This weekend I’ll throw $1,100 down the drain. That is to say, I’ll pay my rent. Pop-finance pundits have long used the drain cliché to describe how renters like me waste money, while homeowners with mortgages “pay themselves” and “build equity.”
In April 2007 I argued something different: Renting Makes More Financial Sense Than Homeownership. Basically, houses produce poor returns over long time periods while stocks and other investments produce good ones, and the outlook for houses is especially poor now, so I’d rather rent cheaply and funnel my extra cash into something other than a house.
Even though house prices have plunged and I have enough money to buy one, I’m still not nearly tempted. In what follows I’ll give five reasons. (The first two form the core of my original argument.) Before all this starts to sound too self-congratulatory, I’ll also explain the one big thing my essay got wrong.
Reason 1: Houses produce lousy returns, while stocks produce good ones
Houses looked like smart investments in 2007. They had returned 9.3% a year for a decade, while stocks had returned just 5.9%. This year, with investors fleeing both houses and stocks, both probably look like a waste of money. But be careful about succumbing to what psychologists call recency bias — the tendency to form beliefs based largely on the most recent observations in a long series of data. For U.S. investors, reliable data on stocks and houses goes back well further than 10, 20 or even 50 years.
Stocks returned 7% a year for 200 years ended 2004, according to Wharton professor Jeremy Siegel. That’s after subtracting an average of 3% a year for inflation, or the gradual rise in prices of ordinary goods. The plunge in stock prices over the past 16 months makes me all the more sure that shares are poised to deliver good returns over the next decade or two. Houses returned 0.4% a year over 114 years ended 2004, according to Yale professor Robert Shiller, co-creator of the most widely used index for house prices. That number is suspiciously close to zero. Indeed, it might have been zero, reckons Shiller, if not for two periods of aggressive house buying, one spurred by government incentives following World War II and another created by the Federal Reserve’s drastic interest rate cuts in 2002 and 2003.
A zero return for houses might sound odd. An editor who re-published my original essay at another web site stuck the word “virtually” before zero, I suppose to soften the message. I made him take it out. If you think about it, zero is the only logical answer, so long as we’re talking about a single-family house and not, say, a rental building built to maximize income. Inflation, recall, is the gradual price rise of ordinary goods. What’s a house if not an ordinary good? Houses don’t spend their days thinking about ways to make themselves more valuable. They just sit there. Subtract inflation from their long-term price increases and there’s nothing left.
Apply heaps of leverage to the numbers if you like, but the outcome only worsens. Mortgage rates now are about as low as they’ve ever been, thanks to more government efforts to, among other things, spur house buying. But you’ll still pay 5.2% to capture long-term price increases that merely match inflation. And today, you’ll tie up a bundle of cash with a down payment. I’d rather pay cheap rent instead of an expensive mortgage and put the monthly cash I save into stocks and other investments. And rent is still plenty cheap, because . . .
Reason 2: House prices have further to fall
Price matters. Few stock investors would think about buying shares of a company before looking at some measure of how expensive it is relative to the value it creates. They might look at the price/earnings ratio, for example. Houses have a price/earnings ratio of sorts — the ratio of their price to the yearly income they could generate if rented out. In April 2007 I noted that price/earnings ratios for stocks were only slightly above their historic average, while price/rent ratios for houses were double their average.
Stock prices were the thing I got wrong. The price/earnings ratio I gave was correct, but the earnings on which it was based were far from ordinary. The fierce housing boom was ringing cash registers at furniture stores, employing heaps of real estate agents, padding the profit statements of lenders and, thanks to home equity loans, puffing up buying power for just about everything. I should have realized that America’s corporate profit was close to a third above normal levels as a percentage of gross domestic product. Profits have reverted to average levels, and stocks have fallen to around 14 times earnings. I recently cautioned readers that, even though stocks are fairly priced, it’s natural to assume that after a long period of above-average prices we can enter a few years of below-average ones.
Houses still seem expensive, though. One recent survey by Moody’s Economy.com found that the price/rent ratio in major markets had fallen to 20 from 24 three years ago, but that for 16 years ended 1999, before the house-buying spree began in earnest, it had stayed below 15.
Numbers like those should inform not only house-buying decisions, but public policy. If a citizen is being made poor by the debt they carry on the house they bought, and if a government policy keeps them tied to that house instead of separated from it into more affordable housing, are we really helping them?
Reason 3: Many houses for sale today seem designed to waste money
“Most men appear never to have considered what a house is, and are actually though needlessly poor all their lives because they think that they must have such a one as their neighbors have.” Henry David Thoreau wrote that about 160 years ago in a long, somewhat preachy but also poignant treatise called "Walden," which argued against materialism and for simplicity. I’d imagine it applies to today’s houses even more than to ones in Thoreau’s day.
Commercial real estate investors seek to maximize the amount of use tenants can get out of a building, while minimizing the operating expenses. Single-family house buyers have lately done almost the opposite, by buying far larger houses than single families need. From the 1950s to 2006, the average American house size doubled, even as the size of families shrank. U.S. tax policy rewards house buyers who borrow, not renters, and not house buyers who pay cash. So naturally, Americans responded by borrowing, which inflated their buying power and ultimately caused dwellings themselves to balloon. The “dream of homeownership” became more of an entitlement to mansion-ownership. But all those mansions on the market do little for me, financially speaking. They’re expensive to heat and cool, and to fill with a respectable amount of stuff.
Reason 4: Big houses are targets for future taxes
This year, U.S. government debt will increase by the largest amount relative to the size of the economy since World War II. Assuming the country will eventually right its financial course, at least some of that money will have to be paid back. That means higher taxes in the future, and taxes come mostly from people with a proven ability to pay — people with high incomes and people with large, expensive, easy-to-find assets. There’s only muted talk of states raising property taxes now, since the federal government is working to support house prices. I’m worried that property taxes will rise sharply in coming years. Of course, renters pay taxes too, if you figure that landlords merely pass along taxes to tenants. But renters live in smaller spaces.
I might have titled this reason, "Few people truly own their house, anyway." To me, owning something is defined in part by not having to pay anymore. Condo owners are really renters, if we consider their endless maintenance fees. But house owners, too, must pay rent to the government in the form of taxes, and must pay for plenty of ongoing maintenance besides.
Reason 5: Neighborhoods are changing in unpredictable ways
In March 2008, The Atlantic published a frightening vision of what might happen to America’s suburbs. Low-density suburbs, it theorized, may become what inner cities became in the 1960s and '70s — "slums characterized by poverty, crime and decay.” I’ve no idea whether anything like that will come to pass. But the popping of America’s giant housing bubble, and a corresponding shift in where people find jobs, seems sure to reshape how and where we live in coming years. For rural folks that might not matter much. (For them, in fact, little of this might apply, since house prices in rural America have stayed pretty sane.) But anyone considering a move to the suburbs should do some careful forecasting before sinking a large portion of their wealth into a house.
I hope all this doesn’t sound alarmist. I’ll surely buy a house one day, when prices are low enough, and I’ll probably even buy one that’s a little bigger than I need. But I’ll do so knowing that I’m spending on luxury, not investing. Also, I hope this doesn’t further the anxiety of readers with mortgage troubles. The trend of the day seems to be to take an angry tone with people who’ve gotten in over their heads -- one fellow columnist referred to them the other day as “deadbeats.” But two other parties deserve a full measure of blame, and I don’t mean lenders. First, lawmakers have for decades trumpeted house affordability initiatives like tax breaks, while leaving supply in choice markets constrained. That inflated demand and ultimately produced the opposite of affordability. Second, too many people who do what I do for a living spent most of the housing boom cheerleading instead of doing math. It’s time to stop lecturing renters — and maybe to ask why public policy treats them as less-worthy citizens than buyers.
Tuesday, March 10, 2009
In the post - UOB’s foray into heartland home loans
In a surprise move, United Overseas Bank (UOB) has tied-up exclusively with SingPost to sell HDB home loans, muscling its way into mass market mortgages that have so far been dominated by rivals DBS Group Holdings and OCBC Bank.
UOB which has previously targeted private property buyers and the affluent yesterday said it has forged a strategic alliance with SingPost to distribute UOB HDB Home Loans.
The bank will initially start with four SingPost outlets and plan to have up to 24 post office branches by the end of the year to sell HDB homes loans. SingPost has 52 branches all over the island.
‘The latest move extends UOB’s HDB home loans’ distribution network beyond its 57 branches,’ UOB and SingPost said in a joint statement.
The exclusive arrangement is for more than 5 years, said Claudia Lim, SingPost corporate communications manager.
SingPost dedicated staff trained by UOB will be selling the HDB home loans, said Ms Lim.
Eddie Khoo, UOB’s executive vice-president for personal financial services, said the latest initiative ‘is really about bringing convenience to customers by extending the bank’s distribution network beyond the walls of our own branches to reach customers’.
‘At the macro level, and in the longer term, we see this as a strategic investment as this additional channel enables us to serve our customers better through convenience and accessibility.’
The surprise move will likely spark off a fierce tussle with rivals DBS and OCBC who may seek to protect their turf. Both banks claim to be the market leader. DBS said it has captured HDB buyers through its POSB customers while OCBC has focused on HDB mortgages from the time the government liberalised the market in Jan 2003.
‘POSB is the market leader in HDB home loans,’ said a DBS spokeswoman. The bank has 53 POSB branches.
‘We were also the first in the market to introduce POSB Home Ideal First for first-time homeowners, offering them a 7-day return policy which allows them to assess if the home loan is suitable for their needs,’ she said.
Gregory Chan, OCBC head of secured lending, said the bank’s team of mobile home loan specialists visit potential customers who are too busy to come to its branches, to explain details of home loan packages and to process applications.
‘At the same time, we work with property agents from the largest property firms in Singapore who are in direct contact with home buyers and help market our home loans. This business model has served us well and we continue to be the top player in the HDB home loan market,’ said Mr Chan.
Mass market home loans are just about the safest products as Singapore enters its worst recession ever because the prices of HDB homes did not surge wildly during the property bubble. And now, they are not skidding sharply.
In contrast, the prices of some high-end properties have crashed as much as 50 per cent from the peak reached last year. A Citigroup report in January said that, in the high-end segment, properties have seen price corrections of about 35 per cent from a year ago and they could fall by another 30-40 per cent this year.
David Conner, OCBC chief executive, said last month while announcing the bank’s 2008 results that negative equity for its property portfolio was low because of the bank’s focus on HDB home loans.
He also noted that HDB mortgages are for owner occupation and the loan quantums are small.
‘A big part of our portfolio is HDB - prices have not gone up as much - and we do not anticipate a big fall,’ he said.
OCBC’s home loan book negative equity was 0.7 per cent while 81 per cent of homes for which it has made loans are owner-occupied.
UOB which has previously targeted private property buyers and the affluent yesterday said it has forged a strategic alliance with SingPost to distribute UOB HDB Home Loans.
The bank will initially start with four SingPost outlets and plan to have up to 24 post office branches by the end of the year to sell HDB homes loans. SingPost has 52 branches all over the island.
‘The latest move extends UOB’s HDB home loans’ distribution network beyond its 57 branches,’ UOB and SingPost said in a joint statement.
The exclusive arrangement is for more than 5 years, said Claudia Lim, SingPost corporate communications manager.
SingPost dedicated staff trained by UOB will be selling the HDB home loans, said Ms Lim.
Eddie Khoo, UOB’s executive vice-president for personal financial services, said the latest initiative ‘is really about bringing convenience to customers by extending the bank’s distribution network beyond the walls of our own branches to reach customers’.
‘At the macro level, and in the longer term, we see this as a strategic investment as this additional channel enables us to serve our customers better through convenience and accessibility.’
The surprise move will likely spark off a fierce tussle with rivals DBS and OCBC who may seek to protect their turf. Both banks claim to be the market leader. DBS said it has captured HDB buyers through its POSB customers while OCBC has focused on HDB mortgages from the time the government liberalised the market in Jan 2003.
‘POSB is the market leader in HDB home loans,’ said a DBS spokeswoman. The bank has 53 POSB branches.
‘We were also the first in the market to introduce POSB Home Ideal First for first-time homeowners, offering them a 7-day return policy which allows them to assess if the home loan is suitable for their needs,’ she said.
Gregory Chan, OCBC head of secured lending, said the bank’s team of mobile home loan specialists visit potential customers who are too busy to come to its branches, to explain details of home loan packages and to process applications.
‘At the same time, we work with property agents from the largest property firms in Singapore who are in direct contact with home buyers and help market our home loans. This business model has served us well and we continue to be the top player in the HDB home loan market,’ said Mr Chan.
Mass market home loans are just about the safest products as Singapore enters its worst recession ever because the prices of HDB homes did not surge wildly during the property bubble. And now, they are not skidding sharply.
In contrast, the prices of some high-end properties have crashed as much as 50 per cent from the peak reached last year. A Citigroup report in January said that, in the high-end segment, properties have seen price corrections of about 35 per cent from a year ago and they could fall by another 30-40 per cent this year.
David Conner, OCBC chief executive, said last month while announcing the bank’s 2008 results that negative equity for its property portfolio was low because of the bank’s focus on HDB home loans.
He also noted that HDB mortgages are for owner occupation and the loan quantums are small.
‘A big part of our portfolio is HDB - prices have not gone up as much - and we do not anticipate a big fall,’ he said.
OCBC’s home loan book negative equity was 0.7 per cent while 81 per cent of homes for which it has made loans are owner-occupied.
Singapore Post & UOB: Tie-up to distribute HDB home loans
Singapore Post (SingPost) has tied-up with United Overseas Bank (UOB) to distribute UOB HDB Home Loans, and has set up limited purpose branches at four SingPost post offices. The plan is to have up to 24 such post office branches by end 2009, and adds on to the variety of services that SingPost currently offers to customers. Known for its proactive measures in launching initiatives to sustain profits, we view this latest development positively as it is further testament of the group’s desire to be a one-stop-shop service provider for customers. We maintain our BUY rating for SingPost with fair value estimate of S$0.93, though we do note that the flagging economy may weigh on the stock price at least for the short term.
For UOB, this is another interesting avenue to branch into the HDB home loans market and we note that HDB prices have remained fairly resilient despite the recent collapse in most sectors of the economy. We are maintaining our estimates and HOLD rating for now and fair value estimate of S$9.30.
For UOB, this is another interesting avenue to branch into the HDB home loans market and we note that HDB prices have remained fairly resilient despite the recent collapse in most sectors of the economy. We are maintaining our estimates and HOLD rating for now and fair value estimate of S$9.30.
Monday, March 9, 2009
Warren Buffett says economy fell off a cliff
Buffett says economy fell off a cliff in the past 6 months as consumers changed their habits
Billionaire Warren Buffett said unemployment will likely climb a lot higher depending upon how effective the nation's policies are, but he remains optimistic over the long term.
Buffett said the nation's leaders need to support President Barack Obama's efforts to repair the economy because fear is dominating Americans' behavior and the economy has basically followed the worst-case scenario he envisioned.
"It's fallen off a cliff," Buffett said Monday during a live appearance on CNBC. "Not only has the economy slowed down a lot, but people have really changed their habits like I haven't seen."
Buffett said the changes are reflected in the results of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.'s subsidiaries. He said Berkshire's jewelry companies have suffered, but more people have been willing to switch to Geico to save money on car insurance.
He predicted that unemployment will likely climb a lot higher before the recession is done, but he also reiterated his optimistic long-term view: "Everything will be all right. We do have the greatest economic machine that's ever been created."
Fear and confusion have been driving consumer and investor behavior in recent months, Buffett said.
The nation's leaders need to clear up the confusion before anyone will become more confident, and he said all 535 members of Congress should stop the partisan bickering about solutions.
Buffett said he believes patriotic Republicans and Democrats will realize the nation is engaged in an economic war.
"What is required is a commander in chief that's looked at like a commander in chief in a time of war," Buffett said.
Whatever the government does to help the economy will likely benefit some people who made poor financial decisions, but Buffett said Americans should realize that everyone is in the same boat.
"The people that behaved well are no doubt going to find themselves taking care of the people who didn't behave well," Buffett said.
A little over a week ago, Buffett released his annual letter to shareholders describing the worst of his 44 years at the helm of Berkshire. The Omaha, Neb.-based company reported sharply lower profit because of its largely unrealized $7.5 billion investment and derivative losses.
Overall, Berkshire's 2008 profit of $4.99 billion, or $3,224 per Class A share, was down 62 percent from $13.21 billion, or $8,548 per share, in 2007.
Berkshire's fourth-quarter numbers were even worse. Buffett's company reported net income of $117 million, or $76 per share, down 96 percent from $2.95 billion, or $1,904 per share, a year earlier.
Buffett said he doesn't regret writing an editorial last fall encouraging people to buy U.S. stocks, but he joked that in hindsight he wishes he'd waited a few months to publish the piece. Since that editorial appeared on Oct. 17, the Dow Jones industrial average has fallen from 8,852.22 to close at 6,626.94 on Friday.
Buffett stands by his overall advice that over time owning stocks will be better than so-called safe investments.
"Overall, equities are going to do far better than U.S. government bonds at these prices," he said.
Buffett said he doesn't regret investing $8 billion of Berkshire's money in investment bank Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and conglomerate General Electric Co. last fall. Both companies gave Berkshire preferred shares paying 10 percent interest that Buffett said he doesn't think he could get now.
Berkshire owns a diverse mix of more than 60 companies, including insurance, furniture, carpet, jewelry, restaurants and utility businesses. And it has major investments in such companies as Wells Fargo & Co. and Coca-Cola Co.
Billionaire Warren Buffett said unemployment will likely climb a lot higher depending upon how effective the nation's policies are, but he remains optimistic over the long term.
Buffett said the nation's leaders need to support President Barack Obama's efforts to repair the economy because fear is dominating Americans' behavior and the economy has basically followed the worst-case scenario he envisioned.
"It's fallen off a cliff," Buffett said Monday during a live appearance on CNBC. "Not only has the economy slowed down a lot, but people have really changed their habits like I haven't seen."
Buffett said the changes are reflected in the results of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.'s subsidiaries. He said Berkshire's jewelry companies have suffered, but more people have been willing to switch to Geico to save money on car insurance.
He predicted that unemployment will likely climb a lot higher before the recession is done, but he also reiterated his optimistic long-term view: "Everything will be all right. We do have the greatest economic machine that's ever been created."
Fear and confusion have been driving consumer and investor behavior in recent months, Buffett said.
The nation's leaders need to clear up the confusion before anyone will become more confident, and he said all 535 members of Congress should stop the partisan bickering about solutions.
Buffett said he believes patriotic Republicans and Democrats will realize the nation is engaged in an economic war.
"What is required is a commander in chief that's looked at like a commander in chief in a time of war," Buffett said.
Whatever the government does to help the economy will likely benefit some people who made poor financial decisions, but Buffett said Americans should realize that everyone is in the same boat.
"The people that behaved well are no doubt going to find themselves taking care of the people who didn't behave well," Buffett said.
A little over a week ago, Buffett released his annual letter to shareholders describing the worst of his 44 years at the helm of Berkshire. The Omaha, Neb.-based company reported sharply lower profit because of its largely unrealized $7.5 billion investment and derivative losses.
Overall, Berkshire's 2008 profit of $4.99 billion, or $3,224 per Class A share, was down 62 percent from $13.21 billion, or $8,548 per share, in 2007.
Berkshire's fourth-quarter numbers were even worse. Buffett's company reported net income of $117 million, or $76 per share, down 96 percent from $2.95 billion, or $1,904 per share, a year earlier.
Buffett said he doesn't regret writing an editorial last fall encouraging people to buy U.S. stocks, but he joked that in hindsight he wishes he'd waited a few months to publish the piece. Since that editorial appeared on Oct. 17, the Dow Jones industrial average has fallen from 8,852.22 to close at 6,626.94 on Friday.
Buffett stands by his overall advice that over time owning stocks will be better than so-called safe investments.
"Overall, equities are going to do far better than U.S. government bonds at these prices," he said.
Buffett said he doesn't regret investing $8 billion of Berkshire's money in investment bank Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and conglomerate General Electric Co. last fall. Both companies gave Berkshire preferred shares paying 10 percent interest that Buffett said he doesn't think he could get now.
Berkshire owns a diverse mix of more than 60 companies, including insurance, furniture, carpet, jewelry, restaurants and utility businesses. And it has major investments in such companies as Wells Fargo & Co. and Coca-Cola Co.
Sunday, March 8, 2009
Stocks or residential property investment?
Needless to say, property and stock markets are the most unlikely places you want your money to be right now. But the question is, given that you have $300,000 to invest now, do you buy a private residential property beside a MRT or a blue chip like DBS for passive income?
Many would argue that in Singapore, buying property would never go wrong. Well, perhaps it is because you have not seen people who have got their hands burnt in property market to live and tell their stories?
Which one offers a higher return and lower risk?
Some parameters of comparison:
DBS: $6.80/share
Assuming you purchased 44 lots.
Dividend per quarter: 10 cents (conservative guesstimate, could be higher or lower)
Income per annum: $17,600
Probability of losing 40% of your $300,000 in 6 months time: 30% (my conservative guess)
Income tax payable: None, as it has already been taxed at source
Yield: 5.89%
Probability of selling and earning a profit in 20 years time: 90% (guesstimate)
Net dividend income at the end of 20 years: $352,000
Assuming a conservative adjustment of 30% error, net dividend income would be: $246,400.
The argument here is that even the best banks in the world can fail, can we even trust to put our money with Singapore blue chips?
There is still a fair chance to lose 100% of our money in stocks.
Next
99 year leasehold Property: E.g: Kovan Melody/Compass heights
Cost: 1000 sq feet, 2 room property purchase @ $580/sq foot, costing $600,000 after stamp duties and other transaction fees. Minor renovations and fixtures have also been accounted.
Loan amount: $300,000 @ 2.5% for 20 years (interest is more likely to be 3.5% on average)
Monthly installment: $1500 (conservatively speaking)
Income from rent: $2100 (conservative estimate)x12= $25,200
Property tax: 10% of $25,000= $2,500
Agent expenses: $1,100
Wear and tear yearly maintenance: $600
Net rental yearly income: $3,000
Yield: 5,400/300,000= 1.0%
Probability of losing 40% of your $300,000 in 6 months time: 30% (my conservative guess)
(Should the property market falls another 20%, the fall in your property price will be $120,000, or 40%.)
Net rental income at the end of 20 years: $60,000
Probability of selling and earning a profit in 20 years time: 99% (based on historical records)
Apparently, property market is a more appealing investment as most people can tap on their CPF funds to finance their property while earning cash returns. From the above example, it is likely that the owner is able to sell the property 20 years later for at least $540,000 and earn a little profit, or carry on renting out the property for a $20,000 annual income.
This risk is considered “lower” as it is unlikely that the property will “fail” due to earthquakes or tsunami.
In the event that nobody wants to rent, the owner can simply move in and enjoy the home himself. You cannot even use the DBS’s branch toilets even if you are a major shareholder!
However, the short term risks are more or less the same. Yet the investment emotions involved are different. The feeling of seeing my property price falling 20% and pain of seeing my investment portfolio falling 50% is totally different even if the amount involved is the same.
Property gives people a sense of security. People need a roof over their heads, no matter what happens. It let investors feel that they can earn some rental income as long as they lower rent. However for stocks, investors do not see themselves owning an essential business. Actually, many businesses are also essential ones. Without them, people cannot own houses or even get a job.
Personally, I feel that property investment carries a higher risk of failure. The rental income might not be stable and one depends on rental income to service the loan. Tenants may default or destroy your house fittings, there might be unhappiness when negotiating new rental contracts or handle difficult tenants.
Still stocks for me for now.
Many would argue that in Singapore, buying property would never go wrong. Well, perhaps it is because you have not seen people who have got their hands burnt in property market to live and tell their stories?
Which one offers a higher return and lower risk?
Some parameters of comparison:
DBS: $6.80/share
Assuming you purchased 44 lots.
Dividend per quarter: 10 cents (conservative guesstimate, could be higher or lower)
Income per annum: $17,600
Probability of losing 40% of your $300,000 in 6 months time: 30% (my conservative guess)
Income tax payable: None, as it has already been taxed at source
Yield: 5.89%
Probability of selling and earning a profit in 20 years time: 90% (guesstimate)
Net dividend income at the end of 20 years: $352,000
Assuming a conservative adjustment of 30% error, net dividend income would be: $246,400.
The argument here is that even the best banks in the world can fail, can we even trust to put our money with Singapore blue chips?
There is still a fair chance to lose 100% of our money in stocks.
Next
99 year leasehold Property: E.g: Kovan Melody/Compass heights
Cost: 1000 sq feet, 2 room property purchase @ $580/sq foot, costing $600,000 after stamp duties and other transaction fees. Minor renovations and fixtures have also been accounted.
Loan amount: $300,000 @ 2.5% for 20 years (interest is more likely to be 3.5% on average)
Monthly installment: $1500 (conservatively speaking)
Income from rent: $2100 (conservative estimate)x12= $25,200
Property tax: 10% of $25,000= $2,500
Agent expenses: $1,100
Wear and tear yearly maintenance: $600
Net rental yearly income: $3,000
Yield: 5,400/300,000= 1.0%
Probability of losing 40% of your $300,000 in 6 months time: 30% (my conservative guess)
(Should the property market falls another 20%, the fall in your property price will be $120,000, or 40%.)
Net rental income at the end of 20 years: $60,000
Probability of selling and earning a profit in 20 years time: 99% (based on historical records)
Apparently, property market is a more appealing investment as most people can tap on their CPF funds to finance their property while earning cash returns. From the above example, it is likely that the owner is able to sell the property 20 years later for at least $540,000 and earn a little profit, or carry on renting out the property for a $20,000 annual income.
This risk is considered “lower” as it is unlikely that the property will “fail” due to earthquakes or tsunami.
In the event that nobody wants to rent, the owner can simply move in and enjoy the home himself. You cannot even use the DBS’s branch toilets even if you are a major shareholder!
However, the short term risks are more or less the same. Yet the investment emotions involved are different. The feeling of seeing my property price falling 20% and pain of seeing my investment portfolio falling 50% is totally different even if the amount involved is the same.
Property gives people a sense of security. People need a roof over their heads, no matter what happens. It let investors feel that they can earn some rental income as long as they lower rent. However for stocks, investors do not see themselves owning an essential business. Actually, many businesses are also essential ones. Without them, people cannot own houses or even get a job.
Personally, I feel that property investment carries a higher risk of failure. The rental income might not be stable and one depends on rental income to service the loan. Tenants may default or destroy your house fittings, there might be unhappiness when negotiating new rental contracts or handle difficult tenants.
Still stocks for me for now.
AusGroup Ltd: Waiting and watching
Summary: We recently caught up with AusGroup Ltd (AusGroup) management. Its 2Q results exceeded our estimates because of a delayed impact of market shrinkage on ongoing projects and some flow through of conservative variation claims from previous quarters. While we have adjusted our estimates slightly to take 2Q figures into account, we still expect significant contractions in 2H09. We have previously commented on AusGroup’s growing pains since FY08 as it transformed itself into a multinational and multiplatform business. The company is finally showing some signs of “growing up”, in our view. The global economic environment is still very uncertain. We stay cautious on revenue and margin estimates and will track the company closely in the months ahead. We maintain our HOLD rating on AusGroup. Our new fair value estimate is S$0.16 or 4x FY09F earnings (prev: S$0.17).
CHINA ZAINO: Q&A with analysts
CHINA ZAINO has FY08 sales statistics that are amazing:
* It sold RMB2.2 billion (up 48.1% year on year) worth of backpacks and luggages.
* It raked in RMB412.1 million in net profit (up 35.0% year on year).
According to a Frost & Sullivan report, China Zaino had a market share of 35.8% in 2006. That may be more than two years ago and the market share may have increased or decreased since, but the company can safely claim to be the No.1 in backpacks in China.
At the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, it was the only PRC backpacks brand associated with the event.
The company generated from operations a healthy RMB 383.8 million. Cash and bank balances stood at RMB800.4 million as at 31 Dec 2008.
Lawrence Lam, CFO. Photo by Sim Kih
Taking analysts through a recent presentation of the financial results, the chief financial officer, Lawrence Lam, said that the company believed it can maintain its 32-33% profit margins this year, although they may fluctuate from quarter to quarter.
For example, Q1 sales and margin are expected to be lower compared to Q4 which is a holiday period ahead of the Chinese New Year.
China Zaino will continue to count on TV advertising (2008 expenditure: RM97 million) as the key way to build its brand, and is budgeting more than RMB100 million for this year.
The advertising and promotion efforts are paying off as seen from increased average selling prices year-on-year and quarter-on-quarter.
”People ask if it’s necessary to advertise during this economic downturn. On the contrary, I would say it’s a golden opportunity to build brand awareness and loyalty. Our Q4 results were satisfactory because of the TV adverts in the second half of the year,” said the chairman, Chen Xizhong.
Mr Lam explained a few aspects of the financial results, including the jump in trade receivables from RMB 186.7 million in FY07 to RMB 318.6 million FY08.
The reason was simply the higher sales - but not to worry. “In Jan 09, we have received about 80% of the Dec 08 debt.”
Chen Xizhong, chairman, China Zaino. Photo by Sim Kih
For the full year 2008, the trade receivables turnover days was 41 days. The credit terms to distributors are 30 days, 40 days and 60 days. If any distributor owes money for more than 60 days, China Zaino will make a full provision for the debt.
In the FY08 results statement, the company did not have to make any provisions.
On trends, Mr Chen said that his company’s brand of luggage (Dapai) is proving more attractive, value-wise, compared to luxury brands like Samsonite. And aside from business and leisure travelers, he noticed two new major customer groups:
a) Students who use luggage for travel and storage.
b) Production workers who travel to and from their hometowns. Dapai luggages are affordable at 200-400 RMB, as compared to their income of 1,500 RMB a month.
Here are some questions and answers from the analyst briefing session on Tuesday (Mar 3) at Fullerton Hotel:
Q Who are your top 5 customers? Have they been increasing their orders in the last few years?
A They are distributors, especially, in Shanghai, Beijing and Guangzhou. Individually, they don’t account for too high a percentage of our Group’s revenue. For some of them, it’s 6-8%. They increase their orders every year – we grow, they also grow. Among the top 10, there is some change – if a distributor is not performing well, we will cut his ‘portion’ and give it to another distributor in the same region.
Q Your company has opened outlets in many parts of China but not focused on your home province, Fujian. Now that you have 3,250 outlets, do you intend to expand into Fujian?
TV advert for Dapai backpags
A We wanted to expand in other parts of China through distributors and planned to do sales on our own in Fujian. In fact, this year we plan to open 150-160 points of sale in Fujian. These are shops in shops (supermarkets, hypermarts) and some standalone shops.
Q Regarding your cash balance, you said you have gotten 80% of the accounts receivables, so now your balance is higher than RMB 800 million as at end of the year?
A It is higher. But after we sign a contract for the construction of our new factory and contracts for TV advertisements, the cash will diminish steadily. Between RMB 140-200 million will be for the factory, RMB 50 million for billboards, RMB80 m in dividends for shareholders, RMB100-150 million for TV advertisements.
So the total is up to RMB500 million. For opening points of sales in Fujian, we will spend RMB100-150 million this year.
As for dividends, I would like to pay it every year, so when I come to Singapore I get smiles from the shareholders!
Q Regarding your plan to open your own retail outlets in Fujian – isn’t there a risk? Why don’t you want to go through distributors?
A It’s a good idea for business development because right now we give a big discount to the distributors. As we are based in Fujian and have close connections with our end-users, we believe we can earn this part of the sales money. We will take care of the rental, the staff and other expenses of the shops.
Q For FY08, you have a 1.97-cent-a-share dividend payout, which is 20% of the net profit. Do you have a policy for FY09?
A We will declare at least 20% of the profit after tax.
* It sold RMB2.2 billion (up 48.1% year on year) worth of backpacks and luggages.
* It raked in RMB412.1 million in net profit (up 35.0% year on year).
According to a Frost & Sullivan report, China Zaino had a market share of 35.8% in 2006. That may be more than two years ago and the market share may have increased or decreased since, but the company can safely claim to be the No.1 in backpacks in China.
At the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, it was the only PRC backpacks brand associated with the event.
The company generated from operations a healthy RMB 383.8 million. Cash and bank balances stood at RMB800.4 million as at 31 Dec 2008.
Lawrence Lam, CFO. Photo by Sim Kih
Taking analysts through a recent presentation of the financial results, the chief financial officer, Lawrence Lam, said that the company believed it can maintain its 32-33% profit margins this year, although they may fluctuate from quarter to quarter.
For example, Q1 sales and margin are expected to be lower compared to Q4 which is a holiday period ahead of the Chinese New Year.
China Zaino will continue to count on TV advertising (2008 expenditure: RM97 million) as the key way to build its brand, and is budgeting more than RMB100 million for this year.
The advertising and promotion efforts are paying off as seen from increased average selling prices year-on-year and quarter-on-quarter.
”People ask if it’s necessary to advertise during this economic downturn. On the contrary, I would say it’s a golden opportunity to build brand awareness and loyalty. Our Q4 results were satisfactory because of the TV adverts in the second half of the year,” said the chairman, Chen Xizhong.
Mr Lam explained a few aspects of the financial results, including the jump in trade receivables from RMB 186.7 million in FY07 to RMB 318.6 million FY08.
The reason was simply the higher sales - but not to worry. “In Jan 09, we have received about 80% of the Dec 08 debt.”
Chen Xizhong, chairman, China Zaino. Photo by Sim Kih
For the full year 2008, the trade receivables turnover days was 41 days. The credit terms to distributors are 30 days, 40 days and 60 days. If any distributor owes money for more than 60 days, China Zaino will make a full provision for the debt.
In the FY08 results statement, the company did not have to make any provisions.
On trends, Mr Chen said that his company’s brand of luggage (Dapai) is proving more attractive, value-wise, compared to luxury brands like Samsonite. And aside from business and leisure travelers, he noticed two new major customer groups:
a) Students who use luggage for travel and storage.
b) Production workers who travel to and from their hometowns. Dapai luggages are affordable at 200-400 RMB, as compared to their income of 1,500 RMB a month.
Here are some questions and answers from the analyst briefing session on Tuesday (Mar 3) at Fullerton Hotel:
Q Who are your top 5 customers? Have they been increasing their orders in the last few years?
A They are distributors, especially, in Shanghai, Beijing and Guangzhou. Individually, they don’t account for too high a percentage of our Group’s revenue. For some of them, it’s 6-8%. They increase their orders every year – we grow, they also grow. Among the top 10, there is some change – if a distributor is not performing well, we will cut his ‘portion’ and give it to another distributor in the same region.
Q Your company has opened outlets in many parts of China but not focused on your home province, Fujian. Now that you have 3,250 outlets, do you intend to expand into Fujian?
TV advert for Dapai backpags
A We wanted to expand in other parts of China through distributors and planned to do sales on our own in Fujian. In fact, this year we plan to open 150-160 points of sale in Fujian. These are shops in shops (supermarkets, hypermarts) and some standalone shops.
Q Regarding your cash balance, you said you have gotten 80% of the accounts receivables, so now your balance is higher than RMB 800 million as at end of the year?
A It is higher. But after we sign a contract for the construction of our new factory and contracts for TV advertisements, the cash will diminish steadily. Between RMB 140-200 million will be for the factory, RMB 50 million for billboards, RMB80 m in dividends for shareholders, RMB100-150 million for TV advertisements.
So the total is up to RMB500 million. For opening points of sales in Fujian, we will spend RMB100-150 million this year.
As for dividends, I would like to pay it every year, so when I come to Singapore I get smiles from the shareholders!
Q Regarding your plan to open your own retail outlets in Fujian – isn’t there a risk? Why don’t you want to go through distributors?
A It’s a good idea for business development because right now we give a big discount to the distributors. As we are based in Fujian and have close connections with our end-users, we believe we can earn this part of the sales money. We will take care of the rental, the staff and other expenses of the shops.
Q For FY08, you have a 1.97-cent-a-share dividend payout, which is 20% of the net profit. Do you have a policy for FY09?
A We will declare at least 20% of the profit after tax.
Saturday, March 7, 2009
华尔街日报:道指已经作别7000点，迎来了6000点时代
道指已经作别7000点，迎来了6000点时代。
美国股市最近的暴跌，以及保险巨头美国国际集团(AIG)创纪录的巨亏，再次启动了华尔街最锺爱的游戏：猜猜道指究竟能跌到多低？
要记住这一点，虽然每个人都有自己的观点，但没人能准确地知道答案。如果你想试图基于市场的下一步动态来交易的话，我会对你说：祝你好运。
我曾经开玩笑地说，道指可能要在今年9月20日、在3600点附近才能触底。为什么呢？当然是为了纪念《道指36000点》出版十周年啦。这么说吧，反正市场早晚要触底，反正也没人能拿出更好的主意了。
人称魔鬼辞典的墨菲定律(Murphy's Law)不是说了嘛，当连你最心爱的人都变成了咆哮的巨熊（看空者）时，就是传说中市场崩溃之时。如果真是这样，或许我还是快点行动起来，了结仓位吧。
说到投资问题，我认为呆在两条30码线之间算得上是明智之举。在2007年股市大涨、每个人都喜形于色之时，我的看法则相当悲观。但是当股市大跌、每个人都惊慌失措之际，我则开始四下寻找投资机会了（我找到了一些通货膨胀保值债券(TIPS)和市政债券，它们走势还不错）。显然，股票估值一度极富吸引力 ──这种情况一直持续到去年9月时。当时第一次救援努力以失败收场，全球投资者的信心当然无存，整个局面全然改观。
上周五，一位顶尖基金经理私下和我交流的话让我深感震惊，他说：我现在看不到任何理由去持有现金资产之外的投资品。这位仁兄在投资问题上拥有灵活的处置权，而且他也不是铁杆的看空人士。他正在卖出所有资产。这位基金经理认为，收益预期下调会和市盈率的不断下滑交替出现；在他看来，整个系统的巨额负债将会把资产及收益吞没，发出巨大的吞咽声。他认为标准普尔指数早晚会跌到500点，这比现在的水平还要再跌去三分之一。
来自金融领域的消息无一例外都很糟糕，从美国国际集团(AIG)、到花旗集团(Citigroup)、再到拥有金融子公司的通用电气(General Electric)。不过，这种状况已经持续一年了。在眼下这个市场中，金融类股应该获得一定的尊重，就象前副总统约翰·南斯·加纳(John Nance Garner)对他的职位一样的尊重。想想这位副总统所说的那句“不值一桶温吞口水”吧。投资者曾有好几个月的时间来把花旗股票脱手，在11月初时该股的身价还将近15美元。现在则没人知道这些金融类股到底还值多少钱，连董事会也不例外。
上周，一些看空人士告诉我，下一波坏消息可能来自保险企业。美国国际集团的巨亏真是飞快就报了出来。只有极端的乐观主义者才曾认为麻烦将到此为止。
但是特别有趣的一点是连抗跌股也开始大跌了。JM Smucker、家乐氏(Kellogg Co.)、美国电力公司(American Electric Power Co.)、宝洁公司(Procter & Gamble Co., 又名:宝硷公司)、强生公司(Johnson & Johnson)、Reynolds American以及美国电话电报公司(AT&T Inc.)都纷纷从悬崖上滚落。人们认为它们都是些基本面非常强劲，应能保持坚挺的企业。许多公司预期收益都很高。
菲利普莫里斯国际公司(Philip Morris International Inc., 在拆分后市场普遍谓之奥驰亚集团(Altria Group Inc.))的股票自1月中旬以来已经跌了2美元。该公司宣称将会有7.5%的预期收益。
在我看来，这些现象说明眼下要么是个吸纳良机，要么就是市场堕入地狱的先兆。
美国股市最近的暴跌，以及保险巨头美国国际集团(AIG)创纪录的巨亏，再次启动了华尔街最锺爱的游戏：猜猜道指究竟能跌到多低？
要记住这一点，虽然每个人都有自己的观点，但没人能准确地知道答案。如果你想试图基于市场的下一步动态来交易的话，我会对你说：祝你好运。
我曾经开玩笑地说，道指可能要在今年9月20日、在3600点附近才能触底。为什么呢？当然是为了纪念《道指36000点》出版十周年啦。这么说吧，反正市场早晚要触底，反正也没人能拿出更好的主意了。
人称魔鬼辞典的墨菲定律(Murphy's Law)不是说了嘛，当连你最心爱的人都变成了咆哮的巨熊（看空者）时，就是传说中市场崩溃之时。如果真是这样，或许我还是快点行动起来，了结仓位吧。
说到投资问题，我认为呆在两条30码线之间算得上是明智之举。在2007年股市大涨、每个人都喜形于色之时，我的看法则相当悲观。但是当股市大跌、每个人都惊慌失措之际，我则开始四下寻找投资机会了（我找到了一些通货膨胀保值债券(TIPS)和市政债券，它们走势还不错）。显然，股票估值一度极富吸引力 ──这种情况一直持续到去年9月时。当时第一次救援努力以失败收场，全球投资者的信心当然无存，整个局面全然改观。
上周五，一位顶尖基金经理私下和我交流的话让我深感震惊，他说：我现在看不到任何理由去持有现金资产之外的投资品。这位仁兄在投资问题上拥有灵活的处置权，而且他也不是铁杆的看空人士。他正在卖出所有资产。这位基金经理认为，收益预期下调会和市盈率的不断下滑交替出现；在他看来，整个系统的巨额负债将会把资产及收益吞没，发出巨大的吞咽声。他认为标准普尔指数早晚会跌到500点，这比现在的水平还要再跌去三分之一。
来自金融领域的消息无一例外都很糟糕，从美国国际集团(AIG)、到花旗集团(Citigroup)、再到拥有金融子公司的通用电气(General Electric)。不过，这种状况已经持续一年了。在眼下这个市场中，金融类股应该获得一定的尊重，就象前副总统约翰·南斯·加纳(John Nance Garner)对他的职位一样的尊重。想想这位副总统所说的那句“不值一桶温吞口水”吧。投资者曾有好几个月的时间来把花旗股票脱手，在11月初时该股的身价还将近15美元。现在则没人知道这些金融类股到底还值多少钱，连董事会也不例外。
上周，一些看空人士告诉我，下一波坏消息可能来自保险企业。美国国际集团的巨亏真是飞快就报了出来。只有极端的乐观主义者才曾认为麻烦将到此为止。
但是特别有趣的一点是连抗跌股也开始大跌了。JM Smucker、家乐氏(Kellogg Co.)、美国电力公司(American Electric Power Co.)、宝洁公司(Procter & Gamble Co., 又名:宝硷公司)、强生公司(Johnson & Johnson)、Reynolds American以及美国电话电报公司(AT&T Inc.)都纷纷从悬崖上滚落。人们认为它们都是些基本面非常强劲，应能保持坚挺的企业。许多公司预期收益都很高。
菲利普莫里斯国际公司(Philip Morris International Inc., 在拆分后市场普遍谓之奥驰亚集团(Altria Group Inc.))的股票自1月中旬以来已经跌了2美元。该公司宣称将会有7.5%的预期收益。
在我看来，这些现象说明眼下要么是个吸纳良机，要么就是市场堕入地狱的先兆。
More mass market projects to launch
Developers are planning to launch more mass market projects this weekend to take advantage of a recent surge in buying interest.
Hiap Hoe Group, a niche developer, will officially launch its 118-unit The Beverly, located at Toh Tuck Road, this Saturday. The starting selling price is $648 per square foot (psf), which Hiap Hoe says is an 'attractive starting selling price'.
'We have designed The Beverly for those looking for affordable, high-quality residential developments in a good location,' said Teo Ho Beng, the company's managing director.
The Beverly's two, three and four-bedroom apartments range from 1,120 sq ft to 4,187 sq ft, while its double-storey penthouses range from 2,099 sq ft to 3,757 sq ft and are each outfitted with a private roof garden and pool.
On the other side of the island at Pasir Ris, Sustained Land Pte Ltd will also officially launch Coastal Breeze Residences come this weekend. Two and three-bedroom units at the 63-unit development will sell for $610-$660 psf.
Sustained Land has sold 13 units in Coastal Breeze Residences since the start of 2008in a soft launch. The units, which were mostly prime apartments on higher floors, went at an average price of $690 psf.
The remaining units are mostly three-bedders between 1159 sq ft and 1356 sq ft in size and there are also duplex penthouses. In terms of absolute value, for example, the price for a three-room 1159 sq ft unit starts at $712,000.
Meanwhile, the UOL Group is expected to launch its 646-unit Double Bay Residences in Simei sometime next week. Market talk has it that the project could be launched at $650-680 psf.
The three projects are coming hot on the heels of two successful launches earlier this month. Units at Frasers Centrepoint's Caspian condominium near Jurong Lake and Alexis @ Alexandra, a project by joint venture partners Yi Kai Group and Fission Group, sold quickly upon the projects' launches.
One market insider said that developers are taking pricing cues from each other, and making sure their newly launched projects are priced to sell. 'There is a sense that people will only be willing to buy projects in the $600-plus psf range, and also only units that don't cost too much in total. People don't really want to pay more than $600,000 or $700,000-plus in these times,' he said.
Developers are also throwing in more upmarket features into their mass market offerings to entice buyers. Each of The Beverly's 118 apartments is served by private lifts that open into the lobby of its interior. UOL's Double Bay Residences will also offer extras such as full-length windows in the kitchen, the company has said.
Hiap Hoe Group, a niche developer, will officially launch its 118-unit The Beverly, located at Toh Tuck Road, this Saturday. The starting selling price is $648 per square foot (psf), which Hiap Hoe says is an 'attractive starting selling price'.
'We have designed The Beverly for those looking for affordable, high-quality residential developments in a good location,' said Teo Ho Beng, the company's managing director.
The Beverly's two, three and four-bedroom apartments range from 1,120 sq ft to 4,187 sq ft, while its double-storey penthouses range from 2,099 sq ft to 3,757 sq ft and are each outfitted with a private roof garden and pool.
On the other side of the island at Pasir Ris, Sustained Land Pte Ltd will also officially launch Coastal Breeze Residences come this weekend. Two and three-bedroom units at the 63-unit development will sell for $610-$660 psf.
Sustained Land has sold 13 units in Coastal Breeze Residences since the start of 2008in a soft launch. The units, which were mostly prime apartments on higher floors, went at an average price of $690 psf.
The remaining units are mostly three-bedders between 1159 sq ft and 1356 sq ft in size and there are also duplex penthouses. In terms of absolute value, for example, the price for a three-room 1159 sq ft unit starts at $712,000.
Meanwhile, the UOL Group is expected to launch its 646-unit Double Bay Residences in Simei sometime next week. Market talk has it that the project could be launched at $650-680 psf.
The three projects are coming hot on the heels of two successful launches earlier this month. Units at Frasers Centrepoint's Caspian condominium near Jurong Lake and Alexis @ Alexandra, a project by joint venture partners Yi Kai Group and Fission Group, sold quickly upon the projects' launches.
One market insider said that developers are taking pricing cues from each other, and making sure their newly launched projects are priced to sell. 'There is a sense that people will only be willing to buy projects in the $600-plus psf range, and also only units that don't cost too much in total. People don't really want to pay more than $600,000 or $700,000-plus in these times,' he said.
Developers are also throwing in more upmarket features into their mass market offerings to entice buyers. Each of The Beverly's 118 apartments is served by private lifts that open into the lobby of its interior. UOL's Double Bay Residences will also offer extras such as full-length windows in the kitchen, the company has said.
朱成志：賺合理的錢
台灣股票市場風起雲湧，許多當年不可一世的金主、作手、主力或業內，如今不是被迫退出江湖，就是窮困潦倒，萬寶週刊社長朱成志秉持「賺合理的錢，走長遠的路」信念，愈戰愈勇，從小牌的證券分析師，成為投資人眼中的大師。
石油危機 家產變成芭樂票
朱家早期曾是股市金主兼大戶，後來遇上全球石油危機，台股崩跌，主力死的死、逃的逃，朱家萬貫家財只換來一保險箱的借據與芭樂票。遭逢遽變的朱成志，見識股海無情，也下定決心要從股票市場「站起來」。
49年次的朱成志畢業於大同工學院機械系，畢業後，先在文化圈繞了一圈，日本文摘、牛頓雜誌與遠見雜誌，他都待過。
錢堆裡混 老老實實做研究
民國77年，朱成志離開遠見雜誌，投入證券市場，先後在大順證券、華昌投顧、國華投顧任職，並曾擔任中央國際投信董事長。當時的台灣錢不只淹腳目，簡直淹到肚臍了，股票天天漲停板，投資人買到就賺到，券商營業員1個月就領9個月薪水，股票市場滿地都是鈔票。
老朱在錢堆裡打滾，卻彷彿視而不見，照樣老老實實做研究、寫報告，每天騎著摩托車趕場演講、上下班。朱成志不是跟新台幣有仇，只因為他堅持「賺合理的錢」，他要求「年薪100萬元」，整天埋頭寫報告，執意成為名符其實的「證券分析師」。「當時的收入已經可以讓我過不錯的日子，我覺得足夠了。」
朱成志說，賺多少錢不重要，重要的是，賺該賺的錢！
看盡起落 學會務實金錢觀
79年股市萬點行情時期，一名在證券商VIP（貴賓室）下單的富太太抱怨，逛街時掉了一隻價值160萬的耳環，1個月後，這位富太太賠掉3億，從此音訊沓然。
某券商超級業務員月領百萬元，卻總是苦著臉，超級業務告訴老朱：「錢太多了，壓力好大！ 」超級營業員三不五時請同事吃大餐、上酒店，唯一的要求是，大家要講笑話給他聽，為他紓壓；不久以後，這位營業員落跑了，留下逾億元的債務不知去向。
看盡了股票市場大起大落，朱成志學會務實的金錢觀：「學會理財很重要，但是學會不貪心、賺合理的錢更重要！」不貪心，才能量力而為，賺到該賺的錢。
累積財富 成功關鍵在時間
對朱成志來說，累積財富像滾雪球，留在雪地上的時間愈久，雪球才會愈滾愈大，「時間」是投資成功最重要的元素，許多人抱著一夕致富的心態買股票，結果落得一夕破產下場。
石油危機 家產變成芭樂票
朱家早期曾是股市金主兼大戶，後來遇上全球石油危機，台股崩跌，主力死的死、逃的逃，朱家萬貫家財只換來一保險箱的借據與芭樂票。遭逢遽變的朱成志，見識股海無情，也下定決心要從股票市場「站起來」。
49年次的朱成志畢業於大同工學院機械系，畢業後，先在文化圈繞了一圈，日本文摘、牛頓雜誌與遠見雜誌，他都待過。
錢堆裡混 老老實實做研究
民國77年，朱成志離開遠見雜誌，投入證券市場，先後在大順證券、華昌投顧、國華投顧任職，並曾擔任中央國際投信董事長。當時的台灣錢不只淹腳目，簡直淹到肚臍了，股票天天漲停板，投資人買到就賺到，券商營業員1個月就領9個月薪水，股票市場滿地都是鈔票。
老朱在錢堆裡打滾，卻彷彿視而不見，照樣老老實實做研究、寫報告，每天騎著摩托車趕場演講、上下班。朱成志不是跟新台幣有仇，只因為他堅持「賺合理的錢」，他要求「年薪100萬元」，整天埋頭寫報告，執意成為名符其實的「證券分析師」。「當時的收入已經可以讓我過不錯的日子，我覺得足夠了。」
朱成志說，賺多少錢不重要，重要的是，賺該賺的錢！
看盡起落 學會務實金錢觀
79年股市萬點行情時期，一名在證券商VIP（貴賓室）下單的富太太抱怨，逛街時掉了一隻價值160萬的耳環，1個月後，這位富太太賠掉3億，從此音訊沓然。
某券商超級業務員月領百萬元，卻總是苦著臉，超級業務告訴老朱：「錢太多了，壓力好大！ 」超級營業員三不五時請同事吃大餐、上酒店，唯一的要求是，大家要講笑話給他聽，為他紓壓；不久以後，這位營業員落跑了，留下逾億元的債務不知去向。
看盡了股票市場大起大落，朱成志學會務實的金錢觀：「學會理財很重要，但是學會不貪心、賺合理的錢更重要！」不貪心，才能量力而為，賺到該賺的錢。
累積財富 成功關鍵在時間
對朱成志來說，累積財富像滾雪球，留在雪地上的時間愈久，雪球才會愈滾愈大，「時間」是投資成功最重要的元素，許多人抱著一夕致富的心態買股票，結果落得一夕破產下場。
中国价值投资谁领风骚大讨论
过去的两年与中国资本市场复杂变化相致的是中国价值投资领军人物的做法以及遭遇，更为多样性。但斌为首的相当多的价值投资选择了不动坚持，而赵丹阳为代表的极少一部分人在一定的点位彻底退出了，李驰为代表的一部分价值投资者，出来又进去。
他们这种不同的做法代表了不同的价值投资思想体系和理念，他们不同做法的结果也给他们个人的投资结果带来了不同的社会评价，尤其以赵丹阳和但斌的做法引起的争论更多，二者都宣称自己是价值投资，但二者的做法截然不同。赵丹阳坚持在3000点之上清盘，而但斌坚持在6000点上持股，双方都是执着的，但是谁的做法更符合价值投资的基本精神和基本理念，或者说两个人的做法都是合乎价值投资基本逻辑，现在还没有办法做出总的评价。
不管怎么说，赵丹阳3000点的清盘和但斌6000点上的坚持都是中国价值投资发展史上的重大事件，甚至是历史事件。他们的做法对中国价值投资的发展方向都产生了长远的影响，近期赵丹阳再次出山，为中国价值投资再次增加新内容。因此深入剖析探讨他们二者行为的合理性以及二者行为背后的理论体系的合理性，对于中国价值投资者是极其珍贵的案例和素才。凌通价值网做为民间价值投资者的公共交流平台，愿意发起这们一个讨论，目的是为了探求真理，目的是为了丰富提高中国价值投资队伍的理论和实践水平，欢迎所有的价值投资者发起评论。
2007年底08年初，媒体刊载着对中国私募基金领军人物赵丹阳的评说，文中透露出的信息是赵丹阳所管理的几支私募基金在2007年整体上只取得了20%左右的收益，成绩极差。而导致赵丹阳取得如此成绩的原因在于，赵丹阳在3000点之上看空 A股，在5月份全面空仓了。因此，全年下来只有这么一点收益。面对这样一个在中国资本市场上有着深刻含意的代表性事件，凌通有如下几点深刻的思考：
一、市场普遍对赵丹阳如此低的收益负面看待有失客观，认为赵丹阳在牛市中只取得这么一点的收益，属于水平太差，对此，凌通并不这么看。我们觉得赵丹阳在3000点上看空，并且全面清仓，从最终的结果来看，明显不如在6000点上还在奋战的大部分投资人。然而，赵丹阳看空并且清仓，固守了某种有生命力的逻辑和理念。赵丹阳的离场毫无疑问是经过深思熟虑的，他的离场最终的结果是非常不好的，但他当时离场，并且始终没有进来，凌通认为赵丹阳在基本行为准则上是有深刻的原则和体系的。这种原则和体系有时候虽然不能够获取超额收益，但对于保障投资人的安全和长寿具有意义。作为一个价值投资者，认为赵丹阳收益率在牛市里很差，就给予全面的负面评价，这种观点并不客观。如果在资金推动和某种非常态的流动性过剩背景下，借助于牛市的背景取得了非常好的收益，从某种程度上这种收益可能并不是一种硬功夫，也不是一种可以在资本市场上成为长青树的保障。而赵丹阳的那种与众不同的，最终给他导致很大困境的行为和操作反而是可以成为长青树的理由和保障。
赵丹阳的做法至少证明了一点，赵丹阳一方面有逻辑体系，另一方面有非常独特的个性。从这一点上讲，赵丹阳具备一个好的资产管理人的特征。
二、毕竟赵丹阳在2007年的成绩极差，赵丹阳的问题出在哪里呢？凌通认为赵丹阳的问题出在没有做到决策中庸化，太过于相信自己，对未来的不确定性和多元走势没有客观的认识，对中国资本市场的特殊结构没有充分的考虑，只凭借了普遍性的价值投资基本原理，而没有考虑在一个具体市场的特殊性，并且在决策操作过程中不给自己留余地，操作极端化了。
儒家有一种重要的思想，就是在做任何决策的过程中一定要“执两端，用中间”，其含意是考虑问题的时候一定要把正负两种极端情况充分考虑到，同时，在具体决策的时候要向中间靠拢，不要太过极端。《史记》中有一段话叫：“凡文事必有武备，凡武事必有文备。”这句话的含意是如果一个国家要和另一个国家打仗，要提前准备好和谈方案，在与另一个国家友好相处的过程中，要提前准备好打仗的方案。可以看到无论儒家还是《史记》都有两手准备的思想。
我们在投资实践中也应该这样，不能单赌一边，当然更不能单赌一支股票。不管有多么充足的理由和事实证明市场要跌，你都不能不留后手。某一支股票，不管有多么充足的理由证明它要涨，你都不能单买一支。当确定性非常充分的时候，你可以适当增加它的仓位比例，但不能采取极端操作。因为，事情的发展是有必然的不确定的。我们必须相信自己对市场和公司未来走势的判断，这是天经地义的。但是，我们也必须相信，自己有必然的认识盲点，我们不可能把影响市场变化的所有因素都考虑到。在这种情况下，应该通过仓位结构来应对多种变化局面，如果看空的时候仓位要少一点，资金要大一点，但不空仓 ; 如果看涨的时候，仓位要重一些，资金要少一点，但不满仓。在任何情况下都不轻易的空仓，当然也不轻易的满仓。仓位组合中多持有几支股票，非常看好的稍微多一点，一般性看好的也持有一点，把个股风险分散掉，当需要把整个仓位整体性降低的时候不要单减一支股票，要看好的和不看好的都减一点，即便是对一支股票的减持也要分多次，逐级减持，不要一次性退出。这些就是我们所说的决策中庸化在具体操作中的含意。
赵丹阳在5月份由于看坏就一股不留，就全面清仓的做法犯了一个技术性和技巧性错误。如果赵丹阳的减仓步骤是分级减持，3000点出一部分、4000点出一部分、5000点出一部分、6000点出一部分，最后在任何条件下都留一部分，他就不会遇到这种困境。遗憾的是赵丹阳采取了绝对的做法、采取了极端的做法和非中庸的做法。
赵丹阳一个有个性的基金经理，让我们祝他越走越好！
他们这种不同的做法代表了不同的价值投资思想体系和理念，他们不同做法的结果也给他们个人的投资结果带来了不同的社会评价，尤其以赵丹阳和但斌的做法引起的争论更多，二者都宣称自己是价值投资，但二者的做法截然不同。赵丹阳坚持在3000点之上清盘，而但斌坚持在6000点上持股，双方都是执着的，但是谁的做法更符合价值投资的基本精神和基本理念，或者说两个人的做法都是合乎价值投资基本逻辑，现在还没有办法做出总的评价。
不管怎么说，赵丹阳3000点的清盘和但斌6000点上的坚持都是中国价值投资发展史上的重大事件，甚至是历史事件。他们的做法对中国价值投资的发展方向都产生了长远的影响，近期赵丹阳再次出山，为中国价值投资再次增加新内容。因此深入剖析探讨他们二者行为的合理性以及二者行为背后的理论体系的合理性，对于中国价值投资者是极其珍贵的案例和素才。凌通价值网做为民间价值投资者的公共交流平台，愿意发起这们一个讨论，目的是为了探求真理，目的是为了丰富提高中国价值投资队伍的理论和实践水平，欢迎所有的价值投资者发起评论。
2007年底08年初，媒体刊载着对中国私募基金领军人物赵丹阳的评说，文中透露出的信息是赵丹阳所管理的几支私募基金在2007年整体上只取得了20%左右的收益，成绩极差。而导致赵丹阳取得如此成绩的原因在于，赵丹阳在3000点之上看空 A股，在5月份全面空仓了。因此，全年下来只有这么一点收益。面对这样一个在中国资本市场上有着深刻含意的代表性事件，凌通有如下几点深刻的思考：
一、市场普遍对赵丹阳如此低的收益负面看待有失客观，认为赵丹阳在牛市中只取得这么一点的收益，属于水平太差，对此，凌通并不这么看。我们觉得赵丹阳在3000点上看空，并且全面清仓，从最终的结果来看，明显不如在6000点上还在奋战的大部分投资人。然而，赵丹阳看空并且清仓，固守了某种有生命力的逻辑和理念。赵丹阳的离场毫无疑问是经过深思熟虑的，他的离场最终的结果是非常不好的，但他当时离场，并且始终没有进来，凌通认为赵丹阳在基本行为准则上是有深刻的原则和体系的。这种原则和体系有时候虽然不能够获取超额收益，但对于保障投资人的安全和长寿具有意义。作为一个价值投资者，认为赵丹阳收益率在牛市里很差，就给予全面的负面评价，这种观点并不客观。如果在资金推动和某种非常态的流动性过剩背景下，借助于牛市的背景取得了非常好的收益，从某种程度上这种收益可能并不是一种硬功夫，也不是一种可以在资本市场上成为长青树的保障。而赵丹阳的那种与众不同的，最终给他导致很大困境的行为和操作反而是可以成为长青树的理由和保障。
赵丹阳的做法至少证明了一点，赵丹阳一方面有逻辑体系，另一方面有非常独特的个性。从这一点上讲，赵丹阳具备一个好的资产管理人的特征。
二、毕竟赵丹阳在2007年的成绩极差，赵丹阳的问题出在哪里呢？凌通认为赵丹阳的问题出在没有做到决策中庸化，太过于相信自己，对未来的不确定性和多元走势没有客观的认识，对中国资本市场的特殊结构没有充分的考虑，只凭借了普遍性的价值投资基本原理，而没有考虑在一个具体市场的特殊性，并且在决策操作过程中不给自己留余地，操作极端化了。
儒家有一种重要的思想，就是在做任何决策的过程中一定要“执两端，用中间”，其含意是考虑问题的时候一定要把正负两种极端情况充分考虑到，同时，在具体决策的时候要向中间靠拢，不要太过极端。《史记》中有一段话叫：“凡文事必有武备，凡武事必有文备。”这句话的含意是如果一个国家要和另一个国家打仗，要提前准备好和谈方案，在与另一个国家友好相处的过程中，要提前准备好打仗的方案。可以看到无论儒家还是《史记》都有两手准备的思想。
我们在投资实践中也应该这样，不能单赌一边，当然更不能单赌一支股票。不管有多么充足的理由和事实证明市场要跌，你都不能不留后手。某一支股票，不管有多么充足的理由证明它要涨，你都不能单买一支。当确定性非常充分的时候，你可以适当增加它的仓位比例，但不能采取极端操作。因为，事情的发展是有必然的不确定的。我们必须相信自己对市场和公司未来走势的判断，这是天经地义的。但是，我们也必须相信，自己有必然的认识盲点，我们不可能把影响市场变化的所有因素都考虑到。在这种情况下，应该通过仓位结构来应对多种变化局面，如果看空的时候仓位要少一点，资金要大一点，但不空仓 ; 如果看涨的时候，仓位要重一些，资金要少一点，但不满仓。在任何情况下都不轻易的空仓，当然也不轻易的满仓。仓位组合中多持有几支股票，非常看好的稍微多一点，一般性看好的也持有一点，把个股风险分散掉，当需要把整个仓位整体性降低的时候不要单减一支股票，要看好的和不看好的都减一点，即便是对一支股票的减持也要分多次，逐级减持，不要一次性退出。这些就是我们所说的决策中庸化在具体操作中的含意。
赵丹阳在5月份由于看坏就一股不留，就全面清仓的做法犯了一个技术性和技巧性错误。如果赵丹阳的减仓步骤是分级减持，3000点出一部分、4000点出一部分、5000点出一部分、6000点出一部分，最后在任何条件下都留一部分，他就不会遇到这种困境。遗憾的是赵丹阳采取了绝对的做法、采取了极端的做法和非中庸的做法。
赵丹阳一个有个性的基金经理，让我们祝他越走越好！
一个私募的空仓之旅
本轮市场针对1664点低点的反弹，发出了A股持续下跌以来的最强音，众多个股的涨幅超过了一倍，在赚得“盆满钵盈”者中踏空者也大有人在。
刘厉剑（化名）是一位踏入A股市场十多年的资深投资者，同时也是当地一位较为知名的私募基金经理。然而，就是在本轮的反弹中，刘厉剑却成了踏空者。
“他的性格中就是包含了谨慎二字。”刘厉剑的朋友告诉《第一财经日报》，他们曾经开玩笑，如果给刘厉剑一百万，他可以管理得很好，不会亏钱但是也不会出现超额收益。
事实上，刘厉剑朋友的话正是印证了刘厉剑在这轮市场的表现。从2007年10月份暴跌之前开始，刘厉剑就开始选择了空仓策略，并且一直延续到了目前。
“这轮我完全踏空啦，我认为这轮反弹没有任何基本面的支撑，对于我们这样的机构而言，对于客户托付的资产需要有极高的责任心。”刘厉剑表示，空仓的根本原因还是在于他坚持认为本轮反弹没有坚实的基本面支撑，资金推动型的上涨并没有持久力，稍有不慎就可能会被套进去。
尽管刘厉剑依然保持着说话不紧不慢的语调，但是语气中似乎仍有稍许的焦虑。显然，面对如此强势反弹，如果完全踏空，来自客户的压力也是巨大的。
不过刘厉剑却笑称，由于与客户合作时间已经很长了，相互之间建立了彼此的信任，因此客户流失的并不多，关键还在于信任二字。
在去年的漫漫熊市中，刘厉剑的空仓策略成功地回避了风险，他也开始转型去做股权投资等一级市场。不过收效有多少，或者只有他自己清楚。
即使是踏空至现在，刘厉剑依然坚定地看空，甚至认为市场的下一轮低点可能至1600点，甚至更低。
“美国经济目前仍然没有企稳的迹象，只有到年终甚至是下半年才能看清市场的走势。”刘厉剑表示，也许只有到那个时候才是考虑建仓的时机。
空仓让刘厉剑看起来既轻松又焦虑，原先联系的时候一直都是显得忙忙碌碌的刘厉剑难得在近期开始睡起了午觉，不知道是春困的原因还是真的开始有所放松。对于他的规划，按照此前的说法，就是挣到了足够的钱之后出国读个MBA。目前是提前放松，还是等待时机，谁也不知道。
同2007年市场火爆时期比，刘厉剑表现得更加淡定，彼时的忙忙碌碌，每天见客户吃饭研究券商报告，以及出差调研，如今似乎都减少了许多。空仓带来的不仅仅是工作上的清闲，心里的压力是否存在？谁知道呢？
刘厉剑（化名）是一位踏入A股市场十多年的资深投资者，同时也是当地一位较为知名的私募基金经理。然而，就是在本轮的反弹中，刘厉剑却成了踏空者。
“他的性格中就是包含了谨慎二字。”刘厉剑的朋友告诉《第一财经日报》，他们曾经开玩笑，如果给刘厉剑一百万，他可以管理得很好，不会亏钱但是也不会出现超额收益。
事实上，刘厉剑朋友的话正是印证了刘厉剑在这轮市场的表现。从2007年10月份暴跌之前开始，刘厉剑就开始选择了空仓策略，并且一直延续到了目前。
“这轮我完全踏空啦，我认为这轮反弹没有任何基本面的支撑，对于我们这样的机构而言，对于客户托付的资产需要有极高的责任心。”刘厉剑表示，空仓的根本原因还是在于他坚持认为本轮反弹没有坚实的基本面支撑，资金推动型的上涨并没有持久力，稍有不慎就可能会被套进去。
尽管刘厉剑依然保持着说话不紧不慢的语调，但是语气中似乎仍有稍许的焦虑。显然，面对如此强势反弹，如果完全踏空，来自客户的压力也是巨大的。
不过刘厉剑却笑称，由于与客户合作时间已经很长了，相互之间建立了彼此的信任，因此客户流失的并不多，关键还在于信任二字。
在去年的漫漫熊市中，刘厉剑的空仓策略成功地回避了风险，他也开始转型去做股权投资等一级市场。不过收效有多少，或者只有他自己清楚。
即使是踏空至现在，刘厉剑依然坚定地看空，甚至认为市场的下一轮低点可能至1600点，甚至更低。
“美国经济目前仍然没有企稳的迹象，只有到年终甚至是下半年才能看清市场的走势。”刘厉剑表示，也许只有到那个时候才是考虑建仓的时机。
空仓让刘厉剑看起来既轻松又焦虑，原先联系的时候一直都是显得忙忙碌碌的刘厉剑难得在近期开始睡起了午觉，不知道是春困的原因还是真的开始有所放松。对于他的规划，按照此前的说法，就是挣到了足够的钱之后出国读个MBA。目前是提前放松，还是等待时机，谁也不知道。
同2007年市场火爆时期比，刘厉剑表现得更加淡定，彼时的忙忙碌碌，每天见客户吃饭研究券商报告，以及出差调研，如今似乎都减少了许多。空仓带来的不仅仅是工作上的清闲，心里的压力是否存在？谁知道呢？
巴菲特的五分钟选股的简单条件
1982年股市走牛，股价上涨。巴菲特在整个1982年都没有能以合理的价格买到好的公司，对此股神说道：“1982年我们最大的成就是没有购买那些我们先前已投入许多的公司的股权。倘若我们真地买了，这些交易必定会耗尽我们所有的时间与精力，但却不一定会获得回报。若我们将去年的投资作成图表介绍本公司的发展，你将会发现有两页空白的跨页插图用来描述这些告吹的交易。我们唯有在可以以合理的价格买到吸引人的企业时才投资。这需要温和的股票市场作配合，1982年的市场不适合买入企业。”
热闹的牛市市场令巴菲特无股可买。为改变无股可买的被动局面，巴菲特花钱登广告求购公司。在广告中巴菲特公布了他要买入公司需符合的条件：
“我们对具有以下条件的公司有兴趣:
(1) 巨额交易(每年税后盈余至少有五百万美元)；
(2) 持续稳定获利(我们对有远景或具转机的公司没兴趣)；
(3) 高股东报酬率(并甚少举债)；
(4) 具备管理阶层(我们无法提供)；
(5) 简单的企业(若牵涉到太多高科技，我们弄不懂)；
(6) 合理的价格(在价格不确定前，我们不希望浪费自己与对方太多时间)。
我们承诺完全保密并尽快答复是否感兴趣，通常时间不超过五分钟。”
对于巴菲特来讲，只要满足以上条件，巴菲特马上就会买入，买入决策不会超过5分钟。这意味着，这6个条件是一组能绝对买到好公司的令人放心的条件。在满足这6个条件后，投资者已经没有什么好担心的问题，剩下的就是根据自己的财力决定买不买的问题。由此看出这6个条件在巴菲特的投资决策上有多么重要的地位。为什么巴菲特会把这6个条件做为他决策的关键依据呢？
1978年巴菲特在给股东的信中提出：
“只有当以下条件都符合时：
(1)我们可以了解的行业；
(2)具有长期竞争力；
(3)由才德兼备的人士所经营；
(4)吸引人的价格。
我们才会把资金投放进去。”
事隔四年巴菲特又提出了6个条件，二者有区别吗？
事实上，两组条件本质上完全相同，差别仅仅是1982年的6条件是对1978年的4条件的细化和具体化。因为，在1982年巴菲特的6条件发布在广告中，它的读者是普通大众，给大众看的客观上需要具体化，明确化，而1978年的4条件是面对自己的股东所说的。对象不同，一个具体，一个相对原则，本质完全一样。就操作性而言，1982年的6条件更具有可操作性。
在此，我们重点讨论一下股神1982年提出的值得投资的公司需符合的6个条件的本质，这6个条件组合起来实质上是告诉我们什么样的公司是好公司，巴菲特不仅一次地说：“以合理的价格买好公司就会必然挣钱”所以什么是好公司是非常关键的问题。不能判断什么是好公司，没有判断什么是好公司的条件和原则，那么投资就变成了没有地基的大厦。现在巴菲特在广告中所提出的这6个条件就是判断什么是好公司的条件和原则。
从这个意义上讲，这6个条件其实是价值投资大厦最重要的基石之一。
什么是好公司？这是我在2009年初所写的《熊市价值投资的春天》一书中第二章最重要的问题和内在的目的和意义。企业存在的唯一使命是挣钱和盈利，不挣钱的企业没有存在的价值，不挣钱的企业是“不道德”的企业。企业为挣钱而产生，为挣钱而存在。企业的好坏评价可以从产品质量、品牌知名度、管理水平来评价，但都不是根本的评价。根本的企业评价方法是看企业能不能在整个经营存续期挣钱，能挣多少钱，看企业在整个经营存续期只是暂时挣钱还是长期挣钱。在整个经营存续期挣钱的企业比不挣钱的企业好，挣钱多的企业比挣钱少的企业好，长期挣钱的企业比暂时挣钱的企业好。一句话，评价企业好坏和价值的唯一标准是在整个经营存续期内企业挣钱的多少。因此我们可以直截了当地说，企业的价值就是它在整个经营存续期的挣钱多少和支持它挣钱能力的大小。能挣钱的企业就有价值，不能挣钱的企业就没价值；挣钱多的企业价值大，挣钱少的企业价值小。”
巴菲特这6个条件实质上和我在《熊市-价值投资的春天》一书中所提出的什么是好公司，什么是有价值的公司的判断原则本质上完全相同。巴菲特直接了当地把盈利做为是否是一家好公司做为核心，所有的这6个条件都是围绕着盈利这一核心来说的，差别仅仅是每个条件从不同的侧面揭示了好公司的盈利应该有什么特点。巴菲特的第一个条件揭示的是好公司首先必须每年要盈利，同时盈利要有规模，不可以盈利太少，更不可以不盈利，好的公司一定是盈利的且是大规模盈利的公司。第二个条件强调的是盈利必须要有持续性和稳定性，不能够好一年歹一年，赚一年赔一年，好公司一定是稳定盈利的公司，一定是长期盈利的公司。第三个条件，强调的是盈利要有效率，所获取的盈利必须尽可能的少耗费资金和资源，耗费非常多的资金和资源所获得的盈利，虽然也是盈利但缺乏效率，也就是说好公司的盈利一定是投入产出比高的盈利，一定是净资产回报率高的盈利。在有效率的基础上，好公司的盈利还必须是安全的，所谓的安全是指不依赖大量的负债，不是放大投资人的风险，也不是干刀口舔血生意所获得的盈利。
具备前三个条件的公司在过去、在历史上是好公司。第四条是在前三条的基础上强调一个过去每年大规模、可持续、高效、安全盈利的企业，在一个有能力可信赖的管理层照顾下公司未来的盈利是有保证和确定性。第五条强调的是公司在客观的产业经济特征上具备简单的特点。从而在前四条的基础上公司发生复杂变化的可能性小。前五条如果同时满足的情况下，这家公司未来也必定是一家好公司。最后一条是巴菲特几十年不变的原则，价格要合适。当某一个公司六条都满足，那么它就是一个好的投资机会。也就是说，前五条解决了什么是好公司的问题，第六条确保了好公司变成好的投资机会。实际上好公司加上好价格就是好机会。
在巴菲特的这六个条件它们的核心是盈利，巴菲特把盈利做为好公司的根本判断原则，不盈利的公司、盈利小的公司、盈利波动性大的公司、盈利需要耗费过多的资金和资源的公司，盈利需要靠大量举债的公司都不是好公司。因为这种盈利不稳定，不安全，不能持续，没有效率。因此未来的确定性小。
巴菲特的前三个条件描述了优秀企业的盈利特征，某一个公司的盈利特征是完全从属于它的产业经济特征，经营特点和产品的技术特征，需求特性以及公司的管理水平和公司所处行业的竞争激烈程度，这些固有的长期不变的基础要素。一个公司的盈利特征是其最基本的基础经营要素决定的，因此公司的盈利特征不会轻易变化，过去的盈利特征也将是将来的盈利特征，除非基础经营经营要素发生变化，基础经营经营要素中最容易变化的是管理层。所以当我们知道某一个公司过去的盈利特征的时候，其实只要给这个公司配置一个有能力的可信赖的管理层再加上这个行业的经济特征本身又比较简单，变化性又小，那么现在的盈利特征也将是未来的盈利特征，企业的未来盈利特征以及企业的未来盈利情况，在这时完全可以通过了解企业过去的盈利特征和盈利情况来知晓。而企业过去的盈利特征和盈利情况都是完全公开的信息，通过历年的年报即使没有财务知识的普通投资人也可以很方便地知晓企业过去的盈利特征。
在这里，我们要指出一点在传统的价值投资领域有一种公司分析的方法，其基本思路是回看历史，把历史上企业的经营数据进行统计和分析，寻找出企业在历史上的增长趋势，比如通过对企业历史上净利率增长率的统计，然后直接就认为未来几年企业还将延续这种趋势，未来的净利率增长率也必定和过去的净利率相一样，这种分析方法从根本上并不错，但是我们说如果企业过去净利率增长了30%，未来也必定无条件地增长30%，这也是有点绝对，未来和过去 不可能完全一样，如果未来和过去完全一样，那么这个世界就变成钟表了，未来和过去一样是有条件的，并不是绝对的，在一定条件下企业未来的发展趋势和企业的过去发展趋势是一样的。那么确保企业未来的发展趋势和企业的过去发展趋势一样的条件是什么？如果我们知道了这个条件，那么我们不就可以通过获取企业过去的经营数据掌握企业的盈利特征和盈利情况，这个盈利特征就是企业未来的盈利特征，也就是说在这种情况下我们可以透过回看公司的历史就能较准确地把握这个公司的未来。
这个条件就是你现在所看到的，由巴菲特给出的这6个条件中的前5个。在世界上任何一个国家中的任何企业，如果企业的盈利特征满足了巴菲特所提供的6个条件中的前3个，那么说明这个公司过去是一家非常好非常有价值的公司。如果这个过去盈利非常好的公司同时满足了第四和第五个条件，那么它的未来也一定是好公司，如果这家过去盈利好且有好的管理层管理，并且产业经济特征也比较简单的公司，当前还有个非常好的价格，那么它一定是个好的投资机会，这就是股神巴菲特所以能在五分钟内决定是否投资的根本原因，事实上不仅是巴菲特，就是你我完全理解吃透这6个条件，我们也可以在五分钟内找到好公司和好的投资机会。
最后巴菲特的这6个条件中实际还隐含着一个条件，巴菲特没有完全挑明，那就是企业的盈利必须要成长，如果一个企业有大规模的盈利也比较有持续性、效率和安全性，但不成长，比如一这有自来水公司是完全满足这个条件的，但是这个自来水公司如果在合理的价格上买到这个公司，长期回报率也不是特别高，因为自来水公司的盈利一般不会大幅增长，这种盈利不会大幅增长的公司并不是好的投资对象，所以在巴菲特所给出的6个条件中，要么我们说巴菲特隐含在其中，没有明示，要么我们说巴菲特可能当时没有意识到成长的意义和价值，不管怎么说企业的成长是一个不能忽略的关键要素。
在1982年之后的年报中，巴菲特年年提这6个条件，我们甚至于能够感到，巴菲特几十年一直在靠这6个条件创造着这财富神化，因为巴菲特在此后的年报中再也没有提供新的核心的选股思想，一些新的观点只不过是对这6个条件的完善和祥解，包括巴菲特后来所提出的护城河理论和特许经营权理论都是对这6个条件的详解。
热闹的牛市市场令巴菲特无股可买。为改变无股可买的被动局面，巴菲特花钱登广告求购公司。在广告中巴菲特公布了他要买入公司需符合的条件：
“我们对具有以下条件的公司有兴趣:
(1) 巨额交易(每年税后盈余至少有五百万美元)；
(2) 持续稳定获利(我们对有远景或具转机的公司没兴趣)；
(3) 高股东报酬率(并甚少举债)；
(4) 具备管理阶层(我们无法提供)；
(5) 简单的企业(若牵涉到太多高科技，我们弄不懂)；
(6) 合理的价格(在价格不确定前，我们不希望浪费自己与对方太多时间)。
我们承诺完全保密并尽快答复是否感兴趣，通常时间不超过五分钟。”
对于巴菲特来讲，只要满足以上条件，巴菲特马上就会买入，买入决策不会超过5分钟。这意味着，这6个条件是一组能绝对买到好公司的令人放心的条件。在满足这6个条件后，投资者已经没有什么好担心的问题，剩下的就是根据自己的财力决定买不买的问题。由此看出这6个条件在巴菲特的投资决策上有多么重要的地位。为什么巴菲特会把这6个条件做为他决策的关键依据呢？
1978年巴菲特在给股东的信中提出：
“只有当以下条件都符合时：
(1)我们可以了解的行业；
(2)具有长期竞争力；
(3)由才德兼备的人士所经营；
(4)吸引人的价格。
我们才会把资金投放进去。”
事隔四年巴菲特又提出了6个条件，二者有区别吗？
事实上，两组条件本质上完全相同，差别仅仅是1982年的6条件是对1978年的4条件的细化和具体化。因为，在1982年巴菲特的6条件发布在广告中，它的读者是普通大众，给大众看的客观上需要具体化，明确化，而1978年的4条件是面对自己的股东所说的。对象不同，一个具体，一个相对原则，本质完全一样。就操作性而言，1982年的6条件更具有可操作性。
在此，我们重点讨论一下股神1982年提出的值得投资的公司需符合的6个条件的本质，这6个条件组合起来实质上是告诉我们什么样的公司是好公司，巴菲特不仅一次地说：“以合理的价格买好公司就会必然挣钱”所以什么是好公司是非常关键的问题。不能判断什么是好公司，没有判断什么是好公司的条件和原则，那么投资就变成了没有地基的大厦。现在巴菲特在广告中所提出的这6个条件就是判断什么是好公司的条件和原则。
从这个意义上讲，这6个条件其实是价值投资大厦最重要的基石之一。
什么是好公司？这是我在2009年初所写的《熊市价值投资的春天》一书中第二章最重要的问题和内在的目的和意义。企业存在的唯一使命是挣钱和盈利，不挣钱的企业没有存在的价值，不挣钱的企业是“不道德”的企业。企业为挣钱而产生，为挣钱而存在。企业的好坏评价可以从产品质量、品牌知名度、管理水平来评价，但都不是根本的评价。根本的企业评价方法是看企业能不能在整个经营存续期挣钱，能挣多少钱，看企业在整个经营存续期只是暂时挣钱还是长期挣钱。在整个经营存续期挣钱的企业比不挣钱的企业好，挣钱多的企业比挣钱少的企业好，长期挣钱的企业比暂时挣钱的企业好。一句话，评价企业好坏和价值的唯一标准是在整个经营存续期内企业挣钱的多少。因此我们可以直截了当地说，企业的价值就是它在整个经营存续期的挣钱多少和支持它挣钱能力的大小。能挣钱的企业就有价值，不能挣钱的企业就没价值；挣钱多的企业价值大，挣钱少的企业价值小。”
巴菲特这6个条件实质上和我在《熊市-价值投资的春天》一书中所提出的什么是好公司，什么是有价值的公司的判断原则本质上完全相同。巴菲特直接了当地把盈利做为是否是一家好公司做为核心，所有的这6个条件都是围绕着盈利这一核心来说的，差别仅仅是每个条件从不同的侧面揭示了好公司的盈利应该有什么特点。巴菲特的第一个条件揭示的是好公司首先必须每年要盈利，同时盈利要有规模，不可以盈利太少，更不可以不盈利，好的公司一定是盈利的且是大规模盈利的公司。第二个条件强调的是盈利必须要有持续性和稳定性，不能够好一年歹一年，赚一年赔一年，好公司一定是稳定盈利的公司，一定是长期盈利的公司。第三个条件，强调的是盈利要有效率，所获取的盈利必须尽可能的少耗费资金和资源，耗费非常多的资金和资源所获得的盈利，虽然也是盈利但缺乏效率，也就是说好公司的盈利一定是投入产出比高的盈利，一定是净资产回报率高的盈利。在有效率的基础上，好公司的盈利还必须是安全的，所谓的安全是指不依赖大量的负债，不是放大投资人的风险，也不是干刀口舔血生意所获得的盈利。
具备前三个条件的公司在过去、在历史上是好公司。第四条是在前三条的基础上强调一个过去每年大规模、可持续、高效、安全盈利的企业，在一个有能力可信赖的管理层照顾下公司未来的盈利是有保证和确定性。第五条强调的是公司在客观的产业经济特征上具备简单的特点。从而在前四条的基础上公司发生复杂变化的可能性小。前五条如果同时满足的情况下，这家公司未来也必定是一家好公司。最后一条是巴菲特几十年不变的原则，价格要合适。当某一个公司六条都满足，那么它就是一个好的投资机会。也就是说，前五条解决了什么是好公司的问题，第六条确保了好公司变成好的投资机会。实际上好公司加上好价格就是好机会。
在巴菲特的这六个条件它们的核心是盈利，巴菲特把盈利做为好公司的根本判断原则，不盈利的公司、盈利小的公司、盈利波动性大的公司、盈利需要耗费过多的资金和资源的公司，盈利需要靠大量举债的公司都不是好公司。因为这种盈利不稳定，不安全，不能持续，没有效率。因此未来的确定性小。
巴菲特的前三个条件描述了优秀企业的盈利特征，某一个公司的盈利特征是完全从属于它的产业经济特征，经营特点和产品的技术特征，需求特性以及公司的管理水平和公司所处行业的竞争激烈程度，这些固有的长期不变的基础要素。一个公司的盈利特征是其最基本的基础经营要素决定的，因此公司的盈利特征不会轻易变化，过去的盈利特征也将是将来的盈利特征，除非基础经营经营要素发生变化，基础经营经营要素中最容易变化的是管理层。所以当我们知道某一个公司过去的盈利特征的时候，其实只要给这个公司配置一个有能力的可信赖的管理层再加上这个行业的经济特征本身又比较简单，变化性又小，那么现在的盈利特征也将是未来的盈利特征，企业的未来盈利特征以及企业的未来盈利情况，在这时完全可以通过了解企业过去的盈利特征和盈利情况来知晓。而企业过去的盈利特征和盈利情况都是完全公开的信息，通过历年的年报即使没有财务知识的普通投资人也可以很方便地知晓企业过去的盈利特征。
在这里，我们要指出一点在传统的价值投资领域有一种公司分析的方法，其基本思路是回看历史，把历史上企业的经营数据进行统计和分析，寻找出企业在历史上的增长趋势，比如通过对企业历史上净利率增长率的统计，然后直接就认为未来几年企业还将延续这种趋势，未来的净利率增长率也必定和过去的净利率相一样，这种分析方法从根本上并不错，但是我们说如果企业过去净利率增长了30%，未来也必定无条件地增长30%，这也是有点绝对，未来和过去 不可能完全一样，如果未来和过去完全一样，那么这个世界就变成钟表了，未来和过去一样是有条件的，并不是绝对的，在一定条件下企业未来的发展趋势和企业的过去发展趋势是一样的。那么确保企业未来的发展趋势和企业的过去发展趋势一样的条件是什么？如果我们知道了这个条件，那么我们不就可以通过获取企业过去的经营数据掌握企业的盈利特征和盈利情况，这个盈利特征就是企业未来的盈利特征，也就是说在这种情况下我们可以透过回看公司的历史就能较准确地把握这个公司的未来。
这个条件就是你现在所看到的，由巴菲特给出的这6个条件中的前5个。在世界上任何一个国家中的任何企业，如果企业的盈利特征满足了巴菲特所提供的6个条件中的前3个，那么说明这个公司过去是一家非常好非常有价值的公司。如果这个过去盈利非常好的公司同时满足了第四和第五个条件，那么它的未来也一定是好公司，如果这家过去盈利好且有好的管理层管理，并且产业经济特征也比较简单的公司，当前还有个非常好的价格，那么它一定是个好的投资机会，这就是股神巴菲特所以能在五分钟内决定是否投资的根本原因，事实上不仅是巴菲特，就是你我完全理解吃透这6个条件，我们也可以在五分钟内找到好公司和好的投资机会。
最后巴菲特的这6个条件中实际还隐含着一个条件，巴菲特没有完全挑明，那就是企业的盈利必须要成长，如果一个企业有大规模的盈利也比较有持续性、效率和安全性，但不成长，比如一这有自来水公司是完全满足这个条件的，但是这个自来水公司如果在合理的价格上买到这个公司，长期回报率也不是特别高，因为自来水公司的盈利一般不会大幅增长，这种盈利不会大幅增长的公司并不是好的投资对象，所以在巴菲特所给出的6个条件中，要么我们说巴菲特隐含在其中，没有明示，要么我们说巴菲特可能当时没有意识到成长的意义和价值，不管怎么说企业的成长是一个不能忽略的关键要素。
在1982年之后的年报中，巴菲特年年提这6个条件，我们甚至于能够感到，巴菲特几十年一直在靠这6个条件创造着这财富神化，因为巴菲特在此后的年报中再也没有提供新的核心的选股思想，一些新的观点只不过是对这6个条件的完善和祥解，包括巴菲特后来所提出的护城河理论和特许经营权理论都是对这6个条件的详解。
错误是投资者的终身伴侣
2009年，巴菲特迎来了他44年来业绩最差的一年。目前，还不清楚美国人民如何看待巴菲特2008年不太美满的答卷，但中国人包括中国投资人对巴菲特的2008年进行了全方位，多角度的评论和猜想。大体上有两种观点，一个观点是，巴菲特盲目自大，晚节不保。巴菲特倒霉的事还在后面，他的神奇将在经济危机中彻底破灭。另一个观点是，走着瞧，没有必要为股神担心。
总体而言，凌通对这件事的态度倾向于后者。理由在于，巴菲特的一生是不断犯错误的一生，是犯了一些重大错误的一生。他的公司伯克希尔就是重大错误的一个证据。40多年前，巴菲特买下这个公司，最后所形成的经济和其它综合损失远比2008年严重。在某一年的年报中，巴菲特说：“芒格善于分析错误案例，而我则不断地为芒格提供他需要的错误案例”。这不是纯粹的幽默，而是真实的事实。几十年来，巴菲特从来没有不犯错误的年份，08年的重大错误，只是巴菲特持续犯错的一个延续。
错误是所有投资人永恒的伴侣，不犯错误的投资人永远不会存在。那些因为巴菲特有错，就预测巴菲特会玩完的观点，实际上是不理解投资本身是在错误中前进的，错误是投资人前进和提高水平强有力动力，而这个驱动力是永远不会枯竭的。那些从来没有犯过错误的所谓的大师们，百分之百都是有意或无意地虚构出来的人物。对于巴菲特的2008年，真正有价值的并不是他的错误，而是巴菲特一如即往对下跌的期待和对市场全面恐慌的利用。他的基本信念和基本行为与10年前、20年前、30年前甚至40年前完全一样，巴菲特还是那个巴菲特。在百年不遇的大危机面前，听听巴菲特在最新年报中的原话,有利于我们认识什么是价值投资，什么是真实的巴菲特？他说，“我们所持有的一些股票和债券的市值由于全球市场的下滑而大幅缩水，但这并没有使查理和我感到不安。我们乐于见到价格下跌，如果我们有足够的可供使用的现金，我们会增加持股。很久以前，本杰明.格雷厄姆教导我‘价格是你所付出的，价值是你所得到的’。无论是股票还是短袜，我都乐于在其减价的时候购买。投资世界已经从对风险的低估走到了高估，这种变化并不小，如钟摆般走完了非同寻常的弧线。盲从并非投资的目标，实际上它会产生相反作用，它使大脑陷于僵化。当心那些能够获得一致喝彩的投资行为，相反，伟大的行动开始遇到的却往往是打呵欠。”
在百年不遇的大危机面前，巴菲特的应对原则和应对方法还是格雷顾姆的那一套尽人皆知的东西，这就够了。格雷顾姆的那一套东西，让巴菲特在错误中成为首富，现在依旧坚持格雷厄姆的巴菲特，真的会晚节不保吗？
总体而言，凌通对这件事的态度倾向于后者。理由在于，巴菲特的一生是不断犯错误的一生，是犯了一些重大错误的一生。他的公司伯克希尔就是重大错误的一个证据。40多年前，巴菲特买下这个公司，最后所形成的经济和其它综合损失远比2008年严重。在某一年的年报中，巴菲特说：“芒格善于分析错误案例，而我则不断地为芒格提供他需要的错误案例”。这不是纯粹的幽默，而是真实的事实。几十年来，巴菲特从来没有不犯错误的年份，08年的重大错误，只是巴菲特持续犯错的一个延续。
错误是所有投资人永恒的伴侣，不犯错误的投资人永远不会存在。那些因为巴菲特有错，就预测巴菲特会玩完的观点，实际上是不理解投资本身是在错误中前进的，错误是投资人前进和提高水平强有力动力，而这个驱动力是永远不会枯竭的。那些从来没有犯过错误的所谓的大师们，百分之百都是有意或无意地虚构出来的人物。对于巴菲特的2008年，真正有价值的并不是他的错误，而是巴菲特一如即往对下跌的期待和对市场全面恐慌的利用。他的基本信念和基本行为与10年前、20年前、30年前甚至40年前完全一样，巴菲特还是那个巴菲特。在百年不遇的大危机面前，听听巴菲特在最新年报中的原话,有利于我们认识什么是价值投资，什么是真实的巴菲特？他说，“我们所持有的一些股票和债券的市值由于全球市场的下滑而大幅缩水，但这并没有使查理和我感到不安。我们乐于见到价格下跌，如果我们有足够的可供使用的现金，我们会增加持股。很久以前，本杰明.格雷厄姆教导我‘价格是你所付出的，价值是你所得到的’。无论是股票还是短袜，我都乐于在其减价的时候购买。投资世界已经从对风险的低估走到了高估，这种变化并不小，如钟摆般走完了非同寻常的弧线。盲从并非投资的目标，实际上它会产生相反作用，它使大脑陷于僵化。当心那些能够获得一致喝彩的投资行为，相反，伟大的行动开始遇到的却往往是打呵欠。”
在百年不遇的大危机面前，巴菲特的应对原则和应对方法还是格雷顾姆的那一套尽人皆知的东西，这就够了。格雷顾姆的那一套东西，让巴菲特在错误中成为首富，现在依旧坚持格雷厄姆的巴菲特，真的会晚节不保吗？
买廉价的烂公司不如以合理价格买优质公司
1979年巴菲特在给股东的信中再一次谈到纺织业。在这一年经过多次惨痛的教训之后，巴菲特得出结论：“与其买廉价的烂公司不如以合理价格买优质公司”， 1989年巴菲特进一步得出这样的结论：“以一般的价格买入一家非同一般的好公司，要比用非同一般的好价格买下一家一般的公司好得多。”这些观点可以作为价值投资最重要的基础原则之一。其所以重要，在于它全面地把价值投资所应该考虑的公司质地与购买价格两方面要素完整地统一了起来。在中国资本市场上，投资人总是单一思维，有些人只强调好公司，认为投资的成功完全决定于一个好公司，而不主张对价格进行考查，而另一些人，又单一地认为投资关键是要把握一个极低的价格，而忽略了公司的质地。
巴菲特彻底把价格和质地有机地统一了起来，形成了一个全面完整的投资原则。在这一原则中一共有四个关键词，分别是烂公司，优质公司，廉价，合理价格。它们互相形成了四组投资组合，分别是廉价的烂公司，廉价的优质公司，合理价格的烂公司，合理价格的优质公司。在这四组投资组合之外，我们也可以引进一个新的词，叫做高估价。把高估价引进来又会形成两个组合，高估价的烂公司和高估价的好公司。现在我们看一下这六组组合，哪一组是好的投资机会？
对于廉价的烂公司，假设它的净资产是100万元人民币，拥有人决定以10万元卖给你，这是不是一个有利可图的投资机会？答案是很难说，为什么？因为公司是一个有生命的活体，它不是一个静态的死物，公司质地和人的健康是一样的。一个劣质的公司的净资产虽然很可观，但是它的获利能力，它的竞争能力已经明显地不如其他公司了，就象一个人的身高体重没有什么变化，但是内在体质处于不健康状态。在这种情况下，随着时间的推移，劣质公司的质地有可能越来越差。这并不是很难理解的道理，大家看一下那些衰老人的体质，总是一年不如一年，企业的竞争力也是这样。一旦丧失了竞争优质，从常规经验来看，随着时间的推移，企业也会象老太太过年，一年不如一年。在现实经济中，中外市场都出现过拥有巨额资产的公司以一块钱转让或者白送给收购方的事情。而这个用一块钱或者白送得到的资产往往最后让收购方赔了夫人又折兵。
巴菲特买纺织企业就是如此，1964年这家公司正在以低于资产价值的折扣待售，因为当时它是一家垂败的、看上去没有希望的企业，可是它很便宜，巴菲特的想法是买下这家公司，清算后分成一块一块出售，最后关门，后来因为工人和地方政府的反对，清算后分成一块一块出售，最后关门的想法不能实现，巴菲特开始经营这家垂败的纺织企业。在完全并购伯克希尔后，巴菲特说：“对投资而言，价格是很大的因素，它会决定最后的想法，我们以一个好价钱买到了伯克希尔”可以看得出，当时巴菲特过于强调了低价格的重要性，没有重视质地本身对投资的重要影响。以至于巴菲特在完成收购的发言中都没有提到这家公司的质地。
若干年后，当这家公司不可避免地陷入无法改变的全面失败后，巴菲特不无后悔地说道： “我所犯的第一个错误，就是买下伯克希尔公司的控制权。虽然我很清楚公司的纺织业务没什么发展前景，却因为它的价格实在太便宜了，让我无法抵挡买入的诱惑。虽然买进的价格相当划算，也取得一些价美物廉的机器设备与不动产，几乎可以说是半买半送的。但整个决策事后证明依然是个错误，因为就算我们再努力，旧的问题好不容易才解决，新的状况又冒出来。”可以看出这个时候股神已经认识到单一关注低价格，忽略公司质地，一条腿走路的决策方式是他遭遇第一个重大失败的根本原因。中国有句俗话，便宜没好货，这个说法也有点过于绝对，并不是便宜的100%没有好货，大部分情况下便宜可能是东西不太好，这时单一基于价格便宜就下注，往往会带来失败和灾难。
投资便宜的烂公司还可能会带来灾难性后果！
与巴菲特买下一家便宜的纺织公司，历经十多年才最后被迫承认失败不同，中国的一家上市公司捡到了家比伯克希尔还要便宜的非优质公司，这家公司仅仅用了短短的三、四年，就因此几乎要赔掉几十年所有的积累，被迫认赔了事。2004年TCL集团一分钱没花就实现了对国际老牌家电企业----法国汤姆逊公司的收购。当时汤姆逊公司的资产规模和彩电产能是TCL集团的几倍，TCL集团资产规模和彩电产能虽然只是汤姆逊公司的几分之一，但两个公司把各自的彩电业务合在一起成立TCL汤姆逊公司时，汤姆逊公司却心甘情愿地做小股东，心甘情愿地做TCL的子公司。合并后，新公司TCL汤姆逊公司的股权比例是TCL集团占67%，汤姆逊公司只占33%。看起来TCL集团捡了个大便宜，因为无论从销售规模、全球市场占有率及业界地位看，TCL集团都尚逊色于已进入全球前四的汤姆逊公司。不过汤姆逊公司是标准的烂公司。汤姆逊公司曾经是法国最大的电子产品制造商，然而它在2004年却是法国亏损最大的电子产品制造商。2004年上半年，汤姆逊公司净亏损就达到了8100万欧元。欧洲电子产品市场的激烈竞争使汤姆逊公司出现的问题不仅仅是简单的亏损，而是会不会破产，因此，汤姆逊主动报出了超低价。这令TCL集团兴奋不已，马上兴冲冲地与汤姆逊公司完婚！巴菲特投资纺织业坚持了近20年才放弃，TCL集团对汤姆逊公司的收购只维持了不到4年，就无可奈何地放弃了，原因很简单，TCL集团实在赔不起了。
四年中，公司因为低价收购汤姆逊公司共亏损20亿，市值平均下跌了50%。07年市值的增加主要是中国股市的牛市原因，不是企业基本面决定的！
与TCL相比巴菲特在投资一家百货公司的遭遇也很类似，在买下伯克希尔不久后，巴菲特通过一家后来并入伯克希尔公司的分公司，买了一家百货公司。巴菲特说：“这家公司的管理层是一流的，我以低于账面价值相当大的折扣买入，而且这笔交易还包括一些额外的利益：未入账的不动产价值和大量采取后进先出法的存货准备。但是，直到在三年后我才得以幸运地以相当于买入成本左右的价格将这家公司脱手。
在结束了伯克希尔公司跟这家百货公司的婚姻关系后，我的感觉就像乡村歌曲中的丈夫们所唱的那样：‘我的老婆跟我最好的朋友跑了，然而我还是非常挂念我的朋友!’”这既是巴菲特的幽默，也是巴菲特在买廉价烂公司后感受到的无奈和痛！
所以，以极其低廉的价格买一个烂公司，相当于在生活中用极其低的聘礼娶一个长年有病，且需要人照顾的病媳妇。虽然聘礼花得少，但结婚后为病人看病买药的钱，累积起来将会是一个天文数字。因此，烂公司以多么廉价的价格卖给你，价格都可能不合适。投资者尽量不要因烂公司的低廉价格去冒险！
因为，低廉价格买烂公司是不合适的，所以，以合理的价格买下一个烂公司，或者以高估的价格买下一个烂公司更加无利可图了。多次以低廉价格买烂公司最后不挣钱的结果令巴菲特认识到蟾蜍不会轻易地变成王子，他说：“我们曾用划算的价钱买下不少蟾蜍，这些低廉价格买来的蟾蜍，最后少有变成王子的，因此，我们通常不会去买那些我们必须替其作许多改变的公司，因为我们发现我们所作的改变不见得是好的。”
实践让巴菲特认识到就象蛤蟆不会轻易变成王子一样，烂公司更不会轻易变成一个优质公司，因此，即使只是支付了低廉的价格，但由于公司质地不能好转，所以就不可能有好的回报。同时烂公司还需要耗费很多资源和金钱，维持正常运作寻求摆脱困境，而这种摆脱常常最终又不能实现，于是，TCL集团那种几乎要把公司所有财力都耗干的局面，成为一种必然。
合理的价格买下优质公司其实质是一场公平交易。合理的含义是既没有多付钱，也没有少付钱。在这种情况下，买入这样的资产凭什么可以挣钱呢？因为，从一般的道理上讲，买下一块资产所以能挣钱，前提是你买得低，由于低买，所以在你以低价买入的情况下自然就获得一个差价。这个差价就是巴菲特老师格雷厄姆所说的安全边际。显然以合理的价格买优质公司，在买入的当时并没有获利的机会，这种情况下所以能挣钱主要是依赖于优质公司所具有的特质。优质公司因为它拥有竞争优势和核心竞争力，使得它随着时间的推移会越来越强大，它的市场份额会越来越大，盈利水平会越来越高，行业地位会越来越稳固，简单地说优质公司随着时间的推移会越来越好，会提升投资人的股权价值，就象巴菲特所说的，“当价格合理，我们很愿意在某些特定的公司身上持有大量的股权，这样做不是为了要取得控制权，也不是为了将来再转卖出去或进行并购，而是期望企业本身能有好的表现，进而转化成企业长期的价值以及丰厚的股利收入，不论是少数股权或是多数股权皆是如此。”
时间是优质公司的朋友，没有什么复杂的道理。对于一个优质公司，如果它过去做得很好，未来它也会做得很好。这是一个常识，正象巴菲特所说的：“过去伟大的企业未来也会是伟大的企业。”当一个公司确定了行业龙头地位，确定了竞争优势，未来这个公司的竞争力会进一步地提高强化，一个优秀企业会随着时间的推移不断地强化它的竞争优势，巩固它的领先地位，这种现象一方面是产业界的常态，另一方面也是马太效应的反应。“马太效应”认为：“强的会越强，有钱的会越有钱，弱的会越弱。任何个体、群体或地区，一旦在某一个方面获得成功和进步，就会产生一种积累优势，就会有更多的机会取得更大的成功和进步。”
产业界的现象和经济学规律都清晰地表达出一个事实，烂公司的经营状况会随着时间的推移越来越烂。那怕你为其付出巨额的资金，最终也不能阻挡烂公司趋于更烂。让一个烂公司发生蛤蟆变王子的奇迹是一个极其罕有的小概率事件。优质的公司会随着时间的推移，变得更加优质，社会资源、资金、人才、技术、需求都会加速涌入优质公司，此种势态下优势公司持续强化自己的领先地位是一种必然。
反过来让一个优质公司趋于衰败，反而很难，这种难度甚至于比让劣质公司趋于复苏都难。王朝建立之初是优质的，而它灭亡之时是腐朽的，从优质到腐朽的过程中，总是经历数十个败家子皇帝。衰败不是短期能实现的，也是个漫长的过程。
所以，时间是优质公司的朋友。在这种情况下，你以合理的价格买入优质公司，虽然你在买的时候没有占到便宜，但由于优质公司会随着时间的推移变得更优质，因此，在你给予优质公司足够的时间之后你会发现，优质公司的内在价值随着时间的推移自动增加了，此时你手上股份的含金量也大幅增加，这就是你以合理的价格买入优质公司可以获利的逻辑。对此巴菲特说道：“我们会持续以合理的价格买入好公司，我们也愿意以不错的价格买下那些对抗通货膨胀的好公司，但我们通常不会买那些我们必须替其作许多改变的公司，因为我们发现我们所作的改变不见得是好的。我们曾经遇到几个王子级的公司，但是早在我们买下时他们就已是王子了，可喜的是，我们买入后他们没有变回蟾蜍。”
通过具体分析，可以看到对于烂公司无论是高估，合理估值，还是廉价低估，从投资的角度来讲都不适合买入。真正适合买入的机会是合理估值的优质公司。烂公司在任何情况下都不是好的投资公司，那怕它的价格非常低。
买廉价的烂公司不如以合理价格买优质公司！
巴菲特彻底把价格和质地有机地统一了起来，形成了一个全面完整的投资原则。在这一原则中一共有四个关键词，分别是烂公司，优质公司，廉价，合理价格。它们互相形成了四组投资组合，分别是廉价的烂公司，廉价的优质公司，合理价格的烂公司，合理价格的优质公司。在这四组投资组合之外，我们也可以引进一个新的词，叫做高估价。把高估价引进来又会形成两个组合，高估价的烂公司和高估价的好公司。现在我们看一下这六组组合，哪一组是好的投资机会？
对于廉价的烂公司，假设它的净资产是100万元人民币，拥有人决定以10万元卖给你，这是不是一个有利可图的投资机会？答案是很难说，为什么？因为公司是一个有生命的活体，它不是一个静态的死物，公司质地和人的健康是一样的。一个劣质的公司的净资产虽然很可观，但是它的获利能力，它的竞争能力已经明显地不如其他公司了，就象一个人的身高体重没有什么变化，但是内在体质处于不健康状态。在这种情况下，随着时间的推移，劣质公司的质地有可能越来越差。这并不是很难理解的道理，大家看一下那些衰老人的体质，总是一年不如一年，企业的竞争力也是这样。一旦丧失了竞争优质，从常规经验来看，随着时间的推移，企业也会象老太太过年，一年不如一年。在现实经济中，中外市场都出现过拥有巨额资产的公司以一块钱转让或者白送给收购方的事情。而这个用一块钱或者白送得到的资产往往最后让收购方赔了夫人又折兵。
巴菲特买纺织企业就是如此，1964年这家公司正在以低于资产价值的折扣待售，因为当时它是一家垂败的、看上去没有希望的企业，可是它很便宜，巴菲特的想法是买下这家公司，清算后分成一块一块出售，最后关门，后来因为工人和地方政府的反对，清算后分成一块一块出售，最后关门的想法不能实现，巴菲特开始经营这家垂败的纺织企业。在完全并购伯克希尔后，巴菲特说：“对投资而言，价格是很大的因素，它会决定最后的想法，我们以一个好价钱买到了伯克希尔”可以看得出，当时巴菲特过于强调了低价格的重要性，没有重视质地本身对投资的重要影响。以至于巴菲特在完成收购的发言中都没有提到这家公司的质地。
若干年后，当这家公司不可避免地陷入无法改变的全面失败后，巴菲特不无后悔地说道： “我所犯的第一个错误，就是买下伯克希尔公司的控制权。虽然我很清楚公司的纺织业务没什么发展前景，却因为它的价格实在太便宜了，让我无法抵挡买入的诱惑。虽然买进的价格相当划算，也取得一些价美物廉的机器设备与不动产，几乎可以说是半买半送的。但整个决策事后证明依然是个错误，因为就算我们再努力，旧的问题好不容易才解决，新的状况又冒出来。”可以看出这个时候股神已经认识到单一关注低价格，忽略公司质地，一条腿走路的决策方式是他遭遇第一个重大失败的根本原因。中国有句俗话，便宜没好货，这个说法也有点过于绝对，并不是便宜的100%没有好货，大部分情况下便宜可能是东西不太好，这时单一基于价格便宜就下注，往往会带来失败和灾难。
投资便宜的烂公司还可能会带来灾难性后果！
与巴菲特买下一家便宜的纺织公司，历经十多年才最后被迫承认失败不同，中国的一家上市公司捡到了家比伯克希尔还要便宜的非优质公司，这家公司仅仅用了短短的三、四年，就因此几乎要赔掉几十年所有的积累，被迫认赔了事。2004年TCL集团一分钱没花就实现了对国际老牌家电企业----法国汤姆逊公司的收购。当时汤姆逊公司的资产规模和彩电产能是TCL集团的几倍，TCL集团资产规模和彩电产能虽然只是汤姆逊公司的几分之一，但两个公司把各自的彩电业务合在一起成立TCL汤姆逊公司时，汤姆逊公司却心甘情愿地做小股东，心甘情愿地做TCL的子公司。合并后，新公司TCL汤姆逊公司的股权比例是TCL集团占67%，汤姆逊公司只占33%。看起来TCL集团捡了个大便宜，因为无论从销售规模、全球市场占有率及业界地位看，TCL集团都尚逊色于已进入全球前四的汤姆逊公司。不过汤姆逊公司是标准的烂公司。汤姆逊公司曾经是法国最大的电子产品制造商，然而它在2004年却是法国亏损最大的电子产品制造商。2004年上半年，汤姆逊公司净亏损就达到了8100万欧元。欧洲电子产品市场的激烈竞争使汤姆逊公司出现的问题不仅仅是简单的亏损，而是会不会破产，因此，汤姆逊主动报出了超低价。这令TCL集团兴奋不已，马上兴冲冲地与汤姆逊公司完婚！巴菲特投资纺织业坚持了近20年才放弃，TCL集团对汤姆逊公司的收购只维持了不到4年，就无可奈何地放弃了，原因很简单，TCL集团实在赔不起了。
四年中，公司因为低价收购汤姆逊公司共亏损20亿，市值平均下跌了50%。07年市值的增加主要是中国股市的牛市原因，不是企业基本面决定的！
与TCL相比巴菲特在投资一家百货公司的遭遇也很类似，在买下伯克希尔不久后，巴菲特通过一家后来并入伯克希尔公司的分公司，买了一家百货公司。巴菲特说：“这家公司的管理层是一流的，我以低于账面价值相当大的折扣买入，而且这笔交易还包括一些额外的利益：未入账的不动产价值和大量采取后进先出法的存货准备。但是，直到在三年后我才得以幸运地以相当于买入成本左右的价格将这家公司脱手。
在结束了伯克希尔公司跟这家百货公司的婚姻关系后，我的感觉就像乡村歌曲中的丈夫们所唱的那样：‘我的老婆跟我最好的朋友跑了，然而我还是非常挂念我的朋友!’”这既是巴菲特的幽默，也是巴菲特在买廉价烂公司后感受到的无奈和痛！
所以，以极其低廉的价格买一个烂公司，相当于在生活中用极其低的聘礼娶一个长年有病，且需要人照顾的病媳妇。虽然聘礼花得少，但结婚后为病人看病买药的钱，累积起来将会是一个天文数字。因此，烂公司以多么廉价的价格卖给你，价格都可能不合适。投资者尽量不要因烂公司的低廉价格去冒险！
因为，低廉价格买烂公司是不合适的，所以，以合理的价格买下一个烂公司，或者以高估的价格买下一个烂公司更加无利可图了。多次以低廉价格买烂公司最后不挣钱的结果令巴菲特认识到蟾蜍不会轻易地变成王子，他说：“我们曾用划算的价钱买下不少蟾蜍，这些低廉价格买来的蟾蜍，最后少有变成王子的，因此，我们通常不会去买那些我们必须替其作许多改变的公司，因为我们发现我们所作的改变不见得是好的。”
实践让巴菲特认识到就象蛤蟆不会轻易变成王子一样，烂公司更不会轻易变成一个优质公司，因此，即使只是支付了低廉的价格，但由于公司质地不能好转，所以就不可能有好的回报。同时烂公司还需要耗费很多资源和金钱，维持正常运作寻求摆脱困境，而这种摆脱常常最终又不能实现，于是，TCL集团那种几乎要把公司所有财力都耗干的局面，成为一种必然。
合理的价格买下优质公司其实质是一场公平交易。合理的含义是既没有多付钱，也没有少付钱。在这种情况下，买入这样的资产凭什么可以挣钱呢？因为，从一般的道理上讲，买下一块资产所以能挣钱，前提是你买得低，由于低买，所以在你以低价买入的情况下自然就获得一个差价。这个差价就是巴菲特老师格雷厄姆所说的安全边际。显然以合理的价格买优质公司，在买入的当时并没有获利的机会，这种情况下所以能挣钱主要是依赖于优质公司所具有的特质。优质公司因为它拥有竞争优势和核心竞争力，使得它随着时间的推移会越来越强大，它的市场份额会越来越大，盈利水平会越来越高，行业地位会越来越稳固，简单地说优质公司随着时间的推移会越来越好，会提升投资人的股权价值，就象巴菲特所说的，“当价格合理，我们很愿意在某些特定的公司身上持有大量的股权，这样做不是为了要取得控制权，也不是为了将来再转卖出去或进行并购，而是期望企业本身能有好的表现，进而转化成企业长期的价值以及丰厚的股利收入，不论是少数股权或是多数股权皆是如此。”
时间是优质公司的朋友，没有什么复杂的道理。对于一个优质公司，如果它过去做得很好，未来它也会做得很好。这是一个常识，正象巴菲特所说的：“过去伟大的企业未来也会是伟大的企业。”当一个公司确定了行业龙头地位，确定了竞争优势，未来这个公司的竞争力会进一步地提高强化，一个优秀企业会随着时间的推移不断地强化它的竞争优势，巩固它的领先地位，这种现象一方面是产业界的常态，另一方面也是马太效应的反应。“马太效应”认为：“强的会越强，有钱的会越有钱，弱的会越弱。任何个体、群体或地区，一旦在某一个方面获得成功和进步，就会产生一种积累优势，就会有更多的机会取得更大的成功和进步。”
产业界的现象和经济学规律都清晰地表达出一个事实，烂公司的经营状况会随着时间的推移越来越烂。那怕你为其付出巨额的资金，最终也不能阻挡烂公司趋于更烂。让一个烂公司发生蛤蟆变王子的奇迹是一个极其罕有的小概率事件。优质的公司会随着时间的推移，变得更加优质，社会资源、资金、人才、技术、需求都会加速涌入优质公司，此种势态下优势公司持续强化自己的领先地位是一种必然。
反过来让一个优质公司趋于衰败，反而很难，这种难度甚至于比让劣质公司趋于复苏都难。王朝建立之初是优质的，而它灭亡之时是腐朽的，从优质到腐朽的过程中，总是经历数十个败家子皇帝。衰败不是短期能实现的，也是个漫长的过程。
所以，时间是优质公司的朋友。在这种情况下，你以合理的价格买入优质公司，虽然你在买的时候没有占到便宜，但由于优质公司会随着时间的推移变得更优质，因此，在你给予优质公司足够的时间之后你会发现，优质公司的内在价值随着时间的推移自动增加了，此时你手上股份的含金量也大幅增加，这就是你以合理的价格买入优质公司可以获利的逻辑。对此巴菲特说道：“我们会持续以合理的价格买入好公司，我们也愿意以不错的价格买下那些对抗通货膨胀的好公司，但我们通常不会买那些我们必须替其作许多改变的公司，因为我们发现我们所作的改变不见得是好的。我们曾经遇到几个王子级的公司，但是早在我们买下时他们就已是王子了，可喜的是，我们买入后他们没有变回蟾蜍。”
通过具体分析，可以看到对于烂公司无论是高估，合理估值，还是廉价低估，从投资的角度来讲都不适合买入。真正适合买入的机会是合理估值的优质公司。烂公司在任何情况下都不是好的投资公司，那怕它的价格非常低。
买廉价的烂公司不如以合理价格买优质公司！
Stock Markets: When Will the Bull Return?
The stock market is crashing -- slowly, and in plain view of the people who count on it most. The 53% plunge in the Dow Jones industrials since October 2007 has wrecked the college- and retirement-savings plans of millions of investors. It has permanently lowered the long-term investment projections of private endowments and pension funds. It has sent corporate compensation experts scrambling to figure out how to reward top employees. All told, more than $10 trillion of stock market wealth has vanished, and with it the confidence that springs from financial security.
While 17 months may feel like an eternity, it could turn out merely to be a prequel. The questions on the minds of investors, money managers, and corporate executives are threefold: How much longer will the bear market last? How low will the averages go? And when might investors get their money back?
As Warren E. Buffett has said: "Beware of geeks bearing formulas." It's especially difficult to predict the direction of the markets these days because the most popular gauges, from price-earnings ratios to measures of investor "capitulation," have stopped working. The peculiar nature of this bear market limits the kit of useful tools to just a handful of bond market and business confidence indicators.
Those signals, along with interviews with financial historians, market strategists, and economists, point mostly to painful scenarios. Stocks don't seem likely to fall much more from here -- but market turmoil could continue for months or even years. Worse, by the time the market revisits its highs, so many years are likely to have passed that many older people will have gotten out of stocks, missing out on the rebound. The flip side is that new money put into the stock market now will likely do comparatively well over the long term. That's welcome news for twentysomethings and executive compensation consultants, but perhaps not for soon-to-be retirees.
Searching For Precedents
History can't provide as many clues to the market's direction as usual. That's because while most bear markets more or less track the business cycle, this one began with a broken financial system. That makes the current bear more like the one that snarled from 1929-32 than others of the past 100 years. But that analogy doesn't fit perfectly, either. "We have no good precedents to help us," says Peter L. Bernstein, a 90-year-old market essayist and financial historian who was a teenager during the Great Depression. "What's breathtaking is the rapidity of the decline and its breadth."
The market anxiety is especially high now because of the raging fire in the economy. "The next six to nine months are going to be awful," says Desmond Lachman of the American Enterprise Institute. Waves of corporate defaults, home foreclosures, bank failures, and job losses are still to come.
Of course, the stock market already knows that for the rest of 2009 the economy will be a "shambles," to use Buffett's recent description. Today's low share prices may well reflect that. The Dow Jones industrial average has already fallen through the 7,000 level predicted earlier this year by Nouriel Roubini, the New York University economist nicknamed Dr. Doom for daring in 2006 to foretell the credit calamity. That's right, even Dr. Doom was too optimistic.
If recent history were a reliable guide, it would be just about time for the bear to retreat to his den, which nowadays might include a flat-panel TV and leather chair bought at a foreclosure sale. The market's average decline during bear markets since the 1929 market crash is just 30%. What's more, those past bears lasted an average of 13 months, making this one look not just mean but old.
But this is no ordinary slump. Even the most basic market gauge, the price-earnings ratio, which measures a company's share price relative to the earnings it generates, is unreliable. Historically, the overall market has traded at prices that average 15 times earnings, ranging from roughly 8 during the worst bear markets to 25 or greater during bull runs. At the start of the year, the market's p-e ratio was about 11, suggesting that stocks were already cheap and wouldn't drop much more. Instead, the Standard & Poor's (NYSE:MHP - News)500-stock index fell 19% in January and February, the worst opening months on record.
Why did the p-e ratio get it so wrong? The "e" is plunging -- by 18% in January and February alone, according to Thomson Reuters (NYSE:TRI - News). As a result, even though the stock market has dropped, it hasn't gotten any cheaper relative to earnings. Sure, a lot of earnings vanished amid a fog of one-time charges that may say nothing about companies' future profit power. But analysts still aren't seeing through that fog; their earnings projections are more scattered than they've been in two decades. "You don't know what the 'e' is because the economy is in free fall," says Charles Biderman, CEO of TrimTabs Investment Research.
The credit bust has rendered other trusted market indicators useless -- most notably monetary policy, or the Federal Reserve's raising or lowering of its benchmark interest rate. Before the current slump, the federal funds rate was a reliable indicator in all but one bear market since World War II, says James B. Stack, president of InvesTech Research and Stack Financial Management. When the economy slowed, the Fed began cutting rates to turn the business cycle back up. After the second cut came, investors stepped in to buy, anticipating higher corporate earnings. But the Fed has cut rates 10 times since August 2007, to essentially zero, and yet the economy and stock market keep sliding. "The Depression is the only parallel for the lack of effectiveness in monetary policy," says Stack. It is failing because too many borrowers don't want to borrow and too many lenders don't have the capital or courage to lend.
Measures of capitulation, Wall Street's term for the final moment of a sell-off when the last weak investors give up on stocks, aren't working, either. The idea is that once the wobbly players are out, the ones left are strong enough to bid up stocks. Bull runs begin during those moments. Market mavens try to track capitulation by parsing statistics from days of heavy selling and comparing the intensity of past routs. Many thought they saw capitulation last September, says Eric C. Bjorgen, senior analyst with the Leuthold Group in Minneapolis. "But then the market kept going down," says Bjorgen. "Extreme fear was not a good indicator." The gauges became even more bullish with the selling in November, after which the market rallied 24%. Then it fell again. Biderman of TrimTabs says that's because much of the selling was by hedge funds that had been using borrowed money, not a major factor in previous bear markets.
Another signal that's turned out to be misleading is "cash on the sidelines," or the funds in money market and bank savings accounts. In normal times, strategists could look with some confidence to money in these accounts as buying power that investors were holding back from the stock market. The greater the cash compared with the value of the overall market, the more impact it could make on stocks. In January the reading reached its highest levels since 1984, says Bjorgen. Even so, he's dubious. As long as investors are worried about their own incomes, he says, the money seems most likely to stay right where it is. TrimTabs' Biderman, who tracks how investors move their money among asset classes, says he doesn't see much chance of this cash flowing into stocks with the job and housing markets so weak. He figures investors have been taking more money out of stocks than they've been putting into their cash accounts. "Some people are being forced to sell stocks to eat," Biderman says. "They are certainly not going to buy Google (NasdaqGS:GOOG - News) here."
With the ordinary historical measures failing, experts are looking further back for clues. During the Great Depression, the Dow plunged 89% from the 1929 crash to July 1932. Then it went through some big swings before losing 49% in 1937-38 as the economy tanked again. World War II, which grew in part out of financial stress around the globe, followed. The Dow didn't get back to its 1929 high until 1954.
Much, of course, has changed in the U.S. since the Great Crash. Back then Washington made major policy mistakes, such as erecting trade barriers and letting too many banks fail without protecting depositors. This time, with a couple of exceptions, the government hasn't blundered so, even though it hasn't yet solved the economy's many problems.
So this bear market likely won't rival that of the Great Depression. But the bear markets during other banking crises have been brutal in their own right. In a recent study of 21 such episodes from around the world, including ones from Spain in 1977, Sweden in 1991, and Thailand in 1997, professors Carmen M. Reinhart of the University of Maryland and Kenneth S. Rogoff of Harvard University found that stocks fell an average of 56% -- the same loss the S&P 500 had suffered through Mar. 3. Those bear markets also tended to be agonizingly slow, taking an average of 3.4 years to reach bottom. "Everything is protracted," says Reinhart. "In the best-case scenario, you are looking at six years or longer" to return to past highs. Bad as that sounds, it would compare favorably with Japan, whose Nikkei index reached 38,900 in 1989 and now trades at around 7,200.
Of course, just because investors have lost money in stocks doesn't mean equities are a bad choice from this point onward. "Stocks can't make up for the past 10 years, but they can do extremely well from our current position," says Jeremy J. Siegel, author of Stocks for the Long Run and professor at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. Siegel says that while stock returns have fallen behind government bond returns over the past 20 years, history says that's almost certain to reverse. He's found only one 30-year period when stocks returned less than bonds, and that one ended in 1861. "That tells us that once you are down 50%, those who are in stock markets for 10 to 15 years will get much better returns," he says. Lately, government bond prices have run up, boosting the odds that stocks will be the better play in the future.
So where to look for signs of an incipient upturn? One logical place is the corporate debt market, which understands the economy's core problem firsthand. Eventually, the pace of new defaults on corporate bonds will slow, and bad debts will be reduced or erased in financial reorganizations and bankruptcies. When those things happen, the economy and stock market should breathe easier.
Some quants see little evidence of that happening yet. "We are looking at a 60% to 70% chance that this bear market is not over," says Robert D. Arnott, chairman of Research Affiliates, a Pasadena (Calif.) firm that manages $25 billion. Jeffrey E. Gundlach, chief investment officer of Los Angeles-based money manager TCW Group, says the junk-bond market, which often tracks the stock market, is headed for new lows.
Another critical factor is the health of the banking system. One measure to watch is banks' so-called net worth, or the difference between how much they owe and the value of their assets. Rebuilding the banking system's net worth will be monumentally difficult. "On average, this process takes about six years," says Joseph Mason, a banking professor at Louisiana State University who has studied past banking crises. So far, little has been accomplished -- a big reason the stock market hasn't gotten up from its knees.
KEEP AN EYE ON CEOs
Government policy decisions could speed or slow the pace of rehabilitation for the banks and, in turn, the stock market. David A. Hendler, a New York-based bank analyst at CreditSights, says his job has shifted from financial analysis toward Washington analysis. Essentially, his task is to figure out how quickly the government will permit weak banks to consolidate. When investors believe they know which banks will survive, they'll buy their stocks. The process is so critical to the stock market that Richard Bernstein, chief investment strategist at Merrill Lynch (NYSE:BAC - News), is tracking six signposts for financial industry consolidation. Among them: the extent to which the government carves up and sells bad banks rather than buying into them to prop them up.
Other strategists are keeping a close eye on the people who really know what's happening in the economy: business leaders. Biderman says he'll know corporations are getting confident once they start buying back their own shares and acquiring other companies. Right now they show no such bravado. Announcements of share buybacks are down 90% from a year ago, leaving that market thermometer so cold the mercury is off the scale.
In the end, the timing of the bear's retreat will likely hinge on that great market imponderable: psychology. How investors feel has a lot to do with whether they start seeing mixed signals as proof of a glass half-full. "The (market) stress causes the analytical part of our brains to shut down, and that makes us hyperreactive to bad news," says Michael A. Ervolini, CEO of Cabot Research, a consultancy catering to institutional investors. People become convinced conditions are worse than rock-bottom bad, he says. Only after they see that they've overreacted can things improve: "We look for the market to start (saying) tomorrow will be brighter."
For now, pessimism is winning the day. In the worst-case scenario, bad debts will continue to weigh on borrowers and lenders, causing the economy to slow even more, which will erode incomes and push more borrowers over the edge. Economies and corporations around the globe will weaken and rattle investors and business executives even more. Such fears have prompted Ben McCoy, a 30-year-old software engineer, to swear off new stock investments. Instead, he's putting money into his own business ventures, such as writing software for real estate appraisers and a blog about personal finance called moneysmartlife.com. "With these investments, I feel like I have more control," he says.
More Ben McCoys could signal the stirrings of an upturn. A market bottom, says Merrill's Bernstein, "generally occurs when everyone thinks it will never happen. You want to hear people giving up on the stocks-for-the-long-run theme."
But something positive must draw investors back. George A. Akerlof, a Nobel prize-winning economist at the University of California at Berkeley and co-author of a new book, with Yale professor Robert J. Shiller, on the importance of sentiment in moving markets, says investors will have to be offered a new story they can believe to get them to buy again.
That new story likely involves corporate and consumer debts being reduced to what borrowers can pay, freeing them of past mistakes so that new money can be put to productive use. Banks resume lending, and the stock market bottoms, signaling that the recession will be over soon. Budding optimism reverses the vicious cycle of losses. A bull is born.
A more probable outcome is the one drawn from the narrow history of bear markets that grew out of financial crises. In it, the bear scenario continues to play out until the bull takes over, with more debt busts and government trial and error until things get set right again. That could mean two more years of bouncing around and then another six or so before the Dow is back above 14,000. Not long ago, such an outcome would have seemed unimaginably bleak. Given the other possibilities, it doesn't seem so bad now.
While 17 months may feel like an eternity, it could turn out merely to be a prequel. The questions on the minds of investors, money managers, and corporate executives are threefold: How much longer will the bear market last? How low will the averages go? And when might investors get their money back?
As Warren E. Buffett has said: "Beware of geeks bearing formulas." It's especially difficult to predict the direction of the markets these days because the most popular gauges, from price-earnings ratios to measures of investor "capitulation," have stopped working. The peculiar nature of this bear market limits the kit of useful tools to just a handful of bond market and business confidence indicators.
Those signals, along with interviews with financial historians, market strategists, and economists, point mostly to painful scenarios. Stocks don't seem likely to fall much more from here -- but market turmoil could continue for months or even years. Worse, by the time the market revisits its highs, so many years are likely to have passed that many older people will have gotten out of stocks, missing out on the rebound. The flip side is that new money put into the stock market now will likely do comparatively well over the long term. That's welcome news for twentysomethings and executive compensation consultants, but perhaps not for soon-to-be retirees.
Searching For Precedents
History can't provide as many clues to the market's direction as usual. That's because while most bear markets more or less track the business cycle, this one began with a broken financial system. That makes the current bear more like the one that snarled from 1929-32 than others of the past 100 years. But that analogy doesn't fit perfectly, either. "We have no good precedents to help us," says Peter L. Bernstein, a 90-year-old market essayist and financial historian who was a teenager during the Great Depression. "What's breathtaking is the rapidity of the decline and its breadth."
The market anxiety is especially high now because of the raging fire in the economy. "The next six to nine months are going to be awful," says Desmond Lachman of the American Enterprise Institute. Waves of corporate defaults, home foreclosures, bank failures, and job losses are still to come.
Of course, the stock market already knows that for the rest of 2009 the economy will be a "shambles," to use Buffett's recent description. Today's low share prices may well reflect that. The Dow Jones industrial average has already fallen through the 7,000 level predicted earlier this year by Nouriel Roubini, the New York University economist nicknamed Dr. Doom for daring in 2006 to foretell the credit calamity. That's right, even Dr. Doom was too optimistic.
If recent history were a reliable guide, it would be just about time for the bear to retreat to his den, which nowadays might include a flat-panel TV and leather chair bought at a foreclosure sale. The market's average decline during bear markets since the 1929 market crash is just 30%. What's more, those past bears lasted an average of 13 months, making this one look not just mean but old.
But this is no ordinary slump. Even the most basic market gauge, the price-earnings ratio, which measures a company's share price relative to the earnings it generates, is unreliable. Historically, the overall market has traded at prices that average 15 times earnings, ranging from roughly 8 during the worst bear markets to 25 or greater during bull runs. At the start of the year, the market's p-e ratio was about 11, suggesting that stocks were already cheap and wouldn't drop much more. Instead, the Standard & Poor's (NYSE:MHP - News)500-stock index fell 19% in January and February, the worst opening months on record.
Why did the p-e ratio get it so wrong? The "e" is plunging -- by 18% in January and February alone, according to Thomson Reuters (NYSE:TRI - News). As a result, even though the stock market has dropped, it hasn't gotten any cheaper relative to earnings. Sure, a lot of earnings vanished amid a fog of one-time charges that may say nothing about companies' future profit power. But analysts still aren't seeing through that fog; their earnings projections are more scattered than they've been in two decades. "You don't know what the 'e' is because the economy is in free fall," says Charles Biderman, CEO of TrimTabs Investment Research.
The credit bust has rendered other trusted market indicators useless -- most notably monetary policy, or the Federal Reserve's raising or lowering of its benchmark interest rate. Before the current slump, the federal funds rate was a reliable indicator in all but one bear market since World War II, says James B. Stack, president of InvesTech Research and Stack Financial Management. When the economy slowed, the Fed began cutting rates to turn the business cycle back up. After the second cut came, investors stepped in to buy, anticipating higher corporate earnings. But the Fed has cut rates 10 times since August 2007, to essentially zero, and yet the economy and stock market keep sliding. "The Depression is the only parallel for the lack of effectiveness in monetary policy," says Stack. It is failing because too many borrowers don't want to borrow and too many lenders don't have the capital or courage to lend.
Measures of capitulation, Wall Street's term for the final moment of a sell-off when the last weak investors give up on stocks, aren't working, either. The idea is that once the wobbly players are out, the ones left are strong enough to bid up stocks. Bull runs begin during those moments. Market mavens try to track capitulation by parsing statistics from days of heavy selling and comparing the intensity of past routs. Many thought they saw capitulation last September, says Eric C. Bjorgen, senior analyst with the Leuthold Group in Minneapolis. "But then the market kept going down," says Bjorgen. "Extreme fear was not a good indicator." The gauges became even more bullish with the selling in November, after which the market rallied 24%. Then it fell again. Biderman of TrimTabs says that's because much of the selling was by hedge funds that had been using borrowed money, not a major factor in previous bear markets.
Another signal that's turned out to be misleading is "cash on the sidelines," or the funds in money market and bank savings accounts. In normal times, strategists could look with some confidence to money in these accounts as buying power that investors were holding back from the stock market. The greater the cash compared with the value of the overall market, the more impact it could make on stocks. In January the reading reached its highest levels since 1984, says Bjorgen. Even so, he's dubious. As long as investors are worried about their own incomes, he says, the money seems most likely to stay right where it is. TrimTabs' Biderman, who tracks how investors move their money among asset classes, says he doesn't see much chance of this cash flowing into stocks with the job and housing markets so weak. He figures investors have been taking more money out of stocks than they've been putting into their cash accounts. "Some people are being forced to sell stocks to eat," Biderman says. "They are certainly not going to buy Google (NasdaqGS:GOOG - News) here."
With the ordinary historical measures failing, experts are looking further back for clues. During the Great Depression, the Dow plunged 89% from the 1929 crash to July 1932. Then it went through some big swings before losing 49% in 1937-38 as the economy tanked again. World War II, which grew in part out of financial stress around the globe, followed. The Dow didn't get back to its 1929 high until 1954.
Much, of course, has changed in the U.S. since the Great Crash. Back then Washington made major policy mistakes, such as erecting trade barriers and letting too many banks fail without protecting depositors. This time, with a couple of exceptions, the government hasn't blundered so, even though it hasn't yet solved the economy's many problems.
So this bear market likely won't rival that of the Great Depression. But the bear markets during other banking crises have been brutal in their own right. In a recent study of 21 such episodes from around the world, including ones from Spain in 1977, Sweden in 1991, and Thailand in 1997, professors Carmen M. Reinhart of the University of Maryland and Kenneth S. Rogoff of Harvard University found that stocks fell an average of 56% -- the same loss the S&P 500 had suffered through Mar. 3. Those bear markets also tended to be agonizingly slow, taking an average of 3.4 years to reach bottom. "Everything is protracted," says Reinhart. "In the best-case scenario, you are looking at six years or longer" to return to past highs. Bad as that sounds, it would compare favorably with Japan, whose Nikkei index reached 38,900 in 1989 and now trades at around 7,200.
Of course, just because investors have lost money in stocks doesn't mean equities are a bad choice from this point onward. "Stocks can't make up for the past 10 years, but they can do extremely well from our current position," says Jeremy J. Siegel, author of Stocks for the Long Run and professor at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. Siegel says that while stock returns have fallen behind government bond returns over the past 20 years, history says that's almost certain to reverse. He's found only one 30-year period when stocks returned less than bonds, and that one ended in 1861. "That tells us that once you are down 50%, those who are in stock markets for 10 to 15 years will get much better returns," he says. Lately, government bond prices have run up, boosting the odds that stocks will be the better play in the future.
So where to look for signs of an incipient upturn? One logical place is the corporate debt market, which understands the economy's core problem firsthand. Eventually, the pace of new defaults on corporate bonds will slow, and bad debts will be reduced or erased in financial reorganizations and bankruptcies. When those things happen, the economy and stock market should breathe easier.
Some quants see little evidence of that happening yet. "We are looking at a 60% to 70% chance that this bear market is not over," says Robert D. Arnott, chairman of Research Affiliates, a Pasadena (Calif.) firm that manages $25 billion. Jeffrey E. Gundlach, chief investment officer of Los Angeles-based money manager TCW Group, says the junk-bond market, which often tracks the stock market, is headed for new lows.
Another critical factor is the health of the banking system. One measure to watch is banks' so-called net worth, or the difference between how much they owe and the value of their assets. Rebuilding the banking system's net worth will be monumentally difficult. "On average, this process takes about six years," says Joseph Mason, a banking professor at Louisiana State University who has studied past banking crises. So far, little has been accomplished -- a big reason the stock market hasn't gotten up from its knees.
KEEP AN EYE ON CEOs
Government policy decisions could speed or slow the pace of rehabilitation for the banks and, in turn, the stock market. David A. Hendler, a New York-based bank analyst at CreditSights, says his job has shifted from financial analysis toward Washington analysis. Essentially, his task is to figure out how quickly the government will permit weak banks to consolidate. When investors believe they know which banks will survive, they'll buy their stocks. The process is so critical to the stock market that Richard Bernstein, chief investment strategist at Merrill Lynch (NYSE:BAC - News), is tracking six signposts for financial industry consolidation. Among them: the extent to which the government carves up and sells bad banks rather than buying into them to prop them up.
Other strategists are keeping a close eye on the people who really know what's happening in the economy: business leaders. Biderman says he'll know corporations are getting confident once they start buying back their own shares and acquiring other companies. Right now they show no such bravado. Announcements of share buybacks are down 90% from a year ago, leaving that market thermometer so cold the mercury is off the scale.
In the end, the timing of the bear's retreat will likely hinge on that great market imponderable: psychology. How investors feel has a lot to do with whether they start seeing mixed signals as proof of a glass half-full. "The (market) stress causes the analytical part of our brains to shut down, and that makes us hyperreactive to bad news," says Michael A. Ervolini, CEO of Cabot Research, a consultancy catering to institutional investors. People become convinced conditions are worse than rock-bottom bad, he says. Only after they see that they've overreacted can things improve: "We look for the market to start (saying) tomorrow will be brighter."
For now, pessimism is winning the day. In the worst-case scenario, bad debts will continue to weigh on borrowers and lenders, causing the economy to slow even more, which will erode incomes and push more borrowers over the edge. Economies and corporations around the globe will weaken and rattle investors and business executives even more. Such fears have prompted Ben McCoy, a 30-year-old software engineer, to swear off new stock investments. Instead, he's putting money into his own business ventures, such as writing software for real estate appraisers and a blog about personal finance called moneysmartlife.com. "With these investments, I feel like I have more control," he says.
More Ben McCoys could signal the stirrings of an upturn. A market bottom, says Merrill's Bernstein, "generally occurs when everyone thinks it will never happen. You want to hear people giving up on the stocks-for-the-long-run theme."
But something positive must draw investors back. George A. Akerlof, a Nobel prize-winning economist at the University of California at Berkeley and co-author of a new book, with Yale professor Robert J. Shiller, on the importance of sentiment in moving markets, says investors will have to be offered a new story they can believe to get them to buy again.
That new story likely involves corporate and consumer debts being reduced to what borrowers can pay, freeing them of past mistakes so that new money can be put to productive use. Banks resume lending, and the stock market bottoms, signaling that the recession will be over soon. Budding optimism reverses the vicious cycle of losses. A bull is born.
A more probable outcome is the one drawn from the narrow history of bear markets that grew out of financial crises. In it, the bear scenario continues to play out until the bull takes over, with more debt busts and government trial and error until things get set right again. That could mean two more years of bouncing around and then another six or so before the Dow is back above 14,000. Not long ago, such an outcome would have seemed unimaginably bleak. Given the other possibilities, it doesn't seem so bad now.
罗杰斯：单靠中国 全球仍无法“走出衰退泥沼”
投资大师罗杰斯表示：“中国解决不了世界的问题。中国是一个极佳且增长的经济体，但无法带领全球走出泥沼。”他还指出，中国股市目前还不具吸引力。
因预期中国总理温家宝在昨日两会的工作报告中将宣布扩大11月份宣布的4万亿元人民币的经济刺激计划，上证综指前日飙升6.1%，创4个月来的最大涨幅。
不过，昨日，上证综合指数收盘上涨1%至2221.08，盘中高度震荡，至少变盘8次。因部分投资者对温家宝的工作报告未提及扩大振兴经济计划感到失望。
但他的讲话也加强投资者对中国经济复苏的信心，提升了沪市综指上扬的力度。A股成交值也大幅增加到人民币1541亿元。前日为1275亿元。
AMP资本投资者驻悉尼的投资策略师纳艾米（Nader Naeimi）说：“中国政府要砸钱刺激经济复苏。虽然没有进一步宣布振兴经济计划，短线会有失望，但是无损中国复苏的题材。”
不过，担任罗杰斯控股公司（Rogers Holdings）董事长的罗杰斯表示，11月来就未买进中国股票，因股价无吸引力。
因预期中国总理温家宝在昨日两会的工作报告中将宣布扩大11月份宣布的4万亿元人民币的经济刺激计划，上证综指前日飙升6.1%，创4个月来的最大涨幅。
不过，昨日，上证综合指数收盘上涨1%至2221.08，盘中高度震荡，至少变盘8次。因部分投资者对温家宝的工作报告未提及扩大振兴经济计划感到失望。
但他的讲话也加强投资者对中国经济复苏的信心，提升了沪市综指上扬的力度。A股成交值也大幅增加到人民币1541亿元。前日为1275亿元。
AMP资本投资者驻悉尼的投资策略师纳艾米（Nader Naeimi）说：“中国政府要砸钱刺激经济复苏。虽然没有进一步宣布振兴经济计划，短线会有失望，但是无损中国复苏的题材。”
不过，担任罗杰斯控股公司（Rogers Holdings）董事长的罗杰斯表示，11月来就未买进中国股票，因股价无吸引力。
超大户连续5天狂扫中国银行
在近期的反弹行情中，许多个股都接连创出反弹新高，而占两市权重极高的银行股表现，则让人唏嘘不已，一言以蔽之，跟跌不跟涨。不过,沉默已久的银行股在近两日大幅上攻，中国银行两天最大涨幅一度达到18%。
据Wind数据统计，中国银行、浦发银行、华夏银行和南京银行均在昨日盘中创出2008年11月以来的反弹新高。
对此，华西证券分析师曹学峰表示，昨天尾盘中国银行急速拉升，可能还是和中投增持的消息有关。
全国政协委员、中国投资有限责任公司副总经理汪建熙在两会间隙向媒体表示，中投今年将继续增持包括H股在内的三大国有银行(工行、建行和中行)股份。
此外，有分析人士认为，金融股周四涨幅居前，是受流动性充裕以及最近有迹象显示信贷强劲增长所致。
据广州万隆统计，4日与5日共有45.8亿元资金流入银行金融板块。
但从大智慧金融终端来看，超大户资金连续5日净流入中国银行，北京银行、中信银行和中国平安的超大户资金显示连续两日净流入，其余沪市金融类股的均显示不同程度的净流出现象。
据Wind数据统计，中国银行、浦发银行、华夏银行和南京银行均在昨日盘中创出2008年11月以来的反弹新高。
对此，华西证券分析师曹学峰表示，昨天尾盘中国银行急速拉升，可能还是和中投增持的消息有关。
全国政协委员、中国投资有限责任公司副总经理汪建熙在两会间隙向媒体表示，中投今年将继续增持包括H股在内的三大国有银行(工行、建行和中行)股份。
此外，有分析人士认为，金融股周四涨幅居前，是受流动性充裕以及最近有迹象显示信贷强劲增长所致。
据广州万隆统计，4日与5日共有45.8亿元资金流入银行金融板块。
但从大智慧金融终端来看，超大户资金连续5日净流入中国银行，北京银行、中信银行和中国平安的超大户资金显示连续两日净流入，其余沪市金融类股的均显示不同程度的净流出现象。
捕捉发展机遇 调整发展战略 中行海外业务逆势飞扬
2008年，面对历史罕见的国际金融风暴，作为中国国际化程度最高的商业银行，中国银行秉持稳健经营原则，及时调整业务发展战略，在危机中捕捉发展机遇，不断发掘新的业务增长点，适时填补长期以来由一些欧美银行主导的市场空白，实现了逆势发展。据最新统计，中行海外机构资产规模一年中增长41%。
全球服务：海外机构突破800家
中国银行是我国历史最悠久的商业银行之一，也是最早向海外发展的中资银行。继1917年在香港设立经营性分支机构之后，1929年，中国银行伦敦分行成立，这是我国银行业在国外设立的第一家分支机构。经过近百年的发展，中国银行构建起遍布全球的服务网络，形成了独特的竞争优势和品牌魅力。
2008年，中国银行海外机构新设机构共8家。这是近10年来中行海外机构增加最多的一年。这些新设机构的业务触角不断伸向新的领域。2008年12月1日，中国银行（瑞士）有限公司正式开业，主营私人银行业务。这是中资银行在瑞士设立的首家机构，也是中行2007年率先在国内银行中推出私人银行业务后，首次跨出国门进军欧洲市场，堪称我国银行业私人银行自有品牌建设的一个里程碑。
中国银行坚持以亚太和美欧地区为重点，着眼当前，立足长远，在海外机构布局上，不断完善覆盖全球的服务网络。目前，中行已在与我国双边贸易额超过200亿美元的17个国家设立机构，其余6个未设机构的国家也已列入中行海外网点建设年度发展规划。截至2008年底，中国银行已在全球29个国家和地区建立800多家分支机构，并与1500家国外代理行及47,000家分支机构保持了代理业务关系。
中国银行在开拓海外新市场的同时，也在成熟市场“深耕细作”，努力实现经营利润最大化。中行在伦敦、纽约、东京、卢森堡、法兰克福、巴黎、新加坡、悉尼及香港、澳门等海外市场已经营多年。2008年，顺应市场变化和客户需求，中行又新开了澳大利亚好事围和珀斯分行、韩国九老分行、加拿大万锦支行、印尼泗水分行以及澳门分行财富管理中心（四季酒店）等分支机构。
内外联动：打造“走出去”企业首选品牌
近年来，作为我国银行业多元化程度最高的银行，中国银行充分发挥跨国集团化经营、专业化管理，面向“走出去”中资企业推出了全方位的金融服务方案，全力支持中资企业进行海外资源开发、开设工厂、上市购并、进出口贸易、对外承包工程和劳务合作的核心合作银行。中行海内外机构与中国银行集团附属的中银国际、中银投、中银保险等机构紧密写作，为“走出去”企业打造了多元化、专业化、集约化的跨境综合金融服务平台。
2008年4月，中国银行在湖南举办“走出去”企业海内外合作研讨会，与当地28个大型“走出去”企业进行现场业务洽谈，提供一揽子金融服务和解决方案。会上，中国银行湖南省分行与华菱集团、中联重科、三一重工、湖南有色等企业分别签署了合作协议。根据协议，中国银行将为这些“走出去”重点客户及其重点项目，提供海内外客户互介服务，出台融资绿色通道和倾斜性政策，给予全球授信额度、境外资金管理等一系列创新服务支持，全力支持这些“走出去”企业开拓国际市场。在这次会议上，有10家企业与中银香港、中银国际，以及中行在纽约、伦敦、巴黎、米兰、新加坡、悉尼等地的分支机构达成30多个具体项目合作意向，部分项目已陆续进入实质操作阶段。
随后，中国银行在云南召开“立足云南,走向世界”的海内外联动会议。当地20多家“走出去”企业应邀参会，并与中银香港以及中行新加坡、马来西亚、曼谷、胡志明市、马尼拉、雅加达、加拿大、悉尼、赞比亚等10家海外分行进行现场业务对接，取得了积极成果。
在支持“走出去”企业的过程中，中行传统优势业务银团贷款发挥了积极作用。中行在香港、伦敦、纽约成立的亚太、欧非、美洲三大海外银团贷款中心，按照“专业化分工、集约化管理、一体化经营”的运营模式，建立了金融同业间的分销网络，在为企业客户解决重大金融需求的同时，市场排名及竞争实力也不断提升。截至2008年第3季度，中银集团银团贷款在内地和港澳市场排名第1，亚太地区（除日本）市场排名第4。
奉献爱心：开通全球赈灾捐款绿色通道
在积极拓展海外市场的同时，中行两万多名海外员工始终心系祖国，不忘履行海外中行人的一份责任。汶川大地震后，中行海外机构率先以机构和个人名义向灾区捐款，开立捐款专户，开辟全球赈灾捐款“绿色通道”，公布救灾机构账号和热线，并免收手续费和电报费，为海外各界援助灾区提供了便捷高效的金融服务。
为激发华人华侨和国际友人援助灾区的热情，中行在纽约、伦敦、巴黎、新加坡、曼谷、悉尼、以及澳门等地的海外机构，地震后的第一时间纷纷在当地主要媒体刊登公益广告，宣传和倡导社会各界捐款献爱心。作为灾后第一家向香港红十字会捐款的机构，中银香港累计向地震灾区捐款1543万港元及15万元人民币，同时还代香港红十字会、东华三院、乐施会等主要慈善机构收集善款2.68亿港元，免费汇出赈灾善款6亿多港元。中国银行其他海外机构及员工支援灾区重建的捐款总额将近170万美元，代转的海外捐款超过1000万美元。
全球服务：海外机构突破800家
中国银行是我国历史最悠久的商业银行之一，也是最早向海外发展的中资银行。继1917年在香港设立经营性分支机构之后，1929年，中国银行伦敦分行成立，这是我国银行业在国外设立的第一家分支机构。经过近百年的发展，中国银行构建起遍布全球的服务网络，形成了独特的竞争优势和品牌魅力。
2008年，中国银行海外机构新设机构共8家。这是近10年来中行海外机构增加最多的一年。这些新设机构的业务触角不断伸向新的领域。2008年12月1日，中国银行（瑞士）有限公司正式开业，主营私人银行业务。这是中资银行在瑞士设立的首家机构，也是中行2007年率先在国内银行中推出私人银行业务后，首次跨出国门进军欧洲市场，堪称我国银行业私人银行自有品牌建设的一个里程碑。
中国银行坚持以亚太和美欧地区为重点，着眼当前，立足长远，在海外机构布局上，不断完善覆盖全球的服务网络。目前，中行已在与我国双边贸易额超过200亿美元的17个国家设立机构，其余6个未设机构的国家也已列入中行海外网点建设年度发展规划。截至2008年底，中国银行已在全球29个国家和地区建立800多家分支机构，并与1500家国外代理行及47,000家分支机构保持了代理业务关系。
中国银行在开拓海外新市场的同时，也在成熟市场“深耕细作”，努力实现经营利润最大化。中行在伦敦、纽约、东京、卢森堡、法兰克福、巴黎、新加坡、悉尼及香港、澳门等海外市场已经营多年。2008年，顺应市场变化和客户需求，中行又新开了澳大利亚好事围和珀斯分行、韩国九老分行、加拿大万锦支行、印尼泗水分行以及澳门分行财富管理中心（四季酒店）等分支机构。
内外联动：打造“走出去”企业首选品牌
近年来，作为我国银行业多元化程度最高的银行，中国银行充分发挥跨国集团化经营、专业化管理，面向“走出去”中资企业推出了全方位的金融服务方案，全力支持中资企业进行海外资源开发、开设工厂、上市购并、进出口贸易、对外承包工程和劳务合作的核心合作银行。中行海内外机构与中国银行集团附属的中银国际、中银投、中银保险等机构紧密写作，为“走出去”企业打造了多元化、专业化、集约化的跨境综合金融服务平台。
2008年4月，中国银行在湖南举办“走出去”企业海内外合作研讨会，与当地28个大型“走出去”企业进行现场业务洽谈，提供一揽子金融服务和解决方案。会上，中国银行湖南省分行与华菱集团、中联重科、三一重工、湖南有色等企业分别签署了合作协议。根据协议，中国银行将为这些“走出去”重点客户及其重点项目，提供海内外客户互介服务，出台融资绿色通道和倾斜性政策，给予全球授信额度、境外资金管理等一系列创新服务支持，全力支持这些“走出去”企业开拓国际市场。在这次会议上，有10家企业与中银香港、中银国际，以及中行在纽约、伦敦、巴黎、米兰、新加坡、悉尼等地的分支机构达成30多个具体项目合作意向，部分项目已陆续进入实质操作阶段。
随后，中国银行在云南召开“立足云南,走向世界”的海内外联动会议。当地20多家“走出去”企业应邀参会，并与中银香港以及中行新加坡、马来西亚、曼谷、胡志明市、马尼拉、雅加达、加拿大、悉尼、赞比亚等10家海外分行进行现场业务对接，取得了积极成果。
在支持“走出去”企业的过程中，中行传统优势业务银团贷款发挥了积极作用。中行在香港、伦敦、纽约成立的亚太、欧非、美洲三大海外银团贷款中心，按照“专业化分工、集约化管理、一体化经营”的运营模式，建立了金融同业间的分销网络，在为企业客户解决重大金融需求的同时，市场排名及竞争实力也不断提升。截至2008年第3季度，中银集团银团贷款在内地和港澳市场排名第1，亚太地区（除日本）市场排名第4。
奉献爱心：开通全球赈灾捐款绿色通道
在积极拓展海外市场的同时，中行两万多名海外员工始终心系祖国，不忘履行海外中行人的一份责任。汶川大地震后，中行海外机构率先以机构和个人名义向灾区捐款，开立捐款专户，开辟全球赈灾捐款“绿色通道”，公布救灾机构账号和热线，并免收手续费和电报费，为海外各界援助灾区提供了便捷高效的金融服务。
为激发华人华侨和国际友人援助灾区的热情，中行在纽约、伦敦、巴黎、新加坡、曼谷、悉尼、以及澳门等地的海外机构，地震后的第一时间纷纷在当地主要媒体刊登公益广告，宣传和倡导社会各界捐款献爱心。作为灾后第一家向香港红十字会捐款的机构，中银香港累计向地震灾区捐款1543万港元及15万元人民币，同时还代香港红十字会、东华三院、乐施会等主要慈善机构收集善款2.68亿港元，免费汇出赈灾善款6亿多港元。中国银行其他海外机构及员工支援灾区重建的捐款总额将近170万美元，代转的海外捐款超过1000万美元。
Downturn, downsize
IN TOUGH times, small is beautiful.
That seems to be the new theme among some developers who are tearing up plans for yet-to-be-launched projects and going back to the drawing board.
They are looking at reconfiguring their residential projects to offer smaller units than planned, so that they would be more affordable for cautious buyers.
This is a major reversal from the boom times when big units were very popular.
In its recent results statement, Sing Holdings said it is reconfiguring the unit sizes and layout of its prime Cairnhill Road project, The Laurels, to adapt to market demand.
'The plan is to have more one- to two-bedroom units,' said managing director Lee Sze Hao. 'Now, I have to be careful with the affordability factor.' He would offer 'luxury at a affordable price'.
Wheelock Properties said in its results statement that it is reviewing building plans of its Ardmore 3 project in view of the poor market.
A UOL Group spokesman said as part of its ongoing product development process, it is considering resizing the units of its Green Meadows project in Upper Thomson to make them more affordable.
The impetus for this emerging trend includes the recent stunning sell-out of the Alexis project, which showed that small, affordable units sell. Of its 293 units, 114 units are one-bedders of just 366 sq ft to 527 sq ft.
Before its launch, developer ECPrime said it had adjusted the mix so that a larger number of the units would be smaller and therefore more affordable. Prices started from $450,000 for the one-bedders to about $650,000 for two-bedders.
It was only in 2005 and 2006 that developers were busy looking at building spacious units to cater to the rich. By late 2006, the bigger flats had attracted such strong interest that they were fetching higher prices on a per sq ft basis than smaller units. Traditionally, the bigger the unit, the lower the psf price.
In 2006, Lippo Realty executive director Thio Gim Hock banked on selling fairly big units at its 91-unit Newton One development. It was a success. 'When the market is good, people go for big units,' he said. Now, he has moved fast to reconfigure the units at the posh project on the prime Angullia Park site, where The Parisian used to be. It will now have two units per floor, instead of one unit per floor.
'Last year, we changed our plans. We want to keep it affordable,' said Mr Thio, now chief executive and group managing director of Overseas Union Enterprise. 'We foresaw that the market will go for smaller units.'
In the original plan, the 27 units ranged in size from more than 4,000 sq ft to 5,000 sq ft. Now, there will be 50-odd units from around 2,500 sq ft to 3,000 sq ft, he said.
Mr Lee said he started reviewing plans for The Laurels late last year. It will be several more months before the approvals come in and it is ready for launch.
'Things have changed. It is better to change from business class to economy class now. It is important to build something the market can absorb,' he said.
'Gone are the days when these people just walk in and pay you $7, $10 million. Unit sizes have to be scaled down but still remain at a comfortable level.'
The original plan was for The Laurels to have 150 units, many of them three- to four-bedders. Now, it will have about 290 units.
More developers may follow suit, given the downturn. Said DTZ executive director Ong Choon Fah: 'People look at the lump sum now. The perception is that there is a smaller capital outlay.'
Mr Lee and Mr Thio both believe developers still able to reconfigure project layout and unit sizes will want to do so now.
Added Knight Frank executive director Peter Ow: 'If the developers have not started selling or building their projects, it would make sense for them to look at resizing the units to make them more affordable, provided it does not affect their planning approvals.
Mr Tai Lee Siang, president of the Singapore Institute of Architects, said: 'If poor economic conditions persist, the trend is likely to be downsizing of units to make them more affordable. The other trend may be the no-frills approach, where units are made simpler and cheaper to build - thus lowering costs.'
That seems to be the new theme among some developers who are tearing up plans for yet-to-be-launched projects and going back to the drawing board.
They are looking at reconfiguring their residential projects to offer smaller units than planned, so that they would be more affordable for cautious buyers.
This is a major reversal from the boom times when big units were very popular.
In its recent results statement, Sing Holdings said it is reconfiguring the unit sizes and layout of its prime Cairnhill Road project, The Laurels, to adapt to market demand.
'The plan is to have more one- to two-bedroom units,' said managing director Lee Sze Hao. 'Now, I have to be careful with the affordability factor.' He would offer 'luxury at a affordable price'.
Wheelock Properties said in its results statement that it is reviewing building plans of its Ardmore 3 project in view of the poor market.
A UOL Group spokesman said as part of its ongoing product development process, it is considering resizing the units of its Green Meadows project in Upper Thomson to make them more affordable.
The impetus for this emerging trend includes the recent stunning sell-out of the Alexis project, which showed that small, affordable units sell. Of its 293 units, 114 units are one-bedders of just 366 sq ft to 527 sq ft.
Before its launch, developer ECPrime said it had adjusted the mix so that a larger number of the units would be smaller and therefore more affordable. Prices started from $450,000 for the one-bedders to about $650,000 for two-bedders.
It was only in 2005 and 2006 that developers were busy looking at building spacious units to cater to the rich. By late 2006, the bigger flats had attracted such strong interest that they were fetching higher prices on a per sq ft basis than smaller units. Traditionally, the bigger the unit, the lower the psf price.
In 2006, Lippo Realty executive director Thio Gim Hock banked on selling fairly big units at its 91-unit Newton One development. It was a success. 'When the market is good, people go for big units,' he said. Now, he has moved fast to reconfigure the units at the posh project on the prime Angullia Park site, where The Parisian used to be. It will now have two units per floor, instead of one unit per floor.
'Last year, we changed our plans. We want to keep it affordable,' said Mr Thio, now chief executive and group managing director of Overseas Union Enterprise. 'We foresaw that the market will go for smaller units.'
In the original plan, the 27 units ranged in size from more than 4,000 sq ft to 5,000 sq ft. Now, there will be 50-odd units from around 2,500 sq ft to 3,000 sq ft, he said.
Mr Lee said he started reviewing plans for The Laurels late last year. It will be several more months before the approvals come in and it is ready for launch.
'Things have changed. It is better to change from business class to economy class now. It is important to build something the market can absorb,' he said.
'Gone are the days when these people just walk in and pay you $7, $10 million. Unit sizes have to be scaled down but still remain at a comfortable level.'
The original plan was for The Laurels to have 150 units, many of them three- to four-bedders. Now, it will have about 290 units.
More developers may follow suit, given the downturn. Said DTZ executive director Ong Choon Fah: 'People look at the lump sum now. The perception is that there is a smaller capital outlay.'
Mr Lee and Mr Thio both believe developers still able to reconfigure project layout and unit sizes will want to do so now.
Added Knight Frank executive director Peter Ow: 'If the developers have not started selling or building their projects, it would make sense for them to look at resizing the units to make them more affordable, provided it does not affect their planning approvals.
Mr Tai Lee Siang, president of the Singapore Institute of Architects, said: 'If poor economic conditions persist, the trend is likely to be downsizing of units to make them more affordable. The other trend may be the no-frills approach, where units are made simpler and cheaper to build - thus lowering costs.'
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