2009年，巴菲特迎来了他44年来业绩最差的一年。目前，还不清楚美国人民如何看待巴菲特2008年不太美满的答卷，但中国人包括中国投资人对巴菲特的2008年进行了全方位，多角度的评论和猜想。大体上有两种观点，一个观点是，巴菲特盲目自大，晚节不保。巴菲特倒霉的事还在后面，他的神奇将在经济危机中彻底破灭。另一个观点是，走着瞧，没有必要为股神担心。
总体而言，凌通对这件事的态度倾向于后者。理由在于，巴菲特的一生是不断犯错误的一生，是犯了一些重大错误的一生。他的公司伯克希尔就是重大错误的一个证据。40多年前，巴菲特买下这个公司，最后所形成的经济和其它综合损失远比2008年严重。在某一年的年报中，巴菲特说：“芒格善于分析错误案例，而我则不断地为芒格提供他需要的错误案例”。这不是纯粹的幽默，而是真实的事实。几十年来，巴菲特从来没有不犯错误的年份，08年的重大错误，只是巴菲特持续犯错的一个延续。
错误是所有投资人永恒的伴侣，不犯错误的投资人永远不会存在。那些因为巴菲特有错，就预测巴菲特会玩完的观点，实际上是不理解投资本身是在错误中前进的，错误是投资人前进和提高水平强有力动力，而这个驱动力是永远不会枯竭的。那些从来没有犯过错误的所谓的大师们，百分之百都是有意或无意地虚构出来的人物。对于巴菲特的2008年，真正有价值的并不是他的错误，而是巴菲特一如即往对下跌的期待和对市场全面恐慌的利用。他的基本信念和基本行为与10年前、20年前、30年前甚至40年前完全一样，巴菲特还是那个巴菲特。在百年不遇的大危机面前，听听巴菲特在最新年报中的原话,有利于我们认识什么是价值投资，什么是真实的巴菲特？他说，“我们所持有的一些股票和债券的市值由于全球市场的下滑而大幅缩水，但这并没有使查理和我感到不安。我们乐于见到价格下跌，如果我们有足够的可供使用的现金，我们会增加持股。很久以前，本杰明.格雷厄姆教导我‘价格是你所付出的，价值是你所得到的’。无论是股票还是短袜，我都乐于在其减价的时候购买。投资世界已经从对风险的低估走到了高估，这种变化并不小，如钟摆般走完了非同寻常的弧线。盲从并非投资的目标，实际上它会产生相反作用，它使大脑陷于僵化。当心那些能够获得一致喝彩的投资行为，相反，伟大的行动开始遇到的却往往是打呵欠。”
在百年不遇的大危机面前，巴菲特的应对原则和应对方法还是格雷顾姆的那一套尽人皆知的东西，这就够了。格雷顾姆的那一套东西，让巴菲特在错误中成为首富，现在依旧坚持格雷厄姆的巴菲特，真的会晚节不保吗？
Saturday, March 7, 2009
买廉价的烂公司不如以合理价格买优质公司
1979年巴菲特在给股东的信中再一次谈到纺织业。在这一年经过多次惨痛的教训之后，巴菲特得出结论：“与其买廉价的烂公司不如以合理价格买优质公司”， 1989年巴菲特进一步得出这样的结论：“以一般的价格买入一家非同一般的好公司，要比用非同一般的好价格买下一家一般的公司好得多。”这些观点可以作为价值投资最重要的基础原则之一。其所以重要，在于它全面地把价值投资所应该考虑的公司质地与购买价格两方面要素完整地统一了起来。在中国资本市场上，投资人总是单一思维，有些人只强调好公司，认为投资的成功完全决定于一个好公司，而不主张对价格进行考查，而另一些人，又单一地认为投资关键是要把握一个极低的价格，而忽略了公司的质地。
巴菲特彻底把价格和质地有机地统一了起来，形成了一个全面完整的投资原则。在这一原则中一共有四个关键词，分别是烂公司，优质公司，廉价，合理价格。它们互相形成了四组投资组合，分别是廉价的烂公司，廉价的优质公司，合理价格的烂公司，合理价格的优质公司。在这四组投资组合之外，我们也可以引进一个新的词，叫做高估价。把高估价引进来又会形成两个组合，高估价的烂公司和高估价的好公司。现在我们看一下这六组组合，哪一组是好的投资机会？
对于廉价的烂公司，假设它的净资产是100万元人民币，拥有人决定以10万元卖给你，这是不是一个有利可图的投资机会？答案是很难说，为什么？因为公司是一个有生命的活体，它不是一个静态的死物，公司质地和人的健康是一样的。一个劣质的公司的净资产虽然很可观，但是它的获利能力，它的竞争能力已经明显地不如其他公司了，就象一个人的身高体重没有什么变化，但是内在体质处于不健康状态。在这种情况下，随着时间的推移，劣质公司的质地有可能越来越差。这并不是很难理解的道理，大家看一下那些衰老人的体质，总是一年不如一年，企业的竞争力也是这样。一旦丧失了竞争优质，从常规经验来看，随着时间的推移，企业也会象老太太过年，一年不如一年。在现实经济中，中外市场都出现过拥有巨额资产的公司以一块钱转让或者白送给收购方的事情。而这个用一块钱或者白送得到的资产往往最后让收购方赔了夫人又折兵。
巴菲特买纺织企业就是如此，1964年这家公司正在以低于资产价值的折扣待售，因为当时它是一家垂败的、看上去没有希望的企业，可是它很便宜，巴菲特的想法是买下这家公司，清算后分成一块一块出售，最后关门，后来因为工人和地方政府的反对，清算后分成一块一块出售，最后关门的想法不能实现，巴菲特开始经营这家垂败的纺织企业。在完全并购伯克希尔后，巴菲特说：“对投资而言，价格是很大的因素，它会决定最后的想法，我们以一个好价钱买到了伯克希尔”可以看得出，当时巴菲特过于强调了低价格的重要性，没有重视质地本身对投资的重要影响。以至于巴菲特在完成收购的发言中都没有提到这家公司的质地。
若干年后，当这家公司不可避免地陷入无法改变的全面失败后，巴菲特不无后悔地说道： “我所犯的第一个错误，就是买下伯克希尔公司的控制权。虽然我很清楚公司的纺织业务没什么发展前景，却因为它的价格实在太便宜了，让我无法抵挡买入的诱惑。虽然买进的价格相当划算，也取得一些价美物廉的机器设备与不动产，几乎可以说是半买半送的。但整个决策事后证明依然是个错误，因为就算我们再努力，旧的问题好不容易才解决，新的状况又冒出来。”可以看出这个时候股神已经认识到单一关注低价格，忽略公司质地，一条腿走路的决策方式是他遭遇第一个重大失败的根本原因。中国有句俗话，便宜没好货，这个说法也有点过于绝对，并不是便宜的100%没有好货，大部分情况下便宜可能是东西不太好，这时单一基于价格便宜就下注，往往会带来失败和灾难。
投资便宜的烂公司还可能会带来灾难性后果！
与巴菲特买下一家便宜的纺织公司，历经十多年才最后被迫承认失败不同，中国的一家上市公司捡到了家比伯克希尔还要便宜的非优质公司，这家公司仅仅用了短短的三、四年，就因此几乎要赔掉几十年所有的积累，被迫认赔了事。2004年TCL集团一分钱没花就实现了对国际老牌家电企业----法国汤姆逊公司的收购。当时汤姆逊公司的资产规模和彩电产能是TCL集团的几倍，TCL集团资产规模和彩电产能虽然只是汤姆逊公司的几分之一，但两个公司把各自的彩电业务合在一起成立TCL汤姆逊公司时，汤姆逊公司却心甘情愿地做小股东，心甘情愿地做TCL的子公司。合并后，新公司TCL汤姆逊公司的股权比例是TCL集团占67%，汤姆逊公司只占33%。看起来TCL集团捡了个大便宜，因为无论从销售规模、全球市场占有率及业界地位看，TCL集团都尚逊色于已进入全球前四的汤姆逊公司。不过汤姆逊公司是标准的烂公司。汤姆逊公司曾经是法国最大的电子产品制造商，然而它在2004年却是法国亏损最大的电子产品制造商。2004年上半年，汤姆逊公司净亏损就达到了8100万欧元。欧洲电子产品市场的激烈竞争使汤姆逊公司出现的问题不仅仅是简单的亏损，而是会不会破产，因此，汤姆逊主动报出了超低价。这令TCL集团兴奋不已，马上兴冲冲地与汤姆逊公司完婚！巴菲特投资纺织业坚持了近20年才放弃，TCL集团对汤姆逊公司的收购只维持了不到4年，就无可奈何地放弃了，原因很简单，TCL集团实在赔不起了。
四年中，公司因为低价收购汤姆逊公司共亏损20亿，市值平均下跌了50%。07年市值的增加主要是中国股市的牛市原因，不是企业基本面决定的！
与TCL相比巴菲特在投资一家百货公司的遭遇也很类似，在买下伯克希尔不久后，巴菲特通过一家后来并入伯克希尔公司的分公司，买了一家百货公司。巴菲特说：“这家公司的管理层是一流的，我以低于账面价值相当大的折扣买入，而且这笔交易还包括一些额外的利益：未入账的不动产价值和大量采取后进先出法的存货准备。但是，直到在三年后我才得以幸运地以相当于买入成本左右的价格将这家公司脱手。
在结束了伯克希尔公司跟这家百货公司的婚姻关系后，我的感觉就像乡村歌曲中的丈夫们所唱的那样：‘我的老婆跟我最好的朋友跑了，然而我还是非常挂念我的朋友!’”这既是巴菲特的幽默，也是巴菲特在买廉价烂公司后感受到的无奈和痛！
所以，以极其低廉的价格买一个烂公司，相当于在生活中用极其低的聘礼娶一个长年有病，且需要人照顾的病媳妇。虽然聘礼花得少，但结婚后为病人看病买药的钱，累积起来将会是一个天文数字。因此，烂公司以多么廉价的价格卖给你，价格都可能不合适。投资者尽量不要因烂公司的低廉价格去冒险！
因为，低廉价格买烂公司是不合适的，所以，以合理的价格买下一个烂公司，或者以高估的价格买下一个烂公司更加无利可图了。多次以低廉价格买烂公司最后不挣钱的结果令巴菲特认识到蟾蜍不会轻易地变成王子，他说：“我们曾用划算的价钱买下不少蟾蜍，这些低廉价格买来的蟾蜍，最后少有变成王子的，因此，我们通常不会去买那些我们必须替其作许多改变的公司，因为我们发现我们所作的改变不见得是好的。”
实践让巴菲特认识到就象蛤蟆不会轻易变成王子一样，烂公司更不会轻易变成一个优质公司，因此，即使只是支付了低廉的价格，但由于公司质地不能好转，所以就不可能有好的回报。同时烂公司还需要耗费很多资源和金钱，维持正常运作寻求摆脱困境，而这种摆脱常常最终又不能实现，于是，TCL集团那种几乎要把公司所有财力都耗干的局面，成为一种必然。
合理的价格买下优质公司其实质是一场公平交易。合理的含义是既没有多付钱，也没有少付钱。在这种情况下，买入这样的资产凭什么可以挣钱呢？因为，从一般的道理上讲，买下一块资产所以能挣钱，前提是你买得低，由于低买，所以在你以低价买入的情况下自然就获得一个差价。这个差价就是巴菲特老师格雷厄姆所说的安全边际。显然以合理的价格买优质公司，在买入的当时并没有获利的机会，这种情况下所以能挣钱主要是依赖于优质公司所具有的特质。优质公司因为它拥有竞争优势和核心竞争力，使得它随着时间的推移会越来越强大，它的市场份额会越来越大，盈利水平会越来越高，行业地位会越来越稳固，简单地说优质公司随着时间的推移会越来越好，会提升投资人的股权价值，就象巴菲特所说的，“当价格合理，我们很愿意在某些特定的公司身上持有大量的股权，这样做不是为了要取得控制权，也不是为了将来再转卖出去或进行并购，而是期望企业本身能有好的表现，进而转化成企业长期的价值以及丰厚的股利收入，不论是少数股权或是多数股权皆是如此。”
时间是优质公司的朋友，没有什么复杂的道理。对于一个优质公司，如果它过去做得很好，未来它也会做得很好。这是一个常识，正象巴菲特所说的：“过去伟大的企业未来也会是伟大的企业。”当一个公司确定了行业龙头地位，确定了竞争优势，未来这个公司的竞争力会进一步地提高强化，一个优秀企业会随着时间的推移不断地强化它的竞争优势，巩固它的领先地位，这种现象一方面是产业界的常态，另一方面也是马太效应的反应。“马太效应”认为：“强的会越强，有钱的会越有钱，弱的会越弱。任何个体、群体或地区，一旦在某一个方面获得成功和进步，就会产生一种积累优势，就会有更多的机会取得更大的成功和进步。”
产业界的现象和经济学规律都清晰地表达出一个事实，烂公司的经营状况会随着时间的推移越来越烂。那怕你为其付出巨额的资金，最终也不能阻挡烂公司趋于更烂。让一个烂公司发生蛤蟆变王子的奇迹是一个极其罕有的小概率事件。优质的公司会随着时间的推移，变得更加优质，社会资源、资金、人才、技术、需求都会加速涌入优质公司，此种势态下优势公司持续强化自己的领先地位是一种必然。
反过来让一个优质公司趋于衰败，反而很难，这种难度甚至于比让劣质公司趋于复苏都难。王朝建立之初是优质的，而它灭亡之时是腐朽的，从优质到腐朽的过程中，总是经历数十个败家子皇帝。衰败不是短期能实现的，也是个漫长的过程。
所以，时间是优质公司的朋友。在这种情况下，你以合理的价格买入优质公司，虽然你在买的时候没有占到便宜，但由于优质公司会随着时间的推移变得更优质，因此，在你给予优质公司足够的时间之后你会发现，优质公司的内在价值随着时间的推移自动增加了，此时你手上股份的含金量也大幅增加，这就是你以合理的价格买入优质公司可以获利的逻辑。对此巴菲特说道：“我们会持续以合理的价格买入好公司，我们也愿意以不错的价格买下那些对抗通货膨胀的好公司，但我们通常不会买那些我们必须替其作许多改变的公司，因为我们发现我们所作的改变不见得是好的。我们曾经遇到几个王子级的公司，但是早在我们买下时他们就已是王子了，可喜的是，我们买入后他们没有变回蟾蜍。”
通过具体分析，可以看到对于烂公司无论是高估，合理估值，还是廉价低估，从投资的角度来讲都不适合买入。真正适合买入的机会是合理估值的优质公司。烂公司在任何情况下都不是好的投资公司，那怕它的价格非常低。
买廉价的烂公司不如以合理价格买优质公司！
巴菲特彻底把价格和质地有机地统一了起来，形成了一个全面完整的投资原则。在这一原则中一共有四个关键词，分别是烂公司，优质公司，廉价，合理价格。它们互相形成了四组投资组合，分别是廉价的烂公司，廉价的优质公司，合理价格的烂公司，合理价格的优质公司。在这四组投资组合之外，我们也可以引进一个新的词，叫做高估价。把高估价引进来又会形成两个组合，高估价的烂公司和高估价的好公司。现在我们看一下这六组组合，哪一组是好的投资机会？
对于廉价的烂公司，假设它的净资产是100万元人民币，拥有人决定以10万元卖给你，这是不是一个有利可图的投资机会？答案是很难说，为什么？因为公司是一个有生命的活体，它不是一个静态的死物，公司质地和人的健康是一样的。一个劣质的公司的净资产虽然很可观，但是它的获利能力，它的竞争能力已经明显地不如其他公司了，就象一个人的身高体重没有什么变化，但是内在体质处于不健康状态。在这种情况下，随着时间的推移，劣质公司的质地有可能越来越差。这并不是很难理解的道理，大家看一下那些衰老人的体质，总是一年不如一年，企业的竞争力也是这样。一旦丧失了竞争优质，从常规经验来看，随着时间的推移，企业也会象老太太过年，一年不如一年。在现实经济中，中外市场都出现过拥有巨额资产的公司以一块钱转让或者白送给收购方的事情。而这个用一块钱或者白送得到的资产往往最后让收购方赔了夫人又折兵。
巴菲特买纺织企业就是如此，1964年这家公司正在以低于资产价值的折扣待售，因为当时它是一家垂败的、看上去没有希望的企业，可是它很便宜，巴菲特的想法是买下这家公司，清算后分成一块一块出售，最后关门，后来因为工人和地方政府的反对，清算后分成一块一块出售，最后关门的想法不能实现，巴菲特开始经营这家垂败的纺织企业。在完全并购伯克希尔后，巴菲特说：“对投资而言，价格是很大的因素，它会决定最后的想法，我们以一个好价钱买到了伯克希尔”可以看得出，当时巴菲特过于强调了低价格的重要性，没有重视质地本身对投资的重要影响。以至于巴菲特在完成收购的发言中都没有提到这家公司的质地。
若干年后，当这家公司不可避免地陷入无法改变的全面失败后，巴菲特不无后悔地说道： “我所犯的第一个错误，就是买下伯克希尔公司的控制权。虽然我很清楚公司的纺织业务没什么发展前景，却因为它的价格实在太便宜了，让我无法抵挡买入的诱惑。虽然买进的价格相当划算，也取得一些价美物廉的机器设备与不动产，几乎可以说是半买半送的。但整个决策事后证明依然是个错误，因为就算我们再努力，旧的问题好不容易才解决，新的状况又冒出来。”可以看出这个时候股神已经认识到单一关注低价格，忽略公司质地，一条腿走路的决策方式是他遭遇第一个重大失败的根本原因。中国有句俗话，便宜没好货，这个说法也有点过于绝对，并不是便宜的100%没有好货，大部分情况下便宜可能是东西不太好，这时单一基于价格便宜就下注，往往会带来失败和灾难。
投资便宜的烂公司还可能会带来灾难性后果！
与巴菲特买下一家便宜的纺织公司，历经十多年才最后被迫承认失败不同，中国的一家上市公司捡到了家比伯克希尔还要便宜的非优质公司，这家公司仅仅用了短短的三、四年，就因此几乎要赔掉几十年所有的积累，被迫认赔了事。2004年TCL集团一分钱没花就实现了对国际老牌家电企业----法国汤姆逊公司的收购。当时汤姆逊公司的资产规模和彩电产能是TCL集团的几倍，TCL集团资产规模和彩电产能虽然只是汤姆逊公司的几分之一，但两个公司把各自的彩电业务合在一起成立TCL汤姆逊公司时，汤姆逊公司却心甘情愿地做小股东，心甘情愿地做TCL的子公司。合并后，新公司TCL汤姆逊公司的股权比例是TCL集团占67%，汤姆逊公司只占33%。看起来TCL集团捡了个大便宜，因为无论从销售规模、全球市场占有率及业界地位看，TCL集团都尚逊色于已进入全球前四的汤姆逊公司。不过汤姆逊公司是标准的烂公司。汤姆逊公司曾经是法国最大的电子产品制造商，然而它在2004年却是法国亏损最大的电子产品制造商。2004年上半年，汤姆逊公司净亏损就达到了8100万欧元。欧洲电子产品市场的激烈竞争使汤姆逊公司出现的问题不仅仅是简单的亏损，而是会不会破产，因此，汤姆逊主动报出了超低价。这令TCL集团兴奋不已，马上兴冲冲地与汤姆逊公司完婚！巴菲特投资纺织业坚持了近20年才放弃，TCL集团对汤姆逊公司的收购只维持了不到4年，就无可奈何地放弃了，原因很简单，TCL集团实在赔不起了。
四年中，公司因为低价收购汤姆逊公司共亏损20亿，市值平均下跌了50%。07年市值的增加主要是中国股市的牛市原因，不是企业基本面决定的！
与TCL相比巴菲特在投资一家百货公司的遭遇也很类似，在买下伯克希尔不久后，巴菲特通过一家后来并入伯克希尔公司的分公司，买了一家百货公司。巴菲特说：“这家公司的管理层是一流的，我以低于账面价值相当大的折扣买入，而且这笔交易还包括一些额外的利益：未入账的不动产价值和大量采取后进先出法的存货准备。但是，直到在三年后我才得以幸运地以相当于买入成本左右的价格将这家公司脱手。
在结束了伯克希尔公司跟这家百货公司的婚姻关系后，我的感觉就像乡村歌曲中的丈夫们所唱的那样：‘我的老婆跟我最好的朋友跑了，然而我还是非常挂念我的朋友!’”这既是巴菲特的幽默，也是巴菲特在买廉价烂公司后感受到的无奈和痛！
所以，以极其低廉的价格买一个烂公司，相当于在生活中用极其低的聘礼娶一个长年有病，且需要人照顾的病媳妇。虽然聘礼花得少，但结婚后为病人看病买药的钱，累积起来将会是一个天文数字。因此，烂公司以多么廉价的价格卖给你，价格都可能不合适。投资者尽量不要因烂公司的低廉价格去冒险！
因为，低廉价格买烂公司是不合适的，所以，以合理的价格买下一个烂公司，或者以高估的价格买下一个烂公司更加无利可图了。多次以低廉价格买烂公司最后不挣钱的结果令巴菲特认识到蟾蜍不会轻易地变成王子，他说：“我们曾用划算的价钱买下不少蟾蜍，这些低廉价格买来的蟾蜍，最后少有变成王子的，因此，我们通常不会去买那些我们必须替其作许多改变的公司，因为我们发现我们所作的改变不见得是好的。”
实践让巴菲特认识到就象蛤蟆不会轻易变成王子一样，烂公司更不会轻易变成一个优质公司，因此，即使只是支付了低廉的价格，但由于公司质地不能好转，所以就不可能有好的回报。同时烂公司还需要耗费很多资源和金钱，维持正常运作寻求摆脱困境，而这种摆脱常常最终又不能实现，于是，TCL集团那种几乎要把公司所有财力都耗干的局面，成为一种必然。
合理的价格买下优质公司其实质是一场公平交易。合理的含义是既没有多付钱，也没有少付钱。在这种情况下，买入这样的资产凭什么可以挣钱呢？因为，从一般的道理上讲，买下一块资产所以能挣钱，前提是你买得低，由于低买，所以在你以低价买入的情况下自然就获得一个差价。这个差价就是巴菲特老师格雷厄姆所说的安全边际。显然以合理的价格买优质公司，在买入的当时并没有获利的机会，这种情况下所以能挣钱主要是依赖于优质公司所具有的特质。优质公司因为它拥有竞争优势和核心竞争力，使得它随着时间的推移会越来越强大，它的市场份额会越来越大，盈利水平会越来越高，行业地位会越来越稳固，简单地说优质公司随着时间的推移会越来越好，会提升投资人的股权价值，就象巴菲特所说的，“当价格合理，我们很愿意在某些特定的公司身上持有大量的股权，这样做不是为了要取得控制权，也不是为了将来再转卖出去或进行并购，而是期望企业本身能有好的表现，进而转化成企业长期的价值以及丰厚的股利收入，不论是少数股权或是多数股权皆是如此。”
时间是优质公司的朋友，没有什么复杂的道理。对于一个优质公司，如果它过去做得很好，未来它也会做得很好。这是一个常识，正象巴菲特所说的：“过去伟大的企业未来也会是伟大的企业。”当一个公司确定了行业龙头地位，确定了竞争优势，未来这个公司的竞争力会进一步地提高强化，一个优秀企业会随着时间的推移不断地强化它的竞争优势，巩固它的领先地位，这种现象一方面是产业界的常态，另一方面也是马太效应的反应。“马太效应”认为：“强的会越强，有钱的会越有钱，弱的会越弱。任何个体、群体或地区，一旦在某一个方面获得成功和进步，就会产生一种积累优势，就会有更多的机会取得更大的成功和进步。”
产业界的现象和经济学规律都清晰地表达出一个事实，烂公司的经营状况会随着时间的推移越来越烂。那怕你为其付出巨额的资金，最终也不能阻挡烂公司趋于更烂。让一个烂公司发生蛤蟆变王子的奇迹是一个极其罕有的小概率事件。优质的公司会随着时间的推移，变得更加优质，社会资源、资金、人才、技术、需求都会加速涌入优质公司，此种势态下优势公司持续强化自己的领先地位是一种必然。
反过来让一个优质公司趋于衰败，反而很难，这种难度甚至于比让劣质公司趋于复苏都难。王朝建立之初是优质的，而它灭亡之时是腐朽的，从优质到腐朽的过程中，总是经历数十个败家子皇帝。衰败不是短期能实现的，也是个漫长的过程。
所以，时间是优质公司的朋友。在这种情况下，你以合理的价格买入优质公司，虽然你在买的时候没有占到便宜，但由于优质公司会随着时间的推移变得更优质，因此，在你给予优质公司足够的时间之后你会发现，优质公司的内在价值随着时间的推移自动增加了，此时你手上股份的含金量也大幅增加，这就是你以合理的价格买入优质公司可以获利的逻辑。对此巴菲特说道：“我们会持续以合理的价格买入好公司，我们也愿意以不错的价格买下那些对抗通货膨胀的好公司，但我们通常不会买那些我们必须替其作许多改变的公司，因为我们发现我们所作的改变不见得是好的。我们曾经遇到几个王子级的公司，但是早在我们买下时他们就已是王子了，可喜的是，我们买入后他们没有变回蟾蜍。”
通过具体分析，可以看到对于烂公司无论是高估，合理估值，还是廉价低估，从投资的角度来讲都不适合买入。真正适合买入的机会是合理估值的优质公司。烂公司在任何情况下都不是好的投资公司，那怕它的价格非常低。
买廉价的烂公司不如以合理价格买优质公司！
Stock Markets: When Will the Bull Return?
The stock market is crashing -- slowly, and in plain view of the people who count on it most. The 53% plunge in the Dow Jones industrials since October 2007 has wrecked the college- and retirement-savings plans of millions of investors. It has permanently lowered the long-term investment projections of private endowments and pension funds. It has sent corporate compensation experts scrambling to figure out how to reward top employees. All told, more than $10 trillion of stock market wealth has vanished, and with it the confidence that springs from financial security.
While 17 months may feel like an eternity, it could turn out merely to be a prequel. The questions on the minds of investors, money managers, and corporate executives are threefold: How much longer will the bear market last? How low will the averages go? And when might investors get their money back?
As Warren E. Buffett has said: "Beware of geeks bearing formulas." It's especially difficult to predict the direction of the markets these days because the most popular gauges, from price-earnings ratios to measures of investor "capitulation," have stopped working. The peculiar nature of this bear market limits the kit of useful tools to just a handful of bond market and business confidence indicators.
Those signals, along with interviews with financial historians, market strategists, and economists, point mostly to painful scenarios. Stocks don't seem likely to fall much more from here -- but market turmoil could continue for months or even years. Worse, by the time the market revisits its highs, so many years are likely to have passed that many older people will have gotten out of stocks, missing out on the rebound. The flip side is that new money put into the stock market now will likely do comparatively well over the long term. That's welcome news for twentysomethings and executive compensation consultants, but perhaps not for soon-to-be retirees.
Searching For Precedents
History can't provide as many clues to the market's direction as usual. That's because while most bear markets more or less track the business cycle, this one began with a broken financial system. That makes the current bear more like the one that snarled from 1929-32 than others of the past 100 years. But that analogy doesn't fit perfectly, either. "We have no good precedents to help us," says Peter L. Bernstein, a 90-year-old market essayist and financial historian who was a teenager during the Great Depression. "What's breathtaking is the rapidity of the decline and its breadth."
The market anxiety is especially high now because of the raging fire in the economy. "The next six to nine months are going to be awful," says Desmond Lachman of the American Enterprise Institute. Waves of corporate defaults, home foreclosures, bank failures, and job losses are still to come.
Of course, the stock market already knows that for the rest of 2009 the economy will be a "shambles," to use Buffett's recent description. Today's low share prices may well reflect that. The Dow Jones industrial average has already fallen through the 7,000 level predicted earlier this year by Nouriel Roubini, the New York University economist nicknamed Dr. Doom for daring in 2006 to foretell the credit calamity. That's right, even Dr. Doom was too optimistic.
If recent history were a reliable guide, it would be just about time for the bear to retreat to his den, which nowadays might include a flat-panel TV and leather chair bought at a foreclosure sale. The market's average decline during bear markets since the 1929 market crash is just 30%. What's more, those past bears lasted an average of 13 months, making this one look not just mean but old.
But this is no ordinary slump. Even the most basic market gauge, the price-earnings ratio, which measures a company's share price relative to the earnings it generates, is unreliable. Historically, the overall market has traded at prices that average 15 times earnings, ranging from roughly 8 during the worst bear markets to 25 or greater during bull runs. At the start of the year, the market's p-e ratio was about 11, suggesting that stocks were already cheap and wouldn't drop much more. Instead, the Standard & Poor's (NYSE:MHP - News)500-stock index fell 19% in January and February, the worst opening months on record.
Why did the p-e ratio get it so wrong? The "e" is plunging -- by 18% in January and February alone, according to Thomson Reuters (NYSE:TRI - News). As a result, even though the stock market has dropped, it hasn't gotten any cheaper relative to earnings. Sure, a lot of earnings vanished amid a fog of one-time charges that may say nothing about companies' future profit power. But analysts still aren't seeing through that fog; their earnings projections are more scattered than they've been in two decades. "You don't know what the 'e' is because the economy is in free fall," says Charles Biderman, CEO of TrimTabs Investment Research.
The credit bust has rendered other trusted market indicators useless -- most notably monetary policy, or the Federal Reserve's raising or lowering of its benchmark interest rate. Before the current slump, the federal funds rate was a reliable indicator in all but one bear market since World War II, says James B. Stack, president of InvesTech Research and Stack Financial Management. When the economy slowed, the Fed began cutting rates to turn the business cycle back up. After the second cut came, investors stepped in to buy, anticipating higher corporate earnings. But the Fed has cut rates 10 times since August 2007, to essentially zero, and yet the economy and stock market keep sliding. "The Depression is the only parallel for the lack of effectiveness in monetary policy," says Stack. It is failing because too many borrowers don't want to borrow and too many lenders don't have the capital or courage to lend.
Measures of capitulation, Wall Street's term for the final moment of a sell-off when the last weak investors give up on stocks, aren't working, either. The idea is that once the wobbly players are out, the ones left are strong enough to bid up stocks. Bull runs begin during those moments. Market mavens try to track capitulation by parsing statistics from days of heavy selling and comparing the intensity of past routs. Many thought they saw capitulation last September, says Eric C. Bjorgen, senior analyst with the Leuthold Group in Minneapolis. "But then the market kept going down," says Bjorgen. "Extreme fear was not a good indicator." The gauges became even more bullish with the selling in November, after which the market rallied 24%. Then it fell again. Biderman of TrimTabs says that's because much of the selling was by hedge funds that had been using borrowed money, not a major factor in previous bear markets.
Another signal that's turned out to be misleading is "cash on the sidelines," or the funds in money market and bank savings accounts. In normal times, strategists could look with some confidence to money in these accounts as buying power that investors were holding back from the stock market. The greater the cash compared with the value of the overall market, the more impact it could make on stocks. In January the reading reached its highest levels since 1984, says Bjorgen. Even so, he's dubious. As long as investors are worried about their own incomes, he says, the money seems most likely to stay right where it is. TrimTabs' Biderman, who tracks how investors move their money among asset classes, says he doesn't see much chance of this cash flowing into stocks with the job and housing markets so weak. He figures investors have been taking more money out of stocks than they've been putting into their cash accounts. "Some people are being forced to sell stocks to eat," Biderman says. "They are certainly not going to buy Google (NasdaqGS:GOOG - News) here."
With the ordinary historical measures failing, experts are looking further back for clues. During the Great Depression, the Dow plunged 89% from the 1929 crash to July 1932. Then it went through some big swings before losing 49% in 1937-38 as the economy tanked again. World War II, which grew in part out of financial stress around the globe, followed. The Dow didn't get back to its 1929 high until 1954.
Much, of course, has changed in the U.S. since the Great Crash. Back then Washington made major policy mistakes, such as erecting trade barriers and letting too many banks fail without protecting depositors. This time, with a couple of exceptions, the government hasn't blundered so, even though it hasn't yet solved the economy's many problems.
So this bear market likely won't rival that of the Great Depression. But the bear markets during other banking crises have been brutal in their own right. In a recent study of 21 such episodes from around the world, including ones from Spain in 1977, Sweden in 1991, and Thailand in 1997, professors Carmen M. Reinhart of the University of Maryland and Kenneth S. Rogoff of Harvard University found that stocks fell an average of 56% -- the same loss the S&P 500 had suffered through Mar. 3. Those bear markets also tended to be agonizingly slow, taking an average of 3.4 years to reach bottom. "Everything is protracted," says Reinhart. "In the best-case scenario, you are looking at six years or longer" to return to past highs. Bad as that sounds, it would compare favorably with Japan, whose Nikkei index reached 38,900 in 1989 and now trades at around 7,200.
Of course, just because investors have lost money in stocks doesn't mean equities are a bad choice from this point onward. "Stocks can't make up for the past 10 years, but they can do extremely well from our current position," says Jeremy J. Siegel, author of Stocks for the Long Run and professor at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. Siegel says that while stock returns have fallen behind government bond returns over the past 20 years, history says that's almost certain to reverse. He's found only one 30-year period when stocks returned less than bonds, and that one ended in 1861. "That tells us that once you are down 50%, those who are in stock markets for 10 to 15 years will get much better returns," he says. Lately, government bond prices have run up, boosting the odds that stocks will be the better play in the future.
So where to look for signs of an incipient upturn? One logical place is the corporate debt market, which understands the economy's core problem firsthand. Eventually, the pace of new defaults on corporate bonds will slow, and bad debts will be reduced or erased in financial reorganizations and bankruptcies. When those things happen, the economy and stock market should breathe easier.
Some quants see little evidence of that happening yet. "We are looking at a 60% to 70% chance that this bear market is not over," says Robert D. Arnott, chairman of Research Affiliates, a Pasadena (Calif.) firm that manages $25 billion. Jeffrey E. Gundlach, chief investment officer of Los Angeles-based money manager TCW Group, says the junk-bond market, which often tracks the stock market, is headed for new lows.
Another critical factor is the health of the banking system. One measure to watch is banks' so-called net worth, or the difference between how much they owe and the value of their assets. Rebuilding the banking system's net worth will be monumentally difficult. "On average, this process takes about six years," says Joseph Mason, a banking professor at Louisiana State University who has studied past banking crises. So far, little has been accomplished -- a big reason the stock market hasn't gotten up from its knees.
KEEP AN EYE ON CEOs
Government policy decisions could speed or slow the pace of rehabilitation for the banks and, in turn, the stock market. David A. Hendler, a New York-based bank analyst at CreditSights, says his job has shifted from financial analysis toward Washington analysis. Essentially, his task is to figure out how quickly the government will permit weak banks to consolidate. When investors believe they know which banks will survive, they'll buy their stocks. The process is so critical to the stock market that Richard Bernstein, chief investment strategist at Merrill Lynch (NYSE:BAC - News), is tracking six signposts for financial industry consolidation. Among them: the extent to which the government carves up and sells bad banks rather than buying into them to prop them up.
Other strategists are keeping a close eye on the people who really know what's happening in the economy: business leaders. Biderman says he'll know corporations are getting confident once they start buying back their own shares and acquiring other companies. Right now they show no such bravado. Announcements of share buybacks are down 90% from a year ago, leaving that market thermometer so cold the mercury is off the scale.
In the end, the timing of the bear's retreat will likely hinge on that great market imponderable: psychology. How investors feel has a lot to do with whether they start seeing mixed signals as proof of a glass half-full. "The (market) stress causes the analytical part of our brains to shut down, and that makes us hyperreactive to bad news," says Michael A. Ervolini, CEO of Cabot Research, a consultancy catering to institutional investors. People become convinced conditions are worse than rock-bottom bad, he says. Only after they see that they've overreacted can things improve: "We look for the market to start (saying) tomorrow will be brighter."
For now, pessimism is winning the day. In the worst-case scenario, bad debts will continue to weigh on borrowers and lenders, causing the economy to slow even more, which will erode incomes and push more borrowers over the edge. Economies and corporations around the globe will weaken and rattle investors and business executives even more. Such fears have prompted Ben McCoy, a 30-year-old software engineer, to swear off new stock investments. Instead, he's putting money into his own business ventures, such as writing software for real estate appraisers and a blog about personal finance called moneysmartlife.com. "With these investments, I feel like I have more control," he says.
More Ben McCoys could signal the stirrings of an upturn. A market bottom, says Merrill's Bernstein, "generally occurs when everyone thinks it will never happen. You want to hear people giving up on the stocks-for-the-long-run theme."
But something positive must draw investors back. George A. Akerlof, a Nobel prize-winning economist at the University of California at Berkeley and co-author of a new book, with Yale professor Robert J. Shiller, on the importance of sentiment in moving markets, says investors will have to be offered a new story they can believe to get them to buy again.
That new story likely involves corporate and consumer debts being reduced to what borrowers can pay, freeing them of past mistakes so that new money can be put to productive use. Banks resume lending, and the stock market bottoms, signaling that the recession will be over soon. Budding optimism reverses the vicious cycle of losses. A bull is born.
A more probable outcome is the one drawn from the narrow history of bear markets that grew out of financial crises. In it, the bear scenario continues to play out until the bull takes over, with more debt busts and government trial and error until things get set right again. That could mean two more years of bouncing around and then another six or so before the Dow is back above 14,000. Not long ago, such an outcome would have seemed unimaginably bleak. Given the other possibilities, it doesn't seem so bad now.
While 17 months may feel like an eternity, it could turn out merely to be a prequel. The questions on the minds of investors, money managers, and corporate executives are threefold: How much longer will the bear market last? How low will the averages go? And when might investors get their money back?
As Warren E. Buffett has said: "Beware of geeks bearing formulas." It's especially difficult to predict the direction of the markets these days because the most popular gauges, from price-earnings ratios to measures of investor "capitulation," have stopped working. The peculiar nature of this bear market limits the kit of useful tools to just a handful of bond market and business confidence indicators.
Those signals, along with interviews with financial historians, market strategists, and economists, point mostly to painful scenarios. Stocks don't seem likely to fall much more from here -- but market turmoil could continue for months or even years. Worse, by the time the market revisits its highs, so many years are likely to have passed that many older people will have gotten out of stocks, missing out on the rebound. The flip side is that new money put into the stock market now will likely do comparatively well over the long term. That's welcome news for twentysomethings and executive compensation consultants, but perhaps not for soon-to-be retirees.
Searching For Precedents
History can't provide as many clues to the market's direction as usual. That's because while most bear markets more or less track the business cycle, this one began with a broken financial system. That makes the current bear more like the one that snarled from 1929-32 than others of the past 100 years. But that analogy doesn't fit perfectly, either. "We have no good precedents to help us," says Peter L. Bernstein, a 90-year-old market essayist and financial historian who was a teenager during the Great Depression. "What's breathtaking is the rapidity of the decline and its breadth."
The market anxiety is especially high now because of the raging fire in the economy. "The next six to nine months are going to be awful," says Desmond Lachman of the American Enterprise Institute. Waves of corporate defaults, home foreclosures, bank failures, and job losses are still to come.
Of course, the stock market already knows that for the rest of 2009 the economy will be a "shambles," to use Buffett's recent description. Today's low share prices may well reflect that. The Dow Jones industrial average has already fallen through the 7,000 level predicted earlier this year by Nouriel Roubini, the New York University economist nicknamed Dr. Doom for daring in 2006 to foretell the credit calamity. That's right, even Dr. Doom was too optimistic.
If recent history were a reliable guide, it would be just about time for the bear to retreat to his den, which nowadays might include a flat-panel TV and leather chair bought at a foreclosure sale. The market's average decline during bear markets since the 1929 market crash is just 30%. What's more, those past bears lasted an average of 13 months, making this one look not just mean but old.
But this is no ordinary slump. Even the most basic market gauge, the price-earnings ratio, which measures a company's share price relative to the earnings it generates, is unreliable. Historically, the overall market has traded at prices that average 15 times earnings, ranging from roughly 8 during the worst bear markets to 25 or greater during bull runs. At the start of the year, the market's p-e ratio was about 11, suggesting that stocks were already cheap and wouldn't drop much more. Instead, the Standard & Poor's (NYSE:MHP - News)500-stock index fell 19% in January and February, the worst opening months on record.
Why did the p-e ratio get it so wrong? The "e" is plunging -- by 18% in January and February alone, according to Thomson Reuters (NYSE:TRI - News). As a result, even though the stock market has dropped, it hasn't gotten any cheaper relative to earnings. Sure, a lot of earnings vanished amid a fog of one-time charges that may say nothing about companies' future profit power. But analysts still aren't seeing through that fog; their earnings projections are more scattered than they've been in two decades. "You don't know what the 'e' is because the economy is in free fall," says Charles Biderman, CEO of TrimTabs Investment Research.
The credit bust has rendered other trusted market indicators useless -- most notably monetary policy, or the Federal Reserve's raising or lowering of its benchmark interest rate. Before the current slump, the federal funds rate was a reliable indicator in all but one bear market since World War II, says James B. Stack, president of InvesTech Research and Stack Financial Management. When the economy slowed, the Fed began cutting rates to turn the business cycle back up. After the second cut came, investors stepped in to buy, anticipating higher corporate earnings. But the Fed has cut rates 10 times since August 2007, to essentially zero, and yet the economy and stock market keep sliding. "The Depression is the only parallel for the lack of effectiveness in monetary policy," says Stack. It is failing because too many borrowers don't want to borrow and too many lenders don't have the capital or courage to lend.
Measures of capitulation, Wall Street's term for the final moment of a sell-off when the last weak investors give up on stocks, aren't working, either. The idea is that once the wobbly players are out, the ones left are strong enough to bid up stocks. Bull runs begin during those moments. Market mavens try to track capitulation by parsing statistics from days of heavy selling and comparing the intensity of past routs. Many thought they saw capitulation last September, says Eric C. Bjorgen, senior analyst with the Leuthold Group in Minneapolis. "But then the market kept going down," says Bjorgen. "Extreme fear was not a good indicator." The gauges became even more bullish with the selling in November, after which the market rallied 24%. Then it fell again. Biderman of TrimTabs says that's because much of the selling was by hedge funds that had been using borrowed money, not a major factor in previous bear markets.
Another signal that's turned out to be misleading is "cash on the sidelines," or the funds in money market and bank savings accounts. In normal times, strategists could look with some confidence to money in these accounts as buying power that investors were holding back from the stock market. The greater the cash compared with the value of the overall market, the more impact it could make on stocks. In January the reading reached its highest levels since 1984, says Bjorgen. Even so, he's dubious. As long as investors are worried about their own incomes, he says, the money seems most likely to stay right where it is. TrimTabs' Biderman, who tracks how investors move their money among asset classes, says he doesn't see much chance of this cash flowing into stocks with the job and housing markets so weak. He figures investors have been taking more money out of stocks than they've been putting into their cash accounts. "Some people are being forced to sell stocks to eat," Biderman says. "They are certainly not going to buy Google (NasdaqGS:GOOG - News) here."
With the ordinary historical measures failing, experts are looking further back for clues. During the Great Depression, the Dow plunged 89% from the 1929 crash to July 1932. Then it went through some big swings before losing 49% in 1937-38 as the economy tanked again. World War II, which grew in part out of financial stress around the globe, followed. The Dow didn't get back to its 1929 high until 1954.
Much, of course, has changed in the U.S. since the Great Crash. Back then Washington made major policy mistakes, such as erecting trade barriers and letting too many banks fail without protecting depositors. This time, with a couple of exceptions, the government hasn't blundered so, even though it hasn't yet solved the economy's many problems.
So this bear market likely won't rival that of the Great Depression. But the bear markets during other banking crises have been brutal in their own right. In a recent study of 21 such episodes from around the world, including ones from Spain in 1977, Sweden in 1991, and Thailand in 1997, professors Carmen M. Reinhart of the University of Maryland and Kenneth S. Rogoff of Harvard University found that stocks fell an average of 56% -- the same loss the S&P 500 had suffered through Mar. 3. Those bear markets also tended to be agonizingly slow, taking an average of 3.4 years to reach bottom. "Everything is protracted," says Reinhart. "In the best-case scenario, you are looking at six years or longer" to return to past highs. Bad as that sounds, it would compare favorably with Japan, whose Nikkei index reached 38,900 in 1989 and now trades at around 7,200.
Of course, just because investors have lost money in stocks doesn't mean equities are a bad choice from this point onward. "Stocks can't make up for the past 10 years, but they can do extremely well from our current position," says Jeremy J. Siegel, author of Stocks for the Long Run and professor at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. Siegel says that while stock returns have fallen behind government bond returns over the past 20 years, history says that's almost certain to reverse. He's found only one 30-year period when stocks returned less than bonds, and that one ended in 1861. "That tells us that once you are down 50%, those who are in stock markets for 10 to 15 years will get much better returns," he says. Lately, government bond prices have run up, boosting the odds that stocks will be the better play in the future.
So where to look for signs of an incipient upturn? One logical place is the corporate debt market, which understands the economy's core problem firsthand. Eventually, the pace of new defaults on corporate bonds will slow, and bad debts will be reduced or erased in financial reorganizations and bankruptcies. When those things happen, the economy and stock market should breathe easier.
Some quants see little evidence of that happening yet. "We are looking at a 60% to 70% chance that this bear market is not over," says Robert D. Arnott, chairman of Research Affiliates, a Pasadena (Calif.) firm that manages $25 billion. Jeffrey E. Gundlach, chief investment officer of Los Angeles-based money manager TCW Group, says the junk-bond market, which often tracks the stock market, is headed for new lows.
Another critical factor is the health of the banking system. One measure to watch is banks' so-called net worth, or the difference between how much they owe and the value of their assets. Rebuilding the banking system's net worth will be monumentally difficult. "On average, this process takes about six years," says Joseph Mason, a banking professor at Louisiana State University who has studied past banking crises. So far, little has been accomplished -- a big reason the stock market hasn't gotten up from its knees.
KEEP AN EYE ON CEOs
Government policy decisions could speed or slow the pace of rehabilitation for the banks and, in turn, the stock market. David A. Hendler, a New York-based bank analyst at CreditSights, says his job has shifted from financial analysis toward Washington analysis. Essentially, his task is to figure out how quickly the government will permit weak banks to consolidate. When investors believe they know which banks will survive, they'll buy their stocks. The process is so critical to the stock market that Richard Bernstein, chief investment strategist at Merrill Lynch (NYSE:BAC - News), is tracking six signposts for financial industry consolidation. Among them: the extent to which the government carves up and sells bad banks rather than buying into them to prop them up.
Other strategists are keeping a close eye on the people who really know what's happening in the economy: business leaders. Biderman says he'll know corporations are getting confident once they start buying back their own shares and acquiring other companies. Right now they show no such bravado. Announcements of share buybacks are down 90% from a year ago, leaving that market thermometer so cold the mercury is off the scale.
In the end, the timing of the bear's retreat will likely hinge on that great market imponderable: psychology. How investors feel has a lot to do with whether they start seeing mixed signals as proof of a glass half-full. "The (market) stress causes the analytical part of our brains to shut down, and that makes us hyperreactive to bad news," says Michael A. Ervolini, CEO of Cabot Research, a consultancy catering to institutional investors. People become convinced conditions are worse than rock-bottom bad, he says. Only after they see that they've overreacted can things improve: "We look for the market to start (saying) tomorrow will be brighter."
For now, pessimism is winning the day. In the worst-case scenario, bad debts will continue to weigh on borrowers and lenders, causing the economy to slow even more, which will erode incomes and push more borrowers over the edge. Economies and corporations around the globe will weaken and rattle investors and business executives even more. Such fears have prompted Ben McCoy, a 30-year-old software engineer, to swear off new stock investments. Instead, he's putting money into his own business ventures, such as writing software for real estate appraisers and a blog about personal finance called moneysmartlife.com. "With these investments, I feel like I have more control," he says.
More Ben McCoys could signal the stirrings of an upturn. A market bottom, says Merrill's Bernstein, "generally occurs when everyone thinks it will never happen. You want to hear people giving up on the stocks-for-the-long-run theme."
But something positive must draw investors back. George A. Akerlof, a Nobel prize-winning economist at the University of California at Berkeley and co-author of a new book, with Yale professor Robert J. Shiller, on the importance of sentiment in moving markets, says investors will have to be offered a new story they can believe to get them to buy again.
That new story likely involves corporate and consumer debts being reduced to what borrowers can pay, freeing them of past mistakes so that new money can be put to productive use. Banks resume lending, and the stock market bottoms, signaling that the recession will be over soon. Budding optimism reverses the vicious cycle of losses. A bull is born.
A more probable outcome is the one drawn from the narrow history of bear markets that grew out of financial crises. In it, the bear scenario continues to play out until the bull takes over, with more debt busts and government trial and error until things get set right again. That could mean two more years of bouncing around and then another six or so before the Dow is back above 14,000. Not long ago, such an outcome would have seemed unimaginably bleak. Given the other possibilities, it doesn't seem so bad now.
罗杰斯：单靠中国 全球仍无法“走出衰退泥沼”
投资大师罗杰斯表示：“中国解决不了世界的问题。中国是一个极佳且增长的经济体，但无法带领全球走出泥沼。”他还指出，中国股市目前还不具吸引力。
因预期中国总理温家宝在昨日两会的工作报告中将宣布扩大11月份宣布的4万亿元人民币的经济刺激计划，上证综指前日飙升6.1%，创4个月来的最大涨幅。
不过，昨日，上证综合指数收盘上涨1%至2221.08，盘中高度震荡，至少变盘8次。因部分投资者对温家宝的工作报告未提及扩大振兴经济计划感到失望。
但他的讲话也加强投资者对中国经济复苏的信心，提升了沪市综指上扬的力度。A股成交值也大幅增加到人民币1541亿元。前日为1275亿元。
AMP资本投资者驻悉尼的投资策略师纳艾米（Nader Naeimi）说：“中国政府要砸钱刺激经济复苏。虽然没有进一步宣布振兴经济计划，短线会有失望，但是无损中国复苏的题材。”
不过，担任罗杰斯控股公司（Rogers Holdings）董事长的罗杰斯表示，11月来就未买进中国股票，因股价无吸引力。
因预期中国总理温家宝在昨日两会的工作报告中将宣布扩大11月份宣布的4万亿元人民币的经济刺激计划，上证综指前日飙升6.1%，创4个月来的最大涨幅。
不过，昨日，上证综合指数收盘上涨1%至2221.08，盘中高度震荡，至少变盘8次。因部分投资者对温家宝的工作报告未提及扩大振兴经济计划感到失望。
但他的讲话也加强投资者对中国经济复苏的信心，提升了沪市综指上扬的力度。A股成交值也大幅增加到人民币1541亿元。前日为1275亿元。
AMP资本投资者驻悉尼的投资策略师纳艾米（Nader Naeimi）说：“中国政府要砸钱刺激经济复苏。虽然没有进一步宣布振兴经济计划，短线会有失望，但是无损中国复苏的题材。”
不过，担任罗杰斯控股公司（Rogers Holdings）董事长的罗杰斯表示，11月来就未买进中国股票，因股价无吸引力。
超大户连续5天狂扫中国银行
在近期的反弹行情中，许多个股都接连创出反弹新高，而占两市权重极高的银行股表现，则让人唏嘘不已，一言以蔽之，跟跌不跟涨。不过,沉默已久的银行股在近两日大幅上攻，中国银行两天最大涨幅一度达到18%。
据Wind数据统计，中国银行、浦发银行、华夏银行和南京银行均在昨日盘中创出2008年11月以来的反弹新高。
对此，华西证券分析师曹学峰表示，昨天尾盘中国银行急速拉升，可能还是和中投增持的消息有关。
全国政协委员、中国投资有限责任公司副总经理汪建熙在两会间隙向媒体表示，中投今年将继续增持包括H股在内的三大国有银行(工行、建行和中行)股份。
此外，有分析人士认为，金融股周四涨幅居前，是受流动性充裕以及最近有迹象显示信贷强劲增长所致。
据广州万隆统计，4日与5日共有45.8亿元资金流入银行金融板块。
但从大智慧金融终端来看，超大户资金连续5日净流入中国银行，北京银行、中信银行和中国平安的超大户资金显示连续两日净流入，其余沪市金融类股的均显示不同程度的净流出现象。
据Wind数据统计，中国银行、浦发银行、华夏银行和南京银行均在昨日盘中创出2008年11月以来的反弹新高。
对此，华西证券分析师曹学峰表示，昨天尾盘中国银行急速拉升，可能还是和中投增持的消息有关。
全国政协委员、中国投资有限责任公司副总经理汪建熙在两会间隙向媒体表示，中投今年将继续增持包括H股在内的三大国有银行(工行、建行和中行)股份。
此外，有分析人士认为，金融股周四涨幅居前，是受流动性充裕以及最近有迹象显示信贷强劲增长所致。
据广州万隆统计，4日与5日共有45.8亿元资金流入银行金融板块。
但从大智慧金融终端来看，超大户资金连续5日净流入中国银行，北京银行、中信银行和中国平安的超大户资金显示连续两日净流入，其余沪市金融类股的均显示不同程度的净流出现象。
捕捉发展机遇 调整发展战略 中行海外业务逆势飞扬
2008年，面对历史罕见的国际金融风暴，作为中国国际化程度最高的商业银行，中国银行秉持稳健经营原则，及时调整业务发展战略，在危机中捕捉发展机遇，不断发掘新的业务增长点，适时填补长期以来由一些欧美银行主导的市场空白，实现了逆势发展。据最新统计，中行海外机构资产规模一年中增长41%。
全球服务：海外机构突破800家
中国银行是我国历史最悠久的商业银行之一，也是最早向海外发展的中资银行。继1917年在香港设立经营性分支机构之后，1929年，中国银行伦敦分行成立，这是我国银行业在国外设立的第一家分支机构。经过近百年的发展，中国银行构建起遍布全球的服务网络，形成了独特的竞争优势和品牌魅力。
2008年，中国银行海外机构新设机构共8家。这是近10年来中行海外机构增加最多的一年。这些新设机构的业务触角不断伸向新的领域。2008年12月1日，中国银行（瑞士）有限公司正式开业，主营私人银行业务。这是中资银行在瑞士设立的首家机构，也是中行2007年率先在国内银行中推出私人银行业务后，首次跨出国门进军欧洲市场，堪称我国银行业私人银行自有品牌建设的一个里程碑。
中国银行坚持以亚太和美欧地区为重点，着眼当前，立足长远，在海外机构布局上，不断完善覆盖全球的服务网络。目前，中行已在与我国双边贸易额超过200亿美元的17个国家设立机构，其余6个未设机构的国家也已列入中行海外网点建设年度发展规划。截至2008年底，中国银行已在全球29个国家和地区建立800多家分支机构，并与1500家国外代理行及47,000家分支机构保持了代理业务关系。
中国银行在开拓海外新市场的同时，也在成熟市场“深耕细作”，努力实现经营利润最大化。中行在伦敦、纽约、东京、卢森堡、法兰克福、巴黎、新加坡、悉尼及香港、澳门等海外市场已经营多年。2008年，顺应市场变化和客户需求，中行又新开了澳大利亚好事围和珀斯分行、韩国九老分行、加拿大万锦支行、印尼泗水分行以及澳门分行财富管理中心（四季酒店）等分支机构。
内外联动：打造“走出去”企业首选品牌
近年来，作为我国银行业多元化程度最高的银行，中国银行充分发挥跨国集团化经营、专业化管理，面向“走出去”中资企业推出了全方位的金融服务方案，全力支持中资企业进行海外资源开发、开设工厂、上市购并、进出口贸易、对外承包工程和劳务合作的核心合作银行。中行海内外机构与中国银行集团附属的中银国际、中银投、中银保险等机构紧密写作，为“走出去”企业打造了多元化、专业化、集约化的跨境综合金融服务平台。
2008年4月，中国银行在湖南举办“走出去”企业海内外合作研讨会，与当地28个大型“走出去”企业进行现场业务洽谈，提供一揽子金融服务和解决方案。会上，中国银行湖南省分行与华菱集团、中联重科、三一重工、湖南有色等企业分别签署了合作协议。根据协议，中国银行将为这些“走出去”重点客户及其重点项目，提供海内外客户互介服务，出台融资绿色通道和倾斜性政策，给予全球授信额度、境外资金管理等一系列创新服务支持，全力支持这些“走出去”企业开拓国际市场。在这次会议上，有10家企业与中银香港、中银国际，以及中行在纽约、伦敦、巴黎、米兰、新加坡、悉尼等地的分支机构达成30多个具体项目合作意向，部分项目已陆续进入实质操作阶段。
随后，中国银行在云南召开“立足云南,走向世界”的海内外联动会议。当地20多家“走出去”企业应邀参会，并与中银香港以及中行新加坡、马来西亚、曼谷、胡志明市、马尼拉、雅加达、加拿大、悉尼、赞比亚等10家海外分行进行现场业务对接，取得了积极成果。
在支持“走出去”企业的过程中，中行传统优势业务银团贷款发挥了积极作用。中行在香港、伦敦、纽约成立的亚太、欧非、美洲三大海外银团贷款中心，按照“专业化分工、集约化管理、一体化经营”的运营模式，建立了金融同业间的分销网络，在为企业客户解决重大金融需求的同时，市场排名及竞争实力也不断提升。截至2008年第3季度，中银集团银团贷款在内地和港澳市场排名第1，亚太地区（除日本）市场排名第4。
奉献爱心：开通全球赈灾捐款绿色通道
在积极拓展海外市场的同时，中行两万多名海外员工始终心系祖国，不忘履行海外中行人的一份责任。汶川大地震后，中行海外机构率先以机构和个人名义向灾区捐款，开立捐款专户，开辟全球赈灾捐款“绿色通道”，公布救灾机构账号和热线，并免收手续费和电报费，为海外各界援助灾区提供了便捷高效的金融服务。
为激发华人华侨和国际友人援助灾区的热情，中行在纽约、伦敦、巴黎、新加坡、曼谷、悉尼、以及澳门等地的海外机构，地震后的第一时间纷纷在当地主要媒体刊登公益广告，宣传和倡导社会各界捐款献爱心。作为灾后第一家向香港红十字会捐款的机构，中银香港累计向地震灾区捐款1543万港元及15万元人民币，同时还代香港红十字会、东华三院、乐施会等主要慈善机构收集善款2.68亿港元，免费汇出赈灾善款6亿多港元。中国银行其他海外机构及员工支援灾区重建的捐款总额将近170万美元，代转的海外捐款超过1000万美元。
全球服务：海外机构突破800家
中国银行是我国历史最悠久的商业银行之一，也是最早向海外发展的中资银行。继1917年在香港设立经营性分支机构之后，1929年，中国银行伦敦分行成立，这是我国银行业在国外设立的第一家分支机构。经过近百年的发展，中国银行构建起遍布全球的服务网络，形成了独特的竞争优势和品牌魅力。
2008年，中国银行海外机构新设机构共8家。这是近10年来中行海外机构增加最多的一年。这些新设机构的业务触角不断伸向新的领域。2008年12月1日，中国银行（瑞士）有限公司正式开业，主营私人银行业务。这是中资银行在瑞士设立的首家机构，也是中行2007年率先在国内银行中推出私人银行业务后，首次跨出国门进军欧洲市场，堪称我国银行业私人银行自有品牌建设的一个里程碑。
中国银行坚持以亚太和美欧地区为重点，着眼当前，立足长远，在海外机构布局上，不断完善覆盖全球的服务网络。目前，中行已在与我国双边贸易额超过200亿美元的17个国家设立机构，其余6个未设机构的国家也已列入中行海外网点建设年度发展规划。截至2008年底，中国银行已在全球29个国家和地区建立800多家分支机构，并与1500家国外代理行及47,000家分支机构保持了代理业务关系。
中国银行在开拓海外新市场的同时，也在成熟市场“深耕细作”，努力实现经营利润最大化。中行在伦敦、纽约、东京、卢森堡、法兰克福、巴黎、新加坡、悉尼及香港、澳门等海外市场已经营多年。2008年，顺应市场变化和客户需求，中行又新开了澳大利亚好事围和珀斯分行、韩国九老分行、加拿大万锦支行、印尼泗水分行以及澳门分行财富管理中心（四季酒店）等分支机构。
内外联动：打造“走出去”企业首选品牌
近年来，作为我国银行业多元化程度最高的银行，中国银行充分发挥跨国集团化经营、专业化管理，面向“走出去”中资企业推出了全方位的金融服务方案，全力支持中资企业进行海外资源开发、开设工厂、上市购并、进出口贸易、对外承包工程和劳务合作的核心合作银行。中行海内外机构与中国银行集团附属的中银国际、中银投、中银保险等机构紧密写作，为“走出去”企业打造了多元化、专业化、集约化的跨境综合金融服务平台。
2008年4月，中国银行在湖南举办“走出去”企业海内外合作研讨会，与当地28个大型“走出去”企业进行现场业务洽谈，提供一揽子金融服务和解决方案。会上，中国银行湖南省分行与华菱集团、中联重科、三一重工、湖南有色等企业分别签署了合作协议。根据协议，中国银行将为这些“走出去”重点客户及其重点项目，提供海内外客户互介服务，出台融资绿色通道和倾斜性政策，给予全球授信额度、境外资金管理等一系列创新服务支持，全力支持这些“走出去”企业开拓国际市场。在这次会议上，有10家企业与中银香港、中银国际，以及中行在纽约、伦敦、巴黎、米兰、新加坡、悉尼等地的分支机构达成30多个具体项目合作意向，部分项目已陆续进入实质操作阶段。
随后，中国银行在云南召开“立足云南,走向世界”的海内外联动会议。当地20多家“走出去”企业应邀参会，并与中银香港以及中行新加坡、马来西亚、曼谷、胡志明市、马尼拉、雅加达、加拿大、悉尼、赞比亚等10家海外分行进行现场业务对接，取得了积极成果。
在支持“走出去”企业的过程中，中行传统优势业务银团贷款发挥了积极作用。中行在香港、伦敦、纽约成立的亚太、欧非、美洲三大海外银团贷款中心，按照“专业化分工、集约化管理、一体化经营”的运营模式，建立了金融同业间的分销网络，在为企业客户解决重大金融需求的同时，市场排名及竞争实力也不断提升。截至2008年第3季度，中银集团银团贷款在内地和港澳市场排名第1，亚太地区（除日本）市场排名第4。
奉献爱心：开通全球赈灾捐款绿色通道
在积极拓展海外市场的同时，中行两万多名海外员工始终心系祖国，不忘履行海外中行人的一份责任。汶川大地震后，中行海外机构率先以机构和个人名义向灾区捐款，开立捐款专户，开辟全球赈灾捐款“绿色通道”，公布救灾机构账号和热线，并免收手续费和电报费，为海外各界援助灾区提供了便捷高效的金融服务。
为激发华人华侨和国际友人援助灾区的热情，中行在纽约、伦敦、巴黎、新加坡、曼谷、悉尼、以及澳门等地的海外机构，地震后的第一时间纷纷在当地主要媒体刊登公益广告，宣传和倡导社会各界捐款献爱心。作为灾后第一家向香港红十字会捐款的机构，中银香港累计向地震灾区捐款1543万港元及15万元人民币，同时还代香港红十字会、东华三院、乐施会等主要慈善机构收集善款2.68亿港元，免费汇出赈灾善款6亿多港元。中国银行其他海外机构及员工支援灾区重建的捐款总额将近170万美元，代转的海外捐款超过1000万美元。
Downturn, downsize
IN TOUGH times, small is beautiful.
That seems to be the new theme among some developers who are tearing up plans for yet-to-be-launched projects and going back to the drawing board.
They are looking at reconfiguring their residential projects to offer smaller units than planned, so that they would be more affordable for cautious buyers.
This is a major reversal from the boom times when big units were very popular.
In its recent results statement, Sing Holdings said it is reconfiguring the unit sizes and layout of its prime Cairnhill Road project, The Laurels, to adapt to market demand.
'The plan is to have more one- to two-bedroom units,' said managing director Lee Sze Hao. 'Now, I have to be careful with the affordability factor.' He would offer 'luxury at a affordable price'.
Wheelock Properties said in its results statement that it is reviewing building plans of its Ardmore 3 project in view of the poor market.
A UOL Group spokesman said as part of its ongoing product development process, it is considering resizing the units of its Green Meadows project in Upper Thomson to make them more affordable.
The impetus for this emerging trend includes the recent stunning sell-out of the Alexis project, which showed that small, affordable units sell. Of its 293 units, 114 units are one-bedders of just 366 sq ft to 527 sq ft.
Before its launch, developer ECPrime said it had adjusted the mix so that a larger number of the units would be smaller and therefore more affordable. Prices started from $450,000 for the one-bedders to about $650,000 for two-bedders.
It was only in 2005 and 2006 that developers were busy looking at building spacious units to cater to the rich. By late 2006, the bigger flats had attracted such strong interest that they were fetching higher prices on a per sq ft basis than smaller units. Traditionally, the bigger the unit, the lower the psf price.
In 2006, Lippo Realty executive director Thio Gim Hock banked on selling fairly big units at its 91-unit Newton One development. It was a success. 'When the market is good, people go for big units,' he said. Now, he has moved fast to reconfigure the units at the posh project on the prime Angullia Park site, where The Parisian used to be. It will now have two units per floor, instead of one unit per floor.
'Last year, we changed our plans. We want to keep it affordable,' said Mr Thio, now chief executive and group managing director of Overseas Union Enterprise. 'We foresaw that the market will go for smaller units.'
In the original plan, the 27 units ranged in size from more than 4,000 sq ft to 5,000 sq ft. Now, there will be 50-odd units from around 2,500 sq ft to 3,000 sq ft, he said.
Mr Lee said he started reviewing plans for The Laurels late last year. It will be several more months before the approvals come in and it is ready for launch.
'Things have changed. It is better to change from business class to economy class now. It is important to build something the market can absorb,' he said.
'Gone are the days when these people just walk in and pay you $7, $10 million. Unit sizes have to be scaled down but still remain at a comfortable level.'
The original plan was for The Laurels to have 150 units, many of them three- to four-bedders. Now, it will have about 290 units.
More developers may follow suit, given the downturn. Said DTZ executive director Ong Choon Fah: 'People look at the lump sum now. The perception is that there is a smaller capital outlay.'
Mr Lee and Mr Thio both believe developers still able to reconfigure project layout and unit sizes will want to do so now.
Added Knight Frank executive director Peter Ow: 'If the developers have not started selling or building their projects, it would make sense for them to look at resizing the units to make them more affordable, provided it does not affect their planning approvals.
Mr Tai Lee Siang, president of the Singapore Institute of Architects, said: 'If poor economic conditions persist, the trend is likely to be downsizing of units to make them more affordable. The other trend may be the no-frills approach, where units are made simpler and cheaper to build - thus lowering costs.'
That seems to be the new theme among some developers who are tearing up plans for yet-to-be-launched projects and going back to the drawing board.
They are looking at reconfiguring their residential projects to offer smaller units than planned, so that they would be more affordable for cautious buyers.
This is a major reversal from the boom times when big units were very popular.
In its recent results statement, Sing Holdings said it is reconfiguring the unit sizes and layout of its prime Cairnhill Road project, The Laurels, to adapt to market demand.
'The plan is to have more one- to two-bedroom units,' said managing director Lee Sze Hao. 'Now, I have to be careful with the affordability factor.' He would offer 'luxury at a affordable price'.
Wheelock Properties said in its results statement that it is reviewing building plans of its Ardmore 3 project in view of the poor market.
A UOL Group spokesman said as part of its ongoing product development process, it is considering resizing the units of its Green Meadows project in Upper Thomson to make them more affordable.
The impetus for this emerging trend includes the recent stunning sell-out of the Alexis project, which showed that small, affordable units sell. Of its 293 units, 114 units are one-bedders of just 366 sq ft to 527 sq ft.
Before its launch, developer ECPrime said it had adjusted the mix so that a larger number of the units would be smaller and therefore more affordable. Prices started from $450,000 for the one-bedders to about $650,000 for two-bedders.
It was only in 2005 and 2006 that developers were busy looking at building spacious units to cater to the rich. By late 2006, the bigger flats had attracted such strong interest that they were fetching higher prices on a per sq ft basis than smaller units. Traditionally, the bigger the unit, the lower the psf price.
In 2006, Lippo Realty executive director Thio Gim Hock banked on selling fairly big units at its 91-unit Newton One development. It was a success. 'When the market is good, people go for big units,' he said. Now, he has moved fast to reconfigure the units at the posh project on the prime Angullia Park site, where The Parisian used to be. It will now have two units per floor, instead of one unit per floor.
'Last year, we changed our plans. We want to keep it affordable,' said Mr Thio, now chief executive and group managing director of Overseas Union Enterprise. 'We foresaw that the market will go for smaller units.'
In the original plan, the 27 units ranged in size from more than 4,000 sq ft to 5,000 sq ft. Now, there will be 50-odd units from around 2,500 sq ft to 3,000 sq ft, he said.
Mr Lee said he started reviewing plans for The Laurels late last year. It will be several more months before the approvals come in and it is ready for launch.
'Things have changed. It is better to change from business class to economy class now. It is important to build something the market can absorb,' he said.
'Gone are the days when these people just walk in and pay you $7, $10 million. Unit sizes have to be scaled down but still remain at a comfortable level.'
The original plan was for The Laurels to have 150 units, many of them three- to four-bedders. Now, it will have about 290 units.
More developers may follow suit, given the downturn. Said DTZ executive director Ong Choon Fah: 'People look at the lump sum now. The perception is that there is a smaller capital outlay.'
Mr Lee and Mr Thio both believe developers still able to reconfigure project layout and unit sizes will want to do so now.
Added Knight Frank executive director Peter Ow: 'If the developers have not started selling or building their projects, it would make sense for them to look at resizing the units to make them more affordable, provided it does not affect their planning approvals.
Mr Tai Lee Siang, president of the Singapore Institute of Architects, said: 'If poor economic conditions persist, the trend is likely to be downsizing of units to make them more affordable. The other trend may be the no-frills approach, where units are made simpler and cheaper to build - thus lowering costs.'
China sees signs economy might be recovering
China sees signs economic growth is recovering but is watching closely to determine whether it needs to expand its huge stimulus effort as global conditions worsen, top economic officials said Friday.
"We have seen some positive signs including recovery of export growth," Zhang Ping, the chairman of the country's planning body, the National Development and Reform Commission, said at a news conference. "It really depends on the changing situation to determine whether we need additional investment."
Zhang and central bank Gov. Zhou Xiaochuan said positive data showed Beijing's policies were working. Zhou repeated Premier Wen Jiabao's statement Thursday at the opening of the legislature that China can achieve 8 percent growth this year as Beijing steps up spending to create jobs and boost exports.
World markets fell Thursday after Wen failed to mention any expansion of the 4 trillion yuan ($586 billion) stimulus plan. Along with worries about the financial health of big U.S. banks and General Motors Corp., that sent the Dow Jones Industrial Average down more than 4 percent. Tokyo stocks were down 3.5 percent in Friday afternoon trade.
Analysts are divided on how quickly China can rebound from the slump that saw growth fall to 6.8 percent in the final quarter of last year from 13 percent in 2007.
Some point to rising bank lending and other indicators and say the decline is already bottoming out. Others expect growth this year to fall as low as 5.6 percent -- the weakest in nearly two decades -- and argue China cannot recover until its Western export markets revive.
Two surveys released this week showed China's manufacturing contracted in February for a fifth month but at a slower rate. Exports fell 17.5 percent in January from a year earlier.
Zhang said China expects to emerge from the crisis more competitive than before.
He said 580 billion yuan ($85 billion) of the stimulus will be spent helping companies improve technology and energy efficiency.
"We are not looking only at immediate difficulties and challenges but also considering how to provide a solid basis for future development," he said. "Having stood the test of this crisis, the quality and competitiveness of the Chinese economy will reach a new high."
Zhang's comments were the most detailed explanation yet of how Beijing plans to spend its stimulus. The package was announced in November but companies and investors have received little information, prompting complaints by China's public and warnings that secrecy would increase the potential for corruption and waste.
The government will spend 370 billion yuan ($54 billion) on roads, power supplies and other rural infrastructure; 1.5 trillion yuan ($219 billion) on highways and railways and 150 billion yuan ($22 billion) on education, health and cultural facilities such as museums, according to Zhang. Some 1 trillion yuan ($145 billion) will go into reconstruction efforts for last year's devastating earthquake.
The stimulus is meant to reduce reliance on exports by boosting domestic consumption.
Zhang said Beijing has assigned 24 teams of auditors to make sure no money is misused or wasted in a system where thousands of officials are punished every year for embezzlement, extortion and other abuses.
"We have not discovered that any money has been misused," Zhang said.
"We have seen some positive signs including recovery of export growth," Zhang Ping, the chairman of the country's planning body, the National Development and Reform Commission, said at a news conference. "It really depends on the changing situation to determine whether we need additional investment."
Zhang and central bank Gov. Zhou Xiaochuan said positive data showed Beijing's policies were working. Zhou repeated Premier Wen Jiabao's statement Thursday at the opening of the legislature that China can achieve 8 percent growth this year as Beijing steps up spending to create jobs and boost exports.
World markets fell Thursday after Wen failed to mention any expansion of the 4 trillion yuan ($586 billion) stimulus plan. Along with worries about the financial health of big U.S. banks and General Motors Corp., that sent the Dow Jones Industrial Average down more than 4 percent. Tokyo stocks were down 3.5 percent in Friday afternoon trade.
Analysts are divided on how quickly China can rebound from the slump that saw growth fall to 6.8 percent in the final quarter of last year from 13 percent in 2007.
Some point to rising bank lending and other indicators and say the decline is already bottoming out. Others expect growth this year to fall as low as 5.6 percent -- the weakest in nearly two decades -- and argue China cannot recover until its Western export markets revive.
Two surveys released this week showed China's manufacturing contracted in February for a fifth month but at a slower rate. Exports fell 17.5 percent in January from a year earlier.
Zhang said China expects to emerge from the crisis more competitive than before.
He said 580 billion yuan ($85 billion) of the stimulus will be spent helping companies improve technology and energy efficiency.
"We are not looking only at immediate difficulties and challenges but also considering how to provide a solid basis for future development," he said. "Having stood the test of this crisis, the quality and competitiveness of the Chinese economy will reach a new high."
Zhang's comments were the most detailed explanation yet of how Beijing plans to spend its stimulus. The package was announced in November but companies and investors have received little information, prompting complaints by China's public and warnings that secrecy would increase the potential for corruption and waste.
The government will spend 370 billion yuan ($54 billion) on roads, power supplies and other rural infrastructure; 1.5 trillion yuan ($219 billion) on highways and railways and 150 billion yuan ($22 billion) on education, health and cultural facilities such as museums, according to Zhang. Some 1 trillion yuan ($145 billion) will go into reconstruction efforts for last year's devastating earthquake.
The stimulus is meant to reduce reliance on exports by boosting domestic consumption.
Zhang said Beijing has assigned 24 teams of auditors to make sure no money is misused or wasted in a system where thousands of officials are punished every year for embezzlement, extortion and other abuses.
"We have not discovered that any money has been misused," Zhang said.
Thursday, March 5, 2009
經濟問題經濟學家沉默是金
一、
經濟學家的經濟預測錯多對少，遠的不說，僅看香港歷來財政預算案集掌握香港經濟脈搏及高薪經濟智囊之力對ＧＤＰ的預測經常不中且離目標甚遠便了解，然而，經濟情況有異動─不論急升（過熱）或暴瀉（大冷）─記者第一時間想到的是向經濟學家、更多是喜歡談論經濟問題因此被人誤會為經濟學家的各色人等（其中尤以專業訓練不包含價值判斷在內的會計師評論經濟事務最令人驚奇）討教，記者這樣做，當然是有市場需求之故。政治是眾人之事，因此人人有資格談政治；日常生活中何處無經濟，因此以為有資格議論經濟問題的人特別多。
這種現象，不只本港為然，美國且有過之！於二○○四年創辦的非牟利團體傳媒觀察（mediamatters.org），去周四公布一項有趣的統計，顯示在一月二十五日至二月十五日，美國有線電視ＣＮＮ一共用了二百零三小時討論當前的經濟問題，在一共七百二十二名嘉賓中，只有四十一名、約百分之六是經濟學家；較早前的調查，顯示一月二十五日至二月八日間，在有線電視上談經濟問題的，只有百分之五是經濟學家！
金融海嘯引起深層經濟危機，本為經濟學家一展經世濟民才具的良機，何以他們不露一手，而讓充內行的「專家」說三道四，筆者的看法有二。
首先是，雖然有小部分經濟學家「證實」經濟學是「科學」（比如地上的紙幣肯定有人撿而拾之），但大多數經濟學家心知肚明，經濟學絕不是如物理學般的科學，其學說不可能通過實驗室檢驗；海耶克一九七四年在接受諾獎典禮上的演說，便力陳經濟學是「情操科學」（moral sciences）而非自然科學，他的演詞（新加坡科學出版社數年前彙編一本諾貝爾經濟學獎得主的講詞集）寫稿時找不到，不過，憑記憶，海耶克大意是說人的思維、見解和經驗各有不同，「我」無法領悟和體會他人的行為，要把所有人的行為歸納為計量模式從而進行「科學研究」是不可能的。經濟是所有人的行為的反映，由於「人心不同、各如其面」，經濟前景因此很難甚至不可測。既然不可測，值此大家希望知道「危機有多深、災難何時了」人心徬徨之際，深明無法提供合理可行答案的經濟學家，又怎敢隨便公開指點江山！這正是何以香港八家大學都有經濟學系而且各學派的名家雲集，可說人才濟濟，值此人人需要他們指點迷津之際，港人卻甚少聽見他們的真知灼見的原因。
其次是，剛在網上（econlog.econlib.org）讀到一則有益的資訊，據加拿大經濟學家獲嘉（M. Walker，設於溫哥華的費沙學社前幹事）接受電台訪問，說他曾當面請教海耶克，何以說服他人改變價值觀特別是說服人相信經濟自由之可貴是那麼困難？海耶克的答案是，思想（idea）是人最珍貴的私有財產，如果你試圖說服某人承認其想法錯誤，等於要他們放棄私產，導致其「資本損失」（capital loss），後果可大可小；為了保護「私有產權」，有「成見」的人因此大都堅持己見。此例用於經濟學家更恰當，捍衞私產令經濟學家非不得已不肯就不可測的經濟前景發表意見─尤其是他們曾經看好而情況突然因為出現「黑天鵝」而轉壞的時候。
經濟學家的「想法」被事實證實不可行時不輕易修改，說明其「想法」是經過深思熟慮後才達致，換句話說，其「私產」得來不易，不肯隨便改正，理當如此。至此，筆者又記得二句同樣出處不明但人人認為是凱恩斯說的話，當他被問何以經常改變對經濟的看法時，他說：「先生，當統計數字改變時，我的看法有什麼辦法不隨之而變。」即使不是出自凱恩斯之口，說者必是絕頂聰明且有智慧之人，這句話的真意在人的價值判斷不變，但其分析必須隨客觀事實之變動而變。
凱恩斯是股市滙市期市的大炒家，想法瞬息萬變，此話出自其口的可能性甚高。
上述這些「金句」，不論是誰說的，都大有道理。
二、
金融海嘯令各國政府特別是美國政府考慮制訂新法、修正舊法，以收緊對金融業的管制；法國總統薩爾科齊甚且公開宣稱「自律已死」（Self-regulation is finished），政府計劃從無形之手奪回主宰市場的大權，彰彰明甚。
在政府「陽謀」伸出「巨靈之掌」積極干預市場這種「不自由」氣氛下，艾．蘭德（Ayn Rand, 1905-1982）鼓吹絕對自私和自由的著作，再度成為暢銷書。蘭德於1957年初版的小說《巨人聳肩》（楊懷康的譯名）去年銷二十餘萬冊，今年最初七周銷量比去年同期多三倍！調查書籍銷售情況的TitleZ的資料顯示，過去二年，《巨人》的平均銷量在阿瑪遜銷量排名542，今年迄2月21日止，排名已躍升至21─今年全年的銷量，肯定比去年再跳前一大步─如果荷里活果真一如傳言會於今年年底拍成電影，《巨人》的銷數必然再上層樓。
《巨人》的主角約翰．蓋爾特（J. Galt），過的是完全憑己意決定的生活。他擁有一家公司，有逾時工作或不工作的自由，他不工作，是因為盈利再增便跌入高稅率的「陷阱」（在加拿大工作的人都有這種經驗）；他可根據本身利益削減員工、收縮公司規模，甚至把生意賣掉，將所得購入有稅務優惠的債券，然後四方遊食（或遊覽）；此外，如果條件合適，他可以移居低稅的外國……。
在蘭德的想像中，假如政府施實太多管制和徵重稅，「有智力的人」（men of the mind）會罷工、怠工，那意味他們不把他們過人的領導才能、科學發明、創新等等有益世人的東西貢獻社會。管制和高稅令這些「有腦士」漸漸從市場上消失，他們被政府有形之手逐出市場─劣政驅逐精英出市場，社會從進步變成落後，是理所當然的。
總而言之，蓋爾特所做的一切，均以自私自利為念及物質誘因為前提。這種自由自在帝力於我何有的生活方式，對面臨政府將無微不至無處不在照顧、監管社會各階層的美國人所嚮往和懷念。這是蘭德著作「熱賣」的底因。
這幾天正在閒讀《花花公子》創辦人赫夫納的傳記《花花公子先生》（S. Watts :Mr. Playboy-Hugh Hefner and the American Dream, Wiley），可記之事不少；今天要說的是，赫夫納原來受蘭德於1943年出版的成名小說《源頭》（Fountainhead）的影響甚深，她鼓吹無拘束不受規範的個人主義，成為赫夫納做人處世辦雜誌的指導原則（頁54─55）。《花花公子》對蘭德的訪問刊1964年三月號（訪員為於七十年代成大名的未來學家托夫拉〔A. Toffler〕），後由蘭德的「客觀主義者公司」以小冊子形式出單行本。
經濟學家的經濟預測錯多對少，遠的不說，僅看香港歷來財政預算案集掌握香港經濟脈搏及高薪經濟智囊之力對ＧＤＰ的預測經常不中且離目標甚遠便了解，然而，經濟情況有異動─不論急升（過熱）或暴瀉（大冷）─記者第一時間想到的是向經濟學家、更多是喜歡談論經濟問題因此被人誤會為經濟學家的各色人等（其中尤以專業訓練不包含價值判斷在內的會計師評論經濟事務最令人驚奇）討教，記者這樣做，當然是有市場需求之故。政治是眾人之事，因此人人有資格談政治；日常生活中何處無經濟，因此以為有資格議論經濟問題的人特別多。
這種現象，不只本港為然，美國且有過之！於二○○四年創辦的非牟利團體傳媒觀察（mediamatters.org），去周四公布一項有趣的統計，顯示在一月二十五日至二月十五日，美國有線電視ＣＮＮ一共用了二百零三小時討論當前的經濟問題，在一共七百二十二名嘉賓中，只有四十一名、約百分之六是經濟學家；較早前的調查，顯示一月二十五日至二月八日間，在有線電視上談經濟問題的，只有百分之五是經濟學家！
金融海嘯引起深層經濟危機，本為經濟學家一展經世濟民才具的良機，何以他們不露一手，而讓充內行的「專家」說三道四，筆者的看法有二。
首先是，雖然有小部分經濟學家「證實」經濟學是「科學」（比如地上的紙幣肯定有人撿而拾之），但大多數經濟學家心知肚明，經濟學絕不是如物理學般的科學，其學說不可能通過實驗室檢驗；海耶克一九七四年在接受諾獎典禮上的演說，便力陳經濟學是「情操科學」（moral sciences）而非自然科學，他的演詞（新加坡科學出版社數年前彙編一本諾貝爾經濟學獎得主的講詞集）寫稿時找不到，不過，憑記憶，海耶克大意是說人的思維、見解和經驗各有不同，「我」無法領悟和體會他人的行為，要把所有人的行為歸納為計量模式從而進行「科學研究」是不可能的。經濟是所有人的行為的反映，由於「人心不同、各如其面」，經濟前景因此很難甚至不可測。既然不可測，值此大家希望知道「危機有多深、災難何時了」人心徬徨之際，深明無法提供合理可行答案的經濟學家，又怎敢隨便公開指點江山！這正是何以香港八家大學都有經濟學系而且各學派的名家雲集，可說人才濟濟，值此人人需要他們指點迷津之際，港人卻甚少聽見他們的真知灼見的原因。
其次是，剛在網上（econlog.econlib.org）讀到一則有益的資訊，據加拿大經濟學家獲嘉（M. Walker，設於溫哥華的費沙學社前幹事）接受電台訪問，說他曾當面請教海耶克，何以說服他人改變價值觀特別是說服人相信經濟自由之可貴是那麼困難？海耶克的答案是，思想（idea）是人最珍貴的私有財產，如果你試圖說服某人承認其想法錯誤，等於要他們放棄私產，導致其「資本損失」（capital loss），後果可大可小；為了保護「私有產權」，有「成見」的人因此大都堅持己見。此例用於經濟學家更恰當，捍衞私產令經濟學家非不得已不肯就不可測的經濟前景發表意見─尤其是他們曾經看好而情況突然因為出現「黑天鵝」而轉壞的時候。
經濟學家的「想法」被事實證實不可行時不輕易修改，說明其「想法」是經過深思熟慮後才達致，換句話說，其「私產」得來不易，不肯隨便改正，理當如此。至此，筆者又記得二句同樣出處不明但人人認為是凱恩斯說的話，當他被問何以經常改變對經濟的看法時，他說：「先生，當統計數字改變時，我的看法有什麼辦法不隨之而變。」即使不是出自凱恩斯之口，說者必是絕頂聰明且有智慧之人，這句話的真意在人的價值判斷不變，但其分析必須隨客觀事實之變動而變。
凱恩斯是股市滙市期市的大炒家，想法瞬息萬變，此話出自其口的可能性甚高。
上述這些「金句」，不論是誰說的，都大有道理。
二、
金融海嘯令各國政府特別是美國政府考慮制訂新法、修正舊法，以收緊對金融業的管制；法國總統薩爾科齊甚且公開宣稱「自律已死」（Self-regulation is finished），政府計劃從無形之手奪回主宰市場的大權，彰彰明甚。
在政府「陽謀」伸出「巨靈之掌」積極干預市場這種「不自由」氣氛下，艾．蘭德（Ayn Rand, 1905-1982）鼓吹絕對自私和自由的著作，再度成為暢銷書。蘭德於1957年初版的小說《巨人聳肩》（楊懷康的譯名）去年銷二十餘萬冊，今年最初七周銷量比去年同期多三倍！調查書籍銷售情況的TitleZ的資料顯示，過去二年，《巨人》的平均銷量在阿瑪遜銷量排名542，今年迄2月21日止，排名已躍升至21─今年全年的銷量，肯定比去年再跳前一大步─如果荷里活果真一如傳言會於今年年底拍成電影，《巨人》的銷數必然再上層樓。
《巨人》的主角約翰．蓋爾特（J. Galt），過的是完全憑己意決定的生活。他擁有一家公司，有逾時工作或不工作的自由，他不工作，是因為盈利再增便跌入高稅率的「陷阱」（在加拿大工作的人都有這種經驗）；他可根據本身利益削減員工、收縮公司規模，甚至把生意賣掉，將所得購入有稅務優惠的債券，然後四方遊食（或遊覽）；此外，如果條件合適，他可以移居低稅的外國……。
在蘭德的想像中，假如政府施實太多管制和徵重稅，「有智力的人」（men of the mind）會罷工、怠工，那意味他們不把他們過人的領導才能、科學發明、創新等等有益世人的東西貢獻社會。管制和高稅令這些「有腦士」漸漸從市場上消失，他們被政府有形之手逐出市場─劣政驅逐精英出市場，社會從進步變成落後，是理所當然的。
總而言之，蓋爾特所做的一切，均以自私自利為念及物質誘因為前提。這種自由自在帝力於我何有的生活方式，對面臨政府將無微不至無處不在照顧、監管社會各階層的美國人所嚮往和懷念。這是蘭德著作「熱賣」的底因。
這幾天正在閒讀《花花公子》創辦人赫夫納的傳記《花花公子先生》（S. Watts :Mr. Playboy-Hugh Hefner and the American Dream, Wiley），可記之事不少；今天要說的是，赫夫納原來受蘭德於1943年出版的成名小說《源頭》（Fountainhead）的影響甚深，她鼓吹無拘束不受規範的個人主義，成為赫夫納做人處世辦雜誌的指導原則（頁54─55）。《花花公子》對蘭德的訪問刊1964年三月號（訪員為於七十年代成大名的未來學家托夫拉〔A. Toffler〕），後由蘭德的「客觀主義者公司」以小冊子形式出單行本。
道指下一站6000點
2 月22日，周日。銀行股已成為「累人累物」之板塊，拖累整個股市下沉。上周五道指已創新低，唔知嗰D認為「牛市」重臨者點樣自圓其說矣。花旗、通用電氣、通用汽車、美國銀行皆大跌，愈係大藍籌愈畀人質；反之，唔少二線股卻守得住。
畢非德持有嘅美國運通、富國銀行、卡夫、Constellation Energy Group及通用電氣皆成為弱勢股。在熊市中，價值投資法係冇學習價值。
東歐國家唔少2001年起計劃加入歐盟，而獲得歐洲銀行大量貸款支持，2008年起卻風雨飄搖，亞洲地區國家2009年亦面對出口減少30-40%，令人擔心我地面對嘅唔止係衰退，仲可能出現蕭條！
二線股跑贏大市成趨勢
過去五十二個星期，共二千七百二十五隻美股表現優於標普五百，其中二千三百五十六隻係二線股。去年10月27日開始，本港二線股表現不但跑贏滙控（005），更加跑贏恒生指數。上述係偶發事件定係大趨勢？今年2月15日，分析界對標普五百去年第四季純利增長估計係負42.1％，為Thomson路透自1998年提供上述服務以來最差嘅一次；其中又以金融、原材料及消費產業最差。至今五百間大企業中已有三百八十五間公布業績，其中57％超過分析界估計、34％低於分析界估計（去年7月1日分析界估計去年第四季純利升59.3％；去年10月1日仍估計純利可升46.7％；今年1月1日改為負1.2％，由此可見情況係急轉直下）。2009年第一季又點？美國分析界估計純利係負增長29.8％（去年10月1日仍估計升25.7％，今年1月1日才估計負 12.5％）。美國經濟前景繼續惡化，最致命傷係嗰D「依賴資產價值支持嘅證券」（asset-backed securities），喺全球去槓桿化大趨勢下冇法子唔跌，分別只喺跌多定跌少。2007年投資者願為每1元純利付出20元代價（P/E二十倍），今天每1元純利投資者只願付8元代價（P/E八倍）；再加上去年企業純利普遍回落，此乃大熊市嘅背後理由。
令人擔心嘅係，道指下一站將見6000點。2009年1月美國出現近三十五年內最多人失業嘅一個月，依家已有超過五百萬美國人失業，消費信心進入極低潮，恐怕道指見6000點乃不久將來嘅事。Buy Smart乃熊市二期內嘅賺錢方法，只係有95.4%散戶做唔到，因為佢地投資冇策略可言（皆因冇睇我老曹《論戰》一書也）！
美國參議員格雷厄姆（美國銀行委員會成員）上周二建議將部分銀行國有化，可見美國銀行情況有幾惡劣。去年我老曹已指出最易嘅賺錢方法係拋空銀行股，只因我老曹無法解除自己嘅心魔，並冇加入拋空行列，只係避開。
今年上半年全球經濟表現相信十分惡劣，之後又如何？如果係結構性衰退（Structural Recession）而非周期性衰退（Cyclical Recession），即世界經濟秩序將進入重整，銀行系統無法履行合約，將引發數以萬計企業破產，數以百萬人失業（估計全球失業人口達一億人）。咁樣，即使今年大市經調整過後，2010年仍會出現另一次大跌市，即低潮喺2010年才出現；反之，如果只係周期性衰退（睇落唔似），復甦才可能响今年下半年出現。大部分回落趨勢（Downtrend）都以ABC浪完成。去年10月完成A浪，依家行緊B浪，未來仲有C浪。喺B浪獲利嘅策略係選擇性投資。
金價上升基於恐懼感
上周銀行股表現勁差，而金價繼續上升。購金者對經濟前景憂慮，但經濟前景同時面對 Credit Deflation 壓力；當信貸減少後，商品價格及服務需求減少，遲早跌價。我老曹雖唔反對大家小量揸金，但大手吸納可免則免。黃金現價已包含恐懼因素在內。聖路易聯儲銀行主席 James Bullard認為，2009年係 disinflation 期，並走向 deflation 期。我老曹睇唔到未來金價可為各位帶來一倍利潤嘅機會，一旦恐懼感消除，金價又將再回落。上周金價最高見1006美元，後市點睇？
七十年代金價上升二十五倍，見850美元，係最佳嘅揸金日子。八十年代、九十年代金價回落70%（加上美元購買力下降，投資黃金者實際虧損85%），並錯過美股超級大牛市。2001年起世界係咪進入七十年代式高通脹期？答案係否定嘅，因通脹呢頭怪獸响1980年已被雪茄伏用22厘息殺死（1980年CPI升幅14%）。2001年金價上升全因美元貶值，但美元貶值潮去年7月已停止。由呢個角度睇，金價升穿1036美元嘅機會唔大。格蛇支持國有化美資銀行，突顯咗美資銀行病情幾惡劣。去年10月至今金價上升，可能係反映投資市場對美國金融業嘅恐慌。呢類「情緒性」上升係無法預計嘅。因此，有金在手者可繼續揸，至於高追？我老曹冇意見。
哈佛大學經濟系教授 Kenneth Rogoff叫大家忘記2009年。過去美國人借入全球三分二儲蓄作為消費嘅時代已經結束。紐約大學嘅魯賓尼（Nouriel Roubini）更估計美國進入Ｌ形經濟，即復甦响很遠很遠嘅地方。至於「尋底」，日本人自1990年開始尋底，至今仍未肯定見底（暫時認為2003年4 月係底）。有人咁快就肯定2009年牛市重臨，只代表呢個人草率。日本人較美國人有更高儲蓄率，喺過去十九年仍捱到金睛火眼，美國人又點？今天嘅環境唔係猜測復甦幾時出現，而係眼前衰退會否變成蕭條（即連續兩年GDP負增長）。
美國面對嘅問題係依家消費者嘅負債為收入嘅130％，甚至喺2000年亦只係100％；儲蓄率係3％（2007年年底更跌至零），正常情況下係10％，响信貸泡沫期，人們購入太多冇實際用途嘅東西，因此減少25%消費並不困難。如重返正常水平，即美國要減少消費25％（或收入上升25％而同時唔再增加消費）。即未來三年內美國消費須減少10.5萬億美元，其中2.5萬億美元用作減債。估計今年第一季美國消費減少12％（去年第四季減少6.3％），以汽車業所受打擊最大（今年1月平均每千美國人只購入三十一點一架車，去年2月係五十點三架），上述調整估計需時二到三年才完成。
世界開始「Re-Balancing」，即歐美國家減少消費、增加儲蓄；中國增加消費、減少儲蓄。1973-74年衰退期係歐美國家經濟轉型期──由製造業轉向服務業。1981-82年衰退後，美國透過增加信貸而解決問題。2000年科網股泡沫爆破後，美國政府透過製造更大嘅泡沫（房地產泡沫）解決咗。呢次次按風暴後又點？經濟一如人，係有生命周期，例如成長期、青春期、中年期及老年期。依家美國經濟已進入老年期，香港則陷入中年危機，只有中國仍處青春期（即剛完成成長期）。
TARP 原先由殊仔時代嘅財長保爾森設計，依家已證明7000億美元並不足以向銀行界買入有毒資產，如今已改為2萬億美元。政府計劃先買5000億美元有毒資產，再買1萬億美元長線有毒資產……。不過，奧巴馬經濟顧問團嘅雪茄伏早已表示仍未足夠，提議：
一、讓有毒資產留喺銀行資產負債表內；
二、唔使銀行按市值入數；
三、銀行嘅真實財政狀況只向聯儲局公布，而將有毒資產列入「有問題資產」項目，毋須撥備；
四、容許投資者以拍賣方式買入銀行嘅有毒資產，逐步減少銀行手上有毒資產。
五、太差嘅銀行由政府接管，政府向銀行發出評級機制；太大嘅銀行將業務分拆出售去縮細其晒士。
六、被收購嘅銀行容許買家將有毒資產作100％撥備。
2008年起，美國連抵押品亦開始減值，因此引發信貸收縮。九十年代美國人認為日本政府處理不善才引發長期通縮。十九年後今天，美國人卻不作如是想。
中國增持原材料好時機
中國政府宣布為海外石油投資企業提供19500億美元低息貸款。油價由去年7月147.27美元大幅回落75％，估計喺2011年前唔少外國石油公司將成為中國石油公司嘅收購對象。勘探方面，估計未來三年中國可搵到新原油儲備七億噸、天然氣十萬二千立方米。另新建煉油設施四億四千萬噸（家吓三億九千五百萬噸一年），加建天然氣入口港於青島、寧波、唐山、珠海，以及加速煉油方面嘅投資。上述方案又為投資界提供唔少賺錢機會。換言之，呢次西方嘅次按風暴，對西方係「危」，對中國係「機」。2011年後中國經濟更強更有力。石油處於低價，正係中國增強能源來源嘅好時機。
西方國家陷入衰退，令全球原材料價廉物美，正係中國發展經濟嘅另一好時光。去年12月中國入口鐵礦石較2007年同期上升6.2％、銅礦升19.3％、原油升11.6％。政府亦向內地八間煉鋁廠購入二十九萬公噸鋁；1月13日公布計劃購入三十萬噸鋅。中國正在趁低吸納原材料，支持全球原材料價。估計美國衰退期仲有一兩年，足夠中國大手吸納低價原材料，令未來中國唔再受原材料漲價嘅威脅。
2 月16至20日內地有二十四家公司限售股解禁，總量五十五億二千萬股流入市場，市值430億元人民幣。其中地產行業佔第一位，然後係交通運輸及醫藥生物，分別佔二十二億九千七百萬股、七億四千五百萬股及四億三千一百萬股。內地Ａ股上周亦開始回落。
拉斯維加斯金沙股價由144美元狂瀉到3.4美元以下；MGM由99美元下跌到5.2美元；香港上市嘅新濠由22元跌到2.5 元；Boyd Gaming由50美元跌到5美元；Trump Entertainment由20多美元跌至18美仙並申請第11章。全球投資賭場股嘅人輸得幾慘，邊個話開賭肯定發達？經濟衰退壓力下，無論拉斯維加斯、大西洋城或澳門賭場無一幸免。但未來澳門仍有唔少賭場在興建中，我老曹真係唔知道佢地點樣度過呢個經濟冬季？
畢非德持有嘅美國運通、富國銀行、卡夫、Constellation Energy Group及通用電氣皆成為弱勢股。在熊市中，價值投資法係冇學習價值。
東歐國家唔少2001年起計劃加入歐盟，而獲得歐洲銀行大量貸款支持，2008年起卻風雨飄搖，亞洲地區國家2009年亦面對出口減少30-40%，令人擔心我地面對嘅唔止係衰退，仲可能出現蕭條！
二線股跑贏大市成趨勢
過去五十二個星期，共二千七百二十五隻美股表現優於標普五百，其中二千三百五十六隻係二線股。去年10月27日開始，本港二線股表現不但跑贏滙控（005），更加跑贏恒生指數。上述係偶發事件定係大趨勢？今年2月15日，分析界對標普五百去年第四季純利增長估計係負42.1％，為Thomson路透自1998年提供上述服務以來最差嘅一次；其中又以金融、原材料及消費產業最差。至今五百間大企業中已有三百八十五間公布業績，其中57％超過分析界估計、34％低於分析界估計（去年7月1日分析界估計去年第四季純利升59.3％；去年10月1日仍估計純利可升46.7％；今年1月1日改為負1.2％，由此可見情況係急轉直下）。2009年第一季又點？美國分析界估計純利係負增長29.8％（去年10月1日仍估計升25.7％，今年1月1日才估計負 12.5％）。美國經濟前景繼續惡化，最致命傷係嗰D「依賴資產價值支持嘅證券」（asset-backed securities），喺全球去槓桿化大趨勢下冇法子唔跌，分別只喺跌多定跌少。2007年投資者願為每1元純利付出20元代價（P/E二十倍），今天每1元純利投資者只願付8元代價（P/E八倍）；再加上去年企業純利普遍回落，此乃大熊市嘅背後理由。
令人擔心嘅係，道指下一站將見6000點。2009年1月美國出現近三十五年內最多人失業嘅一個月，依家已有超過五百萬美國人失業，消費信心進入極低潮，恐怕道指見6000點乃不久將來嘅事。Buy Smart乃熊市二期內嘅賺錢方法，只係有95.4%散戶做唔到，因為佢地投資冇策略可言（皆因冇睇我老曹《論戰》一書也）！
美國參議員格雷厄姆（美國銀行委員會成員）上周二建議將部分銀行國有化，可見美國銀行情況有幾惡劣。去年我老曹已指出最易嘅賺錢方法係拋空銀行股，只因我老曹無法解除自己嘅心魔，並冇加入拋空行列，只係避開。
今年上半年全球經濟表現相信十分惡劣，之後又如何？如果係結構性衰退（Structural Recession）而非周期性衰退（Cyclical Recession），即世界經濟秩序將進入重整，銀行系統無法履行合約，將引發數以萬計企業破產，數以百萬人失業（估計全球失業人口達一億人）。咁樣，即使今年大市經調整過後，2010年仍會出現另一次大跌市，即低潮喺2010年才出現；反之，如果只係周期性衰退（睇落唔似），復甦才可能响今年下半年出現。大部分回落趨勢（Downtrend）都以ABC浪完成。去年10月完成A浪，依家行緊B浪，未來仲有C浪。喺B浪獲利嘅策略係選擇性投資。
金價上升基於恐懼感
上周銀行股表現勁差，而金價繼續上升。購金者對經濟前景憂慮，但經濟前景同時面對 Credit Deflation 壓力；當信貸減少後，商品價格及服務需求減少，遲早跌價。我老曹雖唔反對大家小量揸金，但大手吸納可免則免。黃金現價已包含恐懼因素在內。聖路易聯儲銀行主席 James Bullard認為，2009年係 disinflation 期，並走向 deflation 期。我老曹睇唔到未來金價可為各位帶來一倍利潤嘅機會，一旦恐懼感消除，金價又將再回落。上周金價最高見1006美元，後市點睇？
七十年代金價上升二十五倍，見850美元，係最佳嘅揸金日子。八十年代、九十年代金價回落70%（加上美元購買力下降，投資黃金者實際虧損85%），並錯過美股超級大牛市。2001年起世界係咪進入七十年代式高通脹期？答案係否定嘅，因通脹呢頭怪獸响1980年已被雪茄伏用22厘息殺死（1980年CPI升幅14%）。2001年金價上升全因美元貶值，但美元貶值潮去年7月已停止。由呢個角度睇，金價升穿1036美元嘅機會唔大。格蛇支持國有化美資銀行，突顯咗美資銀行病情幾惡劣。去年10月至今金價上升，可能係反映投資市場對美國金融業嘅恐慌。呢類「情緒性」上升係無法預計嘅。因此，有金在手者可繼續揸，至於高追？我老曹冇意見。
哈佛大學經濟系教授 Kenneth Rogoff叫大家忘記2009年。過去美國人借入全球三分二儲蓄作為消費嘅時代已經結束。紐約大學嘅魯賓尼（Nouriel Roubini）更估計美國進入Ｌ形經濟，即復甦响很遠很遠嘅地方。至於「尋底」，日本人自1990年開始尋底，至今仍未肯定見底（暫時認為2003年4 月係底）。有人咁快就肯定2009年牛市重臨，只代表呢個人草率。日本人較美國人有更高儲蓄率，喺過去十九年仍捱到金睛火眼，美國人又點？今天嘅環境唔係猜測復甦幾時出現，而係眼前衰退會否變成蕭條（即連續兩年GDP負增長）。
美國面對嘅問題係依家消費者嘅負債為收入嘅130％，甚至喺2000年亦只係100％；儲蓄率係3％（2007年年底更跌至零），正常情況下係10％，响信貸泡沫期，人們購入太多冇實際用途嘅東西，因此減少25%消費並不困難。如重返正常水平，即美國要減少消費25％（或收入上升25％而同時唔再增加消費）。即未來三年內美國消費須減少10.5萬億美元，其中2.5萬億美元用作減債。估計今年第一季美國消費減少12％（去年第四季減少6.3％），以汽車業所受打擊最大（今年1月平均每千美國人只購入三十一點一架車，去年2月係五十點三架），上述調整估計需時二到三年才完成。
世界開始「Re-Balancing」，即歐美國家減少消費、增加儲蓄；中國增加消費、減少儲蓄。1973-74年衰退期係歐美國家經濟轉型期──由製造業轉向服務業。1981-82年衰退後，美國透過增加信貸而解決問題。2000年科網股泡沫爆破後，美國政府透過製造更大嘅泡沫（房地產泡沫）解決咗。呢次次按風暴後又點？經濟一如人，係有生命周期，例如成長期、青春期、中年期及老年期。依家美國經濟已進入老年期，香港則陷入中年危機，只有中國仍處青春期（即剛完成成長期）。
TARP 原先由殊仔時代嘅財長保爾森設計，依家已證明7000億美元並不足以向銀行界買入有毒資產，如今已改為2萬億美元。政府計劃先買5000億美元有毒資產，再買1萬億美元長線有毒資產……。不過，奧巴馬經濟顧問團嘅雪茄伏早已表示仍未足夠，提議：
一、讓有毒資產留喺銀行資產負債表內；
二、唔使銀行按市值入數；
三、銀行嘅真實財政狀況只向聯儲局公布，而將有毒資產列入「有問題資產」項目，毋須撥備；
四、容許投資者以拍賣方式買入銀行嘅有毒資產，逐步減少銀行手上有毒資產。
五、太差嘅銀行由政府接管，政府向銀行發出評級機制；太大嘅銀行將業務分拆出售去縮細其晒士。
六、被收購嘅銀行容許買家將有毒資產作100％撥備。
2008年起，美國連抵押品亦開始減值，因此引發信貸收縮。九十年代美國人認為日本政府處理不善才引發長期通縮。十九年後今天，美國人卻不作如是想。
中國增持原材料好時機
中國政府宣布為海外石油投資企業提供19500億美元低息貸款。油價由去年7月147.27美元大幅回落75％，估計喺2011年前唔少外國石油公司將成為中國石油公司嘅收購對象。勘探方面，估計未來三年中國可搵到新原油儲備七億噸、天然氣十萬二千立方米。另新建煉油設施四億四千萬噸（家吓三億九千五百萬噸一年），加建天然氣入口港於青島、寧波、唐山、珠海，以及加速煉油方面嘅投資。上述方案又為投資界提供唔少賺錢機會。換言之，呢次西方嘅次按風暴，對西方係「危」，對中國係「機」。2011年後中國經濟更強更有力。石油處於低價，正係中國增強能源來源嘅好時機。
西方國家陷入衰退，令全球原材料價廉物美，正係中國發展經濟嘅另一好時光。去年12月中國入口鐵礦石較2007年同期上升6.2％、銅礦升19.3％、原油升11.6％。政府亦向內地八間煉鋁廠購入二十九萬公噸鋁；1月13日公布計劃購入三十萬噸鋅。中國正在趁低吸納原材料，支持全球原材料價。估計美國衰退期仲有一兩年，足夠中國大手吸納低價原材料，令未來中國唔再受原材料漲價嘅威脅。
2 月16至20日內地有二十四家公司限售股解禁，總量五十五億二千萬股流入市場，市值430億元人民幣。其中地產行業佔第一位，然後係交通運輸及醫藥生物，分別佔二十二億九千七百萬股、七億四千五百萬股及四億三千一百萬股。內地Ａ股上周亦開始回落。
拉斯維加斯金沙股價由144美元狂瀉到3.4美元以下；MGM由99美元下跌到5.2美元；香港上市嘅新濠由22元跌到2.5 元；Boyd Gaming由50美元跌到5美元；Trump Entertainment由20多美元跌至18美仙並申請第11章。全球投資賭場股嘅人輸得幾慘，邊個話開賭肯定發達？經濟衰退壓力下，無論拉斯維加斯、大西洋城或澳門賭場無一幸免。但未來澳門仍有唔少賭場在興建中，我老曹真係唔知道佢地點樣度過呢個經濟冬季？
外圍未穩勿太興奮
3月4日，周三。港股在中資股推動下，結束連續四日的跌市，不過，歐美金融危機始終未能解決，恒指仍受制阻力位，大市無法出現突破。恒指收報12331點，升297點或2.5%。國指力闖七千關口，收報6948點，升330點或5%。
3月期指收報12248點，升327點，低水83點；4月期指收報12184點，跌292點，低水147點。
市場憧憬內地有更多刺激經濟措施出台，國內股市大升，上證綜合指數收報2198點，升126點或6%；滬深300指數收報2285點，升143點或7%。
「大時大節，阿爺出來做節」，這是民間投資智慧，以為胡、溫等領導人，一定會顧存面子，重要日子不會讓市道難看，是以內地股市必有一隻孔武有力之手托着。今次北京「兩會」又傳來很多好消息，幾位重要官員對「保八」發表樂觀言論，加上表明溫總續有刺激經濟方案出台，內地股市升逾半成。外圍憧憬中國經復甦帶動全球，資源股反彈，連華爾街早段也出現一番「中國熱」。
小心解讀訊息
不過，大家要清楚明白，領導人今時今日已十分務實，2008年北京奧運8月8日開幕，許多人深信股市將大升，但直到開幕也不見「贈慶」之舉，上證綜合指數期間不升反跌；不久即爆發金融海嘯，什麼「後奧運效應」、繼續托市之說徹底幻滅。然而，確實有一股力量不想內地股市下跌，這就是外邊急於找避難所的熱錢，以及國內心急如焚（返本）的股民，他們都會抓着每一個消息大造文章。
由於中、港股市氣氛借「兩會」消息稍為好轉，外國傳媒再度猜測，這是背後有人出手托市之故。如果要從倫理煽情角度去想，老畢相信中央最擔心的是反而是大小企業誤入炒股歧途，理由是面對全球需求萎縮，企業賺錢難若登天，但難都要撑下去，政協主席賈慶林在工作報告中便提出，大家要盡量做到不裁員、不欠薪。言下之意，即要企業集中精神做好自己的生意。中央體諒企業困難，已主動放寬信貸，因為許多廠家反映訂單大減，如果還要面對借貸無門之苦，搞下去只有關廠遣散這條路，大批工人失業，正是中央萬萬不想見到的事。
如果當局發出錯誤訊息，人人以為內地股市有中央出手力托，那就難保手上有信貸的企業會受不住引誘，拿原本出糧、買料的錢，轉到市場炒幾轉，希望上落之間賺夠皮費。這樣的話，內地股市短期內想不大升也難，但最終會累到幾多企業關門，幾多工人失業？
港股總市值半壁江山已由中資股佔據，內地政策消息對香港股市有很大的牽動作用，但一則政策市虛虛實實，二則內地經濟壞消息尚未出盡，三則外圍形勢甚差（不要被一兩天的反彈誤導），內地刺激經濟措施對港股甚至A股，恐怕都只有短暫的支持作用，大形勢仍得看歐美。
西歐大國對挽救東歐並不熱心，但這是歐洲內部問題，外人包括中美均難直接接手，只能透過IMF間接為東歐紓困，效用非常有限。美國方面，昨天已說過，像AIG這種牽涉巨大「交易對手風險」（counterparty risk）的金融機構，不論業績如何差劣、虧蝕何等驚人，美國政府都只能被動地給予無限量支持，救AIG無異於救整個金融體系，華府實際上已被這類在熱錢橫流時不負責任的金融機構「挾持」。貝南奇周二出席參議院預算委員會會議時，一反常態大動肝火，痛斥AIG名為保險機構，實為對沖基金，利用監管制度漏洞豪賭。可是，AIG出事，你貝南奇能不救嗎？
曹Sir最近為美股把脈，其中一篇「筆記」題為〈道指下一站6000點〉。事隔二周，道指離這個「目標」已不遠。那麼，最差可以怎樣？
美股最差可以點？
華爾街過去一世紀曾出現四個巨型股市泡沫，分別在1901、1929、1966和2000年爆破。因《非理性亢奮》一書、大名街知巷聞的耶魯大學經濟學家席勒（Robert Shiller），在其個人網站羅列了一系列標普五百指數統計，包括按成分股十年平均盈利計算出來的市盈率（cyclically adjusted P/Es）。根據這項指標，上述四次股市狂潮處於頂峰時，市盈率均接近或超過二十五倍。美股2007年10月見頂時，以席勒的計算方法，市盈率雖未達1929和2000年的水平，但比1966和1901年都要高，即超過二十五倍。
過去百年股市狂潮最重要的訊息是，在1901、1929和1966年三次泡沫爆破後，標普五百指數市盈率均要跌至單位數（五至八倍）才見底。2000年雖屬例外，但按照席勒的方式計算，當時標普五百指數市盈率達四十五倍，絕後也許未必，空前卻可肯定。科網狂潮的估值水平不能以正常眼光觀之，自然亦不宜用作比較基礎。
經過近期急挫後，標普五百指數當下險守700點水平。假設席勒對美國企業去年業績估算不變（十年平均盈利因而不改），標普五百指數市盈率目前便處於十二倍高一點的水平【主圖】，不能說不吸引。
然而，投資者必須考慮的是，二十世紀三個巨型泡沫爆破後，標普五百指數市盈率均從二十五倍一直跌到五至八倍才見底。歷史雖不會簡單地重覆，但這次由信貸泛濫、銀行危機觸發的股災，跟1901和1929年的軌迹甚為相似。聯儲局和財政部一再出招，問題仍無法解決，有誰可以肯定最壞的情況不會發生？
那麼，根據席勒的估值模式，標普五百指數要跌至什麽水平才見底？答案在附表可以找到，對號入座即可。
港交所（388）去年業績認真麻麻，倒退一成七，雖說在此惡劣環境下，有此表現已屬難得，但身處熊市之中，難望公司如往昔般排隊上市、股民等天光抽新股。企業上市減少、股票交易萎縮，港交所豈不是愈賺愈少，由於這不是政府部門，而是上市公司，股東必然會問，有什麼辦法可以彌補這方面的收入損失？
逆向ETFs有可為
港交所業績披露，牛熊證市場大幅增長，兩年間由每日成交不足1億元，增至去年的42.4億元，佔現貨市場成交總額近6%。香港的衍生產品經常被人視為「博彩」，但「大市淡薄，多咗人賭博」是必然現象，問題是港交所有沒有為風險承受能力有限的散戶，提供真正適合他們的產品，例如推出更多沒有槓桿或槓桿倍數低的工具？紐約證交所有不少逆向ETFs掛牌，讓難以承受高風險、但又想造淡的投資者買賣。港交所可有想過大力拓展這類產品？
3月期指收報12248點，升327點，低水83點；4月期指收報12184點，跌292點，低水147點。
市場憧憬內地有更多刺激經濟措施出台，國內股市大升，上證綜合指數收報2198點，升126點或6%；滬深300指數收報2285點，升143點或7%。
「大時大節，阿爺出來做節」，這是民間投資智慧，以為胡、溫等領導人，一定會顧存面子，重要日子不會讓市道難看，是以內地股市必有一隻孔武有力之手托着。今次北京「兩會」又傳來很多好消息，幾位重要官員對「保八」發表樂觀言論，加上表明溫總續有刺激經濟方案出台，內地股市升逾半成。外圍憧憬中國經復甦帶動全球，資源股反彈，連華爾街早段也出現一番「中國熱」。
小心解讀訊息
不過，大家要清楚明白，領導人今時今日已十分務實，2008年北京奧運8月8日開幕，許多人深信股市將大升，但直到開幕也不見「贈慶」之舉，上證綜合指數期間不升反跌；不久即爆發金融海嘯，什麼「後奧運效應」、繼續托市之說徹底幻滅。然而，確實有一股力量不想內地股市下跌，這就是外邊急於找避難所的熱錢，以及國內心急如焚（返本）的股民，他們都會抓着每一個消息大造文章。
由於中、港股市氣氛借「兩會」消息稍為好轉，外國傳媒再度猜測，這是背後有人出手托市之故。如果要從倫理煽情角度去想，老畢相信中央最擔心的是反而是大小企業誤入炒股歧途，理由是面對全球需求萎縮，企業賺錢難若登天，但難都要撑下去，政協主席賈慶林在工作報告中便提出，大家要盡量做到不裁員、不欠薪。言下之意，即要企業集中精神做好自己的生意。中央體諒企業困難，已主動放寬信貸，因為許多廠家反映訂單大減，如果還要面對借貸無門之苦，搞下去只有關廠遣散這條路，大批工人失業，正是中央萬萬不想見到的事。
如果當局發出錯誤訊息，人人以為內地股市有中央出手力托，那就難保手上有信貸的企業會受不住引誘，拿原本出糧、買料的錢，轉到市場炒幾轉，希望上落之間賺夠皮費。這樣的話，內地股市短期內想不大升也難，但最終會累到幾多企業關門，幾多工人失業？
港股總市值半壁江山已由中資股佔據，內地政策消息對香港股市有很大的牽動作用，但一則政策市虛虛實實，二則內地經濟壞消息尚未出盡，三則外圍形勢甚差（不要被一兩天的反彈誤導），內地刺激經濟措施對港股甚至A股，恐怕都只有短暫的支持作用，大形勢仍得看歐美。
西歐大國對挽救東歐並不熱心，但這是歐洲內部問題，外人包括中美均難直接接手，只能透過IMF間接為東歐紓困，效用非常有限。美國方面，昨天已說過，像AIG這種牽涉巨大「交易對手風險」（counterparty risk）的金融機構，不論業績如何差劣、虧蝕何等驚人，美國政府都只能被動地給予無限量支持，救AIG無異於救整個金融體系，華府實際上已被這類在熱錢橫流時不負責任的金融機構「挾持」。貝南奇周二出席參議院預算委員會會議時，一反常態大動肝火，痛斥AIG名為保險機構，實為對沖基金，利用監管制度漏洞豪賭。可是，AIG出事，你貝南奇能不救嗎？
曹Sir最近為美股把脈，其中一篇「筆記」題為〈道指下一站6000點〉。事隔二周，道指離這個「目標」已不遠。那麼，最差可以怎樣？
美股最差可以點？
華爾街過去一世紀曾出現四個巨型股市泡沫，分別在1901、1929、1966和2000年爆破。因《非理性亢奮》一書、大名街知巷聞的耶魯大學經濟學家席勒（Robert Shiller），在其個人網站羅列了一系列標普五百指數統計，包括按成分股十年平均盈利計算出來的市盈率（cyclically adjusted P/Es）。根據這項指標，上述四次股市狂潮處於頂峰時，市盈率均接近或超過二十五倍。美股2007年10月見頂時，以席勒的計算方法，市盈率雖未達1929和2000年的水平，但比1966和1901年都要高，即超過二十五倍。
過去百年股市狂潮最重要的訊息是，在1901、1929和1966年三次泡沫爆破後，標普五百指數市盈率均要跌至單位數（五至八倍）才見底。2000年雖屬例外，但按照席勒的方式計算，當時標普五百指數市盈率達四十五倍，絕後也許未必，空前卻可肯定。科網狂潮的估值水平不能以正常眼光觀之，自然亦不宜用作比較基礎。
經過近期急挫後，標普五百指數當下險守700點水平。假設席勒對美國企業去年業績估算不變（十年平均盈利因而不改），標普五百指數市盈率目前便處於十二倍高一點的水平【主圖】，不能說不吸引。
然而，投資者必須考慮的是，二十世紀三個巨型泡沫爆破後，標普五百指數市盈率均從二十五倍一直跌到五至八倍才見底。歷史雖不會簡單地重覆，但這次由信貸泛濫、銀行危機觸發的股災，跟1901和1929年的軌迹甚為相似。聯儲局和財政部一再出招，問題仍無法解決，有誰可以肯定最壞的情況不會發生？
那麼，根據席勒的估值模式，標普五百指數要跌至什麽水平才見底？答案在附表可以找到，對號入座即可。
港交所（388）去年業績認真麻麻，倒退一成七，雖說在此惡劣環境下，有此表現已屬難得，但身處熊市之中，難望公司如往昔般排隊上市、股民等天光抽新股。企業上市減少、股票交易萎縮，港交所豈不是愈賺愈少，由於這不是政府部門，而是上市公司，股東必然會問，有什麼辦法可以彌補這方面的收入損失？
逆向ETFs有可為
港交所業績披露，牛熊證市場大幅增長，兩年間由每日成交不足1億元，增至去年的42.4億元，佔現貨市場成交總額近6%。香港的衍生產品經常被人視為「博彩」，但「大市淡薄，多咗人賭博」是必然現象，問題是港交所有沒有為風險承受能力有限的散戶，提供真正適合他們的產品，例如推出更多沒有槓桿或槓桿倍數低的工具？紐約證交所有不少逆向ETFs掛牌，讓難以承受高風險、但又想造淡的投資者買賣。港交所可有想過大力拓展這類產品？
Stock market, politics weigh on Malaysian property
THE two biggest dampeners threatening Malaysia’s property market this year are the country’s moribund stock market and political uncertainty, a survey of chief executives has found.
Unemployment is viewed as a third negative, according to an annual CEO opinion survey conducted by real estate consultancy CH Williams Talhar & Wong (WTW) in November 2008.
Political problems might have been cited as the No. 1 factor likely to hurt property prices and sales had the survey been carried out more recently.
Political hostility has escalated sharply, underscored by the constitutional crisis in Perak which has brought the state to an operational standstill and sparked public division.
While little has been done to minimise politicking, industry players hope a mini-budget or second economic stimulus package will support the property sector.
According to the CEOs surveyed by WTW, the most beneficial would be property gains tax exemption, a 50 per cent cut in stamp duty and more funds for the country’s various economic corridors.
The outlook for property this year is bleak, with feedback from WTW offices throughout Malaysia pointing to a downturn in all sectors.
‘Sorry, there is no good news. Everything is down,’ was WTW managing partner Goh Tian Sui’s frank assessment at the firm’s 2009 outlook briefing yesterday.
WTW’s findings were backed by a survey of CEOs involved in real estate. Most said all property segments are in the early stages of a downturn - suggesting things have not hit bottom.
Compared with 2007, sales growth dropped last year in almost all major cities, especially Kuala Lumpur.
As a result of launches from 2005 onwards, plenty of new space will be added in the Klang Valley this year - an estimated 3.44 million square feet of office space, 3.3 million sq ft of retail space, almost 2,000 new hotel rooms and 5,000-plus luxury condo units.
Given the shaky state of the economy - growth in the fourth quarter of 2008 was just 0.1 per cent - demand for all of this extra space looks uncertain.
In the residential segment, many developers have focused on large units exceeding 3,000-4,000 sq ft, which at an average of RM5 (S$2) per square foot would mean monthly rent of RM15,000 or more. Unfortunately, the market lacks expatriates.
In the hospitality sector, hotels operated at an average occupancy rate of 70 per cent last year.
Although Malaysia has been hit less by declining tourism than its neighbours, the pace of growth is slowing, mainly because of a high base.
Wariness over property is probably greatest in the commercial segment, where proposed acquisitions have been called off because of the deterioration in the economy.
IOI Corporation lost a RM73.4 million deposit on Menara Citibank in central Kuala Lumpur when it decided against completing the RM587 million deal.
WTW’s snapshot of major office transactions shows that in 2006-2007, 56 buildings worth a total of RM6 billion changed hands, with foreigners acquiring 28 per cent.
Last year, only 12 buildings valued at RM3.8 billion were transacted, but foreigners accounted for 61 per cent of the acquisitions.
For those with loads of cash and little gearing, the outlook is bright.
‘It’s a good time to look,’ Mr Goh said yesterday, noting that owners are much more open to negotiating prices now than they were six months ago.
Unemployment is viewed as a third negative, according to an annual CEO opinion survey conducted by real estate consultancy CH Williams Talhar & Wong (WTW) in November 2008.
Political problems might have been cited as the No. 1 factor likely to hurt property prices and sales had the survey been carried out more recently.
Political hostility has escalated sharply, underscored by the constitutional crisis in Perak which has brought the state to an operational standstill and sparked public division.
While little has been done to minimise politicking, industry players hope a mini-budget or second economic stimulus package will support the property sector.
According to the CEOs surveyed by WTW, the most beneficial would be property gains tax exemption, a 50 per cent cut in stamp duty and more funds for the country’s various economic corridors.
The outlook for property this year is bleak, with feedback from WTW offices throughout Malaysia pointing to a downturn in all sectors.
‘Sorry, there is no good news. Everything is down,’ was WTW managing partner Goh Tian Sui’s frank assessment at the firm’s 2009 outlook briefing yesterday.
WTW’s findings were backed by a survey of CEOs involved in real estate. Most said all property segments are in the early stages of a downturn - suggesting things have not hit bottom.
Compared with 2007, sales growth dropped last year in almost all major cities, especially Kuala Lumpur.
As a result of launches from 2005 onwards, plenty of new space will be added in the Klang Valley this year - an estimated 3.44 million square feet of office space, 3.3 million sq ft of retail space, almost 2,000 new hotel rooms and 5,000-plus luxury condo units.
Given the shaky state of the economy - growth in the fourth quarter of 2008 was just 0.1 per cent - demand for all of this extra space looks uncertain.
In the residential segment, many developers have focused on large units exceeding 3,000-4,000 sq ft, which at an average of RM5 (S$2) per square foot would mean monthly rent of RM15,000 or more. Unfortunately, the market lacks expatriates.
In the hospitality sector, hotels operated at an average occupancy rate of 70 per cent last year.
Although Malaysia has been hit less by declining tourism than its neighbours, the pace of growth is slowing, mainly because of a high base.
Wariness over property is probably greatest in the commercial segment, where proposed acquisitions have been called off because of the deterioration in the economy.
IOI Corporation lost a RM73.4 million deposit on Menara Citibank in central Kuala Lumpur when it decided against completing the RM587 million deal.
WTW’s snapshot of major office transactions shows that in 2006-2007, 56 buildings worth a total of RM6 billion changed hands, with foreigners acquiring 28 per cent.
Last year, only 12 buildings valued at RM3.8 billion were transacted, but foreigners accounted for 61 per cent of the acquisitions.
For those with loads of cash and little gearing, the outlook is bright.
‘It’s a good time to look,’ Mr Goh said yesterday, noting that owners are much more open to negotiating prices now than they were six months ago.
Property developers get ‘kiasu’
Some developers are getting so “kiasu” (afraid to lose out) that they are getting the original buyers of homes to indemnify them should a sub-purchaser fail to pay. However, the Controller of Housing has told at least one developer, Keppel Land, that this is wrong.
The issue was raised when the buyer of an apartment at Park Infinia at Wee Nam Road, just off Keng Lee Road, tried to sell the unit bought from KepLand.
The developer had wanted the original buyer to not only be liable for breaches by the sub-purchaser, but also to ensure that property tax and maintenance bills are paid.
Asked to sign such a form, the original buyer asked lawyers to look into its enforceability. The lawyers then wrote to the Housing Controller for advice.
In response to the law firm, the Controller of Housing said in a letter seen by TODAY: “We are of the view that requiring your clients to sign a Letter of Authority with the indemnity clause stated above is contrary to the intention of rule 16 of the Housing Developers Rules, which requires a developer to enter into a fresh S&P Agreement (Sale and Purchase) with the sub-purchasers on the same terms and obligations as the original purchasers. This will place the sub-purchasers in a direct contractual relationship with the developer and releases the original purchasers from their obligations under the original S&P Agreement.”
The Controller added: “We have therefore written to the developer to request that the indemnity clause be deleted from the Letter of Authority which your clients have been asked to sign and complete the sub-sale expeditiously.”
A KepLand spokesman said the matter had since been resolved between the company and the purchaser, and the offending clause taken out of the S&P agreement.
A lawyer-friend of the purchaser said: “The clause should never have been included in the first place. How can any purchaser keep tabs on the financial position of a sub-purchaser down the road?”
Sources said this was not first time that KepLand had asked original purchasers to sign the indemnity form. It also appears that other developers have asked their purchasers to sign similar forms or are keen to follow KepLand’s example.
“In the current climate where scores of purchasers are said to be defaulting on their mortgage payments, it’s not hard to see why developers have to resort to such measures to protect their own interests,” said a prominent developer.
Against a backdrop of rising business failures and unemployment, property industry observers think mortgage defaults could increase this year. As a result, banks have become stricter on their mortgage financing, especially for those buying second and third properties.
The issue was raised when the buyer of an apartment at Park Infinia at Wee Nam Road, just off Keng Lee Road, tried to sell the unit bought from KepLand.
The developer had wanted the original buyer to not only be liable for breaches by the sub-purchaser, but also to ensure that property tax and maintenance bills are paid.
Asked to sign such a form, the original buyer asked lawyers to look into its enforceability. The lawyers then wrote to the Housing Controller for advice.
In response to the law firm, the Controller of Housing said in a letter seen by TODAY: “We are of the view that requiring your clients to sign a Letter of Authority with the indemnity clause stated above is contrary to the intention of rule 16 of the Housing Developers Rules, which requires a developer to enter into a fresh S&P Agreement (Sale and Purchase) with the sub-purchasers on the same terms and obligations as the original purchasers. This will place the sub-purchasers in a direct contractual relationship with the developer and releases the original purchasers from their obligations under the original S&P Agreement.”
The Controller added: “We have therefore written to the developer to request that the indemnity clause be deleted from the Letter of Authority which your clients have been asked to sign and complete the sub-sale expeditiously.”
A KepLand spokesman said the matter had since been resolved between the company and the purchaser, and the offending clause taken out of the S&P agreement.
A lawyer-friend of the purchaser said: “The clause should never have been included in the first place. How can any purchaser keep tabs on the financial position of a sub-purchaser down the road?”
Sources said this was not first time that KepLand had asked original purchasers to sign the indemnity form. It also appears that other developers have asked their purchasers to sign similar forms or are keen to follow KepLand’s example.
“In the current climate where scores of purchasers are said to be defaulting on their mortgage payments, it’s not hard to see why developers have to resort to such measures to protect their own interests,” said a prominent developer.
Against a backdrop of rising business failures and unemployment, property industry observers think mortgage defaults could increase this year. As a result, banks have become stricter on their mortgage financing, especially for those buying second and third properties.
Tuesday, March 3, 2009
Another Wave of Withdrawals Expected to Hit Hedge Funds
The race for the door at hedge funds isn't letting up.
With financial markets in disarray and the alleged fraud by money manager Bernard Madoff casting a pall on the industry, investors have been demanding their money back at a relentless rate in the first weeks of 2009. That is forcing some of the world's best-known hedge-fund managers, who had hoped that massive withdrawals in December would be the worst of it, to brace for another wave.
Among the managers expecting withdrawals are New York-based D.E. Shaw & Co. and Och-Ziff Capital Management Group LLC, which together manage more than $50 billion in assets. Huw van Steenis, an analyst at Morgan Stanley in London, says he has seen "no deceleration" in investors' requests to pull money out of hedge funds. As a result, he estimates that assets under management in the global hedge-fund industry will shrink by as much as 30% this year due to withdrawals, following a 20% decrease in the second half of last year. That leaves total assets at less than $1 trillion, down from their peak of more than $1.9 trillion in mid-2008.
The exodus comes at a time when hedge funds are under fire on a number of fronts. Policy makers, seeking to root out the causes of the financial crisis, have subjected hedge-fund managers to public grillings and are planning greater regulatory scrutiny. Meanwhile, many hedge-fund investors were caught up in the alleged Ponzi scheme run by Madoff, further tarnishing the industry's reputation.
Overall, investment performance at hedge funds has shown signs of improvement this year.
Hedge funds as a group were flat for January after a 19% decline in 2008, according to data tracker Hedge Fund Research Inc.
Part of the explanation for the wave of withdrawals lies in the way hedge funds work. Many hedge funds, particularly U.S.-based funds, allow investors to take their money out only at quarterly intervals, requiring two to three months' notice. That means that investors who discovered in mid-December that they had lost money in the Madoff case and needed to raise extra cash wouldn't have been able to submit their requests in time for the end of last year.
Also, many U.S. hedge funds are playing catch up with their European peers, which bore the brunt of withdrawals late last year. In Europe, managers typically have shorter notice periods and rely heavily on money from high-net-worth individuals, who have moved more quickly to pull out money than the pension funds, college endowments and other institutions that make up a large portion of U.S. hedge-fund investors. Mr. van Steenis estimates that European funds had redemptions of as much as 30% of their assets during the second half of 2008, compared with as much as 20% in the U.S. Roughly three quarters of the industry's assets are in U.S. funds.
Morgan Stanley estimates that Och-Ziff investors could withdraw $2.1 billion during the first half of 2009. That comes on top of the $5.4 billion of net outflows Och-Ziff experienced during 2008, reducing its assets under management to $22.1 billion as of Jan. 1. "We believe that the industry-wide redemption cycle is not yet over," Chief Executive Daniel Och said in a Feb. 12 conference call with analysts.
D.E. Shaw has had more requests for withdrawals for the period ended March 31 than it did for the end of last year, according to people familiar with the matter. The money manager's assets shrank by $9 billion in the second half of last year to $30 billion, due to a combination of investment losses and withdrawals. Late last year, it placed limits on withdrawals from two of its funds after receiving requests for more than 8% of assets in one of them and more than 6% on the other.
In Europe, some fund managers are enjoying a respite. "We've actually seen a dramatic slowdown in the pace of redemptions," Noam Gottesman, co-CEO of London-based GLG Partners LP, said in a Feb. 12 conference call with analysts. He attributed it to the fact that GLG had been hit earlier than many funds because of the loss of one of its key managers last year. GLG's assets fell by $9.6 billion, or about 40%, last year to $15 billion. Still, he said, "it will take some time to win people's trust back."
In the U.S., the "extreme level of redemptions" is pushing New York-based Jana Partners LLC to set aside hard-to-sell assets to prevent them being sold to meet withdrawal requests for March, the firm told investors in a recent letter. Investors have asked to pull 20% to 30% of assets in March, coming on top of the 35% of assets the firm paid out in January. Jana will honor those requests, it said -- minus the illiquid assets that it is setting aside until markets improve.
With financial markets in disarray and the alleged fraud by money manager Bernard Madoff casting a pall on the industry, investors have been demanding their money back at a relentless rate in the first weeks of 2009. That is forcing some of the world's best-known hedge-fund managers, who had hoped that massive withdrawals in December would be the worst of it, to brace for another wave.
Among the managers expecting withdrawals are New York-based D.E. Shaw & Co. and Och-Ziff Capital Management Group LLC, which together manage more than $50 billion in assets. Huw van Steenis, an analyst at Morgan Stanley in London, says he has seen "no deceleration" in investors' requests to pull money out of hedge funds. As a result, he estimates that assets under management in the global hedge-fund industry will shrink by as much as 30% this year due to withdrawals, following a 20% decrease in the second half of last year. That leaves total assets at less than $1 trillion, down from their peak of more than $1.9 trillion in mid-2008.
The exodus comes at a time when hedge funds are under fire on a number of fronts. Policy makers, seeking to root out the causes of the financial crisis, have subjected hedge-fund managers to public grillings and are planning greater regulatory scrutiny. Meanwhile, many hedge-fund investors were caught up in the alleged Ponzi scheme run by Madoff, further tarnishing the industry's reputation.
Overall, investment performance at hedge funds has shown signs of improvement this year.
Hedge funds as a group were flat for January after a 19% decline in 2008, according to data tracker Hedge Fund Research Inc.
Part of the explanation for the wave of withdrawals lies in the way hedge funds work. Many hedge funds, particularly U.S.-based funds, allow investors to take their money out only at quarterly intervals, requiring two to three months' notice. That means that investors who discovered in mid-December that they had lost money in the Madoff case and needed to raise extra cash wouldn't have been able to submit their requests in time for the end of last year.
Also, many U.S. hedge funds are playing catch up with their European peers, which bore the brunt of withdrawals late last year. In Europe, managers typically have shorter notice periods and rely heavily on money from high-net-worth individuals, who have moved more quickly to pull out money than the pension funds, college endowments and other institutions that make up a large portion of U.S. hedge-fund investors. Mr. van Steenis estimates that European funds had redemptions of as much as 30% of their assets during the second half of 2008, compared with as much as 20% in the U.S. Roughly three quarters of the industry's assets are in U.S. funds.
Morgan Stanley estimates that Och-Ziff investors could withdraw $2.1 billion during the first half of 2009. That comes on top of the $5.4 billion of net outflows Och-Ziff experienced during 2008, reducing its assets under management to $22.1 billion as of Jan. 1. "We believe that the industry-wide redemption cycle is not yet over," Chief Executive Daniel Och said in a Feb. 12 conference call with analysts.
D.E. Shaw has had more requests for withdrawals for the period ended March 31 than it did for the end of last year, according to people familiar with the matter. The money manager's assets shrank by $9 billion in the second half of last year to $30 billion, due to a combination of investment losses and withdrawals. Late last year, it placed limits on withdrawals from two of its funds after receiving requests for more than 8% of assets in one of them and more than 6% on the other.
In Europe, some fund managers are enjoying a respite. "We've actually seen a dramatic slowdown in the pace of redemptions," Noam Gottesman, co-CEO of London-based GLG Partners LP, said in a Feb. 12 conference call with analysts. He attributed it to the fact that GLG had been hit earlier than many funds because of the loss of one of its key managers last year. GLG's assets fell by $9.6 billion, or about 40%, last year to $15 billion. Still, he said, "it will take some time to win people's trust back."
In the U.S., the "extreme level of redemptions" is pushing New York-based Jana Partners LLC to set aside hard-to-sell assets to prevent them being sold to meet withdrawal requests for March, the firm told investors in a recent letter. Investors have asked to pull 20% to 30% of assets in March, coming on top of the 35% of assets the firm paid out in January. Jana will honor those requests, it said -- minus the illiquid assets that it is setting aside until markets improve.
Europe's Crisis: Much Bigger Than Subprime, Worse Than U.S.
Europe has borrowed $1.7 trillion abroad, much on short-term maturities. It must repay ? or roll over ? $400bn this year, equal to a third of the region's GDP. Good luck. The credit window has slammed shut.
Not even Russia can easily cover the $500bn dollar debts of its oligarchs while oil remains near $33 a barrel. The budget is based on Urals crude at $95. Russia has bled 36pc of its foreign reserves since August defending the rouble.
"This is the largest run on a currency in history," said Mr Jen.
In Poland , 60pc of mortgages are in Swiss francs. The zloty has just halved against the franc. Hungary , the Balkans, the Baltics, and Ukraine are all suffering variants of this story. As an act of collective folly ? by lenders and borrowers ? it matches America 's sub-prime debacle.. There is a crucial difference, however. European banks are on the hook for both. US banks are not.
Almost all East bloc debts are owed to West Europe , especially Austrian, Swedish, Greek, Italian, and Belgian banks. En plus, Europeans account for an astonishing 74pc of the entire $4.9 trillion portfolio of loans to emerging markets.
They are five times more exposed to this latest bust than American or Japanese banks, and they are 50pc more leveraged (IMF data). Spain is up to its neck in Latin America , which has belatedly joined the slump ( Mexico 's car output fell 51pc in January, and Brazil lost 650,000 jobs in one month). Britain and Switzerland are up to their necks in Asia .
Whether it takes months, or just weeks, the world is going to discover that Europe's financial system is sunk, and that there is no EU Federal Reserve yet ready to act as a lender of last resort or to flood the markets with emergency stimulus.
A note from Strategic Energy, as quoted by John Mauldin:
"The sums needed are beyond the limits of the IMF, which has already bailed out Hungary , Ukraine , Latvia , Belarus , Iceland , and Pakistan -- and Turkey next -- and is fast exhausting its own $200bn (€155bn) reserve. We are nearing the point where the IMF may have to print money for the world, using arcane powers to issue Special Drawing Rights. Its $16bn rescue of Ukraine has unravelled. The country -- facing a 12% contraction in GDP after the collapse of steel prices -- is hurtling towards default, leaving Unicredit, Raffeisen and ING in the lurch. Pakistan wants another $7.6bn.
Latvia's central bank governor has declared his economy "clinically dead" after it shrank 10.5% in the fourth quarter. Protesters have smashed the treasury and stormed parliament.
"'This is much worse than the East Asia crisis in the 1990s,' said Lars Christensen, at Danske Bank. 'There are accidents waiting to happen across the region, but the EU institutions don't have any framework for dealing with this. The day they decide not to save one of these one countries will be the trigger for a massive crisis with contagion spreading into the EU.'
Europe is already in deeper trouble than the ECB or EU leaders ever expected. Germany contracted at an annual rate of 8.4% in the fourth quarter. If Deutsche Bank is correct, the economy will have shrunk by nearly 9% before the end of this year. This is the sort of level that stokes popular revolt.
"The implications are obvious. Berlin is not going to rescue Ireland, Spain, Greece and Portugal as the collapse of their credit bubbles leads to rising defaults, or rescue Italy by accepting plans for EU "union bonds" should the debt markets take fright at the rocketing trajectory of Italy 's public debt (hitting 112pc of GDP next year, just revised up from 101pc -- big change), or rescue Austria from its Habsburg adventurism. So we watch and wait as the lethal brush fires move closer. If one spark jumps across the eurozone line, we will have global systemic crisis within days. Are the firemen ready?"
This is why some folks think the dollar is going to remain strong over the coming months: Because the rest of the world is falling apart even faster than we are.
Just as the global economy wasn't "decoupled" at the beginning of 2007, however (when the majority of Wall Street strategists believed that it was), it's not "decoupled" now. So the collapse of Eastern Europe --and, with it, the Western European banks--would almost certainly jump across the pond.
John Mauldin summarizes:
Eastern Europe has borrowed an estimated $1.7 trillion, primarily from Western European banks. And much of Eastern Europe is already in a deep recession bordering on depression. A great deal of that $1.7 trillion is at risk, especially the portion that is in Swiss francs. It is a story that could easily be as big as the US subprime problem.
In Poland , as an example, 60% of mortgages are in Swiss francs. When times are good and currencies are stable, it is nice to have a low-interest Swiss mortgage. And as a requirement for joining the euro currency union, Poland has been required to keep its currency stable against the euro. This gave borrowers comfort that they could borrow at low interest in francs or euros, rather than at much higher local rates.
But in an echo of teaser-rate subprimes here in the US , there is a problem.
Along came the synchronized global recession and large Polish current-account trade deficits, which were three times those of the US in terms of GDP, just to give us some perspective. Of course, if you are not a reserve currency this is going to bring some pressure to bear. And it did.
The Polish zloty has basically dropped in half compared to the Swiss franc. That means if you are a mortgage holder, your house payment just doubled. That same story is repeated all over the Baltics and Eastern Europe. Austrian banks have lent $289 billion (230 billion euros) to Eastern Europe. That is 70% of Austrian GDP. Much of it is in Swiss francs they borrowed from Swiss banks. Even a 10% impairment (highly optimistic) would bankrupt the Austrian financial system, says the Austrian finance minister, Joseph Proll. In the US we speak of banks that are too big to be allowed to
fail. But the reality is that we could nationalize them if we needed to do so. (And for the record, I favor nationalization and swift privatization. We cannot afford a repeat of Japan 's zombie banks.)
The problem is that in Europe there are many banks that are simply too big to save. The size of the banks in terms of the GDP of the country in which they are domiciled is all out of proportion. For my American readers, it would be as if the bank bailout package were in excess of $14 trillion(give or take a few trillion). In essence, there are small countries which have very large banks (relatively speaking) that have gone outside their own borders to make loans and have done so at levels of leverage which are far in excess of the most leveraged US banks. The ability of the "host" countries to nationalize their banks is simply not there. They are going to have to have help from larger countries. But as we will see below, that help is problematical.
As John Mauldin explains, fixing the problem in Europe will be even more difficult than it is here:
This has the potential to be a real crisis, far worse than in the US. Without concerted action on the part of the ECB and the European countries that are relatively strong, much of Europe could fall further into what would feel like a depression. There is a problem, though. Imagine being a politician in Germany , for instance. Your GDP is down by 8% last quarter.
Unemployment is rising. Budgets are under pressure, as tax collections are down. And you are going to be asked to vote in favor of bailing out (pick a small country)? What will the voters who put you into office think? We are going to find out this year whether the European Union is like the Three Musketeers. Are they "all for one and one for all?" or is it every country for itself? My bet (or hope) is that it is the former. Dissolution at this point would be devastating for all concerned, and for the world economy at large. Many of us in the US don't think much about Europe or the rest of the world, but without a healthy Europe , much of our world trade
would vanish.
It is not clear how it will all play out. But there is real risk of Europe dragging the world into a longer, darker night. Their banks not only have exposure to our US foibles, much of which has already been written off, but now many banks will have to contend with massive losses from emerging-market loans, which could be even larger than the losses stemming from US problems. Plus, they are more leveraged.
Not even Russia can easily cover the $500bn dollar debts of its oligarchs while oil remains near $33 a barrel. The budget is based on Urals crude at $95. Russia has bled 36pc of its foreign reserves since August defending the rouble.
"This is the largest run on a currency in history," said Mr Jen.
In Poland , 60pc of mortgages are in Swiss francs. The zloty has just halved against the franc. Hungary , the Balkans, the Baltics, and Ukraine are all suffering variants of this story. As an act of collective folly ? by lenders and borrowers ? it matches America 's sub-prime debacle.. There is a crucial difference, however. European banks are on the hook for both. US banks are not.
Almost all East bloc debts are owed to West Europe , especially Austrian, Swedish, Greek, Italian, and Belgian banks. En plus, Europeans account for an astonishing 74pc of the entire $4.9 trillion portfolio of loans to emerging markets.
They are five times more exposed to this latest bust than American or Japanese banks, and they are 50pc more leveraged (IMF data). Spain is up to its neck in Latin America , which has belatedly joined the slump ( Mexico 's car output fell 51pc in January, and Brazil lost 650,000 jobs in one month). Britain and Switzerland are up to their necks in Asia .
Whether it takes months, or just weeks, the world is going to discover that Europe's financial system is sunk, and that there is no EU Federal Reserve yet ready to act as a lender of last resort or to flood the markets with emergency stimulus.
A note from Strategic Energy, as quoted by John Mauldin:
"The sums needed are beyond the limits of the IMF, which has already bailed out Hungary , Ukraine , Latvia , Belarus , Iceland , and Pakistan -- and Turkey next -- and is fast exhausting its own $200bn (€155bn) reserve. We are nearing the point where the IMF may have to print money for the world, using arcane powers to issue Special Drawing Rights. Its $16bn rescue of Ukraine has unravelled. The country -- facing a 12% contraction in GDP after the collapse of steel prices -- is hurtling towards default, leaving Unicredit, Raffeisen and ING in the lurch. Pakistan wants another $7.6bn.
Latvia's central bank governor has declared his economy "clinically dead" after it shrank 10.5% in the fourth quarter. Protesters have smashed the treasury and stormed parliament.
"'This is much worse than the East Asia crisis in the 1990s,' said Lars Christensen, at Danske Bank. 'There are accidents waiting to happen across the region, but the EU institutions don't have any framework for dealing with this. The day they decide not to save one of these one countries will be the trigger for a massive crisis with contagion spreading into the EU.'
Europe is already in deeper trouble than the ECB or EU leaders ever expected. Germany contracted at an annual rate of 8.4% in the fourth quarter. If Deutsche Bank is correct, the economy will have shrunk by nearly 9% before the end of this year. This is the sort of level that stokes popular revolt.
"The implications are obvious. Berlin is not going to rescue Ireland, Spain, Greece and Portugal as the collapse of their credit bubbles leads to rising defaults, or rescue Italy by accepting plans for EU "union bonds" should the debt markets take fright at the rocketing trajectory of Italy 's public debt (hitting 112pc of GDP next year, just revised up from 101pc -- big change), or rescue Austria from its Habsburg adventurism. So we watch and wait as the lethal brush fires move closer. If one spark jumps across the eurozone line, we will have global systemic crisis within days. Are the firemen ready?"
This is why some folks think the dollar is going to remain strong over the coming months: Because the rest of the world is falling apart even faster than we are.
Just as the global economy wasn't "decoupled" at the beginning of 2007, however (when the majority of Wall Street strategists believed that it was), it's not "decoupled" now. So the collapse of Eastern Europe --and, with it, the Western European banks--would almost certainly jump across the pond.
John Mauldin summarizes:
Eastern Europe has borrowed an estimated $1.7 trillion, primarily from Western European banks. And much of Eastern Europe is already in a deep recession bordering on depression. A great deal of that $1.7 trillion is at risk, especially the portion that is in Swiss francs. It is a story that could easily be as big as the US subprime problem.
In Poland , as an example, 60% of mortgages are in Swiss francs. When times are good and currencies are stable, it is nice to have a low-interest Swiss mortgage. And as a requirement for joining the euro currency union, Poland has been required to keep its currency stable against the euro. This gave borrowers comfort that they could borrow at low interest in francs or euros, rather than at much higher local rates.
But in an echo of teaser-rate subprimes here in the US , there is a problem.
Along came the synchronized global recession and large Polish current-account trade deficits, which were three times those of the US in terms of GDP, just to give us some perspective. Of course, if you are not a reserve currency this is going to bring some pressure to bear. And it did.
The Polish zloty has basically dropped in half compared to the Swiss franc. That means if you are a mortgage holder, your house payment just doubled. That same story is repeated all over the Baltics and Eastern Europe. Austrian banks have lent $289 billion (230 billion euros) to Eastern Europe. That is 70% of Austrian GDP. Much of it is in Swiss francs they borrowed from Swiss banks. Even a 10% impairment (highly optimistic) would bankrupt the Austrian financial system, says the Austrian finance minister, Joseph Proll. In the US we speak of banks that are too big to be allowed to
fail. But the reality is that we could nationalize them if we needed to do so. (And for the record, I favor nationalization and swift privatization. We cannot afford a repeat of Japan 's zombie banks.)
The problem is that in Europe there are many banks that are simply too big to save. The size of the banks in terms of the GDP of the country in which they are domiciled is all out of proportion. For my American readers, it would be as if the bank bailout package were in excess of $14 trillion(give or take a few trillion). In essence, there are small countries which have very large banks (relatively speaking) that have gone outside their own borders to make loans and have done so at levels of leverage which are far in excess of the most leveraged US banks. The ability of the "host" countries to nationalize their banks is simply not there. They are going to have to have help from larger countries. But as we will see below, that help is problematical.
As John Mauldin explains, fixing the problem in Europe will be even more difficult than it is here:
This has the potential to be a real crisis, far worse than in the US. Without concerted action on the part of the ECB and the European countries that are relatively strong, much of Europe could fall further into what would feel like a depression. There is a problem, though. Imagine being a politician in Germany , for instance. Your GDP is down by 8% last quarter.
Unemployment is rising. Budgets are under pressure, as tax collections are down. And you are going to be asked to vote in favor of bailing out (pick a small country)? What will the voters who put you into office think? We are going to find out this year whether the European Union is like the Three Musketeers. Are they "all for one and one for all?" or is it every country for itself? My bet (or hope) is that it is the former. Dissolution at this point would be devastating for all concerned, and for the world economy at large. Many of us in the US don't think much about Europe or the rest of the world, but without a healthy Europe , much of our world trade
would vanish.
It is not clear how it will all play out. But there is real risk of Europe dragging the world into a longer, darker night. Their banks not only have exposure to our US foibles, much of which has already been written off, but now many banks will have to contend with massive losses from emerging-market loans, which could be even larger than the losses stemming from US problems. Plus, they are more leveraged.
不被别人的意见所左右
一群青蛙在进行比赛，看谁先到达一座高塔的顶端。周围有一大群围观的青蛙在看热闹。
比赛开始了，由于大伙都不信有谁能到达那座塔的顶端，只听周围一片嘘声：“太难为它们了！这些青蛙无法达到目的，无法达到目的。”青蛙们开始泄气了，可是还有一只青蛙在奋力摸索着向上爬去。
围观的青蛙继续喊着：“太艰苦了！你们不可能到达塔顶的！”其他的青蛙都停下来了，只有那只青蛙一如既往继续向前，并且更加努力地爬着。
比赛结束，其他青蛙都半途而废，只有那只青蛙以令人不解的毅力一直坚持了下来，竭尽全力到达了终点。
其他的青蛙都很好奇，想知道为什么它就能够做到不管不顾地一直向前冲，为什么能坚持下来到达终点。这时，大家才发现——它是一只聋青蛙！
你是要成功还是要听别人的话？如果有人说，你无法实现你的梦想，这时你最好做一个“聋子”！
奥里森·马登说过一段耐人寻味的话：“如果我们分析一下那些卓越人物的人格特质，就会看到他们有一个共同的特点：他们在开始做事前，总是充分相信自己的能力，深信所从事之事业必能成功。因此，他们在做事时就能付出全都精力，排除一切艰难险阻，直到胜利！”
比尔·盖茨和迈克尔·戴尔是新经济时代的两个创业的“神话”：他们都中途退学，都成为世界上顶尖的大富豪。也许他们的传奇经历并没有普遍意义，但至少可以告诉我们一点：做你真正喜欢的事，而且你可以从你的事业中获得许多乐趣——财富、名誉、成就感等。
每项奇迹开始时总是始于一种伟大的想法。或许没有人知道今天的一个想法将会走多远，但是我们不要怀疑，只要沉下心来，努力去做，让心中的杂音寂静，你就会听见它们就在不远处，而且伸手可及。
成功学的创始人拿破仑·希尔说：“自信，是人类运用和驾驭宇宙无穷大智的唯一管道，是所有‘奇迹’的根基，是所有科学法则无法分析的玄妙神奇的发源地。”被称为石油巨子的保罗·盖蒂就是凭着极强的自信，一次次把自己推到事业的巅峰的。
当人们问及盖蒂成功的秘诀时，他说：“一个人的成功，关键是应该坚信自己的判断，有自己的主见。对成功充满自信和乐观的态度，而不要迷信权威。”接着他深有感触地谈了自己因缺乏自信而犯的三个错误：
第一个错误发生在盖蒂年轻的时候，他在俄克拉荷马州买了一块自认为相当不错的地皮，根据他的经验，下面会有相当丰富的石油。他请来一位地质学专家，专家考察后在报告中肯定地说：“这块地根本产不出一滴油，最好将其卖掉。”盖蒂听信了专家的话，把地皮卖掉了。然而没过多久，那块地上竟打出了高产油井，事实证明那是个石油高产区。
第二个让盖蒂痛心的失误发生在1931年，那时美国经济大萧条的影响还在继续，全国的经济不景气，股票的价格降到了极低的水平。盖蒂认为美国的经济基础是好的，随着经济形势的逐渐恢复，股票价格会大幅上升。于是他买下了墨西哥石油价值数百万美元的股票，随后几天股市出现了一些下跌，盖蒂自信下跌已经接近最低点。然而他的同事们已经被大萧条弄怕了，他们竭力劝说他将手中的股票抛售出去。大伙的一致意见使盖蒂动摇了，最终抛出了墨西哥石油公司的股票。事实最终证明，盖蒂先前的判断是正确的，在以后的几年中，这家石油公司财源滚滚。事后盖蒂不无后悔地说：“真理往往掌握在少数人的手中。失去了自信，你也就失去了一切。”
最倒霉的一次是在1932年。那时盖蒂意识到中东原油的巨大潜力，于是派出谈判代表到巴格达，同伊拉克政府反复交涉后，他们打算买下一块很有前景的地皮的开采特许权，价格只有几十万美元。就在此时，世界市场上的原油价格忽然波动，于是大家普遍认为，这个时候在中东进行投资是不明智的。盖蒂再一次被大家的意见所左右，推翻了自己原来的判断，命令在巴格达的手下人中止谈判。结果十多年以后，当盖蒂决定再次进军中东的时候，情况就大不一样了，为了得到那块地皮的开采特许权，他竟多付出了一千多万美元的代价。
缺乏自信而导致失败的教训是深刻的，也是弥足珍贵的。在以后的岁月，里盖蒂“一意孤行”，最终成为美国最成功的商人之一。
比赛开始了，由于大伙都不信有谁能到达那座塔的顶端，只听周围一片嘘声：“太难为它们了！这些青蛙无法达到目的，无法达到目的。”青蛙们开始泄气了，可是还有一只青蛙在奋力摸索着向上爬去。
围观的青蛙继续喊着：“太艰苦了！你们不可能到达塔顶的！”其他的青蛙都停下来了，只有那只青蛙一如既往继续向前，并且更加努力地爬着。
比赛结束，其他青蛙都半途而废，只有那只青蛙以令人不解的毅力一直坚持了下来，竭尽全力到达了终点。
其他的青蛙都很好奇，想知道为什么它就能够做到不管不顾地一直向前冲，为什么能坚持下来到达终点。这时，大家才发现——它是一只聋青蛙！
你是要成功还是要听别人的话？如果有人说，你无法实现你的梦想，这时你最好做一个“聋子”！
奥里森·马登说过一段耐人寻味的话：“如果我们分析一下那些卓越人物的人格特质，就会看到他们有一个共同的特点：他们在开始做事前，总是充分相信自己的能力，深信所从事之事业必能成功。因此，他们在做事时就能付出全都精力，排除一切艰难险阻，直到胜利！”
比尔·盖茨和迈克尔·戴尔是新经济时代的两个创业的“神话”：他们都中途退学，都成为世界上顶尖的大富豪。也许他们的传奇经历并没有普遍意义，但至少可以告诉我们一点：做你真正喜欢的事，而且你可以从你的事业中获得许多乐趣——财富、名誉、成就感等。
每项奇迹开始时总是始于一种伟大的想法。或许没有人知道今天的一个想法将会走多远，但是我们不要怀疑，只要沉下心来，努力去做，让心中的杂音寂静，你就会听见它们就在不远处，而且伸手可及。
成功学的创始人拿破仑·希尔说：“自信，是人类运用和驾驭宇宙无穷大智的唯一管道，是所有‘奇迹’的根基，是所有科学法则无法分析的玄妙神奇的发源地。”被称为石油巨子的保罗·盖蒂就是凭着极强的自信，一次次把自己推到事业的巅峰的。
当人们问及盖蒂成功的秘诀时，他说：“一个人的成功，关键是应该坚信自己的判断，有自己的主见。对成功充满自信和乐观的态度，而不要迷信权威。”接着他深有感触地谈了自己因缺乏自信而犯的三个错误：
第一个错误发生在盖蒂年轻的时候，他在俄克拉荷马州买了一块自认为相当不错的地皮，根据他的经验，下面会有相当丰富的石油。他请来一位地质学专家，专家考察后在报告中肯定地说：“这块地根本产不出一滴油，最好将其卖掉。”盖蒂听信了专家的话，把地皮卖掉了。然而没过多久，那块地上竟打出了高产油井，事实证明那是个石油高产区。
第二个让盖蒂痛心的失误发生在1931年，那时美国经济大萧条的影响还在继续，全国的经济不景气，股票的价格降到了极低的水平。盖蒂认为美国的经济基础是好的，随着经济形势的逐渐恢复，股票价格会大幅上升。于是他买下了墨西哥石油价值数百万美元的股票，随后几天股市出现了一些下跌，盖蒂自信下跌已经接近最低点。然而他的同事们已经被大萧条弄怕了，他们竭力劝说他将手中的股票抛售出去。大伙的一致意见使盖蒂动摇了，最终抛出了墨西哥石油公司的股票。事实最终证明，盖蒂先前的判断是正确的，在以后的几年中，这家石油公司财源滚滚。事后盖蒂不无后悔地说：“真理往往掌握在少数人的手中。失去了自信，你也就失去了一切。”
最倒霉的一次是在1932年。那时盖蒂意识到中东原油的巨大潜力，于是派出谈判代表到巴格达，同伊拉克政府反复交涉后，他们打算买下一块很有前景的地皮的开采特许权，价格只有几十万美元。就在此时，世界市场上的原油价格忽然波动，于是大家普遍认为，这个时候在中东进行投资是不明智的。盖蒂再一次被大家的意见所左右，推翻了自己原来的判断，命令在巴格达的手下人中止谈判。结果十多年以后，当盖蒂决定再次进军中东的时候，情况就大不一样了，为了得到那块地皮的开采特许权，他竟多付出了一千多万美元的代价。
缺乏自信而导致失败的教训是深刻的，也是弥足珍贵的。在以后的岁月，里盖蒂“一意孤行”，最终成为美国最成功的商人之一。
石油怪杰保罗盖蒂：享乐间铸就石油帝国
1929年大萧条之后的野心
30年代，美国经济出现了大萧条，股票市场崩溃。当大多数投资家和商人纷纷退缩和躲避的时候，盖蒂却逆流而上，断定这是他施展才华、创建一个大型石油综合企业的良机。
当时许多石油公司的股票已跌到相当于原来几分之一的价格，而股票的持有者们仍继续抛售。盖蒂看中了加利福尼亚的两家石油公司，它们是墨西哥海滨联合石油公司和太平洋西方石油公司，这两家公司在凯特尔曼山油田拥有宝贵的地皮。特别是太平洋西方石油公司每股价值3美元，但市场价仅售0.4美元。但他的母亲萨拉反对购买股票，盖蒂就绕开母亲，设法说服公司的董事们，用贷款购买了300万美元股票。
但市场严重衰退股价甚至下跌到0.09美元，当时股价的下跌让保罗的压力十分沉重，在这段期间，保罗的胆量和毅力得到了前所未有的考验，为此，他不得不放弃了海滨联合石油公司，专心对付太平洋西方石油。他曾这样说：“如果这次失败，我将身无分文，一无所有了。”而为了完全控制太平洋西方石油公司的股份，到1931年，他用完了自己的全部存款。
终于，掌握大量资金的母亲松开了紧紧掌握在手中的资金，给儿子以援助，帮助保罗渡过了难关。这时，海滨石油公司已经被当时的石油巨头——美孚所控制，面对巨头的挑战，保罗表现出他极大的勇气和持久的耐力。他的表现让整个世界都为之震惊!
起初，和美孚交手了几个回合的保罗总是处于劣势的一方，但他毫不气馁，等待着机会的到来。1934年，美国总统罗斯福要对全国最有权势的家族财产进行审查，而作为美孚的最大股东——洛克菲勒必须坦白他的所有股份，为了免去高额遗产税，洛克菲勒决定出卖一部分股份。保罗没有放过这个机会，通过朋友，他得到了洛克菲勒在海滨10%的股份。
这只是开始，在后来的10多年里，盖蒂又不断地扩大他的股权，到50年代初，海滨联合石油公司的董事会里除一人之外，其他的董事都是在盖蒂的股份下产生的，这也就是说，盖蒂那时已经完全控制了这家公司。
30年代，美国经济出现了大萧条，股票市场崩溃。当大多数投资家和商人纷纷退缩和躲避的时候，盖蒂却逆流而上，断定这是他施展才华、创建一个大型石油综合企业的良机。
当时许多石油公司的股票已跌到相当于原来几分之一的价格，而股票的持有者们仍继续抛售。盖蒂看中了加利福尼亚的两家石油公司，它们是墨西哥海滨联合石油公司和太平洋西方石油公司，这两家公司在凯特尔曼山油田拥有宝贵的地皮。特别是太平洋西方石油公司每股价值3美元，但市场价仅售0.4美元。但他的母亲萨拉反对购买股票，盖蒂就绕开母亲，设法说服公司的董事们，用贷款购买了300万美元股票。
但市场严重衰退股价甚至下跌到0.09美元，当时股价的下跌让保罗的压力十分沉重，在这段期间，保罗的胆量和毅力得到了前所未有的考验，为此，他不得不放弃了海滨联合石油公司，专心对付太平洋西方石油。他曾这样说：“如果这次失败，我将身无分文，一无所有了。”而为了完全控制太平洋西方石油公司的股份，到1931年，他用完了自己的全部存款。
终于，掌握大量资金的母亲松开了紧紧掌握在手中的资金，给儿子以援助，帮助保罗渡过了难关。这时，海滨石油公司已经被当时的石油巨头——美孚所控制，面对巨头的挑战，保罗表现出他极大的勇气和持久的耐力。他的表现让整个世界都为之震惊!
起初，和美孚交手了几个回合的保罗总是处于劣势的一方，但他毫不气馁，等待着机会的到来。1934年，美国总统罗斯福要对全国最有权势的家族财产进行审查，而作为美孚的最大股东——洛克菲勒必须坦白他的所有股份，为了免去高额遗产税，洛克菲勒决定出卖一部分股份。保罗没有放过这个机会，通过朋友，他得到了洛克菲勒在海滨10%的股份。
这只是开始，在后来的10多年里，盖蒂又不断地扩大他的股权，到50年代初，海滨联合石油公司的董事会里除一人之外，其他的董事都是在盖蒂的股份下产生的，这也就是说，盖蒂那时已经完全控制了这家公司。
保罗。盖蒂
好的股票，在低价时以投资的目的买进，在价格缓慢变动时继续持有，将来很有可能由于股息价格上升，而带来高额利润。-------保罗。盖蒂
1，投资家不同与投机家，他们谨慎的买进，并对此始终保持信心。
2，投资家不赌博。
3，不抱“速成致富”的希望。
4，从科学理智的基础出发。
5，买那些优秀的普通股票。
6，总趁低价或卖风正旺时买进。
7，具有冷静和耐心。
8，在足够高的时候抛出。
1，投资家不同与投机家，他们谨慎的买进，并对此始终保持信心。
2，投资家不赌博。
3，不抱“速成致富”的希望。
4，从科学理智的基础出发。
5，买那些优秀的普通股票。
6，总趁低价或卖风正旺时买进。
7，具有冷静和耐心。
8，在足够高的时候抛出。
保罗·盖蒂：吝啬与慷慨
保罗·盖蒂的巨大财富主要得自于石油业,不过他在股市中的操作也大有可圈可点之处。令人称羡的是,盖蒂在证券投资方面似乎也有着采油上的不传之秘,总能在股市大调整时选准时机买入而大发一票。好在盖蒂颇为自负和自信,不吝把他的投资心得说出来,与大众分享。
与大多数成功的投资者一样,盖蒂鼓励长线投资。在选择买入什么股票时,他提醒要注意行业的生命周期,同时还得加强了解对象公司的本身。
盖蒂认为,投资者必须对公司三个方面的十个问题有明确的答案后才能作出投资决策。这三个方面是:
(1)公司的发展前景。包括公司的历史情况,公司产品在未来的市场需求,公司所处的行业竞争是否已经过于激烈；
(2)公司的财务状况。包括公司的费用支出是否过大,公司的财务报表能否经受住严格的审查,有没有令人满意的盈利记录,股利政策如何,以及公司的偿债能力.
(3)公司股票的市场表现由两方面的因素组成:股价在过去几年里是否出现过异常波动,公司的市值是否超过了它能够变现的净资产。只有对公司的这些情况有了深入的了解之后,投资者才可以放心持有它的股票,而不必去计较一时的价格涨跌。
盖蒂相信成功的投资者一生中只需抓住少数几次投资机会就足以致富。
1929年做了一次精彩的抄底之后,他就一直耐心等待新的入市机会。
1962年,股市又出现了一次大的调整,短短几天内从700多点跌到600点以下。当专家、学者、股评家们在报纸电台长篇累犊地进行事后诸葛式的分析时,盖蒂却在暗暗地买进。他的理由很简单,当时的美国经济运行健康,决大多数上市公司经营良好,股市的下跌只是对前一阶段过度上涨的修正,股指再拾升途是迟早的事。
结果盖蒂判断正确,此役中斩获了数亿美元。
有意思的是,尽管盖蒂拥有家财万贯,但他个人生活常有守财奴式的节俭癖好,不少小掌故至今为人传诵。例如,盖蒂在1959年买下伦敦附近的一座公寓楼,作为私人办公地兼住所。虽然每个房间都装有电话,但只有在他的办公室和卧室,电话可以打长途。然而当他查核电话帐单时还是惊讶地发现,电话费之高远远出乎他的意料,而且大多数的电话是员工们溜进盖蒂的卧室去私打的。盖蒂大怒之下果断行动。他撤掉了楼内所有的外线电话,并在一楼大厅里安装了一部投币电话。后来盖蒂更进一步把这套法宝广泛施用,盖蒂的许多豪门贵客在他皇宫般的府邸宴饮之后骇然发觉必须投币才能借用盖府的电话,因而颇有微词。盖蒂解释说,我邀请客人来吃饭,这并没有包括请他们来打免费电话。于是,盖蒂荣获了世界上最富有的吝啬鬼的称号。
尽管在生活方面十分节俭,但盖蒂对艺术方面的捐赠可从不吝惜。盖蒂认为一个人只有真正热爱艺术才能称得上是有教养的文明人。他对古典美术和雕塑颇下了一番工夫,并且著有好几部高水准的美术史和理论的专著。保罗·盖蒂于1976年去世,临终前慷慨捐助22亿美元给保罗·盖蒂博物馆,使之成为世界上最富有的美术馆。
确实,盖蒂在为后人留下不朽传奇的同时,也保存了不朽的文化遗产供你我去瞻仰。
与大多数成功的投资者一样,盖蒂鼓励长线投资。在选择买入什么股票时,他提醒要注意行业的生命周期,同时还得加强了解对象公司的本身。
盖蒂认为,投资者必须对公司三个方面的十个问题有明确的答案后才能作出投资决策。这三个方面是:
(1)公司的发展前景。包括公司的历史情况,公司产品在未来的市场需求,公司所处的行业竞争是否已经过于激烈；
(2)公司的财务状况。包括公司的费用支出是否过大,公司的财务报表能否经受住严格的审查,有没有令人满意的盈利记录,股利政策如何,以及公司的偿债能力.
(3)公司股票的市场表现由两方面的因素组成:股价在过去几年里是否出现过异常波动,公司的市值是否超过了它能够变现的净资产。只有对公司的这些情况有了深入的了解之后,投资者才可以放心持有它的股票,而不必去计较一时的价格涨跌。
盖蒂相信成功的投资者一生中只需抓住少数几次投资机会就足以致富。
1929年做了一次精彩的抄底之后,他就一直耐心等待新的入市机会。
1962年,股市又出现了一次大的调整,短短几天内从700多点跌到600点以下。当专家、学者、股评家们在报纸电台长篇累犊地进行事后诸葛式的分析时,盖蒂却在暗暗地买进。他的理由很简单,当时的美国经济运行健康,决大多数上市公司经营良好,股市的下跌只是对前一阶段过度上涨的修正,股指再拾升途是迟早的事。
结果盖蒂判断正确,此役中斩获了数亿美元。
有意思的是,尽管盖蒂拥有家财万贯,但他个人生活常有守财奴式的节俭癖好,不少小掌故至今为人传诵。例如,盖蒂在1959年买下伦敦附近的一座公寓楼,作为私人办公地兼住所。虽然每个房间都装有电话,但只有在他的办公室和卧室,电话可以打长途。然而当他查核电话帐单时还是惊讶地发现,电话费之高远远出乎他的意料,而且大多数的电话是员工们溜进盖蒂的卧室去私打的。盖蒂大怒之下果断行动。他撤掉了楼内所有的外线电话,并在一楼大厅里安装了一部投币电话。后来盖蒂更进一步把这套法宝广泛施用,盖蒂的许多豪门贵客在他皇宫般的府邸宴饮之后骇然发觉必须投币才能借用盖府的电话,因而颇有微词。盖蒂解释说,我邀请客人来吃饭,这并没有包括请他们来打免费电话。于是,盖蒂荣获了世界上最富有的吝啬鬼的称号。
尽管在生活方面十分节俭,但盖蒂对艺术方面的捐赠可从不吝惜。盖蒂认为一个人只有真正热爱艺术才能称得上是有教养的文明人。他对古典美术和雕塑颇下了一番工夫,并且著有好几部高水准的美术史和理论的专著。保罗·盖蒂于1976年去世,临终前慷慨捐助22亿美元给保罗·盖蒂博物馆,使之成为世界上最富有的美术馆。
确实,盖蒂在为后人留下不朽传奇的同时,也保存了不朽的文化遗产供你我去瞻仰。
Monday, March 2, 2009
買入長揸不合時宜
美國政府出招救金融業愈救愈跌，最新一招係上周宣佈把持有的花旗銀行優先股轉作普通股，此舉雖可減少花旗支付優先股的利息，但並無向花旗注入新資金，市場亦擔心這並非政府最後一次救花旗的行動。評級機構標普和穆迪亦在政府轉股後調低花旗評級，令花旗股份再急插至1.5美元。加上美國去年第4季經濟收縮情況比估計嚴重，杜指上周五跌至7062點收市，跌119點，跌幅1.8%。
滙控今天公佈業績，英國報章消息滿天飛，話滙控將削減派息，並可能宣佈供股集資120億英鎊(即1320億港元)。滙控曾經被香港人譽為股王，如今股價56.95元，在美國預託證券更見53.98元，已跌回 96年的價錢，即係過去12年買入滙控者，全部都要輸錢。
買得滙控絕大部份係投資者，而唔係投機者(買滙控輪者例外)，但一樣中重招，若在 07年10月時以150元高位買貨者，如今得番三分之一。滙控的下跌，絕對損害唔想炒炒吓的投資者的核心價值，他們信奉buy and hold(買入並長揸)的原則，認為咁樣比進進出出炒股好，愈跌愈買，愈買愈多，如今真係喊都無謂。
78億變幾千萬
如果你認為做咗滙控股東好慘，我可以安慰吓你，你一啲都唔算慘，呢個世界有好多人慘過你，呢個講法稍嫌阿Q，但也是事實，上面講的花旗是一個例子，AIG(美國國際集團)也是另一個例子，如果你係AIG的股東，你就慘過揸滙控100倍。AIG這隻美國保險股王，在2000年12月的高位是98.56美元，過去1年高位也有52.25美元，如今只有42美仙，如果一年前你話AIG會跌到42美仙，美國人一定當你發神經，有誰料到一年後會變成這樣，如果從8年前的高位揸到?家，只得番200分之1！
你可能會話，無人會見AIG跌咁多都唔走啩，我可以話俾大家聽，現實上大有人在，而且仲係最熟悉AIG的內幕人士(insider)，聽聞有個AIG亞洲區高層，擁有的股票加購股權，在高峰時值10億美元(78億港元)，如今跌到只值3幾千萬港元！
身家縮水之多，只能以「恐怖」兩個字來形容，你可能覺得3幾千萬已經好多，但試想你身家由78億跌到3幾千萬，都真係幾惡頂。這個故事第一個教訓，就係唔好聽咁多內幕人士的消息，因為內幕人士對自己家公司有偏愛，可能睇唔到公司的問題，君不見香港的交易所高層，正正是在股市唔係跌咗好多時，行使了購股權認股，但又無沽貨，結果隻股跌到四腳朝天，如果再跌多啲，隨時佢行使購付的稅款高過股份的市價。
講番AIG，你可能唔係好熟悉AIG的死因，我不妨講多兩句，AIG現價市值69億美元，只是高峰期的零頭，這家環球保險業巨企最直接的死因，是沽出大量的信貸違約調期(CDS)，信貸違約調期即係迷你債券背後的「資產」，性質是一種保險，債券投資者買了公司的債券，怕公司倒閉時一無所有，就走去買這些信貸違約調期，付出一年幾厘的保險金，以換取一個權利，在其持有債券的公司信用出問題時，就把這些債券「調」給信貸違約調期的交易對手，所以這些CDS其實等如企業的違約保險。
沽CDS殺AIG
一手把AIG搞大的AIG前行政總裁甘伯(Maurice Greenberg)，就係令AIG大量承擔信貸違約調期合約的始作俑者，佢發現沽出信貸違約調期合約非常好賺，所以大做特做，這也是AIG近年盈利急升執行業牛耳的一大原因。理由諗落好簡單，AIG賣人壽保險收保險金，每年都有大量投保人過世要賠償，但佢賣信貸違約調期這種企業保險，在金融海嘯到來之前，風平浪靜，鮮有大企業倒閉(之前幾年都只係一間安龍公司執咗)，所以沽出信貸違約調期合約，都係白收保險金，賣得多賺得多，AIG自然係盡量做，賺到笑。信貸違約調期的市場全無監管，交易規則又鬆，到去年底已發展成一個54萬億美元(唔係寫錯，真係萬億)的超巨型市場，亦潛藏巨大風險。
據甘伯的一個老友話，AIG是合該有事，甘伯一手促成AIG大量投身信貸違約調期的市場，但他自己深明箇中風險，如果由他一直執掌公司，在07年次按問題開始浮現之時，他應該識得走避，或許可以帶領AIG避過這場巨浪，不過甘伯在他事業高峰時，被一個州檢察官看中作狙擊目標，指甘伯以違規手法進行交易，結果甘伯在訴訟聲中黯然下台，公司就由經驗較淺者上台掌控。後來次按危機深化，企業爆煲機會大增，去年9月雷曼倒閉，更令信貸違約調期的合約價格大升，做咗咁多信貸違約調期合約的AIG中重錘，股價急挫，皆因大量公司岌岌可危，全部有違約風險時，沽出這些CDS隨時要賠到傻，搞到AIG資不抵債，成為一家負資產公司。
這個故事的第二個教訓是金融機構的股價可以跌到咁殘，皆因它們的生意有重大槓桿，遇上逆境時，隨時變成深度負資產。
金融行業槓桿遊戲
好多朋友唔明大銀行、大保險公司為何如此化學，股價可以跌到無譜，關鍵就係它們生意的槓桿。以保險公司為例，佢不斷收來客戶保險金，就利用保金進行投資，甚至加大借貸進行槓桿投資，爭取最大回報，保險金等如一個源源不絕的資金來源，要支付賠償的時間會滯後好多，所以在投資暢旺、搵錢容易的日子，水源充足的保險公司好易賺到笑。但在經濟逆轉時，保險公司本已難捱，若好像AIG那樣做了大量信貸違約調期合約，就等如壽險公司遇上地球大瘟疫，死人無數，賠到手軟，都唔係咁易捱。
銀行情況亦唔係好得好多，銀行亦係槓桿生意，佢一手收存款或在銀行同業市場借錢回來，另一手借錢出街俾客戶，所以銀行有1元淨資產，可以做10元生意，道理係咁，銀行有1000億美元資產，同時有900億美元負債，即係淨資產只有100億美元，即係有100億美元淨資產時去做 1000億美元生意，槓桿相當大。
有時銀行嫌借錢俾人賺1、2厘息差太少，就攞啲錢去投資，賺取更大回報，例如去買吓一啲叫CDO的東西，這些產品都有AAA評級，表面睇好似好穩陣，點鬼知這些產品和次按有關，一出事就大跌價，一跌跌3、4成。又例如銀行做樓按，借咗9成樓價俾業主，樓市跌落來，資產若跌3、4成，若要把資產貼現，家銀行豈不是馬上變負資產？
現金為王慎擇投資
上面講完金融業的高槓桿營運，這也是它們在好景時賺咁多錢的原因，但遇上這個百年一遇亦唔知幾時完的金融海嘯，它們的風險大增，而這種風險是真正的風險，不光是人家唱衰所致。
所以第三個教訓是簡單的買入長揸策略，已經不合時宜，現今全球化的社會，一切事情以10倍的速度發生，97年香港回歸港股升上17,000點，98年亞洲金融風暴跌番落5800點，2000年科網狂潮再上18,000點，翌年科網爆破又落到12,000點，到2007年又炒番到31,900點，如今跌到 13,000點，12年經歷3個起跌周期，你長揸股票升到高一高時唔走，結果跌番轉頭就一身蟻，如果揸着一隻AIG，更加可以變到差不多一無所有，你話揸咗啲四線神仙股跌咁多都心甘命抵，揸隻環球保險股王都變咁，就要明白現代社會企業用咁多金融槓桿搵食，無一隻股可以話十足穩陣。
買入股票，見升到癲時不妨沽吓，見到好股下跌，也不要不問環球股市下跌的情由，就盲目去愈跌愈買，在這場百年不遇的金融海嘯中，相信還有不少巨型公司要被淘汰出局，記住現金為王，慎擇投資，金融業乃高危行業，三思之後先至好落注。
滙控今天公佈業績，英國報章消息滿天飛，話滙控將削減派息，並可能宣佈供股集資120億英鎊(即1320億港元)。滙控曾經被香港人譽為股王，如今股價56.95元，在美國預託證券更見53.98元，已跌回 96年的價錢，即係過去12年買入滙控者，全部都要輸錢。
買得滙控絕大部份係投資者，而唔係投機者(買滙控輪者例外)，但一樣中重招，若在 07年10月時以150元高位買貨者，如今得番三分之一。滙控的下跌，絕對損害唔想炒炒吓的投資者的核心價值，他們信奉buy and hold(買入並長揸)的原則，認為咁樣比進進出出炒股好，愈跌愈買，愈買愈多，如今真係喊都無謂。
78億變幾千萬
如果你認為做咗滙控股東好慘，我可以安慰吓你，你一啲都唔算慘，呢個世界有好多人慘過你，呢個講法稍嫌阿Q，但也是事實，上面講的花旗是一個例子，AIG(美國國際集團)也是另一個例子，如果你係AIG的股東，你就慘過揸滙控100倍。AIG這隻美國保險股王，在2000年12月的高位是98.56美元，過去1年高位也有52.25美元，如今只有42美仙，如果一年前你話AIG會跌到42美仙，美國人一定當你發神經，有誰料到一年後會變成這樣，如果從8年前的高位揸到?家，只得番200分之1！
你可能會話，無人會見AIG跌咁多都唔走啩，我可以話俾大家聽，現實上大有人在，而且仲係最熟悉AIG的內幕人士(insider)，聽聞有個AIG亞洲區高層，擁有的股票加購股權，在高峰時值10億美元(78億港元)，如今跌到只值3幾千萬港元！
身家縮水之多，只能以「恐怖」兩個字來形容，你可能覺得3幾千萬已經好多，但試想你身家由78億跌到3幾千萬，都真係幾惡頂。這個故事第一個教訓，就係唔好聽咁多內幕人士的消息，因為內幕人士對自己家公司有偏愛，可能睇唔到公司的問題，君不見香港的交易所高層，正正是在股市唔係跌咗好多時，行使了購股權認股，但又無沽貨，結果隻股跌到四腳朝天，如果再跌多啲，隨時佢行使購付的稅款高過股份的市價。
講番AIG，你可能唔係好熟悉AIG的死因，我不妨講多兩句，AIG現價市值69億美元，只是高峰期的零頭，這家環球保險業巨企最直接的死因，是沽出大量的信貸違約調期(CDS)，信貸違約調期即係迷你債券背後的「資產」，性質是一種保險，債券投資者買了公司的債券，怕公司倒閉時一無所有，就走去買這些信貸違約調期，付出一年幾厘的保險金，以換取一個權利，在其持有債券的公司信用出問題時，就把這些債券「調」給信貸違約調期的交易對手，所以這些CDS其實等如企業的違約保險。
沽CDS殺AIG
一手把AIG搞大的AIG前行政總裁甘伯(Maurice Greenberg)，就係令AIG大量承擔信貸違約調期合約的始作俑者，佢發現沽出信貸違約調期合約非常好賺，所以大做特做，這也是AIG近年盈利急升執行業牛耳的一大原因。理由諗落好簡單，AIG賣人壽保險收保險金，每年都有大量投保人過世要賠償，但佢賣信貸違約調期這種企業保險，在金融海嘯到來之前，風平浪靜，鮮有大企業倒閉(之前幾年都只係一間安龍公司執咗)，所以沽出信貸違約調期合約，都係白收保險金，賣得多賺得多，AIG自然係盡量做，賺到笑。信貸違約調期的市場全無監管，交易規則又鬆，到去年底已發展成一個54萬億美元(唔係寫錯，真係萬億)的超巨型市場，亦潛藏巨大風險。
據甘伯的一個老友話，AIG是合該有事，甘伯一手促成AIG大量投身信貸違約調期的市場，但他自己深明箇中風險，如果由他一直執掌公司，在07年次按問題開始浮現之時，他應該識得走避，或許可以帶領AIG避過這場巨浪，不過甘伯在他事業高峰時，被一個州檢察官看中作狙擊目標，指甘伯以違規手法進行交易，結果甘伯在訴訟聲中黯然下台，公司就由經驗較淺者上台掌控。後來次按危機深化，企業爆煲機會大增，去年9月雷曼倒閉，更令信貸違約調期的合約價格大升，做咗咁多信貸違約調期合約的AIG中重錘，股價急挫，皆因大量公司岌岌可危，全部有違約風險時，沽出這些CDS隨時要賠到傻，搞到AIG資不抵債，成為一家負資產公司。
這個故事的第二個教訓是金融機構的股價可以跌到咁殘，皆因它們的生意有重大槓桿，遇上逆境時，隨時變成深度負資產。
金融行業槓桿遊戲
好多朋友唔明大銀行、大保險公司為何如此化學，股價可以跌到無譜，關鍵就係它們生意的槓桿。以保險公司為例，佢不斷收來客戶保險金，就利用保金進行投資，甚至加大借貸進行槓桿投資，爭取最大回報，保險金等如一個源源不絕的資金來源，要支付賠償的時間會滯後好多，所以在投資暢旺、搵錢容易的日子，水源充足的保險公司好易賺到笑。但在經濟逆轉時，保險公司本已難捱，若好像AIG那樣做了大量信貸違約調期合約，就等如壽險公司遇上地球大瘟疫，死人無數，賠到手軟，都唔係咁易捱。
銀行情況亦唔係好得好多，銀行亦係槓桿生意，佢一手收存款或在銀行同業市場借錢回來，另一手借錢出街俾客戶，所以銀行有1元淨資產，可以做10元生意，道理係咁，銀行有1000億美元資產，同時有900億美元負債，即係淨資產只有100億美元，即係有100億美元淨資產時去做 1000億美元生意，槓桿相當大。
有時銀行嫌借錢俾人賺1、2厘息差太少，就攞啲錢去投資，賺取更大回報，例如去買吓一啲叫CDO的東西，這些產品都有AAA評級，表面睇好似好穩陣，點鬼知這些產品和次按有關，一出事就大跌價，一跌跌3、4成。又例如銀行做樓按，借咗9成樓價俾業主，樓市跌落來，資產若跌3、4成，若要把資產貼現，家銀行豈不是馬上變負資產？
現金為王慎擇投資
上面講完金融業的高槓桿營運，這也是它們在好景時賺咁多錢的原因，但遇上這個百年一遇亦唔知幾時完的金融海嘯，它們的風險大增，而這種風險是真正的風險，不光是人家唱衰所致。
所以第三個教訓是簡單的買入長揸策略，已經不合時宜，現今全球化的社會，一切事情以10倍的速度發生，97年香港回歸港股升上17,000點，98年亞洲金融風暴跌番落5800點，2000年科網狂潮再上18,000點，翌年科網爆破又落到12,000點，到2007年又炒番到31,900點，如今跌到 13,000點，12年經歷3個起跌周期，你長揸股票升到高一高時唔走，結果跌番轉頭就一身蟻，如果揸着一隻AIG，更加可以變到差不多一無所有，你話揸咗啲四線神仙股跌咁多都心甘命抵，揸隻環球保險股王都變咁，就要明白現代社會企業用咁多金融槓桿搵食，無一隻股可以話十足穩陣。
買入股票，見升到癲時不妨沽吓，見到好股下跌，也不要不問環球股市下跌的情由，就盲目去愈跌愈買，在這場百年不遇的金融海嘯中，相信還有不少巨型公司要被淘汰出局，記住現金為王，慎擇投資，金融業乃高危行業，三思之後先至好落注。
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)