“基金经理都是骗子”的基民
互联网泡沫灭了。金砖四国又冒出来了，特别是中国，进入21世纪后，雄起得不得了。中国转眼之间成了世界的加工厂、世界第一大钢铁生产国、第二大汽车生产国、世界第三大经济发展国。2007年中国这头昏睡的狮子，终于彻底醒了。深圳的楼市开始超过香港的新界，上海北京的写字楼也开始赶纽约，开户炒股的人到了1亿。于是，一下子创造了世界第一大银行、第一大石油公司、第一大房地产公司、第一大保险公司……这一年全世界500强排名乱了，因为那些老牌500强纷纷被突然变大的中国公司挤出去了。中国商人在世界上开始扬眉吐气了，腰里揣着大把股民的钱，也能想买谁就买谁了。于是，中亚和非洲的油田，拉美的铜矿和铝矿、澳洲的铁矿和煤矿频频被来自中国的买家问价。澳洲有些人小心眼，看中国人要收购澳洲最大矿业公司，竟提出将会威胁本国民族经济。中国外长婉转讲话了：“中国对澳洲的投资，还不及澳洲对中国投资的一半，我们希望澳洲继续对中国增大投资。” 真是富国风范，以柔克刚。
2007年世界经济的焦点放到了中国，全球的经济天才都在讨论中国股市和楼市，一派说泡沫太大了，另一派说中国正在改写世界经济，潜力远远还没发挥出来。
可惜世界经济还没改写完，美国那边次贷泡沫又碎了。中国股市进入2008年，少了近三分之一。记得2007年9月我回长春度假，碰到我母亲一位老同事。一个当了一辈子会计的75岁老头，成了中国第一代“基迷”。他把报纸上所有有关基金的报道用剪子剪下来，钉成三本半大书，还跟人学会了在坐标纸上画图表。他把家里所有闲钱都买了基金。我问他现在买股票是不是风险太大？老头说，他买的不是股票，是基金，基金是由金融专业人士管理、抗风险能力最强的综合投资工具。他刚买的QDII是走了银行后门才买到的，现在不到一个月就赚了5%。春节后母亲打电话告诉我：老头投到基金的20万元，只剩了10万元，现在有些精神不正常。老伴治病需要病，他捂着就是不卖，整天到银行管人家要钱。见谁跟谁说：基金经理都是骗子。
后记
我是1955年出生的，以上是我活到现在亲身经历的经济泡沫。其实，所有学经济的人都知道人类历史上这样的泡沫比比皆是，比如：19世纪英国的南海金矿泡沫、荷兰的郁金香股票泡沫，20世纪初的美国铁路泡沫、造船泡沫、杠杆并购和垃圾债券泡沫……
我奇怪的是：人类怎么一点都没有学聪明？尽管每一次泡沫都有过去的影子，可是人类还是重蹈覆辙。诺贝尔经济学奖快有一个世纪了，那么多聪明过人的脑袋得了这个奖；计算机在百万里的星空中，就能算出你把钥匙藏在家门口的第几块砖头下；人类也能把羊变成人、把人变成羊，怎么人类就是不能避免这些如此相似的泡沫？
一些历史上的泡沫故事往往让我们匪夷所思。比如在英国南海泡沫中，一个骗子注册了一个叫南海投资的公司，在他的招股书上写道“本公司在拉美有一个诱人的投资项目，现在需要融资，这个项目的具体内容暂时不能透露”。第二天，当他打开办公司的大门时，外边挤满了给他送支票的股民。第三天，这个骗子拿了钱就消失了。
我认为“以史为诫”和“读史明志”对人类不灵，人类是不能从历史中吸取教训的。就像公元前欧洲种族之间的屠杀在二战犹太人的集中营依然上演、秦始皇的焚书坑儒在“文化大革命”中完整复制一样，不论发生过多少次泡沫，泡沫还会再发生。
为什么？
因为人类就是人，人类就是由每一代的你和我组成的。尽管我们的父母都会告诫我们，不要玩火，火会烫手！可是有哪个人没有被火烫过？！人只有被烫过，才成熟；人成熟了，就是离开舞台的时候了；舞台永远是新一代人玩火的地方；每一代人只能从自己的经历中长大；每一代人都要创造自己的泡沫和体验它的破碎。
这就是黑格尔说的：历史能给我们提供的惟一借鉴就是我们从历史不能得到任何借鉴。
有人可能说：经济泡沫中损失的是不太懂经济的大众，经济领域的专业精英——经济学家、银行家、基金经理……他们是应该能比一般人更早知道泡沫的，从而更多地避免损失。可是大量统计研究证明：这些精英作为一个整体，他们在预测泡沫的水平上一点也不比老百姓强，因为他们在股市中的平均收益同股民大众一样，他们比普通股民惟一多赚的只是手续费。
难怪诚实的格林斯潘一再说：“泡沫是很难确定的，除非它破了。”
3 BIG Reasons To Avoid Stocks
By Susan C. Walker Fri, 07 Aug 2009
AIG just made a BIG comeback: it announced its first profitable quarter after seven quarters of losses on Friday. (Let's all light a CIGar and celebrate, since taxpayers helped bail it out to the tune of $180 billion.)
So why shouldn't the rest of us DIG into our pockets to show that we give a FIG about the stock market's own comeback? Who would refuse a GIG to dance a JIG on the grave of the bear market?
Fortunately, it doesn't take a MIG to shoot down this idea. Bob Prechter did it in his best-selling book, Conquer the Crash, when he explained that it's best not to act like a PIG at a trough that will soon be empty -- particularly since the U.S. economy is heading for a deflationary depression. It's better to RIG up some kind of safety net in advance, rather than to WIG out about market ZIG-zags.
Here are three reasons Conquer the Crash gives not to speculate in the stock market now, even though it has been rising since the July low.
Excerpted from Chapter 20 of Conquer the Crash, You Can Survive and Prosper in a Deflationary Depression by Robert R. Prechter, Jr.
Should You Speculate in Stocks?
Perhaps the number one precaution to take at the start of a deflationary crash is to make sure that your investment capital is not invested “long” in stocks, stock mutual funds, stock index futures, stock options or any other equity-based investment or speculation. That advice alone should be worth the time you spent to read this book.
1. Stocks May Go to Near Zero
In 2000 and 2001, countless Internet stocks fell from $50 or $100 a share to near zero in a matter of months. In 2001, Enron went from $85 to pennies a share in less than a year. These are the early casualties of debt, leverage and incautious speculation. Countless investors, including the managers of insurance companies, pension funds and mutual funds, express great confidence that their “diverse holdings” will keep major portfolio risk at bay. Aside from piles of questionable debt, what are those diverse holdings? Stocks, stocks and more stocks. Despite current optimism that the bull market is back, there will be many more casualties to come when stock prices turn back down again.
2. Stock Mutual Funds Will Fall, Too
Not only will many stocks fall 90 to 100 percent, but so will a substantial number of stock mutual funds, which cannot exit large equity positions without depressing prices and which have the added burden to you of one percent (or more) annual management fees. The good news is that we will finally find out who the few truly good fund managers are and which ones were heroes by virtue of being around for a bull market.
3. The Fed Won't Be Able To Save the Stock Market
Don’t presume that the Fed will rescue the stock market, either. In theory, the Fed could declare a support price for certain stocks, but which ones? And how much money would it commit to buying them? If the Fed were actually to buy equities or stock-index futures, the temporary result might be a brief rally, but the ultimate result would be a collapse in the value of the Fed’s own assets when the market turned back down, making the Fed look foolish and compromising its primary goals, as cited in Chapter 13. It wouldn’t want to keep repeating that experience. The bankers’ pools of 1929 gave up on this strategy, and so will the Fed if it tries it.
AIG just made a BIG comeback: it announced its first profitable quarter after seven quarters of losses on Friday. (Let's all light a CIGar and celebrate, since taxpayers helped bail it out to the tune of $180 billion.)
So why shouldn't the rest of us DIG into our pockets to show that we give a FIG about the stock market's own comeback? Who would refuse a GIG to dance a JIG on the grave of the bear market?
Fortunately, it doesn't take a MIG to shoot down this idea. Bob Prechter did it in his best-selling book, Conquer the Crash, when he explained that it's best not to act like a PIG at a trough that will soon be empty -- particularly since the U.S. economy is heading for a deflationary depression. It's better to RIG up some kind of safety net in advance, rather than to WIG out about market ZIG-zags.
Here are three reasons Conquer the Crash gives not to speculate in the stock market now, even though it has been rising since the July low.
Excerpted from Chapter 20 of Conquer the Crash, You Can Survive and Prosper in a Deflationary Depression by Robert R. Prechter, Jr.
Should You Speculate in Stocks?
Perhaps the number one precaution to take at the start of a deflationary crash is to make sure that your investment capital is not invested “long” in stocks, stock mutual funds, stock index futures, stock options or any other equity-based investment or speculation. That advice alone should be worth the time you spent to read this book.
1. Stocks May Go to Near Zero
In 2000 and 2001, countless Internet stocks fell from $50 or $100 a share to near zero in a matter of months. In 2001, Enron went from $85 to pennies a share in less than a year. These are the early casualties of debt, leverage and incautious speculation. Countless investors, including the managers of insurance companies, pension funds and mutual funds, express great confidence that their “diverse holdings” will keep major portfolio risk at bay. Aside from piles of questionable debt, what are those diverse holdings? Stocks, stocks and more stocks. Despite current optimism that the bull market is back, there will be many more casualties to come when stock prices turn back down again.
2. Stock Mutual Funds Will Fall, Too
Not only will many stocks fall 90 to 100 percent, but so will a substantial number of stock mutual funds, which cannot exit large equity positions without depressing prices and which have the added burden to you of one percent (or more) annual management fees. The good news is that we will finally find out who the few truly good fund managers are and which ones were heroes by virtue of being around for a bull market.
3. The Fed Won't Be Able To Save the Stock Market
Don’t presume that the Fed will rescue the stock market, either. In theory, the Fed could declare a support price for certain stocks, but which ones? And how much money would it commit to buying them? If the Fed were actually to buy equities or stock-index futures, the temporary result might be a brief rally, but the ultimate result would be a collapse in the value of the Fed’s own assets when the market turned back down, making the Fed look foolish and compromising its primary goals, as cited in Chapter 13. It wouldn’t want to keep repeating that experience. The bankers’ pools of 1929 gave up on this strategy, and so will the Fed if it tries it.
传奇散户王献军的传奇人生
做股票"三不看":
不看政策
不看宏观经济
不看大盘
我不否认现在宏观经济对股票市场有着重大的影响，但决定宏观经济变量太多了，宏观经济各个方面对股市的影响太多了，所以，你要对它作出预测，看对大盘有什么影响其实是相当困难的。这一点对我来说大大超出了我个人的范围，所以，我的只能选择研究股票，没有人告诉我政策何时出台，无法提前预测，我估计大家都不知道。
当年谁预测涨到6124点，没有人预测到，这次下调谁预测到下跌到1802点，也没有人预测。明天涨多少？后天涨多少，一年以后，一个月以后涨多少？做不了很准确的预测，就没有办法提供操作的指导。
"巴菲特式"的选股在相当的程度上规避了6124-1802惨烈调整的风险， 我的投资组合同期最大亏损不到三成.
学习巴菲特投资企业，不用价格的波动来折磨自己。
巴菲特第一个最重要的东西，就是你所有的投资都必须以贴近企业的方式进行。所谓"贴近企业的方式"，就是你的眼睛只能盯在企业上，而不是技术、波浪，不是价格，做股票，第一经历过的事情是很重要的，第二学习很重要，我们有幸了解到巴菲特的投资理念是一个方面。第三积累，包括资金的积累，经验的积累，研究的积累，像巴菲特说，要投资就一句话，就是阅读。他讲的非常简单他每年要读成千上万份报表，我们在座有几个人能做到？我一年能读一千份报表就说明我相当能干了。
1994年我把我的投资组合赔了70%以上，以后就痛下决心把这个东西整个明白。最困难的时候，我激励自己不要放弃，我说我一定要百分之百的努力，来证明我自己真的不行，我就改行做别的。幸运的是，由于机遇和自己努力的原因，觉得自己做得还勉强可以。
2003年买入茅台的理由：垄断、未来十年每年确定的复利收益、低PE、破发。2007年卖掉茅台的理由：100倍PE、三年半股票增值了15.94倍、未来十年的年回报会低于15%，当时还有更好的投资目标。
长期投资是挺孤独的，巴菲特说过，股票投资是看起来简单，做起来不容易的事情
做股票决不负债，所有亏的都是真金白银，没有借款也没有透支。而且我要求以后不做这个，既不融资也不做融券。即使退市不会归零，不能有负数。
我投资的公司至少有七年的历史。在我现在研究它，至少有七年，我才可以研究它。之后我才能对它作出预测。
1. 做股票"三不看"，不看政策，不看宏观经济，不看大盘。
他的名字叫王献军。王先生实际上不是一个很普通的人，他从1991年就开始买入股票，应该是我们这个市场最资深的股民了，股龄最长的，到现在已经有17年的股龄。今天请他来，主要是跟大家分享一下，他利用价值投资，怎么样在股票市场上获取丰厚的利润的。现在调整从6124点到1802点调整，股票下跌70%，股民损失惨重。而王先生的账户最低损失百分之十几。他当时的股票仓位是六成，他是怎么样通过价值理念投资的选股股票市场的风险？
记者：我们和王先生讨论的第一个问题，目前市场上大家都在关注的是井喷行情，从9月18日三大政策救市开始，已经连续两天大涨，从1800点已经涨到2200多点了。市场上所有的人，无论个人还是机构都在关注着政策下一步有什么动静，国内外宏观经济形势有什么变化，关注大盘的走势。王先生说他不看这三点，您怎么在"三不看"的情况下获得丰厚的回报，你为什么有这"三不看"？
王献军：其实我就是一个很一般的人，是从散户做起来的普通的人。从宏观经济政策、大盘研究的结果，最后都要落实到对你的行为有指导意义上面。比如说它能不能给我提供足够的信息，使我买入或者卖出，最后才能对你赚钱产生效益。现在宏观经济我不可否认对股票市场有着重大的影响，但宏观经济变量太多了，宏观经济各个方面对股市的影响太多了，所以，你要对它作出预测，并且对它做出预测之后，看对大盘有什么影响其实是相当困难的。这一点对我来说大大超出了我个人的范围，所以，我的只能选择股票，我并不否认宏观经济的影响。
记者：搞不清楚宏观经济的影响，也在股市上赚了点钱。
王献军：对，赚了一点钱，可能运气比较好。
记者：怎么看我们的政策，政策一出市场马上上升。
王献军：没有人告诉我政策何时出台，无法提前预测，也没有做什么准备，要知道我星期四就会买进，现在我不知道，我估计大家都不知道。
记者：就算你不看宏观经济，不看政策，总得看大盘。大盘和个股的走势很密切。这次绝大多数个股都跟大盘一起调。
王献军：对，这是基于两个原因。第一，还是预测的问题，当年谁预测涨到6124点，没有人预测到，这次下调谁预测到下跌到1802点，也没有人预测。我再问一个问题，你预测明天涨了多少？后天涨了多少，一年以后，一个月以后？做不了很准确的预测，就没有办法提供操作的指导。
记者：你的意思是，无论大盘长期走势还是中长期走势都是无法预测的。很多高手都是通过各种各样的技术分析，波浪理论进行预测。听说您也学习了这方面的东西，但为什么没有用上呢？
王献军：不是没用，用过，但效果不好。我进股市从学技术开始，平均数、技术指标，波浪理论，道氐理论、江恩理论、四度空间等等都有所涉及。技术分析有一本书对我的影响非常大，大概是97、98年看的，一个叫郭小舟的人，他写了一本书叫《系统交易的投资回报》。他说如果你有一个技术指标、技术参数，你要对这个技术参数首先进行检测它对还是不对。你设定参数之后，提出买点卖点，假设是历史是重复的，就模拟地把历史进行计算，到底赚了没有。在这个基础上假设未来是一致的，才能赚钱。
记者：假设是历史是重复的。
王献军：对。现在假定历史是会重复的情况下，用这些技术参数，回顾历史的时候，赚钱的都非常少。
记者：你是指完全靠技术分析赚钱的人很少吗？
王献军：如果把技术指标在走势上进行检验，赚钱的都很少，更不要说未来是否能够重复，未来本身还不一定，所以赚钱的就更少了。我通过这些作为操作，也不太理想。
记者：掌握不好买点和卖点？
王献军：对，有时候是捡了芝麻丢了西瓜。
记者：你的价值投资理念是什么时候，怎么想起去买贵州茅台，是受巴菲特的影响吗？
王献军：肯定是受巴菲特的影响。
记者：王先生2003年买入茅台，2007年卖出，四年赚了16倍，请王先生谈谈这个体会。
2.巴菲特第一个最重要的东西，就是你所有的投资都必须以贴近企业的方式进行。
王献军：说起来稍微有点复杂，前面谈到技术，我在技术上找不到方向，找不到我自己认为正确的东西，能指导我赢钱的东西，我就在其它方面找。最后碰到了价值投资的东西，其实在上个世纪价值投资的书都很难找到，也许是我孤陋寡闻，最后才找到巴菲特。
记者：你看的巴菲特的第一本叫什么？
王献军：我看的第一本是国内翻译的叫《投资圣经》，很厚的，红皮的。
记者：你从里面获得的收获是什么？
王献军：最主要的收获是他的理念和思想。
记者：你能用几句话概括一下你理解的巴菲特的思想吗？或者你把你认为巴菲特最重要的思想表达一下。
王献军：巴菲特第一个最重要的东西，就是你所有的投资都必须以贴近企业的方式进行。所谓"贴近企业的方式"，就是你的眼睛只能盯在企业上，而不是技术、波浪，不是价格，今天涨多少，明天涨多少，不是宏观经济对它的影响。要贴近企业，想我买这个企业的股票就要了解这个企业是怎样的，领导人怎么样，有没有垄断，未来的企业发展会不会很好。
3.2003年买入茅台的理由：垄断、未来十年每年确定的复利收益、低PE、破发
记者：企业这么多信息当中，哪些信息是最重要的，垄断是不是最重要的？
王献军：那当然了，巴菲特关于好企业有两个最重要的特征，第一，消费者垄断的企业。
记者：消费者垄断就是市场垄断的企业？
王献军：对，消费者垄断的企业，比如可口可乐，它的规模已经到了这样一个地步，牌子已经这样深入人心。到了什么地步呢？巴菲特的话说，给你1000亿，在市场上再造一个企业打垮可口可乐不可能，这是消费者垄断企业。第二，收费桥。巴菲特最典型的投资理念，比如一个城市只有一家报纸，所有的平面广告都只能通过它发布，它就是一个收费桥，你不能跟我讨价还价，你来我这儿登广告，这是区域垄断的概念。这是好企业的标准。
记者：你觉得茅台符合这个标准？
王献军：茅台可能两者皆有，他有消费者垄断，同样的产品可能没有能比过它的，他是酱香型的，是唯一的，没有企业能跟他竞争。
记者：区域垄断，好象在全国占的份额也很好。
王献军：区域垄断还有一个原因是什么呢？他的生产是独特的，当年有一条资料，不知道真假，当年在遵义建了10万吨的茅台厂，想再造茅台。原料、工艺都一样，配方也一样，就在遵义，做出来的酒就是不一样，什么原因呢？
记者：是不是和水有关系？
王献军：水好办，可以把水引过来，是茅台当地那个环境使它的酒发酵就是这样的，换一个环境不能有相同的东西，所以没有办法复制。
记者：没有竞争？
王献军：对，所以他基本上每年都提价。
记者：巴菲特还告诉你什么选择股票的标准？
王献军：巴菲特还有一个选择股票的标准就是确定性，举个例子，你买国债，不会去关心市场上价格的波动。我有国债，急需用钱可能以很低的价格就卖出去了。但如果你不卖，可以保证每年的回报是很确定的。巴菲特说，未来十年每年你能平均给我保证多少的复利收益，就可以了。
记者：巴菲特要求每年的复利收益是多少？10%？
王献军：巴菲特建伯克希尔公司的时候，要求自己每年做到复利的投资回报15%，就是净资产增长是15%。
记者：你在什么时候买的茅台，除了考虑它稳定的分红，市场的垄断，还考虑了什么指标，有没有具体的经营指标吗？
王献军：当年我买茅台的时候，可能是很走运的一件事情，因为我大概在03年初上半年的时候，又开始看巴菲特的书。刚才说的《投资圣经》那本书，里面就举有例子，巴菲特收购了法国的一家酒类企业，他是怎么计算的。这就给我一个现成的例子，我就套用，简单地算了一下，其实那时候对巴菲特这些东西远远没有今天理解得那么深刻。
记者：那是先简单模仿一下再说。
王献军：对，这是第一个幸运的地方。贵州茅台上市的时候是30多元，发行价格也在30元以上，之后一路下跌，跌破20多元，大大跌破发行价，跌到21、22元。
记者：当时正好赶上熊市。
王献军：对，当时在2003年，赶上连续的熊市。我当时在10月下旬，在21.5-22元之间建的仓，当初心里还不是太有底，如果现在看到这样的好企业肯定下重注的。当时把计划要投入的钱拿出来，准备分两批建仓，结果最遗憾的是只建了一批仓，永远没有见第二批仓。
记者：因为涨起来就不愿意建了。
王献军：是。
4.2007年卖掉茅台的理由：100倍PE、三年半股票增值了15.94倍、未来十年的年回报会低于15%，当时还有更好的投资目标。
记者：你买入之后的持有标准是什么？因为你持有了四年，可是在07年上半年90多元的时候你给卖了，最后茅台涨到220元，你为什么在07年上半年90多元的时候卖掉的呢？你是出于什么考虑的呢？
王献军：客观地说，当时有多方面的考虑。其中最重要的，就是在我的能力范围之内，我觉得它未来是怎样的，换句话说，我们回溯到03年我买的时候，我觉得它一定是很好的股票，不会辜负我。
记者：你一句什么指标呢？它的垄断性没有变。
王献军：当时的市盈率很低，好象才不到20倍，我卖的时候，当时市盈率已经接近100倍了。另外，我买它的时候对它进行价值评估，认为它未来可以给我满意的收入。我们说十年以后的事情，其实很难看得清，假设我们对十年做一个判断的话，如果我各种参数都比较保守，这十年平均每年能提供给我使我感到很满意的收益率。比如我当时觉得达到20%的收益率，到了97年我卖出的时候，21元买到90多元卖出，加股改，加送股，加上权证，实际这三年半的持股这只股票增值了15.94倍。除了企业增长原因，市场也给它很高的价值。，未来它给我的回报会低于15%。
记者：红利回报？
王献军：包括增长，留存利润再加之上的体现，包括送股。
记者：没考虑价差的波动？
王献军：考虑了。因为它派息不多，就留存收益，新的资金又产生效益。这个留存收益要体现在价格上不能吃亏，现在90多元，未来100元，留存收益上我就亏了。不是卖了它会不会涨。这是第一点。第二点，当时还有更好的投资目标。
记者：你买了航天信息？
王献军：不具体提，是买了别的股票。我在研究其它股票的时候，发现有的股票可能比它更好，当时赚了那么多倍数以后，自己觉得挺得意的，同时很不愿意在这个问题上再回头。
记者：再往下跌，把收益收回。
5. 长期投资是挺孤独的，巴菲特说过，股票投资是看起来简单，做起来不容易的事情
王献军：不愿意让朋友说你是傻子之类，有心理承受能力的问题。
记者：我们再回头谈一个市场近期说的话题，第一，有人说巴菲特不适合中国，或者中国没法产生巴菲特。为什么呢？因为中国的股市波动得很厉害，一跌跌得那么惨，长期投资的话，会损失惨重。你觉得中国股市适不适合巴菲特来投资？
王献军：巴菲特一些投资思想我很欣赏，甚至崇拜，至于有些网友提出巴菲特不可复制，这其实涉及到技术上的问题，不是思想，不是理念的问题。是大家可以共享，你有一个想法，我们大家认可不认可。
记者：可敬不可学的问题。
王献军：对，说到复制，这个复制是Copy还是克隆呢？他现在600多亿美元的身价，我们没法跟他比。如果能复制，他今年78岁了，你想复制他吗？想变成他吗？这也没有什么意思，就读他的书，从中吸取他的投资精华，我们赚点钱，就很高兴了。
记者：公募基金也好，QFII、保险基金也好，他们过去打的往往是价值投资的旗号，和巴菲特是一样的，最后他们都没有长期投资，都在那儿搞高抛低吸，你认为中国机构投资者这种行为变化说明了什么呢？说明巴菲特这种投资理念只适合你这样的个人投资者，不适合机构吗？
王献军：我没有办法评价这个问题，但对我来说觉得很有用。
记者：你觉得任何一个个人投资者都可以像你这样，把巴菲特的理念搬过来，发现好的股票，长期投资吗？
王献军：这是几乎不可能的。
记者：为什么呢？你和别人又有什么不同呢？我相信你有不一样的地方，要不然就会产生一大批像你一样的人了。历过的事情是很重要的，第二学习很重要，我们有幸了解到巴菲特的投资理念是一个方面。第三积累，包括资金的积累，经验的积累，研究的积累，像巴菲特说，要投资就一句话，就是阅读。他讲的非常简单他每年要读成千上万份报表，我们在座有几个人能做到？我一年能读一千份报表就说明我相当能干了。
记者：这几年你读到多少报表？
王献军：我只读了几百份，我希望以后能读到上千份。
记者：你持有的组合大部分是从03年持有，没有动，你卖与不卖不是取决于它的股价高低，而是取决于巴菲特所说的股票价值有没有发生变化？
王献军：如果这只股票涨到超出我认为的价值区域，我肯定卖。比如这块玉，如果它的价值太高了，我就会卖。
记者：你用什么方法评估这只股票值多少钱，举一个最简单的例子，给大家介绍一下。比如你当时觉得茅台应该值多少钱，有没有简单的计算方法？公募基金喜欢用现金贴现的方法计算。
王献军：当时计算茅台的时候，就只用了现金流贴现法计算的。当时算出多少钱，后来的价格大大高出我算的，我当时算的很初步的。最早人人都知道市盈率，PEG等于几那个。因为市盈率没有考虑成长的因素，所以，后来PEG加进成长的因素。评估的方法还有净资产法，重组资产法，我自己用的是比较现金流贴现，PEG等等。我认为，真正从理论上说这个阶级的价值，还是生命周期内所有现金的贴现。这是最准确的方法。我花了多少钱，最后我能得到多少钱，进行换算之后一比就得出结果。
记者：王先生，你怎么走上这路的？很多人是很难选择这条长期孤独的投资之路。
王献军：是挺孤独的，巴菲特说过，股票投资是看起来简单，做起来不容易的事情。怎么看起来简单呢？新股民一进股市，人家说你怎么赚钱呢？低买高卖就可以赚钱，这很简单。但下一步就不简单了，什么叫低，什么叫高呢？很多人做投机，做差价的，也许这个对他们就很简单。比如第一天你10元买了一个股票，第二涨到11元，你买的是低，现在你有条件，卖不卖？我们前面说的是标准的问题，谁叫低，谁叫高？你第一天10元买，第二天11元卖，你卖就叫做对了。第三天到了10元，你没有对错，只是损失手续费的问题。到第四天变成9元了，你又错了。现在你这一笔交易，在企业没有任何变化，宏观经济几乎看不出任何变化的情况下，你到底对还是不对，已经说不清楚了。其实没有标准，是结果作为标准，这在逻辑某种程度上是说不过去的。我经过思考之后，我觉得不能这样找标准，要在外围找标准。后来接触到巴菲特，很幸运，知道要贴近企业找标准。
6. "巴菲特式"的选股在相当的程度上规避了6124-1802惨烈调整的风险，
记者：我觉得你确实挺幸运的，无论现在你仓位持有的股票，他们从调整以来的跌幅，还是你卖掉的股票，比如茅台，发现绝大多数的股票都经受住了这次惨烈调整的考验。我曾经在写一些文章的时候，曾经注意对一些典型热门股票的研究，发现绝大多数股票，尤其蓝筹类个股，热门股票都跌得跟大盘同等的幅度，甚至高于大盘的幅度，基本上都有70%的调整幅度。我看过您买过和卖过的股票，只有两只跟大盘下跌比较接近，但其它的股票居然就只跌了百分之二十几。所以，我王先生成功地用"巴菲特式"的选股在相当的程度上规避了大盘调整的风险，某种意义上可以验证，巴菲特这种选股理念对中国市场也是有价值的，这么惨烈的调整都能扛住。
王献军：至少到目前我个人来讲，我觉得很受用。
记者：我们从行业的角度往下谈谈，茅台属于食品，酿酒行业。盐湖钾肥是属于资源性行业，它给你带来的回报是10-15倍的回报，你怎么把这两个行业作为你自己选择股票的标的。我觉得你为什么幸运呢？因为资源类行业，不算地产的话，有色、黄金(资讯,行情)都是在大涨之后出现暴跌，暴跌幅度相当大盘，有色板块超过大盘，你选择的盐湖只有百分之二十几的调整，你怎么幸运地在资源类行业里把最好的分支行业钾肥行业找到的？你把选行业的体会跟大家分享一下吧。
王献军：关于钾肥行业，我当年买钾肥的时候是在05年，我们属于钾肥资源比较贫乏的国家，大部分钾肥都依靠进口，进口的数额占到国内销售总额的70%以上。当年盐湖钾肥自己报告说是整个国内产量的95%以上。
记者：进口占国内的70%，而它占国内生产和消费的90%以上，属于垄断性行业。
王献军：对，当时它的价格也不高。
记者：05年它只有10元不到的价格。
王献军：对，有垄断性，市场没有保护。它没有定价权，但国外定价权在美元持续贬值的情况下，涨价预期不会改变，因为美国双赤字（贸易赤字，财政赤字），只有印美元来补，所以，我当时很看好这个股。
记者：美元贬值受益的不仅仅是钾肥一家，大宗商品都受益。当然它的垄断性是最高的，仅仅因为这两点吗？还算了其它的指标吗？
王献军：价值评估肯定要做，看它买入是否合算。去年钾肥2130美元/吨涨到今年1万美元/吨。
记者：差不多五倍。
王献军：对。这是我没有想到的，这是受国外的影响，价格我们与国外的谈判是一年一谈的。
记者：你在众多行业中筛选的能够产生高回报个股的行业，你是用什么标准选择行业的？
王献军：以巴菲特选股来说，他选择好的股票有十二条原则，其中第一是行业，业务是不是足够简单，做得是不是足够好。第二这个企业的历史是不是同样的简单又好，有没有发生变化，简单你就容易理解。第三如果企业历史又好又简单，现在做得又好，以后你就可以预期未来，当然不会有什么负面的消息，未来会发生什么变化。第四领导人的问题，是否坦诚，是否有独立的意识，是否理性。很多企业的领导人，巴菲特都批评，就像国外的那些基金，一保大家都保。为什么房地美、房利美把大家都套住了呢？他们有一个共同化的趋势，你做什么我做什么，要做咱们一起做，他需要那个企业领导人有独立的想法，不随波逐流。第五财务上的要求。比如说这个企业经营利润率要高，要重股东收益，不要重净利润。净利润有折旧等等原因。第六每一美元的留存收益未来能不能得到回报。比如这个钱没分给你，留在企业，要有超过产生一美元的价值回报。第七算出这个企业能值多少钱。其中最后一点，在以上的前提下，在价格比较合适的地方买入。巴菲特三儿子的前妻写过一本书，他说过这么一句经典的话，好企业决定你是否盈利，但价格决定你盈利的收益率。
7. 94年我把我的投资组合赔了70%以上，我激励自己不要放弃。
记者：王先生您能不能谈谈您的投资历史，你是怎么摸索到这条路上，您是不是曾经摔过跟头，有没有做过短线？
王献军：一进来大家都是一样的，我1991年第一只买的是深宝安。
记者：三个月赚了三倍不是挺好吗？
王献军：是挺好，但接下来就不美好了。94年我把我的投资组合赔了70%以上，以后就痛下决心把这个东西整个明白。最困难的时候，我激励自己不要放弃，我说我一定要百分之百的努力，来证明我自己真的不行，我就改行做别的。幸运的是，由于机遇和自己努力的原因，觉得自己做得还勉强可以。
记者：你在1994年赔了70%的时候，有没有想退出股市，不再玩"这坑人的游戏"？
王献军：我没有这个想法，我还不想输，我是想通过我的努力，证明我真的努力也不行，非输不可才退出。
记者：那是因为你当时仅仅亏了70%，如果你亏了90%或者亏得更惨，你会不会就放弃了呢？
8. 做股票决不负债
王献军：你想不放弃都没有办法了，买一手都买不了了。在这点上我有两点的体会，第一不负债，所有亏的都是真金白银，没有借款也没有透支。而且我要求以后不做这个，既不融资也不做融券。即使退市不会归零，不能有负数。
记者：不能把自己的本赔光。大家反复引用的巴菲特的话是第一保住你的本金，第二还是保住，第三记住你的前两条。现在人家把这个话怎么演绎呢？演绎成止损，可是在你这儿好象没有止损，大盘跌60%，你的股票跌多少不管，你怎么理解巴菲特的话。
王献军：你这个话相当关键，巴菲特说过这样一句话，你把这个钱投下去之后，它就不带输的。
记者：肯定是增值的？
王献军：对，这是第一句话。
记者：第二句话呢？
王献军：万一股票价格有波动，忽略这个，如果这个企业足够好，在十年的时间周期里，能平均给我提供一个满意的投资回报，怎么会输呢？还有一句话也是很经典的，就是格雷厄姆说的，股票市场是看你的长期价值的。
记者：巴菲特的股票也有下跌50%的。
王献军：对。关键要考虑回报，我在读巴菲特的书里的时候，没有什么止损的概念。巴菲特的思想是这样的，如果你想买一个东西，当你10元买了它，是有足够理由的。如果你是对的，它跌到5元，应该买入更多，而不是止损卖掉。如果你卖掉，说明你10元买的时候本身就是错的，为什么你10元的时候要买呢？现在5元应该是更值得去买了。我们买套房子100万，现在跌到50万了，怎么会想我100万不买就好了。这种说法纯粹是胡说八道。
记者：王先生，现在这个市场到底有没有投资价值？和机构的分歧很大，有些人认可的认为市盈率已经比较低了，静态市盈率整个市场可能也就16、17倍，市净率也比较低了，甚至相当一部分股票已经跌破了净资产，不考虑个别股票，你能不能用巴菲特的思想来分析一下，我们这个市场已经到了价值底部区域？
王献军：这没有意义，不能在指数上赚钱。
9.巴菲特说过，真正的好股票是很少的。在6000点的时候就更少了，现在也不多。
记者：指数反映的是平均的情况，市场上大多数个股或者相当多数个股进入了低风险或者进入了比较高回报的区域呢？
王献军：巴菲特说过，真正的好股票是很少的。他不是说不一定没有投资价值，只是收益平平，可能你不亏损，可能略有盈余，或者平均有7%、8%的回报甚至10%的回报，但真正产生高额回报的企业是很少的。在6000点的时候就更少了，现在也不多。这就是我每年想要读成千上万份报表的原因，就是想找出这个东西。
记者：你能不能给大家介绍一下你看报表的经验，你看报表的时候，最看重的是哪个指标，能不能找出最关键的两三项指标，作为大家的投资参考。报表上没有市盈率。
王献军：前面说过巴菲特有十二条原则，这本书是我今年读的叫《巴菲特之路》，这十二条原则我觉得已经很经典了。
10. 巴菲特的选股指标：经营利润率、十年平均市盈率、十年平均PEG
记者：如果把这十二条原则体现在财务报表上，财务报表上哪个指标最重要？
王献军：他提过四个，叫经营利润率。
记者：我们的报表上有吗？
王献军：没有的话可以自己简单计算一下。
记者：报表上有的呢？
王献军：这几项都没有直接的。但是F10可能有，对于市盈率，F10就有。
记者：巴菲特有市盈率的概念吗？
王献军：没有。
记者：你选择股票参考市盈率吗？
王献军：参考。巴菲特的做法里，前面说过巴菲特前二媳妇，彼得前妻所写的披露巴菲特家族的密切，如果她作为巴菲特媳妇，巴菲特说过餐桌上的话不能说的，她是离婚了，所以把话说出来了。前面说过一个公司平均市盈率多少，可以假定未来十年平均市盈率差不多。这样来提供一个标准，比如一元的每个股收益，前面十年平均市盈率是二十倍，未来十年也可以按二十倍来假设。这是一个意思。
另外一个意思是PEG的概念，前面十年是按每年平均25%的成长，现在发现你有垄断，所有的好事你都占了，我们得出一个合理的假设，未来你也能十年成长25%。那么到了第十年年末的时候，你大概就是9.3元了，乘上市盈率20倍，就是180元，如果现在20元买的，180元卖的，你就赚了。
记者：你是用这样的办法来考虑的，一个是企业里前十年平均每年赚多少钱，这是一个概念。还有一个是前十年企业的业绩成长，每年稳定在什么样的水平上。
王献军：彼得林奇和巴菲特不太一样，彼得林奇持仓比例有1000多只，巴菲特不一样。
记者：你和巴菲特比较像。
王献军：对，我的股票也不多，有一句话说不要把所有的鸡蛋放在一个篮子里。巴菲特说过把所有的鸡蛋可以放在一只篮子里，但要看好这些股票。
记者：你更认同巴菲特的观点。最后你再说说你的投资组合，随着你的股票只有七八只，但也涉及到四五个行业，这是有意识地用组合分散风险。
王献军：对，我们每个人的能力都是有限的，或者个人的性格上可能是有缺陷的，知识水平各方面有的地方是不到位的。虽然你在做的时候，尽量做你能理解的股票，在你做你能股票的范围内可能有你预测不到的地方。这样可以使你的风险分散，在投资组合里还是有一定的道理。
11. 学习巴菲特投资企业，不用价格的波动来折磨自己。
记者：现在市场上，大家都愁眉苦脸的，你给大家一个什么样的忠告，这次调整对你没有什么影响，你的组合总共才下降了百分之二十几，相对你的长期回报，简直不算什么。但大多数人，无论机构还是个人，都经历了50%甚至更多的损失，你对他们有什么样的建议？怎么来应对这个市场？
王献军：巴菲特说"投资股票就是投资企业"，你要用贴近企业的方法来做投资，这是我对他们的忠告。第二，我再补充一下，刚才你说过，不过损失百分之二十几，其实我对这百分之二十几不是不在乎的，不是不心疼的，但我的能力没有办法做到，我只能认命。巴菲特是这样的思想，他是长期以来，每年可以获得多少投资回报，是这样计算它的成果，而不是用价格的波动来折磨自己，我比较倾向于这样的投资理念，否则会活得比较累。
记者：总的结论来讲，你认为巴菲特投资方法适合中国股市？
王献军：总的思想可以借鉴，不分人种，不分学历。
记者：可能有一个例外，巴菲特是根据财务报表来选股的，但中国一段时间很多上市公司的报表都有虚假的，那么你选择看的股票的报表是不是都是真的，你不是没有上市公司访问过吗？
王献军：没有去过，即便去上市公司访问过，也不能完全确定报表都是真实的。我现在并没有肯定我所看过的报表都是真的，只是我通过看这些报表做出了我的决定，幸运的是这些决定没有给我带来太大的损失，给我带来了一些收益。第二，在看报表的时候，如果我发现是假的，或者我觉得不太顺眼，不太可靠的，我就直接拿一边去，这个公司就Pass了。
12. 我投资的公司至少有七年的历史
记者：能举一个例子吗？某一个公司某一个股票，你觉得它当时不正常，就把它割掉。
王献军：对，比如没有历史的公司你就没有办法研究它，像新上市的公司，它有历史，但它不跟你说，就模拟报表三年。
记者：你投资的公司一般要多少年的历史？
王献军：七年。在我现在研究它，至少有七年，我才可以研究它。之后我才能对它作出预测。
记者：以后是不是也想像巴菲特那样，用十年时间。
王献军：对，历史越长越可靠。你获得的信息越多，你在投资时候的优势就越大。举个例子，有一个公司净利润是7个亿，净利润里投资收益有5亿，这个我就不能研究，因为等于报表没有说。
记者：一定是主营，是经常性的，不是偶然的获得？
王献军：有的投资收益也是经常性的。但它不进报表，就进投资收益一个数字，资产负债表什么都不进的。
记者：我觉得从王献军先生的个案证明了一点，巴菲特的思想还是适合中国股市的。即使像王先生这样不看大盘，也不看宏观经济，也不看政策，通过选股，他仍然能够很大程度上去规避市场调整的风险，获得丰厚的长期投资回报.
不看政策
不看宏观经济
不看大盘
我不否认现在宏观经济对股票市场有着重大的影响，但决定宏观经济变量太多了，宏观经济各个方面对股市的影响太多了，所以，你要对它作出预测，看对大盘有什么影响其实是相当困难的。这一点对我来说大大超出了我个人的范围，所以，我的只能选择研究股票，没有人告诉我政策何时出台，无法提前预测，我估计大家都不知道。
当年谁预测涨到6124点，没有人预测到，这次下调谁预测到下跌到1802点，也没有人预测。明天涨多少？后天涨多少，一年以后，一个月以后涨多少？做不了很准确的预测，就没有办法提供操作的指导。
"巴菲特式"的选股在相当的程度上规避了6124-1802惨烈调整的风险， 我的投资组合同期最大亏损不到三成.
学习巴菲特投资企业，不用价格的波动来折磨自己。
巴菲特第一个最重要的东西，就是你所有的投资都必须以贴近企业的方式进行。所谓"贴近企业的方式"，就是你的眼睛只能盯在企业上，而不是技术、波浪，不是价格，做股票，第一经历过的事情是很重要的，第二学习很重要，我们有幸了解到巴菲特的投资理念是一个方面。第三积累，包括资金的积累，经验的积累，研究的积累，像巴菲特说，要投资就一句话，就是阅读。他讲的非常简单他每年要读成千上万份报表，我们在座有几个人能做到？我一年能读一千份报表就说明我相当能干了。
1994年我把我的投资组合赔了70%以上，以后就痛下决心把这个东西整个明白。最困难的时候，我激励自己不要放弃，我说我一定要百分之百的努力，来证明我自己真的不行，我就改行做别的。幸运的是，由于机遇和自己努力的原因，觉得自己做得还勉强可以。
2003年买入茅台的理由：垄断、未来十年每年确定的复利收益、低PE、破发。2007年卖掉茅台的理由：100倍PE、三年半股票增值了15.94倍、未来十年的年回报会低于15%，当时还有更好的投资目标。
长期投资是挺孤独的，巴菲特说过，股票投资是看起来简单，做起来不容易的事情
做股票决不负债，所有亏的都是真金白银，没有借款也没有透支。而且我要求以后不做这个，既不融资也不做融券。即使退市不会归零，不能有负数。
我投资的公司至少有七年的历史。在我现在研究它，至少有七年，我才可以研究它。之后我才能对它作出预测。
1. 做股票"三不看"，不看政策，不看宏观经济，不看大盘。
他的名字叫王献军。王先生实际上不是一个很普通的人，他从1991年就开始买入股票，应该是我们这个市场最资深的股民了，股龄最长的，到现在已经有17年的股龄。今天请他来，主要是跟大家分享一下，他利用价值投资，怎么样在股票市场上获取丰厚的利润的。现在调整从6124点到1802点调整，股票下跌70%，股民损失惨重。而王先生的账户最低损失百分之十几。他当时的股票仓位是六成，他是怎么样通过价值理念投资的选股股票市场的风险？
记者：我们和王先生讨论的第一个问题，目前市场上大家都在关注的是井喷行情，从9月18日三大政策救市开始，已经连续两天大涨，从1800点已经涨到2200多点了。市场上所有的人，无论个人还是机构都在关注着政策下一步有什么动静，国内外宏观经济形势有什么变化，关注大盘的走势。王先生说他不看这三点，您怎么在"三不看"的情况下获得丰厚的回报，你为什么有这"三不看"？
王献军：其实我就是一个很一般的人，是从散户做起来的普通的人。从宏观经济政策、大盘研究的结果，最后都要落实到对你的行为有指导意义上面。比如说它能不能给我提供足够的信息，使我买入或者卖出，最后才能对你赚钱产生效益。现在宏观经济我不可否认对股票市场有着重大的影响，但宏观经济变量太多了，宏观经济各个方面对股市的影响太多了，所以，你要对它作出预测，并且对它做出预测之后，看对大盘有什么影响其实是相当困难的。这一点对我来说大大超出了我个人的范围，所以，我的只能选择股票，我并不否认宏观经济的影响。
记者：搞不清楚宏观经济的影响，也在股市上赚了点钱。
王献军：对，赚了一点钱，可能运气比较好。
记者：怎么看我们的政策，政策一出市场马上上升。
王献军：没有人告诉我政策何时出台，无法提前预测，也没有做什么准备，要知道我星期四就会买进，现在我不知道，我估计大家都不知道。
记者：就算你不看宏观经济，不看政策，总得看大盘。大盘和个股的走势很密切。这次绝大多数个股都跟大盘一起调。
王献军：对，这是基于两个原因。第一，还是预测的问题，当年谁预测涨到6124点，没有人预测到，这次下调谁预测到下跌到1802点，也没有人预测。我再问一个问题，你预测明天涨了多少？后天涨了多少，一年以后，一个月以后？做不了很准确的预测，就没有办法提供操作的指导。
记者：你的意思是，无论大盘长期走势还是中长期走势都是无法预测的。很多高手都是通过各种各样的技术分析，波浪理论进行预测。听说您也学习了这方面的东西，但为什么没有用上呢？
王献军：不是没用，用过，但效果不好。我进股市从学技术开始，平均数、技术指标，波浪理论，道氐理论、江恩理论、四度空间等等都有所涉及。技术分析有一本书对我的影响非常大，大概是97、98年看的，一个叫郭小舟的人，他写了一本书叫《系统交易的投资回报》。他说如果你有一个技术指标、技术参数，你要对这个技术参数首先进行检测它对还是不对。你设定参数之后，提出买点卖点，假设是历史是重复的，就模拟地把历史进行计算，到底赚了没有。在这个基础上假设未来是一致的，才能赚钱。
记者：假设是历史是重复的。
王献军：对。现在假定历史是会重复的情况下，用这些技术参数，回顾历史的时候，赚钱的都非常少。
记者：你是指完全靠技术分析赚钱的人很少吗？
王献军：如果把技术指标在走势上进行检验，赚钱的都很少，更不要说未来是否能够重复，未来本身还不一定，所以赚钱的就更少了。我通过这些作为操作，也不太理想。
记者：掌握不好买点和卖点？
王献军：对，有时候是捡了芝麻丢了西瓜。
记者：你的价值投资理念是什么时候，怎么想起去买贵州茅台，是受巴菲特的影响吗？
王献军：肯定是受巴菲特的影响。
记者：王先生2003年买入茅台，2007年卖出，四年赚了16倍，请王先生谈谈这个体会。
2.巴菲特第一个最重要的东西，就是你所有的投资都必须以贴近企业的方式进行。
王献军：说起来稍微有点复杂，前面谈到技术，我在技术上找不到方向，找不到我自己认为正确的东西，能指导我赢钱的东西，我就在其它方面找。最后碰到了价值投资的东西，其实在上个世纪价值投资的书都很难找到，也许是我孤陋寡闻，最后才找到巴菲特。
记者：你看的巴菲特的第一本叫什么？
王献军：我看的第一本是国内翻译的叫《投资圣经》，很厚的，红皮的。
记者：你从里面获得的收获是什么？
王献军：最主要的收获是他的理念和思想。
记者：你能用几句话概括一下你理解的巴菲特的思想吗？或者你把你认为巴菲特最重要的思想表达一下。
王献军：巴菲特第一个最重要的东西，就是你所有的投资都必须以贴近企业的方式进行。所谓"贴近企业的方式"，就是你的眼睛只能盯在企业上，而不是技术、波浪，不是价格，今天涨多少，明天涨多少，不是宏观经济对它的影响。要贴近企业，想我买这个企业的股票就要了解这个企业是怎样的，领导人怎么样，有没有垄断，未来的企业发展会不会很好。
3.2003年买入茅台的理由：垄断、未来十年每年确定的复利收益、低PE、破发
记者：企业这么多信息当中，哪些信息是最重要的，垄断是不是最重要的？
王献军：那当然了，巴菲特关于好企业有两个最重要的特征，第一，消费者垄断的企业。
记者：消费者垄断就是市场垄断的企业？
王献军：对，消费者垄断的企业，比如可口可乐，它的规模已经到了这样一个地步，牌子已经这样深入人心。到了什么地步呢？巴菲特的话说，给你1000亿，在市场上再造一个企业打垮可口可乐不可能，这是消费者垄断企业。第二，收费桥。巴菲特最典型的投资理念，比如一个城市只有一家报纸，所有的平面广告都只能通过它发布，它就是一个收费桥，你不能跟我讨价还价，你来我这儿登广告，这是区域垄断的概念。这是好企业的标准。
记者：你觉得茅台符合这个标准？
王献军：茅台可能两者皆有，他有消费者垄断，同样的产品可能没有能比过它的，他是酱香型的，是唯一的，没有企业能跟他竞争。
记者：区域垄断，好象在全国占的份额也很好。
王献军：区域垄断还有一个原因是什么呢？他的生产是独特的，当年有一条资料，不知道真假，当年在遵义建了10万吨的茅台厂，想再造茅台。原料、工艺都一样，配方也一样，就在遵义，做出来的酒就是不一样，什么原因呢？
记者：是不是和水有关系？
王献军：水好办，可以把水引过来，是茅台当地那个环境使它的酒发酵就是这样的，换一个环境不能有相同的东西，所以没有办法复制。
记者：没有竞争？
王献军：对，所以他基本上每年都提价。
记者：巴菲特还告诉你什么选择股票的标准？
王献军：巴菲特还有一个选择股票的标准就是确定性，举个例子，你买国债，不会去关心市场上价格的波动。我有国债，急需用钱可能以很低的价格就卖出去了。但如果你不卖，可以保证每年的回报是很确定的。巴菲特说，未来十年每年你能平均给我保证多少的复利收益，就可以了。
记者：巴菲特要求每年的复利收益是多少？10%？
王献军：巴菲特建伯克希尔公司的时候，要求自己每年做到复利的投资回报15%，就是净资产增长是15%。
记者：你在什么时候买的茅台，除了考虑它稳定的分红，市场的垄断，还考虑了什么指标，有没有具体的经营指标吗？
王献军：当年我买茅台的时候，可能是很走运的一件事情，因为我大概在03年初上半年的时候，又开始看巴菲特的书。刚才说的《投资圣经》那本书，里面就举有例子，巴菲特收购了法国的一家酒类企业，他是怎么计算的。这就给我一个现成的例子，我就套用，简单地算了一下，其实那时候对巴菲特这些东西远远没有今天理解得那么深刻。
记者：那是先简单模仿一下再说。
王献军：对，这是第一个幸运的地方。贵州茅台上市的时候是30多元，发行价格也在30元以上，之后一路下跌，跌破20多元，大大跌破发行价，跌到21、22元。
记者：当时正好赶上熊市。
王献军：对，当时在2003年，赶上连续的熊市。我当时在10月下旬，在21.5-22元之间建的仓，当初心里还不是太有底，如果现在看到这样的好企业肯定下重注的。当时把计划要投入的钱拿出来，准备分两批建仓，结果最遗憾的是只建了一批仓，永远没有见第二批仓。
记者：因为涨起来就不愿意建了。
王献军：是。
4.2007年卖掉茅台的理由：100倍PE、三年半股票增值了15.94倍、未来十年的年回报会低于15%，当时还有更好的投资目标。
记者：你买入之后的持有标准是什么？因为你持有了四年，可是在07年上半年90多元的时候你给卖了，最后茅台涨到220元，你为什么在07年上半年90多元的时候卖掉的呢？你是出于什么考虑的呢？
王献军：客观地说，当时有多方面的考虑。其中最重要的，就是在我的能力范围之内，我觉得它未来是怎样的，换句话说，我们回溯到03年我买的时候，我觉得它一定是很好的股票，不会辜负我。
记者：你一句什么指标呢？它的垄断性没有变。
王献军：当时的市盈率很低，好象才不到20倍，我卖的时候，当时市盈率已经接近100倍了。另外，我买它的时候对它进行价值评估，认为它未来可以给我满意的收入。我们说十年以后的事情，其实很难看得清，假设我们对十年做一个判断的话，如果我各种参数都比较保守，这十年平均每年能提供给我使我感到很满意的收益率。比如我当时觉得达到20%的收益率，到了97年我卖出的时候，21元买到90多元卖出，加股改，加送股，加上权证，实际这三年半的持股这只股票增值了15.94倍。除了企业增长原因，市场也给它很高的价值。，未来它给我的回报会低于15%。
记者：红利回报？
王献军：包括增长，留存利润再加之上的体现，包括送股。
记者：没考虑价差的波动？
王献军：考虑了。因为它派息不多，就留存收益，新的资金又产生效益。这个留存收益要体现在价格上不能吃亏，现在90多元，未来100元，留存收益上我就亏了。不是卖了它会不会涨。这是第一点。第二点，当时还有更好的投资目标。
记者：你买了航天信息？
王献军：不具体提，是买了别的股票。我在研究其它股票的时候，发现有的股票可能比它更好，当时赚了那么多倍数以后，自己觉得挺得意的，同时很不愿意在这个问题上再回头。
记者：再往下跌，把收益收回。
5. 长期投资是挺孤独的，巴菲特说过，股票投资是看起来简单，做起来不容易的事情
王献军：不愿意让朋友说你是傻子之类，有心理承受能力的问题。
记者：我们再回头谈一个市场近期说的话题，第一，有人说巴菲特不适合中国，或者中国没法产生巴菲特。为什么呢？因为中国的股市波动得很厉害，一跌跌得那么惨，长期投资的话，会损失惨重。你觉得中国股市适不适合巴菲特来投资？
王献军：巴菲特一些投资思想我很欣赏，甚至崇拜，至于有些网友提出巴菲特不可复制，这其实涉及到技术上的问题，不是思想，不是理念的问题。是大家可以共享，你有一个想法，我们大家认可不认可。
记者：可敬不可学的问题。
王献军：对，说到复制，这个复制是Copy还是克隆呢？他现在600多亿美元的身价，我们没法跟他比。如果能复制，他今年78岁了，你想复制他吗？想变成他吗？这也没有什么意思，就读他的书，从中吸取他的投资精华，我们赚点钱，就很高兴了。
记者：公募基金也好，QFII、保险基金也好，他们过去打的往往是价值投资的旗号，和巴菲特是一样的，最后他们都没有长期投资，都在那儿搞高抛低吸，你认为中国机构投资者这种行为变化说明了什么呢？说明巴菲特这种投资理念只适合你这样的个人投资者，不适合机构吗？
王献军：我没有办法评价这个问题，但对我来说觉得很有用。
记者：你觉得任何一个个人投资者都可以像你这样，把巴菲特的理念搬过来，发现好的股票，长期投资吗？
王献军：这是几乎不可能的。
记者：为什么呢？你和别人又有什么不同呢？我相信你有不一样的地方，要不然就会产生一大批像你一样的人了。历过的事情是很重要的，第二学习很重要，我们有幸了解到巴菲特的投资理念是一个方面。第三积累，包括资金的积累，经验的积累，研究的积累，像巴菲特说，要投资就一句话，就是阅读。他讲的非常简单他每年要读成千上万份报表，我们在座有几个人能做到？我一年能读一千份报表就说明我相当能干了。
记者：这几年你读到多少报表？
王献军：我只读了几百份，我希望以后能读到上千份。
记者：你持有的组合大部分是从03年持有，没有动，你卖与不卖不是取决于它的股价高低，而是取决于巴菲特所说的股票价值有没有发生变化？
王献军：如果这只股票涨到超出我认为的价值区域，我肯定卖。比如这块玉，如果它的价值太高了，我就会卖。
记者：你用什么方法评估这只股票值多少钱，举一个最简单的例子，给大家介绍一下。比如你当时觉得茅台应该值多少钱，有没有简单的计算方法？公募基金喜欢用现金贴现的方法计算。
王献军：当时计算茅台的时候，就只用了现金流贴现法计算的。当时算出多少钱，后来的价格大大高出我算的，我当时算的很初步的。最早人人都知道市盈率，PEG等于几那个。因为市盈率没有考虑成长的因素，所以，后来PEG加进成长的因素。评估的方法还有净资产法，重组资产法，我自己用的是比较现金流贴现，PEG等等。我认为，真正从理论上说这个阶级的价值，还是生命周期内所有现金的贴现。这是最准确的方法。我花了多少钱，最后我能得到多少钱，进行换算之后一比就得出结果。
记者：王先生，你怎么走上这路的？很多人是很难选择这条长期孤独的投资之路。
王献军：是挺孤独的，巴菲特说过，股票投资是看起来简单，做起来不容易的事情。怎么看起来简单呢？新股民一进股市，人家说你怎么赚钱呢？低买高卖就可以赚钱，这很简单。但下一步就不简单了，什么叫低，什么叫高呢？很多人做投机，做差价的，也许这个对他们就很简单。比如第一天你10元买了一个股票，第二涨到11元，你买的是低，现在你有条件，卖不卖？我们前面说的是标准的问题，谁叫低，谁叫高？你第一天10元买，第二天11元卖，你卖就叫做对了。第三天到了10元，你没有对错，只是损失手续费的问题。到第四天变成9元了，你又错了。现在你这一笔交易，在企业没有任何变化，宏观经济几乎看不出任何变化的情况下，你到底对还是不对，已经说不清楚了。其实没有标准，是结果作为标准，这在逻辑某种程度上是说不过去的。我经过思考之后，我觉得不能这样找标准，要在外围找标准。后来接触到巴菲特，很幸运，知道要贴近企业找标准。
6. "巴菲特式"的选股在相当的程度上规避了6124-1802惨烈调整的风险，
记者：我觉得你确实挺幸运的，无论现在你仓位持有的股票，他们从调整以来的跌幅，还是你卖掉的股票，比如茅台，发现绝大多数的股票都经受住了这次惨烈调整的考验。我曾经在写一些文章的时候，曾经注意对一些典型热门股票的研究，发现绝大多数股票，尤其蓝筹类个股，热门股票都跌得跟大盘同等的幅度，甚至高于大盘的幅度，基本上都有70%的调整幅度。我看过您买过和卖过的股票，只有两只跟大盘下跌比较接近，但其它的股票居然就只跌了百分之二十几。所以，我王先生成功地用"巴菲特式"的选股在相当的程度上规避了大盘调整的风险，某种意义上可以验证，巴菲特这种选股理念对中国市场也是有价值的，这么惨烈的调整都能扛住。
王献军：至少到目前我个人来讲，我觉得很受用。
记者：我们从行业的角度往下谈谈，茅台属于食品，酿酒行业。盐湖钾肥是属于资源性行业，它给你带来的回报是10-15倍的回报，你怎么把这两个行业作为你自己选择股票的标的。我觉得你为什么幸运呢？因为资源类行业，不算地产的话，有色、黄金(资讯,行情)都是在大涨之后出现暴跌，暴跌幅度相当大盘，有色板块超过大盘，你选择的盐湖只有百分之二十几的调整，你怎么幸运地在资源类行业里把最好的分支行业钾肥行业找到的？你把选行业的体会跟大家分享一下吧。
王献军：关于钾肥行业，我当年买钾肥的时候是在05年，我们属于钾肥资源比较贫乏的国家，大部分钾肥都依靠进口，进口的数额占到国内销售总额的70%以上。当年盐湖钾肥自己报告说是整个国内产量的95%以上。
记者：进口占国内的70%，而它占国内生产和消费的90%以上，属于垄断性行业。
王献军：对，当时它的价格也不高。
记者：05年它只有10元不到的价格。
王献军：对，有垄断性，市场没有保护。它没有定价权，但国外定价权在美元持续贬值的情况下，涨价预期不会改变，因为美国双赤字（贸易赤字，财政赤字），只有印美元来补，所以，我当时很看好这个股。
记者：美元贬值受益的不仅仅是钾肥一家，大宗商品都受益。当然它的垄断性是最高的，仅仅因为这两点吗？还算了其它的指标吗？
王献军：价值评估肯定要做，看它买入是否合算。去年钾肥2130美元/吨涨到今年1万美元/吨。
记者：差不多五倍。
王献军：对。这是我没有想到的，这是受国外的影响，价格我们与国外的谈判是一年一谈的。
记者：你在众多行业中筛选的能够产生高回报个股的行业，你是用什么标准选择行业的？
王献军：以巴菲特选股来说，他选择好的股票有十二条原则，其中第一是行业，业务是不是足够简单，做得是不是足够好。第二这个企业的历史是不是同样的简单又好，有没有发生变化，简单你就容易理解。第三如果企业历史又好又简单，现在做得又好，以后你就可以预期未来，当然不会有什么负面的消息，未来会发生什么变化。第四领导人的问题，是否坦诚，是否有独立的意识，是否理性。很多企业的领导人，巴菲特都批评，就像国外的那些基金，一保大家都保。为什么房地美、房利美把大家都套住了呢？他们有一个共同化的趋势，你做什么我做什么，要做咱们一起做，他需要那个企业领导人有独立的想法，不随波逐流。第五财务上的要求。比如说这个企业经营利润率要高，要重股东收益，不要重净利润。净利润有折旧等等原因。第六每一美元的留存收益未来能不能得到回报。比如这个钱没分给你，留在企业，要有超过产生一美元的价值回报。第七算出这个企业能值多少钱。其中最后一点，在以上的前提下，在价格比较合适的地方买入。巴菲特三儿子的前妻写过一本书，他说过这么一句经典的话，好企业决定你是否盈利，但价格决定你盈利的收益率。
7. 94年我把我的投资组合赔了70%以上，我激励自己不要放弃。
记者：王先生您能不能谈谈您的投资历史，你是怎么摸索到这条路上，您是不是曾经摔过跟头，有没有做过短线？
王献军：一进来大家都是一样的，我1991年第一只买的是深宝安。
记者：三个月赚了三倍不是挺好吗？
王献军：是挺好，但接下来就不美好了。94年我把我的投资组合赔了70%以上，以后就痛下决心把这个东西整个明白。最困难的时候，我激励自己不要放弃，我说我一定要百分之百的努力，来证明我自己真的不行，我就改行做别的。幸运的是，由于机遇和自己努力的原因，觉得自己做得还勉强可以。
记者：你在1994年赔了70%的时候，有没有想退出股市，不再玩"这坑人的游戏"？
王献军：我没有这个想法，我还不想输，我是想通过我的努力，证明我真的努力也不行，非输不可才退出。
记者：那是因为你当时仅仅亏了70%，如果你亏了90%或者亏得更惨，你会不会就放弃了呢？
8. 做股票决不负债
王献军：你想不放弃都没有办法了，买一手都买不了了。在这点上我有两点的体会，第一不负债，所有亏的都是真金白银，没有借款也没有透支。而且我要求以后不做这个，既不融资也不做融券。即使退市不会归零，不能有负数。
记者：不能把自己的本赔光。大家反复引用的巴菲特的话是第一保住你的本金，第二还是保住，第三记住你的前两条。现在人家把这个话怎么演绎呢？演绎成止损，可是在你这儿好象没有止损，大盘跌60%，你的股票跌多少不管，你怎么理解巴菲特的话。
王献军：你这个话相当关键，巴菲特说过这样一句话，你把这个钱投下去之后，它就不带输的。
记者：肯定是增值的？
王献军：对，这是第一句话。
记者：第二句话呢？
王献军：万一股票价格有波动，忽略这个，如果这个企业足够好，在十年的时间周期里，能平均给我提供一个满意的投资回报，怎么会输呢？还有一句话也是很经典的，就是格雷厄姆说的，股票市场是看你的长期价值的。
记者：巴菲特的股票也有下跌50%的。
王献军：对。关键要考虑回报，我在读巴菲特的书里的时候，没有什么止损的概念。巴菲特的思想是这样的，如果你想买一个东西，当你10元买了它，是有足够理由的。如果你是对的，它跌到5元，应该买入更多，而不是止损卖掉。如果你卖掉，说明你10元买的时候本身就是错的，为什么你10元的时候要买呢？现在5元应该是更值得去买了。我们买套房子100万，现在跌到50万了，怎么会想我100万不买就好了。这种说法纯粹是胡说八道。
记者：王先生，现在这个市场到底有没有投资价值？和机构的分歧很大，有些人认可的认为市盈率已经比较低了，静态市盈率整个市场可能也就16、17倍，市净率也比较低了，甚至相当一部分股票已经跌破了净资产，不考虑个别股票，你能不能用巴菲特的思想来分析一下，我们这个市场已经到了价值底部区域？
王献军：这没有意义，不能在指数上赚钱。
9.巴菲特说过，真正的好股票是很少的。在6000点的时候就更少了，现在也不多。
记者：指数反映的是平均的情况，市场上大多数个股或者相当多数个股进入了低风险或者进入了比较高回报的区域呢？
王献军：巴菲特说过，真正的好股票是很少的。他不是说不一定没有投资价值，只是收益平平，可能你不亏损，可能略有盈余，或者平均有7%、8%的回报甚至10%的回报，但真正产生高额回报的企业是很少的。在6000点的时候就更少了，现在也不多。这就是我每年想要读成千上万份报表的原因，就是想找出这个东西。
记者：你能不能给大家介绍一下你看报表的经验，你看报表的时候，最看重的是哪个指标，能不能找出最关键的两三项指标，作为大家的投资参考。报表上没有市盈率。
王献军：前面说过巴菲特有十二条原则，这本书是我今年读的叫《巴菲特之路》，这十二条原则我觉得已经很经典了。
10. 巴菲特的选股指标：经营利润率、十年平均市盈率、十年平均PEG
记者：如果把这十二条原则体现在财务报表上，财务报表上哪个指标最重要？
王献军：他提过四个，叫经营利润率。
记者：我们的报表上有吗？
王献军：没有的话可以自己简单计算一下。
记者：报表上有的呢？
王献军：这几项都没有直接的。但是F10可能有，对于市盈率，F10就有。
记者：巴菲特有市盈率的概念吗？
王献军：没有。
记者：你选择股票参考市盈率吗？
王献军：参考。巴菲特的做法里，前面说过巴菲特前二媳妇，彼得前妻所写的披露巴菲特家族的密切，如果她作为巴菲特媳妇，巴菲特说过餐桌上的话不能说的，她是离婚了，所以把话说出来了。前面说过一个公司平均市盈率多少，可以假定未来十年平均市盈率差不多。这样来提供一个标准，比如一元的每个股收益，前面十年平均市盈率是二十倍，未来十年也可以按二十倍来假设。这是一个意思。
另外一个意思是PEG的概念，前面十年是按每年平均25%的成长，现在发现你有垄断，所有的好事你都占了，我们得出一个合理的假设，未来你也能十年成长25%。那么到了第十年年末的时候，你大概就是9.3元了，乘上市盈率20倍，就是180元，如果现在20元买的，180元卖的，你就赚了。
记者：你是用这样的办法来考虑的，一个是企业里前十年平均每年赚多少钱，这是一个概念。还有一个是前十年企业的业绩成长，每年稳定在什么样的水平上。
王献军：彼得林奇和巴菲特不太一样，彼得林奇持仓比例有1000多只，巴菲特不一样。
记者：你和巴菲特比较像。
王献军：对，我的股票也不多，有一句话说不要把所有的鸡蛋放在一个篮子里。巴菲特说过把所有的鸡蛋可以放在一只篮子里，但要看好这些股票。
记者：你更认同巴菲特的观点。最后你再说说你的投资组合，随着你的股票只有七八只，但也涉及到四五个行业，这是有意识地用组合分散风险。
王献军：对，我们每个人的能力都是有限的，或者个人的性格上可能是有缺陷的，知识水平各方面有的地方是不到位的。虽然你在做的时候，尽量做你能理解的股票，在你做你能股票的范围内可能有你预测不到的地方。这样可以使你的风险分散，在投资组合里还是有一定的道理。
11. 学习巴菲特投资企业，不用价格的波动来折磨自己。
记者：现在市场上，大家都愁眉苦脸的，你给大家一个什么样的忠告，这次调整对你没有什么影响，你的组合总共才下降了百分之二十几，相对你的长期回报，简直不算什么。但大多数人，无论机构还是个人，都经历了50%甚至更多的损失，你对他们有什么样的建议？怎么来应对这个市场？
王献军：巴菲特说"投资股票就是投资企业"，你要用贴近企业的方法来做投资，这是我对他们的忠告。第二，我再补充一下，刚才你说过，不过损失百分之二十几，其实我对这百分之二十几不是不在乎的，不是不心疼的，但我的能力没有办法做到，我只能认命。巴菲特是这样的思想，他是长期以来，每年可以获得多少投资回报，是这样计算它的成果，而不是用价格的波动来折磨自己，我比较倾向于这样的投资理念，否则会活得比较累。
记者：总的结论来讲，你认为巴菲特投资方法适合中国股市？
王献军：总的思想可以借鉴，不分人种，不分学历。
记者：可能有一个例外，巴菲特是根据财务报表来选股的，但中国一段时间很多上市公司的报表都有虚假的，那么你选择看的股票的报表是不是都是真的，你不是没有上市公司访问过吗？
王献军：没有去过，即便去上市公司访问过，也不能完全确定报表都是真实的。我现在并没有肯定我所看过的报表都是真的，只是我通过看这些报表做出了我的决定，幸运的是这些决定没有给我带来太大的损失，给我带来了一些收益。第二，在看报表的时候，如果我发现是假的，或者我觉得不太顺眼，不太可靠的，我就直接拿一边去，这个公司就Pass了。
12. 我投资的公司至少有七年的历史
记者：能举一个例子吗？某一个公司某一个股票，你觉得它当时不正常，就把它割掉。
王献军：对，比如没有历史的公司你就没有办法研究它，像新上市的公司，它有历史，但它不跟你说，就模拟报表三年。
记者：你投资的公司一般要多少年的历史？
王献军：七年。在我现在研究它，至少有七年，我才可以研究它。之后我才能对它作出预测。
记者：以后是不是也想像巴菲特那样，用十年时间。
王献军：对，历史越长越可靠。你获得的信息越多，你在投资时候的优势就越大。举个例子，有一个公司净利润是7个亿，净利润里投资收益有5亿，这个我就不能研究，因为等于报表没有说。
记者：一定是主营，是经常性的，不是偶然的获得？
王献军：有的投资收益也是经常性的。但它不进报表，就进投资收益一个数字，资产负债表什么都不进的。
记者：我觉得从王献军先生的个案证明了一点，巴菲特的思想还是适合中国股市的。即使像王先生这样不看大盘，也不看宏观经济，也不看政策，通过选股，他仍然能够很大程度上去规避市场调整的风险，获得丰厚的长期投资回报.
Adampak.
September 5, 2008
Analysis of Adampak (Part III - An Interview with the CEO)
I was invited by nextinsight.com.sg to publish this article at http://www.nextinsight.com.sg/content/view/602/60/
I had the great honour to meet up with Adampak CEO Mr Chua on 29th August at Adampak's office at Loyang Way. Prior to this meetup, I had submitted the analysis and list of queries lock-stock-and-barrel, to him via his secretary. He had already read through everything and gave me very interesting observations about Adampak and its business. I did not make any recordings, as it will be too rude; everything existed as just a verbal discussion that flowed for 90 mins.
I have summarized and properly categorised my takeaways from my conversation with him, as below. In all my analyses, as more information is acquired, it is only natural that the perceptions evolve and are refined to greater accuracy. Penned in this blog will be the observations and corrections to past erroneous perceptions. Please do not be alarmed as you encounter conflicting propositions as compared to earlier research reports.
On business strategy:
1. Gun for the big deals from the MNCs in any available sector
Mr Chua revealed that Adampak's business strategy is to focus on securing contracts from big time multi-national corporations and making their name known amongst them. Business from other MNCs will then automatically come through referrals etc. Gunning for deals from MNCs is a good strategy and there are two key benefits: firstly, Adampak can ride along on the bustling growth of the MNCs; secondly, increased resilience to regional economic impact. In 1997 when Asian was struck with the financial crisis, sales of Adampak continued to increase at double digit growth, simply because a bulk of Adampak's sales went to US, European MNCs.
The fact that 90% of Adampak's sales derives from the electronic sector is an outcome that is just somehow generated as Adampak just grew it's portfolio over the years; there was no deliberated or active efforts on a particular market focus.
2. Establishing a localised presence as a proximity advantage
In Mr Chua's words, "In this competitive industry, the first one in, wins." In the manufacturing industry, for customer companies to engage a manufacturer, they have to first go through a lengthy qualification process to assess whether the manufacturer is up to standards and can match their requirements. It is after the qualification process that the manufacturer will stand a chance at gaining a part of the contract. A localised presence has helped Adampak obtain more customers who have qualified their plant.
The best exemplification is China. Adampak set up a factory in Suzhou Industrial Park geographically sited alongside many MNCs and the company has an added proximity advantage over other non-local label suppliers based in South-East Asia. In many ways, this move has helped to increase the list of customers who qualified Adampak's plant. In recent months, the number of suppliers based in China has increased sufficiently for a break even point to be achieved at Adampak Suzhou. And it is expected for the number of qualified suppliers to continue to grow
3. Building strong relationships with suppliers to achieve a preferred label converter status and increase revenue streams
Over the years, Adampak has forged strong relations with their suppliers. Today, Adampak is a preferred label converter to 3M, which will recommend their clients to adopt Adampak's services. This further lends credence to Adampak's reputation and opens up an additional revenue stream.
4. Building a strong reputation of quality, reliability, consistency in service delivery
At first glance, it does appear that anyone can do the job of printing labels. But to be able to do the job, consistently, every time is an immense challenge. This is a critical success factor: over the last 20+ years, Adampak has built a strong brand of being able to consistently deliver high quality products on schedule. The brand is there, and the big corporations like HP, FedEx, Seagate, P&G, major telcos, etc. all know Adampak for its ability to consistently deliver at the lowest cost. It was also revealed that HP has been using Adampak's services for the last 20 years since the Adampak was founded. How amazing for a little factory that started in Loyang Avenue!
On growth drivers
RFID
"RFID faces a chicken and egg problem. No one wants to take the lead in adoption; everyone just want to be the follower of a tried, tested technology". Those were words of Mr Chua. The history of barcode labels is a very good case study. It used to be very expensive in the early phases of industry adoption, every company only started to catch on the wave when major players started using it and costs concurrently went down. Likewise, RFID in 3rd Party Logistics will definitely come as the next big wave, as it greatly simplifies inventory management, let's wait patiently to see this sector blossom.
On competitors
According to Mr Chua, it is hard to claim that Adampak is the industry leader in South-East Asia because the coverage is just too difficult to ascertain. There are so many companies operating in a similar fashion in the region, and all are covering different scopes with different strategies. Just to name a few, like Brady, Zephyr (these I know) and ITW, etc. I would estimate there are 10 odd competitors in this industry.
Nonetheless, Adampak is certainly no small player here. Mr Chua shared that a lot of MNCs know Adampak when it comes to die-cut products and high end labels, and companies acknowledge Adampak's reputation for a consistent delivery of quality products. This is a good sign of a company that probably counts as the top few of the list.
He also revealed that Zephyr did make an attempt to break into China many years back, but the venture failed miserably and never materialised, and this made Zephyr's management adopt a more conservative approach of keeping to local confines of Malaysia and China.
On production capacity and scaling up capabilities rapidly
Adampak's factories run 24 hours shift. Mr Chua shared, "in this industry, there's no way you can survive if you work only on 1 shift". The plants run at full capacity for 5 full working days, and during peak periods, the staff work overtime. Clearly, Adampak is running at maximum operating capacity, with little evidence of any excesses.
One of the critical success factors for the manufacturing business is the ability to flex and scale up production capacity rapidly within a very short notice. If a company does not have strong processes in place, achieving a rapid scaling up will not be possible. Mr Chua shared that Adampak has the ability to set up new plants, new factories and get them up and running in a matter of 2~3 months.
On financial management
The sense of financial prudence
Mr Chua shared that the management closely watches the returns on equity. In addition, the company practises a good sense of financial prudence because the management is always fully cognizant of the risks involved in credit calls when banks face a liquidity crunch. Adampak has consistently maintained a high current ratio (current assets over current liabilities), whereby the short term borrowings and liabilities are well within the company's capabilities to repay within 1 year.
Good cashflow management
He also mentioned that Adampak happens to be doing well in this area and is very fortunate because "the customers see the company not as bankers", and their clients have been very prompt and regular with their payments. This is another sign of a well managed business where the company has a very strong relationship of trust and goodwill with their clients.
On process re-engineering and cost rationalization
Adampak does not have a specific department on this. But what they have are a few key staff trained in Six-Sigma (a qualification in process streamlining to reduce costs). Initiatives on cost rationalization are always on-going. For quality checks, computerised imaging was employed a few years back, but there are problems with obtaining a consistent output. Hence the idea was shelved and manual labour is retained. "Nothing beats a visual check", he says.
Putting the money at where there are greatest cost savings/avoidance
If there are any projects ongoing, Mr Chua cited that the company will generally invest more resources to refine the key processes that are potential show-stoppers in the entire manufacturing process. For example, one of the showstoppers in the label manufacturing chain is the punching of label holes and unwarranted retention of debris that causes clogging. This was mentioned by Mr Chua to be a real problem where resources in engineering were diverted to improve the process because of the immense costs of failure in the entire chain.
On Aident
Mr Chua shared that the original plans for Aident was to secure a public listing on the Malaysian Stock Exchange. However, for some reasons, this did not materialise.
I vaguely recalled that in one of my conversations with a Malaysian factory businessman, he mentioned that for anyone to go on a public listing in M'sia, 50% of the company shares will have to go to the government. That is why, there are so many companies that do not want to go public listing to raise funds, because by doing so, they will have lost control of the company and will be reduced to doing the bidding of the government. This is anecdotal evidence, and has yet to be verified. But this might just be one of the reasons that Aident's listing never materialised and Adampak decided to acquire Aident.
On dilution of earnings post-consolidation with Aident
Mr Chua enlightened that the gross profit margin dilution is primarily due to a consolidation with Aident. For 1H07, profits from the associate company Aident were accounted for, but not the revenue. Whereas for 1H08, post-consolidation, the revenue is now included, hence this accounts for the decline.
On impact of inflation and cost increases
I further asked Mr Chua on the impact of inflation on Adampak's business. He gave a very straightforward reply that these are factors that are not within Adampak's control, and when raw material costs increases, Adampak just transfer the cost increases to the customer. This also meant that Adampak should be insulated from damaging effects on cost increases in raw material
On employees
Giving where credit is due, and striving to reduce employee turnover to a minimum
Adampak's management strongly believes in the principle of rewarding the employees for their efforts. This could probably explain why admin expenses generally rose in a 1:1 ratio to revenue, while maintaining a very strong ROE. And this principle has done Adampak a lot of good. Mr Chua shared that it's a well known fact that "Adampak has one of the lowest employee turnover rates around"
This is comforting, because with a HR policy that focuses on rewarding good managers for their efforts, I do not have to worry about excellent managers being poached by other companies.
On management succession planning
I asked him on the plans for management succession planning, he mentioned that this has already put in place - all the managers running different segments of the company. As for the question of importing foreign talent to helm the ship, like many Singapore companeies, Mr Chua said that the issue is not on foreign talent, but on finding the right man for the right job. He is confident that if he is not around, his managers can step up and run the company as well as he does.
On the board of directors
A strong representation of independent directors with experience across multiple industries
Mr Chua also shared that the representation of solid independent directors who hold concurrent appointments on other companies' board helped a lot. The executive management has received good advice from these people who are able to draw on their industry experience.
My final remarks
I think Adampak is a very good company, that is well worth the money I put in as investment. From a financial perspective: the intrinsic value is much higher than the current share price of S$0.22, and there's a very significant margin of safety. Moreover, the net asset value approximates S$0.18 cents per share. Their current significant exposure to the electronics industry will also mean that they may ride along the economic cycles, but I do not expect their ardent clients like HP and Fed-Ex to go out of business, so I am not really worried.
(A sidenote, I realised that HDD are dirt-cheap now. Now, don't you think that developing nations will be very hungry over the next few years for such low-cost storage?)
From a people perspective: it is well managed by a strong team, and this is validated by every single touch point I have with Adampak. From asking of AGM minutes, to requesting for a meetup with the CEO, to posing as a customer to test the sales staff competency, to warm customer service officers who gladly brought me around the factory floor to see a group of workers who are going about their tasks professionally. The team has not failed my expectations thus far. The management is financially prudent, and people like Mr Chua comes across as a forthcoming person an astute businessman.
Does it really bother me if there will be a recessionary year ahead and that electronics industry may be affected? Not at all. Even if the stock market shuts down for the next 12 months, I can continue to sleep well, knowing that the company will continue running and my money will be in good hands. I have done my due diligence to the best of my abilities, and the entire study tells me that the odds are in my favour. Let's wait to see if this gem will really shimmer and shine so brightly that the market cannot ignore anymore.
For Adampak, I have done more than sufficient as an analyst and part owner. It's time to move on to understand other businesses, while keeping this in view.
(P.S. Mr Chua was visibly impressed when he knew that all the written analyst reports I submitted to him came from an engineer. "Not many engineers I know write as well", he said. What a compliment! I guess I was just short of submitting my resume to seek employment in Adampak. :P )
August 16, 2008
Analysis of Adampak (Part II)
Comments on 1HFY08 Results Released on 15th August
(Updated as at 19 August 08, after a release of new information found in 1H08 briefing slides)
Revenue at US$28m for 1H08 as compared to earlier year (1H07) grew by 49%, cost of sales grew by 57.8%, reducing the gross profit margin by 4 percentage points (as compared to 1H07). Given an estimated inventory turnover ratio (cost of sales = US$19m / Inventory = US$7m) of 2.7, the raw material inventory (est. to take up 62% of all inventory, from FY07 AR) is not expected to last beyond 3 months. From this, it can be infered that inflationary pressure on material prices over the last 6 months have been factored into the rise in cost of sales.
(Effects of exchange rate between USD and SGD on profit margin are more fuzzy here to draw direct relations, so I shall not comment on it)
The administrative/distribution expenses rose in tandem (approx. 49%) with the revenue growth - this is reasonable from a retrospective point of view because historical trends have shown that Adampak's admin/distribution expenses growth correlates to revenue growth on a 1:1 ratio. Balance sheet is healthy with a current ratio of (46mil/12mil) of 3.8.
Comparatively, Brady, the global market leader for labelling, is doing much worse and has only registered a 1% growth in revenue for Apr 08 in the Asia-Pacific region (as compared to similar quarter in 2007), and 10% overall sales growth.
Revenue Structure
Examining the revenue structure reveals that Adampak has an inherent business vulnerability that must be addressed in the longer run. i.e. over-dependence on the HDD market. The management acknowledged that efforts must be made to expand their scope of business into other sectors like pharmaceuticals, telecommunications, etc. But it remains to be seen if Adampak can achieve diversification into other sectors and reduce its exposure in the HDD industry. For 1H08, 45% (compared to 49% in 1H07) of the revenue was derived from sales to HDD manufacturers like Seagate.
An overly focused revenue structure is a double edged sword: on one hand, the company is able to ride on the rapid expansion of the HDD industry; but on the other hand, it is definitely not healthy in the long run as Adampak's performance will be half (literally) dependent on the HDD industry.
For RFID sales, revenue registered a growth of 57% from US$0.5m to US$0.8m. By absolute figures, this is a modest figure but definitely not sluggish. While there are serious challenges for RFID to achieve a ubiquitous status, it will definitely come. Let's maintain a close watch on this.
Pre-Aident consolidation versus Post-Aident merger
From the 1H08 results briefing slides, if we assume that Aident was already fully merged with Adampak in 1H07 as a single entity, then compare the sales against that of 1H08 when they have fully merged, we see that sales to telecom products fell by 46% from US$4.2m to US$2.3m. Sales to other electronics sector shrunk by 6% from US$9.7m to US$9.1m. Are this as a result of slowing demand in the electronics products? Does this imply that there were some inherent inefficiencies in Aident's business that brought about the decision of the management to shut down their plant in Shanghai?
It is also noteworthy that it was mentioned that Adampak accrued the lower net profit margin due to the consolidation of Aident's results, as compared to the earlier year which was based on a 1 month equity accounting (i.e. apportioning the results of Aident by the percentage of Adampak's ownership). Such a statement necessarily implies that management acquired Aident, which is a company that is less profitable.
There are many questions that needs answers. But I believe that Adampak's management made this strategic acquisition for good reasons of expanding fast to rapidly penetrate Asian markets like Malaysia and China by leveraging on the established processes and infrastructure of Aident. And all the time, the management is fully aware of the need to restructure and streamline Aident's operations for greater efficiency.
A financially prudent and candid management
The management has also demonstrated financial prudence by curtailing their purchases on plant and equipment (1H08 US$0.2m compared to 1H07 US$1.2m) to conserve cash holdings, brace for a slowdown in global demand, and prevent built up of excess production capacity.
What consistently struck me in my entire analysis was the candid nature of the management about areas of their business that was not doing so well.
Final remarks
Adampak has so far done extremely well in light of the inflationary pressures and slowdown in global demand. Profit margins may be slightly squeezed in view of rough times ahead, but given an efficient cost structure and strong balance sheet, the company will definitely be able to continue to inch forward and expand their market share. Also, management and the business development personnel must continue to aggressively expand sales to other industry sectors to minimise their risk exposure.
August 9, 2008
Analysis of Adampak (Part I)
Over the last few days, I applied Buffett principles and Fisher's concept of 'scuttlebutt' to deeply understand my investment holdings. So I went and approached two companies Adampak and Zephyr as a potential client. By conversing with various senior executives in both companies, I managed to glean a lot of insights that are otherwise not found on financial reports or the internet. For the lay reader, from this blog entry you will be able to gain a much better understanding into the business of labelling and RFIDs.
1. Overview
Products and Services
Adampak products and services are in the area of manufacturing labels for any products that requires some form of labeling. Their labels range from serialized barcodes, generic paste-on labels, tamper-proof labels, labels and seals for use in electronic circuit boards (clean-room 100 and 1000 requirements), insertion of Radio Frequency Identification Tags (RFID) onto labels.
In recent years, Adampak acquired 100% stake in Aident, and hence expanded its business laterally into precision die-cut components, as well as enlarged the manufacturing base to reach into Malaysia.
Industry analysis
Product labels have grown to become ubiquitous and indispensable in our daily lives. And as human’s insatiable need for more products grow indefinitely, the demand for labels will also grow in pace. The global market size for labels is estimated to be worth US$2.0 billion in terms of sales[1]
From a manufacturing perspective, labeling services are critical in the entire product value chain. Companies rely heavily on the labeling services to firstly, perform effective inventory management (using barcodes or RFID), secondly, to communicate key information visually (e.g. from manufacturer to distributor to suppliers to front line sales).
Dividing the pie for service redundancy
In view of the criticality in the entire value chain, companies are cautious in awarding their contracts to the label manufacturers. They will normally adopt a policy distributing the required number of labels amongst the shortlisted manufacturers. This prevents a single point of failure in the entire value chain by building in a layer of service redundancy. For instance, say HP requires 1,000,000 labels for their entire series of printers, if there are three competitors, they will split the pie accordingly and award each label manufacturer a part of the entire contract. Should one label manufacturer’s operations suspend, the customers will be able to fall back on another substituting firm and prevent a catastrophic disruption of the product value chain.
Market Dominance and Barriers to Entry
The prior paragraph implies that the industry will never allow the creation of a monopoly. One manufacturer may be able to eat a majority of the pie, but it will never be able to swallow it complete; in the longer run, many will perish and at the same time, none will be able to achieve complete market dominance; the competition will always taper out to an equilibrium comprising several key players in the industry.
At first glance, the labeling business appears to be a commodity-like industry, with low barriers to entry for potential competitors. But a closer look reveals otherwise. For those companies that have an impressive clientele of most global clients, with 30 to 40 years of industry experience, with consistent delivery of high quality products – these are invisible barriers to entry. For instance, HP will naturally be disinclined to switch to a new China label manufacturer entrant that has not yet been tried tested and proven, and avoid any risk of their product labels fading or falling off at the consumer’s end; they will prefer to stay with the reliable incumbents like Adampak. In addition, for any competitor to take on Adampak in terms of being the lowest cost producer, it must be able to achieve a significant scale of operation to derive economies of scales. It is also quite apparent that extensive experience is required in terms of running a labeling business and managing the technicalities of operations.
As long as the incumbents continue to consistently deliver quality labels at the lowest possible cost, I do not see why product companies like HP will take a risk and perform a switch on such critical services.
Exposure to economic cycles of boom and bust
Adampak and Zephyr currently derive a majority of their sales from pharmaceuticals, electronics, hard drives, telecommunication products. Therefore their businesses are inadvertently driven by demand in the various sectors. While they are making efforts to expand into other industries like 3rd Party Logistics, it will be inadvertent that their sales and profits will depend on the expansion and contraction of the various sectors during economic cycles of boom of bust.
Competitor Analysis: History of the Three Kingdoms
For industrial applications, Adampak, Zephyr and Brady – all these three companies hail as the giants who take up majority of the global pie of labeling services. In the South-East-Asia region, Adampak & Zephyr hail as the two industry leaders. This is based on the fact that their clientele include an impressive list of MNCs like HP, Fed-Ex, DHL, Merck, Seagate, Maxtor, etc. etc. While on the international arena, all three of them compete for contracts from the big companies. There are other labelers, but judging at the Adampak and Brady’s ability to grow sales so consistently and rapidly over the last few years, it does seem that they are gradually scalping sales from the smaller competitors.
Zephyr (pronounced as Zef-fee) is a privately held company based in Singapore. It has 2 factories in Malaysia and 1 in Singapore, as compared to Adampak’s 8 multi-national factories spread over Philippines, China, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore. Sources from industry insiders revealed that Adampak started out as a sub-contractor of Zephyr. When Zephyr is not able to fully satisfy the sales due to production capacity, the spillover deals went to Adampak. Adampak subsequently cut the umbilical cord, moved forward and went public in 2002. Adampak took the bold move and seized the opportunity to launch into China, while at the same time, Zephyr was cautious of operations in China, so it stayed within the confines of Singapore and Malaysia.
Now, Brady is a US based company with a very extensive range of label services. It has a global outreach with offices and factories spread across Europe, America and Asia. For FY07, it has achieved sales of US$1.3 billion, with 25% of the sales of some US$520m from Asia Pacific countries. In recent years, it has been trying to make attempts to secure its foothold in the Asian region. To break into the Asian markets, Brady took a move to setup factories and offices in Asia, and once attempted mounted a takeover bid on Zephyr.
Competitors Analysis: Financials
From comparisons from FY06 and FY07 annual reports, Zephyr’s revenue dipped slightly by 5% from S$44m to S$42m[2], while Adampak has been fast soaring ahead with revenues growing by 50% from US$31.8m to US$47.8m. Zephyr’s profit margin for FY07 is 26.7%, while Adampak’s gross profit margin is 33%.
In addition, profit/sales ratio for Zephyr is 13.3%, Brady’s is 8%, and Adampak leads with a profit/sales ratio of 15%. In terms of efficiency in cost structure, Adampak emerges as the clear winner here. In terms of Return on Assets (as a measure of profit per dollar of asset), Zephyr has ROA of 13.4%, Brady's is 6%, Adampak leads the pack with an ROA of 16%.
Comparatively in terms of growth, Zephyr is languishing (-5% growth for FY07, and only a total 12% growth since 2003 from then S$39m to FY07 S$44m) as it watches Adampak rapidly expand into Asian markets. If Adampak can continue to sustain its current rate of growth, it is only a matter of time that Adampak will overtake Zephyr to become the South-East Asia’s industry leader. Adampak is well anchored in the Asian markets but the company faces stiff challenges from the goliath incumbent Brady. Given Adampak’s well established network and factories well positioned in South East Asia, I do not rule out a possibility that Brady will extend a takeover bid for Adampak for it to leapfrog and expand its presence in Asian countries.
Areas of Improvement for Adampak
For Adampak to continue to maintain its edge in this industry, efforts must be continually made to leverage on technology to reduce costs and streamline operations. What is observed from a ground tour is that there are many areas that can be further improved with the aid of technology. For example, quality checks on barcodes are performed to 100% by manual visual checks, and this can be expedited by incorporating computerized image recognition technology to replace labour and speed up such checks. This is perhaps just one of the many possible areas of improvements. In addition, instead of a manufacturer offering labeling services, Adampak can consider forging strong relationships with partner companies in related industries to provide customized turnkey solutions for customers. i.e. Adampak can become the customer’s single point of contact from setting up of a label system to printing of labels.
Adampak's business strategy
It is in my opinion that Adampak adopts a strategy that (1) maintains a niche specialization in label manufacturing, (2) leverage on resources in developing nations to reduce production and labour costs, and (3) grows business aggressively in Asian regions by establishing a localised presence.
Challenges of Industry and growth drivers
It was several years ago that RFID was slated as the next wave in 3rd Party Logistics. However, RFID technology faces immense challenges to attain a status that is as ubiquitous as the barcode. Firstly, cost: the transponders are highly expensive, and firms think twice on adoption of such technology for their inventory management needs. Insiders revealed that current RFID technology costs about 10 times more compared to barcode. Secondly, lack of a common standard. Currently, there is a lack of a common standard in production and RFID technology is still largely proprietary as firms with the know-how closely guard the secrets. Finding substitutes are hard and practically non-existent at the moment. Without readily available substitutes to create service redundancy, the take up rate of RFID is consequently reduced. Liberalization and wide adoption of RFID technology by companies for 3rd Party logistics remains to be seen.
Final Remarks
Quotes from Brady’s FY07 report
“Fiscal 2007 was marked by challenges and progress for Brady. While sales grew 34 percent over last year, we were disappointed by a 5 percent increase in net income, which fell well short of our expectations. This was primarily driven by challenges we faced in our OEM markets, with increased pricing pressure from our customers, a loss of focus due to major acquisition integration efforts and some loss of market share. We responded quickly to correct our cost structure, refocus our OEM sales force in Asia and integrate recent acquisitions.”
Was Brady’s CEO referring to a loss of market share to up and rising competitors like Adampak? I would think so. The deeper I analyze the business; the more I am convinced that Adampak is well poised to become the next Unisteel of labels.
2. Management Quality
Is the management of (a) an unquestionable integrity, (b) holds a vested interest, (c) highly competent and (d) shareholder oriented?
Vested Interest
The executive management has a significant vested interest in the company. Executive Director Mr Anthony Tay Song Seng holds a 32% stake in the company with 85 mil shares, while CEO Mr Chua Cheng Song holds a 2% stake with 6.1 mil shares. In addition, in recent months, the Executive Director has steadily been increasing his holdings through open market purchase. As a minority shareholder, the above facts provide immense confidence that the management will be acting in the best interests of the shareholder.
Management stability & integrity
There is also great stability in the management as there have been no changes in the key appointment holders for the last 7 years of listings. This is a good indication of a good and united leadership core. Management has thus far been forthcoming and candid – be it about the challenges the company faces, or the quality of earnings in light of rough times ahead. Management integrity is also spotless, with no clear signs of inconsistencies.
Management competency
The executive director Mr Anthony Tay Song Seng is the founder of the company with more than 25 years of experience in the industry. CEO Mr Chua has been with the company for a period of 10 years. At the manager level, at least 50% of the appointment holders had experience level ranging from 10 years to 20 years in the industry. The independent directors comprise of two chartered accountants, Mr Goh Siang Khin and Mr Lee Joo Hai, and one lawyer Mr Teo Kiang Kok. In addition, interestingly, both independent directors served a stint in Unisteel, and hence they will definitely be able to add value to Adampak from their experience in Unisteel. All of them have an illustrious professional track record in either accountancy or the law practice. This is a very strong representation, and enhances the shareholder confidence in the accuracy and transparency of the financial statements.
Shareholder oriented
Adampak has consistently and unfailingly made good its promise to share the wealth generated from its operations with the shareholders. Although there’s no formal dividend policy, Adampak has distributed approx. 30% of profits to all shareholders for the last few years. This is not expected to change in the near future as the management will likely remain in operation.
My Impression of Adampak’s staff
I went into Adampak posing as a potential customer. I was greeted with a forthcoming Customer Service Manager, and happened to bump into the Executive Director Anthony dressed in tee-shirt and jeans just stepping out from the production floor, probably after doing his ground walkabout. He gave me the first impression as a very down-to-earth and hands on person who knows his stuff. A casual walkabout at the production floor reveals that several technicians are highly experienced with over 20 years of service in this industry.
3. Business Fundamentals & Valuation
Adampak has excellent business fundamentals. For FY2007, using Owner’s Earnings (3.242 mil) / Share Capital (15.5 mil) ROE = 20.9%. For FY2006, ROE is 25.6%. It has a high current ratio of 4, and runs on low debt to finance its growth. The Net Tangible Asset Value as at FY07 is US$0.14, or S$0.19. Using the FY07 operating cashflow of S$0.0275, and a projected growth rate of 15%, assuming Adampak has no terminal value and stays in business for 7 years, Adampak’s intrinsic value is estimated to be S$0.38, which is actually a very conservative estimate of intrinsic value. Take this value and compare to current share price, there is a significant margin of safety of 1.57.
[1] US$2.0 billion is a figure that is derived based on Brady (market leader) Annual Report sales of US$1.3b. A good ballpark estimate is that Brady has cornered some 60~70% of the global market share, while the rest went to smaller labeling manufacturers.
Analysis of Adampak (Part III - An Interview with the CEO)
I was invited by nextinsight.com.sg to publish this article at http://www.nextinsight.com.sg/content/view/602/60/
I had the great honour to meet up with Adampak CEO Mr Chua on 29th August at Adampak's office at Loyang Way. Prior to this meetup, I had submitted the analysis and list of queries lock-stock-and-barrel, to him via his secretary. He had already read through everything and gave me very interesting observations about Adampak and its business. I did not make any recordings, as it will be too rude; everything existed as just a verbal discussion that flowed for 90 mins.
I have summarized and properly categorised my takeaways from my conversation with him, as below. In all my analyses, as more information is acquired, it is only natural that the perceptions evolve and are refined to greater accuracy. Penned in this blog will be the observations and corrections to past erroneous perceptions. Please do not be alarmed as you encounter conflicting propositions as compared to earlier research reports.
On business strategy:
1. Gun for the big deals from the MNCs in any available sector
Mr Chua revealed that Adampak's business strategy is to focus on securing contracts from big time multi-national corporations and making their name known amongst them. Business from other MNCs will then automatically come through referrals etc. Gunning for deals from MNCs is a good strategy and there are two key benefits: firstly, Adampak can ride along on the bustling growth of the MNCs; secondly, increased resilience to regional economic impact. In 1997 when Asian was struck with the financial crisis, sales of Adampak continued to increase at double digit growth, simply because a bulk of Adampak's sales went to US, European MNCs.
The fact that 90% of Adampak's sales derives from the electronic sector is an outcome that is just somehow generated as Adampak just grew it's portfolio over the years; there was no deliberated or active efforts on a particular market focus.
2. Establishing a localised presence as a proximity advantage
In Mr Chua's words, "In this competitive industry, the first one in, wins." In the manufacturing industry, for customer companies to engage a manufacturer, they have to first go through a lengthy qualification process to assess whether the manufacturer is up to standards and can match their requirements. It is after the qualification process that the manufacturer will stand a chance at gaining a part of the contract. A localised presence has helped Adampak obtain more customers who have qualified their plant.
The best exemplification is China. Adampak set up a factory in Suzhou Industrial Park geographically sited alongside many MNCs and the company has an added proximity advantage over other non-local label suppliers based in South-East Asia. In many ways, this move has helped to increase the list of customers who qualified Adampak's plant. In recent months, the number of suppliers based in China has increased sufficiently for a break even point to be achieved at Adampak Suzhou. And it is expected for the number of qualified suppliers to continue to grow
3. Building strong relationships with suppliers to achieve a preferred label converter status and increase revenue streams
Over the years, Adampak has forged strong relations with their suppliers. Today, Adampak is a preferred label converter to 3M, which will recommend their clients to adopt Adampak's services. This further lends credence to Adampak's reputation and opens up an additional revenue stream.
4. Building a strong reputation of quality, reliability, consistency in service delivery
At first glance, it does appear that anyone can do the job of printing labels. But to be able to do the job, consistently, every time is an immense challenge. This is a critical success factor: over the last 20+ years, Adampak has built a strong brand of being able to consistently deliver high quality products on schedule. The brand is there, and the big corporations like HP, FedEx, Seagate, P&G, major telcos, etc. all know Adampak for its ability to consistently deliver at the lowest cost. It was also revealed that HP has been using Adampak's services for the last 20 years since the Adampak was founded. How amazing for a little factory that started in Loyang Avenue!
On growth drivers
RFID
"RFID faces a chicken and egg problem. No one wants to take the lead in adoption; everyone just want to be the follower of a tried, tested technology". Those were words of Mr Chua. The history of barcode labels is a very good case study. It used to be very expensive in the early phases of industry adoption, every company only started to catch on the wave when major players started using it and costs concurrently went down. Likewise, RFID in 3rd Party Logistics will definitely come as the next big wave, as it greatly simplifies inventory management, let's wait patiently to see this sector blossom.
On competitors
According to Mr Chua, it is hard to claim that Adampak is the industry leader in South-East Asia because the coverage is just too difficult to ascertain. There are so many companies operating in a similar fashion in the region, and all are covering different scopes with different strategies. Just to name a few, like Brady, Zephyr (these I know) and ITW, etc. I would estimate there are 10 odd competitors in this industry.
Nonetheless, Adampak is certainly no small player here. Mr Chua shared that a lot of MNCs know Adampak when it comes to die-cut products and high end labels, and companies acknowledge Adampak's reputation for a consistent delivery of quality products. This is a good sign of a company that probably counts as the top few of the list.
He also revealed that Zephyr did make an attempt to break into China many years back, but the venture failed miserably and never materialised, and this made Zephyr's management adopt a more conservative approach of keeping to local confines of Malaysia and China.
On production capacity and scaling up capabilities rapidly
Adampak's factories run 24 hours shift. Mr Chua shared, "in this industry, there's no way you can survive if you work only on 1 shift". The plants run at full capacity for 5 full working days, and during peak periods, the staff work overtime. Clearly, Adampak is running at maximum operating capacity, with little evidence of any excesses.
One of the critical success factors for the manufacturing business is the ability to flex and scale up production capacity rapidly within a very short notice. If a company does not have strong processes in place, achieving a rapid scaling up will not be possible. Mr Chua shared that Adampak has the ability to set up new plants, new factories and get them up and running in a matter of 2~3 months.
On financial management
The sense of financial prudence
Mr Chua shared that the management closely watches the returns on equity. In addition, the company practises a good sense of financial prudence because the management is always fully cognizant of the risks involved in credit calls when banks face a liquidity crunch. Adampak has consistently maintained a high current ratio (current assets over current liabilities), whereby the short term borrowings and liabilities are well within the company's capabilities to repay within 1 year.
Good cashflow management
He also mentioned that Adampak happens to be doing well in this area and is very fortunate because "the customers see the company not as bankers", and their clients have been very prompt and regular with their payments. This is another sign of a well managed business where the company has a very strong relationship of trust and goodwill with their clients.
On process re-engineering and cost rationalization
Adampak does not have a specific department on this. But what they have are a few key staff trained in Six-Sigma (a qualification in process streamlining to reduce costs). Initiatives on cost rationalization are always on-going. For quality checks, computerised imaging was employed a few years back, but there are problems with obtaining a consistent output. Hence the idea was shelved and manual labour is retained. "Nothing beats a visual check", he says.
Putting the money at where there are greatest cost savings/avoidance
If there are any projects ongoing, Mr Chua cited that the company will generally invest more resources to refine the key processes that are potential show-stoppers in the entire manufacturing process. For example, one of the showstoppers in the label manufacturing chain is the punching of label holes and unwarranted retention of debris that causes clogging. This was mentioned by Mr Chua to be a real problem where resources in engineering were diverted to improve the process because of the immense costs of failure in the entire chain.
On Aident
Mr Chua shared that the original plans for Aident was to secure a public listing on the Malaysian Stock Exchange. However, for some reasons, this did not materialise.
I vaguely recalled that in one of my conversations with a Malaysian factory businessman, he mentioned that for anyone to go on a public listing in M'sia, 50% of the company shares will have to go to the government. That is why, there are so many companies that do not want to go public listing to raise funds, because by doing so, they will have lost control of the company and will be reduced to doing the bidding of the government. This is anecdotal evidence, and has yet to be verified. But this might just be one of the reasons that Aident's listing never materialised and Adampak decided to acquire Aident.
On dilution of earnings post-consolidation with Aident
Mr Chua enlightened that the gross profit margin dilution is primarily due to a consolidation with Aident. For 1H07, profits from the associate company Aident were accounted for, but not the revenue. Whereas for 1H08, post-consolidation, the revenue is now included, hence this accounts for the decline.
On impact of inflation and cost increases
I further asked Mr Chua on the impact of inflation on Adampak's business. He gave a very straightforward reply that these are factors that are not within Adampak's control, and when raw material costs increases, Adampak just transfer the cost increases to the customer. This also meant that Adampak should be insulated from damaging effects on cost increases in raw material
On employees
Giving where credit is due, and striving to reduce employee turnover to a minimum
Adampak's management strongly believes in the principle of rewarding the employees for their efforts. This could probably explain why admin expenses generally rose in a 1:1 ratio to revenue, while maintaining a very strong ROE. And this principle has done Adampak a lot of good. Mr Chua shared that it's a well known fact that "Adampak has one of the lowest employee turnover rates around"
This is comforting, because with a HR policy that focuses on rewarding good managers for their efforts, I do not have to worry about excellent managers being poached by other companies.
On management succession planning
I asked him on the plans for management succession planning, he mentioned that this has already put in place - all the managers running different segments of the company. As for the question of importing foreign talent to helm the ship, like many Singapore companeies, Mr Chua said that the issue is not on foreign talent, but on finding the right man for the right job. He is confident that if he is not around, his managers can step up and run the company as well as he does.
On the board of directors
A strong representation of independent directors with experience across multiple industries
Mr Chua also shared that the representation of solid independent directors who hold concurrent appointments on other companies' board helped a lot. The executive management has received good advice from these people who are able to draw on their industry experience.
My final remarks
I think Adampak is a very good company, that is well worth the money I put in as investment. From a financial perspective: the intrinsic value is much higher than the current share price of S$0.22, and there's a very significant margin of safety. Moreover, the net asset value approximates S$0.18 cents per share. Their current significant exposure to the electronics industry will also mean that they may ride along the economic cycles, but I do not expect their ardent clients like HP and Fed-Ex to go out of business, so I am not really worried.
(A sidenote, I realised that HDD are dirt-cheap now. Now, don't you think that developing nations will be very hungry over the next few years for such low-cost storage?)
From a people perspective: it is well managed by a strong team, and this is validated by every single touch point I have with Adampak. From asking of AGM minutes, to requesting for a meetup with the CEO, to posing as a customer to test the sales staff competency, to warm customer service officers who gladly brought me around the factory floor to see a group of workers who are going about their tasks professionally. The team has not failed my expectations thus far. The management is financially prudent, and people like Mr Chua comes across as a forthcoming person an astute businessman.
Does it really bother me if there will be a recessionary year ahead and that electronics industry may be affected? Not at all. Even if the stock market shuts down for the next 12 months, I can continue to sleep well, knowing that the company will continue running and my money will be in good hands. I have done my due diligence to the best of my abilities, and the entire study tells me that the odds are in my favour. Let's wait to see if this gem will really shimmer and shine so brightly that the market cannot ignore anymore.
For Adampak, I have done more than sufficient as an analyst and part owner. It's time to move on to understand other businesses, while keeping this in view.
(P.S. Mr Chua was visibly impressed when he knew that all the written analyst reports I submitted to him came from an engineer. "Not many engineers I know write as well", he said. What a compliment! I guess I was just short of submitting my resume to seek employment in Adampak. :P )
August 16, 2008
Analysis of Adampak (Part II)
Comments on 1HFY08 Results Released on 15th August
(Updated as at 19 August 08, after a release of new information found in 1H08 briefing slides)
Revenue at US$28m for 1H08 as compared to earlier year (1H07) grew by 49%, cost of sales grew by 57.8%, reducing the gross profit margin by 4 percentage points (as compared to 1H07). Given an estimated inventory turnover ratio (cost of sales = US$19m / Inventory = US$7m) of 2.7, the raw material inventory (est. to take up 62% of all inventory, from FY07 AR) is not expected to last beyond 3 months. From this, it can be infered that inflationary pressure on material prices over the last 6 months have been factored into the rise in cost of sales.
(Effects of exchange rate between USD and SGD on profit margin are more fuzzy here to draw direct relations, so I shall not comment on it)
The administrative/distribution expenses rose in tandem (approx. 49%) with the revenue growth - this is reasonable from a retrospective point of view because historical trends have shown that Adampak's admin/distribution expenses growth correlates to revenue growth on a 1:1 ratio. Balance sheet is healthy with a current ratio of (46mil/12mil) of 3.8.
Comparatively, Brady, the global market leader for labelling, is doing much worse and has only registered a 1% growth in revenue for Apr 08 in the Asia-Pacific region (as compared to similar quarter in 2007), and 10% overall sales growth.
Revenue Structure
Examining the revenue structure reveals that Adampak has an inherent business vulnerability that must be addressed in the longer run. i.e. over-dependence on the HDD market. The management acknowledged that efforts must be made to expand their scope of business into other sectors like pharmaceuticals, telecommunications, etc. But it remains to be seen if Adampak can achieve diversification into other sectors and reduce its exposure in the HDD industry. For 1H08, 45% (compared to 49% in 1H07) of the revenue was derived from sales to HDD manufacturers like Seagate.
An overly focused revenue structure is a double edged sword: on one hand, the company is able to ride on the rapid expansion of the HDD industry; but on the other hand, it is definitely not healthy in the long run as Adampak's performance will be half (literally) dependent on the HDD industry.
For RFID sales, revenue registered a growth of 57% from US$0.5m to US$0.8m. By absolute figures, this is a modest figure but definitely not sluggish. While there are serious challenges for RFID to achieve a ubiquitous status, it will definitely come. Let's maintain a close watch on this.
Pre-Aident consolidation versus Post-Aident merger
From the 1H08 results briefing slides, if we assume that Aident was already fully merged with Adampak in 1H07 as a single entity, then compare the sales against that of 1H08 when they have fully merged, we see that sales to telecom products fell by 46% from US$4.2m to US$2.3m. Sales to other electronics sector shrunk by 6% from US$9.7m to US$9.1m. Are this as a result of slowing demand in the electronics products? Does this imply that there were some inherent inefficiencies in Aident's business that brought about the decision of the management to shut down their plant in Shanghai?
It is also noteworthy that it was mentioned that Adampak accrued the lower net profit margin due to the consolidation of Aident's results, as compared to the earlier year which was based on a 1 month equity accounting (i.e. apportioning the results of Aident by the percentage of Adampak's ownership). Such a statement necessarily implies that management acquired Aident, which is a company that is less profitable.
There are many questions that needs answers. But I believe that Adampak's management made this strategic acquisition for good reasons of expanding fast to rapidly penetrate Asian markets like Malaysia and China by leveraging on the established processes and infrastructure of Aident. And all the time, the management is fully aware of the need to restructure and streamline Aident's operations for greater efficiency.
A financially prudent and candid management
The management has also demonstrated financial prudence by curtailing their purchases on plant and equipment (1H08 US$0.2m compared to 1H07 US$1.2m) to conserve cash holdings, brace for a slowdown in global demand, and prevent built up of excess production capacity.
What consistently struck me in my entire analysis was the candid nature of the management about areas of their business that was not doing so well.
Final remarks
Adampak has so far done extremely well in light of the inflationary pressures and slowdown in global demand. Profit margins may be slightly squeezed in view of rough times ahead, but given an efficient cost structure and strong balance sheet, the company will definitely be able to continue to inch forward and expand their market share. Also, management and the business development personnel must continue to aggressively expand sales to other industry sectors to minimise their risk exposure.
August 9, 2008
Analysis of Adampak (Part I)
Over the last few days, I applied Buffett principles and Fisher's concept of 'scuttlebutt' to deeply understand my investment holdings. So I went and approached two companies Adampak and Zephyr as a potential client. By conversing with various senior executives in both companies, I managed to glean a lot of insights that are otherwise not found on financial reports or the internet. For the lay reader, from this blog entry you will be able to gain a much better understanding into the business of labelling and RFIDs.
1. Overview
Products and Services
Adampak products and services are in the area of manufacturing labels for any products that requires some form of labeling. Their labels range from serialized barcodes, generic paste-on labels, tamper-proof labels, labels and seals for use in electronic circuit boards (clean-room 100 and 1000 requirements), insertion of Radio Frequency Identification Tags (RFID) onto labels.
In recent years, Adampak acquired 100% stake in Aident, and hence expanded its business laterally into precision die-cut components, as well as enlarged the manufacturing base to reach into Malaysia.
Industry analysis
Product labels have grown to become ubiquitous and indispensable in our daily lives. And as human’s insatiable need for more products grow indefinitely, the demand for labels will also grow in pace. The global market size for labels is estimated to be worth US$2.0 billion in terms of sales[1]
From a manufacturing perspective, labeling services are critical in the entire product value chain. Companies rely heavily on the labeling services to firstly, perform effective inventory management (using barcodes or RFID), secondly, to communicate key information visually (e.g. from manufacturer to distributor to suppliers to front line sales).
Dividing the pie for service redundancy
In view of the criticality in the entire value chain, companies are cautious in awarding their contracts to the label manufacturers. They will normally adopt a policy distributing the required number of labels amongst the shortlisted manufacturers. This prevents a single point of failure in the entire value chain by building in a layer of service redundancy. For instance, say HP requires 1,000,000 labels for their entire series of printers, if there are three competitors, they will split the pie accordingly and award each label manufacturer a part of the entire contract. Should one label manufacturer’s operations suspend, the customers will be able to fall back on another substituting firm and prevent a catastrophic disruption of the product value chain.
Market Dominance and Barriers to Entry
The prior paragraph implies that the industry will never allow the creation of a monopoly. One manufacturer may be able to eat a majority of the pie, but it will never be able to swallow it complete; in the longer run, many will perish and at the same time, none will be able to achieve complete market dominance; the competition will always taper out to an equilibrium comprising several key players in the industry.
At first glance, the labeling business appears to be a commodity-like industry, with low barriers to entry for potential competitors. But a closer look reveals otherwise. For those companies that have an impressive clientele of most global clients, with 30 to 40 years of industry experience, with consistent delivery of high quality products – these are invisible barriers to entry. For instance, HP will naturally be disinclined to switch to a new China label manufacturer entrant that has not yet been tried tested and proven, and avoid any risk of their product labels fading or falling off at the consumer’s end; they will prefer to stay with the reliable incumbents like Adampak. In addition, for any competitor to take on Adampak in terms of being the lowest cost producer, it must be able to achieve a significant scale of operation to derive economies of scales. It is also quite apparent that extensive experience is required in terms of running a labeling business and managing the technicalities of operations.
As long as the incumbents continue to consistently deliver quality labels at the lowest possible cost, I do not see why product companies like HP will take a risk and perform a switch on such critical services.
Exposure to economic cycles of boom and bust
Adampak and Zephyr currently derive a majority of their sales from pharmaceuticals, electronics, hard drives, telecommunication products. Therefore their businesses are inadvertently driven by demand in the various sectors. While they are making efforts to expand into other industries like 3rd Party Logistics, it will be inadvertent that their sales and profits will depend on the expansion and contraction of the various sectors during economic cycles of boom of bust.
Competitor Analysis: History of the Three Kingdoms
For industrial applications, Adampak, Zephyr and Brady – all these three companies hail as the giants who take up majority of the global pie of labeling services. In the South-East-Asia region, Adampak & Zephyr hail as the two industry leaders. This is based on the fact that their clientele include an impressive list of MNCs like HP, Fed-Ex, DHL, Merck, Seagate, Maxtor, etc. etc. While on the international arena, all three of them compete for contracts from the big companies. There are other labelers, but judging at the Adampak and Brady’s ability to grow sales so consistently and rapidly over the last few years, it does seem that they are gradually scalping sales from the smaller competitors.
Zephyr (pronounced as Zef-fee) is a privately held company based in Singapore. It has 2 factories in Malaysia and 1 in Singapore, as compared to Adampak’s 8 multi-national factories spread over Philippines, China, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore. Sources from industry insiders revealed that Adampak started out as a sub-contractor of Zephyr. When Zephyr is not able to fully satisfy the sales due to production capacity, the spillover deals went to Adampak. Adampak subsequently cut the umbilical cord, moved forward and went public in 2002. Adampak took the bold move and seized the opportunity to launch into China, while at the same time, Zephyr was cautious of operations in China, so it stayed within the confines of Singapore and Malaysia.
Now, Brady is a US based company with a very extensive range of label services. It has a global outreach with offices and factories spread across Europe, America and Asia. For FY07, it has achieved sales of US$1.3 billion, with 25% of the sales of some US$520m from Asia Pacific countries. In recent years, it has been trying to make attempts to secure its foothold in the Asian region. To break into the Asian markets, Brady took a move to setup factories and offices in Asia, and once attempted mounted a takeover bid on Zephyr.
Competitors Analysis: Financials
From comparisons from FY06 and FY07 annual reports, Zephyr’s revenue dipped slightly by 5% from S$44m to S$42m[2], while Adampak has been fast soaring ahead with revenues growing by 50% from US$31.8m to US$47.8m. Zephyr’s profit margin for FY07 is 26.7%, while Adampak’s gross profit margin is 33%.
In addition, profit/sales ratio for Zephyr is 13.3%, Brady’s is 8%, and Adampak leads with a profit/sales ratio of 15%. In terms of efficiency in cost structure, Adampak emerges as the clear winner here. In terms of Return on Assets (as a measure of profit per dollar of asset), Zephyr has ROA of 13.4%, Brady's is 6%, Adampak leads the pack with an ROA of 16%.
Comparatively in terms of growth, Zephyr is languishing (-5% growth for FY07, and only a total 12% growth since 2003 from then S$39m to FY07 S$44m) as it watches Adampak rapidly expand into Asian markets. If Adampak can continue to sustain its current rate of growth, it is only a matter of time that Adampak will overtake Zephyr to become the South-East Asia’s industry leader. Adampak is well anchored in the Asian markets but the company faces stiff challenges from the goliath incumbent Brady. Given Adampak’s well established network and factories well positioned in South East Asia, I do not rule out a possibility that Brady will extend a takeover bid for Adampak for it to leapfrog and expand its presence in Asian countries.
Areas of Improvement for Adampak
For Adampak to continue to maintain its edge in this industry, efforts must be continually made to leverage on technology to reduce costs and streamline operations. What is observed from a ground tour is that there are many areas that can be further improved with the aid of technology. For example, quality checks on barcodes are performed to 100% by manual visual checks, and this can be expedited by incorporating computerized image recognition technology to replace labour and speed up such checks. This is perhaps just one of the many possible areas of improvements. In addition, instead of a manufacturer offering labeling services, Adampak can consider forging strong relationships with partner companies in related industries to provide customized turnkey solutions for customers. i.e. Adampak can become the customer’s single point of contact from setting up of a label system to printing of labels.
Adampak's business strategy
It is in my opinion that Adampak adopts a strategy that (1) maintains a niche specialization in label manufacturing, (2) leverage on resources in developing nations to reduce production and labour costs, and (3) grows business aggressively in Asian regions by establishing a localised presence.
Challenges of Industry and growth drivers
It was several years ago that RFID was slated as the next wave in 3rd Party Logistics. However, RFID technology faces immense challenges to attain a status that is as ubiquitous as the barcode. Firstly, cost: the transponders are highly expensive, and firms think twice on adoption of such technology for their inventory management needs. Insiders revealed that current RFID technology costs about 10 times more compared to barcode. Secondly, lack of a common standard. Currently, there is a lack of a common standard in production and RFID technology is still largely proprietary as firms with the know-how closely guard the secrets. Finding substitutes are hard and practically non-existent at the moment. Without readily available substitutes to create service redundancy, the take up rate of RFID is consequently reduced. Liberalization and wide adoption of RFID technology by companies for 3rd Party logistics remains to be seen.
Final Remarks
Quotes from Brady’s FY07 report
“Fiscal 2007 was marked by challenges and progress for Brady. While sales grew 34 percent over last year, we were disappointed by a 5 percent increase in net income, which fell well short of our expectations. This was primarily driven by challenges we faced in our OEM markets, with increased pricing pressure from our customers, a loss of focus due to major acquisition integration efforts and some loss of market share. We responded quickly to correct our cost structure, refocus our OEM sales force in Asia and integrate recent acquisitions.”
Was Brady’s CEO referring to a loss of market share to up and rising competitors like Adampak? I would think so. The deeper I analyze the business; the more I am convinced that Adampak is well poised to become the next Unisteel of labels.
2. Management Quality
Is the management of (a) an unquestionable integrity, (b) holds a vested interest, (c) highly competent and (d) shareholder oriented?
Vested Interest
The executive management has a significant vested interest in the company. Executive Director Mr Anthony Tay Song Seng holds a 32% stake in the company with 85 mil shares, while CEO Mr Chua Cheng Song holds a 2% stake with 6.1 mil shares. In addition, in recent months, the Executive Director has steadily been increasing his holdings through open market purchase. As a minority shareholder, the above facts provide immense confidence that the management will be acting in the best interests of the shareholder.
Management stability & integrity
There is also great stability in the management as there have been no changes in the key appointment holders for the last 7 years of listings. This is a good indication of a good and united leadership core. Management has thus far been forthcoming and candid – be it about the challenges the company faces, or the quality of earnings in light of rough times ahead. Management integrity is also spotless, with no clear signs of inconsistencies.
Management competency
The executive director Mr Anthony Tay Song Seng is the founder of the company with more than 25 years of experience in the industry. CEO Mr Chua has been with the company for a period of 10 years. At the manager level, at least 50% of the appointment holders had experience level ranging from 10 years to 20 years in the industry. The independent directors comprise of two chartered accountants, Mr Goh Siang Khin and Mr Lee Joo Hai, and one lawyer Mr Teo Kiang Kok. In addition, interestingly, both independent directors served a stint in Unisteel, and hence they will definitely be able to add value to Adampak from their experience in Unisteel. All of them have an illustrious professional track record in either accountancy or the law practice. This is a very strong representation, and enhances the shareholder confidence in the accuracy and transparency of the financial statements.
Shareholder oriented
Adampak has consistently and unfailingly made good its promise to share the wealth generated from its operations with the shareholders. Although there’s no formal dividend policy, Adampak has distributed approx. 30% of profits to all shareholders for the last few years. This is not expected to change in the near future as the management will likely remain in operation.
My Impression of Adampak’s staff
I went into Adampak posing as a potential customer. I was greeted with a forthcoming Customer Service Manager, and happened to bump into the Executive Director Anthony dressed in tee-shirt and jeans just stepping out from the production floor, probably after doing his ground walkabout. He gave me the first impression as a very down-to-earth and hands on person who knows his stuff. A casual walkabout at the production floor reveals that several technicians are highly experienced with over 20 years of service in this industry.
3. Business Fundamentals & Valuation
Adampak has excellent business fundamentals. For FY2007, using Owner’s Earnings (3.242 mil) / Share Capital (15.5 mil) ROE = 20.9%. For FY2006, ROE is 25.6%. It has a high current ratio of 4, and runs on low debt to finance its growth. The Net Tangible Asset Value as at FY07 is US$0.14, or S$0.19. Using the FY07 operating cashflow of S$0.0275, and a projected growth rate of 15%, assuming Adampak has no terminal value and stays in business for 7 years, Adampak’s intrinsic value is estimated to be S$0.38, which is actually a very conservative estimate of intrinsic value. Take this value and compare to current share price, there is a significant margin of safety of 1.57.
[1] US$2.0 billion is a figure that is derived based on Brady (market leader) Annual Report sales of US$1.3b. A good ballpark estimate is that Brady has cornered some 60~70% of the global market share, while the rest went to smaller labeling manufacturers.
Saturday, August 8, 2009
价值投资的核心
价值投资的核心是什么？受价值投资鼻祖——格雷厄姆的影响，很多投资人认为安全边际是价值投资的核心。安全边际确实非常重要，但我坚定地认为：成长，持续性地成长，才是价值投资的核心。成长，在此是指一个企业内在价值的稳定增长，而非想像性的短期爆发式增长。
对价值投资而言，安全边际的重要性毋庸置疑，但它绝不是价值投资的核心。错误地以安全边际为核心的人，是没有认识到企业的内在价值是动态的、可变的，而非静态的、不变的。它可以增加，可以减少，也可以保持不变。关键就在于企业是否成长。
理智的投资者不能仅仅因为某只股票相对其静态的价值而言很便宜——即存在安全边际，就简单地认为投资后能带来安全而满意的回报。比如，某只股票静态的内在价值为每股25元，投资者在其价格为15元时买入。也就是说，有40％的安全边际，这个折扣应该说已经非常可观了。但问题是，谁知道要持有多长时间股价才能涨到其内在价值25元呢？假如投资者持有一年时间就涨到了25元，那么年收益率将达到66％，但是如果花了两年时间，那年收益率就降为29.3％，持有三年，年收益率降为18.6％，四年，降为13.7％……以此类推，持有的时间越长，年收益率就越低。
最大的问题是，投资者怎么能确定其所买的股票价格就一定会涨到预计的内在价值之上呢？如果该企业的盈利能力停滞不前或者发生了衰退，即企业没有了成长，那么，股价涨到预计的内在价值之上更将是遥遥无期，甚至会一路下跌，导致投资者严重亏损。投资大师巴菲特早期的失败经历已经证明，“捡烟屁股”式投资没有多大效果，他已经放弃了“以便宜的价格购买几只癞蛤蟆”的投资思想，转而坚信“以一般的价格买入一家非同一般的好公司，远远胜过用非同一般的好价格买入一家一般的公司”。因此，可以下这样的结论：脱离了成长的安全边际，将不再安全，也就是说没有多大的实质投资价值。
买股票与购物有一个共同的道理——廉价不能成为你购物的主要理由。仅仅因为价格低廉，就买入一个对你没有使用价值的商品，毫无疑问是在浪费金钱。只有物美，才是你购物的价值所在。同样，成长才是投资的价值所在。成长，持续稳定地成长，才是价值投资的核心。即使安全边际很小甚至为零，只要所投资的企业持续、稳定地成长，长期而言，股价就会随着企业利润的增长而上涨。只有成长，才会使你投资的企业增值，才会使你的投资升值。
中国股市的发展历史已经证明，只有成长才能催生“超级大牛股”。如，１９９８年以前的四川长虹、２００５年以前的中集集团和近几年的贵州茅台、盐湖钾肥、万科Ａ、苏宁电器、云南白药等经典案例。无一不是因为企业持续、稳定地成长所造就。
中国如此，美国亦然。众所周知的美国“超级长线大牛股”——沃尔玛、戴尔、可口可乐以及菲利普·莫里斯等，皆由长期地成长所造就。巴菲特思想的精髓——“经济特许权”、“消费垄断”和“护城河”概念就是从企业分析角度，最大限度地确保成长的稳定性与持续性。可以说，巴菲特的核心思想就是从分析企业能否持续稳定地成长出发的。消费的时候，物美价廉的商品会让消费者满意而归；投资的时候，成长再加安全边际那就会锦上添花、如虎添翼。
当然，成长虽如此重要，但也绝不意味着就一味追求成长而忽略安全边际。质量优，价格也要合算才行。
在此，笔者大胆地将价值投资浓缩为一个公式：价值投资＝（成长＋安全边际）×时间。
只有在企业稳定成长的基础上，安全边际大于等于零（当然越大越好）的时候买入，并耐心持有，直到价格严重高估或企业成长不再持续为止。这就是价值投资的真正内涵。
投资人都知道，股票就是企业股权，买股票就是投资企业，投资企业就是买企业的未来，企业的未来就是企业的成长。因此，成长才是价值投资的真正核心。
对价值投资而言，安全边际的重要性毋庸置疑，但它绝不是价值投资的核心。错误地以安全边际为核心的人，是没有认识到企业的内在价值是动态的、可变的，而非静态的、不变的。它可以增加，可以减少，也可以保持不变。关键就在于企业是否成长。
理智的投资者不能仅仅因为某只股票相对其静态的价值而言很便宜——即存在安全边际，就简单地认为投资后能带来安全而满意的回报。比如，某只股票静态的内在价值为每股25元，投资者在其价格为15元时买入。也就是说，有40％的安全边际，这个折扣应该说已经非常可观了。但问题是，谁知道要持有多长时间股价才能涨到其内在价值25元呢？假如投资者持有一年时间就涨到了25元，那么年收益率将达到66％，但是如果花了两年时间，那年收益率就降为29.3％，持有三年，年收益率降为18.6％，四年，降为13.7％……以此类推，持有的时间越长，年收益率就越低。
最大的问题是，投资者怎么能确定其所买的股票价格就一定会涨到预计的内在价值之上呢？如果该企业的盈利能力停滞不前或者发生了衰退，即企业没有了成长，那么，股价涨到预计的内在价值之上更将是遥遥无期，甚至会一路下跌，导致投资者严重亏损。投资大师巴菲特早期的失败经历已经证明，“捡烟屁股”式投资没有多大效果，他已经放弃了“以便宜的价格购买几只癞蛤蟆”的投资思想，转而坚信“以一般的价格买入一家非同一般的好公司，远远胜过用非同一般的好价格买入一家一般的公司”。因此，可以下这样的结论：脱离了成长的安全边际，将不再安全，也就是说没有多大的实质投资价值。
买股票与购物有一个共同的道理——廉价不能成为你购物的主要理由。仅仅因为价格低廉，就买入一个对你没有使用价值的商品，毫无疑问是在浪费金钱。只有物美，才是你购物的价值所在。同样，成长才是投资的价值所在。成长，持续稳定地成长，才是价值投资的核心。即使安全边际很小甚至为零，只要所投资的企业持续、稳定地成长，长期而言，股价就会随着企业利润的增长而上涨。只有成长，才会使你投资的企业增值，才会使你的投资升值。
中国股市的发展历史已经证明，只有成长才能催生“超级大牛股”。如，１９９８年以前的四川长虹、２００５年以前的中集集团和近几年的贵州茅台、盐湖钾肥、万科Ａ、苏宁电器、云南白药等经典案例。无一不是因为企业持续、稳定地成长所造就。
中国如此，美国亦然。众所周知的美国“超级长线大牛股”——沃尔玛、戴尔、可口可乐以及菲利普·莫里斯等，皆由长期地成长所造就。巴菲特思想的精髓——“经济特许权”、“消费垄断”和“护城河”概念就是从企业分析角度，最大限度地确保成长的稳定性与持续性。可以说，巴菲特的核心思想就是从分析企业能否持续稳定地成长出发的。消费的时候，物美价廉的商品会让消费者满意而归；投资的时候，成长再加安全边际那就会锦上添花、如虎添翼。
当然，成长虽如此重要，但也绝不意味着就一味追求成长而忽略安全边际。质量优，价格也要合算才行。
在此，笔者大胆地将价值投资浓缩为一个公式：价值投资＝（成长＋安全边际）×时间。
只有在企业稳定成长的基础上，安全边际大于等于零（当然越大越好）的时候买入，并耐心持有，直到价格严重高估或企业成长不再持续为止。这就是价值投资的真正内涵。
投资人都知道，股票就是企业股权，买股票就是投资企业，投资企业就是买企业的未来，企业的未来就是企业的成长。因此，成长才是价值投资的真正核心。
我喜欢“大道至简”的方法
估值主题只有一个，那就是，在熊市中买，而在牛市中卖。
“估值固然重要，确实大可不必过分地关注”，主要是基于内在价值的复杂性考虑的。因为价值评估的最大困难是内在价值取决于公司未来的长期现金流，而未来的现金流又取决于公司未来的业务状况，而未来是动态的、不确定的，预测时间越长，其准确度就越低。要给出未来现金流量出现的时间和数量这两个变量的具体数值是一个非常困难的任务。一般情况下，对这两个变量的估计往往不得不在很大的区间范围内，以至于根本得不出什么有用的结论。所以，“估值并不是一件那么容易的事”。即使能够被计算出来的内在价值又怎么样？它也仍然只是一个近似值，并非精确值，而且随着利率变化或者对未来现金流也必须做修正，这种主观认定的内在价值也因此会有所变动。
实际上，就是沃伦·巴菲特和他的老搭档查理·芒格在计算同一企业时也总是不可避免地得出略有不同的内在价值，比如对他们自己公司伯克希尔内在价值的估计就从未一致过，他们各自估计出的内在价值往往相差10%，这也是巴菲特不能向他的股东解释如何计算企业内在价值的原因，“就像我们不断告诉各位，内在价值才是重点所在，有一些事情是无法条列说明，但却必须列入考虑的”。
价值评估确实是投资的最佳方式，然而事实上却没有谁能够精确地评估出一个企业的内在价值，就连巴菲特也坦承：“我们只是对于估计一小部分的内在价值还有点自信，但这也只限于一个价值区间，而绝非那些貌似精确实为谬误的数字。”但是反过来，绝不应当因为估值由于种种因素的影响而导致实际应用时效果差，又去轻易地否定或漠视它。就是说，这种分析仍然是很有价值的。因为“如果你把自己的时间集中在某些行业上，你将会学到许多关于估值的方法。”（巴菲特）
本杰明·格雷厄姆认为，股票内在价值的概念非常灵活，这种灵活性在不同情况下会表现出不同的明确性。举一个例，比如对于招商银行，如果我知道近三年（2008、2007和2006）来它的营业收入分别为553亿、409亿和250亿；净利润分别为209亿、152亿和71亿；净资产收益率分别为28.5%、24.7%和16.7%；不良贷款率由2006年2.12%降到2008年的1.11%；资本充足率则一直维持11.%以上。 2008年10月和2009年1月招商银行又发生了两个重要事项：一是纽约分行正式开业，这是继1991年美国颁布《外资银行监管加强法》以来第一个获得美联储准入的中资银行；一是收购永隆银行，使得永隆银行成为全资附属公司。毫无疑问，这两个重大的举措将提升公司的内在价值，对于进一步加快国际化进程，深入推进经营战略调整，具有深远的战略意义。因此，我估计招商银行的内在价值不会少于5100亿元。当然，如果由另一个人去估计，他得出的肯定又是另一个数据。实际上招商银行在去年市场极端下跌后，其股票价格曾经一度跌破了11元，市盈率不足8倍，市净率在2倍以下，这种情形并不常见。要知道2倍以下的市净率往往是银行并购的价格，招商银行自己全资收购永隆银行，出价就相当于市净率3.01倍。因此，在我看来，此时对“内在价值不会少于5100亿元”，并且准备以多少折扣买入这个判断不如“市盈率不足8倍，市净率在2倍以下”来得明确。但即便如此，也并不意味着我就不重视估值，因为毕竟“这种定性分析本身就非常有助于股票买卖决策”（格雷厄姆）。菲利普·费雪在他另一本名著《股市投资致富之道》中说，“归根结底，即使最成功的股票投资在本质上都包括也反包括三个部分：
1、选择一只或多只未来增长潜势超越市场大盘的股票；
2、知道应该买入的适当时间；
3、知道应该卖出的时间。”
在我看来，“知道应该买入的适当时间”，要么就是大萧条或大崩溃的时候，要么就是在优秀企业遭遇严重困难的时候。特别在大萧条或大崩溃的情形下，几乎所有的股票都会出奇得便宜，所以此时不必过分关注估值——因为事实太明朗了。反之亦反是。确切地说，我喜欢这种“大道至简”的方法，因为这本身也符合费雪在他的《怎样选择成长股》第一部分《普通股和不普通的利润》第一章的开头所说的，“在萧条时买入，而在繁荣时卖出股票的做法包含了很浓厚的价值原理。”而且，我更深信，投资最根本的问题就是心态，并非精确地估值。无论多么重视估值、精确估值，假如不能抑制内心的冲动，控制好情绪，一样地难以取得成功。
过去我对“价值评估，既是艺术，又是科学”深感不解。现在我才知道，大致准确地预测是一种艺术，但满意地进行预测以满足投资决策却是一门科学。关于这一点，我认为肯尼斯在他的父亲菲利普·费雪《怎样选择成长股》的序言“从父亲的著作中学到的”中一段话可以作为这句话的参考：“在本书出版的时候，父亲已经51岁了，他具有不拘一格的才华，已经获得了非常大的成功。这些年来，他慢慢地从直觉上将对技巧的理解转变为对艺术的理解，但是我认为，他不明白这一转变是新手需要花很长的时间才能学会的。......我写这些文字的时候已经52岁了，和他当时写本书的年龄差不多；我很清楚地了解这一点，因为我也不得不花时间去学习，而不是创造这一过程。”看起来，掌握一门“技巧”易，但是上升至“艺术”则难得多。相对于肯尼斯，我绝对不会比他更聪明。他尚且还要“花时间去学习”，以求得“从直觉上将对技巧的理解转变为对艺术的理解”，而况于我，因此我肯定“也不得不花时间去学习，而不是创造这一过程”。
约翰·邓普顿指出：“正确的买入时间是悲观情绪最严重的时刻，那样的话，大部分的问题都可能被解决。”我想，这里面“大部分的问题”中应该也包含了估值的问题。
“估值固然重要，确实大可不必过分地关注”，主要是基于内在价值的复杂性考虑的。因为价值评估的最大困难是内在价值取决于公司未来的长期现金流，而未来的现金流又取决于公司未来的业务状况，而未来是动态的、不确定的，预测时间越长，其准确度就越低。要给出未来现金流量出现的时间和数量这两个变量的具体数值是一个非常困难的任务。一般情况下，对这两个变量的估计往往不得不在很大的区间范围内，以至于根本得不出什么有用的结论。所以，“估值并不是一件那么容易的事”。即使能够被计算出来的内在价值又怎么样？它也仍然只是一个近似值，并非精确值，而且随着利率变化或者对未来现金流也必须做修正，这种主观认定的内在价值也因此会有所变动。
实际上，就是沃伦·巴菲特和他的老搭档查理·芒格在计算同一企业时也总是不可避免地得出略有不同的内在价值，比如对他们自己公司伯克希尔内在价值的估计就从未一致过，他们各自估计出的内在价值往往相差10%，这也是巴菲特不能向他的股东解释如何计算企业内在价值的原因，“就像我们不断告诉各位，内在价值才是重点所在，有一些事情是无法条列说明，但却必须列入考虑的”。
价值评估确实是投资的最佳方式，然而事实上却没有谁能够精确地评估出一个企业的内在价值，就连巴菲特也坦承：“我们只是对于估计一小部分的内在价值还有点自信，但这也只限于一个价值区间，而绝非那些貌似精确实为谬误的数字。”但是反过来，绝不应当因为估值由于种种因素的影响而导致实际应用时效果差，又去轻易地否定或漠视它。就是说，这种分析仍然是很有价值的。因为“如果你把自己的时间集中在某些行业上，你将会学到许多关于估值的方法。”（巴菲特）
本杰明·格雷厄姆认为，股票内在价值的概念非常灵活，这种灵活性在不同情况下会表现出不同的明确性。举一个例，比如对于招商银行，如果我知道近三年（2008、2007和2006）来它的营业收入分别为553亿、409亿和250亿；净利润分别为209亿、152亿和71亿；净资产收益率分别为28.5%、24.7%和16.7%；不良贷款率由2006年2.12%降到2008年的1.11%；资本充足率则一直维持11.%以上。 2008年10月和2009年1月招商银行又发生了两个重要事项：一是纽约分行正式开业，这是继1991年美国颁布《外资银行监管加强法》以来第一个获得美联储准入的中资银行；一是收购永隆银行，使得永隆银行成为全资附属公司。毫无疑问，这两个重大的举措将提升公司的内在价值，对于进一步加快国际化进程，深入推进经营战略调整，具有深远的战略意义。因此，我估计招商银行的内在价值不会少于5100亿元。当然，如果由另一个人去估计，他得出的肯定又是另一个数据。实际上招商银行在去年市场极端下跌后，其股票价格曾经一度跌破了11元，市盈率不足8倍，市净率在2倍以下，这种情形并不常见。要知道2倍以下的市净率往往是银行并购的价格，招商银行自己全资收购永隆银行，出价就相当于市净率3.01倍。因此，在我看来，此时对“内在价值不会少于5100亿元”，并且准备以多少折扣买入这个判断不如“市盈率不足8倍，市净率在2倍以下”来得明确。但即便如此，也并不意味着我就不重视估值，因为毕竟“这种定性分析本身就非常有助于股票买卖决策”（格雷厄姆）。菲利普·费雪在他另一本名著《股市投资致富之道》中说，“归根结底，即使最成功的股票投资在本质上都包括也反包括三个部分：
1、选择一只或多只未来增长潜势超越市场大盘的股票；
2、知道应该买入的适当时间；
3、知道应该卖出的时间。”
在我看来，“知道应该买入的适当时间”，要么就是大萧条或大崩溃的时候，要么就是在优秀企业遭遇严重困难的时候。特别在大萧条或大崩溃的情形下，几乎所有的股票都会出奇得便宜，所以此时不必过分关注估值——因为事实太明朗了。反之亦反是。确切地说，我喜欢这种“大道至简”的方法，因为这本身也符合费雪在他的《怎样选择成长股》第一部分《普通股和不普通的利润》第一章的开头所说的，“在萧条时买入，而在繁荣时卖出股票的做法包含了很浓厚的价值原理。”而且，我更深信，投资最根本的问题就是心态，并非精确地估值。无论多么重视估值、精确估值，假如不能抑制内心的冲动，控制好情绪，一样地难以取得成功。
过去我对“价值评估，既是艺术，又是科学”深感不解。现在我才知道，大致准确地预测是一种艺术，但满意地进行预测以满足投资决策却是一门科学。关于这一点，我认为肯尼斯在他的父亲菲利普·费雪《怎样选择成长股》的序言“从父亲的著作中学到的”中一段话可以作为这句话的参考：“在本书出版的时候，父亲已经51岁了，他具有不拘一格的才华，已经获得了非常大的成功。这些年来，他慢慢地从直觉上将对技巧的理解转变为对艺术的理解，但是我认为，他不明白这一转变是新手需要花很长的时间才能学会的。......我写这些文字的时候已经52岁了，和他当时写本书的年龄差不多；我很清楚地了解这一点，因为我也不得不花时间去学习，而不是创造这一过程。”看起来，掌握一门“技巧”易，但是上升至“艺术”则难得多。相对于肯尼斯，我绝对不会比他更聪明。他尚且还要“花时间去学习”，以求得“从直觉上将对技巧的理解转变为对艺术的理解”，而况于我，因此我肯定“也不得不花时间去学习，而不是创造这一过程”。
约翰·邓普顿指出：“正确的买入时间是悲观情绪最严重的时刻，那样的话，大部分的问题都可能被解决。”我想，这里面“大部分的问题”中应该也包含了估值的问题。
林奇金盆洗手时的告诫
最近，我比较系统地重温了美国著名的投资杂志《杰出投资者文摘》中高手的文章，看到大名鼎鼎的富达麦哲伦基金经理彼得·林奇1990年5月31日退休前的一篇演讲。由于这一年半来市场左右折腾，现在看看人家近20年前的提醒，还是有用的。
林奇的演讲题目是《关于股市赚钱的几个要点》。
规则一：了解你持有的股票。
规则二：作经济预测徒劳无益。
这次全球金融危机，几乎让投资人都成了宏观经济学家。我自己似乎也难免，天天被各种经济数据与投资市场之间的关系搅得晕头转向，工作量之大比得上细读20本金融教科书。不幸的是，我很怀疑自己真正学到了什么有用的学问。
彼得·林奇的疑问是：“在座的大多数人应该还记得1980年至1982年的衰退，这是‘大萧条’之后最严重的衰退。你们有谁接到电话，告诉你们会发生衰退吗？在你经常阅读的那些杂志中，有哪一本杂志曾经成功地预见到了这种情况？没有人告诉我将出现这么悲惨的局面。”
“你可能不相信，人们在预测一年之后将要发生的事情上面，浪费了多少时间。能提前知道一年后的事情当然很棒，但你永远无法知道。因此，不要枉费心机了。这没有任何好处。”
规则三：不要担心股市，也就是集中于个股，忘掉全局（big picture）。
其实，这是规则二的类推，你没法预测宏观市场，那就乖乖地研究个股吧。一场金融大危机，让人们觉得覆巢之下，安有完卵？但是，确实有个别公司经得起折腾，这也是事实。
规则四：不要急躁，你有充足的时间。
这对今天的我们很重要，即便我们真的已处于大牛市中，也不必急于追涨，有的是机会。林奇的原话是：“给我带来丰厚回报的股票，都是我在关注它们第二年、第三年或者第四、第五年才买入的。”
林奇举的例子是沃尔玛。沃尔玛1970年上市，有38家店，售价8美分。五年后，沃尔玛有125家店，股价涨了5倍，达到41美分。1980年，沃尔玛有275家店，利润又比五年前上升了5倍；股价也涨了5倍，为1.89美元。1985年，它有859家店，股价是15.94美元。1990年，林奇演讲的时候，沃尔玛的股价是50美元。
林奇说道，在1980年买沃尔玛股票，已比上市时晚了十年，但持有它仍能赚25倍。不过，林奇也坦承，他并没有持有沃尔玛，当时觉得它的股价过高。
演讲至今，又一个20年过去了。在这次危机中，沃尔玛仍表现出色。我没有细算这20年来沃尔玛股价又翻了多少倍，但一定是惊人的。有意思的是，巴菲特在林奇发出感叹十多年后，才追买沃尔玛。想到这里，大家可以宽慰一下自己了。
林奇提到了一些有关股市投资危险的说法。
危险说法一：股价已经下跌了这么多了，还能跌多少呢？
这个教训大家刚领会，不必谈了。
危险说法二：股价还能上涨多少？记住上面沃尔玛的例子。
危险说法三：我能赔多少？股价只有3美元。这与危险说法一区别不大，再次提醒你跌幅仍会巨大。
危险说法四：最终，跌去的全都将反弹回来。这次流动性大泛滥，让许多股票又创了新高，人们不再提防这个危险的说法了。不过，走着瞧，林奇是对的。
危险说法五：情况糟糕得不能再糟糕，我应该买入。它类似于危险说法一和危险说法三。
危险说法六：当股价反弹到10美元/股时，我就卖出。它类似危险说法四，不少人不以为然。他们总会明白的。
危险说法七：保守型股票波动不大。个中滋味在2008年的市场中领教了。
危险说法八：因为没有买入而赔了钱。
这就是所谓的踏空。这次股市大反弹，许多人因此而十分懊丧。他们也许没有买，有的买了又抛了，有的投机不成还亏了钱。他们见周围的人声称赚了钱，几乎失去了投资的自信。关于这一点，说来话长。大致来说，看看自己的账户吧，踏空不像套牢，你没有亏什么钱。记住林奇的警句：“你错过了成百上千的股票，不过，你只需要几只股票便可发财。”
危险说法九：这是下一个伟大的公司。
由于沃尔玛等个别伟大股票的存在，让人情不自禁，但“下一个伟大的公司永远都没有成功过。下一个玩具反斗城没有成功，下一个家得宝没有成功，下一个施乐没有成功——施乐自己做得也不是很好。下一个麦当劳等，都失败了”。
作者为《科学与财富（Value）》（www.valuegood.com）主编
林奇的演讲题目是《关于股市赚钱的几个要点》。
规则一：了解你持有的股票。
规则二：作经济预测徒劳无益。
这次全球金融危机，几乎让投资人都成了宏观经济学家。我自己似乎也难免，天天被各种经济数据与投资市场之间的关系搅得晕头转向，工作量之大比得上细读20本金融教科书。不幸的是，我很怀疑自己真正学到了什么有用的学问。
彼得·林奇的疑问是：“在座的大多数人应该还记得1980年至1982年的衰退，这是‘大萧条’之后最严重的衰退。你们有谁接到电话，告诉你们会发生衰退吗？在你经常阅读的那些杂志中，有哪一本杂志曾经成功地预见到了这种情况？没有人告诉我将出现这么悲惨的局面。”
“你可能不相信，人们在预测一年之后将要发生的事情上面，浪费了多少时间。能提前知道一年后的事情当然很棒，但你永远无法知道。因此，不要枉费心机了。这没有任何好处。”
规则三：不要担心股市，也就是集中于个股，忘掉全局（big picture）。
其实，这是规则二的类推，你没法预测宏观市场，那就乖乖地研究个股吧。一场金融大危机，让人们觉得覆巢之下，安有完卵？但是，确实有个别公司经得起折腾，这也是事实。
规则四：不要急躁，你有充足的时间。
这对今天的我们很重要，即便我们真的已处于大牛市中，也不必急于追涨，有的是机会。林奇的原话是：“给我带来丰厚回报的股票，都是我在关注它们第二年、第三年或者第四、第五年才买入的。”
林奇举的例子是沃尔玛。沃尔玛1970年上市，有38家店，售价8美分。五年后，沃尔玛有125家店，股价涨了5倍，达到41美分。1980年，沃尔玛有275家店，利润又比五年前上升了5倍；股价也涨了5倍，为1.89美元。1985年，它有859家店，股价是15.94美元。1990年，林奇演讲的时候，沃尔玛的股价是50美元。
林奇说道，在1980年买沃尔玛股票，已比上市时晚了十年，但持有它仍能赚25倍。不过，林奇也坦承，他并没有持有沃尔玛，当时觉得它的股价过高。
演讲至今，又一个20年过去了。在这次危机中，沃尔玛仍表现出色。我没有细算这20年来沃尔玛股价又翻了多少倍，但一定是惊人的。有意思的是，巴菲特在林奇发出感叹十多年后，才追买沃尔玛。想到这里，大家可以宽慰一下自己了。
林奇提到了一些有关股市投资危险的说法。
危险说法一：股价已经下跌了这么多了，还能跌多少呢？
这个教训大家刚领会，不必谈了。
危险说法二：股价还能上涨多少？记住上面沃尔玛的例子。
危险说法三：我能赔多少？股价只有3美元。这与危险说法一区别不大，再次提醒你跌幅仍会巨大。
危险说法四：最终，跌去的全都将反弹回来。这次流动性大泛滥，让许多股票又创了新高，人们不再提防这个危险的说法了。不过，走着瞧，林奇是对的。
危险说法五：情况糟糕得不能再糟糕，我应该买入。它类似于危险说法一和危险说法三。
危险说法六：当股价反弹到10美元/股时，我就卖出。它类似危险说法四，不少人不以为然。他们总会明白的。
危险说法七：保守型股票波动不大。个中滋味在2008年的市场中领教了。
危险说法八：因为没有买入而赔了钱。
这就是所谓的踏空。这次股市大反弹，许多人因此而十分懊丧。他们也许没有买，有的买了又抛了，有的投机不成还亏了钱。他们见周围的人声称赚了钱，几乎失去了投资的自信。关于这一点，说来话长。大致来说，看看自己的账户吧，踏空不像套牢，你没有亏什么钱。记住林奇的警句：“你错过了成百上千的股票，不过，你只需要几只股票便可发财。”
危险说法九：这是下一个伟大的公司。
由于沃尔玛等个别伟大股票的存在，让人情不自禁，但“下一个伟大的公司永远都没有成功过。下一个玩具反斗城没有成功，下一个家得宝没有成功，下一个施乐没有成功——施乐自己做得也不是很好。下一个麦当劳等，都失败了”。
作者为《科学与财富（Value）》（www.valuegood.com）主编
金融预言家谢国忠，再判股市楼市 - 谢国忠：通胀来了
房市、股市火爆，他却直言存在风险。
谢：我觉得见顶可能九十月份
市场信心增强，他却预言通胀来了。
谢：你货币涨得比实体经济快那么多，最终还是要变成通胀的
【解说】据统计，上海上半年的房产价格节节攀升，半年内平均成交价上涨近10%，新房成交价更是比去年同期上涨41%。就在楼市疯狂上涨，许多人对未来房价充满信心的时候。有一个人，却提出了与众不同的看法。
【采访】谢：为什么大家应该去买房地产，其实它是造一个故事来炒房地产/它提供了一个让大家一个预期，就是房价会涨我以后会变成一个有钱人，给你一个梦
采访】3237 记者：您预测一下房市的发展是什么样的？
答：中国以后的房市会出现波动型的，房租回报率是非常低的，所以它不可能靠资产真正的回报，来吸引大家买房子，它通过你的预期让你去买它的房子，所以它这样一个浪头掉下来的掉得低时候，没人买房子，它掉到差不多的时候，他突然故事来了，他们开始买房子第一浪上来了，上来之后又上一浪，我们去年四五月份的时候见过一浪.
记者：您预测这一轮的波峰在那儿？
答：我觉得九,十月份差不多了，因为长期的上升是经济基本面很好的时候他会比较长期的一个上升的阶段，在经济不好的情况下，在资金来炒的情况下，这种波浪不会很长.
【解说】谢国忠认为，楼市的涨跌是有周期性的，主要应该受整体经济的走势而波动。而近期房价攀升的主要原因，并不是由于经济基本面变好导致的，而是许多人放大了对通货膨胀的预期。
【采访】记者：很多老百姓的常识当中觉得通货膨胀只是一个商品价格上涨，其实从我们经济学的原理当中来说这个通货膨胀到底是怎么造成的呢？
答：通货膨胀最重要的就是一个货币增加比经济增加快，大家比较容易理解的一个通货膨胀的一个来源就是经济过热，是供不应求的一个概念，就是经济涨得太快，生产跟不上，那就要提价了.
记者：您估计这个拐点可能会在什么时候
我觉得中国通胀的拐点在4月份已经出现了.
【解说】谢国忠说，通货膨胀来临时，房价会上涨，因此，许多人通过购买房产来对抗通胀，从理论上是可行的。但是，当房价的增长速度超过通货膨胀的速度，也就产生了泡沫。谢国忠认为，目前楼市上涨的幅度已经远远超过通胀的速度，出现了严重的泡沫。
【采访】谢：现在都很高了，一个东西都是相对的，你通胀的话我刚刚提到过这个概念就是通胀百分之五六七减去利息亏的话就是三四五这样一个概念，如果这些规避通胀的一些产品它已经涨到100%，是不是还值得追，跟通胀的风险相比是不是还值得追，这是一个值得大家考虑我觉得不宜追，第二就是这些价格也要回调
【解说】面对不断上升的房价，许多有刚性需求的居民，不得不选择追高，对于这样的选择，谢国忠提出了自己的建议。
3505记者：您觉得现在去买房似乎是不太恰当的时候
答：现在是很不合适的
记者：如果确实是有居住需求有刚性需求的这些消费者他怎么办吗
我觉得中国的城市发展，自己可以做一点基本的努力去研究一下哪里的地段会变好，最核心的就是要有地铁站，因为轨道交通上海的城市可能以后是四五千万人，再怎么限制车辆以后陆地交通可能是非常困难的，所以如果是没有轨道交通上下班是非常很困难的，所以要看看这个城市发展的规划哪里会造地铁站，这个是一个大家可以注意的一件事，第二件事情就是要注意开发商造房子的质量，现在我们思想已经出现开发商之间的区别，有的是比较偏重于房子的质量，房子的质量对二手市场的价值有非常重要/房子是一个长线投资千万不要冲动型的消费，我个人认为买房子要三好，地点好，房子好然后价格好。
【解说】这次由美国次贷危机引发的全球金融危机，使世界各国实体经济不同程度遭到重创。为了应对危机，增加市场流动性，世界各国都不约而同减息。我国中央银行基准利率更是降到了20年来最低，与1999年亚洲金融危机全面爆发后的利率持平。
【采访】银行存款利息非常低，所以在这种情况下大家寻找它有推动的作用把资金走向其他的市场可能性大，它股市一天的波动比银行一年的利息还大，所以对他来说有这个吸引力了，
【解说】谢国忠说，流动性推升了资产价格，通胀的拐点已经形成。也正是因为预期通胀的原因，国内股票市场一路上扬，在短短半年多时间，上证指数大涨74%。
【交易所实况一点】
就在所有人都极度乐观的时候，谢国忠却认为，由于通胀的到来，政策面一旦转向，国内的股市即将见顶。
【采访】2207 记者：很多投资者他既不希望股票跌但同时他也不希望看到通胀，这两者之间一定是矛盾的吗？
答：一定是矛盾的，因为股票过高一定是货币过多引起来的，中国的资产价格跟银根连得非常紧，如果银根一缩紧的话股市楼市都会掉，如果银根放松的话股市楼市都会涨
记者：类似这样的房市股市当前上涨的情况在您判断还会维持多久？
我觉得见顶可能在九十月份，因为银根虽然说现在还没有缩紧，但是已经不放松了，央行发票据毕竟有信号在那边了。
【解说】2009年7月2日，中国人民银行宣布发行2009年第二十三期中央银行票据，发行量为500亿元。在持续一年的减息之后，央行转向回收货币，开始收紧市场流动性，为即将来临的通货膨胀未雨绸缪。
【采访】谢：其实我们有一个通缩的力量在抵消这个通胀的力量，第一个就是全球化的力量，发展中国家的劳动力的成本比较低，把发达国家的工资压着。第二个就是IT的力量，IT使得生产力上升，成本下降，这两个力量把通胀暂时压住了，所以在发放货币的时候它引起了市场价格的通胀，所以股市楼市暴涨并没有引起一般的通胀，我们今天进入一个时代就是全球化带来的好处基本都已经消化了
【解说】谢国忠担心，由于通胀预期导致资金大量涌入虚拟经济，过高的资产价格泡沫一旦破裂，将会对整个宏观经济造成很大的影响。
【采访】1427 记者：那大家头把钱投到虚拟经济当中去，这对实体经济会产生什么影响呢？
答：炒股市跟炒楼市它是没有生产力的，同一个股票同一个房子炒高了怎么可能会创造价值呢？这是不可能的。如果它是创造了知识产权，他的公司的管理体制有了改善了，那个才是创造价值的，所以我觉得我们政府在引导经济当中我觉得要有平衡，不能让老百姓的精力过度花费在没有生产力的活动上面去
【解说】尽管谢国忠曾经长期在金融机构任职，但是他一直主张轻虚拟，重实体的经济模式，在业界也得到了广泛的认同。2007年谢国忠离开摩根士丹利，成为独立经济学家和金融投资顾问，并领导一家股权投资俱乐部，投资中国非上市公司。
【采访】谢：我觉得世界上现在都在加税，中国的机会就来了/
因为中国的负债率比较低，增长的空间城市化还有一半的路要走，所以增长的空间也是很大，在这情况下中国能够让世界上的有钱的人能够或者基金来积累中国的金融资产，因为这边是外国人在积累中国的金融资产，这边是中国的话实际的财富就是城市化，只要这个是同步走的话中国就能够自己点把火烧起来，不是以出口来带动经济，而是用世界上的财富转移到中国来，给中国带来发展。
【解说】 谢国忠认为，这次由美国引发的金融危机已经动摇了美国在全球经济中的霸主地位。但是对于中国经济来说，是一个危机，更是一个大好的转型良机。
【采访】我们这个蛋糕要做大还要利用世界的力量，过去我们是通过出口把世界的力量引入中国，这一条路很可能是走到头了，以后需要开一条新的路，就是怎么把世界的财富引到中国来，这样中国有了更多的资源之后各个方面都能照顾到，资产市场也能相对比较好，但是经济基本面也能做到不错，这样资产市场股市楼市还能得到更好的支持，所以大家既能开心，经济还能很好。
谢：我觉得见顶可能九十月份
市场信心增强，他却预言通胀来了。
谢：你货币涨得比实体经济快那么多，最终还是要变成通胀的
【解说】据统计，上海上半年的房产价格节节攀升，半年内平均成交价上涨近10%，新房成交价更是比去年同期上涨41%。就在楼市疯狂上涨，许多人对未来房价充满信心的时候。有一个人，却提出了与众不同的看法。
【采访】谢：为什么大家应该去买房地产，其实它是造一个故事来炒房地产/它提供了一个让大家一个预期，就是房价会涨我以后会变成一个有钱人，给你一个梦
采访】3237 记者：您预测一下房市的发展是什么样的？
答：中国以后的房市会出现波动型的，房租回报率是非常低的，所以它不可能靠资产真正的回报，来吸引大家买房子，它通过你的预期让你去买它的房子，所以它这样一个浪头掉下来的掉得低时候，没人买房子，它掉到差不多的时候，他突然故事来了，他们开始买房子第一浪上来了，上来之后又上一浪，我们去年四五月份的时候见过一浪.
记者：您预测这一轮的波峰在那儿？
答：我觉得九,十月份差不多了，因为长期的上升是经济基本面很好的时候他会比较长期的一个上升的阶段，在经济不好的情况下，在资金来炒的情况下，这种波浪不会很长.
【解说】谢国忠认为，楼市的涨跌是有周期性的，主要应该受整体经济的走势而波动。而近期房价攀升的主要原因，并不是由于经济基本面变好导致的，而是许多人放大了对通货膨胀的预期。
【采访】记者：很多老百姓的常识当中觉得通货膨胀只是一个商品价格上涨，其实从我们经济学的原理当中来说这个通货膨胀到底是怎么造成的呢？
答：通货膨胀最重要的就是一个货币增加比经济增加快，大家比较容易理解的一个通货膨胀的一个来源就是经济过热，是供不应求的一个概念，就是经济涨得太快，生产跟不上，那就要提价了.
记者：您估计这个拐点可能会在什么时候
我觉得中国通胀的拐点在4月份已经出现了.
【解说】谢国忠说，通货膨胀来临时，房价会上涨，因此，许多人通过购买房产来对抗通胀，从理论上是可行的。但是，当房价的增长速度超过通货膨胀的速度，也就产生了泡沫。谢国忠认为，目前楼市上涨的幅度已经远远超过通胀的速度，出现了严重的泡沫。
【采访】谢：现在都很高了，一个东西都是相对的，你通胀的话我刚刚提到过这个概念就是通胀百分之五六七减去利息亏的话就是三四五这样一个概念，如果这些规避通胀的一些产品它已经涨到100%，是不是还值得追，跟通胀的风险相比是不是还值得追，这是一个值得大家考虑我觉得不宜追，第二就是这些价格也要回调
【解说】面对不断上升的房价，许多有刚性需求的居民，不得不选择追高，对于这样的选择，谢国忠提出了自己的建议。
3505记者：您觉得现在去买房似乎是不太恰当的时候
答：现在是很不合适的
记者：如果确实是有居住需求有刚性需求的这些消费者他怎么办吗
我觉得中国的城市发展，自己可以做一点基本的努力去研究一下哪里的地段会变好，最核心的就是要有地铁站，因为轨道交通上海的城市可能以后是四五千万人，再怎么限制车辆以后陆地交通可能是非常困难的，所以如果是没有轨道交通上下班是非常很困难的，所以要看看这个城市发展的规划哪里会造地铁站，这个是一个大家可以注意的一件事，第二件事情就是要注意开发商造房子的质量，现在我们思想已经出现开发商之间的区别，有的是比较偏重于房子的质量，房子的质量对二手市场的价值有非常重要/房子是一个长线投资千万不要冲动型的消费，我个人认为买房子要三好，地点好，房子好然后价格好。
【解说】这次由美国次贷危机引发的全球金融危机，使世界各国实体经济不同程度遭到重创。为了应对危机，增加市场流动性，世界各国都不约而同减息。我国中央银行基准利率更是降到了20年来最低，与1999年亚洲金融危机全面爆发后的利率持平。
【采访】银行存款利息非常低，所以在这种情况下大家寻找它有推动的作用把资金走向其他的市场可能性大，它股市一天的波动比银行一年的利息还大，所以对他来说有这个吸引力了，
【解说】谢国忠说，流动性推升了资产价格，通胀的拐点已经形成。也正是因为预期通胀的原因，国内股票市场一路上扬，在短短半年多时间，上证指数大涨74%。
【交易所实况一点】
就在所有人都极度乐观的时候，谢国忠却认为，由于通胀的到来，政策面一旦转向，国内的股市即将见顶。
【采访】2207 记者：很多投资者他既不希望股票跌但同时他也不希望看到通胀，这两者之间一定是矛盾的吗？
答：一定是矛盾的，因为股票过高一定是货币过多引起来的，中国的资产价格跟银根连得非常紧，如果银根一缩紧的话股市楼市都会掉，如果银根放松的话股市楼市都会涨
记者：类似这样的房市股市当前上涨的情况在您判断还会维持多久？
我觉得见顶可能在九十月份，因为银根虽然说现在还没有缩紧，但是已经不放松了，央行发票据毕竟有信号在那边了。
【解说】2009年7月2日，中国人民银行宣布发行2009年第二十三期中央银行票据，发行量为500亿元。在持续一年的减息之后，央行转向回收货币，开始收紧市场流动性，为即将来临的通货膨胀未雨绸缪。
【采访】谢：其实我们有一个通缩的力量在抵消这个通胀的力量，第一个就是全球化的力量，发展中国家的劳动力的成本比较低，把发达国家的工资压着。第二个就是IT的力量，IT使得生产力上升，成本下降，这两个力量把通胀暂时压住了，所以在发放货币的时候它引起了市场价格的通胀，所以股市楼市暴涨并没有引起一般的通胀，我们今天进入一个时代就是全球化带来的好处基本都已经消化了
【解说】谢国忠担心，由于通胀预期导致资金大量涌入虚拟经济，过高的资产价格泡沫一旦破裂，将会对整个宏观经济造成很大的影响。
【采访】1427 记者：那大家头把钱投到虚拟经济当中去，这对实体经济会产生什么影响呢？
答：炒股市跟炒楼市它是没有生产力的，同一个股票同一个房子炒高了怎么可能会创造价值呢？这是不可能的。如果它是创造了知识产权，他的公司的管理体制有了改善了，那个才是创造价值的，所以我觉得我们政府在引导经济当中我觉得要有平衡，不能让老百姓的精力过度花费在没有生产力的活动上面去
【解说】尽管谢国忠曾经长期在金融机构任职，但是他一直主张轻虚拟，重实体的经济模式，在业界也得到了广泛的认同。2007年谢国忠离开摩根士丹利，成为独立经济学家和金融投资顾问，并领导一家股权投资俱乐部，投资中国非上市公司。
【采访】谢：我觉得世界上现在都在加税，中国的机会就来了/
因为中国的负债率比较低，增长的空间城市化还有一半的路要走，所以增长的空间也是很大，在这情况下中国能够让世界上的有钱的人能够或者基金来积累中国的金融资产，因为这边是外国人在积累中国的金融资产，这边是中国的话实际的财富就是城市化，只要这个是同步走的话中国就能够自己点把火烧起来，不是以出口来带动经济，而是用世界上的财富转移到中国来，给中国带来发展。
【解说】 谢国忠认为，这次由美国引发的金融危机已经动摇了美国在全球经济中的霸主地位。但是对于中国经济来说，是一个危机，更是一个大好的转型良机。
【采访】我们这个蛋糕要做大还要利用世界的力量，过去我们是通过出口把世界的力量引入中国，这一条路很可能是走到头了，以后需要开一条新的路，就是怎么把世界的财富引到中国来，这样中国有了更多的资源之后各个方面都能照顾到，资产市场也能相对比较好，但是经济基本面也能做到不错，这样资产市场股市楼市还能得到更好的支持，所以大家既能开心，经济还能很好。
Friday, August 7, 2009
Adampak
Adampak has a very strong track record of being very shareholder oriented, with a sound and logical approach to managing their business, unfailingly and consistently delivering good dividends and ROE for the past few years. In terms of financial performance thus far, Adampak is almost unparalleled. I briefly screened through using summary guides ($6 in popular) on all the listed stocks, and apparently, by standards of John Burr Williams (Intrinsic valuation) or Warren Buffett and Graham, at currently irrationally depressed prices, this seems like the greatest gem of all - excellent and honest management, consistent performance, outstanding economics, and plenty of room for growth.
However, the greatest challenge for this to become a true stellar performer, is for Adampak to build and continue to retain their 'moat' in this highly competitive industry, to continue to keep that 20+% ROE, and high dividend yield. Dydx correctly pointed out (in an earlier thread) that their RFID tags will be a possible third engine of growth (first being HDD business, second is precision die cuts).
All this information paints about 50~60% the actual reality of Adampak, given that retail investors have access to so limited information. BUT, the assurance came when I know full well that the Exec Directors are heavily vested (total of 50+%), and have been continuously increasing their stakes in recent months.
I am betting on this to become a future ten bagger, the stakes are currently in my favour.
On Adampak's 'moat', I think the main point lies with the very nature of the label converter business focussing on quality-name customers with the requirements of high technical specifications, high-volume, and demanding customer service support. The technical specs involve different types of face-stocks, different types of adhesives, different types of printing, different and exact specifications for different labels/parts/RFID tags, and high-precision die-cutting process. So unless one knows enough about the technical specs, it is difficult to start this kind of business and hope to attain an economic scale within a reasonable period of time, as the production equipment are also quite expensive. Adampak's seasoned management has delivered from the business a high GP margin of over 33% in the last 2 FY's, and this good performance in a way indicates Adampak's 'moat'.
To answer Grandrake's questions -
Ong Hock Leng is one of the founding investors, including Anthony Tay (ED and the largest shareholder) and Tham Kim Par. Both Ong and Tham have not been involved in running the business for quite some time already.
Based on what I know, there is no other listed company which is competing directly with Adampak as a label converter with similar scale and range of products/services. Armstrong does die-cutting and also supplies to HDD manufacturers, but is focussed in rubber parts. Based on what I know, Adampak's direct competitors are Zephyr (local but privately held) and regional subsidiaries of Brady Corp (listed on NYSE).
However, the greatest challenge for this to become a true stellar performer, is for Adampak to build and continue to retain their 'moat' in this highly competitive industry, to continue to keep that 20+% ROE, and high dividend yield. Dydx correctly pointed out (in an earlier thread) that their RFID tags will be a possible third engine of growth (first being HDD business, second is precision die cuts).
All this information paints about 50~60% the actual reality of Adampak, given that retail investors have access to so limited information. BUT, the assurance came when I know full well that the Exec Directors are heavily vested (total of 50+%), and have been continuously increasing their stakes in recent months.
I am betting on this to become a future ten bagger, the stakes are currently in my favour.
On Adampak's 'moat', I think the main point lies with the very nature of the label converter business focussing on quality-name customers with the requirements of high technical specifications, high-volume, and demanding customer service support. The technical specs involve different types of face-stocks, different types of adhesives, different types of printing, different and exact specifications for different labels/parts/RFID tags, and high-precision die-cutting process. So unless one knows enough about the technical specs, it is difficult to start this kind of business and hope to attain an economic scale within a reasonable period of time, as the production equipment are also quite expensive. Adampak's seasoned management has delivered from the business a high GP margin of over 33% in the last 2 FY's, and this good performance in a way indicates Adampak's 'moat'.
To answer Grandrake's questions -
Ong Hock Leng is one of the founding investors, including Anthony Tay (ED and the largest shareholder) and Tham Kim Par. Both Ong and Tham have not been involved in running the business for quite some time already.
Based on what I know, there is no other listed company which is competing directly with Adampak as a label converter with similar scale and range of products/services. Armstrong does die-cutting and also supplies to HDD manufacturers, but is focussed in rubber parts. Based on what I know, Adampak's direct competitors are Zephyr (local but privately held) and regional subsidiaries of Brady Corp (listed on NYSE).
Tat Seng Packaging Group
The 1H(ended 30Jun09)-FY09 results announcement released last evening makes interesting reading.....
After quite a few years of efforts to grow the business, I think this large and well-established local corrugated box producer with 2 large plants in PRC is finally showing some colours in its business and financial results!.....and the company is even paying an interim div. of $0.01/share!
With a current market cap. of only $29.9m (based on the 157.2m issued shares and the last done share price of $0.19), and against the current scale of Tat Seng's business - rev. at some $105.0m p.a., NP at some $6.0 p.a., aftertax FCF (before capex) at some $9.3m p.a., and NAV of $55.6m - the counter is quite obviously grossly under-priced! If profits can continue to rise, then it is highly possible that the counter will be re-rated in a big way.....
Already some smart investors have started actively picking up the shares this morning. So far, the counter has gone up $0.015, or 8.6%; but at $0.19, it is still a long way off its NAV/share of $0.354 as at 30Jun09!
After quite a few years of efforts to grow the business, I think this large and well-established local corrugated box producer with 2 large plants in PRC is finally showing some colours in its business and financial results!.....and the company is even paying an interim div. of $0.01/share!
With a current market cap. of only $29.9m (based on the 157.2m issued shares and the last done share price of $0.19), and against the current scale of Tat Seng's business - rev. at some $105.0m p.a., NP at some $6.0 p.a., aftertax FCF (before capex) at some $9.3m p.a., and NAV of $55.6m - the counter is quite obviously grossly under-priced! If profits can continue to rise, then it is highly possible that the counter will be re-rated in a big way.....
Already some smart investors have started actively picking up the shares this morning. So far, the counter has gone up $0.015, or 8.6%; but at $0.19, it is still a long way off its NAV/share of $0.354 as at 30Jun09!
Popular Holdings
Chou is a driven man, pursuing his dreams in building his business even at the age of 69! I finally think he has a certain flair in developing high-quality, well-designed residential properties. Popular's first project - the "One Robin" - is now practically sold out. The second project - a 19-unit exclusive high-end condo project - at 18 Shelford Rd is now under construction and should be ready for launch and sale in early 2010. I checked out the ground 2 weeks ago, and noted the project also has a distinctive design - at least from the outside. I also noted CDL is building a bigger condo project just next door.
I checked out the One Robin site again yesterday and found out that, following Popular's 26 Jun 09 announcement giving an update of the project.....
the company has successfully sold off the remaining 4 units in the last few weeks, at an average price of $1,400 p.s.f., or approx. $2.7m per unit with a build-in area of 1,900 sq. ft.
I was also told that the 2nd project at 18 Shelford Rd will be launched shortly, at about the same pricing of $1,400 p.s.f. It certainly looks like Popular's residential projects will likely bring in some decent profits going forward, on top of a almost certain write-back of a substantial portion of the provisions taken in last FY on its property projects.
All these properties now seem so cheap, when u compare with Ang Mo Kio's $1150 psf
I accepted Popular because -
1. Their cash-based book shop business in Singapore is solid - most households with primary/secondary students buy from their nearby Popular shops regularly. The same business model is being successfully replicated in Malaysia and Hong Kong.
2. Their scaled up primary/secondary text books publishing business for the Hong Kong market, and the related assessment books publishing business for Singapore, Malaysia, and Hong Kong, are cash cows.
End last year, as a shareholder I was forced upon to put in more capital by the 1-for-2 rights issue @$0.10/share. Because of the depressed stock market then and the rights issue, the share price had fallen to close to $0.10. When compared with the then and post-rights NAV/share, it became a compelling value investing opportunity to load up, especially so as the new rights shares were eligible for a $0.005/share interim dividend.
Popular's current market cap. of $110.0m (based on 647.0m issued shares at today's closing share price of $0.17) is still very low, when compared with the current scale of the business, asset base, and cash flow. And one must not forget the additional value of the publishing and related assets, which are not reflected on the B/S. The expected write-back of a substantial portion of the $31.16m provisions on property projects taken last FY will strengthen equity and the B/S, as well as NAV/share and EPS, going forward. Take a good look into the FY09 (ended 30Apr09) results, one should be able to better appreciate the value of Popular's business, and perhaps also why Mr Market has started re-rating this counter in the last 4 months.....
I think it is relevant to note that the relatively new Harris Book Store (English books) operations, including the 3 small shops opened in the new Terminal 3 of Changi Airport, have suffered some start-up losses, which have dragged down the profits of the entire book retail/distribution business in FY09. Quite clearly, CAAS has pushed the retail idea in Changi Airport too much, and with the opening of T3, the retail business volume in Changi has been spread too thin, to the sufferings of all the retailers there. Given enough time, I think Harris should become profitable.
Based on Popular's accounting policy, rev. and profits from One Robin will only be booked in FY2010. So we can expect a boost on rev. of some $44.0m, and perhaps some $6.0m (based on a 15% profit margin) on PBT, in FY2010.
I checked out the One Robin site again yesterday and found out that, following Popular's 26 Jun 09 announcement giving an update of the project.....
the company has successfully sold off the remaining 4 units in the last few weeks, at an average price of $1,400 p.s.f., or approx. $2.7m per unit with a build-in area of 1,900 sq. ft.
I was also told that the 2nd project at 18 Shelford Rd will be launched shortly, at about the same pricing of $1,400 p.s.f. It certainly looks like Popular's residential projects will likely bring in some decent profits going forward, on top of a almost certain write-back of a substantial portion of the provisions taken in last FY on its property projects.
All these properties now seem so cheap, when u compare with Ang Mo Kio's $1150 psf
I accepted Popular because -
1. Their cash-based book shop business in Singapore is solid - most households with primary/secondary students buy from their nearby Popular shops regularly. The same business model is being successfully replicated in Malaysia and Hong Kong.
2. Their scaled up primary/secondary text books publishing business for the Hong Kong market, and the related assessment books publishing business for Singapore, Malaysia, and Hong Kong, are cash cows.
End last year, as a shareholder I was forced upon to put in more capital by the 1-for-2 rights issue @$0.10/share. Because of the depressed stock market then and the rights issue, the share price had fallen to close to $0.10. When compared with the then and post-rights NAV/share, it became a compelling value investing opportunity to load up, especially so as the new rights shares were eligible for a $0.005/share interim dividend.
Popular's current market cap. of $110.0m (based on 647.0m issued shares at today's closing share price of $0.17) is still very low, when compared with the current scale of the business, asset base, and cash flow. And one must not forget the additional value of the publishing and related assets, which are not reflected on the B/S. The expected write-back of a substantial portion of the $31.16m provisions on property projects taken last FY will strengthen equity and the B/S, as well as NAV/share and EPS, going forward. Take a good look into the FY09 (ended 30Apr09) results, one should be able to better appreciate the value of Popular's business, and perhaps also why Mr Market has started re-rating this counter in the last 4 months.....
I think it is relevant to note that the relatively new Harris Book Store (English books) operations, including the 3 small shops opened in the new Terminal 3 of Changi Airport, have suffered some start-up losses, which have dragged down the profits of the entire book retail/distribution business in FY09. Quite clearly, CAAS has pushed the retail idea in Changi Airport too much, and with the opening of T3, the retail business volume in Changi has been spread too thin, to the sufferings of all the retailers there. Given enough time, I think Harris should become profitable.
Based on Popular's accounting policy, rev. and profits from One Robin will only be booked in FY2010. So we can expect a boost on rev. of some $44.0m, and perhaps some $6.0m (based on a 15% profit margin) on PBT, in FY2010.
Why the Economic Recovery May Be Different This Time
This is not your father's recession.
If domestic spending has been the engine of US economic growth in the past few decades, then the coming recovery - and the job creation that comes with it - won't be a smooth ride.
Much like the American auto industry, the broader economy is undergoing a sea change.
Consumer spending, which typically accounts for 70 percent of economic activity, has been so shaken that it will take years to recover. And even then, the growth will be slow and painful, with subpar job creation.
"The concern is that the magnitude of the downturn was so great and the structural issues so significant that you wouldn't look for a normal recovery," says John J. Castellani, president and chief economist of the Business Roundtable.
Castellani's outlook may not be among the most pessimistic. But it reflects the prevailing caution about how the austerity of consumers, business, and state and local government will keep a lid on spending and hiring.
"We believe that the painful adjustments to household and corporate balance sheets that are likely, given the excesses of the past, are enough to make the economic recovery a slow and tenuous one over the medium term," Morgan Stanley's global economics team said in its Aug. 5 research note.
All of this points to an economic cycle that looks V-shaped on the way down and U-shaped on the way up - something of a first in modern times.
"The major sectors that have pulled us out before are not happening this time - housing, durables, exports," says economist Heidi Shierholz of the Economic Policy Institute.
Friday's unemployment report is likely to show that the economy is shedding fewer jobs but it's not creating many either. Analysts expect the government to report that 320,000 jobs were lost in July, far fewer than in previous months. But the unemployment rate is expected to inch up to 9.6 percent, the highest in 26 years.
For all the talk about the jobless recovery that followed the 1991 recession, the decade between that downturn and the one in 2001 created a staggering amount of jobs.
Though payrolls shrank for more than a year after the end of the 1991 recession, there were 22.7 million more jobs at the expansionary peak of February 2001 than the prior peak in June 1990. About 20 million off those jobs were in services, including 2 million in retail. Another 2 million were in construction.
By contrast, employment was just 5.6 million higher in the peak-through-peak period of 2001-2007. Though manufacturing shed jobs by the millions, construction payrolls jumped by almost 13 percent, or 875,000.
Many of those jobs are now gone. By the end of the second quarter, the economy had lost 6.5 million jobs. Construction payrolls are now lower than they were a decade ago.
"Retailers were already reducing the number of employees with a focus on productivity gains," says HIS Global Strategy economist Brian Bethune, who doesn't expect employers to hire back quickly. "This is the inherent risk of what we're toying with. Where are we going to get the sources of employment growth? If housing remains weak, services will suffer."
In the latest recession, consumer spending shrank for two consecutive quarters for the first time in half a century.
Based on June data, retail sales, which peaked in 2007, are now at a mid-2005 level. Spending on furniture and household furnishings is back to where it was in 2001. The building and garden materials category is at a five-year low; autos an 11-year low.
"We don't see the consumer as being a normal part of the recovery," says Richard Hastings, consumer strategist at Global Hunter Securities. Instead, the consumer will be "very much a lagging piece" of the recovery, because of the "threat of unemployment with the absence of housing market wealth effect and the debt overhang."
Between June 2007 and December 2008, inflation-adjusted personal wealth fell by 22.8 percent - the most since the Federal Reserve began collecting data almost 60 years ago. Some $6 trillion in housing wealth alone was lost in 2008.
"When wages and salaries in the private sector are deflating you are really in a difficult situation," observes Bethune. "I don't see how you can move to any kind of strong recovery."
Consumer confidence as well as disposable income are critical to sustaining demand, which is a precondition to companies increasing output and eventually adding new employees.
"When we talk about a sustained rebound in employment, that's going to require a pick up in demand of all goods," says Mickey Levy, chief economist at Bank of America, who might be described ad a borderline optimist. "And we're not there yet."
Though companies may have over-reacted when they were slashing jobs in the wake of the Lehman Brothers failure, it's unlikely to mean any short-term correction.
"Even though companies have cut a lot, there is still some capacity," says Tig Gilliam, CEO of Adecco North America, the job placement firm.
Companies are also cutting costs by slashing their own spending on goods and services.
"In this austerity mode, the first wave is the corporations that have cut back on contractors, vendors, travel," says Bethune. "That keeps happening as corporations keep moving up the tree from the low-hanging fruit until their baseline costs are more aligned with final demand."
Business and professional services, such as IT support, which are often outsourced by big companies, have suffered, say experts. The ISM survey for June reflects such conditions and trends.
"You're not going to see the kind of capital expenditures and investment to have the whole supply chain moving along with you," adds Castellani.
Cash-strapped state and local government are doing much the same as they struggle with budget deficits. Work outsourced to private contractors gets cut in an effort to save payroll positions.
"I don't think we're going to see a rapid pace of demand growth," says Steve East of Height Analytics. "We don't have private sector credit creation anymore and that's different in this recovery than past recoveries. In past recoveries lower interest got people to lever up more and household balance sheets lever up more."
Household mortgage debt decreased in 2008 for the first time since the Federal Reserve started issuing reports 35 years and has fallen four straight quarters though the first quarter of 2009. Consumer credit has fallen two straight quarters as of the first quarter of this year.
That sort of demand environment does not bode well for job creation, especially small business, which generates the majority of jobs.
Right now companies that need to increase output are adding to the workweek of current employees or hiring temporary workers. Hiring for full time positions usually lags by six to 12 months, according to experts.
"Even if they come back into the market, they're going to come in a little more slowly than they have to hire people in past recessions," says Gilliam.
Castellani of the Business Roundtable says hiring "will be a little more iffy than usual" because of doubts about the strength of the recovery.
Conference Board economist Ken Goldstein also expects a slow recovery but doesn't subscribe to the consumer slump, jobless recovery scenario. He says job growth - once it gets going in 2010--will average to 150,00-175,000 a month, but that is well below the quarter of a million average of the 1990s boom.
"There may be fewer clerks behind the cash register at the mall," says Goldstein, but jobs will appear as the economy grows and evolves. "The jobs that will be there may not be the jobs that are there right now. There are always new services."
Right now, the new force in the labor market is the federal government. By some estimates, the $789 billion stimulus package is creating 200,000-250,000. If so, that would put it on track to fulfill the Obama administration's goal of saving or creating 3.5 million jobs, which is about 2.7 percent of the total payrolls as of June.
Many of the plan's initiatives - from tax rebates to the cash-for-clunkers program to a homebuyer credit - are conventional tools meant to spur consumption, particularly of durable goods.
"The government is our spender of last resort," says Shierholz.
If domestic spending has been the engine of US economic growth in the past few decades, then the coming recovery - and the job creation that comes with it - won't be a smooth ride.
Much like the American auto industry, the broader economy is undergoing a sea change.
Consumer spending, which typically accounts for 70 percent of economic activity, has been so shaken that it will take years to recover. And even then, the growth will be slow and painful, with subpar job creation.
"The concern is that the magnitude of the downturn was so great and the structural issues so significant that you wouldn't look for a normal recovery," says John J. Castellani, president and chief economist of the Business Roundtable.
Castellani's outlook may not be among the most pessimistic. But it reflects the prevailing caution about how the austerity of consumers, business, and state and local government will keep a lid on spending and hiring.
"We believe that the painful adjustments to household and corporate balance sheets that are likely, given the excesses of the past, are enough to make the economic recovery a slow and tenuous one over the medium term," Morgan Stanley's global economics team said in its Aug. 5 research note.
All of this points to an economic cycle that looks V-shaped on the way down and U-shaped on the way up - something of a first in modern times.
"The major sectors that have pulled us out before are not happening this time - housing, durables, exports," says economist Heidi Shierholz of the Economic Policy Institute.
Friday's unemployment report is likely to show that the economy is shedding fewer jobs but it's not creating many either. Analysts expect the government to report that 320,000 jobs were lost in July, far fewer than in previous months. But the unemployment rate is expected to inch up to 9.6 percent, the highest in 26 years.
For all the talk about the jobless recovery that followed the 1991 recession, the decade between that downturn and the one in 2001 created a staggering amount of jobs.
Though payrolls shrank for more than a year after the end of the 1991 recession, there were 22.7 million more jobs at the expansionary peak of February 2001 than the prior peak in June 1990. About 20 million off those jobs were in services, including 2 million in retail. Another 2 million were in construction.
By contrast, employment was just 5.6 million higher in the peak-through-peak period of 2001-2007. Though manufacturing shed jobs by the millions, construction payrolls jumped by almost 13 percent, or 875,000.
Many of those jobs are now gone. By the end of the second quarter, the economy had lost 6.5 million jobs. Construction payrolls are now lower than they were a decade ago.
"Retailers were already reducing the number of employees with a focus on productivity gains," says HIS Global Strategy economist Brian Bethune, who doesn't expect employers to hire back quickly. "This is the inherent risk of what we're toying with. Where are we going to get the sources of employment growth? If housing remains weak, services will suffer."
In the latest recession, consumer spending shrank for two consecutive quarters for the first time in half a century.
Based on June data, retail sales, which peaked in 2007, are now at a mid-2005 level. Spending on furniture and household furnishings is back to where it was in 2001. The building and garden materials category is at a five-year low; autos an 11-year low.
"We don't see the consumer as being a normal part of the recovery," says Richard Hastings, consumer strategist at Global Hunter Securities. Instead, the consumer will be "very much a lagging piece" of the recovery, because of the "threat of unemployment with the absence of housing market wealth effect and the debt overhang."
Between June 2007 and December 2008, inflation-adjusted personal wealth fell by 22.8 percent - the most since the Federal Reserve began collecting data almost 60 years ago. Some $6 trillion in housing wealth alone was lost in 2008.
"When wages and salaries in the private sector are deflating you are really in a difficult situation," observes Bethune. "I don't see how you can move to any kind of strong recovery."
Consumer confidence as well as disposable income are critical to sustaining demand, which is a precondition to companies increasing output and eventually adding new employees.
"When we talk about a sustained rebound in employment, that's going to require a pick up in demand of all goods," says Mickey Levy, chief economist at Bank of America, who might be described ad a borderline optimist. "And we're not there yet."
Though companies may have over-reacted when they were slashing jobs in the wake of the Lehman Brothers failure, it's unlikely to mean any short-term correction.
"Even though companies have cut a lot, there is still some capacity," says Tig Gilliam, CEO of Adecco North America, the job placement firm.
Companies are also cutting costs by slashing their own spending on goods and services.
"In this austerity mode, the first wave is the corporations that have cut back on contractors, vendors, travel," says Bethune. "That keeps happening as corporations keep moving up the tree from the low-hanging fruit until their baseline costs are more aligned with final demand."
Business and professional services, such as IT support, which are often outsourced by big companies, have suffered, say experts. The ISM survey for June reflects such conditions and trends.
"You're not going to see the kind of capital expenditures and investment to have the whole supply chain moving along with you," adds Castellani.
Cash-strapped state and local government are doing much the same as they struggle with budget deficits. Work outsourced to private contractors gets cut in an effort to save payroll positions.
"I don't think we're going to see a rapid pace of demand growth," says Steve East of Height Analytics. "We don't have private sector credit creation anymore and that's different in this recovery than past recoveries. In past recoveries lower interest got people to lever up more and household balance sheets lever up more."
Household mortgage debt decreased in 2008 for the first time since the Federal Reserve started issuing reports 35 years and has fallen four straight quarters though the first quarter of 2009. Consumer credit has fallen two straight quarters as of the first quarter of this year.
That sort of demand environment does not bode well for job creation, especially small business, which generates the majority of jobs.
Right now companies that need to increase output are adding to the workweek of current employees or hiring temporary workers. Hiring for full time positions usually lags by six to 12 months, according to experts.
"Even if they come back into the market, they're going to come in a little more slowly than they have to hire people in past recessions," says Gilliam.
Castellani of the Business Roundtable says hiring "will be a little more iffy than usual" because of doubts about the strength of the recovery.
Conference Board economist Ken Goldstein also expects a slow recovery but doesn't subscribe to the consumer slump, jobless recovery scenario. He says job growth - once it gets going in 2010--will average to 150,00-175,000 a month, but that is well below the quarter of a million average of the 1990s boom.
"There may be fewer clerks behind the cash register at the mall," says Goldstein, but jobs will appear as the economy grows and evolves. "The jobs that will be there may not be the jobs that are there right now. There are always new services."
Right now, the new force in the labor market is the federal government. By some estimates, the $789 billion stimulus package is creating 200,000-250,000. If so, that would put it on track to fulfill the Obama administration's goal of saving or creating 3.5 million jobs, which is about 2.7 percent of the total payrolls as of June.
Many of the plan's initiatives - from tax rebates to the cash-for-clunkers program to a homebuyer credit - are conventional tools meant to spur consumption, particularly of durable goods.
"The government is our spender of last resort," says Shierholz.
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