安德烈·科斯托蘭尼(Andre Kostolany)是筆者最尊敬的投資大師其中之一，跨張一點說，拜讀完此君的作品後，可能會對坊間大部份有關投資的書籍失去興趣。至低限度，這觀點對筆者來說是成立的:
(一) 股市
股市與經濟:
男子帶著狗在街上散步，狗兒先跑到前面，再回到男人身邊。接著又跑到前面，看到自己跑得太遠，又再折回來。反反覆覆，最後男子和狗同時抵達終點，男子走了一公里，而狗兄跑前跑後地走了四公里。
男人就是經濟，狗則是股票市場。然而，長期來看，證券市場無法脫離經濟。
市場的邏輯:
證券市場有自己的邏輯，和普通消費者的邏輯沒有什麼關係。
股票價格:
股價永遠不會和企業的實際價值相等，總是或高或低於合理值。
資訊:
凡是證券交易所裡人盡皆知的事，不會令我激動。在讀報紙的過程中，可以發現對我來說重要的消息，通常是隱藏在字裡行間的訊息。
測底:
在出現不利消息時，市場並沒有下跌，是行情已接近最低點的徵兆。
當最後的樂觀者變成悲觀者，當傳媒氣氛變得非常負面時，便是市況見底的跡象。
市場升跌:
暴漲和崩盤是分不開的搭檔。
股票走勢:
貨幣供應 + 心理 = 趨勢
恐慌性拋售:
就像在電影院裡，有人喊著火了，於是所有人衝向唯一的逃生門。結果是雖然連一根火柴也沒有點著，卻出現了傷亡人士。
投資人最壞的特質:
固執和猶疑不決
投資人最好的特質:
直覺和靈活性。直覺是下意識的邏輯和想像力，而投資人出錯時必須立即修正。
買賣的原因:
決定是否出售某隻股票跟買進價格沒有關係，而是取決於未來的發展。
內幕消息:
股市上的「消息靈通」經常是「毁滅」的代名詞。
耐性:
一個沒有耐力的投機者雖然有理，但永遠為之太晚。
投機者:
有遠見的戰略家，制定周密的計劃和策略，根據每天發生的事件進行調整。投機者總有一個想法，這亦是投機者和證券玩家的分別。
投資者:
市場中的長跑者
證券玩家:
市場中的賭徒
逆向操作:
勇於與眾不同，大家必須訓練有素、冷靜，有時甚至必須玩世不恭。因此在證券市場內，只有少數人能夠投機成功，所以投資人必須勇敢、全力以赴，明智，甚至表現得自負一些。對自己說: 「我知道，其他人都是傻瓜」
不忘彈性:
但如果出現根本性變化，例如戰爭、重大的政治和經濟決策等無法預料的事件時，就必須馬上考慮後果，必要時還要放棄昨天還十分喜歡(但今天變得很貴)的股票。
技術分析:
圖表可能賺錢，但肯定賠錢
(二) 經濟/匯率
通漲:
輕度通貨膨脹根本不會危害經濟。寧要5%通漲率，也不要5%的失業率。
通縮:
通縮時，貨幣供應持續短缺，消費者什麼也不想買，企業也不投資。在這情況下，沒有消費和投資，亦妨礙經濟發展。
金本位:
金本位制度尤如一條雙人被，棉被下的兩個人都試圖把被子拉向自己這一邊。嚴守金本位制阻礙貨幣供應的靈活性，隨之而來是失業、危機和破產。
總有一些政治家和經濟學者，每當外匯激烈波動時，總要求回到金本位制度。
美元:
在弱小與高強的衝突中，大多數人總是同情弱小。
全世界的人總是抱怨美國的貿易逆差，儘管多年來美國一直是整個世界經濟的「母乳」。
美國人將大部份的積蓄投入巨額的人壽保險和股票投資。
匯率:
一個國家的經濟實力和財政管理制度，才是構成貨幣強弱的主因。
Sunday, October 19, 2008
CIMB - Singapore Post (S$1.23) - 2QFY08 results - Delivers again - 31 Oct 2007
Core earnings in line. 2QFY08 core earnings of S$35.5m (+9.6% yoy) was in-line with consensus and our estimates. 1HFY08 core earnings formed 50% of our full year FY08 estimates. Reported S$39.7m earnings benefited from S$5.2m of exceptional gains from the sale of property at Clementi Central. This was another solid set of results with 8.8%yoy revenue growth with steady margins. As expected, quarterly DPS of 1.25 cts was also announced.
Revenue up 8.8% yoy. Logistics led growth at 11.5%yoy as a result of increased contributions from Speedpost and warehousing, fulfilment & distribution. Mail and Retail grew by 8.5%yoy and 9.0%yoy respectively. Mail revenue growth was driven by higher mail volumes and price adjustments. Retail revenue growth was driven by financial services (+29%yoy) and vPost on-line shopping transactions but these gains were dampened by decline in agency/bill presentment services.
Operating margin steady yoy at 37.4%. Slight operating margin improvements at Mail and Retail operations helped offset margin decline (-130bps yoy to 14.2%) at Logistics which faced increased competition and volume-related cost pressure.
New CEO likely to give SingPost greater regional focus. The new CEO, Mr. Wilson Tan joined SingPost just two weeks ago and did not indicate any change in SingPost?s strategic direction. Mr. Tan comes with a strong IT background and regional experience. We believe that Mr. Tan?s arrival will step up the regional agenda in SingPost?s current growth strategy. SingPost has been extending its regional reach with initiatives to grow the hybrid mail and vPOST businesses in the regional markets due to limited domestic growth prospects. Key initiatives implemented during 1HFY08 include hybrid mail expansion into HK and Thailand (in addition to Philippines and Malaysia) as well as continued vPOST regional rollout into Australia and India (in addition to Malaysia and Thailand).
Maintain Outperform and target price of S$1.41. Our target price is based on DDM (cost of equity: 6.5%, terminal growth: 1.5%). FY08 earnings estimate is raised by 3% to reflect gains in property sales. SingPost offers reliable earnings delivery and forward yields of 5.5-6.0% for the next three years. We see scope for dividends to surprise on upside given current net gearing of 1.2x vs. target of 2.0x.
Revenue up 8.8% yoy. Logistics led growth at 11.5%yoy as a result of increased contributions from Speedpost and warehousing, fulfilment & distribution. Mail and Retail grew by 8.5%yoy and 9.0%yoy respectively. Mail revenue growth was driven by higher mail volumes and price adjustments. Retail revenue growth was driven by financial services (+29%yoy) and vPost on-line shopping transactions but these gains were dampened by decline in agency/bill presentment services.
Operating margin steady yoy at 37.4%. Slight operating margin improvements at Mail and Retail operations helped offset margin decline (-130bps yoy to 14.2%) at Logistics which faced increased competition and volume-related cost pressure.
New CEO likely to give SingPost greater regional focus. The new CEO, Mr. Wilson Tan joined SingPost just two weeks ago and did not indicate any change in SingPost?s strategic direction. Mr. Tan comes with a strong IT background and regional experience. We believe that Mr. Tan?s arrival will step up the regional agenda in SingPost?s current growth strategy. SingPost has been extending its regional reach with initiatives to grow the hybrid mail and vPOST businesses in the regional markets due to limited domestic growth prospects. Key initiatives implemented during 1HFY08 include hybrid mail expansion into HK and Thailand (in addition to Philippines and Malaysia) as well as continued vPOST regional rollout into Australia and India (in addition to Malaysia and Thailand).
Maintain Outperform and target price of S$1.41. Our target price is based on DDM (cost of equity: 6.5%, terminal growth: 1.5%). FY08 earnings estimate is raised by 3% to reflect gains in property sales. SingPost offers reliable earnings delivery and forward yields of 5.5-6.0% for the next three years. We see scope for dividends to surprise on upside given current net gearing of 1.2x vs. target of 2.0x.
SingPost - In Pursuit of Growth
31-Oct-2007 KIM ENG - In Pursuit of Growth
♦ Another positive quarter
SingPost reported 2Q08 underlying net profit of $34.8m (+10.9% Y/Y) and underlying EBITDA of $51.4m (+6.5% Y/Y) on revenue of $116m (+8.8% Y/Y). All segments posted higher revenue and operating profits. We had earlier assumed that operating margin would improve from FY07 due to operating leverage. As SingPost?s operating margin is relatively stable, we have thus trimmed our margin forecasts.
♦ Domestic mail volume trending up
The main growth driver was domestic mail (Fig 1), which was bolstered by higher mail volumes and buoyed by price adjustments. Within domestic mail, direct mail volume increased 15.1% Y/Y while business and government mail volume increased 9.1%. We view the stronger mail volume as indicative of the strong economy and SingPost?s effective marketing of its direct mail services.
♦ Actively pursuing growth
We continue to see SingPost growth initiatives bearing fruits, particularly in international mail (as publishers increase their posting volume) and financial services (Fig 1). The company is actively expanding its vPost and hybrid mail business in the region. A new CEO at the helm could also bring a new dimension to SingPost?s business.
♦ Potential bonus from relocating post offices
Upside to our forecasts could arise from SingPost?s sale of any of its post offices. SingPost has an ongoing optimisation programme to relocate some of its post offices to locations which are ?less prime?. We think the sale of Singapore Post Centre (SPC) is less likely as SingPost is currently benefiting from rising rental rates at SPC.
♦ Reducing margin forecast, downgrade to HOLD
In line with its dividend policy, SingPost has declared an interim dividend of 1.25cts/share for 2Q08. We forecast FY09 dividend of 6.9cts/share and arrived at a target price of $1.38 (implied FY09 dividend yield of 5%). Downgrade to HOLD.
♦ Another positive quarter
SingPost reported 2Q08 underlying net profit of $34.8m (+10.9% Y/Y) and underlying EBITDA of $51.4m (+6.5% Y/Y) on revenue of $116m (+8.8% Y/Y). All segments posted higher revenue and operating profits. We had earlier assumed that operating margin would improve from FY07 due to operating leverage. As SingPost?s operating margin is relatively stable, we have thus trimmed our margin forecasts.
♦ Domestic mail volume trending up
The main growth driver was domestic mail (Fig 1), which was bolstered by higher mail volumes and buoyed by price adjustments. Within domestic mail, direct mail volume increased 15.1% Y/Y while business and government mail volume increased 9.1%. We view the stronger mail volume as indicative of the strong economy and SingPost?s effective marketing of its direct mail services.
♦ Actively pursuing growth
We continue to see SingPost growth initiatives bearing fruits, particularly in international mail (as publishers increase their posting volume) and financial services (Fig 1). The company is actively expanding its vPost and hybrid mail business in the region. A new CEO at the helm could also bring a new dimension to SingPost?s business.
♦ Potential bonus from relocating post offices
Upside to our forecasts could arise from SingPost?s sale of any of its post offices. SingPost has an ongoing optimisation programme to relocate some of its post offices to locations which are ?less prime?. We think the sale of Singapore Post Centre (SPC) is less likely as SingPost is currently benefiting from rising rental rates at SPC.
♦ Reducing margin forecast, downgrade to HOLD
In line with its dividend policy, SingPost has declared an interim dividend of 1.25cts/share for 2Q08. We forecast FY09 dividend of 6.9cts/share and arrived at a target price of $1.38 (implied FY09 dividend yield of 5%). Downgrade to HOLD.
Singpost is a value stock
It has long operating history, high profit margins, consistent dividend payout history and policy, high ROE and low debt. It is currently trading at below historical PE.
If you are willing to buy 10 lots of Singpost at $1.10, when Singpost dips 10% to $0.99, you should buy at least the same number of lots or even more. This is because for the same amount of price I spend on Singpost originally, I can now buy more with less money. I will collect more dividends with the same amount invested and at the same time, dollar cost average my investment.
Assuming I bought another 10 lots at $0.99, my average cost will be $1.045/lot. Singpost only need to rebound 5.6% from $0.99 to breakeven. It will take Singpost to rebound more than 11% from $0.99 for me to breakeven at $1.10.
You must believe in the companies you have initially invested in. Do not lose faith just because others have bought and sold it at a different price you had bought. The price changes all the time, not the fundamentals. Hence, do your homework thoroughly before you take the plunge and only invest in companies you believe in.
I don't think singpost has low debts.
In fy08, total debt to equity is 2.31. Perhaps it's due to the nature of the business (something like utility, i'm not sure since there's no good comparison for singpost) that it is highly leveraged. I say that because their Plant property equipment (PPE) stands at a substanstial 34.7% of total assets. They did sell off a lot of their properties already though, to be fair.
Current ratio stands at 0.90, not exactly wonderful either.
If it's not for the wonderful little monopoly (which is eroding with the liberisation of postal services) and the management's future direction of singpost AND the wonderful long history of good dividends, I'll be cutting loss on this one too :)
What do you think of singpost's pending sale of paya lebar HQ? At 850 million, it'll generate around $0.44 per share. Might give a bonanza of dividends for the divestment, when it occurs. Maybe 0.2-0.3 per share as special dividend?
The way I look at it, debts itself is a good tool to reduce tax and increase ROE for companies. Usually only conservative companies have low debt ratios. I think Allgreen is one of them.
Consider pp77 of Singpost latest annual report. It has borrowings of 302m, a tad lower than 2007's 316m.
Cash inflow for financing activities has increased 13m YOY, cash outflow from financing activities has been reduced by 8m.
Cash at bank has increased by 36m YOY.
I think the above shows good and improving financing discipline for Singpost.
For the special dividends, consider a worst case scenario:
Singpost gets 750m from the sale after some bargaining and pays up all its 300m debts.
It will still stand to gain 450m or $0.21 per share.
Again, we adjust 50% retention ratio, there is still a special dividend of $0.10 per share.
Singpost dividend policy is 80% payout ratio or $0.05 per share, whichever higher. Last year dividend rate was at 81% payout ratio.
Hence, it is definitely highly likely we can get a good bonus if the sale of the paya lebar HQ materialises.
The company is almost idiot proof and integral part of any economy. Hence, it will remain a core component of my portfolio for recurring income.
If you are willing to buy 10 lots of Singpost at $1.10, when Singpost dips 10% to $0.99, you should buy at least the same number of lots or even more. This is because for the same amount of price I spend on Singpost originally, I can now buy more with less money. I will collect more dividends with the same amount invested and at the same time, dollar cost average my investment.
Assuming I bought another 10 lots at $0.99, my average cost will be $1.045/lot. Singpost only need to rebound 5.6% from $0.99 to breakeven. It will take Singpost to rebound more than 11% from $0.99 for me to breakeven at $1.10.
You must believe in the companies you have initially invested in. Do not lose faith just because others have bought and sold it at a different price you had bought. The price changes all the time, not the fundamentals. Hence, do your homework thoroughly before you take the plunge and only invest in companies you believe in.
I don't think singpost has low debts.
In fy08, total debt to equity is 2.31. Perhaps it's due to the nature of the business (something like utility, i'm not sure since there's no good comparison for singpost) that it is highly leveraged. I say that because their Plant property equipment (PPE) stands at a substanstial 34.7% of total assets. They did sell off a lot of their properties already though, to be fair.
Current ratio stands at 0.90, not exactly wonderful either.
If it's not for the wonderful little monopoly (which is eroding with the liberisation of postal services) and the management's future direction of singpost AND the wonderful long history of good dividends, I'll be cutting loss on this one too :)
What do you think of singpost's pending sale of paya lebar HQ? At 850 million, it'll generate around $0.44 per share. Might give a bonanza of dividends for the divestment, when it occurs. Maybe 0.2-0.3 per share as special dividend?
The way I look at it, debts itself is a good tool to reduce tax and increase ROE for companies. Usually only conservative companies have low debt ratios. I think Allgreen is one of them.
Consider pp77 of Singpost latest annual report. It has borrowings of 302m, a tad lower than 2007's 316m.
Cash inflow for financing activities has increased 13m YOY, cash outflow from financing activities has been reduced by 8m.
Cash at bank has increased by 36m YOY.
I think the above shows good and improving financing discipline for Singpost.
For the special dividends, consider a worst case scenario:
Singpost gets 750m from the sale after some bargaining and pays up all its 300m debts.
It will still stand to gain 450m or $0.21 per share.
Again, we adjust 50% retention ratio, there is still a special dividend of $0.10 per share.
Singpost dividend policy is 80% payout ratio or $0.05 per share, whichever higher. Last year dividend rate was at 81% payout ratio.
Hence, it is definitely highly likely we can get a good bonus if the sale of the paya lebar HQ materialises.
The company is almost idiot proof and integral part of any economy. Hence, it will remain a core component of my portfolio for recurring income.
SingPost HQ up for sale with $850m tag
Terms of any leaseback deal could determine price it fetches: observers
THE buzz created by recently unveiled plans to develop the Paya Lebar area into a commercial hub may get a boost from Singapore Post’s planned sale of its landmark headquarters building next to Paya Lebar MRT Station.
BT understands the listed group has launched an expression of interest for the 14-storey building and the price tag is said to be around $850 million based on the existing use of Singapore Post Centre.
SingPost is expected to lease back the space it currently occupies - which is roughly half the building’s one million sq ft net lettable area - for both its corporate office and operations, including the mail processing centre.
The rest of the property is leased to a mix of retail and office tenants, including NTUC FairPrice, Kopitiam, Barang Barang, This Fashion, HSBC Insurance, Northwest Airlines and Symantec Corporation.
CB Richard Ellis is understood to be handling the sale of SingPost Centre.
The current approved use for the site is around 60 per cent industrial and 40 per cent commercial, based on an earlier report.
However, potential investors may seek the authorities’ approval to convert the use to full commercial, to optimise the site’s commercial zoning under both the 2003 and 2008 (draft) Master Plans.
A differential premium would have to be paid to the state in exchange for realising the enhancement in use.
SingPost Centre’s existing gross floor area of 1.48 million sq ft has already tapped the 4.2 maximum plot ratio allowed under the two Master Plans.
The property is on a 352,389 sq ft site with a remaining lease of about 73 years. The 14-storey building, which also has three basement levels (mostly for retail), has 587 carpark lots.
Industry observers say the terms of SingPost’s leaseback arrangement with the potential buyer will be a critical factor in determining the price the building fetches.
Banks have also tightened lending for property acquisitions but core funds and core-plus funds, which rely less on debt and more on their own equity when making property purchases, are still interested in making acquisitions.
BT also reported recently that some of the big overseas funds which have been buying office properties in Singapore in the past few years are now also looking at industrial, logistics and business park assets, which offer higher yields.
Against this backdrop, SingPost Centre’s potential buyer may well continue with the existing industrial/commercial use of the property.
SingPost has also been selling some of its smaller properties, for instance, at Clementi Central, Boon Lay, Marine Parade and Hougang South. The group is still left with a dozen properties, including two in the prime districts - Tanglin and Killiney Road post offices.
THE buzz created by recently unveiled plans to develop the Paya Lebar area into a commercial hub may get a boost from Singapore Post’s planned sale of its landmark headquarters building next to Paya Lebar MRT Station.
BT understands the listed group has launched an expression of interest for the 14-storey building and the price tag is said to be around $850 million based on the existing use of Singapore Post Centre.
SingPost is expected to lease back the space it currently occupies - which is roughly half the building’s one million sq ft net lettable area - for both its corporate office and operations, including the mail processing centre.
The rest of the property is leased to a mix of retail and office tenants, including NTUC FairPrice, Kopitiam, Barang Barang, This Fashion, HSBC Insurance, Northwest Airlines and Symantec Corporation.
CB Richard Ellis is understood to be handling the sale of SingPost Centre.
The current approved use for the site is around 60 per cent industrial and 40 per cent commercial, based on an earlier report.
However, potential investors may seek the authorities’ approval to convert the use to full commercial, to optimise the site’s commercial zoning under both the 2003 and 2008 (draft) Master Plans.
A differential premium would have to be paid to the state in exchange for realising the enhancement in use.
SingPost Centre’s existing gross floor area of 1.48 million sq ft has already tapped the 4.2 maximum plot ratio allowed under the two Master Plans.
The property is on a 352,389 sq ft site with a remaining lease of about 73 years. The 14-storey building, which also has three basement levels (mostly for retail), has 587 carpark lots.
Industry observers say the terms of SingPost’s leaseback arrangement with the potential buyer will be a critical factor in determining the price the building fetches.
Banks have also tightened lending for property acquisitions but core funds and core-plus funds, which rely less on debt and more on their own equity when making property purchases, are still interested in making acquisitions.
BT also reported recently that some of the big overseas funds which have been buying office properties in Singapore in the past few years are now also looking at industrial, logistics and business park assets, which offer higher yields.
Against this backdrop, SingPost Centre’s potential buyer may well continue with the existing industrial/commercial use of the property.
SingPost has also been selling some of its smaller properties, for instance, at Clementi Central, Boon Lay, Marine Parade and Hougang South. The group is still left with a dozen properties, including two in the prime districts - Tanglin and Killiney Road post offices.
SingPost may sell landmark Paya Lebar HQ
It’s said to have appointed property consultant to explore its options.
Singapore Post’s landmark headquarters next to Paya Lebar MRT station may be on the verge of unlocking some riches.
SingPost said it is ‘exploring opportunities’ for Singapore Post Centre, which has about one million sq ft of net lettable area. Valued at $1,000 to $1,300 per square foot of existing net lettable area, this could translate to a total of $1 billion to $1.3 billion, assuming a full-commercial use, analysts estimate. The 14-storey building is on a 352,389 sq ft site with a remaining lease of about 73 years.
In its third quarter results statement last month SingPost said that it is ‘continuing to review its non- core businesses, and is also exploring opportunities in respect of SingPost Centre, including unlocking the value of SingPost Centre’.
When contacted for details, SingPost’s spokeswoman would only say that the group was at the ‘preliminary stage of exploring opportunities in respect of SingPost Centre’ and declined to elaborate.
But industry observers say SingPost held a ‘beauty parade’ late last year to select a property consultant to advise it on exploring its options for the property . The exercise is believed to have culminated in an appointment being made.
Market watchers say that among the factors that will determine the price that any potential buyer will be prepared to pay for SingPost Centre is whether SingPost will lease back the space it currently occupies in the building and the rental it is prepared to pay.
SingPost currently occupies about half of the property ’s one million sq ft total net lettable area for both its corporate office and operations including the mail processing centre.
The rest of the property is leased to a mix of office and retail tenants including HSBC Insurance, NorthWest Airlines, Symantec Corporation, Prudential (whose lease expires this year), This Fashion, Barang Barang, NTUC FairPrice and Kopitiam.
Although the site is zoned for commercial use with a 4.2 plot ratio (ratio of maximum potential gross floor area to land area) under Master Plan 2003, the current approved use for the site is understood to be 60 per cent industrial and 40 per cent commercial.
SingPost will probably be advised to make an application to convert the approved use to full commercial, to optimise the site’s use under the current Master Plan. This would also be in keeping with the government’s intention, announced last year, to transform the area around Paya Lebar MRT Station into a new business hub.
Some property consultants have since commented that the location will be ideal for cost-conscious office tenants, and could serve as backroom offices for banks, given its proximity to the city.
In exchange for allowing a conversion of the site’s approved use a differential premium will have to be paid to the state.
SingPost Centre’s existing gross floor area of 1.48 million sq ft has already tapped the 4.2 maximum plot ratio allowed under Master Plan 2003.
Property analysts reckon that office and retail space on the SingPost Centre site could be worth around $1,000 to $1,300 psf of net lettable area, with the higher end of this range ascribed to retail space.
SingPost Centre was completed in two phases - the industrial component in July 1998 and the commercial space in May 1999.
The 14-storey building, which also has three basement levels (mostly for retail), has a total of 587 car park lots.
SingPost has been selling some of its smaller properties . For the financial year ended March 31, 2007, it divested two HDB shop units - one at Marine Parade sold for $5.7 million, and the other at Hougang South divested for $2.2 million. The Marine Parade property was the group’s former post office branch; SingPost has since relocated to a nearby leased property . The Hougang property was not used as a post office but was instead leased to a supermarket operator.
In the current financial year, the group has divested its former post office branch at Clementi Central and relocated its operations to another location nearby and sold a property at Boon Lay, which it had leased to a third party.
Several years ago, there had been market speculation that SingPost could spin off its post office properties into a real estate investment trust (and lease back the premises from the Reit). But that does not seem to be the way SingPost is headed currently in optimising its property portfolio. The group is still left with over a dozen properties , including two in the prime districts - Tanglin Post Office and Killiney Road Post Office.
Singapore Post’s landmark headquarters next to Paya Lebar MRT station may be on the verge of unlocking some riches.
SingPost said it is ‘exploring opportunities’ for Singapore Post Centre, which has about one million sq ft of net lettable area. Valued at $1,000 to $1,300 per square foot of existing net lettable area, this could translate to a total of $1 billion to $1.3 billion, assuming a full-commercial use, analysts estimate. The 14-storey building is on a 352,389 sq ft site with a remaining lease of about 73 years.
In its third quarter results statement last month SingPost said that it is ‘continuing to review its non- core businesses, and is also exploring opportunities in respect of SingPost Centre, including unlocking the value of SingPost Centre’.
When contacted for details, SingPost’s spokeswoman would only say that the group was at the ‘preliminary stage of exploring opportunities in respect of SingPost Centre’ and declined to elaborate.
But industry observers say SingPost held a ‘beauty parade’ late last year to select a property consultant to advise it on exploring its options for the property . The exercise is believed to have culminated in an appointment being made.
Market watchers say that among the factors that will determine the price that any potential buyer will be prepared to pay for SingPost Centre is whether SingPost will lease back the space it currently occupies in the building and the rental it is prepared to pay.
SingPost currently occupies about half of the property ’s one million sq ft total net lettable area for both its corporate office and operations including the mail processing centre.
The rest of the property is leased to a mix of office and retail tenants including HSBC Insurance, NorthWest Airlines, Symantec Corporation, Prudential (whose lease expires this year), This Fashion, Barang Barang, NTUC FairPrice and Kopitiam.
Although the site is zoned for commercial use with a 4.2 plot ratio (ratio of maximum potential gross floor area to land area) under Master Plan 2003, the current approved use for the site is understood to be 60 per cent industrial and 40 per cent commercial.
SingPost will probably be advised to make an application to convert the approved use to full commercial, to optimise the site’s use under the current Master Plan. This would also be in keeping with the government’s intention, announced last year, to transform the area around Paya Lebar MRT Station into a new business hub.
Some property consultants have since commented that the location will be ideal for cost-conscious office tenants, and could serve as backroom offices for banks, given its proximity to the city.
In exchange for allowing a conversion of the site’s approved use a differential premium will have to be paid to the state.
SingPost Centre’s existing gross floor area of 1.48 million sq ft has already tapped the 4.2 maximum plot ratio allowed under Master Plan 2003.
Property analysts reckon that office and retail space on the SingPost Centre site could be worth around $1,000 to $1,300 psf of net lettable area, with the higher end of this range ascribed to retail space.
SingPost Centre was completed in two phases - the industrial component in July 1998 and the commercial space in May 1999.
The 14-storey building, which also has three basement levels (mostly for retail), has a total of 587 car park lots.
SingPost has been selling some of its smaller properties . For the financial year ended March 31, 2007, it divested two HDB shop units - one at Marine Parade sold for $5.7 million, and the other at Hougang South divested for $2.2 million. The Marine Parade property was the group’s former post office branch; SingPost has since relocated to a nearby leased property . The Hougang property was not used as a post office but was instead leased to a supermarket operator.
In the current financial year, the group has divested its former post office branch at Clementi Central and relocated its operations to another location nearby and sold a property at Boon Lay, which it had leased to a third party.
Several years ago, there had been market speculation that SingPost could spin off its post office properties into a real estate investment trust (and lease back the premises from the Reit). But that does not seem to be the way SingPost is headed currently in optimising its property portfolio. The group is still left with over a dozen properties , including two in the prime districts - Tanglin Post Office and Killiney Road Post Office.
CIMB-GK's top picks for a volatile market
CIMB-GK ISSUED a 13-page Singapore Strategy report yesterday, cautioning against further downside risks of stocks but also gave its selection of top stock picks.
The top picks and the excerpts from the report are:
• Ascendas REIT. A-REIT is the only industrial REIT with a significant share of science park/business park space, the best-in-class of industrial space. A-REIT’srelatively long weighted average lease term to expiry (of 5.5 years) and average security deposits (of 10 months) for sale-and-lease back deals provide cash flow visibility. Its industrial tenant mix is also the most diversified among the industrialREITs.
Development projects are expected to boost DPU going forward withsuch projects offering higher yields than acquisitions. Current asset leverage of 40% is expected to reach 45% by 2010-11 as development projects are completed. Refinancing is manageable with short-term debt of S$255m (or 14% of total debt) rolled over in 2009. Write-downs of asset values are less likely than for offices, as industrial capital values have not appreciated as quickly as those in the office sector.
• City Developments. CityDev has a strong balance sheet with an estimated net debt to re-valued assets of 0.28x. Presale proceeds are expected to come through in the next 2-3 years, of more than S$4bn. Asset write-downs are less ofa threat given that: 1) its investment properties are booked at cost; and 2) the bulk of its outstanding residential land bank was bought during the previous cycle or atthe early stage of this cycle. In a downturn, CityDev has a good portfolio mix and can afford to cut prices and still book profits, if needed. Valuations are attractive at an estimated 38% discount to our conservative RNAV estimate of S$10.50.Although Keppel Land’s underperformance makes it increasingly tempting on valuation grounds, we have retained CityDev as our top pick given its more robustbalance sheet.
• ComfortDelgro. We like its globally diversified transportation business,generating steady earnings in a recession. ComfortDelgro will also benefit from lower energy prices while in Singapore, ridership growth should boost revenue. Revenue is more defensive than for most businesses in a recession. With steady earnings, dividend yields have consistently been above 5%.
• SembCorp Marine – Earnings growth till 2010 is supported by S$10bn orderbook. Order cancellation is unlikely given strong standing of non-speculative customer base with low risk of credit crunch. Global charter rates for rigs and semi-submersibles are still holding strong given that current demand still outstrips supply. SembMarine is also supported by strong balance sheet with net cash per share of about S$0.40 or 20% of current share price. Valuation attractive at 10-year trough level of about 9-10x.
• SGX. Average weekly stock-market volumes have stayed above the S$1bn mark, even as markets crumble. There is some earnings risk if we enter a protracted period of low trading volumes. However, volatility could also help to support trading volumes. A growing derivatives business should partially take up the slack of lower securities turnover. The key risk is valuation compression. P/E and P/BV valuations look high but are justified by a high ROE business, with little financing needed. If valuation compression worsens, the saving grace is that SGX’s valuation also typically expands strongly when the cycle recovers.
• SPH. Lower adex (typical in a recession) and high newsprint costs could pile some pressure on operational earnings. However, bonus property development profits are coming through and capex needs are muted. This gives some assurance to its dividend outlook. With sustainable dividends yields and amonopoly business, P/E compression should not be that drastic.
• UOB. CY08 P/BV of 1.25x is already in the trough range seen during 2001 and 2003. Our key concern now is potential capital strains when write-offs and provisions occur. Comparing Tier-1 CAR among banks alone is no longer foolproof. Loan book exposure and investment securities exposure are more crucial. But even as higher NPLs and loan loss provisions are inevitable when industry NPLs rise, we are confident that UOB will have the least write-downs, given its typical conservatism.
• Venture. One of the cheapest (P/E) big-cap stocks even if we input a core earnings decline, expected in this environment. Its underlying business is now more stable after the acquisition of GES and successful expansion of mid-sizedOEM customers. Venture has a strong balance sheet and good free cash flow. We expect it to rebuild its cash reserves in the coming years. The stock is usually ignored by most investors during times of uncertain global consumption, but valuations are attractive, at a historical low P/BV, with 9% of its share price backed by cash. Venture also offers dividend yields of more than 10%.
Big-caps
Some of the more interesting stock picks in the big-capcategory are SATS and SIAEC. Both have to fly against the headwinds of adeteriorating aviation industry, but with more than 20% of their current share prices backed by net cash, valuations will look increasingly attractive as share prices fall further.
Mid-caps
It is in the mid-cap space that we see amazing values emerging after last Friday’s sell-down. In the mass stampede, sellers of some S-chips have pushed share prices down to net cash values already. In ourmid-cap space (defined as S$200m-1bn in market cap), stocks that are trading below or near our FY08 net cash forecasts include: China Sky, Synear, CreativeTechnology, China Hongxing and China Zaino.
China Zaino
In the midcap space, the other attractive stock on a cash basis is Wheelock Properties. Thestock has fallen to a 72% discount to our RNAV estimate (S$2.85) and is trading at 32% of our FY08 net cash projection. Wheelock is expected to recognise more than S$1.2bn of presales revenue over the next three years, with the bulk coming from Scotts Square (70% sold since launch last year). We estimate that it will book over S$1bn of presales revenue from this project alone over the next three years, even assuming zero new sales from here. Wheelock is, in addition, one of the rare developers with net cash and will be able to land-bank at the trough of the cycle again.
Small-caps
Some small-cap stocks also trading at net cash levels, but liquidity could be unacceptable. In the less than S$200m market-cap category, stocks that trade below net cash are China Sports and Sino Environment. Stocks that trade close to netcash are Valuetronics and Longcheer. We expect all to be profitable. Again, even ifearnings contract, such marked-down valuations are suggesting distress valuations.Our only grouse with these stocks is that liquidity can be really low, which might not make them practical investments.
Concluding remarks:
We believe that it is too early to call a final bottom for the STI, as banks and property earnings are at risk. We reiterate that a short-term bottom might emergesoon when the panic subsides.Beyond the current period of panic, we believe that a value approach historically works well and is likely to work again. In the current environment, we would downplaythe emphasis on P/E, highlighting that it is extremely fallible. Balance-sheet analysis is recommended and we would consider stocks trading below their net cash levels as bargains, provided that profitability is somewhat assured.
We highlight S-chips trading near net cash levels as deserving some attention. We are typically not advocates of diversification but in this environment, little is predictable. With all manner of risk to consider and with a wide selection of stocksemerging with attractive valuations that can yield outsized returns in the years ahead,diversification will help limit any unforeseen business deterioration.
The top picks and the excerpts from the report are:
• Ascendas REIT. A-REIT is the only industrial REIT with a significant share of science park/business park space, the best-in-class of industrial space. A-REIT’srelatively long weighted average lease term to expiry (of 5.5 years) and average security deposits (of 10 months) for sale-and-lease back deals provide cash flow visibility. Its industrial tenant mix is also the most diversified among the industrialREITs.
Development projects are expected to boost DPU going forward withsuch projects offering higher yields than acquisitions. Current asset leverage of 40% is expected to reach 45% by 2010-11 as development projects are completed. Refinancing is manageable with short-term debt of S$255m (or 14% of total debt) rolled over in 2009. Write-downs of asset values are less likely than for offices, as industrial capital values have not appreciated as quickly as those in the office sector.
• City Developments. CityDev has a strong balance sheet with an estimated net debt to re-valued assets of 0.28x. Presale proceeds are expected to come through in the next 2-3 years, of more than S$4bn. Asset write-downs are less ofa threat given that: 1) its investment properties are booked at cost; and 2) the bulk of its outstanding residential land bank was bought during the previous cycle or atthe early stage of this cycle. In a downturn, CityDev has a good portfolio mix and can afford to cut prices and still book profits, if needed. Valuations are attractive at an estimated 38% discount to our conservative RNAV estimate of S$10.50.Although Keppel Land’s underperformance makes it increasingly tempting on valuation grounds, we have retained CityDev as our top pick given its more robustbalance sheet.
• ComfortDelgro. We like its globally diversified transportation business,generating steady earnings in a recession. ComfortDelgro will also benefit from lower energy prices while in Singapore, ridership growth should boost revenue. Revenue is more defensive than for most businesses in a recession. With steady earnings, dividend yields have consistently been above 5%.
• SembCorp Marine – Earnings growth till 2010 is supported by S$10bn orderbook. Order cancellation is unlikely given strong standing of non-speculative customer base with low risk of credit crunch. Global charter rates for rigs and semi-submersibles are still holding strong given that current demand still outstrips supply. SembMarine is also supported by strong balance sheet with net cash per share of about S$0.40 or 20% of current share price. Valuation attractive at 10-year trough level of about 9-10x.
• SGX. Average weekly stock-market volumes have stayed above the S$1bn mark, even as markets crumble. There is some earnings risk if we enter a protracted period of low trading volumes. However, volatility could also help to support trading volumes. A growing derivatives business should partially take up the slack of lower securities turnover. The key risk is valuation compression. P/E and P/BV valuations look high but are justified by a high ROE business, with little financing needed. If valuation compression worsens, the saving grace is that SGX’s valuation also typically expands strongly when the cycle recovers.
• SPH. Lower adex (typical in a recession) and high newsprint costs could pile some pressure on operational earnings. However, bonus property development profits are coming through and capex needs are muted. This gives some assurance to its dividend outlook. With sustainable dividends yields and amonopoly business, P/E compression should not be that drastic.
• UOB. CY08 P/BV of 1.25x is already in the trough range seen during 2001 and 2003. Our key concern now is potential capital strains when write-offs and provisions occur. Comparing Tier-1 CAR among banks alone is no longer foolproof. Loan book exposure and investment securities exposure are more crucial. But even as higher NPLs and loan loss provisions are inevitable when industry NPLs rise, we are confident that UOB will have the least write-downs, given its typical conservatism.
• Venture. One of the cheapest (P/E) big-cap stocks even if we input a core earnings decline, expected in this environment. Its underlying business is now more stable after the acquisition of GES and successful expansion of mid-sizedOEM customers. Venture has a strong balance sheet and good free cash flow. We expect it to rebuild its cash reserves in the coming years. The stock is usually ignored by most investors during times of uncertain global consumption, but valuations are attractive, at a historical low P/BV, with 9% of its share price backed by cash. Venture also offers dividend yields of more than 10%.
Big-caps
Some of the more interesting stock picks in the big-capcategory are SATS and SIAEC. Both have to fly against the headwinds of adeteriorating aviation industry, but with more than 20% of their current share prices backed by net cash, valuations will look increasingly attractive as share prices fall further.
Mid-caps
It is in the mid-cap space that we see amazing values emerging after last Friday’s sell-down. In the mass stampede, sellers of some S-chips have pushed share prices down to net cash values already. In ourmid-cap space (defined as S$200m-1bn in market cap), stocks that are trading below or near our FY08 net cash forecasts include: China Sky, Synear, CreativeTechnology, China Hongxing and China Zaino.
China Zaino
In the midcap space, the other attractive stock on a cash basis is Wheelock Properties. Thestock has fallen to a 72% discount to our RNAV estimate (S$2.85) and is trading at 32% of our FY08 net cash projection. Wheelock is expected to recognise more than S$1.2bn of presales revenue over the next three years, with the bulk coming from Scotts Square (70% sold since launch last year). We estimate that it will book over S$1bn of presales revenue from this project alone over the next three years, even assuming zero new sales from here. Wheelock is, in addition, one of the rare developers with net cash and will be able to land-bank at the trough of the cycle again.
Small-caps
Some small-cap stocks also trading at net cash levels, but liquidity could be unacceptable. In the less than S$200m market-cap category, stocks that trade below net cash are China Sports and Sino Environment. Stocks that trade close to netcash are Valuetronics and Longcheer. We expect all to be profitable. Again, even ifearnings contract, such marked-down valuations are suggesting distress valuations.Our only grouse with these stocks is that liquidity can be really low, which might not make them practical investments.
Concluding remarks:
We believe that it is too early to call a final bottom for the STI, as banks and property earnings are at risk. We reiterate that a short-term bottom might emergesoon when the panic subsides.Beyond the current period of panic, we believe that a value approach historically works well and is likely to work again. In the current environment, we would downplaythe emphasis on P/E, highlighting that it is extremely fallible. Balance-sheet analysis is recommended and we would consider stocks trading below their net cash levels as bargains, provided that profitability is somewhat assured.
We highlight S-chips trading near net cash levels as deserving some attention. We are typically not advocates of diversification but in this environment, little is predictable. With all manner of risk to consider and with a wide selection of stocksemerging with attractive valuations that can yield outsized returns in the years ahead,diversification will help limit any unforeseen business deterioration.
巴菲特风暴中疯狂买入 救市还是打劫？
继50亿美元投资高盛后，巴菲特又相继宣布入股充电电池制造商比亚迪、美国通用电气，而其持有大量股份的富国银行更是宣布将以总价151亿美元的价格收购美联银行。看到巴菲特的频频出手，人们都在问：“股神出手了，市场是不是见底了？”
结论恐怕会令一些人失望。翻看巴菲特的投资历史，我们发现巴菲特每次出手并非都是市场见底之时，很多时候在他购买之后股票价格还会继续下跌，甚至于一两年都低于他的持有成本。
对于巴菲特出手高盛，罗杰斯明确地说：“巴菲特确实进行了一笔非常划算的交易，如果我们其他人也能以这样的条件和价格成交，我们也可以说是笔好买卖，因为这些资产总有一天会反弹。”
“从短期来说，巴菲特的投资存在风险。他目前所持有的通用电气和高盛的股权价值暂时全都已归于零，他是在看长期的价值。”加拿大TD资产公司投资管理副总裁吴雅楠说。
那么巴菲特投资到底说明了什么呢？“说明了这些股票的交易价格和条件有了较高的安全边际。”专家表示，“在这个价格之下，巴菲特会越跌越买。”
吴雅楠对记者说：“巴菲特又对了。”巴菲特在2002年的年终股东报告中，明确地表示对金融衍生产品的担心，他认为这些产品“是大规模杀伤武器，其中的危险短期来说潜伏着，长期来说是致命的。”5年多后证明了他的担心和预见。“所以，他在很早时候就开始在自己的再保险企业中退出衍生品市场。在股票市场火热时期，他持有愈300亿美元现金，因为他觉得股票市场严重超值，没有“便宜公司”可以购买。如今他在这样流通性严重紧缩的环境下，手中有现金，开始以长期的眼光，看到有些价值的公司已经可以便宜购买了。”
巴菲特曾表示，他一直牢记着格雷厄姆教导的安全边际准则，即在估算的内在价值超过其市场价格的差额具有较高的安全系数时，才能购买该公司股票。
国内研究巴菲特的专家汇添富基金策略分析师刘建位在接受《每日经济新闻》记者采访时说：“巴菲特出手不是看整个市场见底不见底，而是关注他想要的好东西。他关注企业本身，现在这些企业的价格已经到了他满意的价格。就像他本来就想去超市买几样东西，正好赶上商场大减价，他觉得价格合适就买了。但是是否继续降价他并不介意。”
美国FULLER&THALER资产管理公司高级副总裁丁专鑫表示：“我估计巴菲特想买高盛不是一年两年而是很长时间了，这次是个千载难逢的机会。”
而巴菲特买入理想的公司的股票后，面对股市的继续下跌，巴菲特选择的是坚定的持续买入。巴菲特1973年买入了联合出版公司的股票，随着股票的一跌再跌，1974年1月8日他又买进了联合出版公司，11﹑16日再次买进。在当年2月13﹑15﹑19﹑20﹑21﹑22日连续多次重返市场。一年中都在不断买进，有107天巴菲特都在买进联合出版公司的股票，最低买价达到5.5美元。
结论恐怕会令一些人失望。翻看巴菲特的投资历史，我们发现巴菲特每次出手并非都是市场见底之时，很多时候在他购买之后股票价格还会继续下跌，甚至于一两年都低于他的持有成本。
对于巴菲特出手高盛，罗杰斯明确地说：“巴菲特确实进行了一笔非常划算的交易，如果我们其他人也能以这样的条件和价格成交，我们也可以说是笔好买卖，因为这些资产总有一天会反弹。”
“从短期来说，巴菲特的投资存在风险。他目前所持有的通用电气和高盛的股权价值暂时全都已归于零，他是在看长期的价值。”加拿大TD资产公司投资管理副总裁吴雅楠说。
那么巴菲特投资到底说明了什么呢？“说明了这些股票的交易价格和条件有了较高的安全边际。”专家表示，“在这个价格之下，巴菲特会越跌越买。”
吴雅楠对记者说：“巴菲特又对了。”巴菲特在2002年的年终股东报告中，明确地表示对金融衍生产品的担心，他认为这些产品“是大规模杀伤武器，其中的危险短期来说潜伏着，长期来说是致命的。”5年多后证明了他的担心和预见。“所以，他在很早时候就开始在自己的再保险企业中退出衍生品市场。在股票市场火热时期，他持有愈300亿美元现金，因为他觉得股票市场严重超值，没有“便宜公司”可以购买。如今他在这样流通性严重紧缩的环境下，手中有现金，开始以长期的眼光，看到有些价值的公司已经可以便宜购买了。”
巴菲特曾表示，他一直牢记着格雷厄姆教导的安全边际准则，即在估算的内在价值超过其市场价格的差额具有较高的安全系数时，才能购买该公司股票。
国内研究巴菲特的专家汇添富基金策略分析师刘建位在接受《每日经济新闻》记者采访时说：“巴菲特出手不是看整个市场见底不见底，而是关注他想要的好东西。他关注企业本身，现在这些企业的价格已经到了他满意的价格。就像他本来就想去超市买几样东西，正好赶上商场大减价，他觉得价格合适就买了。但是是否继续降价他并不介意。”
美国FULLER&THALER资产管理公司高级副总裁丁专鑫表示：“我估计巴菲特想买高盛不是一年两年而是很长时间了，这次是个千载难逢的机会。”
而巴菲特买入理想的公司的股票后，面对股市的继续下跌，巴菲特选择的是坚定的持续买入。巴菲特1973年买入了联合出版公司的股票，随着股票的一跌再跌，1974年1月8日他又买进了联合出版公司，11﹑16日再次买进。在当年2月13﹑15﹑19﹑20﹑21﹑22日连续多次重返市场。一年中都在不断买进，有107天巴菲特都在买进联合出版公司的股票，最低买价达到5.5美元。
股市不是为聪明人而设
在股市四十年，我发现一个有趣的现象，那些太过聪明的人，往往在股市中赚不到钱。
赚钱最多的，反而是那些看起来并不怎样聪明的人。
原来这个股市，原本就是为不聪明的人而设的。
请听我细说从头。
在数百年前，欧洲就发现他们的社会中存在着两种人，一种是懂得做事业，但缺乏资金，这种人叫“企业家”。
另一种人有资金，却不懂得做事业，这种人叫“群众”——“群众”是指老百姓，属於各行各业，他们数以百万计，散居全国，互不相识，手头有一点储蓄，叫“游资”。
有人想出了一个办法，收集了老百姓的游资，交给企业家去创办企业，赚到的钱，按出资比例分给出资人。
按出资比例分享盈利
这实在是两全其美。
凡是将资金交给企业家的人，叫投“资”者，投资者就叫“股东”，企业家发给每个投资者一纸证书，证明股份的数额，叫“股票”，按股份数额分发利润，有如银行的利息，叫“股息”，买卖股份（票）的市场，叫“股市”。
那些小户之所以要把钱交给企业家去创办企业，是因为他们对有关企业（例如银行、保险、船运……），没有认识，从企业的角度看，他们都不是聪明人。
所以，说股市不是为聪明人，而是为不聪明的平凡人而存在，是有道理的。
自作聪明自讨苦吃
但是，当股市越来越发达时，这个最基本的观念，就离人们越来越远，到最后，人们根本就忘记了股票的宗旨，而且绝大部份的人都根本不再理会股票是什么，他们都全神贯注於股价的起落，股票变成了赌桌上的筹码，而股市变成了世界最大的合法赌场。
既然股市不是为聪明的人而设，则在股市中栽筋斗的，都是聪明人。
因为所有聪明的人在这个大赌场中斗智，谁也没法胜过对手，结果是斗来斗去，两败惧伤，真正得利的，反而是那些看起来不大聪明，其实是大智若愚的平凡的投资者。
记住，股市不是为聪明人而设，所以不要自作聪明，企图去胜过股市(beat the market )，那是自讨苦吃。
站稳你目前的岗位，尽本份做好你的工作，然后乘股市低沉时（如目前的股市），买进一些好股，长期持有。
这种生活，比在股市抢进杀出，写意得多了。
赚钱最多的，反而是那些看起来并不怎样聪明的人。
原来这个股市，原本就是为不聪明的人而设的。
请听我细说从头。
在数百年前，欧洲就发现他们的社会中存在着两种人，一种是懂得做事业，但缺乏资金，这种人叫“企业家”。
另一种人有资金，却不懂得做事业，这种人叫“群众”——“群众”是指老百姓，属於各行各业，他们数以百万计，散居全国，互不相识，手头有一点储蓄，叫“游资”。
有人想出了一个办法，收集了老百姓的游资，交给企业家去创办企业，赚到的钱，按出资比例分给出资人。
按出资比例分享盈利
这实在是两全其美。
凡是将资金交给企业家的人，叫投“资”者，投资者就叫“股东”，企业家发给每个投资者一纸证书，证明股份的数额，叫“股票”，按股份数额分发利润，有如银行的利息，叫“股息”，买卖股份（票）的市场，叫“股市”。
那些小户之所以要把钱交给企业家去创办企业，是因为他们对有关企业（例如银行、保险、船运……），没有认识，从企业的角度看，他们都不是聪明人。
所以，说股市不是为聪明人，而是为不聪明的平凡人而存在，是有道理的。
自作聪明自讨苦吃
但是，当股市越来越发达时，这个最基本的观念，就离人们越来越远，到最后，人们根本就忘记了股票的宗旨，而且绝大部份的人都根本不再理会股票是什么，他们都全神贯注於股价的起落，股票变成了赌桌上的筹码，而股市变成了世界最大的合法赌场。
既然股市不是为聪明的人而设，则在股市中栽筋斗的，都是聪明人。
因为所有聪明的人在这个大赌场中斗智，谁也没法胜过对手，结果是斗来斗去，两败惧伤，真正得利的，反而是那些看起来不大聪明，其实是大智若愚的平凡的投资者。
记住，股市不是为聪明人而设，所以不要自作聪明，企图去胜过股市(beat the market )，那是自讨苦吃。
站稳你目前的岗位，尽本份做好你的工作，然后乘股市低沉时（如目前的股市），买进一些好股，长期持有。
这种生活，比在股市抢进杀出，写意得多了。
Saturday, October 18, 2008
Nera Telecom: Project delays hit earnings; FULLY VALUED (Downgrade from Hold) S$0.24 Price Target : S$ 0.24 (Prev S$ 0.40)
Comment on Results
3Q08 net profit fell 39% y-o-y to S$1.86m, significantly lower than our S$3.0m expectation. The main culprit was lower turnover (-22% y-o-y)coupled with higher operating expenses. Management attributed the weaker turnover to project delays, some of which should be recognized in 4Q08.
Operating expenses rose due to higher payroll and related costs.
Total cash stood at S$26.4m, lower than S$39.5m in 2Q08 due to additional S$19m cash held up in work-in progress in the quarter.
Project delays are not uncommon in this line of business, but we believe the broad economic slowdown could prevent a meaningful recovery soon.
Recommendation
We lower our FY08F and FY09F earnings by 10% and 35%, respectively, after imputing lower turnover assumptions. Accordingly, our target price is lowered to S$0.24, pegged to 10x FY09F earnings, and the counter downgraded to Fully Valued. The anticipated 3 cents dividend per share at the end of the year is a key attraction, but business prospects in this industry do not seem to inspire confidence in the stock.
3Q08 net profit fell 39% y-o-y to S$1.86m, significantly lower than our S$3.0m expectation. The main culprit was lower turnover (-22% y-o-y)coupled with higher operating expenses. Management attributed the weaker turnover to project delays, some of which should be recognized in 4Q08.
Operating expenses rose due to higher payroll and related costs.
Total cash stood at S$26.4m, lower than S$39.5m in 2Q08 due to additional S$19m cash held up in work-in progress in the quarter.
Project delays are not uncommon in this line of business, but we believe the broad economic slowdown could prevent a meaningful recovery soon.
Recommendation
We lower our FY08F and FY09F earnings by 10% and 35%, respectively, after imputing lower turnover assumptions. Accordingly, our target price is lowered to S$0.24, pegged to 10x FY09F earnings, and the counter downgraded to Fully Valued. The anticipated 3 cents dividend per share at the end of the year is a key attraction, but business prospects in this industry do not seem to inspire confidence in the stock.
熊市對壞消息特別敏感, 市場沽壓隨時湧現
˙蹺不怕舊最緊要受，美股周三仍以市場擔心經濟衰退而插水。
˙金融市場已發生海嘯，衰退早在預期中，現再翻炒一次，殺傷力依然。
˙大熊市中，股市反彈往往短暫且有限，心理因素主導股市走勢更明顯，估計日後淡友借衰退造淡機會仍時有出現。
美國推出一連串救市措施以保持流動資金，市場開始擔心無以為繼，所以借擔心經濟衰退理由仍足以令道指周三再現急瀉，港股繼周三大跌後，周四再急跌。
恒指一度低見14579，差些又再試上周低位14399，收報15230，仍跌767點。
大熊市下悲觀因素放大
太陽之下無新事，聯儲局主席伯南克話穩定金融市場的措施不會成為刺激經濟立即好轉的強心劑，即被解讀為經濟將會衰退。難道大家眼見歐、美金融市場如此糟糕，還心存僥倖美國經濟不會出現衰退？筆者不是經濟學者也在周初提出對實體經濟憂慮，股市反應慢了三拍反應，說穿了，是市場嚴重缺乏信心的表現。對壞消息反應特別敏感。投資者悲觀心理在大熊市中發揮得淋漓盡致。記得巴菲特恩師Benjamin Graham（格雷漢姆）曾經總結過：「當一次泡沫破滅後，股價總會跌到偏低水平。」格雷漢姆曾經歷1929年至1933年的美國經濟大蕭條時期，有感而發地指出當年美國許多大企業破產清盤後比它們繼續營運更為值錢，慨歎當年大企業之資產值遠低於市場價值之現實。
市場沽壓強過承接力
不要以為筆者近月只集中研究國際經濟及金融形勢而忽略了股票分析。事實上，愈來愈多公司股價出現格雷漢姆當年所經歷之低於估值現象。好像新華文軒（00811）目前市值只有15.33億元，截至08年6月底止單持淨現金已經為16.85億港元，持物業就話怕會貶值，但新華文軒持淨現金，居然淨現金值會低於市值？要筆者解釋的話，其實找到個較牽強理由，據知西京投資管理（香港）公司宣布已暫停旗下在愛爾蘭上市的中資概念對冲基金「中國財富基金」的交易，由於「中國財富基金」因有大額贖回而面臨流動性壓力，令投資者也擔心西京會減持其在港持股套現。西京持有新華文軒5.2%股權，大家就怕有沽售壓力。此外，只能解釋為悲觀心理作怪了。
股票真正價值基本上是通過買賣交易才能體現出來，然而，在某一段時間，總有賣方的力量強過買方力量，像現在銀根緊張、金融機構及基金要減持股票套現、對冲基金離場、大把蟹民蝕到無錢再投入股市、有錢在手的受薪階級也擔心裁員潮而傾向手持現金，種種因素構成市場承接力較弱。
對冲基金相繼離場
據《華爾街日報》引述高盛集團分析師David Kostin說，對冲基金業近來已經將總額高達4,000億美元的資金轉成了現金等項目，從一些對冲基金如SAC Capital Advisors這隻市值140億美元對冲基金的Steven Cohen，據說已將其所管理資金的一半，約70億美元，轉入了貨幣市場基金和其他短期證券。對冲基金一直利用借貸作槓桿式炒作，在目前及可預計將來連國際知名銀行也出現拆借困難，對冲基金籌資困難，令其運作受約制。部分選擇將投資變現，除了因市場極端混亂和投資者的恐慌情緒未平復，寧願選擇離場觀望。更可能是美國監管機構最近收緊了沽空限制，令對冲基金無法使用沽空這種投資策略，只好暫時離場。
綜合現時市況，雖已察覺部分港股的股價跌至過低水平，價值投資良機在浮現。惟大熊市下負面心理不容忽略，仍偏向耐心等待歐、美金融市場穩定下來，以及各國出招刺激經濟方案出台。股市冰河時期，倖存股民還是「刨定」一些專門分析證券真正價值之心法，為日後破冰之旅做好準備，投資界聖經《證券分析》值得細讀（見下文分析）。
﹏﹏﹏﹏﹏﹏﹏﹏﹏﹏﹏﹏﹏﹏﹏﹏﹏﹏
閱讀心得︰衰退期選股秘笈
Benjamin Graham 與 David Dodd合著的《Security Analysis》（證券分析）可說是分析證券價值及固定價值類投資的聖經，是價值投資者學習入門書籍。
由於Benjamin Graham經歷過美國經濟大蕭條日子，在書中詳述當時嚴選股票之準則，相信有助大家在面對全球市選股漸回歸基本價值時作參考，有關選股策略。書中有如下四點分析：
一、市場不是一台根據證券的內在品質而精確地、客觀地記錄其價值的計量器，而是滙集了無數人部分出於理性，部分出於感性的選擇的投票機。
二、人的因素或多或少會影響選股及買賣。其中具有重要性的因素是關係到購買者的財務狀況。
三、股票在牛市賣價過高而在熊市賣價過低，這是老生常談。
四、投資是根據詳盡的分析、資金安全和滿意回報有保證下的操作。不符合這一標準的操作就是投機。
只要大家用心閱讀此書，相信可領會究竟在經濟衰退形勢下，如何嚴選股份方法。
˙金融市場已發生海嘯，衰退早在預期中，現再翻炒一次，殺傷力依然。
˙大熊市中，股市反彈往往短暫且有限，心理因素主導股市走勢更明顯，估計日後淡友借衰退造淡機會仍時有出現。
美國推出一連串救市措施以保持流動資金，市場開始擔心無以為繼，所以借擔心經濟衰退理由仍足以令道指周三再現急瀉，港股繼周三大跌後，周四再急跌。
恒指一度低見14579，差些又再試上周低位14399，收報15230，仍跌767點。
大熊市下悲觀因素放大
太陽之下無新事，聯儲局主席伯南克話穩定金融市場的措施不會成為刺激經濟立即好轉的強心劑，即被解讀為經濟將會衰退。難道大家眼見歐、美金融市場如此糟糕，還心存僥倖美國經濟不會出現衰退？筆者不是經濟學者也在周初提出對實體經濟憂慮，股市反應慢了三拍反應，說穿了，是市場嚴重缺乏信心的表現。對壞消息反應特別敏感。投資者悲觀心理在大熊市中發揮得淋漓盡致。記得巴菲特恩師Benjamin Graham（格雷漢姆）曾經總結過：「當一次泡沫破滅後，股價總會跌到偏低水平。」格雷漢姆曾經歷1929年至1933年的美國經濟大蕭條時期，有感而發地指出當年美國許多大企業破產清盤後比它們繼續營運更為值錢，慨歎當年大企業之資產值遠低於市場價值之現實。
市場沽壓強過承接力
不要以為筆者近月只集中研究國際經濟及金融形勢而忽略了股票分析。事實上，愈來愈多公司股價出現格雷漢姆當年所經歷之低於估值現象。好像新華文軒（00811）目前市值只有15.33億元，截至08年6月底止單持淨現金已經為16.85億港元，持物業就話怕會貶值，但新華文軒持淨現金，居然淨現金值會低於市值？要筆者解釋的話，其實找到個較牽強理由，據知西京投資管理（香港）公司宣布已暫停旗下在愛爾蘭上市的中資概念對冲基金「中國財富基金」的交易，由於「中國財富基金」因有大額贖回而面臨流動性壓力，令投資者也擔心西京會減持其在港持股套現。西京持有新華文軒5.2%股權，大家就怕有沽售壓力。此外，只能解釋為悲觀心理作怪了。
股票真正價值基本上是通過買賣交易才能體現出來，然而，在某一段時間，總有賣方的力量強過買方力量，像現在銀根緊張、金融機構及基金要減持股票套現、對冲基金離場、大把蟹民蝕到無錢再投入股市、有錢在手的受薪階級也擔心裁員潮而傾向手持現金，種種因素構成市場承接力較弱。
對冲基金相繼離場
據《華爾街日報》引述高盛集團分析師David Kostin說，對冲基金業近來已經將總額高達4,000億美元的資金轉成了現金等項目，從一些對冲基金如SAC Capital Advisors這隻市值140億美元對冲基金的Steven Cohen，據說已將其所管理資金的一半，約70億美元，轉入了貨幣市場基金和其他短期證券。對冲基金一直利用借貸作槓桿式炒作，在目前及可預計將來連國際知名銀行也出現拆借困難，對冲基金籌資困難，令其運作受約制。部分選擇將投資變現，除了因市場極端混亂和投資者的恐慌情緒未平復，寧願選擇離場觀望。更可能是美國監管機構最近收緊了沽空限制，令對冲基金無法使用沽空這種投資策略，只好暫時離場。
綜合現時市況，雖已察覺部分港股的股價跌至過低水平，價值投資良機在浮現。惟大熊市下負面心理不容忽略，仍偏向耐心等待歐、美金融市場穩定下來，以及各國出招刺激經濟方案出台。股市冰河時期，倖存股民還是「刨定」一些專門分析證券真正價值之心法，為日後破冰之旅做好準備，投資界聖經《證券分析》值得細讀（見下文分析）。
﹏﹏﹏﹏﹏﹏﹏﹏﹏﹏﹏﹏﹏﹏﹏﹏﹏﹏
閱讀心得︰衰退期選股秘笈
Benjamin Graham 與 David Dodd合著的《Security Analysis》（證券分析）可說是分析證券價值及固定價值類投資的聖經，是價值投資者學習入門書籍。
由於Benjamin Graham經歷過美國經濟大蕭條日子，在書中詳述當時嚴選股票之準則，相信有助大家在面對全球市選股漸回歸基本價值時作參考，有關選股策略。書中有如下四點分析：
一、市場不是一台根據證券的內在品質而精確地、客觀地記錄其價值的計量器，而是滙集了無數人部分出於理性，部分出於感性的選擇的投票機。
二、人的因素或多或少會影響選股及買賣。其中具有重要性的因素是關係到購買者的財務狀況。
三、股票在牛市賣價過高而在熊市賣價過低，這是老生常談。
四、投資是根據詳盡的分析、資金安全和滿意回報有保證下的操作。不符合這一標準的操作就是投機。
只要大家用心閱讀此書，相信可領會究竟在經濟衰退形勢下，如何嚴選股份方法。
做股票简单点好--握住好股不放弃
鼠年伊始，沪深股市既没出现人们期待中的开门红，也没出现恐慌性暴跌，尽管指数以跌势收盘，但下跌的都是那些大盘权重股，而差不多有一半的股票最终还是以红盘收市。年过好了，人们的心态也调整好了，雪灾也已经过去了，股市也恢复了常态。
节日期间，看了电视剧《士兵突击》，对许三多的三句话印象深刻——第一句是不抛弃、不放弃；第二句是要做有意义的事情，不做没意义的事；第三句是做人简单好、复杂了不好。将这三句话引申到股市中，笔者以为可以作为今年股票的操作策略。
对今年的股票操作而言，对那些好股票要做到不抛弃、不放弃。今年的市场震荡其架势不要说新股民没见识过，连在市场上摸爬滚打了近20年的老股民都感到见过无数次下跌，没见过这样跌法的，这种架势会让那些心态不好的人吓得不知所措。在这种激烈震荡中，“离战场越近越容易成炮灰”，在吓人的跌势中，不管好股烂股都被吓出去了，面对这种上蹿下跳、鼠性十足的股市，最好的投资策略是握住那些有业绩保证、有题材支撑的小盘股不放弃、不抛弃，事实也证明，在今年的深幅调整中，这批股票的抗跌性是最好的。
在股市中要做有意义的事，不做没意义的事。现在的股市中哪些事是有意义的，哪些事是没意义的呢？高抛低吸是有意义的事，而追涨杀跌是没意义的事；与市场适当保持一段距离是有意义的事，天天盯盘则是一件没意义的事；手中只持有两三只股票是有意义的事，而手中像开中药铺似地持有一大把股票还自称是“股票池”是没意义的事；一年做几次买卖是有意义的事，天天像“猴”似地倒进倒出、为券商打工是没意义的事……
做股票简单点好，复杂不好。专家们说股票的事可以越说越复杂，好像这是一个伟大的工程。其实，越说得复杂，离股市的真谛越远，股票的操作很简单，任何股票只有三种走势——上涨、下跌、横盘，您根本说不出还有第四种走势；任何投资也只有三种行为——买入、卖出、观望，您也找不出第四种行为。三种走势配三种行为就会产生不同的结果，只有买入配上上涨，您才能赚钱，其他颠三倒四的配置，要么不赚钱，要么赔钱。股市上的事您想明白了就这么简单，如果有人将其越说越复杂，就离赚钱越来越远。
今年的股市太有戏了。大家可以将两个月前机构们的2008年股市分析报告拿出来再读一下，肯定会觉得贻笑大方。只有一个月，大多数机构对今年股市最低点的预测被证明已经出错，大家可以大胆地推测一下，机构们对今年股市高点的预测会不会出错呢，笔者感觉也会的。此轮行情调整得越彻底，在不久的将来竖起来就会越高。不久有多久？不会很久，几个月而已，信不信由您。
节日期间，看了电视剧《士兵突击》，对许三多的三句话印象深刻——第一句是不抛弃、不放弃；第二句是要做有意义的事情，不做没意义的事；第三句是做人简单好、复杂了不好。将这三句话引申到股市中，笔者以为可以作为今年股票的操作策略。
对今年的股票操作而言，对那些好股票要做到不抛弃、不放弃。今年的市场震荡其架势不要说新股民没见识过，连在市场上摸爬滚打了近20年的老股民都感到见过无数次下跌，没见过这样跌法的，这种架势会让那些心态不好的人吓得不知所措。在这种激烈震荡中，“离战场越近越容易成炮灰”，在吓人的跌势中，不管好股烂股都被吓出去了，面对这种上蹿下跳、鼠性十足的股市，最好的投资策略是握住那些有业绩保证、有题材支撑的小盘股不放弃、不抛弃，事实也证明，在今年的深幅调整中，这批股票的抗跌性是最好的。
在股市中要做有意义的事，不做没意义的事。现在的股市中哪些事是有意义的，哪些事是没意义的呢？高抛低吸是有意义的事，而追涨杀跌是没意义的事；与市场适当保持一段距离是有意义的事，天天盯盘则是一件没意义的事；手中只持有两三只股票是有意义的事，而手中像开中药铺似地持有一大把股票还自称是“股票池”是没意义的事；一年做几次买卖是有意义的事，天天像“猴”似地倒进倒出、为券商打工是没意义的事……
做股票简单点好，复杂不好。专家们说股票的事可以越说越复杂，好像这是一个伟大的工程。其实，越说得复杂，离股市的真谛越远，股票的操作很简单，任何股票只有三种走势——上涨、下跌、横盘，您根本说不出还有第四种走势；任何投资也只有三种行为——买入、卖出、观望，您也找不出第四种行为。三种走势配三种行为就会产生不同的结果，只有买入配上上涨，您才能赚钱，其他颠三倒四的配置，要么不赚钱，要么赔钱。股市上的事您想明白了就这么简单，如果有人将其越说越复杂，就离赚钱越来越远。
今年的股市太有戏了。大家可以将两个月前机构们的2008年股市分析报告拿出来再读一下，肯定会觉得贻笑大方。只有一个月，大多数机构对今年股市最低点的预测被证明已经出错，大家可以大胆地推测一下，机构们对今年股市高点的预测会不会出错呢，笔者感觉也会的。此轮行情调整得越彻底，在不久的将来竖起来就会越高。不久有多久？不会很久，几个月而已，信不信由您。
巴式投资心理--针对人性弱点
巴菲特法则是沃伦-巴菲特42年成功投资生涯一直秉持的不二法则，核心精髓包括价值投资、边际安全原则、集中投资组合、长期持有股权等，秉持巴菲特法则的投资者如凯恩斯(Keynesian)、芒格(Monger)等都获得超越大盘的投资回报。考虑到美国股市在过去20年增长10倍的大牛市背景下，仍然有90%的投资者未能盈利的严峻事实，长期获得超越大盘的投资回报几乎是不可能完成的任务，历史证明巴菲特法则是投资界的黄金法则。
然而，尽管巴菲特法则为广大投资界人士所熟知，但成功应用巴菲特法则获得成功的人还是凤毛麟角。其原因到底何在？
巴菲特法则执行的最大难点在两个方面，一是对人类本性的理解与超越，二是对投资价值判断的专业性。前者涉及人类心理的奥秘，后者涉及对股票背后商业运营的洞察力(将另文论述)。任何投资市场背后都是活生生的人在推动，因而对他们心理的研究是洞察投资市场的独特视角。
直觉判断与四大错觉思维
“我和查理还没学会如何解决公司的难题，我们的成功在于我们集中力量于我们能跨越的一尺栅栏上，而不是发现了跨越七尺栅栏的方法。”
巴菲特还坚持投资于自己所熟悉的行业，他承认自己不投资于高科技公司的原因是自己没有能力理解和评价它们。
心理学的一个重大发现就是人类的直觉，正如法国哲学家帕斯卡尔所说：“心灵活动有其自身原因，而理性却无法知晓。”人类的思维、记忆、态度都是同时在两个水平上运行的，一个是有意识和有意图的，另一个是无意识和自动的。我们的所知比我们知道自己所知的还要多。
直觉是人类在长期进化中基因优化的结果，是人类反应及处理问题时的心理捷径。股市中恐惧、贪婪、乐观、悲观等情绪均是无意识的自动的直觉反映，是人类的本性。为什么人们会疯狂地追涨(贪婪)、杀跌(恐惧)？为什么股市不断重演非理性繁荣与非理性萧条的循环？就是因为直觉和本性的原因。
任何事物都存在两面性，直觉判断一方面节省了人类的心智资源，另一方面也为人类带来了错觉思维。由于直觉存在敏感性、即时性、既定模式反应等特征，直觉在进行判断与决策时有着明显的局限性，从而使人们产生了事后聪明偏见、过度敏感效应、信念固着现象、过度自信倾向等错误思维，这在股市投资决策中充分反映了出来。
1.事后聪明偏见
所谓事后聪明偏见是指人们往往倾向于利用事件发生之后的结果去理解事件发生的原因及过程。“事后诸葛亮”就是指这一现象。人们往往会忽视事后理解的天然优势，而进一步贬低事前决策的复杂性与难度。事后聪明偏见是普遍存在的，是人性的一部分，这一错觉思维使人们倾向于高估自身的能力，而低估他人的能力。
巴菲特在投资中尽量避免犯这样的错误，事实上20世纪60年代对伯克夏?哈撒韦的投资(当年主要以纺织业为主)给了巴菲特非常大的教训，20世纪80年代他被迫将持续亏损的纺织业务关闭。这形成了巴菲特非常重要的投资准则，即投资于保持一贯经营原则的公司，避开陷入困境的公司。不要高估自己，指望自己比该公司的经营者做得更好，能够扭亏为盈。“我和查理还没学会如何解决公司的难题，”巴菲特承认，“但是我们学会了如何避开难题，我们的成功在于我们集中力量于我们能跨越的一尺栅栏上，而不是发现了跨越七尺栅栏的方法。”
2.过度敏感效应
高估与夸大刚刚发生的事件的影响因素，而低估影响整体系统的其他因素的作用，从而作出错误判断，并对此作出过度的行为反应。敏感能使人们及时发现异常现象并加快对此的反应速度，但也会加大反应的幅度，使反应过分。
以美国“9?11”事件为例。“9·11”事件后，恐怖分子劫持飞机撞毁纽约世贸双塔的情景极大刺激了美国公众的神经，于是人们大大高估了航空旅行的危险性，倾向于选择其他旅行方式，美国航空业随之进入大萧条期。然而，数据统计显示，即使考虑到“9·11”事件的航空灾难，航空旅行也是所有旅行方式中最安全的，其事故率是火车旅行的三分之一。过度敏感效应在股票市场投资中反映得淋漓尽致，在股市上涨时，人们往往过分乐观，倾向于相信大牛市是永无尽头的，于是过分推高了股票价格；而股市下跌时，人们往往过分悲观，倾向于相信大熊市是不可避免的，于是过分打压了股票的价格。巴菲特认为正是人们的非理性行为使得股票价格围绕其价值进行过分的波动，为投资带来机会。他认为好的投资者应当利用这一现象，在别人贪婪时恐惧(1969年当巴菲特发现股票市场中人们已经陷入疯狂时果断抛售了所有股票，并解散了投资基金)，在别人恐惧时贪婪(在1973、1974年美国股市大幅下跌进入熊市后，巴菲特又逢低分批建仓成功抄底)。巴菲特认为，“股票市场下跌在某种情况下不是坏事，投资机会正是从投资退潮中显露出来。”
3.信念固着现象
信念固着现象是指人们一旦对某项事物建立了某种信念，尤其是为它建立了一个理论支持体系，那么就很难打破人们的这一看法，即使是相反的证据与信息出现时他们也往往视而不见。从心理学的角度看，人们越是极力想证明自己的理论与解释是正确的，就越是对挑战自己信念的信息封闭。
信念固着现象是股票投资中非常重要的心理现象，股票投资者往往倾向于预测股市的涨跌与股票价格的波动，各类证券分析机构也通过预测股价波动获取收益。然而，人们往往会落入信念固着的思维陷阱，在满仓时忽视下跌信号的出现，而在空仓时忽视上涨因素的累积。巴菲特看透了这一思维误区，主张理解投资与投机差异，认为应理性投资而不应非理性投机。应当说，这就是巴菲特法则的思想精髓——价值投资。
凯恩斯、格雷厄姆及巴菲特都曾解释过投资与投机的差异。凯恩斯认为：“投资是预测资产未来收益的活动，而投机是预测市场心理的活动。”对格雷厄姆来说，“投资操作就是基于透彻的分析，确保本金的安全并能获得满意的回报。不能满足这个要求的操作就是投机。”巴菲特相信：“如果你是投资者，你所关注的就是资产——在我们这里是指公司——未来的发展变化。如果你是投机者，你主要预测独立于公司的价格变化。”以上述标准来看，中国股市目前还是一个投机气氛浓厚的市场。
4.过度自信倾向
过度自信倾向是指人们在对过去知识进行判断中存在智力自负现象，这种现象会影响对目前知识的评价和未来行为的预测。尽管我们知道自己过去出过错，但我们对未来的预期仍然相当乐观。造成过度自信倾向的主要原因是人们往往倾向于在他们完全正确的时刻回忆自己的错误判断，从而认为这只是偶然发生的事件，与他们的能力缺陷无关。过度自信倾向几乎影响了每一个人，约翰逊的过度自信造成了美国20世纪60年代陷入了越南战争的泥潭，尼克?里森的过度自信造成了百年巴林银行的倒闭。可以说过度自信倾向是人类理性决策的最大敌人，这一倾向还容易使人们产生控制错觉，就如赌徒，一旦赢了就归因于自己的赌技与预见力，一旦输了就认为“差一点就成了，或偶然倒霉”。而从理性角度来看，进行赌博与购买彩票从概率上来说是一场必输的游戏，然而还是有无数赌徒与彩民由于控制错觉而沉迷于此。
真正摆脱过度自信倾向，超越自己是非常不容易的事。绝大多数的股票投资人都坚信自己能够判断出大盘的涨跌趋势，并通过“逢低买入与逢高卖出”来获取收益，自己的收益将远远超出大盘指数的涨幅。然而具有讽刺意味的是，据统计90%的投资者(包括机构投资者)投资收益落后于大盘指数的增长，尽管这一统计数据是如此明显的证据，人们还是相信自己有能力成为那部分10%的投资者，而拒绝接受傻瓜似的股指基金组合，认为这是对自我智力的羞辱。巴菲特清楚认识到自己的局限性，认为大盘是无法预测的，能够把握的是对股票背后公司价值的评价与未来收益的预测，因此他从不期望于通过预测大盘来获益。
此外，巴菲特还坚持投资于自己所熟悉的行业，他承认自己不投资于高科技公司的原因是自己没有能力理解和评价它们。在伯克夏?哈撒韦公司1998年年会上他说：“我很敬佩安迪?格罗夫和比尔?盖茨，而且希望把这种敬佩通过资金支持他们转化成行动。但是说到微软与英特尔，我不知道十年后的世界是什么样的，而且我也不喜欢玩那种对方占优势的游戏。我花所有的时间考虑技术，但我仍然可能是分析这个行业的第100、第1000甚至第10000个聪明的人。确实有人能分析这个行业，但是我不行。”
从众与群体极化
他不仅在投资决策中坚持独立思考，还在被投资公司中重用抵制行业惯性的经营者
从众是指人们受他人影响而改变自己的行为与信念。旅鼠行动是经典的从众案例，这种生长在北极的小动物每当种群繁殖到一定程度就会集体跳海，自杀身亡。社会心理学家所做的从众研究试验中，人类也表现出了强烈的从众倾向。
从众可以引发群体极化效应，即群体成员的相互影响可以强化群体成员最初的观点与信念。群体极化效应的产生原因有两条，一是群体成员倾向于与其他成员保持行为与信念的一致，以获取群体对他的认可及团体归属感；二是群体成员在对需要决策的事件拿不准的时候，模仿与顺从他人的行为与信念往往是安全的。
从众与群体极化效应在人类的投资活动中充分体现了出来。人们的投资行为往往会受到他人的影响，当大多数投资者都陷入贪婪的疯狂而拼命追涨时，很少有投资者能冷静而理智地抵制购买的诱惑；而当大多数投资者都陷入恐惧之中而拼命杀跌时，也很少有投资者能抵制抛售的冲动。这种从众的压力是非常巨大的，然而，明智的投资决策往往是“预料之外而情理之中”的决策，大家都看中的热点板块的投资价值通常已经提前透支了，而聪明的投资者一般会不断观察与跟踪具有投资价值的股票，当它的股价下跌到合理的区间范围之内时(被大多数投资者忽视)，就会果断吃进。很显然，这样做不仅需要专业的价值评估水平，更需要抵制从众压力的坚定意志与敢为天下先的巨大勇气。巴菲特的老师格雷厄姆曾经教导他要从股市的情感漩涡中拔出来，要发现大多数投资者的不理智行为，他们购买股票不是基于逻辑，而是基于情感。如果你在正确的判断基础上获得符合逻辑的结论，那么不要因别人与你的意见不一致而放弃，“你的正确或错误都不会是因为别人和你不一致，你之所以正确是因为你的数据与逻辑推理正确。”巴菲特遵循了老师的教导，他不仅在投资决策中坚持独立思考，还在被投资公司中重用抵制行业惯性的经营者，并将抵制行业惯性作为他所归纳的12条最重要的投资准则之一。在对Notre Dame商学院的学生发表演讲时，他归纳了37家投资银行的失败原因：“他们为什么有这样的结局呢？我来告诉你们，那就是愚蠢的模仿同行的行为。”
根据合理的数据与逻辑得出的理性判断，从不为他人的观点所动；他只投资于自己搞得懂的产业与公司，在公司调研上亲力亲为，从不借助他人的判断。他将投资活动比喻为打 棒球，他认为投资比打棒球容易，打棒球是没有选择地击打投过来的每一个球，而投资只需要选择击打那些最有把握击中的球就可以了，合适的球没投过来之前你只需要躺着休息就可以了。可以说，巴菲特是少数有理性与勇气爬出虚假信息洞穴获得理性光明的人。
信息洞穴与事实真相
他从不阅读华尔街的所谓权威证券分析，也不热衷到处收集影响股市的小道消息
国外一些研究 伊拉克问题的专家指出，伊拉克前总统萨达姆·侯赛因出身平民，精明能干，通过奋斗夺取了国家最高权力。但他作出了两次关键性的重大决策失误，导致付出生命的代价。一次是入侵科威特，这是基于美国不会武力干预的判断；第二次是在核武问题上采取强硬立场，这是基于对自身武装力量的过高估计。为什么像萨达姆这样精明的人会犯这种错误呢？专家分析，萨达姆实际上是一个信息洞穴人，他所接触到的信息都被伊拉克高级官员所垄断，而这些官员往往或是依据自身利益来歪曲、加工与屏蔽信息，或是投其所好，报喜不报忧，以此保住官位。于是萨达姆呆在虚假信息的洞穴中，看不清洞穴外的事实真相，作出基于错误信息的错误判断与决策也就理所当然了。
投资者是典型的信息洞穴人，投资市场上活跃着交易所、上市公司大股东及管理层、公募与私募基金、证券公司、普通股民、投资咨询机构、媒体、银行、律师及审计事务所等主体，构成了一个巨大的生态系统，每个个体都处于食物链的某一个环节，为了各自的切身利益，时常有意识或下意识地发布、制造、夸大、歪曲信息。由于信息发布者“裁剪”信息的内容，不少人被虚假或片面信息所操纵，作出错误的投资决策。典型的事例是上市公司高管与庄家相互勾结，配合庄家对股价的操纵而制作财务数据、发布虚假消息，最终受损的是普通散户。此外，普通投资者对庞杂信息的识别缺乏专业知识的支持，更容易受到愚弄。例如前一阶段我国拟发行1.55万亿特别国债的紧缩效应就被高估，而我国今年上半年看似不高的CPI指数(3.2个百分点)使普通投资者低估了通胀的可能性，这主要是由于我国CPI指数的构成比例不合理所致。
巴菲特清楚地认识到这一点，他从不阅读华尔街的所谓权威证券分析，也不热衷到处收集影响股市的小道消息，同样不天天紧张地盯着盘面的变化，这使得他的投资工作非常轻松，他有时甚至在家中一边享受天伦之乐、一边工作，美国股市上世纪80年代末崩盘的那一天他甚至无暇关注股市。巴菲特只相信自己
如何应对人性的弱点
在可能的情况下延迟投资决策的时间，避免一切冲动情形下的决策行动，应当是保持理性与明智的有效方法
客观地说，直觉、从众等人类本性并不是绝对的缺点，我们的主观体验是构成人性的材料，它是人类对艺术和音乐、友谊与爱情、神秘性与宗教体验的感受源泉。但必须承认，上述人类本性会造成错觉思维、错误判断和错误行为，这一现象在投资活动中充分表现出来。巴菲特法则的核心并不是他所创立的12条投资法则，任何所谓投资真经都会随着时间的流逝而失灵，只有其背后的真正原则与规律才会永恒，巴菲特在投资活动中对人性心理弱点的克服与利用正是这种永恒的法则与逻辑。人性之所以被称为人性，就是因其源自于自身并难以克服，但仍然有应对之道，人们可以从态度、反思、试错与时间四个维度来修炼自己，克服人性弱点，获取满意的投资收益。
首先，正确的态度是克服心理弱点的基础。
我们应当正视与承认人类具有局限性这一事实，这种对人类能力的自谦与怀疑是科学与宗教的核心所在。社会心理学家戴维?迈尔斯对此有精彩的论述，“科学同样包括直觉和严格检验的相互影响。从错觉中寻找现实需要开放的好奇心与冷静的头脑。以下观点被证明是对待生活的正确态度：批判而不愤世嫉俗，好奇而不受蒙蔽，开放而不被操纵。”在投资活动中树立这一态度同样是至关重要的，这需要保持中庸避免极端。如果不能保持好奇与开放的心态，就不能最大限度获取投资决策相关的信息，也就不能及早发现环境的转变与新的规律的形成，也就不能抓住转瞬即逝的投资机会；而如果不能以批判的态度对待一切信息，就容易受到他人的蒙蔽与操纵，从而陷入无数的投资陷阱。
其次，反思是克服心理弱点的方法。
正如苏格拉底的旷世名言所说：“不加审视的生活是不值得过的。”反思与总结是人类进步的源泉，也是提升投资活动与投资决策成功率的重要方法。法国哲学家帕斯卡尔认识到，“任何一个单独的真理都是不充分的，因为世界是很复杂的。任何一个真理如果脱离了和它互补的真理，就只能算是部分真理而已。”世上没有绝对正确的事情，在做任何投资决策之前，不要先入为主与过分自信，务必从反对这一投资决策的角度进行思考，试着提出反对的道理与理由，或是咨询其他投资人的意见，尤其重视反对者的意见，这种反思与多重思考会极大地完善、丰富与修正你的投资决策，提高投资决策的质量。
再次，试错是克服心理弱点的手段。
人类是有限理性的，而投资市场是错综复杂与不断变化的，人们不可能穷尽投资决策所需的一切信息与规律，因此有效检验投资决策正确与否的手段就是试错，对可能的投资方法与对象进行尝试性投资，将投资手段与方法放到实践中进行检验。对试错的批评可能在于两点，一是认为试错的代价过于高昂，二是投资的时效性，当发现投资机会时该机会已丧失。对第一种批评的对策是将降低试错筹码，当确认投资决策有效时再进行大笔投资；对第二种批评的对策是试错检验对象的选择，不是具体的投资对象(如具体的股票)，而是投资的规律与哲学的检验(如高科技股票的投资规律)。
最后，掌握投资决策时间是克服心理弱点的补充。
人类的心理本性具有极强的时间敏感性，在理性与感性的斗争中，随着时间的推移，感性往往由强变弱，理性往往由弱变强。人类大多数的错误都是出现在一时冲动的情形下，人们常常会在一时冲动下做了某种行为，事后又追悔莫及。这主要是因为人们在事情刚刚发生之时，会夸大导致事情发生的因素，而忽视其他因素的重要性，造成思维偏见与决策失误。这在人类投资活动中也很常见，大涨与大跌都会在发生之时极大地刺激人们的神经，调动人们的情绪，使人们产生买入与卖出的冲动，而冲动情况下作出的投资决策往往是不明智的。因此，在可能的情况下延迟投资决策的时间，避免一切冲动情形下的决策行动，应当是保持理性与明智的有效方法。
过度敏感效应是指人们在心理上倾向于
然而，尽管巴菲特法则为广大投资界人士所熟知，但成功应用巴菲特法则获得成功的人还是凤毛麟角。其原因到底何在？
巴菲特法则执行的最大难点在两个方面，一是对人类本性的理解与超越，二是对投资价值判断的专业性。前者涉及人类心理的奥秘，后者涉及对股票背后商业运营的洞察力(将另文论述)。任何投资市场背后都是活生生的人在推动，因而对他们心理的研究是洞察投资市场的独特视角。
直觉判断与四大错觉思维
“我和查理还没学会如何解决公司的难题，我们的成功在于我们集中力量于我们能跨越的一尺栅栏上，而不是发现了跨越七尺栅栏的方法。”
巴菲特还坚持投资于自己所熟悉的行业，他承认自己不投资于高科技公司的原因是自己没有能力理解和评价它们。
心理学的一个重大发现就是人类的直觉，正如法国哲学家帕斯卡尔所说：“心灵活动有其自身原因，而理性却无法知晓。”人类的思维、记忆、态度都是同时在两个水平上运行的，一个是有意识和有意图的，另一个是无意识和自动的。我们的所知比我们知道自己所知的还要多。
直觉是人类在长期进化中基因优化的结果，是人类反应及处理问题时的心理捷径。股市中恐惧、贪婪、乐观、悲观等情绪均是无意识的自动的直觉反映，是人类的本性。为什么人们会疯狂地追涨(贪婪)、杀跌(恐惧)？为什么股市不断重演非理性繁荣与非理性萧条的循环？就是因为直觉和本性的原因。
任何事物都存在两面性，直觉判断一方面节省了人类的心智资源，另一方面也为人类带来了错觉思维。由于直觉存在敏感性、即时性、既定模式反应等特征，直觉在进行判断与决策时有着明显的局限性，从而使人们产生了事后聪明偏见、过度敏感效应、信念固着现象、过度自信倾向等错误思维，这在股市投资决策中充分反映了出来。
1.事后聪明偏见
所谓事后聪明偏见是指人们往往倾向于利用事件发生之后的结果去理解事件发生的原因及过程。“事后诸葛亮”就是指这一现象。人们往往会忽视事后理解的天然优势，而进一步贬低事前决策的复杂性与难度。事后聪明偏见是普遍存在的，是人性的一部分，这一错觉思维使人们倾向于高估自身的能力，而低估他人的能力。
巴菲特在投资中尽量避免犯这样的错误，事实上20世纪60年代对伯克夏?哈撒韦的投资(当年主要以纺织业为主)给了巴菲特非常大的教训，20世纪80年代他被迫将持续亏损的纺织业务关闭。这形成了巴菲特非常重要的投资准则，即投资于保持一贯经营原则的公司，避开陷入困境的公司。不要高估自己，指望自己比该公司的经营者做得更好，能够扭亏为盈。“我和查理还没学会如何解决公司的难题，”巴菲特承认，“但是我们学会了如何避开难题，我们的成功在于我们集中力量于我们能跨越的一尺栅栏上，而不是发现了跨越七尺栅栏的方法。”
2.过度敏感效应
高估与夸大刚刚发生的事件的影响因素，而低估影响整体系统的其他因素的作用，从而作出错误判断，并对此作出过度的行为反应。敏感能使人们及时发现异常现象并加快对此的反应速度，但也会加大反应的幅度，使反应过分。
以美国“9?11”事件为例。“9·11”事件后，恐怖分子劫持飞机撞毁纽约世贸双塔的情景极大刺激了美国公众的神经，于是人们大大高估了航空旅行的危险性，倾向于选择其他旅行方式，美国航空业随之进入大萧条期。然而，数据统计显示，即使考虑到“9·11”事件的航空灾难，航空旅行也是所有旅行方式中最安全的，其事故率是火车旅行的三分之一。过度敏感效应在股票市场投资中反映得淋漓尽致，在股市上涨时，人们往往过分乐观，倾向于相信大牛市是永无尽头的，于是过分推高了股票价格；而股市下跌时，人们往往过分悲观，倾向于相信大熊市是不可避免的，于是过分打压了股票的价格。巴菲特认为正是人们的非理性行为使得股票价格围绕其价值进行过分的波动，为投资带来机会。他认为好的投资者应当利用这一现象，在别人贪婪时恐惧(1969年当巴菲特发现股票市场中人们已经陷入疯狂时果断抛售了所有股票，并解散了投资基金)，在别人恐惧时贪婪(在1973、1974年美国股市大幅下跌进入熊市后，巴菲特又逢低分批建仓成功抄底)。巴菲特认为，“股票市场下跌在某种情况下不是坏事，投资机会正是从投资退潮中显露出来。”
3.信念固着现象
信念固着现象是指人们一旦对某项事物建立了某种信念，尤其是为它建立了一个理论支持体系，那么就很难打破人们的这一看法，即使是相反的证据与信息出现时他们也往往视而不见。从心理学的角度看，人们越是极力想证明自己的理论与解释是正确的，就越是对挑战自己信念的信息封闭。
信念固着现象是股票投资中非常重要的心理现象，股票投资者往往倾向于预测股市的涨跌与股票价格的波动，各类证券分析机构也通过预测股价波动获取收益。然而，人们往往会落入信念固着的思维陷阱，在满仓时忽视下跌信号的出现，而在空仓时忽视上涨因素的累积。巴菲特看透了这一思维误区，主张理解投资与投机差异，认为应理性投资而不应非理性投机。应当说，这就是巴菲特法则的思想精髓——价值投资。
凯恩斯、格雷厄姆及巴菲特都曾解释过投资与投机的差异。凯恩斯认为：“投资是预测资产未来收益的活动，而投机是预测市场心理的活动。”对格雷厄姆来说，“投资操作就是基于透彻的分析，确保本金的安全并能获得满意的回报。不能满足这个要求的操作就是投机。”巴菲特相信：“如果你是投资者，你所关注的就是资产——在我们这里是指公司——未来的发展变化。如果你是投机者，你主要预测独立于公司的价格变化。”以上述标准来看，中国股市目前还是一个投机气氛浓厚的市场。
4.过度自信倾向
过度自信倾向是指人们在对过去知识进行判断中存在智力自负现象，这种现象会影响对目前知识的评价和未来行为的预测。尽管我们知道自己过去出过错，但我们对未来的预期仍然相当乐观。造成过度自信倾向的主要原因是人们往往倾向于在他们完全正确的时刻回忆自己的错误判断，从而认为这只是偶然发生的事件，与他们的能力缺陷无关。过度自信倾向几乎影响了每一个人，约翰逊的过度自信造成了美国20世纪60年代陷入了越南战争的泥潭，尼克?里森的过度自信造成了百年巴林银行的倒闭。可以说过度自信倾向是人类理性决策的最大敌人，这一倾向还容易使人们产生控制错觉，就如赌徒，一旦赢了就归因于自己的赌技与预见力，一旦输了就认为“差一点就成了，或偶然倒霉”。而从理性角度来看，进行赌博与购买彩票从概率上来说是一场必输的游戏，然而还是有无数赌徒与彩民由于控制错觉而沉迷于此。
真正摆脱过度自信倾向，超越自己是非常不容易的事。绝大多数的股票投资人都坚信自己能够判断出大盘的涨跌趋势，并通过“逢低买入与逢高卖出”来获取收益，自己的收益将远远超出大盘指数的涨幅。然而具有讽刺意味的是，据统计90%的投资者(包括机构投资者)投资收益落后于大盘指数的增长，尽管这一统计数据是如此明显的证据，人们还是相信自己有能力成为那部分10%的投资者，而拒绝接受傻瓜似的股指基金组合，认为这是对自我智力的羞辱。巴菲特清楚认识到自己的局限性，认为大盘是无法预测的，能够把握的是对股票背后公司价值的评价与未来收益的预测，因此他从不期望于通过预测大盘来获益。
此外，巴菲特还坚持投资于自己所熟悉的行业，他承认自己不投资于高科技公司的原因是自己没有能力理解和评价它们。在伯克夏?哈撒韦公司1998年年会上他说：“我很敬佩安迪?格罗夫和比尔?盖茨，而且希望把这种敬佩通过资金支持他们转化成行动。但是说到微软与英特尔，我不知道十年后的世界是什么样的，而且我也不喜欢玩那种对方占优势的游戏。我花所有的时间考虑技术，但我仍然可能是分析这个行业的第100、第1000甚至第10000个聪明的人。确实有人能分析这个行业，但是我不行。”
从众与群体极化
他不仅在投资决策中坚持独立思考，还在被投资公司中重用抵制行业惯性的经营者
从众是指人们受他人影响而改变自己的行为与信念。旅鼠行动是经典的从众案例，这种生长在北极的小动物每当种群繁殖到一定程度就会集体跳海，自杀身亡。社会心理学家所做的从众研究试验中，人类也表现出了强烈的从众倾向。
从众可以引发群体极化效应，即群体成员的相互影响可以强化群体成员最初的观点与信念。群体极化效应的产生原因有两条，一是群体成员倾向于与其他成员保持行为与信念的一致，以获取群体对他的认可及团体归属感；二是群体成员在对需要决策的事件拿不准的时候，模仿与顺从他人的行为与信念往往是安全的。
从众与群体极化效应在人类的投资活动中充分体现了出来。人们的投资行为往往会受到他人的影响，当大多数投资者都陷入贪婪的疯狂而拼命追涨时，很少有投资者能冷静而理智地抵制购买的诱惑；而当大多数投资者都陷入恐惧之中而拼命杀跌时，也很少有投资者能抵制抛售的冲动。这种从众的压力是非常巨大的，然而，明智的投资决策往往是“预料之外而情理之中”的决策，大家都看中的热点板块的投资价值通常已经提前透支了，而聪明的投资者一般会不断观察与跟踪具有投资价值的股票，当它的股价下跌到合理的区间范围之内时(被大多数投资者忽视)，就会果断吃进。很显然，这样做不仅需要专业的价值评估水平，更需要抵制从众压力的坚定意志与敢为天下先的巨大勇气。巴菲特的老师格雷厄姆曾经教导他要从股市的情感漩涡中拔出来，要发现大多数投资者的不理智行为，他们购买股票不是基于逻辑，而是基于情感。如果你在正确的判断基础上获得符合逻辑的结论，那么不要因别人与你的意见不一致而放弃，“你的正确或错误都不会是因为别人和你不一致，你之所以正确是因为你的数据与逻辑推理正确。”巴菲特遵循了老师的教导，他不仅在投资决策中坚持独立思考，还在被投资公司中重用抵制行业惯性的经营者，并将抵制行业惯性作为他所归纳的12条最重要的投资准则之一。在对Notre Dame商学院的学生发表演讲时，他归纳了37家投资银行的失败原因：“他们为什么有这样的结局呢？我来告诉你们，那就是愚蠢的模仿同行的行为。”
根据合理的数据与逻辑得出的理性判断，从不为他人的观点所动；他只投资于自己搞得懂的产业与公司，在公司调研上亲力亲为，从不借助他人的判断。他将投资活动比喻为打 棒球，他认为投资比打棒球容易，打棒球是没有选择地击打投过来的每一个球，而投资只需要选择击打那些最有把握击中的球就可以了，合适的球没投过来之前你只需要躺着休息就可以了。可以说，巴菲特是少数有理性与勇气爬出虚假信息洞穴获得理性光明的人。
信息洞穴与事实真相
他从不阅读华尔街的所谓权威证券分析，也不热衷到处收集影响股市的小道消息
国外一些研究 伊拉克问题的专家指出，伊拉克前总统萨达姆·侯赛因出身平民，精明能干，通过奋斗夺取了国家最高权力。但他作出了两次关键性的重大决策失误，导致付出生命的代价。一次是入侵科威特，这是基于美国不会武力干预的判断；第二次是在核武问题上采取强硬立场，这是基于对自身武装力量的过高估计。为什么像萨达姆这样精明的人会犯这种错误呢？专家分析，萨达姆实际上是一个信息洞穴人，他所接触到的信息都被伊拉克高级官员所垄断，而这些官员往往或是依据自身利益来歪曲、加工与屏蔽信息，或是投其所好，报喜不报忧，以此保住官位。于是萨达姆呆在虚假信息的洞穴中，看不清洞穴外的事实真相，作出基于错误信息的错误判断与决策也就理所当然了。
投资者是典型的信息洞穴人，投资市场上活跃着交易所、上市公司大股东及管理层、公募与私募基金、证券公司、普通股民、投资咨询机构、媒体、银行、律师及审计事务所等主体，构成了一个巨大的生态系统，每个个体都处于食物链的某一个环节，为了各自的切身利益，时常有意识或下意识地发布、制造、夸大、歪曲信息。由于信息发布者“裁剪”信息的内容，不少人被虚假或片面信息所操纵，作出错误的投资决策。典型的事例是上市公司高管与庄家相互勾结，配合庄家对股价的操纵而制作财务数据、发布虚假消息，最终受损的是普通散户。此外，普通投资者对庞杂信息的识别缺乏专业知识的支持，更容易受到愚弄。例如前一阶段我国拟发行1.55万亿特别国债的紧缩效应就被高估，而我国今年上半年看似不高的CPI指数(3.2个百分点)使普通投资者低估了通胀的可能性，这主要是由于我国CPI指数的构成比例不合理所致。
巴菲特清楚地认识到这一点，他从不阅读华尔街的所谓权威证券分析，也不热衷到处收集影响股市的小道消息，同样不天天紧张地盯着盘面的变化，这使得他的投资工作非常轻松，他有时甚至在家中一边享受天伦之乐、一边工作，美国股市上世纪80年代末崩盘的那一天他甚至无暇关注股市。巴菲特只相信自己
如何应对人性的弱点
在可能的情况下延迟投资决策的时间，避免一切冲动情形下的决策行动，应当是保持理性与明智的有效方法
客观地说，直觉、从众等人类本性并不是绝对的缺点，我们的主观体验是构成人性的材料，它是人类对艺术和音乐、友谊与爱情、神秘性与宗教体验的感受源泉。但必须承认，上述人类本性会造成错觉思维、错误判断和错误行为，这一现象在投资活动中充分表现出来。巴菲特法则的核心并不是他所创立的12条投资法则，任何所谓投资真经都会随着时间的流逝而失灵，只有其背后的真正原则与规律才会永恒，巴菲特在投资活动中对人性心理弱点的克服与利用正是这种永恒的法则与逻辑。人性之所以被称为人性，就是因其源自于自身并难以克服，但仍然有应对之道，人们可以从态度、反思、试错与时间四个维度来修炼自己，克服人性弱点，获取满意的投资收益。
首先，正确的态度是克服心理弱点的基础。
我们应当正视与承认人类具有局限性这一事实，这种对人类能力的自谦与怀疑是科学与宗教的核心所在。社会心理学家戴维?迈尔斯对此有精彩的论述，“科学同样包括直觉和严格检验的相互影响。从错觉中寻找现实需要开放的好奇心与冷静的头脑。以下观点被证明是对待生活的正确态度：批判而不愤世嫉俗，好奇而不受蒙蔽，开放而不被操纵。”在投资活动中树立这一态度同样是至关重要的，这需要保持中庸避免极端。如果不能保持好奇与开放的心态，就不能最大限度获取投资决策相关的信息，也就不能及早发现环境的转变与新的规律的形成，也就不能抓住转瞬即逝的投资机会；而如果不能以批判的态度对待一切信息，就容易受到他人的蒙蔽与操纵，从而陷入无数的投资陷阱。
其次，反思是克服心理弱点的方法。
正如苏格拉底的旷世名言所说：“不加审视的生活是不值得过的。”反思与总结是人类进步的源泉，也是提升投资活动与投资决策成功率的重要方法。法国哲学家帕斯卡尔认识到，“任何一个单独的真理都是不充分的，因为世界是很复杂的。任何一个真理如果脱离了和它互补的真理，就只能算是部分真理而已。”世上没有绝对正确的事情，在做任何投资决策之前，不要先入为主与过分自信，务必从反对这一投资决策的角度进行思考，试着提出反对的道理与理由，或是咨询其他投资人的意见，尤其重视反对者的意见，这种反思与多重思考会极大地完善、丰富与修正你的投资决策，提高投资决策的质量。
再次，试错是克服心理弱点的手段。
人类是有限理性的，而投资市场是错综复杂与不断变化的，人们不可能穷尽投资决策所需的一切信息与规律，因此有效检验投资决策正确与否的手段就是试错，对可能的投资方法与对象进行尝试性投资，将投资手段与方法放到实践中进行检验。对试错的批评可能在于两点，一是认为试错的代价过于高昂，二是投资的时效性，当发现投资机会时该机会已丧失。对第一种批评的对策是将降低试错筹码，当确认投资决策有效时再进行大笔投资；对第二种批评的对策是试错检验对象的选择，不是具体的投资对象(如具体的股票)，而是投资的规律与哲学的检验(如高科技股票的投资规律)。
最后，掌握投资决策时间是克服心理弱点的补充。
人类的心理本性具有极强的时间敏感性，在理性与感性的斗争中，随着时间的推移，感性往往由强变弱，理性往往由弱变强。人类大多数的错误都是出现在一时冲动的情形下，人们常常会在一时冲动下做了某种行为，事后又追悔莫及。这主要是因为人们在事情刚刚发生之时，会夸大导致事情发生的因素，而忽视其他因素的重要性，造成思维偏见与决策失误。这在人类投资活动中也很常见，大涨与大跌都会在发生之时极大地刺激人们的神经，调动人们的情绪，使人们产生买入与卖出的冲动，而冲动情况下作出的投资决策往往是不明智的。因此，在可能的情况下延迟投资决策的时间，避免一切冲动情形下的决策行动，应当是保持理性与明智的有效方法。
过度敏感效应是指人们在心理上倾向于
巴菲特如何炒股揭秘时间：我是怎么样投资的
节选自巴菲特在美国佛罗里达大学商学院的一次演讲,译者易晓澜。
我的5项投资逻辑
1. 因为我把自己当成是企业的经营者，所以我成为优秀的投资人;因为我把自己当成投资人，所以我成为优秀的企业经营者。
2. 好的企业比好的价格更重要。
3. 一生追求消费垄断企业。
4. 最终决定股价的是实质价值。
5. 没有任何时间适合将最优秀的企业脱手。
我怎么选股:
重心是“什么”上面，而不是“何时”
可口可乐公司于1919年上市，那时的价格是40美元左右。一年后，股价降了50％，只有19美元。看起来那是一场灾难。瓶装问题，糖料涨价，你总能发现这样那样的原因让你觉得那不是一个合适的买入时机。一些年之后，又发生了大萧条，第二次世界大战，核武器竞赛等。总是有原因（让你不买）。如果你在一开始40块钱买了一股，然后你把派发的红利进行再投资（买入可口可乐的股票），一直到现在，那股可乐股票的价值是5000万。这个事实压倒了一切。如果你看对了生意模式，你就会赚很多钱。
切入点的时机是很难把握的。所以，如果我拥有的是一个绝佳的生意，我丝毫不会为某一个事件的发生，或者它对未来一年的影响等等而担忧。当然，在过去的某些个时间段，政府施加了价格管制政策。企业因而不能涨价，即使最好的企业有时也会受影响，我们的See’s Candy糖果不能在12月26日涨价。但是，管制该发生的时候就会发生，它绝不会把一个杰出的企业蜕变成一个平庸的企业。政府是不可能永远实施管制政策的。
一个杰出的企业可以预计到将来可能会发生什么，但不一定会准确到何时会发生。重心需要放在“什么”上面，而不是“何时”上。如果对“什么”的判断是正确的，那么对“何时”大可不必过虑。
我凭什么选股:
给我10亿和10年
我只喜欢我看得懂的生意，这个标准排除了90％的企业。我想要的生意外面得有个城墙，居中是价值不菲的城堡，我要负责的、能干的人才来管理。
三十年前，柯达公司的城墙和可口可乐的城墙是一样难以逾越的。柯达向你保证你今天的照片，20年，50年后看起来仍是栩栩如生，这一点对你而言可能恰恰是最重要的。30年前的柯达就有那样的魅力，它占据了每个人的心。在地球上每个人的心里，它的那个小黄盒子都在说，柯达是最好的。那真是无价的。
现在的柯达已经不再独占人们的心。它的城墙变薄了，富士用各种手段缩小了差距。柯达让富士成为奥林匹克运动会的赞助商，一个一直以来由柯达独占的位置。于是在人们的印象里，富士变得和柯达平起平坐起来。
与之相反的是，可口可乐的城墙与30年前比，变得更宽了。你可能看不到城墙一天天的变化。但是，每次你看到可口可乐的工厂扩张到一个目前并不盈利，但20年后一定会的国家，它的城墙就加宽些。企业的城墙每天每年都在变，或厚或窄。10年后，你就会看到不同。
我给那些公司经理人的要求就是，让城墙更厚些，保护好它，拒竞争者于墙外。我寻找的就是这样的企业。那么这样的企业都在做什么生意呢?我要找到他们，就要从最简单的产品里找到那些（杰出的企业）。因为我没法预料到10年以后，甲骨文，莲花，或微软会发展成什么样。比尔•盖茨是我碰到过的最好的生意人。微软现在所处的位置也很好。但是我还是对他们10年后的状况无从知晓。同样我对他们的竞争对手10年后的情形也一无所知。
虽然我不拥有口香糖的公司，但是我知道10年后他们的发展会怎样。互联网是不会改变我们嚼口香糖的方式的，事实上，没什么能改变我们嚼口香糖的方式。会有很多的（口香糖）新产品不断进入试验期，一些以失败告终。这是事物发展的规律。如果你给我10个亿，让我进入口香糖的生意，打开一个缺口，我无法做到。这就是我考量一个生意的基本原则。给我10个亿，我能对竞争对手有多少打击?给我100个亿，我对全世界的可口可乐的损失会有多大?我做不到，因为，他们的生意稳如磐石。给我些钱，让我去占领其他领域，我却总能找出办法把事情做到。
这样，我就能看清这个企业10年的大方向。如果我做不到这一点，我是不会买的。
我的5项投资逻辑
1. 因为我把自己当成是企业的经营者，所以我成为优秀的投资人;因为我把自己当成投资人，所以我成为优秀的企业经营者。
2. 好的企业比好的价格更重要。
3. 一生追求消费垄断企业。
4. 最终决定股价的是实质价值。
5. 没有任何时间适合将最优秀的企业脱手。
我怎么选股:
重心是“什么”上面，而不是“何时”
可口可乐公司于1919年上市，那时的价格是40美元左右。一年后，股价降了50％，只有19美元。看起来那是一场灾难。瓶装问题，糖料涨价，你总能发现这样那样的原因让你觉得那不是一个合适的买入时机。一些年之后，又发生了大萧条，第二次世界大战，核武器竞赛等。总是有原因（让你不买）。如果你在一开始40块钱买了一股，然后你把派发的红利进行再投资（买入可口可乐的股票），一直到现在，那股可乐股票的价值是5000万。这个事实压倒了一切。如果你看对了生意模式，你就会赚很多钱。
切入点的时机是很难把握的。所以，如果我拥有的是一个绝佳的生意，我丝毫不会为某一个事件的发生，或者它对未来一年的影响等等而担忧。当然，在过去的某些个时间段，政府施加了价格管制政策。企业因而不能涨价，即使最好的企业有时也会受影响，我们的See’s Candy糖果不能在12月26日涨价。但是，管制该发生的时候就会发生，它绝不会把一个杰出的企业蜕变成一个平庸的企业。政府是不可能永远实施管制政策的。
一个杰出的企业可以预计到将来可能会发生什么，但不一定会准确到何时会发生。重心需要放在“什么”上面，而不是“何时”上。如果对“什么”的判断是正确的，那么对“何时”大可不必过虑。
我凭什么选股:
给我10亿和10年
我只喜欢我看得懂的生意，这个标准排除了90％的企业。我想要的生意外面得有个城墙，居中是价值不菲的城堡，我要负责的、能干的人才来管理。
三十年前，柯达公司的城墙和可口可乐的城墙是一样难以逾越的。柯达向你保证你今天的照片，20年，50年后看起来仍是栩栩如生，这一点对你而言可能恰恰是最重要的。30年前的柯达就有那样的魅力，它占据了每个人的心。在地球上每个人的心里，它的那个小黄盒子都在说，柯达是最好的。那真是无价的。
现在的柯达已经不再独占人们的心。它的城墙变薄了，富士用各种手段缩小了差距。柯达让富士成为奥林匹克运动会的赞助商，一个一直以来由柯达独占的位置。于是在人们的印象里，富士变得和柯达平起平坐起来。
与之相反的是，可口可乐的城墙与30年前比，变得更宽了。你可能看不到城墙一天天的变化。但是，每次你看到可口可乐的工厂扩张到一个目前并不盈利，但20年后一定会的国家，它的城墙就加宽些。企业的城墙每天每年都在变，或厚或窄。10年后，你就会看到不同。
我给那些公司经理人的要求就是，让城墙更厚些，保护好它，拒竞争者于墙外。我寻找的就是这样的企业。那么这样的企业都在做什么生意呢?我要找到他们，就要从最简单的产品里找到那些（杰出的企业）。因为我没法预料到10年以后，甲骨文，莲花，或微软会发展成什么样。比尔•盖茨是我碰到过的最好的生意人。微软现在所处的位置也很好。但是我还是对他们10年后的状况无从知晓。同样我对他们的竞争对手10年后的情形也一无所知。
虽然我不拥有口香糖的公司，但是我知道10年后他们的发展会怎样。互联网是不会改变我们嚼口香糖的方式的，事实上，没什么能改变我们嚼口香糖的方式。会有很多的（口香糖）新产品不断进入试验期，一些以失败告终。这是事物发展的规律。如果你给我10个亿，让我进入口香糖的生意，打开一个缺口，我无法做到。这就是我考量一个生意的基本原则。给我10个亿，我能对竞争对手有多少打击?给我100个亿，我对全世界的可口可乐的损失会有多大?我做不到，因为，他们的生意稳如磐石。给我些钱，让我去占领其他领域，我却总能找出办法把事情做到。
这样，我就能看清这个企业10年的大方向。如果我做不到这一点，我是不会买的。
Friday, October 17, 2008
专家称普通投资者学习巴菲特误人误己
我个人定义的价值投资是：“所谓价值就是价格在上涨前值得买入的目标，并且买了就要继续上涨和增值，而不是一路下跌一半；只要是下跌，任何人都没有资格和不能武断地说它将来有价值，包括巴菲特先生也一样，因为好公司不等于好股票和好价值”。
巴菲特作为一个财富名人是公众关注的对象，近几年在中国尤其风靡，但他在美国这个家乡的粉丝绝对不如在中国多。国内最喜欢讨论巴菲特的就是他的巨额财富来自价值投资法则，但是毫无疑问这些“巴学研究会”的专家小组成员在多年后依然只能认识到巴菲特的一些皮毛，自然传到市场上也就是似是而非的“巴氏投资法”。对于巴老的财富论，我是100% 认同他毫无疑问是世界上所有富人的楷模，也是我辈最值得尊敬和学习的榜样。但这并不等于我们错误的接受媒体对他的神化论，并误导大众的投资方式步入歧途。
巴菲特的价值投资法的核心是建立在“三个都是不要赔钱”的原则上，如果你赔钱，一直赔钱，或赔到已没脾气，那你就不是巴菲特，就算你头上高举巴菲特语录也一样。我对巴菲特的理解是：他是一位在美国稳定金融法规下，通过多个长期成功的价格投机，形成财富效应的价值投资者。如果巴菲特没有价格投机的成功在前，他是绝对不会有之后价值投资的结果。也就是说，任何成功的价值投资者都是从成功的价格投机者开始的。
巴菲特早期就是个成功的价格投机者积累大量的财富，最终成为了全球最成功的价值投资专家。他的长期价值发现成功是基于价格和价值落差在产业中是有起死回生的前提下出手的，他更是名最好的实业投资家。这点国内开始已经认识到了，他的二级市场股票交易只是他的很少一部分，这是国内深圳那里从去年开始迅速刮起“股权投资风”的原因。
当巴老拥有300 亿资金可供投资的话，他的蓝图就是用10 个30 亿介入他所发现的不同的低估资产标，每个标投入的30 亿对地球人来说是很大的数字，对他就是10%都不到的资产。但你是个中国A股的投资人，如果你听信“中国的巴菲特”所说的 贵州茅台 是个长期投资标，而把资金的全部资金30万都押上一个盈利增长速率开始迅速向下的个股，你的风险就大幅度上升了。
任何投资人盲目学习巴菲特的外衣，你是会倾家荡产的。如果国人都想学做巴菲特，这是造神，在中国从来都不缺乏神。要成为巴菲特不是你坚持努力学几十年就一定行，中国的特殊国情以我们的认识，可以肯定而负责任地说，中国不会出巴菲特，最少我这辈子不会看见。因为到目前为止，地球另一边的美国，连小巴菲特都没有出现过，难道你不认为美国肯定会有比你更勤奋模仿巴菲特的大有人在吗？巴菲特这个洋老师为什么在本国找不到衣钵传人，而偏要千里迢迢来中国传道授业解惑广布弟子呢？我们要理解的是巴菲特的成功核心和他老先生对财富的豁达和社会给予他成功后回馈的人生价值观，取之于民众，返回给社会。至于他的方法你能不能转化为财富，这个最近一年在中国A股发生的事实已经完全说明问题了。
几周前收到不少国内的客户来电话和我讨论巴菲特为什么能在这么短的几天内就赚到了80亿美元，我感到很奇怪，有那么好的事情吗？据悉这个消息来自于最新一期的美国财经杂志《福布斯》公布了“美国富豪400强榜”。“股神”沃伦?巴菲特个人净资产在33天内增加80亿美元，击败微软公司的盖茨，重新登上首富宝座。
下面我用技术分析法来分析图二的周K 线，这个图上我们可以清楚的看到，巴菲特的股价在最近从140,000 美元跌到105,000 美元左右，跌幅是25% 左右，从抗跌性来说是超过了指数，那么是真的波克夏的股价抗跌吗？事实绝非如此，而是因为波克夏股票每天只有1000 多股的成交量(2 个多月前，每天成交量只有几百股，半年前才400 股左右)，想卖的大户无法大量兑现，而小户，一般也买不起这样的股票，所以巴菲特的股东都是美国有钱人，他们的收入原本就非常高。在兑现事实上是不迫切的，因为他们不缺这点资产增长。而是把钱投资在巴菲特这个德才兼备人的信誉、品性和价值观上。如果说是投资巴菲特的成长性，还不如说他们把巴菲特公司的流通股作为资产避风港。但是如果你的总资产一共才只有一股波克夏的股票价值，你没有其他更多的资产性收入，而波克夏公司的股票上升是你唯一的资产性收入的来源，你觉得这个25% 的下跌幅度你能不难受吗？
我们现在长期来分析波克夏的股价真实走势，可以清楚地得出巴菲特公司的成长性，所以最终告诉我们一个事实就是目前中国国内对巴菲特的各种声音都是只注重一层表面现象，而传言上的距离和实质性事实是不一样的。我们看巴菲特公司股价的8 年走势图解就能理解这些。
从2000-2008 年巴菲特的财富增值200% 多，但是美国很多股票在2002 年底股灾结束的短短6 年内，价格上升了1,000%，对，就是增值10 倍以上，这样的股票最少有30 个。我们用市场的事实说明8 年的200% 增值和6 年的1,000% 增值，哪个更有效？巴菲特的股票基本上只能纸上增值而很难全部兑成现金资产，而那些涨幅1,000% 的股票短短几天就能完成金融资产到现金资产的转变，你说选择哪个？
波克夏的股价月K 线完全说明了他的股票是富人避风港的游戏，但不是增值成长后能兑现的选择标。巴菲特的股价是从美国股灾开始后从熊变牛，2000 年初股价最低在45,000美元，美国熊市开始了，在股灾中富人就把大量的资产不断买入成交量稀少的波克夏股票作为避风港。8 年中这个接力棒游戏不断。而一般的美国投资者也买不起即便是45,000 美元一股的巴菲特股票。
国内机构有种观点就是把茅台做成巴菲特在国内的样板。这从基金抱团取暖来说，茅台股是有些象波克夏投资者的做法。可是想把茅台变成超级成长股的“中国小巴菲特们”没明白，茅台的成交量、流通股和总股数在那里，茅台股的本身结构性和波克夏股票完全不同，如果茅台的总盘子是只有100 万股，每股高达100,000 元一股，每天成交低于1000 股，那几个大基金自己能扛。只要超过50 个基金，茅台是扛不住的，这点波克夏最近的走势也说明了这些。不少股东在140,000 美元上开始兑现，造成成交量上升。
我过去一年中建议机构投资者卖出 贵州茅台的解析图，当超级牛市进入尾声和开始熊途的时候，一般都要迅速作出反应卖出金融资产折成现金资产。我肯定 “巴菲特本人投资贵州茅台”一定会早卖了，可见中国的小巴菲特们没有学到巴老的精髓。想想看为什么巴老在那么早就卖出 中石油而没坚持10 年持有这个亚洲最赚钱公司的价值呢?
当然巴菲特的名声在外，他的股票基本上还是相对稳定的。如果中国A 股市场上，有个专家要把中国茅台的股票投资和巴菲特的波克夏公司挂钩比较，这里我解析全部实真相。
我认为这样的投资专家并不了解股票和金融资本市场投资的核心和事实是么，不是言必崇拜巴菲特，自己模仿后就是他的接班人的，而且这样的“巴学专家”是害死一大批没有受过金融资本风险基础教育的中国普通投资大众。
因为所谓的价值资一旦发生质变，其跌幅之惨烈是令你无法想象的， 中国平安于富通股价刚刚大幅度滑后发现它是“价值投资”的目标，结果买入后“富通的价值几乎跌归零”了，中国平安150 亿的价值投资一年就这样血本无归了，就是最好的例子。在资本市场上，误己最你赔光所有资产，一切回归到从新开始。但是误人，那就会“大家很生气，后果很严重”。
巴菲特作为一个财富名人是公众关注的对象，近几年在中国尤其风靡，但他在美国这个家乡的粉丝绝对不如在中国多。国内最喜欢讨论巴菲特的就是他的巨额财富来自价值投资法则，但是毫无疑问这些“巴学研究会”的专家小组成员在多年后依然只能认识到巴菲特的一些皮毛，自然传到市场上也就是似是而非的“巴氏投资法”。对于巴老的财富论，我是100% 认同他毫无疑问是世界上所有富人的楷模，也是我辈最值得尊敬和学习的榜样。但这并不等于我们错误的接受媒体对他的神化论，并误导大众的投资方式步入歧途。
巴菲特的价值投资法的核心是建立在“三个都是不要赔钱”的原则上，如果你赔钱，一直赔钱，或赔到已没脾气，那你就不是巴菲特，就算你头上高举巴菲特语录也一样。我对巴菲特的理解是：他是一位在美国稳定金融法规下，通过多个长期成功的价格投机，形成财富效应的价值投资者。如果巴菲特没有价格投机的成功在前，他是绝对不会有之后价值投资的结果。也就是说，任何成功的价值投资者都是从成功的价格投机者开始的。
巴菲特早期就是个成功的价格投机者积累大量的财富，最终成为了全球最成功的价值投资专家。他的长期价值发现成功是基于价格和价值落差在产业中是有起死回生的前提下出手的，他更是名最好的实业投资家。这点国内开始已经认识到了，他的二级市场股票交易只是他的很少一部分，这是国内深圳那里从去年开始迅速刮起“股权投资风”的原因。
当巴老拥有300 亿资金可供投资的话，他的蓝图就是用10 个30 亿介入他所发现的不同的低估资产标，每个标投入的30 亿对地球人来说是很大的数字，对他就是10%都不到的资产。但你是个中国A股的投资人，如果你听信“中国的巴菲特”所说的 贵州茅台 是个长期投资标，而把资金的全部资金30万都押上一个盈利增长速率开始迅速向下的个股，你的风险就大幅度上升了。
任何投资人盲目学习巴菲特的外衣，你是会倾家荡产的。如果国人都想学做巴菲特，这是造神，在中国从来都不缺乏神。要成为巴菲特不是你坚持努力学几十年就一定行，中国的特殊国情以我们的认识，可以肯定而负责任地说，中国不会出巴菲特，最少我这辈子不会看见。因为到目前为止，地球另一边的美国，连小巴菲特都没有出现过，难道你不认为美国肯定会有比你更勤奋模仿巴菲特的大有人在吗？巴菲特这个洋老师为什么在本国找不到衣钵传人，而偏要千里迢迢来中国传道授业解惑广布弟子呢？我们要理解的是巴菲特的成功核心和他老先生对财富的豁达和社会给予他成功后回馈的人生价值观，取之于民众，返回给社会。至于他的方法你能不能转化为财富，这个最近一年在中国A股发生的事实已经完全说明问题了。
几周前收到不少国内的客户来电话和我讨论巴菲特为什么能在这么短的几天内就赚到了80亿美元，我感到很奇怪，有那么好的事情吗？据悉这个消息来自于最新一期的美国财经杂志《福布斯》公布了“美国富豪400强榜”。“股神”沃伦?巴菲特个人净资产在33天内增加80亿美元，击败微软公司的盖茨，重新登上首富宝座。
下面我用技术分析法来分析图二的周K 线，这个图上我们可以清楚的看到，巴菲特的股价在最近从140,000 美元跌到105,000 美元左右，跌幅是25% 左右，从抗跌性来说是超过了指数，那么是真的波克夏的股价抗跌吗？事实绝非如此，而是因为波克夏股票每天只有1000 多股的成交量(2 个多月前，每天成交量只有几百股，半年前才400 股左右)，想卖的大户无法大量兑现，而小户，一般也买不起这样的股票，所以巴菲特的股东都是美国有钱人，他们的收入原本就非常高。在兑现事实上是不迫切的，因为他们不缺这点资产增长。而是把钱投资在巴菲特这个德才兼备人的信誉、品性和价值观上。如果说是投资巴菲特的成长性，还不如说他们把巴菲特公司的流通股作为资产避风港。但是如果你的总资产一共才只有一股波克夏的股票价值，你没有其他更多的资产性收入，而波克夏公司的股票上升是你唯一的资产性收入的来源，你觉得这个25% 的下跌幅度你能不难受吗？
我们现在长期来分析波克夏的股价真实走势，可以清楚地得出巴菲特公司的成长性，所以最终告诉我们一个事实就是目前中国国内对巴菲特的各种声音都是只注重一层表面现象，而传言上的距离和实质性事实是不一样的。我们看巴菲特公司股价的8 年走势图解就能理解这些。
从2000-2008 年巴菲特的财富增值200% 多，但是美国很多股票在2002 年底股灾结束的短短6 年内，价格上升了1,000%，对，就是增值10 倍以上，这样的股票最少有30 个。我们用市场的事实说明8 年的200% 增值和6 年的1,000% 增值，哪个更有效？巴菲特的股票基本上只能纸上增值而很难全部兑成现金资产，而那些涨幅1,000% 的股票短短几天就能完成金融资产到现金资产的转变，你说选择哪个？
波克夏的股价月K 线完全说明了他的股票是富人避风港的游戏，但不是增值成长后能兑现的选择标。巴菲特的股价是从美国股灾开始后从熊变牛，2000 年初股价最低在45,000美元，美国熊市开始了，在股灾中富人就把大量的资产不断买入成交量稀少的波克夏股票作为避风港。8 年中这个接力棒游戏不断。而一般的美国投资者也买不起即便是45,000 美元一股的巴菲特股票。
国内机构有种观点就是把茅台做成巴菲特在国内的样板。这从基金抱团取暖来说，茅台股是有些象波克夏投资者的做法。可是想把茅台变成超级成长股的“中国小巴菲特们”没明白，茅台的成交量、流通股和总股数在那里，茅台股的本身结构性和波克夏股票完全不同，如果茅台的总盘子是只有100 万股，每股高达100,000 元一股，每天成交低于1000 股，那几个大基金自己能扛。只要超过50 个基金，茅台是扛不住的，这点波克夏最近的走势也说明了这些。不少股东在140,000 美元上开始兑现，造成成交量上升。
我过去一年中建议机构投资者卖出 贵州茅台的解析图，当超级牛市进入尾声和开始熊途的时候，一般都要迅速作出反应卖出金融资产折成现金资产。我肯定 “巴菲特本人投资贵州茅台”一定会早卖了，可见中国的小巴菲特们没有学到巴老的精髓。想想看为什么巴老在那么早就卖出 中石油而没坚持10 年持有这个亚洲最赚钱公司的价值呢?
当然巴菲特的名声在外，他的股票基本上还是相对稳定的。如果中国A 股市场上，有个专家要把中国茅台的股票投资和巴菲特的波克夏公司挂钩比较，这里我解析全部实真相。
我认为这样的投资专家并不了解股票和金融资本市场投资的核心和事实是么，不是言必崇拜巴菲特，自己模仿后就是他的接班人的，而且这样的“巴学专家”是害死一大批没有受过金融资本风险基础教育的中国普通投资大众。
因为所谓的价值资一旦发生质变，其跌幅之惨烈是令你无法想象的， 中国平安于富通股价刚刚大幅度滑后发现它是“价值投资”的目标，结果买入后“富通的价值几乎跌归零”了，中国平安150 亿的价值投资一年就这样血本无归了，就是最好的例子。在资本市场上，误己最你赔光所有资产，一切回归到从新开始。但是误人，那就会“大家很生气，后果很严重”。
Buffett says he's buying U.S. stocks
Billionaire investor Warren Buffett is buying U.S. stocks, he wrote in an opinion column in the New York Times.
"A simple rule dictates my buying: Be fearful when others are greedy, and be greedy when others are fearful," Buffett wrote in the paper.
Buffett acknowledged the economic news was bad, with the financial world in a mess, unemployment rising and business activity faltering.
"What is likely, however, is that the market will move higher, perhaps substantially so, well before either sentiment or the economy turns up," he said. "So if you wait for the robins, spring will be over."
Buffett, who made his money by building his company Berkshire Hathaway Inc into a $199 billion conglomerate, wrote that investors were right to be wary of highly leveraged entities or businesses in weak competitive positions.
"But fears regarding the long-term prosperity of the nation's many sound companies make no sense," he said.
Buffett said major companies would suffer earnings hiccups, but added they "will be setting new profit records five, 10 and 20 years from now."
"A simple rule dictates my buying: Be fearful when others are greedy, and be greedy when others are fearful," Buffett wrote in the paper.
Buffett acknowledged the economic news was bad, with the financial world in a mess, unemployment rising and business activity faltering.
"What is likely, however, is that the market will move higher, perhaps substantially so, well before either sentiment or the economy turns up," he said. "So if you wait for the robins, spring will be over."
Buffett, who made his money by building his company Berkshire Hathaway Inc into a $199 billion conglomerate, wrote that investors were right to be wary of highly leveraged entities or businesses in weak competitive positions.
"But fears regarding the long-term prosperity of the nation's many sound companies make no sense," he said.
Buffett said major companies would suffer earnings hiccups, but added they "will be setting new profit records five, 10 and 20 years from now."
Thursday, October 16, 2008
谢国忠：资产价格还原
谢国忠：股市将迎较大规模反弹 时间或持续一个月
凤凰卫视10月14日播出节目“谢国忠：股市将迎较大规模反弹 时间或持续一个月”，以下是文字实录：
曾瀞漪：现在全球央行有不同的协调行动开始在救市，目前情况看起来，你觉得效果怎么样？
抓住短线病根：股本金不足注资银行
谢国忠：这一轮的话，我觉得在它基本上找到短线的一个市场的病根在哪里？那就是银行的股本金不足，所以现在政府借钱注资银行，暂时会带来一定的稳定。
核心问题：资产价格还原经济衰退难挡
谢国忠：核心问题就是资产价格还原，房地产价格还原，然后会引起经济的衰退，这个问题就挡不住的。
谢国忠：所以我们现在看到的是一个熊市里面的一个反弹，这个反弹规模会比较大，可能会维持一个月，甚至更长的时间。
谢国忠：但是熊市还远远没有结束，必须要等经济调整，我们才会有新一轮的牛市。
凤凰卫视10月14日播出节目“谢国忠：股市将迎较大规模反弹 时间或持续一个月”，以下是文字实录：
曾瀞漪：现在全球央行有不同的协调行动开始在救市，目前情况看起来，你觉得效果怎么样？
抓住短线病根：股本金不足注资银行
谢国忠：这一轮的话，我觉得在它基本上找到短线的一个市场的病根在哪里？那就是银行的股本金不足，所以现在政府借钱注资银行，暂时会带来一定的稳定。
核心问题：资产价格还原经济衰退难挡
谢国忠：核心问题就是资产价格还原，房地产价格还原，然后会引起经济的衰退，这个问题就挡不住的。
谢国忠：所以我们现在看到的是一个熊市里面的一个反弹，这个反弹规模会比较大，可能会维持一个月，甚至更长的时间。
谢国忠：但是熊市还远远没有结束，必须要等经济调整，我们才会有新一轮的牛市。
预见美国金融危机, 罗比尼爆红
当华尔街哀鸿遍野之际，二○○六年就预见这场危机的纽约大学教授罗比尼( Nouriel Roubini)，因预测精准一夕爆红，现为当前最火红的经济学家。罗比尼表示，美国将经历至少两年的经济衰退，最坏的情况可能是长达十年的成长停滞。
《纽约时报》称罗比尼是“末日博士”(Dr. Doom)，二○○六年国际经济情势欣欣向荣，罗比尼在国际货币基金的会议上，却预言房市将拖垮经济，数百万人因无法支付房贷，重创不动产抵押的金融业，随之引发惨重骨牌效应。
罗比尼两年前发表有关论文时，没有人严肃看待，甚至一名专家在评论时，批评他缺乏数学架构。如今证实他的先前预言正确，各界立刻对他另眼相看，罗比尼随即成为最抢手的经济学家，财政部和大集团都抢着邀他当顾问，媒体每天都在等候他下一步的预言。
罗比尼在七月间曾预测，美林、雷曼兄弟、摩根史丹利和高盛等四大投资银行，其命运不是破产，就是必须和传统商业银行合并，经济衰退将走U形，持续十二至十八个月，股市将下跌四十％。事后证明，这些预言几乎全都命中。
罗比尼在网站上的最新文章说，美国金融体系宛如心跳停止，目前金融濒临系统性崩溃。他建议，进行积极的经济和金融改革，同时全球各国必须合作。他甚至建议减息一．五％，因为在非常的金融和经济情势中，需要非常的政策措施。罗比尼强调，即使这些措施奏效，也不会在一夜间扭转全球经济的低迷情势。他预测，两年的经济衰退不可避免，最坏的情况甚至可能出现长达十年的成长停滞。
罗比尼现年四十九岁，在纽约大学任教。他出生在土耳其伊斯坦堡，为伊朗犹太人之子，两岁时随家人搬到以色列，最后在义大利定居。他大学时曾先在耶路撒冷进修一年，在义大利米兰完成大学教育后，前往美国哈佛大学攻读国际经济，一九八八年获得博士学位。
罗比尼在爆红之前，运气并不是很好，之前曾在耶鲁大学任教，但未能顺利得到终身职教授职位，后来转到纽约大学史登商学院任教。《纽约时报》说，罗比尼的数学才华和对经济的直觉判断，使他能够精准预测出景气危机，
罗比尼在一九九七年亚洲遭逢金融风暴时，成立全球经济观测网﹝www.rgemonitor.com/blog/roubini﹞，当初默默无闻的个人网站，如今成为投资人、政府官员和媒体关注的热门网站。
《纽约时报》称罗比尼是“末日博士”(Dr. Doom)，二○○六年国际经济情势欣欣向荣，罗比尼在国际货币基金的会议上，却预言房市将拖垮经济，数百万人因无法支付房贷，重创不动产抵押的金融业，随之引发惨重骨牌效应。
罗比尼两年前发表有关论文时，没有人严肃看待，甚至一名专家在评论时，批评他缺乏数学架构。如今证实他的先前预言正确，各界立刻对他另眼相看，罗比尼随即成为最抢手的经济学家，财政部和大集团都抢着邀他当顾问，媒体每天都在等候他下一步的预言。
罗比尼在七月间曾预测，美林、雷曼兄弟、摩根史丹利和高盛等四大投资银行，其命运不是破产，就是必须和传统商业银行合并，经济衰退将走U形，持续十二至十八个月，股市将下跌四十％。事后证明，这些预言几乎全都命中。
罗比尼在网站上的最新文章说，美国金融体系宛如心跳停止，目前金融濒临系统性崩溃。他建议，进行积极的经济和金融改革，同时全球各国必须合作。他甚至建议减息一．五％，因为在非常的金融和经济情势中，需要非常的政策措施。罗比尼强调，即使这些措施奏效，也不会在一夜间扭转全球经济的低迷情势。他预测，两年的经济衰退不可避免，最坏的情况甚至可能出现长达十年的成长停滞。
罗比尼现年四十九岁，在纽约大学任教。他出生在土耳其伊斯坦堡，为伊朗犹太人之子，两岁时随家人搬到以色列，最后在义大利定居。他大学时曾先在耶路撒冷进修一年，在义大利米兰完成大学教育后，前往美国哈佛大学攻读国际经济，一九八八年获得博士学位。
罗比尼在爆红之前，运气并不是很好，之前曾在耶鲁大学任教，但未能顺利得到终身职教授职位，后来转到纽约大学史登商学院任教。《纽约时报》说，罗比尼的数学才华和对经济的直觉判断，使他能够精准预测出景气危机，
罗比尼在一九九七年亚洲遭逢金融风暴时，成立全球经济观测网﹝www.rgemonitor.com/blog/roubini﹞，当初默默无闻的个人网站，如今成为投资人、政府官员和媒体关注的热门网站。
Wednesday, October 15, 2008
AIA saga: What will happen if every policyholder surrenders policy?
”AIA SINGAPORE has more than sufficient capital and reserves above the regulatory minimum requirements to meet our obligations to policyholders,” said the Singapore-registered subsidiary of the beleaguered AIG in a press statement issued two days ago.
In the aftermath of Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s decision to lend AIG US$85 billion to keep it afloat, how well sheltered are AIA Singapore’s insurance funds in the financial tsunami that is drowning stock markets worldwide?
Despite the throng of crowds at AIA Tower’s main lobby these past two days, a straw poll by NextInsight shows most policyholders are holding on to their policies.
”Yes, I am concerned but if everyone surrenders his policy, fund redemptions will only worsen the financial markets”, said a policyholder.
One of NextInsight’s active forumers, who started the AIA saga thread under ‘scbchan’, is an experienced actuary.
NextInsight interviewed ‘scbchan’, whose real name is Benjamin Chan, for an exclusive low-down on the numbers behind AIA’s claim of being able to meet policy obligations.
We zoomed in on “participating policies”, which account for over half of AIA’s Singapore life policy liabilities.
(Participating policies are the most common type of life insurance policy and allow the policyholder to receive bonuses when the underlying insurance fund performs favorably.)
Asset base to meet immediate policy liability is 1.5 times
AIA's insurance funds are about 75% in fixed income and 20% in equities & real estate.
AIA's total fund assets for meeting policy plus other liabilities as at 31 Dec 2007 amounted to S$14.8 billion with 15% equities and 75% in fixed income.
Assuming the worst-case hypothetical scenario where all of AIA’s participating policyholders surrendered their policies as at 31 Dec 2007, it would have needed to pay out S$8.3 billion, against policy assets of S$12.1 billion for this category.
These figures were drawn from an MAS filing of AIA’s balance sheet. That is, the portion of fund assets for meeting policy liabilities were S$12.1 billion.
Most of AIA's equity investments were in Singapore blue chips, and these would have fallen by 30% since 31 Dec 2007 going by the fall in the Straits Times Index of SGX's top 30 stocks.
Factoring in a 30% drop in equities value, AIA's policy assets would still be around S$11.4 billion, estimates Mr Chan.
This still leaves a buffer of some S$3.1 billion over the S$8.3 billion surrender value.
So what checks and balances exist to safeguard the policyholders' claim?
Together with the insurer’s CEO, an appointed actuary lays out investment guidelines to which the insurance fund manager has to adhere.
This is the fund’s investment mandate, which defines its aims, the limits within which it is supposed to invest, and the asset allocation policy it should follow.
”Even if AIG were to become insolvent, the insurance funds maintained by AIA Singapore are protected by [Singapore’s] Insurance Act and [these funds] cannot be touched by creditors of its parent company,” commented Mr Chan in a recent posting on NextInsight’s forum.
Now with an international reinsurance group, Mr Chan was referring in particular, to section 17 on the establishment of insurance funds.
Section 17 of the Act requires insurers to maintain separate funds to meet the obligations to policyholders for different categories of insurance policies sold.
Categories are grouped by domestic versus offshore, life versus non-life as well as their sub-categories.
Revenues mostly from policies that allow policyholders to participate in fluctuations of the insurance fund's market value.
Life insurance policies are in three sub-categories:
(1) Participating Policy
Backed by PAR Funds (abbreviated from ‘participating’), these allow policyholders to receive non-guaranteed (bonus) payouts over and above the benefit payment guaranteed by the insurance contract.
For example, a S$100,000 life insurance policy may pay bonuses in excess of S$1,000 a year.
Actual bonus amount is dependent on performance of the underlying insurance fund.
The present value of AIA’s policy liabilities in this category amounted to S$12.1 billion as at 31 Dec 2007.
What’s the difference between this and immediate surrender value (S$8.3 billion)? Well, liabilities on the insurer’s balance sheet include future undeclared bonuses as well as the present value of the sum assured.
Conceptually, policy liabilities aggregate the probability of the policyholder making a claim multiplied by the present value of sum assured.
(2) Non-participating Policy
These cost the policyholder less insurance premiums, but do not pay bonuses.
(3) Investment-linked Policy
Investment-linked policies work like unit trusts.
Redemption values fluctuate directly with the underlying insurance fund, but should the policyholder die or become permanently disabled, beneficiaries receive the sum assured and/or the value of the investment units.
So what advice does the actuary have for the man in the street?
"Think hard before you surrender your policy," says Mr Chan.
"AIA will benefit the most, since the surrender values are set such that the insurer profits on pre-mature surrender."
"Your [insurance] agent [will also win], since after the dust settles in the next few months, you will consider buying another new policy and he will earn his upfront commission all over again" cautions the actuary.
In the aftermath of Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s decision to lend AIG US$85 billion to keep it afloat, how well sheltered are AIA Singapore’s insurance funds in the financial tsunami that is drowning stock markets worldwide?
Despite the throng of crowds at AIA Tower’s main lobby these past two days, a straw poll by NextInsight shows most policyholders are holding on to their policies.
”Yes, I am concerned but if everyone surrenders his policy, fund redemptions will only worsen the financial markets”, said a policyholder.
One of NextInsight’s active forumers, who started the AIA saga thread under ‘scbchan’, is an experienced actuary.
NextInsight interviewed ‘scbchan’, whose real name is Benjamin Chan, for an exclusive low-down on the numbers behind AIA’s claim of being able to meet policy obligations.
We zoomed in on “participating policies”, which account for over half of AIA’s Singapore life policy liabilities.
(Participating policies are the most common type of life insurance policy and allow the policyholder to receive bonuses when the underlying insurance fund performs favorably.)
Asset base to meet immediate policy liability is 1.5 times
AIA's insurance funds are about 75% in fixed income and 20% in equities & real estate.
AIA's total fund assets for meeting policy plus other liabilities as at 31 Dec 2007 amounted to S$14.8 billion with 15% equities and 75% in fixed income.
Assuming the worst-case hypothetical scenario where all of AIA’s participating policyholders surrendered their policies as at 31 Dec 2007, it would have needed to pay out S$8.3 billion, against policy assets of S$12.1 billion for this category.
These figures were drawn from an MAS filing of AIA’s balance sheet. That is, the portion of fund assets for meeting policy liabilities were S$12.1 billion.
Most of AIA's equity investments were in Singapore blue chips, and these would have fallen by 30% since 31 Dec 2007 going by the fall in the Straits Times Index of SGX's top 30 stocks.
Factoring in a 30% drop in equities value, AIA's policy assets would still be around S$11.4 billion, estimates Mr Chan.
This still leaves a buffer of some S$3.1 billion over the S$8.3 billion surrender value.
So what checks and balances exist to safeguard the policyholders' claim?
Together with the insurer’s CEO, an appointed actuary lays out investment guidelines to which the insurance fund manager has to adhere.
This is the fund’s investment mandate, which defines its aims, the limits within which it is supposed to invest, and the asset allocation policy it should follow.
”Even if AIG were to become insolvent, the insurance funds maintained by AIA Singapore are protected by [Singapore’s] Insurance Act and [these funds] cannot be touched by creditors of its parent company,” commented Mr Chan in a recent posting on NextInsight’s forum.
Now with an international reinsurance group, Mr Chan was referring in particular, to section 17 on the establishment of insurance funds.
Section 17 of the Act requires insurers to maintain separate funds to meet the obligations to policyholders for different categories of insurance policies sold.
Categories are grouped by domestic versus offshore, life versus non-life as well as their sub-categories.
Revenues mostly from policies that allow policyholders to participate in fluctuations of the insurance fund's market value.
Life insurance policies are in three sub-categories:
(1) Participating Policy
Backed by PAR Funds (abbreviated from ‘participating’), these allow policyholders to receive non-guaranteed (bonus) payouts over and above the benefit payment guaranteed by the insurance contract.
For example, a S$100,000 life insurance policy may pay bonuses in excess of S$1,000 a year.
Actual bonus amount is dependent on performance of the underlying insurance fund.
The present value of AIA’s policy liabilities in this category amounted to S$12.1 billion as at 31 Dec 2007.
What’s the difference between this and immediate surrender value (S$8.3 billion)? Well, liabilities on the insurer’s balance sheet include future undeclared bonuses as well as the present value of the sum assured.
Conceptually, policy liabilities aggregate the probability of the policyholder making a claim multiplied by the present value of sum assured.
(2) Non-participating Policy
These cost the policyholder less insurance premiums, but do not pay bonuses.
(3) Investment-linked Policy
Investment-linked policies work like unit trusts.
Redemption values fluctuate directly with the underlying insurance fund, but should the policyholder die or become permanently disabled, beneficiaries receive the sum assured and/or the value of the investment units.
So what advice does the actuary have for the man in the street?
"Think hard before you surrender your policy," says Mr Chan.
"AIA will benefit the most, since the surrender values are set such that the insurer profits on pre-mature surrender."
"Your [insurance] agent [will also win], since after the dust settles in the next few months, you will consider buying another new policy and he will earn his upfront commission all over again" cautions the actuary.
HMI: Targeting Indonesian & Johor patients
”MEDICAL TOURISTS from Indonesia looking for a lower cost alternative to Singapore are most likely to choose Malaysia,” says Dr Gan See Khem, executive chairman of Health Management International.
HMI owns a 49% stake of Malacca’s Mahkota Medical Center, one of the most profitable private hospitals in Malaysia.
The 235-bed tertiary care hospital received Malaysia’s Healthcare Services Industry Excellence Award from its Ministry of International Trade and Industry for two consecutive years in 2006-2007.
Most of its doctors are Malaysians trained in Singapore, says Dr Gan during a visit by 10 analysts, fund managers and traders to her office in Bukit Merah yesterday.
The facilities and medical equipment in Mahkota Medical Center are comparable to premier private hospitals in Singapore such as the Gleneagles, she says.
What lures Indonesian patients to the Mahkota is the fact that fees for most of its medical services, from doctors’ consultation and surgical procedures, drugs, rental of medical equipment to bed charges in Malaysia are half what they would have to pay in Singapore.
For this reason, Dr Gan expects HMI’s patient load to increase even as the global recession hits hard at the pockets of Indonesian medical tourists who patronize Singapore hospitals during boom times.
Malaysia attracted 386,000 medical tourists in 2007, of which 70% were Indonesians. Industry experts reckon this market will grow 30% a year to RM 584 million by 2010.
Mahkota Medical Center's facilities are comparable to premier hospitals in Singapore.
HMI has 9 marketing offices in Indonesia promoting Mahkota Medical Center.
Dr Gan, who holds a PhD in business administration from the University of Sheffield, UK, said HMI’s patient load rose during Asia’s last recession.
By 1H09 (ending December 2008), HMI will open a second tertiary care hospital in Johor, where there is a chronic shortage of operating theatres.
Named Regency Specialist Hospital, the 61%-owned subsidiary obtained its licence to operate in August 2008.
About 97% of HMI's revenue in FY08 come from the provision of inpatient and outpatient services such as laboratory, pharmacy or radiology, rental of operating theatres and other equipment in its specialist centers, as well as the sale or lease of medical suites to doctors.
The remaining 3% of revenues comes from accreditation programs for nursing professionals, as well as vocational training for healthcare workers.
Meeting a worldwide shortage of nursing professionals
Though education services is a small segment now, Dr Gan wants to increase its revenue contribution.
There is currently a worldwide shortage of accredited nursing professionals, especially in developed nations such as Singapore, Australia and North America.
Chinese nationals at HMI's nursing course. Photo by Sim Kih
Nurses from developing nations are keen on these jobs which pay far more than what they can get at home. For example, in China, they earn no more than Rmb 1,000 a month, versus up to S$2,000 in Singapore when allowances and other perks are thrown in.
However, nursing qualifications from developing nations are usually not recognized by developed nations.
Here’s where HMI fills the gap.
Its School of Nursing attracts Chinese nationals by collaborating with China's hospitals and varsities to offer nursing programs.
Nurses registered in China can also convert their qualification into one licensed by the Singapore Nursing Board by going through HMI’s program.
HMI has the added competitive advantage of being able to secure jobs for trainees after their graduation.
As a recruitment and training partner of Singapore hospitals and nursing homes, HMI Institute of Health Sciences has trained and placed over 1,000 students to date.
Unlike other medical services providers in Singapore, HMI does not operate any hospitals here, which is why local hospitals do not view HMI as a competitive threat. Instead, they show their support in providing clinical attachment and job recruitment opportunities.
HMI Institute of Health Sciences also provides vocational training for adults who wish to be healthcare assistants certified with Singapore Workforce Skills Qualifications (WSQ). The qualification is subsidized by the local government’s Workforce Development Agency.
Like Malaysia’s medical tourism industry, Dr Gan believes demand for continuing adult education tends to rise in recessions.
At market cap of S$38.5 million, HMI is currently trading at less than half the asset value of its two hospitals, which the management believes to be worth over RM 200 million (S$85 million).
HMI generated sales of S$44.5 million for the financial year ended 30 June 2008 and net margins of 10.9%.
Historical price earnings ratio is now at 7.9X.
HMI owns a 49% stake of Malacca’s Mahkota Medical Center, one of the most profitable private hospitals in Malaysia.
The 235-bed tertiary care hospital received Malaysia’s Healthcare Services Industry Excellence Award from its Ministry of International Trade and Industry for two consecutive years in 2006-2007.
Most of its doctors are Malaysians trained in Singapore, says Dr Gan during a visit by 10 analysts, fund managers and traders to her office in Bukit Merah yesterday.
The facilities and medical equipment in Mahkota Medical Center are comparable to premier private hospitals in Singapore such as the Gleneagles, she says.
What lures Indonesian patients to the Mahkota is the fact that fees for most of its medical services, from doctors’ consultation and surgical procedures, drugs, rental of medical equipment to bed charges in Malaysia are half what they would have to pay in Singapore.
For this reason, Dr Gan expects HMI’s patient load to increase even as the global recession hits hard at the pockets of Indonesian medical tourists who patronize Singapore hospitals during boom times.
Malaysia attracted 386,000 medical tourists in 2007, of which 70% were Indonesians. Industry experts reckon this market will grow 30% a year to RM 584 million by 2010.
Mahkota Medical Center's facilities are comparable to premier hospitals in Singapore.
HMI has 9 marketing offices in Indonesia promoting Mahkota Medical Center.
Dr Gan, who holds a PhD in business administration from the University of Sheffield, UK, said HMI’s patient load rose during Asia’s last recession.
By 1H09 (ending December 2008), HMI will open a second tertiary care hospital in Johor, where there is a chronic shortage of operating theatres.
Named Regency Specialist Hospital, the 61%-owned subsidiary obtained its licence to operate in August 2008.
About 97% of HMI's revenue in FY08 come from the provision of inpatient and outpatient services such as laboratory, pharmacy or radiology, rental of operating theatres and other equipment in its specialist centers, as well as the sale or lease of medical suites to doctors.
The remaining 3% of revenues comes from accreditation programs for nursing professionals, as well as vocational training for healthcare workers.
Meeting a worldwide shortage of nursing professionals
Though education services is a small segment now, Dr Gan wants to increase its revenue contribution.
There is currently a worldwide shortage of accredited nursing professionals, especially in developed nations such as Singapore, Australia and North America.
Chinese nationals at HMI's nursing course. Photo by Sim Kih
Nurses from developing nations are keen on these jobs which pay far more than what they can get at home. For example, in China, they earn no more than Rmb 1,000 a month, versus up to S$2,000 in Singapore when allowances and other perks are thrown in.
However, nursing qualifications from developing nations are usually not recognized by developed nations.
Here’s where HMI fills the gap.
Its School of Nursing attracts Chinese nationals by collaborating with China's hospitals and varsities to offer nursing programs.
Nurses registered in China can also convert their qualification into one licensed by the Singapore Nursing Board by going through HMI’s program.
HMI has the added competitive advantage of being able to secure jobs for trainees after their graduation.
As a recruitment and training partner of Singapore hospitals and nursing homes, HMI Institute of Health Sciences has trained and placed over 1,000 students to date.
Unlike other medical services providers in Singapore, HMI does not operate any hospitals here, which is why local hospitals do not view HMI as a competitive threat. Instead, they show their support in providing clinical attachment and job recruitment opportunities.
HMI Institute of Health Sciences also provides vocational training for adults who wish to be healthcare assistants certified with Singapore Workforce Skills Qualifications (WSQ). The qualification is subsidized by the local government’s Workforce Development Agency.
Like Malaysia’s medical tourism industry, Dr Gan believes demand for continuing adult education tends to rise in recessions.
At market cap of S$38.5 million, HMI is currently trading at less than half the asset value of its two hospitals, which the management believes to be worth over RM 200 million (S$85 million).
HMI generated sales of S$44.5 million for the financial year ended 30 June 2008 and net margins of 10.9%.
Historical price earnings ratio is now at 7.9X.
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