做人，要有情有义。
尤其是跟你同患共难的伙伴及跟你出生入死的战友，一定要同甘共苦。但是，这个做人的原则，切勿应用到股票投资上。
对股票，一定要炼就一副铁石心肠，不但要无情，而且要无义。三种情愫我们常常听到“不要与股票发生感情”之类的话，但不是每一个人都了解此言之深义。
实际的意义，就是“对股票，要无情。”
股友对股票，可以生出三种情愫：
第一种：一见钟情
对股票一见钟情，就好像一对一见钟情的男女，眼中只见其优点，不见其弱点，很容易作出错误的判断。
第二种：日久生情
对长期收藏的股票，发生感情，即使公司业务走向亏损，也不捨得脱售。他会找出种种理由来支持他不卖的决定。结果是亏损越来越严重，最后一无所有。
第三种是意乱情迷。
“意乱”就是心乱如麻，“情迷”就是情绪迷惘，不知何去何从。在这种情况下，思路焉得清晰？思路不清，如何能作出正确的判断？无法作出判断的人，多数没有主见，这种人最易被人牵着鼻子走。在股市屡次上当的，都是这种人。
凡是对股票一见钟情，或是日久生情，或是意乱情迷，最后都是身陷情网，为情所害。所以，对股票，一定要“无情”。
那么，何以对股票，还要“无义”呢？小股东以血汗钱买股票，就是购买公司的股份。购买公司的股份，其实就是提供免息的资金给公司。一厢情愿他希望与大股东同甘共苦，但，这只是一厢情愿的想法。
作为公司掌舵人的大股东，十之八九都以本身的利益为大前提，能为股东全体利益着想的并不多。散户只是搭客，大股东才是司机。汽车要驶向何方，完全掌握在司机手中，搭客无法置喙。
公司即使蒙受严重亏损，掌舵人照领高薪，小股东一无所得。既然大股东不能与小股东“共苦”，小股东又何必与大股东“同甘”呢？
所以，当汽车抛锚时，作为搭客的小股东一定要马上下车，切勿枯坐车中，浪费时间。跟股票发生感情，即使公司走向破产，仍不捨得脱售，就好像眼见铁坦尼号已快沉没了，仍不肯上救生艇，愚不可及。
所以，对所投资的公司，小股东要“有福同享，有难不同当”。这样做，有点残酷，却是小股东和散户生存之道。记住，对人不可无情。对股票不可有情。
Sunday, May 4, 2008
Buffett Says Credit Crisis Ebbs for Wall Street Firms
Warren Buffett, said the global credit crunch has eased for bankers, and the Federal Reserve probably averted more failures by helping to rescue Bear Stearns Cos.
“The worst of the crisis in Wall Street is over,” Buffett said today on Bloomberg Television. “In terms of people with individual mortgages, there’s a lot of pain left to come.”
Buffett, the world’s richest man according to Forbes magazine, said the Fed acted properly when it arranged a $2.4 billion buyout in March of New York-based Bear Stearns by JPMorgan Chase & Co. The billionaire said he turned down the opportunity because he lacked enough capital and time to craft a solution. More failures and wider panic may have resulted if the regulators didn’t halt the run on Bear Stearns, he said.
“The worry was that there would be contagion; it was a very real worry,” Buffett said. “If Bear Stearns had gone, the next day, somebody else would have gone. It could’ve been a very, very, very chaotic situation.”
Buffett, 77, said he was contacted in March before JPMorgan, the third-biggest U.S. bank by assets, agreed to buy Bear Stearns. The person calling him, whom he wouldn’t identify, was “someone responsible” and wasn’t from the Federal Reserve or the Treasury. The call lasted about half an hour, Buffett said.
Too Big for Buffett
“As I understand it, Bear Stearns had $65 billion due on Monday and I didn’t have $65 billion,” Buffett said. “I couldn’t get my mind around that situation in the required time.” New York-based JPMorgan was the right buyer for Bear Stearns, he added.
Berkshire had about $35 billion in cash as of March 31, according to a regulatory filing yesterday.
JPMorgan agreed in mid-March to acquire Bear Stearns, once the fifth-biggest U.S. securities firm, after customers grew concerned about the company’s health and pulled out their money, leaving Bear Stearns short on cash. JPMorgan, which got financial support from the Federal Reserve, raised the purchase price a week later to $10 a share from $2 to mollify Bear Stearns shareholders who said they weren’t getting enough.
The 24-company KBW Bank Index has advanced 14 percent since the Bear Stearns bailout was announced in March, and the 11- company Amex Securities Broker/Dealer Index has climbed 30 percent.
Credit Losses
In a question-and-answer session at the shareholder meeting, Buffett said that from a risk perspective, some banks got “too big to manage.”
The world’s largest banks and investment firms have recorded more than $300 billion of losses and writedowns tied to mortgages, bonds and loans.
Berkshire’s own investment in derivative contracts recovered $500 million to $600 million of lost value since the end of March, Buffett said. The company will make “significant money” on the derivatives over the long term, he said at the meeting. Berkshire said yesterday the value of the investments had declined by $1.7 billion in the first quarter. The entire company’s quarterly profit plunged 64 percent to $940 million.
Buffett is scheduled to embark on a four-city European trip this month to scout potential acquisitions, including family- owned companies. He has been investing in China, Israel and the U.K. to spur profit growth after saying that U.S. investments meeting his criteria have become scarce.
International Earnings
“Over time we’d like to develop more international earnings,” Buffett said. “If it’s a $2 billion deal, fine; if it’s a $20 billion dollar deal, fine.”
Buffett, who made his first non-U.S. acquisition in 2006, paying $4 billion for 80 percent of Israel-based Iscar Metalworking Cos., said he can’t predict the location of the next company Berkshire will acquire.
“They can come from Europe, they can come from the United States, you just never know,” he said. “Somebody, someplace is going to have a situation where we fit. They’re going to call me; I want to make sure I’m on their radar screen.”
Buffett said during the meeting he’d like to buy businesses in India and China, and that he wanted to acquire one or two non- U.S. companies in the next three years. He is looking as competition forces down insurance rates in the U.S. for Berkshire, which typically gets about half its profit from insurance units including National Indemnity, General Re Corp. and Geico Corp.
The U.S. dollar will keep weakening and Buffett feels “no need to hedge” against currency risk when buying large companies outside the U.S., he said.
Landing From Mars
“If I landed from Mars today with a billion of Mars dollars, or whatever they call them on Mars, and I was thinking about where to put my money,” he said. “I don’t think I’d put the entire billion in U.S. dollars.”
Berkshire Hathaway has spent $4 billion investing in the municipal auction-rate bond market, taking advantage of payouts that topped 10 percent after regular bidders fled the market. Markets were so disrupted, Buffett said, that bonds from the same issue were selling simultaneously from the same broker with yields of 6 percent and 11 percent.
Berkshire has risen about 22 percent in New York Stock Exchange composite trading during the past 12 months and gained about 4,700 percent in 20 years through Dec. 31, about six times more than the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index including dividends.
Buffett took shareholder questions for more than five hours on dozens of issues.
Other topics Buffett addressed include:
– There’s “no guarantee” Berkshire Hathaway won’t be a buyout target after his death, though such a takeover is unlikely.
– He said he’s in good health because of his diet, “some Wrigley, some Mars, some See’s, some Coke.” Berkshire this week committed $6.5 billion to help finance candy company Mars Inc.’s takeover of Wm. Wrigley Jr., the world’s biggest maker of chewing gum. Berkshire owns See’s Candies and is the top shareholder of Coca-Cola Co.
– He doesn’t support a push for companies or countries to boycott the Olympics in China based on that country’s human rights record.
– He would buy shares of PetroChina Co. again if they are at a level he considers cheap, Buffett said. Berkshire sold a stake in the company last year.
– Factories in China have different norms for working conditions than those in the U.S., and he won’t “tell the world how to run” their businesses.
“The worst of the crisis in Wall Street is over,” Buffett said today on Bloomberg Television. “In terms of people with individual mortgages, there’s a lot of pain left to come.”
Buffett, the world’s richest man according to Forbes magazine, said the Fed acted properly when it arranged a $2.4 billion buyout in March of New York-based Bear Stearns by JPMorgan Chase & Co. The billionaire said he turned down the opportunity because he lacked enough capital and time to craft a solution. More failures and wider panic may have resulted if the regulators didn’t halt the run on Bear Stearns, he said.
“The worry was that there would be contagion; it was a very real worry,” Buffett said. “If Bear Stearns had gone, the next day, somebody else would have gone. It could’ve been a very, very, very chaotic situation.”
Buffett, 77, said he was contacted in March before JPMorgan, the third-biggest U.S. bank by assets, agreed to buy Bear Stearns. The person calling him, whom he wouldn’t identify, was “someone responsible” and wasn’t from the Federal Reserve or the Treasury. The call lasted about half an hour, Buffett said.
Too Big for Buffett
“As I understand it, Bear Stearns had $65 billion due on Monday and I didn’t have $65 billion,” Buffett said. “I couldn’t get my mind around that situation in the required time.” New York-based JPMorgan was the right buyer for Bear Stearns, he added.
Berkshire had about $35 billion in cash as of March 31, according to a regulatory filing yesterday.
JPMorgan agreed in mid-March to acquire Bear Stearns, once the fifth-biggest U.S. securities firm, after customers grew concerned about the company’s health and pulled out their money, leaving Bear Stearns short on cash. JPMorgan, which got financial support from the Federal Reserve, raised the purchase price a week later to $10 a share from $2 to mollify Bear Stearns shareholders who said they weren’t getting enough.
The 24-company KBW Bank Index has advanced 14 percent since the Bear Stearns bailout was announced in March, and the 11- company Amex Securities Broker/Dealer Index has climbed 30 percent.
Credit Losses
In a question-and-answer session at the shareholder meeting, Buffett said that from a risk perspective, some banks got “too big to manage.”
The world’s largest banks and investment firms have recorded more than $300 billion of losses and writedowns tied to mortgages, bonds and loans.
Berkshire’s own investment in derivative contracts recovered $500 million to $600 million of lost value since the end of March, Buffett said. The company will make “significant money” on the derivatives over the long term, he said at the meeting. Berkshire said yesterday the value of the investments had declined by $1.7 billion in the first quarter. The entire company’s quarterly profit plunged 64 percent to $940 million.
Buffett is scheduled to embark on a four-city European trip this month to scout potential acquisitions, including family- owned companies. He has been investing in China, Israel and the U.K. to spur profit growth after saying that U.S. investments meeting his criteria have become scarce.
International Earnings
“Over time we’d like to develop more international earnings,” Buffett said. “If it’s a $2 billion deal, fine; if it’s a $20 billion dollar deal, fine.”
Buffett, who made his first non-U.S. acquisition in 2006, paying $4 billion for 80 percent of Israel-based Iscar Metalworking Cos., said he can’t predict the location of the next company Berkshire will acquire.
“They can come from Europe, they can come from the United States, you just never know,” he said. “Somebody, someplace is going to have a situation where we fit. They’re going to call me; I want to make sure I’m on their radar screen.”
Buffett said during the meeting he’d like to buy businesses in India and China, and that he wanted to acquire one or two non- U.S. companies in the next three years. He is looking as competition forces down insurance rates in the U.S. for Berkshire, which typically gets about half its profit from insurance units including National Indemnity, General Re Corp. and Geico Corp.
The U.S. dollar will keep weakening and Buffett feels “no need to hedge” against currency risk when buying large companies outside the U.S., he said.
Landing From Mars
“If I landed from Mars today with a billion of Mars dollars, or whatever they call them on Mars, and I was thinking about where to put my money,” he said. “I don’t think I’d put the entire billion in U.S. dollars.”
Berkshire Hathaway has spent $4 billion investing in the municipal auction-rate bond market, taking advantage of payouts that topped 10 percent after regular bidders fled the market. Markets were so disrupted, Buffett said, that bonds from the same issue were selling simultaneously from the same broker with yields of 6 percent and 11 percent.
Berkshire has risen about 22 percent in New York Stock Exchange composite trading during the past 12 months and gained about 4,700 percent in 20 years through Dec. 31, about six times more than the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index including dividends.
Buffett took shareholder questions for more than five hours on dozens of issues.
Other topics Buffett addressed include:
– There’s “no guarantee” Berkshire Hathaway won’t be a buyout target after his death, though such a takeover is unlikely.
– He said he’s in good health because of his diet, “some Wrigley, some Mars, some See’s, some Coke.” Berkshire this week committed $6.5 billion to help finance candy company Mars Inc.’s takeover of Wm. Wrigley Jr., the world’s biggest maker of chewing gum. Berkshire owns See’s Candies and is the top shareholder of Coca-Cola Co.
– He doesn’t support a push for companies or countries to boycott the Olympics in China based on that country’s human rights record.
– He would buy shares of PetroChina Co. again if they are at a level he considers cheap, Buffett said. Berkshire sold a stake in the company last year.
– Factories in China have different norms for working conditions than those in the U.S., and he won’t “tell the world how to run” their businesses.
生日礼物
大部份股票投资者，都有一种错误的想法：那就是在股市中不断地把股票买来卖出，赚取价差，是最好的赚钱法。
实际上，这样做，能赚大钱的人并不多。虽然没有人做过研究，也无法以数字加以证实，但我可以很有信心地说：通过这种投资方法发达的人，绝无仅有。
那些真正赚大钱的，几乎都不是活跃于股市的投资者。他们几乎从来没有脱售过他们的股票。不信的话，请你们看看马来西亚最富有的40个人中，有那一个是不断地将他们所持有的股票，买来卖去，而赚到他们今天的庞大财富？
长期持股累积财富尽管他们所从事的行业不同，做生意的手法也不同，但他们都有一个共同点：都是靠长期持有公司的股票而累积了庞大的财富。他们所持的股票，以复利的方式增长，经过了20、30、40年，增值数百倍。他们的身家，就这样如雪球般，越滚越大，把他们推上了大马富豪榜。如果他们在股价上涨5倍、10倍以后就把股票卖掉，他们绝对无法挤身于富豪之林。
以云顶（Genting，3182，主板贸服股）为例。假如你在1971年云顶上市时，以每股2令吉买进1千股，30多年来，不管股价起得多高，你都没有脱售，经过红股与股票拆细后，原来的1千股，现在变成了约35万股。以目前的股价，价值250万令吉左右。云顶在1989年时将部份名胜世界（Resorts，4715，主板贸服股）的股票分发给股东，然后让名胜世界上市。假如把云顶分发给股东的名胜世界股票，以及云顶和名胜世界历年所派发的股息计算在内的话，当初以2千令吉买进的1千股，现在估计价值500万令吉。假如小股东也好像已故丹斯里林梧桐那样，把云顶股票锁在保险箱中，一股也不卖，30多年后的今天，那些买进几千股的小股东，个个都是千万富翁。难怪一名老律师对我说：他在云顶上市时买进1万股，赚了10倍利润时就卖掉，当时还沾沾自喜，认为自己很聪明。今天当他回顾自己的投资时，他才发现这是他一生中所作的最大错误决定，如果他收藏这批云顶至今，他的身家直逼5千万令吉，他可以提早10年退休。
一般人总认为，只在富人才有机会在股市赚大钱。如果是这样的话，工薪阶级就没有机会升级为富人了。实际的情况是，大部份富人都不是来自富裕家庭。40个富豪榜中人，大部份年轻时都不富有。是的，不是每一个人都有像他们的际遇，成就他们这么庞大的事业。
我们其实也不必像他们那么富有，作为工薪阶级，在退休时手头有一、二百万令吉，晚年就可以过得很写意。若善于投资，这是大部份中等收入的工薪阶级都可以做到的。
定期投资五星级股票一个可行的方法是定期定量投资于五星级股票。请你在开始工作那年起你在每年生日那天，为自己买进1千股五星级股票，年年如此，累积至退休时，极有可能已是百万富翁。如果你在孩子出世时起，每年他生日那天，买进1千股五星级股票，你多数不必负担他的大学教育费。
请坚持以下几点：
（1）只买五星级股票。
（2）只要公司盈利持续上升，就不卖。
（3）把股息重新投资在派息公司的股票，可以加速复利增长率。
（4）绝不投机。
实际上，这样做，能赚大钱的人并不多。虽然没有人做过研究，也无法以数字加以证实，但我可以很有信心地说：通过这种投资方法发达的人，绝无仅有。
那些真正赚大钱的，几乎都不是活跃于股市的投资者。他们几乎从来没有脱售过他们的股票。不信的话，请你们看看马来西亚最富有的40个人中，有那一个是不断地将他们所持有的股票，买来卖去，而赚到他们今天的庞大财富？
长期持股累积财富尽管他们所从事的行业不同，做生意的手法也不同，但他们都有一个共同点：都是靠长期持有公司的股票而累积了庞大的财富。他们所持的股票，以复利的方式增长，经过了20、30、40年，增值数百倍。他们的身家，就这样如雪球般，越滚越大，把他们推上了大马富豪榜。如果他们在股价上涨5倍、10倍以后就把股票卖掉，他们绝对无法挤身于富豪之林。
以云顶（Genting，3182，主板贸服股）为例。假如你在1971年云顶上市时，以每股2令吉买进1千股，30多年来，不管股价起得多高，你都没有脱售，经过红股与股票拆细后，原来的1千股，现在变成了约35万股。以目前的股价，价值250万令吉左右。云顶在1989年时将部份名胜世界（Resorts，4715，主板贸服股）的股票分发给股东，然后让名胜世界上市。假如把云顶分发给股东的名胜世界股票，以及云顶和名胜世界历年所派发的股息计算在内的话，当初以2千令吉买进的1千股，现在估计价值500万令吉。假如小股东也好像已故丹斯里林梧桐那样，把云顶股票锁在保险箱中，一股也不卖，30多年后的今天，那些买进几千股的小股东，个个都是千万富翁。难怪一名老律师对我说：他在云顶上市时买进1万股，赚了10倍利润时就卖掉，当时还沾沾自喜，认为自己很聪明。今天当他回顾自己的投资时，他才发现这是他一生中所作的最大错误决定，如果他收藏这批云顶至今，他的身家直逼5千万令吉，他可以提早10年退休。
一般人总认为，只在富人才有机会在股市赚大钱。如果是这样的话，工薪阶级就没有机会升级为富人了。实际的情况是，大部份富人都不是来自富裕家庭。40个富豪榜中人，大部份年轻时都不富有。是的，不是每一个人都有像他们的际遇，成就他们这么庞大的事业。
我们其实也不必像他们那么富有，作为工薪阶级，在退休时手头有一、二百万令吉，晚年就可以过得很写意。若善于投资，这是大部份中等收入的工薪阶级都可以做到的。
定期投资五星级股票一个可行的方法是定期定量投资于五星级股票。请你在开始工作那年起你在每年生日那天，为自己买进1千股五星级股票，年年如此，累积至退休时，极有可能已是百万富翁。如果你在孩子出世时起，每年他生日那天，买进1千股五星级股票，你多数不必负担他的大学教育费。
请坚持以下几点：
（1）只买五星级股票。
（2）只要公司盈利持续上升，就不卖。
（3）把股息重新投资在派息公司的股票，可以加速复利增长率。
（4）绝不投机。
此时不买何时买？
四十年的投资经验告诉我：要准确地预测股市何时跌到底，是不可能的。因为股市是不可预测的。
最有成就的投资家，没有一个是靠预测“时机”（Timing）而成功的。我认为“可以买进了”，并非我有预测股市动向的能力。我没有这种“先知”的能力，我也不认为有谁有这种能力。即使是最成功的投资家和经济学家，也没有这种能力，何况是平凡的我们。我认为可以买进的理由是：许多股票已很便宜了，值得买进作为长期投资了。
我强调“长期”，是因为经验告诉我：股票投资不能靠“短期”赚钱。买进价值被低估，前景不错的股票，长期持有，是最稳当的赚钱途径。赚大钱需长期投资诸位不可立志赚快钱，却不可不立志赚大钱。赚大钱非长期投资不可。股票惟有价值被低估时才可以买进。现在价值被低估的股票，比比皆是。
随手举一个例子：以本月初4.50令吉的价格买进贸易风(TWS，4421，主板消费股)，等于你免费得到一间糖厂。这话怎么说？原来贸易风拥有贸易风种植(TWS Plnt，6327，主板种植股)的74%股权，以本月初贸易风种植3.50令吉的股价计算，单这74%股权价值超过13亿令吉。贸易风在沙阿南拥有一间大糖厂，价值数亿令吉。假设你以月初每股RM4.50，买完贸易风全部2亿9千600万股的股票，总投资额为13亿令吉。然后以每股RM3.50卖掉所持有的74%贸易风种植股票的话，刚好收回13亿令吉，你是不是免费得到一间价值数亿令吉的大糖厂？
不需要高深的理论，只要以常识去判断，就可以沙里淘金，找到价值被低估，而前景展望不错的股票。再举一个简单的例子，速远机构(Zhulian，5131，主板消费股)去年每股净赚18仙，派息15.5仙，以月初1.03令吉的股价，本益比为5.7倍，周息率高达15%，是不是值得考虑？许多人不敢买进，因为他们把股价孤立起来看，只看到股市和股价的波动，忘记了股票背后所代表的资产，所以，在股价下跌时，不敢买进。
实际上，在股票投资中，股市下跌才是机会，因为你才可以低价买到好股。养成反向思维习惯养成反向思维的习惯，在所有人不敢买进的时候，当所有在报章上出现的，都是坏消息的时候，就是买进的良机。无可否认的，美国经济已进入衰退期。次贷危机还未到尾声。
股市中人心惶惶，这是个危机，而机会往往就藏在危机中。我不知道股市明天会怎样，我没有这种本领，我也不靠这种本领赚钱。我的经验是：只要股票价值被低估，而所买股票的公司，前景展望良好。就应该买进。买进后贴身跟踪有关公司的业务进展，只要公司盈利继续上升，就不理会股价的波动，就不卖，可以赚钱。现在是择肥而噬的时候了。
不要忘记，股市通常是跑在经济前头六个月的。此时不买何时买？
最有成就的投资家，没有一个是靠预测“时机”（Timing）而成功的。我认为“可以买进了”，并非我有预测股市动向的能力。我没有这种“先知”的能力，我也不认为有谁有这种能力。即使是最成功的投资家和经济学家，也没有这种能力，何况是平凡的我们。我认为可以买进的理由是：许多股票已很便宜了，值得买进作为长期投资了。
我强调“长期”，是因为经验告诉我：股票投资不能靠“短期”赚钱。买进价值被低估，前景不错的股票，长期持有，是最稳当的赚钱途径。赚大钱需长期投资诸位不可立志赚快钱，却不可不立志赚大钱。赚大钱非长期投资不可。股票惟有价值被低估时才可以买进。现在价值被低估的股票，比比皆是。
随手举一个例子：以本月初4.50令吉的价格买进贸易风(TWS，4421，主板消费股)，等于你免费得到一间糖厂。这话怎么说？原来贸易风拥有贸易风种植(TWS Plnt，6327，主板种植股)的74%股权，以本月初贸易风种植3.50令吉的股价计算，单这74%股权价值超过13亿令吉。贸易风在沙阿南拥有一间大糖厂，价值数亿令吉。假设你以月初每股RM4.50，买完贸易风全部2亿9千600万股的股票，总投资额为13亿令吉。然后以每股RM3.50卖掉所持有的74%贸易风种植股票的话，刚好收回13亿令吉，你是不是免费得到一间价值数亿令吉的大糖厂？
不需要高深的理论，只要以常识去判断，就可以沙里淘金，找到价值被低估，而前景展望不错的股票。再举一个简单的例子，速远机构(Zhulian，5131，主板消费股)去年每股净赚18仙，派息15.5仙，以月初1.03令吉的股价，本益比为5.7倍，周息率高达15%，是不是值得考虑？许多人不敢买进，因为他们把股价孤立起来看，只看到股市和股价的波动，忘记了股票背后所代表的资产，所以，在股价下跌时，不敢买进。
实际上，在股票投资中，股市下跌才是机会，因为你才可以低价买到好股。养成反向思维习惯养成反向思维的习惯，在所有人不敢买进的时候，当所有在报章上出现的，都是坏消息的时候，就是买进的良机。无可否认的，美国经济已进入衰退期。次贷危机还未到尾声。
股市中人心惶惶，这是个危机，而机会往往就藏在危机中。我不知道股市明天会怎样，我没有这种本领，我也不靠这种本领赚钱。我的经验是：只要股票价值被低估，而所买股票的公司，前景展望良好。就应该买进。买进后贴身跟踪有关公司的业务进展，只要公司盈利继续上升，就不理会股价的波动，就不卖，可以赚钱。现在是择肥而噬的时候了。
不要忘记，股市通常是跑在经济前头六个月的。此时不买何时买？
知道風險投機較投資安全
大家都知道，凱恩斯是把操縱經濟的大權從神靈手上奪回交給政府的經濟學一代宗師，對他在投機上的成就，知之者似乎不多或僅略知一二。
事實上，凱恩斯在投機市場，雖然屢敗屢戰（其資本主要來自稿費和版稅），但最終仍藉投機外滙、期貨、股票和債券，賺取可觀利潤。以今天的購買力，遺產約達一億港元，對於學者來說，這樣的財富，史家指出只有李嘉圖勝他一籌。
不論站在什麼角度，凱恩斯的投機成績都很出色，雖然期間他數度「押錯寶」瀕臨破產之厄，唯整體而言，以複利計算，每年平均增值仍高達百分之十三（以「七二法則」〔Rule of 72〕推算，五年多便翻一番），雖比不上畢非德和索羅斯之輩，卻遠較大部分專業投資經理為佳.
凱恩斯不僅自己發財，他負責的劍大英皇書院的基金亦有可觀的增長，這些事實，知之者則不少，唯他的投機秘訣與心得，則向來甚少人提及。對於他的「投機倒把」亦隻字不提.
說凱恩斯投機而非投資，並非筆誤而是大有道理。在一般人心目中，投資是正道，投機是左道，這是基於投資所冒風險較小較安全的設想；但凱恩斯的看法完全相反，他自稱是「嚴格的賭徒」（scientific gambler），認為投機較投資安全，因為投機者知道他須冒風險，同時清楚風險所在，因此投機之前必定設想周到，處處設防（如定下止蝕價位，即投機項目升跌逸出預算時便「壯士斷臂」割掉損失），結果反而沒有危險或把風險限制在可以承擔的水平；若把買賣視作投資，投資者以為一切都在計算之中，許多時候忽視或漠視了隱藏的風險，結果反而更不安全。
凱恩斯因此認為劃分投機和投資的簡便方法，是前者知道危險而後者不知道危險。這段話是凱恩斯一九三八年寫信給他一位友人時提及的，其精義便是現在眾所周知的投機者座右銘：「知道危險沒有危險！」意味真正投機者在買賣前必須對形勢作全面評估—連可能出現的風險都在計算之中。筆者的看法是，香港人入市（任何市場），即使抱持長線「投資」的宗旨，亦應以投機心情觀察市場變化，才不會受「投資」之名所累而吃虧。
說起「長線投資」，大家不期然會記起凱恩斯那句膾炙人口的話「長期而言，我們都一命嗚呼」（in the long run we are all dead）
事實上，凱恩斯從不認為能夠「預測最短期的經濟甚至最短期（內公布）的公司盈利」，香港政府多年來數度調低經濟增長預測，便是一個活生生的例子。凱恩斯於一九三一年和一九三四年兩度遊美，對華爾街大亨誇言能預測六個月後的公司業績，大感驚奇並大不以為然。
凱恩斯的投資哲學和實踐手法很值得學習；那些知道凱恩斯精於投資和投機之道的，可能忽略他的成功取決於其簡單的「相反理論實力主義」（Contrarian Fundamentalism），而非倚賴他的經濟學理論或熟悉金融市場內幕。凱恩斯的投機習慣令人羡慕，其買賣決策於早上在床上完成—他醒後在床上進早餐、讀報、接聽倫敦經紀「報行情」的電話，然後在電話中落單買賣。
凱恩斯不大重視投資專家特別是經紀行的分析，亦極少公開談論市道，他的投機活動在他起床後告終，以後的時間埋首於學術研究；假如你希望找尋一位投機大師作為仿效榜樣，不妨考慮凱恩斯這位偉大的英國唯美主義者和經濟學家。基本上，他是一名典型的業餘投機者，把投機視作豐裕人生中的一個環節。他洞悉投機對象的真正價值，加上有知識分子的高傲性格，以致他的投資策略經常與群眾（包括一些自以為消息靈通的市場人士）背道而馳。
他於一九四四年致友人（基金經理）的函件中說：「我的投資原則，不同流俗。因為當人們看好某種股票時（agreed about its merits），其股價肯定已被炒高，因此亦失去吸購的價值。」凱恩斯認為股民是盲目的，因此他要「背離群眾」；不但如此，他還經常說服他們買入或沽出，然後採取相反步驟，以現在的標準，這當然是不道德的。
凱恩斯這句來自其一九二三年發表的〈貨幣改革短論〉（A Tract on Monetary Reform），整段話是：「This long run is a misleading guide to current affairs. In the long run we are all dead. Economists set themselves too easy, too useless a task if in tempestuous seasons they can only tell us that when the storm is long past the ocean is flat again.」試譯如下：「看得太遠，對當前事務有誤導作用。長期而言，大家都一命嗚呼。經濟學家為自己定下太容易太容易達致的工作目標，這便如在狂風驟雨中經濟學家老說風暴過後天氣會再晴朗。」凱恩斯重複long run二字，頗有幽默的味道，本該照譯，才能顯其妙趣，但中文讀起來有點不自然，遂改之如上.
事實上，凱恩斯在投機市場，雖然屢敗屢戰（其資本主要來自稿費和版稅），但最終仍藉投機外滙、期貨、股票和債券，賺取可觀利潤。以今天的購買力，遺產約達一億港元，對於學者來說，這樣的財富，史家指出只有李嘉圖勝他一籌。
不論站在什麼角度，凱恩斯的投機成績都很出色，雖然期間他數度「押錯寶」瀕臨破產之厄，唯整體而言，以複利計算，每年平均增值仍高達百分之十三（以「七二法則」〔Rule of 72〕推算，五年多便翻一番），雖比不上畢非德和索羅斯之輩，卻遠較大部分專業投資經理為佳.
凱恩斯不僅自己發財，他負責的劍大英皇書院的基金亦有可觀的增長，這些事實，知之者則不少，唯他的投機秘訣與心得，則向來甚少人提及。對於他的「投機倒把」亦隻字不提.
說凱恩斯投機而非投資，並非筆誤而是大有道理。在一般人心目中，投資是正道，投機是左道，這是基於投資所冒風險較小較安全的設想；但凱恩斯的看法完全相反，他自稱是「嚴格的賭徒」（scientific gambler），認為投機較投資安全，因為投機者知道他須冒風險，同時清楚風險所在，因此投機之前必定設想周到，處處設防（如定下止蝕價位，即投機項目升跌逸出預算時便「壯士斷臂」割掉損失），結果反而沒有危險或把風險限制在可以承擔的水平；若把買賣視作投資，投資者以為一切都在計算之中，許多時候忽視或漠視了隱藏的風險，結果反而更不安全。
凱恩斯因此認為劃分投機和投資的簡便方法，是前者知道危險而後者不知道危險。這段話是凱恩斯一九三八年寫信給他一位友人時提及的，其精義便是現在眾所周知的投機者座右銘：「知道危險沒有危險！」意味真正投機者在買賣前必須對形勢作全面評估—連可能出現的風險都在計算之中。筆者的看法是，香港人入市（任何市場），即使抱持長線「投資」的宗旨，亦應以投機心情觀察市場變化，才不會受「投資」之名所累而吃虧。
說起「長線投資」，大家不期然會記起凱恩斯那句膾炙人口的話「長期而言，我們都一命嗚呼」（in the long run we are all dead）
事實上，凱恩斯從不認為能夠「預測最短期的經濟甚至最短期（內公布）的公司盈利」，香港政府多年來數度調低經濟增長預測，便是一個活生生的例子。凱恩斯於一九三一年和一九三四年兩度遊美，對華爾街大亨誇言能預測六個月後的公司業績，大感驚奇並大不以為然。
凱恩斯的投資哲學和實踐手法很值得學習；那些知道凱恩斯精於投資和投機之道的，可能忽略他的成功取決於其簡單的「相反理論實力主義」（Contrarian Fundamentalism），而非倚賴他的經濟學理論或熟悉金融市場內幕。凱恩斯的投機習慣令人羡慕，其買賣決策於早上在床上完成—他醒後在床上進早餐、讀報、接聽倫敦經紀「報行情」的電話，然後在電話中落單買賣。
凱恩斯不大重視投資專家特別是經紀行的分析，亦極少公開談論市道，他的投機活動在他起床後告終，以後的時間埋首於學術研究；假如你希望找尋一位投機大師作為仿效榜樣，不妨考慮凱恩斯這位偉大的英國唯美主義者和經濟學家。基本上，他是一名典型的業餘投機者，把投機視作豐裕人生中的一個環節。他洞悉投機對象的真正價值，加上有知識分子的高傲性格，以致他的投資策略經常與群眾（包括一些自以為消息靈通的市場人士）背道而馳。
他於一九四四年致友人（基金經理）的函件中說：「我的投資原則，不同流俗。因為當人們看好某種股票時（agreed about its merits），其股價肯定已被炒高，因此亦失去吸購的價值。」凱恩斯認為股民是盲目的，因此他要「背離群眾」；不但如此，他還經常說服他們買入或沽出，然後採取相反步驟，以現在的標準，這當然是不道德的。
凱恩斯這句來自其一九二三年發表的〈貨幣改革短論〉（A Tract on Monetary Reform），整段話是：「This long run is a misleading guide to current affairs. In the long run we are all dead. Economists set themselves too easy, too useless a task if in tempestuous seasons they can only tell us that when the storm is long past the ocean is flat again.」試譯如下：「看得太遠，對當前事務有誤導作用。長期而言，大家都一命嗚呼。經濟學家為自己定下太容易太容易達致的工作目標，這便如在狂風驟雨中經濟學家老說風暴過後天氣會再晴朗。」凱恩斯重複long run二字，頗有幽默的味道，本該照譯，才能顯其妙趣，但中文讀起來有點不自然，遂改之如上.
Saturday, May 3, 2008
美減稅法案將自動失效
美股方面，2000年殊仔上台後提出減稅方案（股息稅由35％降至15％，資本升值稅由20％降到15％，2003年生效，到2009年12月31日後失效）。
除非明年新總統上台後立即通過臨時減稅法案加以延長，不然2009年後美股將大受壓力，因上述減稅方案係令美股由2003年起上升嘅其中一項重要因素；上述法案卻喺二十個月後自動失效，將係2009年後美股另一威脅。响美國政府財政赤字咁龐大嘅情況下，又有邊位新總統有吉士一上台便要求將上述減稅法案延長而同時獲國會通過？2009年同2002年環境唔同，當年因發生2001年「九一一慘劇」，人人憂慮美國出現衰退。當年客觀環境有利通過減股息稅及資本升值稅法案（何況係臨時）；依家客觀環境卻大大唔同。
拉斯維加斯嘅金沙集團（全球最大賭業集團）宣布，今年首季虧損1120萬美元或每股3美仙（去年同期獲利9090萬美元或每股26美仙）。該公司投資120億美元喺澳門興建酒店及賭場。金沙今年首季收益雖然較去年同期上升 72％，達10.08億美元，但仍未符合分析員事前估計嘅12.2億美元。消息公布後金沙股價喺場外交易跌7.22美元，至69美元；今年金沙股價已回落 26％。
今年1月金沙集團响拉斯維加斯開業嘅Palazzo入住率只有79％，較拉斯維加斯另一酒店威尼斯人91％（一年前99％）為低，主要受高油價影響，令揸車去拉斯維加斯賭嘅人數較估計中少。
2004年响澳門開業嘅金沙酒店EBITDA亦跌36％，至6530萬元，主因係被去年8月開業嘅威尼斯人搶走部分VIP客戶，以及去年5月新濠國際開業嘅Crown酒店影響。今年4月23日澳門政府宣布停發新賭牌，維持只有六個，因回歸後至今賭場數目已增加超過一倍，至二十九間，而且未來仍然在增加中。
金沙集團亦有投資新加坡聖淘沙嘅賭場，2009年開業，涉及資金40億美元。另喺美國賓州伯利恒城投資一間賭場，涉及投資8億美元，並有意用7500萬英鎊購入倫敦賭場Les Ambassadurs。
過去一般人認為生意淡薄，不離賭博。睇嚟世界性賭業一樣受經濟吹淡風所影響！
除非明年新總統上台後立即通過臨時減稅法案加以延長，不然2009年後美股將大受壓力，因上述減稅方案係令美股由2003年起上升嘅其中一項重要因素；上述法案卻喺二十個月後自動失效，將係2009年後美股另一威脅。响美國政府財政赤字咁龐大嘅情況下，又有邊位新總統有吉士一上台便要求將上述減稅法案延長而同時獲國會通過？2009年同2002年環境唔同，當年因發生2001年「九一一慘劇」，人人憂慮美國出現衰退。當年客觀環境有利通過減股息稅及資本升值稅法案（何況係臨時）；依家客觀環境卻大大唔同。
拉斯維加斯嘅金沙集團（全球最大賭業集團）宣布，今年首季虧損1120萬美元或每股3美仙（去年同期獲利9090萬美元或每股26美仙）。該公司投資120億美元喺澳門興建酒店及賭場。金沙今年首季收益雖然較去年同期上升 72％，達10.08億美元，但仍未符合分析員事前估計嘅12.2億美元。消息公布後金沙股價喺場外交易跌7.22美元，至69美元；今年金沙股價已回落 26％。
今年1月金沙集團响拉斯維加斯開業嘅Palazzo入住率只有79％，較拉斯維加斯另一酒店威尼斯人91％（一年前99％）為低，主要受高油價影響，令揸車去拉斯維加斯賭嘅人數較估計中少。
2004年响澳門開業嘅金沙酒店EBITDA亦跌36％，至6530萬元，主因係被去年8月開業嘅威尼斯人搶走部分VIP客戶，以及去年5月新濠國際開業嘅Crown酒店影響。今年4月23日澳門政府宣布停發新賭牌，維持只有六個，因回歸後至今賭場數目已增加超過一倍，至二十九間，而且未來仍然在增加中。
金沙集團亦有投資新加坡聖淘沙嘅賭場，2009年開業，涉及資金40億美元。另喺美國賓州伯利恒城投資一間賭場，涉及投資8億美元，並有意用7500萬英鎊購入倫敦賭場Les Ambassadurs。
過去一般人認為生意淡薄，不離賭博。睇嚟世界性賭業一樣受經濟吹淡風所影響！
市場永遠是Forward Looking
要投資成功，高學歷和複雜的財經知識可能是優勢，並有助投資者鑽研各類金融資產之虛實。
但說句老實話，知識和分析力不是最重要的成功因素，反而一些看似是常識(Common Sense)的因素往往能影響大局，如下:
1) 良好的心理質素 --- 心亂了，那管閣下坐擁億萬圓資金，亦只會敗陣.
2) 紀律 --- 即使有上好戰略，軍中陣法亂了亦很難取勝.
3) 實行已定計劃 --- 即是簡單至「Buy & Hold」大型藍籌股，亦是一項計劃。若然不老實執行，就算是諸葛亮的「隆中對」亦亳無用處.
4) 有承認錯誤的勇氣，凡人不是全能全知的 --- 發現看錯了市場形勢，或者是選錯了股票，最聰明的做法是立即沽出認賠(Cut Loss)。若然基本面嚴重轉壞，下跌20%的股票可以再跌多20%、30%，直至一文不值之時閣下才可說不能再跌.
5) 用「Common Sense」及「Simple Logic」去思考，並用「Simple Maths」去「廟算」。太深的事情可能不是投資者應去接觸
6) 了解欲投資的國家、行業和個股，並用「Simple Words」再講一次個「Story」，即是包括其業務性質、競爭優勢、前景、風險、估值等等
7) 若然自認不能做到. 大可向人請教。若然自認問人太麻煩，可投資於「Exchanged Traded Fund (ETF)」，如盈富基金.
8) 永遠保持彈性，形勢變了就要重新評估策略，切忌墨守成規.
9) 專家意見僅能作參巧，盲目迷信而不作獨立思考是十分危險的事情。始終，投資人是要向自己負責，逃避是最差劣的輸家做法，而以欠公平或不客觀的方法去進行分析亦能導至致命的犯錯(Fatal Mistake).
10) 別以為自已能夠時常戰勝市場 --- 事實上，大部份時間市場是有效率(當然有時市場失效)，而且比起大部份人聰明。不少基金長遠跑輸大市，但是大部份大眾的表現比起基金經理還要差勁.
11) 哲學(尤是Logic和東方哲學)、心理、歷史等書籍，不能不看.
12) 向前望，而不是用倒後鏡 --- 永遠不要忘記，資本市場永遠是向前看(Forward Looking)。若然等到業績、經濟數據或事情成為新聞之際，很多時早已被市場反映。因此，優秀的投資者應該像棋手一般，由蛛絲馬跡中聞到市場或基本面的趨勢轉變，並有先見之明早作分析和部暑。不少人，甚至包括專家，只依靠滯後的事實來預測未來。對於這類人，筆者只能說: 「傻瓜，市場是Forward Looking的!」
但說句老實話，知識和分析力不是最重要的成功因素，反而一些看似是常識(Common Sense)的因素往往能影響大局，如下:
1) 良好的心理質素 --- 心亂了，那管閣下坐擁億萬圓資金，亦只會敗陣.
2) 紀律 --- 即使有上好戰略，軍中陣法亂了亦很難取勝.
3) 實行已定計劃 --- 即是簡單至「Buy & Hold」大型藍籌股，亦是一項計劃。若然不老實執行，就算是諸葛亮的「隆中對」亦亳無用處.
4) 有承認錯誤的勇氣，凡人不是全能全知的 --- 發現看錯了市場形勢，或者是選錯了股票，最聰明的做法是立即沽出認賠(Cut Loss)。若然基本面嚴重轉壞，下跌20%的股票可以再跌多20%、30%，直至一文不值之時閣下才可說不能再跌.
5) 用「Common Sense」及「Simple Logic」去思考，並用「Simple Maths」去「廟算」。太深的事情可能不是投資者應去接觸
6) 了解欲投資的國家、行業和個股，並用「Simple Words」再講一次個「Story」，即是包括其業務性質、競爭優勢、前景、風險、估值等等
7) 若然自認不能做到. 大可向人請教。若然自認問人太麻煩，可投資於「Exchanged Traded Fund (ETF)」，如盈富基金.
8) 永遠保持彈性，形勢變了就要重新評估策略，切忌墨守成規.
9) 專家意見僅能作參巧，盲目迷信而不作獨立思考是十分危險的事情。始終，投資人是要向自己負責，逃避是最差劣的輸家做法，而以欠公平或不客觀的方法去進行分析亦能導至致命的犯錯(Fatal Mistake).
10) 別以為自已能夠時常戰勝市場 --- 事實上，大部份時間市場是有效率(當然有時市場失效)，而且比起大部份人聰明。不少基金長遠跑輸大市，但是大部份大眾的表現比起基金經理還要差勁.
11) 哲學(尤是Logic和東方哲學)、心理、歷史等書籍，不能不看.
12) 向前望，而不是用倒後鏡 --- 永遠不要忘記，資本市場永遠是向前看(Forward Looking)。若然等到業績、經濟數據或事情成為新聞之際，很多時早已被市場反映。因此，優秀的投資者應該像棋手一般，由蛛絲馬跡中聞到市場或基本面的趨勢轉變，並有先見之明早作分析和部暑。不少人，甚至包括專家，只依靠滯後的事實來預測未來。對於這類人，筆者只能說: 「傻瓜，市場是Forward Looking的!」
Thursday, May 1, 2008
When those who didn't care meet those who didn't think
What happens when the one who doesn't care meets the one who doesn’t think?
It is a recipe for mischief and ultimately disaster in the field of investment.In investment, who is the one who doesn’t care and who is the one who doesn’t think is clearly distinguishable.
As Warren Bufett remarked, “First, many on Wall Street – a community which quality control is not prized – will sell investors anything they will buy. Generally, many market participants will not think what they will buy. A public opinion poll will usually replace thoughts for them which is the first step towards disaster. Obviously, no single event works per se can cause destruction to the world of investment. It’s usually a chain of events that lead to it. And we will try to unravel some of the critical events and key players that lead to it.
And of course, simply by following a contrarian approach is just as foolish as a follow-the-crowd strategy. Just because a stock or business is unpopular does not make it an intelligent purchase. What’s required is thinking rather than polling.
In reality, unfortunately, Bertrand Russell’s observation about life in general applies with an uncanny truth in the financial world: “Most men would rather die than think. Many do.”Originally, bonds that were initially investment-grade and downgraded were termed as “fallen-angels.” But yet again, Wall Street is full of illusionists.
Then, in the 1980s, a new kind of bastardized fallen angel burst onto the investment scene – “Junk bonds” that were far below investment grade when issued. As the decade passed, new offerings of manufactured junks became ever junkier and ultimately the predictable outcome occurred: Junk bonds lived up to their name and obviously it was started promoted by those who didn’t care to those who didn’t think. In 1990 – even before the recession dealt its blows – the financial sky became dark with the bodies of failing corporations.
The preacher of debt assured us that this collapse wouldn’t happen: Huge debt, we were told, would cause operating managers to focus their efforts as never before (remember when you were a student, it is so easy to come up with dozens of positive reason for doing something but then most of it are illusions), much as a dagger mounted on the steering wheel of a car could be expected to make its driver proceed with intensified care. With such attention given, a very alert driver will be produced. But another certain consequence would be a deadly – and unnecessary – accident if the car hit even the tiniest pothole. The roads of business are riddled with potholes; a plan that required dodging them all is a plan for disaster.
In the final chapter of The Intelligent Investor Ben Graham forcefully rejected the dagger thesis: “Confronted with a challenge to distill the secret of sound investment into three words, we venture the motto, Margin of Safety.” The failure of investors to heed this simple message caused them staggering losses as the 1990s began.
At the height of the debt mania, capital structures were concocted that guaranteed failure: In some cases, so much debt was issued that even highly favorable business results could not produce the funds to service it. Many businesses, good or bad, then bought with a mountain of debts could not service the interest with the gross income. Many of the bonds that financed the purchase were sold to the eventual failing savings and loan associations. And guess again who pick up the tabs for this folly? Again, it is the taxpayer.
When these disservices were done, however, dagger-selling investment bankers or rather promotees pointed to the “scholarly” research of academics, which reported that over the years the higher the interest rates received from low-grade bonds had more than compensated for their higher rate of default. Thus, said the friendly salesmen, a diversified portfolio of junk bonds would produce greater net returns than would a portfolio of high-grade bonds.
But, there was a flaw in the salesmen’s logic – one that a first-year student in statistics is taught to recognize. An assumption was being made that the universe of newly-minted junk bonds was identical to the universe of low-grade fallen angels and that, therefore, the default experience of the latter group was meaningful in predicting the default experience of the new issues.
The universes were of course unlike in several vital respects. For openers, the manager of a fallen angel almost invariably yearned to regain investment-grade status and worked towards that goal. The junk-bond operator was usually an entirely different breed. Behaving much as a heroin user might, he devoted his energies not to finding a cure for his debt-ridden condition, but rather to finding another fix. Additionally, the fiduciary sensitivities of the executives managing the typical fallen angel were often, though not always, more finely developed than were those of the junk-bond-issuing ones.
Wall Street cared little for such distinctions. As usual, the Street’s enthusiasm for an idea was proportional not to its merit, but rather to the revenue it would produce. Mountains of junk bonds were sold by those who didn’t care to those who didn’t think – and there was no shortage of either.
It is a recipe for mischief and ultimately disaster in the field of investment.In investment, who is the one who doesn’t care and who is the one who doesn’t think is clearly distinguishable.
As Warren Bufett remarked, “First, many on Wall Street – a community which quality control is not prized – will sell investors anything they will buy. Generally, many market participants will not think what they will buy. A public opinion poll will usually replace thoughts for them which is the first step towards disaster. Obviously, no single event works per se can cause destruction to the world of investment. It’s usually a chain of events that lead to it. And we will try to unravel some of the critical events and key players that lead to it.
And of course, simply by following a contrarian approach is just as foolish as a follow-the-crowd strategy. Just because a stock or business is unpopular does not make it an intelligent purchase. What’s required is thinking rather than polling.
In reality, unfortunately, Bertrand Russell’s observation about life in general applies with an uncanny truth in the financial world: “Most men would rather die than think. Many do.”Originally, bonds that were initially investment-grade and downgraded were termed as “fallen-angels.” But yet again, Wall Street is full of illusionists.
Then, in the 1980s, a new kind of bastardized fallen angel burst onto the investment scene – “Junk bonds” that were far below investment grade when issued. As the decade passed, new offerings of manufactured junks became ever junkier and ultimately the predictable outcome occurred: Junk bonds lived up to their name and obviously it was started promoted by those who didn’t care to those who didn’t think. In 1990 – even before the recession dealt its blows – the financial sky became dark with the bodies of failing corporations.
The preacher of debt assured us that this collapse wouldn’t happen: Huge debt, we were told, would cause operating managers to focus their efforts as never before (remember when you were a student, it is so easy to come up with dozens of positive reason for doing something but then most of it are illusions), much as a dagger mounted on the steering wheel of a car could be expected to make its driver proceed with intensified care. With such attention given, a very alert driver will be produced. But another certain consequence would be a deadly – and unnecessary – accident if the car hit even the tiniest pothole. The roads of business are riddled with potholes; a plan that required dodging them all is a plan for disaster.
In the final chapter of The Intelligent Investor Ben Graham forcefully rejected the dagger thesis: “Confronted with a challenge to distill the secret of sound investment into three words, we venture the motto, Margin of Safety.” The failure of investors to heed this simple message caused them staggering losses as the 1990s began.
At the height of the debt mania, capital structures were concocted that guaranteed failure: In some cases, so much debt was issued that even highly favorable business results could not produce the funds to service it. Many businesses, good or bad, then bought with a mountain of debts could not service the interest with the gross income. Many of the bonds that financed the purchase were sold to the eventual failing savings and loan associations. And guess again who pick up the tabs for this folly? Again, it is the taxpayer.
When these disservices were done, however, dagger-selling investment bankers or rather promotees pointed to the “scholarly” research of academics, which reported that over the years the higher the interest rates received from low-grade bonds had more than compensated for their higher rate of default. Thus, said the friendly salesmen, a diversified portfolio of junk bonds would produce greater net returns than would a portfolio of high-grade bonds.
But, there was a flaw in the salesmen’s logic – one that a first-year student in statistics is taught to recognize. An assumption was being made that the universe of newly-minted junk bonds was identical to the universe of low-grade fallen angels and that, therefore, the default experience of the latter group was meaningful in predicting the default experience of the new issues.
The universes were of course unlike in several vital respects. For openers, the manager of a fallen angel almost invariably yearned to regain investment-grade status and worked towards that goal. The junk-bond operator was usually an entirely different breed. Behaving much as a heroin user might, he devoted his energies not to finding a cure for his debt-ridden condition, but rather to finding another fix. Additionally, the fiduciary sensitivities of the executives managing the typical fallen angel were often, though not always, more finely developed than were those of the junk-bond-issuing ones.
Wall Street cared little for such distinctions. As usual, the Street’s enthusiasm for an idea was proportional not to its merit, but rather to the revenue it would produce. Mountains of junk bonds were sold by those who didn’t care to those who didn’t think – and there was no shortage of either.
Who does better collectively? Active or Passive investors?
Who does better, the active investor or the passive investor? William Sharpe, a Nobel Prize winner, divides the world of investors in “active” and “passive” investors.
A passive investor is one who is sensible enough to realize you can’t beat the market. The passive investor who thus knowing his limitation would logically put all his money into a market portfolio of every stock in existence (roughly, an “index fund”).
An active investor is one who suffers from the delusion (if you know what you are doing, it is not a delusion) that he can beat the market. The active investor puts his money into anything except a market portfolio. By Sharpe’s terms, an active investor need not trade “actively.” A retiree who has two shares of Johnson & Johnson in the bottom of his drawer counts as an active investor. He is operating on the assumption that JNJ is a better stock to own than a total market index fund. Active investors include anyone who tries to pick “good” stocks and shun “bad” ones, or who hires someone else to do that by putting money into an actively managed mutual fund or investment partnership.
Who does better was Sharpe’s query: the active investors or the passive ones? Collectively, the world’s investors own 100 percent of all the world’s stocks. In other words, the average return of all the world’s investors – before factoring in management expenses, brokerage fees and taxes – has to be identical to the average return of the stock market as a whole. It can’t be otherwise.
Even more clearly, the average return of just the passive investors is equal to the average stock market return since all passive investors invest in the market index which matches the return of the whole market.
By subtracting the return of the passive investors from the aggregate, this leaves the return of the active investors. Since the passive investors have exactly the same return as the whole, it follows that the active investors, as a group, must also have the same average return as the whole market. This leads to a surprising conclusion. Collectively (not individually), active investors must do no better or worst (before taxes and fees) than the passive investors.
Some active investors do better than others, as we all know. Every active investor hopes to do better than the others. One thing is for sure: Everyone can’t do “better than average.”
Active investing is thus a zero-sum game. The only way for one active investor to do better than average is for another active investor to do worst than average. You can’t wriggle out of this conclusion by imagining that the active investor’s profits come at the expense of those wimpy passive investors who settle for average return. The average return of the passive investors is exactly the same as that of the active investors, for the reason highlighted earlier.
Now factor in expenses. The passive investors have little or no brokerage fees, management fees, or capital gain taxes (they rarely have to sell). The expenses of the active traders vary. For most parts, active investors will be paying a percent or two in fees and more in commissions and taxes. (Hedge fund investors pay much more in fees when the fund does well.) This is something like 2 percent on capital per year and must be deducted from the return.
Two percent is no small cake. In the twentieth century, the average stock market return was something like 5 percent more than the risk-free rate. Yet an active investor has to earn about two percentage points more than average just to keep up with the passive investors.
Do some active investors achieve that? Absolutely. Then do these active investors who have achieved that are also able to sustain what they are doing? Again, a resounding yes. They’re the smart or lucky few – more smart than lucky – who fall at the upper end of the spectrum of returns. The majority of active investors do not achieve that break-even point. Most people who think they can beat the market do worst than the market (worst yet, some deceive themselves by counting the wins but not the losses – ask how many gamblers who always proclaim a win when they strike a lottery). This is an irrefutable conclusion. Sharpe said, and it is not based on fancy economic theorizing. It simply follows from the laws of arithmetic.
A passive investor is one who is sensible enough to realize you can’t beat the market. The passive investor who thus knowing his limitation would logically put all his money into a market portfolio of every stock in existence (roughly, an “index fund”).
An active investor is one who suffers from the delusion (if you know what you are doing, it is not a delusion) that he can beat the market. The active investor puts his money into anything except a market portfolio. By Sharpe’s terms, an active investor need not trade “actively.” A retiree who has two shares of Johnson & Johnson in the bottom of his drawer counts as an active investor. He is operating on the assumption that JNJ is a better stock to own than a total market index fund. Active investors include anyone who tries to pick “good” stocks and shun “bad” ones, or who hires someone else to do that by putting money into an actively managed mutual fund or investment partnership.
Who does better was Sharpe’s query: the active investors or the passive ones? Collectively, the world’s investors own 100 percent of all the world’s stocks. In other words, the average return of all the world’s investors – before factoring in management expenses, brokerage fees and taxes – has to be identical to the average return of the stock market as a whole. It can’t be otherwise.
Even more clearly, the average return of just the passive investors is equal to the average stock market return since all passive investors invest in the market index which matches the return of the whole market.
By subtracting the return of the passive investors from the aggregate, this leaves the return of the active investors. Since the passive investors have exactly the same return as the whole, it follows that the active investors, as a group, must also have the same average return as the whole market. This leads to a surprising conclusion. Collectively (not individually), active investors must do no better or worst (before taxes and fees) than the passive investors.
Some active investors do better than others, as we all know. Every active investor hopes to do better than the others. One thing is for sure: Everyone can’t do “better than average.”
Active investing is thus a zero-sum game. The only way for one active investor to do better than average is for another active investor to do worst than average. You can’t wriggle out of this conclusion by imagining that the active investor’s profits come at the expense of those wimpy passive investors who settle for average return. The average return of the passive investors is exactly the same as that of the active investors, for the reason highlighted earlier.
Now factor in expenses. The passive investors have little or no brokerage fees, management fees, or capital gain taxes (they rarely have to sell). The expenses of the active traders vary. For most parts, active investors will be paying a percent or two in fees and more in commissions and taxes. (Hedge fund investors pay much more in fees when the fund does well.) This is something like 2 percent on capital per year and must be deducted from the return.
Two percent is no small cake. In the twentieth century, the average stock market return was something like 5 percent more than the risk-free rate. Yet an active investor has to earn about two percentage points more than average just to keep up with the passive investors.
Do some active investors achieve that? Absolutely. Then do these active investors who have achieved that are also able to sustain what they are doing? Again, a resounding yes. They’re the smart or lucky few – more smart than lucky – who fall at the upper end of the spectrum of returns. The majority of active investors do not achieve that break-even point. Most people who think they can beat the market do worst than the market (worst yet, some deceive themselves by counting the wins but not the losses – ask how many gamblers who always proclaim a win when they strike a lottery). This is an irrefutable conclusion. Sharpe said, and it is not based on fancy economic theorizing. It simply follows from the laws of arithmetic.
View on long term investing
The major reason why investors lose money is:
1) they view stock market as some sort of magic expecting a dollar invested today to be worth two tomorrow (too short an horizon);
2) by paying the wrong price;
3) at times by paying the wrong price, there’s still a chance for recovery if the business economics will improve with time but then investors do not have the patience and sell themselves out early.
Investors of such practice simply are watching and following the wrong indicator of performance that tells the truth – they are just watching the price ticker. As if in watching a basketball game, the action is on the game floor, not on the scoreboard. It is what the players that are doing on the court that influence what will be shown on the scoreboard.And then as if one is able to outscore every other player on the board, one tries to outmaneuver the other by trying to catch both the top and the bottom by pressing and squeezing harder than the one next door. These players are just influenced by trying to predict when the next storm is going to come. As a storm approaches, they try to run for cover totally but then a storm does not unroot all tress. Trees which are well deeply rooted are never in the long run destroyed by any storms. Thus, let us look a little in the history of stock which may give a little insight into what may happen in the future and thus improve the chances of investing success.
Firstly, investing is an act of faith. By investing a dollar today, we are entrusting to the steward in a corporation in the faith or at least with the hope that their endeavors will generate a rate of return that more than commensurate our investments. In this commitment of faith, we are committing our investment in the long term success of the corporation or economy at large and that the world’s financial markets will continue to march forward.Any attempt to try to time, rather than price the market is an act of speculation. This action of timing is more to do with human psychology rather than wisdom. Market participants’ faith in investing has waxed and waned, kindled by bull markets and chilled by bear markets that happened from time to time, but over time the market has always remained intact. The market has survived the Great Depression, two world wars, the rise and fall of communism, two oil shocks, the assassination of a U.S. president, time of high inflation, shocks in commodity prices, among many others. In recent years (since 1982 though), our faith has been enhanced by the bull market in stocks and has accelerated, without much ado – perhaps only in early 2000s – until now.
In the event of both bull, many just can only see all things which are rosy and unfortunately, the reverse applies in the bear market as well where many just cannot see anything rosy except doomsday. Excessive behaviors always lead an investor to either bringing himself to be in a very risky position where he might make a lot but the price to be paid for the risk to be undertaken simply does not commensurate the price with the risk. On the other hand, in a frenzy market downturn, an investor may simply just head for any exit as long as he sees one where again, he will not consider the price he is selling commensurate with the value that he is foregoing. Might some unforeseeable or unpredictable shock trigger another depression so severe that it would destroy our faith in the promise of investing? Possibility is always there. Excessive confidence in a smooth and rising sea can only blind us to the risk of storms. History is littered with episodes in which the enthusiasm of investors has driven equity prices to and beyond the point at which they are swept into the vortex of speculation, ultimately leading to unexpected losses. There is definitely little certainty in investing, at least for the short run. As long term investors, however, we must be aware of the past and cannot afford to let the ruinous possibilities frighten us away from the markets. For without risk, there is no return.Here is a story about Chance. Chance is someone who knows about risk in all seasons because he is a gardener. His story contains an inspirational message to long term investors. The seasons of his garden are akin to the cycles of the economy and the financial markets. We can emulate his faith that their patterns of the past is an indication that may define their course in the future.
Chance is a gardener who works for a rich man in his mansion. He lives in a solitary world bereft of contact with the outside world. One day, the rich man dies, Chance wanders out on his first foray into the world. He is hit by the limousine of a powerful advisor to the president. When he is rushed to the advisor’s estate for medical care, he identifies himself only as “Chance the gardener.” In the confusion, his name is wrongly interpreted as “Chauncey Gardiner.
”When the President visits the advisor, the recuperating Chance sits in on the meeting. The economy is slumping; blue chip corporations are under duress and the stock market is collapsing. Unexpectedly, Chance is asked for his advice:“In a garden,” he said, “growth has its season. There are spring and summer, but there are also fall and winter. And then spring and summer again. As long as the roots are not severed, all is well and all will be well.
”The president seems quietly pleased and delighted with the insightful thoughts of Chance. The president said: “I must admit, Mr. Gardiner, that is one of the most refreshing and optimistic statements I’ve heard in a very, very long time. Many of us forget that nature and society as one. Like nature, our economic system remains, in the long run, stable and rational and that’s why we must not fear to be at its mercy. We welcome the inevitable seasons of nature, yet we are upset by the seasons of our economy. How foolish of us.
”This story may be fictional. But like Chance, I see the history of our economy to be similar. The economy has passed the test of any past disasters and remains as healthy and stable in the long run. No doubt, it is marked by seasons of growth, sluggishness and decline but its roots have remained intact and strong. Despite changing seasons, our economy has persisted in an upward course, rebounding from the blackest of calamities.
Just for some historical figures. The average annual nominal return for three different time periods are:
1) 1802 to 1870 is 7.1%;
2) 1871 to 1925 is 7.2%;
3) 1926 to 1977 is 10.6%. After accounting for inflation, the net real return is 7%, 6.6% and 7.2% for the same periods respectively.
For an eye opener, an initial $10,000 investment in stocks from 1802 on, with all dividends reinvested will result in a terminal value of $5.6 billion in real dollars. Yet more staggering result if the same $10,000 is invested in bonds rather than stocks, it will result in $8 million. Well, that is not the worst, the worst is to invest in lands or properties.
Well, of course, none of us can expect to live near to two centuries, much less one. But having 50 years of investing time period is certainly within the reach of most people and 50 years is certainly a long time period where many different seasons will come and then go and come again. And with the story of Chance, having a strategy like his will certainly be great for most investors, at least for those who don’t know what they are doing.
1) they view stock market as some sort of magic expecting a dollar invested today to be worth two tomorrow (too short an horizon);
2) by paying the wrong price;
3) at times by paying the wrong price, there’s still a chance for recovery if the business economics will improve with time but then investors do not have the patience and sell themselves out early.
Investors of such practice simply are watching and following the wrong indicator of performance that tells the truth – they are just watching the price ticker. As if in watching a basketball game, the action is on the game floor, not on the scoreboard. It is what the players that are doing on the court that influence what will be shown on the scoreboard.And then as if one is able to outscore every other player on the board, one tries to outmaneuver the other by trying to catch both the top and the bottom by pressing and squeezing harder than the one next door. These players are just influenced by trying to predict when the next storm is going to come. As a storm approaches, they try to run for cover totally but then a storm does not unroot all tress. Trees which are well deeply rooted are never in the long run destroyed by any storms. Thus, let us look a little in the history of stock which may give a little insight into what may happen in the future and thus improve the chances of investing success.
Firstly, investing is an act of faith. By investing a dollar today, we are entrusting to the steward in a corporation in the faith or at least with the hope that their endeavors will generate a rate of return that more than commensurate our investments. In this commitment of faith, we are committing our investment in the long term success of the corporation or economy at large and that the world’s financial markets will continue to march forward.Any attempt to try to time, rather than price the market is an act of speculation. This action of timing is more to do with human psychology rather than wisdom. Market participants’ faith in investing has waxed and waned, kindled by bull markets and chilled by bear markets that happened from time to time, but over time the market has always remained intact. The market has survived the Great Depression, two world wars, the rise and fall of communism, two oil shocks, the assassination of a U.S. president, time of high inflation, shocks in commodity prices, among many others. In recent years (since 1982 though), our faith has been enhanced by the bull market in stocks and has accelerated, without much ado – perhaps only in early 2000s – until now.
In the event of both bull, many just can only see all things which are rosy and unfortunately, the reverse applies in the bear market as well where many just cannot see anything rosy except doomsday. Excessive behaviors always lead an investor to either bringing himself to be in a very risky position where he might make a lot but the price to be paid for the risk to be undertaken simply does not commensurate the price with the risk. On the other hand, in a frenzy market downturn, an investor may simply just head for any exit as long as he sees one where again, he will not consider the price he is selling commensurate with the value that he is foregoing. Might some unforeseeable or unpredictable shock trigger another depression so severe that it would destroy our faith in the promise of investing? Possibility is always there. Excessive confidence in a smooth and rising sea can only blind us to the risk of storms. History is littered with episodes in which the enthusiasm of investors has driven equity prices to and beyond the point at which they are swept into the vortex of speculation, ultimately leading to unexpected losses. There is definitely little certainty in investing, at least for the short run. As long term investors, however, we must be aware of the past and cannot afford to let the ruinous possibilities frighten us away from the markets. For without risk, there is no return.Here is a story about Chance. Chance is someone who knows about risk in all seasons because he is a gardener. His story contains an inspirational message to long term investors. The seasons of his garden are akin to the cycles of the economy and the financial markets. We can emulate his faith that their patterns of the past is an indication that may define their course in the future.
Chance is a gardener who works for a rich man in his mansion. He lives in a solitary world bereft of contact with the outside world. One day, the rich man dies, Chance wanders out on his first foray into the world. He is hit by the limousine of a powerful advisor to the president. When he is rushed to the advisor’s estate for medical care, he identifies himself only as “Chance the gardener.” In the confusion, his name is wrongly interpreted as “Chauncey Gardiner.
”When the President visits the advisor, the recuperating Chance sits in on the meeting. The economy is slumping; blue chip corporations are under duress and the stock market is collapsing. Unexpectedly, Chance is asked for his advice:“In a garden,” he said, “growth has its season. There are spring and summer, but there are also fall and winter. And then spring and summer again. As long as the roots are not severed, all is well and all will be well.
”The president seems quietly pleased and delighted with the insightful thoughts of Chance. The president said: “I must admit, Mr. Gardiner, that is one of the most refreshing and optimistic statements I’ve heard in a very, very long time. Many of us forget that nature and society as one. Like nature, our economic system remains, in the long run, stable and rational and that’s why we must not fear to be at its mercy. We welcome the inevitable seasons of nature, yet we are upset by the seasons of our economy. How foolish of us.
”This story may be fictional. But like Chance, I see the history of our economy to be similar. The economy has passed the test of any past disasters and remains as healthy and stable in the long run. No doubt, it is marked by seasons of growth, sluggishness and decline but its roots have remained intact and strong. Despite changing seasons, our economy has persisted in an upward course, rebounding from the blackest of calamities.
Just for some historical figures. The average annual nominal return for three different time periods are:
1) 1802 to 1870 is 7.1%;
2) 1871 to 1925 is 7.2%;
3) 1926 to 1977 is 10.6%. After accounting for inflation, the net real return is 7%, 6.6% and 7.2% for the same periods respectively.
For an eye opener, an initial $10,000 investment in stocks from 1802 on, with all dividends reinvested will result in a terminal value of $5.6 billion in real dollars. Yet more staggering result if the same $10,000 is invested in bonds rather than stocks, it will result in $8 million. Well, that is not the worst, the worst is to invest in lands or properties.
Well, of course, none of us can expect to live near to two centuries, much less one. But having 50 years of investing time period is certainly within the reach of most people and 50 years is certainly a long time period where many different seasons will come and then go and come again. And with the story of Chance, having a strategy like his will certainly be great for most investors, at least for those who don’t know what they are doing.
Wednesday, April 30, 2008
How To Make Your Own Luck
"It's better to be lucky than smart." "You make your own luck in life."
"Some folks are just born lucky." In an environment marked by rising tensions and diminished expectations, most of us could use a little luck -- at our companies, in our careers, with our investments. Richard Wiseman thinks that he can help you find some.
Wiseman, 37, is head of a psychology research department at the University of Hertfordshire in England. For the past eight years, he and his colleagues at the university's Perrott-Warrick Research Unit have studied what makes some people lucky and others not. After conducting thousands of interviews and hundreds of experiments, Wiseman now claims that he's cracked the code. Luck isn't due to kismet, karma, or coincidence, he says. Instead, lucky folks -- without even knowing it -- think and behave in ways that create good fortune in their lives. In his new book, The Luck Factor: Changing Your Luck, Changing Your Life: The Four Essential Principles (Miramax, 2003), Wiseman reveals four approaches to life that turn certain people into luck magnets. (And, as luck would have it, he tells the rest of us how to improve our own odds.)
Wiseman's four principles turn out to be slightly more polished renditions of some of the self-help canon's greatest hits. One thing Wiseman discovered, for example, was that when things go awry, the lucky "turn bad luck into good" by seeing how they can squeeze some benefit from the misfortune. (Lemonade, anyone?) The lucky also "expect good fortune," which no doubt has Norman Vincent Peale, author of The Power of Positive Thinking, grinning in his grave.
But if these insights aren't exactly groundbreaking, neither are they wrongheaded. For instance, Wiseman found that lucky people are particularly open to possibility. Why do some people always seem to find fortune? It's not dumb luck. Unlike everyone else, they see it. "Most people are just not open to what's around them," Wiseman says. "That's the key to it."
Wiseman began his career as a teenage magician who joined London's prestigious Magic Circle society and journeyed to Hollywood to perform for thousands. "Magic is very good training for seeing the world from somebody else's perspective," he says. Wiseman's latest research makes several forays into areas where most scholars rarely tread: He has investigated the psychological underpinnings of magic, the dynamics of deception, and the psychology of the paranormal. In 2001, he achieved international notoriety conducting a yearlong search for the world's funniest joke, testing how some 350,000 participants reacted to 40,000 jokes.
Fast Company was lucky enough to catch up with the hip and affable professor at a café overlooking London's Hyde Park.
How did a serious academic like you become interested in a squishy subject like luck?
Round about 10 years ago, I was talking to people about why they'd ended up where they'd ended up in their lives -- the people they were with, the careers they were in, and so on. And the words that kept coming up were things like "luck" and "chance." People said, "I met my partner by chance." Or "I'm in this particular career because I just happened to go to this party." I knew from the psychology literature that psychologists avoided luck. They said you couldn't do science with it. So I decided to test that. I did some research that asked people, "Do you consider yourself unlucky, or lucky?"
Over time, we built up a database of about 400 people from all over the UK, all walks of life, who considered themselves especially lucky or unlucky. The people in both groups were saying, "I've no idea why this is the case; I'm just lucky" -- or unlucky. But I didn't believe that for a minute. I thought there was something else going on. So in the Luck Project, we've had them take part in experiments, interviewed them, had them keep diaries -- all sorts of things -- trying to piece together why you'd have one group of people for whom everything would work out well and another group for whom things would be completely disastrous.
Isn't there a distinction between chance and luck?
There's a big distinction. Chance events are like winning the lottery. They're events over which we have no control, other than buying a ticket. They don't consistently happen to the same person. They may be formative events in people's lives, but they're not frequent. When people say that they consistently experience good fortune, I think that, by definition, it has to be because of something they are doing.
In other words, they make their own luck.
That's right. What I'm arguing is that we have far more control over events than we thought previously. You might say, "Fifty percent of my life is due to chance events." No, it's not. Maybe 10% is. That other 40% that you think you're having no influence over at all is actually defined by the way you think.
What are some of the ways that lucky people think differently from unlucky people?
One way is to be open to new experiences. Unlucky people are stuck in routines. When they see something new, they want no part of it. Lucky people always want something new. They're prepared to take risks and relaxed enough to see the opportunities in the first place.
How did you uncover that in your lab?
We did an experiment. We asked subjects to flip through a news-paper that had photographs in it. All they had to do was count the number of photographs. That's it. Luck wasn't on their minds, just some silly task. They'd go through, and after about three pages, there'd be a massive half-page advert saying, STOP COUNTING. THERE ARE 43 PHOTOGRAPHS IN THIS NEWSPAPER. It was next to a photo, so we knew they were looking at that area. A few pages later, there was another massive advert -- I mean, we're talking big -- that said, STOP COUNTING. TELL THE EXPERIMENTER YOU'VE SEEN THIS AND WIN 150 POUNDS [about $235].
For the most part, the unlucky would just flip past these things. Lucky people would flip through and laugh and say, "There are 43 photos. That's what it says. Do you want me to bother counting?" We'd say, "Yeah, carry on." They'd flip some more and say, "Do I get my 150 pounds?" Most of the unlucky people didn't notice.
But the business culture typically worships drive -- setting a goal, single-mindedly pursuing it, and plowing past obstacles. Are you arguing that, to be more lucky, we need to be less focused?
This is one of the most counterintuitive ideas. We are traditionally taught to be really focused, to be really driven, to try really hard at tasks. But in the real world, you've got opportunities all around you. And if you're driven in one direction, you're not going to spot the others. It's about getting people to have various game plans running in their heads. Unlucky people, if they go to a party wanting to meet the love of their life, end up not meeting people who might become close friends or people who might help them in their careers. Being relaxed and open allows lucky people to see what's around them and to maximize what's around them.
Much of business is also about rational analysis: pulling up the spreadsheet, running the numbers, looking at the serious facts. Yet you found that lucky people rely heavily on their gut instincts.
Yes. You don't want to broadly say that whenever you get an intuitive feeling, it's right and you should go with it. But you could be missing out on a massive font of knowledge that you've built up over the years. We are amazingly good at detecting patterns. That's what our brains are set up to do.
What are some other ways you found that lucky people's minds operate differently?
They practice "counterfactual thinking." The degree to which you think that something is fortunate or not is the degree to which you generate alternatives that are better or worse.
Unlucky people say, "I can't believe I've been in another car accident." Lucky people go, "Wonderful. Yes, I had a car accident, but I wasn't killed. And I met the guy in the other car, and we got on really well, and there might be a relationship there." What's interesting is that both ways of thinking are unconscious and automatic. It would never occur to the unlucky people to see it a different way.
Isn't there something delusional about that approach -- sort of a modern version of Dr. Pangloss's "All for the best in the best of all possible worlds"? Suppose I said, "I just wrote this article, and the article stinks, and nobody read it. But hey, at least I have two arms."
What's so delusional about that? If it keeps you going in the face of adversity and softens the impact of the fact that no one read your article, and therefore you think, "Well, I can write another article, and I'm going to learn from the mistakes of the past one, and I'm going to keep on going," I think that's fine. It would be delusional if you took it to the extreme -- especially if you weren't learning from your mistakes.
But can we acknowledge that sometimes bad stuff -- car accidents, natural disasters -- just happens? Sometimes it's purely bad, and there's nothing good about it.
I've never heard that from a lucky person.
So if you buy that way of thinking, then there is no bad luck.
That's right. That's what was weird about conducting some of the interviews. Subjects would say, "I'm the luckiest person alive" -- and they'd come up with dreadful stories. They'd have the same life events as the unlucky person, but they'd look at them entirely differently.
Isn't that just a fancy version of the power of positive thinking?
There's more science to it -- as opposed to the classic "Just think positive, and you'll be successful." I think if you understand a little about where it's coming from, it's a bit easier to adapt into your life.
We had a subject named Carolyn. When she would come to the unit to be interviewed, it would be just this whole string of bad-luck stories: "I can't find anyone. I'm unlucky in love. When I did find someone, the guy fell off his motorbike. The next blind date broke his nose. We were supposed to get married, and the church burned down." But to every single interview, she'd bring along her two kids. They were 6 and 7 years old -- very healthy, very happy kids who'd sit there and play. And it was interesting, because most people would love to have two kids like that, but that wasn't part of her world, because she was unlucky in her mind.
How do you get people to begin thinking like lucky people?
We've created a Luck School that teaches people certain techniques. One thing that we do is have people keep a luck diary. At the end of each day, they spend a couple of moments writing down the positive and lucky things that happened. We ask them not to write down the unlucky stuff. Once that starts to build up, what they're doing is adding on, each day. So they look back, and it's five days' worth of positive events, and now it's day six. After doing that for a month, it's difficult not to be thinking about the good things that are happening.
What are the applications of your research to business?
We've just done our first Luck School with an entire company. We took all 35 employees through it. The CEO was very open to change. The ideas resonated with him because that's how he has lived his life. So when he heard them, he said, "I want everybody in my organization to think like this." If we did nothing but make his employees feel better about themselves, he'll be a happy man. If it has an impact on profits and productivity, he'll be a very happy man.
Do you think that lucky organizations really exist?
Yes. Whether it translates to just percentages of lucky people, or whether it translates to a particular mixture, where some score high on one principle and others score high on another, I don't know. In the sense of organizational culture and identity, I think that some organizations will be seen as lucky and successful and others will be seen as unlucky, in the same way that individuals are.
You spent a year trying to find the world's funniest joke. Could you tell us the joke that won?
Two New Jersey hunters go hunting. After a while, one of the hunters clutches his throat and falls to the ground, his eyes roll back, and he's lying there motionless. The other one picks up a cell phone, dials 911, and says, "I think my friend is dead! I don't know what to do!" And the operator says, "Just relax. Calm down. The first thing to do is to make certain your friend is dead." There's a pause -- then a gunshot. And the hunter gets back on the phone and says, "Okay. Now what?"
That's some bad luck for the friend.
Yes, unfortunately. But bad luck is funny.
Bad luck is funny?
Bad luck is funny -- provided it's not happening to you.
Wanna Get Lucky?
According to Richard Wiseman, these four principles can create good fortune in your life and career.
1. Maximize Chance Opportunities
Lucky people are skilled at creating, noticing, and acting upon chance opportunities. They do this in various ways, which include building and maintaining a strong network, adopting a relaxed attitude to life, and being open to new experiences.
2. Listen to Your Lucky Hunches
Lucky people make effective decisions by listening to their intuition and gut feelings. They also take steps to actively boost their intuitive abilities -- for example, by meditating and clearing their mind of other thoughts.
3. Expect Good Fortune
Lucky people are certain that the future will be bright. Over time, that expectation becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy because it helps lucky people persist in the face of failure and positively shapes their interactions with other people.
4. Turn Bad Luck Into Good
Lucky people employ various psychological techniques to cope with, and even thrive upon, the ill fortune that comes their way. For example, they spontaneously imagine how things could have been worse, they don't dwell on the ill fortune, and they take control of the situation.
"Some folks are just born lucky." In an environment marked by rising tensions and diminished expectations, most of us could use a little luck -- at our companies, in our careers, with our investments. Richard Wiseman thinks that he can help you find some.
Wiseman, 37, is head of a psychology research department at the University of Hertfordshire in England. For the past eight years, he and his colleagues at the university's Perrott-Warrick Research Unit have studied what makes some people lucky and others not. After conducting thousands of interviews and hundreds of experiments, Wiseman now claims that he's cracked the code. Luck isn't due to kismet, karma, or coincidence, he says. Instead, lucky folks -- without even knowing it -- think and behave in ways that create good fortune in their lives. In his new book, The Luck Factor: Changing Your Luck, Changing Your Life: The Four Essential Principles (Miramax, 2003), Wiseman reveals four approaches to life that turn certain people into luck magnets. (And, as luck would have it, he tells the rest of us how to improve our own odds.)
Wiseman's four principles turn out to be slightly more polished renditions of some of the self-help canon's greatest hits. One thing Wiseman discovered, for example, was that when things go awry, the lucky "turn bad luck into good" by seeing how they can squeeze some benefit from the misfortune. (Lemonade, anyone?) The lucky also "expect good fortune," which no doubt has Norman Vincent Peale, author of The Power of Positive Thinking, grinning in his grave.
But if these insights aren't exactly groundbreaking, neither are they wrongheaded. For instance, Wiseman found that lucky people are particularly open to possibility. Why do some people always seem to find fortune? It's not dumb luck. Unlike everyone else, they see it. "Most people are just not open to what's around them," Wiseman says. "That's the key to it."
Wiseman began his career as a teenage magician who joined London's prestigious Magic Circle society and journeyed to Hollywood to perform for thousands. "Magic is very good training for seeing the world from somebody else's perspective," he says. Wiseman's latest research makes several forays into areas where most scholars rarely tread: He has investigated the psychological underpinnings of magic, the dynamics of deception, and the psychology of the paranormal. In 2001, he achieved international notoriety conducting a yearlong search for the world's funniest joke, testing how some 350,000 participants reacted to 40,000 jokes.
Fast Company was lucky enough to catch up with the hip and affable professor at a café overlooking London's Hyde Park.
How did a serious academic like you become interested in a squishy subject like luck?
Round about 10 years ago, I was talking to people about why they'd ended up where they'd ended up in their lives -- the people they were with, the careers they were in, and so on. And the words that kept coming up were things like "luck" and "chance." People said, "I met my partner by chance." Or "I'm in this particular career because I just happened to go to this party." I knew from the psychology literature that psychologists avoided luck. They said you couldn't do science with it. So I decided to test that. I did some research that asked people, "Do you consider yourself unlucky, or lucky?"
Over time, we built up a database of about 400 people from all over the UK, all walks of life, who considered themselves especially lucky or unlucky. The people in both groups were saying, "I've no idea why this is the case; I'm just lucky" -- or unlucky. But I didn't believe that for a minute. I thought there was something else going on. So in the Luck Project, we've had them take part in experiments, interviewed them, had them keep diaries -- all sorts of things -- trying to piece together why you'd have one group of people for whom everything would work out well and another group for whom things would be completely disastrous.
Isn't there a distinction between chance and luck?
There's a big distinction. Chance events are like winning the lottery. They're events over which we have no control, other than buying a ticket. They don't consistently happen to the same person. They may be formative events in people's lives, but they're not frequent. When people say that they consistently experience good fortune, I think that, by definition, it has to be because of something they are doing.
In other words, they make their own luck.
That's right. What I'm arguing is that we have far more control over events than we thought previously. You might say, "Fifty percent of my life is due to chance events." No, it's not. Maybe 10% is. That other 40% that you think you're having no influence over at all is actually defined by the way you think.
What are some of the ways that lucky people think differently from unlucky people?
One way is to be open to new experiences. Unlucky people are stuck in routines. When they see something new, they want no part of it. Lucky people always want something new. They're prepared to take risks and relaxed enough to see the opportunities in the first place.
How did you uncover that in your lab?
We did an experiment. We asked subjects to flip through a news-paper that had photographs in it. All they had to do was count the number of photographs. That's it. Luck wasn't on their minds, just some silly task. They'd go through, and after about three pages, there'd be a massive half-page advert saying, STOP COUNTING. THERE ARE 43 PHOTOGRAPHS IN THIS NEWSPAPER. It was next to a photo, so we knew they were looking at that area. A few pages later, there was another massive advert -- I mean, we're talking big -- that said, STOP COUNTING. TELL THE EXPERIMENTER YOU'VE SEEN THIS AND WIN 150 POUNDS [about $235].
For the most part, the unlucky would just flip past these things. Lucky people would flip through and laugh and say, "There are 43 photos. That's what it says. Do you want me to bother counting?" We'd say, "Yeah, carry on." They'd flip some more and say, "Do I get my 150 pounds?" Most of the unlucky people didn't notice.
But the business culture typically worships drive -- setting a goal, single-mindedly pursuing it, and plowing past obstacles. Are you arguing that, to be more lucky, we need to be less focused?
This is one of the most counterintuitive ideas. We are traditionally taught to be really focused, to be really driven, to try really hard at tasks. But in the real world, you've got opportunities all around you. And if you're driven in one direction, you're not going to spot the others. It's about getting people to have various game plans running in their heads. Unlucky people, if they go to a party wanting to meet the love of their life, end up not meeting people who might become close friends or people who might help them in their careers. Being relaxed and open allows lucky people to see what's around them and to maximize what's around them.
Much of business is also about rational analysis: pulling up the spreadsheet, running the numbers, looking at the serious facts. Yet you found that lucky people rely heavily on their gut instincts.
Yes. You don't want to broadly say that whenever you get an intuitive feeling, it's right and you should go with it. But you could be missing out on a massive font of knowledge that you've built up over the years. We are amazingly good at detecting patterns. That's what our brains are set up to do.
What are some other ways you found that lucky people's minds operate differently?
They practice "counterfactual thinking." The degree to which you think that something is fortunate or not is the degree to which you generate alternatives that are better or worse.
Unlucky people say, "I can't believe I've been in another car accident." Lucky people go, "Wonderful. Yes, I had a car accident, but I wasn't killed. And I met the guy in the other car, and we got on really well, and there might be a relationship there." What's interesting is that both ways of thinking are unconscious and automatic. It would never occur to the unlucky people to see it a different way.
Isn't there something delusional about that approach -- sort of a modern version of Dr. Pangloss's "All for the best in the best of all possible worlds"? Suppose I said, "I just wrote this article, and the article stinks, and nobody read it. But hey, at least I have two arms."
What's so delusional about that? If it keeps you going in the face of adversity and softens the impact of the fact that no one read your article, and therefore you think, "Well, I can write another article, and I'm going to learn from the mistakes of the past one, and I'm going to keep on going," I think that's fine. It would be delusional if you took it to the extreme -- especially if you weren't learning from your mistakes.
But can we acknowledge that sometimes bad stuff -- car accidents, natural disasters -- just happens? Sometimes it's purely bad, and there's nothing good about it.
I've never heard that from a lucky person.
So if you buy that way of thinking, then there is no bad luck.
That's right. That's what was weird about conducting some of the interviews. Subjects would say, "I'm the luckiest person alive" -- and they'd come up with dreadful stories. They'd have the same life events as the unlucky person, but they'd look at them entirely differently.
Isn't that just a fancy version of the power of positive thinking?
There's more science to it -- as opposed to the classic "Just think positive, and you'll be successful." I think if you understand a little about where it's coming from, it's a bit easier to adapt into your life.
We had a subject named Carolyn. When she would come to the unit to be interviewed, it would be just this whole string of bad-luck stories: "I can't find anyone. I'm unlucky in love. When I did find someone, the guy fell off his motorbike. The next blind date broke his nose. We were supposed to get married, and the church burned down." But to every single interview, she'd bring along her two kids. They were 6 and 7 years old -- very healthy, very happy kids who'd sit there and play. And it was interesting, because most people would love to have two kids like that, but that wasn't part of her world, because she was unlucky in her mind.
How do you get people to begin thinking like lucky people?
We've created a Luck School that teaches people certain techniques. One thing that we do is have people keep a luck diary. At the end of each day, they spend a couple of moments writing down the positive and lucky things that happened. We ask them not to write down the unlucky stuff. Once that starts to build up, what they're doing is adding on, each day. So they look back, and it's five days' worth of positive events, and now it's day six. After doing that for a month, it's difficult not to be thinking about the good things that are happening.
What are the applications of your research to business?
We've just done our first Luck School with an entire company. We took all 35 employees through it. The CEO was very open to change. The ideas resonated with him because that's how he has lived his life. So when he heard them, he said, "I want everybody in my organization to think like this." If we did nothing but make his employees feel better about themselves, he'll be a happy man. If it has an impact on profits and productivity, he'll be a very happy man.
Do you think that lucky organizations really exist?
Yes. Whether it translates to just percentages of lucky people, or whether it translates to a particular mixture, where some score high on one principle and others score high on another, I don't know. In the sense of organizational culture and identity, I think that some organizations will be seen as lucky and successful and others will be seen as unlucky, in the same way that individuals are.
You spent a year trying to find the world's funniest joke. Could you tell us the joke that won?
Two New Jersey hunters go hunting. After a while, one of the hunters clutches his throat and falls to the ground, his eyes roll back, and he's lying there motionless. The other one picks up a cell phone, dials 911, and says, "I think my friend is dead! I don't know what to do!" And the operator says, "Just relax. Calm down. The first thing to do is to make certain your friend is dead." There's a pause -- then a gunshot. And the hunter gets back on the phone and says, "Okay. Now what?"
That's some bad luck for the friend.
Yes, unfortunately. But bad luck is funny.
Bad luck is funny?
Bad luck is funny -- provided it's not happening to you.
Wanna Get Lucky?
According to Richard Wiseman, these four principles can create good fortune in your life and career.
1. Maximize Chance Opportunities
Lucky people are skilled at creating, noticing, and acting upon chance opportunities. They do this in various ways, which include building and maintaining a strong network, adopting a relaxed attitude to life, and being open to new experiences.
2. Listen to Your Lucky Hunches
Lucky people make effective decisions by listening to their intuition and gut feelings. They also take steps to actively boost their intuitive abilities -- for example, by meditating and clearing their mind of other thoughts.
3. Expect Good Fortune
Lucky people are certain that the future will be bright. Over time, that expectation becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy because it helps lucky people persist in the face of failure and positively shapes their interactions with other people.
4. Turn Bad Luck Into Good
Lucky people employ various psychological techniques to cope with, and even thrive upon, the ill fortune that comes their way. For example, they spontaneously imagine how things could have been worse, they don't dwell on the ill fortune, and they take control of the situation.
NERA: Attractive dividends, flattish earnings
Nera Telecom (Hold - Downgrade from BUY)
Price Target : 12-Month S$ 0.48 (Prev S$ 0.55)
Story:
Net profit of S$2.65m is up 10% up y-o-y is lower than our expectation of S$3.0m mainly due to lower turnover. On the other hand, cash collection was very strong for the quarter.
Point:
We have adjusted NeraTel’s FY08 earnings estimates by 9% downwards in the light of current set of results and the possibility of slowdown in IT spending in the near future. Final FY07 dividend of 4 cents, goes ex-date on 30 Apr 08 and the stock price could adjust downwards in the absence of additional catalysts.
Lower turnover was the main culprit.
Lower than expected turnover of S$39.0m rose by only 7% y-o-y although gross margins over 23% compensated to some extent. The company attributed this to slippage in some contracts to 2Q08 due to logistic issues, and we expect the company to report net profit of over S$3.0m in 2Q08.
Significant increase in cash from reduction in receivables. NeraTel generated S$29m of cash from operating activities compared to S$0.6m cash deficit last year. This was due to solid recovery of S$27.8m in cash from its trade debtors during 1Q08. At this time, NeraTel has about S$50.6m in cash (~14 cents cash per share).
Relevance:
Based on 12x FY08 earnings, our one-year target price is S$0.48and we downgrade to HOLD. The stock has outperformed the market in the last four months but may not continue to do well due to the absence of catalysts. On the positive side, balance sheet is very strong with 14 cents cash per share.
Price Target : 12-Month S$ 0.48 (Prev S$ 0.55)
Story:
Net profit of S$2.65m is up 10% up y-o-y is lower than our expectation of S$3.0m mainly due to lower turnover. On the other hand, cash collection was very strong for the quarter.
Point:
We have adjusted NeraTel’s FY08 earnings estimates by 9% downwards in the light of current set of results and the possibility of slowdown in IT spending in the near future. Final FY07 dividend of 4 cents, goes ex-date on 30 Apr 08 and the stock price could adjust downwards in the absence of additional catalysts.
Lower turnover was the main culprit.
Lower than expected turnover of S$39.0m rose by only 7% y-o-y although gross margins over 23% compensated to some extent. The company attributed this to slippage in some contracts to 2Q08 due to logistic issues, and we expect the company to report net profit of over S$3.0m in 2Q08.
Significant increase in cash from reduction in receivables. NeraTel generated S$29m of cash from operating activities compared to S$0.6m cash deficit last year. This was due to solid recovery of S$27.8m in cash from its trade debtors during 1Q08. At this time, NeraTel has about S$50.6m in cash (~14 cents cash per share).
Relevance:
Based on 12x FY08 earnings, our one-year target price is S$0.48and we downgrade to HOLD. The stock has outperformed the market in the last four months but may not continue to do well due to the absence of catalysts. On the positive side, balance sheet is very strong with 14 cents cash per share.
Subprime Crisis’s Next Stop: Prime Mortgages
Even the best eggs in the mortgage basket are now beginning to turn rotten.
Delinquencies among the nation’s least risky mortgages, known as “prime”mortgages, are rising quickly.
Although large financial institutions have already racked up more than $215billion in losses stemming from high-risk subprime and “Alt-A” mortgages —the poster children of the mortgage crisis — the data that banks releasedthis week suggests that even borrowers with the safest credit profiles arequickly falling behind on their payments.
At JPMorgan Chase & Co., which reported its earnings Wednesday, nearly 3.5%of the bank’s prime mortgages now stand at least 30 days past due, up morethan 200% over a year ago. What’s more, the number of tardy prime mortgageborrowers at JPMorgan is up about 40% since just December.
At Wachovia Corp., which reported earnings on Monday, the number of souringloans within the bank’s “traditional mortgage” business — which emphasizesconservative underwriting guidelines — stands at 1.15% of the business’s$48.9 billion in mortgages, an increase of more than double in the lastthree months alone.
“It’s a sign of the times,” said Jeff Davis, an analyst at FTN MidwestSecurities Corp. “The unemployment rate is starting to drift up, so youwould expect to see rising delinquencies.” The nation’s unemployment ratewas 5.1% in March, up from 4.8% in February.
Analysts also said the nation’s declining housing market is behind the risein delinquencies among historically reliable mortgage borrowers, since manyowe more in mortgage debt than their homes are worth, leaving them withoutthe option of selling the property and repaying the mortgage.
As a result of lost jobs and evaporating home equity, many of thesepreviously low-risk borrowers are quitting their mortgages. Shouldborrowers of prime mortgages continue to fall behind in greater numbers,the trend will affect pools of mortgages that are much larger than thenow-infamous mountains of subrpime debt.
For example, a survey of lenders by the Mortgage Bankers Association, saidthe mortgage industry wrote $656 billion in home loans during the firsthalf of 2007, and 69% of those loans were prime loans. By contrast, only26% of those loans were subprime mortgages. The association said data is not yet available for the second half of 2007.
Delinquencies among the nation’s least risky mortgages, known as “prime”mortgages, are rising quickly.
Although large financial institutions have already racked up more than $215billion in losses stemming from high-risk subprime and “Alt-A” mortgages —the poster children of the mortgage crisis — the data that banks releasedthis week suggests that even borrowers with the safest credit profiles arequickly falling behind on their payments.
At JPMorgan Chase & Co., which reported its earnings Wednesday, nearly 3.5%of the bank’s prime mortgages now stand at least 30 days past due, up morethan 200% over a year ago. What’s more, the number of tardy prime mortgageborrowers at JPMorgan is up about 40% since just December.
At Wachovia Corp., which reported earnings on Monday, the number of souringloans within the bank’s “traditional mortgage” business — which emphasizesconservative underwriting guidelines — stands at 1.15% of the business’s$48.9 billion in mortgages, an increase of more than double in the lastthree months alone.
“It’s a sign of the times,” said Jeff Davis, an analyst at FTN MidwestSecurities Corp. “The unemployment rate is starting to drift up, so youwould expect to see rising delinquencies.” The nation’s unemployment ratewas 5.1% in March, up from 4.8% in February.
Analysts also said the nation’s declining housing market is behind the risein delinquencies among historically reliable mortgage borrowers, since manyowe more in mortgage debt than their homes are worth, leaving them withoutthe option of selling the property and repaying the mortgage.
As a result of lost jobs and evaporating home equity, many of thesepreviously low-risk borrowers are quitting their mortgages. Shouldborrowers of prime mortgages continue to fall behind in greater numbers,the trend will affect pools of mortgages that are much larger than thenow-infamous mountains of subrpime debt.
For example, a survey of lenders by the Mortgage Bankers Association, saidthe mortgage industry wrote $656 billion in home loans during the firsthalf of 2007, and 69% of those loans were prime loans. By contrast, only26% of those loans were subprime mortgages. The association said data is not yet available for the second half of 2007.
The Luck Factor
Lucky people meet their perfect partners, achieve their lifelong ambitions, find fulfilling careers, and live happy and meaningful lives.
Their success is not due to them working especially hard, being amazingly talented or exceptionally intelligent. Instead, they simply appear to have an uncanny ability to be in the right place at the right time and enjoy more than their fair share of lucky breaks.
The Luck Project scientifically explores why some people live such charmed lives, and aims to develop techniques that enable others to enhance their own good fortune. The main findings from the research have been published in Prof. Wiseman’s bestselling book The Luck Factor.
The Luck Project was originally conceived to scientifically explore psychological differences between people who considered themselves exceptionally lucky and unlucky. This initial work was funded by The Leverhulme Trust and undertaken by Prof. Wiseman in collaboration with Dr. Matthew Smith and Dr. Peter Harris.
Prof. Wiseman has since built upon this initial work by identifying the four basic principles used by lucky people to create good fortune in their lives, and developing techniques that enable individuals to enhance their own good luck. This research has involved working with hundreds of exceptionally lucky and unlucky people, and has employed various methods to better understand the psychology of luck.
The results of this work reveal that people are not born lucky.
Instead, lucky people are, without realising it, using four basic principles to create good fortune in their lives:
Principle One: Maximise Chance Opportunities
Lucky people are skilled at creating, noticing and acting upon chance opportunities. They do this in various ways, including networking, adopting a relaxed attitude to life and by being open to new experiences.
Principle Two: Listening to Lucky Hunches
Lucky people make effective decisions by listening to their intuition and gut feelings. In addition, they take steps to actively boost their intuitive abilities by, for example, meditating and clearing their mind of other thoughts.
Principle Three: Expect Good Fortune
Lucky people are certain that the future is going to be full of good fortune. These expectations become self-fulfilling prophecies by helping lucky people persist in the face of failure, and shape their interactions with others in a positive way.
Principle Four: Turn Bad Luck to Good
Lucky people employ various psychological techniques to cope with, and often even thrive upon, the ill fortune that comes their way. For example, they spontaneously imagine how things could have been worse, do not dwell on the ill fortune, and take control of the situation.
A key aspect of The Luck Project involves developing techniques that help people increase the good fortune they encounter in their life. These techniques help people think and behave like a lucky person. The efficacy of these techniques has been scientifically tested in a series of experiments referred to as ‘luck schools’. These studies involve identifying participants’ ‘luck profiles’ – a measure of the degree to which they incorporate the principles of luck into their lives and then asking them to carry out specially-designed exercises that target areas in need of enhancement.
Luck school has proved highly successful, with almost all participants reporting significant life changes, including increased levels of luck, self-esteem, confidence and success.
Their success is not due to them working especially hard, being amazingly talented or exceptionally intelligent. Instead, they simply appear to have an uncanny ability to be in the right place at the right time and enjoy more than their fair share of lucky breaks.
The Luck Project scientifically explores why some people live such charmed lives, and aims to develop techniques that enable others to enhance their own good fortune. The main findings from the research have been published in Prof. Wiseman’s bestselling book The Luck Factor.
The Luck Project was originally conceived to scientifically explore psychological differences between people who considered themselves exceptionally lucky and unlucky. This initial work was funded by The Leverhulme Trust and undertaken by Prof. Wiseman in collaboration with Dr. Matthew Smith and Dr. Peter Harris.
Prof. Wiseman has since built upon this initial work by identifying the four basic principles used by lucky people to create good fortune in their lives, and developing techniques that enable individuals to enhance their own good luck. This research has involved working with hundreds of exceptionally lucky and unlucky people, and has employed various methods to better understand the psychology of luck.
The results of this work reveal that people are not born lucky.
Instead, lucky people are, without realising it, using four basic principles to create good fortune in their lives:
Principle One: Maximise Chance Opportunities
Lucky people are skilled at creating, noticing and acting upon chance opportunities. They do this in various ways, including networking, adopting a relaxed attitude to life and by being open to new experiences.
Principle Two: Listening to Lucky Hunches
Lucky people make effective decisions by listening to their intuition and gut feelings. In addition, they take steps to actively boost their intuitive abilities by, for example, meditating and clearing their mind of other thoughts.
Principle Three: Expect Good Fortune
Lucky people are certain that the future is going to be full of good fortune. These expectations become self-fulfilling prophecies by helping lucky people persist in the face of failure, and shape their interactions with others in a positive way.
Principle Four: Turn Bad Luck to Good
Lucky people employ various psychological techniques to cope with, and often even thrive upon, the ill fortune that comes their way. For example, they spontaneously imagine how things could have been worse, do not dwell on the ill fortune, and take control of the situation.
A key aspect of The Luck Project involves developing techniques that help people increase the good fortune they encounter in their life. These techniques help people think and behave like a lucky person. The efficacy of these techniques has been scientifically tested in a series of experiments referred to as ‘luck schools’. These studies involve identifying participants’ ‘luck profiles’ – a measure of the degree to which they incorporate the principles of luck into their lives and then asking them to carry out specially-designed exercises that target areas in need of enhancement.
Luck school has proved highly successful, with almost all participants reporting significant life changes, including increased levels of luck, self-esteem, confidence and success.
SMRT: Get on board for dividends
SMRT: Get on board for dividends
Price Target : 12-month S$ 2.00 (Prev S$ 1.78)
Story:
Full year earnings came in slightly ahead of our expectations, up 11% yoy to S$150m as revenue grew by 8% yoy to S$800m, driven primarily by ridership growth on its MRT trains. EBIT grew 23% yoy, led by the MRTsegment (+25% yoy), rental and ads (+22% yoy) and a turnaround from a loss of S$5.1m for the taxi segment to a profit of $0.6m. A final net DPS of 6Scts was declared, bringing total DPS for FY08 to 7.75 Scts, above our 7.5 Scts forecast.
Point:
SMRT continues to impress with effective cost management and with strong ridership growth, the Group’s profitability has scaled well, with EBIT margin expanding from 15% five years ago to over 22% currently.
Looking ahead, we expect earnings growth to slow down as it comes from a higher base and as the group faces higher cost pressures, as well as likely start-up costs for the new circle line (Stage 3 is targeted to open in mid 2009). Nonetheless, we expect ridership growth and increasing rental incometo continue to underpin steady earnings growth.
Relevance:
With a formal policy of aiming to maintain or improve the absolute amount of dividends each year, and given SMRT’s generous trackrecord (c. 80% the last 3 years), we are optimistic that shareholders can look forward to growing dividends as the Group continues to grow. We raise our DPS forecast to 8.5 Scts and 9 Scts for FY09 and FY10 respectively. As such, we raise our TP to S$2 (target 4.5% net yield for FY10) and upgrade the stock to a BUY.
Furthermore, SMRT has highlighted the possibility of giving a special dividend, which we believe has a high likelihood as we project the Group to move into a net cash position this year. We estimate that SMRT can pay another 10-15 cents in special dividends with internal funds, without crossing the 0.5x Net Debt-to-Equity mark.
Price Target : 12-month S$ 2.00 (Prev S$ 1.78)
Story:
Full year earnings came in slightly ahead of our expectations, up 11% yoy to S$150m as revenue grew by 8% yoy to S$800m, driven primarily by ridership growth on its MRT trains. EBIT grew 23% yoy, led by the MRTsegment (+25% yoy), rental and ads (+22% yoy) and a turnaround from a loss of S$5.1m for the taxi segment to a profit of $0.6m. A final net DPS of 6Scts was declared, bringing total DPS for FY08 to 7.75 Scts, above our 7.5 Scts forecast.
Point:
SMRT continues to impress with effective cost management and with strong ridership growth, the Group’s profitability has scaled well, with EBIT margin expanding from 15% five years ago to over 22% currently.
Looking ahead, we expect earnings growth to slow down as it comes from a higher base and as the group faces higher cost pressures, as well as likely start-up costs for the new circle line (Stage 3 is targeted to open in mid 2009). Nonetheless, we expect ridership growth and increasing rental incometo continue to underpin steady earnings growth.
Relevance:
With a formal policy of aiming to maintain or improve the absolute amount of dividends each year, and given SMRT’s generous trackrecord (c. 80% the last 3 years), we are optimistic that shareholders can look forward to growing dividends as the Group continues to grow. We raise our DPS forecast to 8.5 Scts and 9 Scts for FY09 and FY10 respectively. As such, we raise our TP to S$2 (target 4.5% net yield for FY10) and upgrade the stock to a BUY.
Furthermore, SMRT has highlighted the possibility of giving a special dividend, which we believe has a high likelihood as we project the Group to move into a net cash position this year. We estimate that SMRT can pay another 10-15 cents in special dividends with internal funds, without crossing the 0.5x Net Debt-to-Equity mark.
If US was a company , it will be bankrupt long time ago.
How to Prosper During the Coming Bad Years In the 21st Century
While we are unable to express an opinion on the U.S. government's consolidated financial statements, the following key items deserve emphasis inorder to put the information contained in the financial statements and the Management's Discussion and Analysis section of the 2006 Financial Report of the United States Government into context.
Despite improvement in both the fiscal year 2006 reported net operating cost and the cash-based budget deficit, the U.S. government's total reported liabilities, net social insurance commitments, and other fiscal exposures continue to grow andnow totalapproximately $50 trillion, representing approximately four times the Nation's total output (GDP) in fiscal year 2006, up from about $20 trillion, or two times GDP in fiscal year 2000.
As this long-term fiscal imbalance continues to grow, the retirement of the"baby boom" generation is closer to becoming a reality with the first wave of boomers eligible for early retirement under Social Security in 2008.
While we are unable to express an opinion on the U.S. government's consolidated financial statements, the following key items deserve emphasis inorder to put the information contained in the financial statements and the Management's Discussion and Analysis section of the 2006 Financial Report of the United States Government into context.
Despite improvement in both the fiscal year 2006 reported net operating cost and the cash-based budget deficit, the U.S. government's total reported liabilities, net social insurance commitments, and other fiscal exposures continue to grow andnow totalapproximately $50 trillion, representing approximately four times the Nation's total output (GDP) in fiscal year 2006, up from about $20 trillion, or two times GDP in fiscal year 2000.
As this long-term fiscal imbalance continues to grow, the retirement of the"baby boom" generation is closer to becoming a reality with the first wave of boomers eligible for early retirement under Social Security in 2008.
False optimism - Straits Times Index
- The STI has unfolded as per our predictions on 3 April. We had forecasted a mild pullback and a resumption of the rebound thereafter. Indeed, the index pulled back in early April and then rebounded to a high of 3,235.24 last week.
- A short-term uptrend line has been established at this stage of the rebound. The index is currently trading above this trend line, but we do not think this level will hold.
- We anticipate a pullback and this is reinforced by the stochastic indicator which is currently displaying a negative divergence. A pullback would take the index down to the 3,100 support level.
- Having broken above the 50 and 100-day moving averages, the index seems poised to take on our forecasted resistance at 3,300. However, it is unlikely to do so before a pullback unfolds in the near-term.
- We view 3,300 as a critical level as the 200-day moving average is also in proximity to this level. Hence we view the resistance as strong. The index could stage a substantial reversal as compared to the pullbacks we have witnessed since the commencement of the rebound in mid March.
- Hence we advise traders not to get swept up by false optimism at this juncture. We have yet to observe convincing signs of a market recovery to support a full scale resumption of the bull market rally. We feel the upside is limited at this stage.
- Should the index crack the 3,000 level, subsequent support is set at 2,745, which was the low formed in March.
- A short-term uptrend line has been established at this stage of the rebound. The index is currently trading above this trend line, but we do not think this level will hold.
- We anticipate a pullback and this is reinforced by the stochastic indicator which is currently displaying a negative divergence. A pullback would take the index down to the 3,100 support level.
- Having broken above the 50 and 100-day moving averages, the index seems poised to take on our forecasted resistance at 3,300. However, it is unlikely to do so before a pullback unfolds in the near-term.
- We view 3,300 as a critical level as the 200-day moving average is also in proximity to this level. Hence we view the resistance as strong. The index could stage a substantial reversal as compared to the pullbacks we have witnessed since the commencement of the rebound in mid March.
- Hence we advise traders not to get swept up by false optimism at this juncture. We have yet to observe convincing signs of a market recovery to support a full scale resumption of the bull market rally. We feel the upside is limited at this stage.
- Should the index crack the 3,000 level, subsequent support is set at 2,745, which was the low formed in March.
解剖赌博：赌局乾坤大 当心输裤子
想发横财吗？十七世纪两名法国知名数学家穷究赌博致富之道，结论是赌博中赢钱的或然率极低极低；因此，倒不如开家赌场，绝对保证赚尽世界各地赌徒的血汗赌本。
赌马、赌波、买六合彩……就等于用辛苦赚得的金钱，再一次引证数学上的或然率定律。或然率是预测胜败比率(当然不可能绝对准确)的定律，早于十六、十七世纪的欧洲，不少赌业富豪聘请数学专才，设计有利赌场、庄家胜数的方法。
数学专才设计赌局
或然率看似复杂，说穿了不过是计算数学而矣。举个例说，掷硬币两次，要两次都“公仔”朝上，方为赢，那么阁下的赢率就是四分之一，因为第一次掷出“公仔”的机会是二分之一，第二次也是二分之一，因而两次俱为公仔的或然率是1/2×1/2＝1/4。
在或然率预测胜败问题上，“零”代表绝对输，“一”代表绝对赢。上述掷硬币例子中，掷硬币两次的结果，有四个(公仔、公仔；公仔、字；字、公仔；字、字)，其中一个是胜果，占四分之一，也就是零点二五。
不少赌徒自作聪明，把上例的四分之一推算为只要玩四局，里面总有一局赢出。事实非焉。或然率中有一个非常重要的概念———独立性。以上述掷硬币四局为例，四局各不相干，互相独立，第一局掷出“公仔、字”结果后，不会排除掉第二局掷出“公仔、字”的机会。
所有博彩的方式方法和游戏规则，都是数学家为庄家精心设计的成果。赌场内不会掷硬币，只会掷骰子。硬币两个平面，骰子有六个平面(用“1”至“6”代表)，若掷骰两次，掷出两次“6”为赢，那么胜出的或然率就是1/6×1/6﹦1/36，输钱的机会是35/36。
由于赌徒的输面远远大于赢面，赌场于是用大赔率去吸引赌徒，让他们只看到一赔四、五十的“着数”，而忽视赢面极极小上的“吃亏”。
从理论上说，赌徒最有可能在赌场赢钱的唯一办法是：以掷骰两次为例，重复不断地玩上数万、数十万局，或许可以平均每三十六局赢一局，若一局赌本为十元，平均每三百六十元赌本可赢一百四十元(假设一赔五十)。不过，要留意“数万、数十万次”和“或许可以平均”这些关键词语，不少赌徒忘了，结果连裤子也输掉。
高赔率诱赌徒输钱
况且，现实情况是，专家永远会把赔率设计在胜率之下，哪怕赌徒有精力、有金钱玩上数万、数十万局，哪怕真的出现“或许可以平均”的条件，赌徒最终还是要输钱的(后面谈到的轮盘赌局是典型例子)。
六合彩是最普罗大众化的赌局，预测六合彩中彩结果，跟计算掷硬币一样。六合彩要求在四十九个数字中选出六个，那么，中第一个数字的或然率是四十九分之一，中第二个数字的或然率是四十八分之一(因为已搅出的第一个数字不能在往后数字中重复)，第三个的机率是四十七分之一，如此类推，六个号码全中的或然率是1/49×1/48×1/47×1/46×1/45×1/44﹦1/10068347520。
不过，由于六合彩搅珠的先后次序并不影响中彩机会，也就是说，如果买了“11、12、13、14、15、16”，不管它搅出的是“12、16、13、15、14、11”抑或“16、15、14、13、12、11”，阁下还是中奖，因而，实质中彩机率应该是上述答案除以6×5×4×3×2×1(重复次数)，即1/13983816。
假如阁下每周买两期六合彩，每年买上一百零四期，那么，买13,983,816期六合彩需时十三万五千年(相当于人类在地球上存活的岁月)，但也不保证中上一期啊！
当然，不中头奖可以中二奖、三奖，以数学或然率计算，中二奖的机会是1/2330636，中三奖是1/55491，一点不高，连要赢博彩当局二十元(减除赌本实质只赢十五元)的机率，亦只得1/57(中三个号码)。
任何六个数字组合的搅珠率都相若，事实上没有什么方法可以提高选中号码的机会。假如阁下一定要买六合彩，唯一可以做的，是在假如有幸中奖的大前提下，增加中彩的款额。
由于六合彩规则之一是中彩者平分奖金，一人独得时奖金自然更可观。因此选号码时不妨选些别人不太会选择的号码，提高独得奖金机会。例如每期有一万人选1、2、3、4、5、6，假如搅出这个组合，就会有一万人分钱，即使彩金有一千万元，每人不过分得一千块而矣，这个头奖中不中也罢了，省得中彩后激死！
赌博活动可追溯至古希腊神话中三位天神掷骰决定宇宙分治时，结果宙斯赢了，管天堂；波塞冬第二，做了海神，冥王输了，得到地府。在现实世界里，掷骰乃最古老赌博方式，有证据显示至少在公元前三千五百年已经出现。
香港的博彩活动都是沿袭英式的。英国最早全国性抽彩中奖活动于一五六六年举行，当时伊丽莎白一世以彩票形式筹款修建辛基港。抽彩活动亦载于圣经时期，据称先知摩西用抽彩方式把约旦河以西的多块土地分别奖给多人。
轮盘桌局绝无胜算
赌场(CASINO)是十七世纪产物。在意大利，CASINO是“小屋”的意思。十七世纪的意大利贵族爱聚于一些小屋中，谈生意、论政治，妓女投怀送抱之际，他们会下点赌注。
十八世纪时，赌场已扩及欧洲大部分地方，十九世纪时赌场甚至成为大银幕上常见的背景。一八六○年，摩纳哥公国财政紧绌，当时一名叫做弗朗西·布兰克的赌场老板，建议开豪华赌场增加国库收入，数年间，蒙地卡罗成为世界赌场之都。
今天的国际赌场大多提供四大种桌局———二十一点(一种作庄牌局，玩者力争二十一点总牌点，或者比庄家更接近二十一点，但不得超过二十一点)、双骰子赌博、轮盘赌局和扑克牌局；非桌局则以老虎机最为普遍。
这些赌博绝大多数是或然率游戏，由数学专才精心设计，既能吸引赌徒，又能百分百保障赌场老板利益。例如轮盘。一般轮盘局有三十七个槽，号码为○至三十七。○号槽是绿色的，其它号码则是红色和黑色相间，庄家以一个方向旋转轮盘，然后以相反方向往轮盘边甩出小球，小球从转动状态到慢慢停下时，会掉落轮盘中心其中一个槽内，以决定胜果。
这种游戏的吸引处在于多种投注方式和多种赔率、小球掉落槽内掀动刺激感，以及每晚都有不少人赢钱。不过，数学家已透过赔率的设定，把赌徒胜率设计至低至于总或然率，也就是说，整个晚上最终赢家还是赌场老板。
老虎机是赌场内最简便的赌博，那是美国人查尔斯·费伊一八九五年发明的，一九○七年正式投产，原先老虎机滚轮上的图画是些扑克牌，一九一○年改为水果，大概要减少赌徒战死赌场的血腥味吧。一般来说，三个滚轮都旋到车厘子图画，就叫“满堂红”，这时老虎机会吐出全部硬币归中奖者所有。六十年代老虎机开始电子化，部分老虎机的图画改为太空时代象征物。
老虎机吃人不吐骨
哪怕你是天才，也无法战胜老虎机。赌场会闢出老虎机室，内放很多很多(愈多愈好)老虎机，专家预设这组老虎机的“满堂红”吐钱机率，务求每隔一段不长时间就有一部机器吐钱，目的是营造中奖机会经常出现的错觉，硬币铿铿锵锵掉落金属兜时，往往是整个老虎机室全部玩家情绪最高涨的时刻，不独中奖者会继续甘心情愿把彩金输回去，非中奖者也会希望大增，继续向赌场老板进贡。
在滚盘赌戏中，老虎机最吃人不吐骨，也是赌场的最大滚盘式财神。相对之下，轮盘赌局则是赌场“薄利多销”游戏，例如，玩者连续玩足三百七十局(每局十元，赔率三十五)，局局都买“死”一个号码，从理论上说那号码的大约平均胜出率是三十七分一，即三百七十局中有十局胜出。玩者一局赢三百五十元，十局就赢了三千五百元；但别忘记他同时已输掉三百六十局，即输掉三千六百元，总计起来还是要输一百元。
总而言之，阁下若走入赌场，就不要抱着赢钱心态，赌博其实不叫博彩，因为其中绝无彩数(幸运)可言。一如六合彩，间中会制造些富翁出来，但“这个富翁不是你”的机率极大极大。
赌马、赌波、网上赌博的情况一样，精心策划的游戏方式，能勾起人性的欲念，甚至令人陷入迷恋、上瘾和不能自拔境地，而庄家永远是大赢家。
忘了赌神、赌圣这类超级虚拟人物吧，看看报章上多少人为赌博家破人亡。买六合彩可以当作捐款，别望中奖，其中奖率不足一千四百万分之一。金钱能买快乐吗？答案是“不一定”。一项面对二百四十九名曾中彩七十万元以上美国人士的调查结果显示，百分之四十五觉得中奖后不比以前快乐。
赌马、赌波、买六合彩……就等于用辛苦赚得的金钱，再一次引证数学上的或然率定律。或然率是预测胜败比率(当然不可能绝对准确)的定律，早于十六、十七世纪的欧洲，不少赌业富豪聘请数学专才，设计有利赌场、庄家胜数的方法。
数学专才设计赌局
或然率看似复杂，说穿了不过是计算数学而矣。举个例说，掷硬币两次，要两次都“公仔”朝上，方为赢，那么阁下的赢率就是四分之一，因为第一次掷出“公仔”的机会是二分之一，第二次也是二分之一，因而两次俱为公仔的或然率是1/2×1/2＝1/4。
在或然率预测胜败问题上，“零”代表绝对输，“一”代表绝对赢。上述掷硬币例子中，掷硬币两次的结果，有四个(公仔、公仔；公仔、字；字、公仔；字、字)，其中一个是胜果，占四分之一，也就是零点二五。
不少赌徒自作聪明，把上例的四分之一推算为只要玩四局，里面总有一局赢出。事实非焉。或然率中有一个非常重要的概念———独立性。以上述掷硬币四局为例，四局各不相干，互相独立，第一局掷出“公仔、字”结果后，不会排除掉第二局掷出“公仔、字”的机会。
所有博彩的方式方法和游戏规则，都是数学家为庄家精心设计的成果。赌场内不会掷硬币，只会掷骰子。硬币两个平面，骰子有六个平面(用“1”至“6”代表)，若掷骰两次，掷出两次“6”为赢，那么胜出的或然率就是1/6×1/6﹦1/36，输钱的机会是35/36。
由于赌徒的输面远远大于赢面，赌场于是用大赔率去吸引赌徒，让他们只看到一赔四、五十的“着数”，而忽视赢面极极小上的“吃亏”。
从理论上说，赌徒最有可能在赌场赢钱的唯一办法是：以掷骰两次为例，重复不断地玩上数万、数十万局，或许可以平均每三十六局赢一局，若一局赌本为十元，平均每三百六十元赌本可赢一百四十元(假设一赔五十)。不过，要留意“数万、数十万次”和“或许可以平均”这些关键词语，不少赌徒忘了，结果连裤子也输掉。
高赔率诱赌徒输钱
况且，现实情况是，专家永远会把赔率设计在胜率之下，哪怕赌徒有精力、有金钱玩上数万、数十万局，哪怕真的出现“或许可以平均”的条件，赌徒最终还是要输钱的(后面谈到的轮盘赌局是典型例子)。
六合彩是最普罗大众化的赌局，预测六合彩中彩结果，跟计算掷硬币一样。六合彩要求在四十九个数字中选出六个，那么，中第一个数字的或然率是四十九分之一，中第二个数字的或然率是四十八分之一(因为已搅出的第一个数字不能在往后数字中重复)，第三个的机率是四十七分之一，如此类推，六个号码全中的或然率是1/49×1/48×1/47×1/46×1/45×1/44﹦1/10068347520。
不过，由于六合彩搅珠的先后次序并不影响中彩机会，也就是说，如果买了“11、12、13、14、15、16”，不管它搅出的是“12、16、13、15、14、11”抑或“16、15、14、13、12、11”，阁下还是中奖，因而，实质中彩机率应该是上述答案除以6×5×4×3×2×1(重复次数)，即1/13983816。
假如阁下每周买两期六合彩，每年买上一百零四期，那么，买13,983,816期六合彩需时十三万五千年(相当于人类在地球上存活的岁月)，但也不保证中上一期啊！
当然，不中头奖可以中二奖、三奖，以数学或然率计算，中二奖的机会是1/2330636，中三奖是1/55491，一点不高，连要赢博彩当局二十元(减除赌本实质只赢十五元)的机率，亦只得1/57(中三个号码)。
任何六个数字组合的搅珠率都相若，事实上没有什么方法可以提高选中号码的机会。假如阁下一定要买六合彩，唯一可以做的，是在假如有幸中奖的大前提下，增加中彩的款额。
由于六合彩规则之一是中彩者平分奖金，一人独得时奖金自然更可观。因此选号码时不妨选些别人不太会选择的号码，提高独得奖金机会。例如每期有一万人选1、2、3、4、5、6，假如搅出这个组合，就会有一万人分钱，即使彩金有一千万元，每人不过分得一千块而矣，这个头奖中不中也罢了，省得中彩后激死！
赌博活动可追溯至古希腊神话中三位天神掷骰决定宇宙分治时，结果宙斯赢了，管天堂；波塞冬第二，做了海神，冥王输了，得到地府。在现实世界里，掷骰乃最古老赌博方式，有证据显示至少在公元前三千五百年已经出现。
香港的博彩活动都是沿袭英式的。英国最早全国性抽彩中奖活动于一五六六年举行，当时伊丽莎白一世以彩票形式筹款修建辛基港。抽彩活动亦载于圣经时期，据称先知摩西用抽彩方式把约旦河以西的多块土地分别奖给多人。
轮盘桌局绝无胜算
赌场(CASINO)是十七世纪产物。在意大利，CASINO是“小屋”的意思。十七世纪的意大利贵族爱聚于一些小屋中，谈生意、论政治，妓女投怀送抱之际，他们会下点赌注。
十八世纪时，赌场已扩及欧洲大部分地方，十九世纪时赌场甚至成为大银幕上常见的背景。一八六○年，摩纳哥公国财政紧绌，当时一名叫做弗朗西·布兰克的赌场老板，建议开豪华赌场增加国库收入，数年间，蒙地卡罗成为世界赌场之都。
今天的国际赌场大多提供四大种桌局———二十一点(一种作庄牌局，玩者力争二十一点总牌点，或者比庄家更接近二十一点，但不得超过二十一点)、双骰子赌博、轮盘赌局和扑克牌局；非桌局则以老虎机最为普遍。
这些赌博绝大多数是或然率游戏，由数学专才精心设计，既能吸引赌徒，又能百分百保障赌场老板利益。例如轮盘。一般轮盘局有三十七个槽，号码为○至三十七。○号槽是绿色的，其它号码则是红色和黑色相间，庄家以一个方向旋转轮盘，然后以相反方向往轮盘边甩出小球，小球从转动状态到慢慢停下时，会掉落轮盘中心其中一个槽内，以决定胜果。
这种游戏的吸引处在于多种投注方式和多种赔率、小球掉落槽内掀动刺激感，以及每晚都有不少人赢钱。不过，数学家已透过赔率的设定，把赌徒胜率设计至低至于总或然率，也就是说，整个晚上最终赢家还是赌场老板。
老虎机是赌场内最简便的赌博，那是美国人查尔斯·费伊一八九五年发明的，一九○七年正式投产，原先老虎机滚轮上的图画是些扑克牌，一九一○年改为水果，大概要减少赌徒战死赌场的血腥味吧。一般来说，三个滚轮都旋到车厘子图画，就叫“满堂红”，这时老虎机会吐出全部硬币归中奖者所有。六十年代老虎机开始电子化，部分老虎机的图画改为太空时代象征物。
老虎机吃人不吐骨
哪怕你是天才，也无法战胜老虎机。赌场会闢出老虎机室，内放很多很多(愈多愈好)老虎机，专家预设这组老虎机的“满堂红”吐钱机率，务求每隔一段不长时间就有一部机器吐钱，目的是营造中奖机会经常出现的错觉，硬币铿铿锵锵掉落金属兜时，往往是整个老虎机室全部玩家情绪最高涨的时刻，不独中奖者会继续甘心情愿把彩金输回去，非中奖者也会希望大增，继续向赌场老板进贡。
在滚盘赌戏中，老虎机最吃人不吐骨，也是赌场的最大滚盘式财神。相对之下，轮盘赌局则是赌场“薄利多销”游戏，例如，玩者连续玩足三百七十局(每局十元，赔率三十五)，局局都买“死”一个号码，从理论上说那号码的大约平均胜出率是三十七分一，即三百七十局中有十局胜出。玩者一局赢三百五十元，十局就赢了三千五百元；但别忘记他同时已输掉三百六十局，即输掉三千六百元，总计起来还是要输一百元。
总而言之，阁下若走入赌场，就不要抱着赢钱心态，赌博其实不叫博彩，因为其中绝无彩数(幸运)可言。一如六合彩，间中会制造些富翁出来，但“这个富翁不是你”的机率极大极大。
赌马、赌波、网上赌博的情况一样，精心策划的游戏方式，能勾起人性的欲念，甚至令人陷入迷恋、上瘾和不能自拔境地，而庄家永远是大赢家。
忘了赌神、赌圣这类超级虚拟人物吧，看看报章上多少人为赌博家破人亡。买六合彩可以当作捐款，别望中奖，其中奖率不足一千四百万分之一。金钱能买快乐吗？答案是“不一定”。一项面对二百四十九名曾中彩七十万元以上美国人士的调查结果显示，百分之四十五觉得中奖后不比以前快乐。
Tuesday, April 29, 2008
“慢,稳,忍” 高明的拙招
慢的意境
仓促行事考虑不周往往只会见期好不见其坏 不客观的态度+不完整的资料=错误的判断慢， 可以让你更清醒，在适当的时机买入卖出， 通常熊市都会持续一段不短的时间，低价高值股偏地 可是都不多人买 800-900点不买都等1200才追 本末倒置, SUPPOSELY 在1200卖 800点买的。 目前的全世界股市“横尸片野”，机会应该不远了.
稳
巴菲特的“不 损失”的高招， 就如打仗一样 要探清楚敌军的虚实，一步一脚印，不打没把握的仗. 轻率出击 将王兵损 智者不为也。 那些喜欢每次全力进攻的将领你认为可以活过多少次的厮杀？一次的失利也许就把99次的胜利化为零机会永远存在，只看你有没有机会看到它，如果没了本钱 有机会也便没机会了。不亏钱也是赚钱的方法之一
忍
忍？对就是它买进之前 忍人所不能忍 才能低价买进卖出之前 忍人所不能忍 才能高价卖出买进之后 忍人所不能忍 才能长期获大利股坛里有多少短线高手？至少我不是买股是买公司的将来 业务，计划，发展都需要时间故“忍”有百益而无一害
故快不如慢，狠不如稳，准不如忍 看似笨拙实属高明.
仓促行事考虑不周往往只会见期好不见其坏 不客观的态度+不完整的资料=错误的判断慢， 可以让你更清醒，在适当的时机买入卖出， 通常熊市都会持续一段不短的时间，低价高值股偏地 可是都不多人买 800-900点不买都等1200才追 本末倒置, SUPPOSELY 在1200卖 800点买的。 目前的全世界股市“横尸片野”，机会应该不远了.
稳
巴菲特的“不 损失”的高招， 就如打仗一样 要探清楚敌军的虚实，一步一脚印，不打没把握的仗. 轻率出击 将王兵损 智者不为也。 那些喜欢每次全力进攻的将领你认为可以活过多少次的厮杀？一次的失利也许就把99次的胜利化为零机会永远存在，只看你有没有机会看到它，如果没了本钱 有机会也便没机会了。不亏钱也是赚钱的方法之一
忍
忍？对就是它买进之前 忍人所不能忍 才能低价买进卖出之前 忍人所不能忍 才能高价卖出买进之后 忍人所不能忍 才能长期获大利股坛里有多少短线高手？至少我不是买股是买公司的将来 业务，计划，发展都需要时间故“忍”有百益而无一害
故快不如慢，狠不如稳，准不如忍 看似笨拙实属高明.
Sunday, April 27, 2008
为什么不能等三年？
●你买了一间屋子，由跟发展商签约到发展商交屋给你，前后三年，你觉得这是理所当然的事，三年的等待，你觉得一点也不长。在这期间，你没有分文收入，却定期的给银行利息，你也毫无怨言。
●你买了一百英亩的荒地，开辟为油棕园，由伐木、烧芭、开路挖沟，育苗，种植，除草，施肥，整整忙了三年，才看到棕果出现，收成仍不足以维持开支，再等两年，棕果渐丰，油棕园的收支才达到平衡，仍没钱赚。这已是第五个年头了。忙了五年，只有付出，没有收入，你不以为苦，因为你知道那是赚钱无可避免的途径。
●你买了五十亩的地，是树胶园，属农业地，你要把它发展为住宅区，於是你向土地局申请将农业地转为屋地，再将屋地分割为五、六百段每段20′×75′的屋地，以兴建五，六百间排屋出售。分割后为每段屋地申请个别地契，请绘测师设计屋子的图样，请工程师计算成本，请承包商承建屋子，由市场部登广告出售屋子，跟银行接洽融资问题，屋子建筑过程中要处理许多附近居民的申诉，要按期向购屋者收款，到领到入伙纸，把屋交给购屋者，由购买土地到交屋收工，前后长达五年，总算钱赚到了手。作为发展商，你认为以五年的时间赚钱，是正常的，是合理的，你耐心地等待，从无怨言。
●你是一名中小型企业家，你有制造某种产品的经验，过去你是为别人管理公司的，现在决定自己创业，你决定建一间工厂，你从调查市场，向银行接洽借款，寻找厂地，设计厂房，招聘员工，装置机器，试验生产，到产品推入市场，从策划到产品出现在百货公司的货架上，前后三年，再苦撑两年，才开始有盈利，那已是第五个年头了。你认为这是创业的正常过程，你心甘情愿与你的事业同行五年，毫无怨言。
●你是开药剂店的，你决定在城市的另一区，开一间分店，为来自该区的顾客服务，从寻找店铺，装修，聘请药剂师，筹备开张，到正式做生意，前后也要一年半。
以上的五个例子－－买屋子收租，开辟油棕园，建屋出售，从事工业，开零售店，从筹备到赚钱，快则一年半，慢则五年，业者从无怨言，因为他们了解，做任何事业，都需要时间，绝对没有一蹴即成这回事。
以上的五个例子有一个共同点，那就是投入资金，希望赚取合理的利润，这叫“投资”，业者除了知道投资需要时间外，他们也接受一个事实，即凡是投资，都有风险，没有任何投资是没有风险的，风险是他们赚取比银行定存更高的利润所面付出的代价。
投资者接受两项事实：
①投资需要时间才能赚到利润，没有捷径可操。
②凡投资都有风险，风险的高低常与利润成正比。
股票投资，是许许多多投资管道之一，为什么投资者不能接受以上的两项事实。做事业，你可以等三、五年，股票投资为什么不能等三、五年？
绝大部份的股票投资者，都希望今天买进，明天就卖出，赚取暴利。假如你告诉他，低价买进好股，持握三年，可以赚钱，他们觉得时间太长，难以接受。
为什么买屋子可以等三年，买股票却不能？
为什么肯化五年的时间去完成一项建屋计划，等油棕成熟，等工业产生利润，为什么股票投资不肯等五年？
为什么肯化一年半的时间去开一间药剂店分行，买股票却不愿等一年半载？
股票就是公司的股份，跟合资买屋，参股种油棕，建屋，开工厂，开药剂店分行没有两样，你拥有股份的上市公司，跟你所参股的别的私人公司一样，需要时间去完成业务，才能赚到钱，为什么你用不一样的态度去对待同样的股份？
这种态度合理吗？
投资生意有赚有亏，做生意的人坦然面对，无怨无尤。
你持有股份的上市公司也是在做生意，当然也是有赚有亏，投资者为什么不能忍受亏蚀，为什么不能接受可能亏蚀的事实而怨无尤人？
上市公司多达950家，任你挑选参股的对象，你因为无知，因为贪婪，因为听信谣言，而参股於错误的企业，岂能完全归咎於股市？你自己没有责任吗？
大多数股票每年的股价波动幅度由数十巴仙至数百巴仙不等，你在低价时不买，高价时抢进，亏了本，不怨自己怨别人，合理吗？
参股做生意，例如合股种油棕，六、七年之后才可能分红，买棕油股，当年就可分到股息，不是更合算吗？
在做任何事情失败后，多数人只怨别人，把责任推在别人或环境身上，能自我反省的人少之又少。
股票投资也一样，亏了本不是怨股市，就是怨别人使奸用诈，从来不检讨自己失败的原因。
我再问：买屋子可以等三年，为什么买股票不能等三年？
●你买了一百英亩的荒地，开辟为油棕园，由伐木、烧芭、开路挖沟，育苗，种植，除草，施肥，整整忙了三年，才看到棕果出现，收成仍不足以维持开支，再等两年，棕果渐丰，油棕园的收支才达到平衡，仍没钱赚。这已是第五个年头了。忙了五年，只有付出，没有收入，你不以为苦，因为你知道那是赚钱无可避免的途径。
●你买了五十亩的地，是树胶园，属农业地，你要把它发展为住宅区，於是你向土地局申请将农业地转为屋地，再将屋地分割为五、六百段每段20′×75′的屋地，以兴建五，六百间排屋出售。分割后为每段屋地申请个别地契，请绘测师设计屋子的图样，请工程师计算成本，请承包商承建屋子，由市场部登广告出售屋子，跟银行接洽融资问题，屋子建筑过程中要处理许多附近居民的申诉，要按期向购屋者收款，到领到入伙纸，把屋交给购屋者，由购买土地到交屋收工，前后长达五年，总算钱赚到了手。作为发展商，你认为以五年的时间赚钱，是正常的，是合理的，你耐心地等待，从无怨言。
●你是一名中小型企业家，你有制造某种产品的经验，过去你是为别人管理公司的，现在决定自己创业，你决定建一间工厂，你从调查市场，向银行接洽借款，寻找厂地，设计厂房，招聘员工，装置机器，试验生产，到产品推入市场，从策划到产品出现在百货公司的货架上，前后三年，再苦撑两年，才开始有盈利，那已是第五个年头了。你认为这是创业的正常过程，你心甘情愿与你的事业同行五年，毫无怨言。
●你是开药剂店的，你决定在城市的另一区，开一间分店，为来自该区的顾客服务，从寻找店铺，装修，聘请药剂师，筹备开张，到正式做生意，前后也要一年半。
以上的五个例子－－买屋子收租，开辟油棕园，建屋出售，从事工业，开零售店，从筹备到赚钱，快则一年半，慢则五年，业者从无怨言，因为他们了解，做任何事业，都需要时间，绝对没有一蹴即成这回事。
以上的五个例子有一个共同点，那就是投入资金，希望赚取合理的利润，这叫“投资”，业者除了知道投资需要时间外，他们也接受一个事实，即凡是投资，都有风险，没有任何投资是没有风险的，风险是他们赚取比银行定存更高的利润所面付出的代价。
投资者接受两项事实：
①投资需要时间才能赚到利润，没有捷径可操。
②凡投资都有风险，风险的高低常与利润成正比。
股票投资，是许许多多投资管道之一，为什么投资者不能接受以上的两项事实。做事业，你可以等三、五年，股票投资为什么不能等三、五年？
绝大部份的股票投资者，都希望今天买进，明天就卖出，赚取暴利。假如你告诉他，低价买进好股，持握三年，可以赚钱，他们觉得时间太长，难以接受。
为什么买屋子可以等三年，买股票却不能？
为什么肯化五年的时间去完成一项建屋计划，等油棕成熟，等工业产生利润，为什么股票投资不肯等五年？
为什么肯化一年半的时间去开一间药剂店分行，买股票却不愿等一年半载？
股票就是公司的股份，跟合资买屋，参股种油棕，建屋，开工厂，开药剂店分行没有两样，你拥有股份的上市公司，跟你所参股的别的私人公司一样，需要时间去完成业务，才能赚到钱，为什么你用不一样的态度去对待同样的股份？
这种态度合理吗？
投资生意有赚有亏，做生意的人坦然面对，无怨无尤。
你持有股份的上市公司也是在做生意，当然也是有赚有亏，投资者为什么不能忍受亏蚀，为什么不能接受可能亏蚀的事实而怨无尤人？
上市公司多达950家，任你挑选参股的对象，你因为无知，因为贪婪，因为听信谣言，而参股於错误的企业，岂能完全归咎於股市？你自己没有责任吗？
大多数股票每年的股价波动幅度由数十巴仙至数百巴仙不等，你在低价时不买，高价时抢进，亏了本，不怨自己怨别人，合理吗？
参股做生意，例如合股种油棕，六、七年之后才可能分红，买棕油股，当年就可分到股息，不是更合算吗？
在做任何事情失败后，多数人只怨别人，把责任推在别人或环境身上，能自我反省的人少之又少。
股票投资也一样，亏了本不是怨股市，就是怨别人使奸用诈，从来不检讨自己失败的原因。
我再问：买屋子可以等三年，为什么买股票不能等三年？
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)