Should you Trust them?
My very good friend Fred Sheehan, a book author, economist and market historian recently wrote a report entitled “Anatomy of the Bubble” in which he quoted the views, among others, of some senior economic policy members in 2007 – dead ahead of one of the most serious financial crisis in history (Frederick J. Sheehan (Fsheehan@AuContrarian.com;www.AuContrarian.com).
Now, I do not wish to be unfair to our brilliant economic policy makers and business leaders, after all I also made many bad calls in my life as an investment advisor. But I find it rather amusing that the very people who brought about the current financial mess or were major contributors to the problems we are faced with today (Hank Paulson as a CEO of Goldman Sachs and Jack Welsh overseeing GE Capital) should
now be in charge of bailing out the system. Not to mention Ben Bernanke, who significantly aggravated the crisis with his abstruse monetary philosophy and theories! Mr. Bernanke became Fed governor in 2002 and under his influence the Fed fund rate was cut to 1% and left there until June 2004 although the US economic recovery had begun in November 2001. By focusing almost entirely on “core inflation” he failed to observe the increase in commodity prices and the enormous growth in
credit, which led to the housing bubble, and was accompanied by a huge expansion of leverage among financial institutions.
Incidentally, excessive credit growth between 1921 and 1929 was also largely
responsible for the depression of the 1930s and not, as Bernanke thinks,policy errors at the time by the Fed. Then, after having raised the Fed funds rate in baby steps between June 2004 and August 2006, he slashed the rate from 5¼% to 2% between September 2007 and January 2008.
The result was that commodity prices took off (oil rose from $75 before the rate cuts to close to $150 per barrel), the US dollar weakened further and most importantly his rate cuts sent the wrong message to leveraged financial institutions because it gave them a false sense of security. Had the Fed funds rate at the time not been cut, financial institutions would have begun immediately to deleverage. But by cutting rates further not only was leverage actually encouraged but it also fostered another huge increase in the volume of outstanding Credit Default Swaps (CDS) to currently approximately $62 trillion (compared to just $1 trillion in subprime mortgages). The CDS market is, I may add, a far more powerful time bomb than the sub-prime mortgage market and is likely to explode at some point (that’s why AIG had to be bailed out). Ben Stein writing for the New York Times echoes a similar view. According to Stein, “what I hear from my betters in the world of finance, the most serious problems are not with the bundles of subprime mortgages themselves — a large but not lethal quantum as far as I can tell — but with derivatives contracts tied to subprime and other dicey debt. These contracts are superficially an attempt to “insure” against risks of default, hence the name ‘credit-default swaps.’ In fact, they are an immense wager — which anyone with lots of money or borrowing ability can enter — about how mortgage-backed bonds, leveraged loan bonds, student loan bonds, credit card bonds and the like will perform.”
I should add that, unlike what Mr. Paulson says, falling house prices are not the problem. It is the huge leverage that is the problem. If your house is 100% self-financed (no mortgage outstanding) a rise or a decline in the value of your house has no direct economic or financial impact. In short, my view is that the bail-out plan is not addressing the cause of the problem, which is excessive leverage. Moreover, it is unlikely to help struggling homeowners but is designed to encourage even more speculation by financial companies. Peter Boockvar of Millar Tabak is
furthermore concerned that it will lead to further bailout.
According to him, “the Paulson bailout plan is a government bailout of the previously failed government bailout which was a bailout of the previously failed government bailout etc… Each bailout had its own unintended consequences which the next bailout tried to address. Greenspan bailed out the economy after the stock market bubble popped with 1% interest rates which sowed the seeds for the credit bubble. In order to bail us out, Bernanke slashed interest rates to 2% and a dramatic rise in commodity prices ensued. When that bailout didn’t work, he instituted a bailout of the investment banks with the initiation of the TSLF and PDCF credit facilities for investment banks. That slowed down the deleveraging process as it gave the investment banks a false sense of security. I highlight Dick
Fuld’s comments soon after it began where he said it takes the liquidity issue off the table. The lack of dramatic deleveraging brought us to last week’s panic in GS and MS, a failed LEH and a shotgun wedding for MER which led us to the Paulson bailout. The unintended consequence of this bailout will be a much lower US$ and
selloff in the US bond market which will leave us with higher interest rates and higher mortgage rates throw’s the intentions of the Paulson plan out the window. Who will bailout this bailout”?
One solution Boockvar proposes would be for banks to cut their dividends in order to strengthen their capital.
According to Boockvar, “here's a plan for Washington DC, tel l the banksto stop paying dividends to their shareholders. I went back and looked at just 20 of the top banks, including GS, MS and MER and saw that they are paying out $40 Billion per year out in dividends. The lending rule of thumb is $1 of capital can service $10 of lending. That is $400 Billion in lending capacity that can get freed up. That is more than half of the Paulson bailout plan and it costs the taxpayer ZERO.”
Equally critical of the bailout plan is Professor Nouriel Roubini who correctly forecasted the current crisis. In a recent report he writes that the bailout plan “is Rather a Disgrace and Rip-Off Benefitting only the Shareholders and Unsecured Creditors of Banks.” Professor Roubini then discusses a recent IMF study:
“A recent IMF study of 42 systemic banking crises across the world provides evidence on how different crises were resolved. First of all only in 32 of the 42 cases there was government financial intervention of any sort; in 10 cases systemic banking crises were resolved without any government financial intervention. Of the 32 cases where the government recapitalized the banking system only seven included a program of purchase of bad assets/loans (like the one proposed by the US Treasury).
In 25 other cases there was no government purchase of such toxic assets.
In 6 cases the government purchased preferred shares; in 4 cases the government purchased common shares; in 11 cases the government purchased subordinated debt; in 12 cases the government injected cash in the banks; in 2 cases credit was extended to the banks; and in 3 cases the government assumed bank liabilities. Even in cases where bad assets were purchased – as in Chile – dividends were suspended and all profits and recoveries had to be used to repurchase the bad assets. Of course in
most cases multiple forms of government recapitalization of banks were used.
But government purchase of bad assets was the exception rather than the rule. It was used only in Mexico, Japan, Bolivia, Czech Republic, Jamaica, Malaysia, and Paraguay. Even in six of these seven cases where the recapitalization of banks occurred via the government purchase of bad assets such recapitalization was a combination of purchase of bad assets together with other forms of recapitalization (such as government purchase of preferred shares or subordinated debt).
In the Scandinavian banking crises (Sweden, Norway, Finland) that are a model of how a banking crisis should be resolved there was not government purchase of bad assets; most of the recapitalization occurred through various injections of public capital in the banking system.
Purchase of toxic assets instead – in most cases in which it was used – made the fiscal cost of the crisis much higher and expensive (as in Japan and Mexico).
Thus the claim by the Fed and Treasury that spending $700 billion of public money is the best way to recapitalize banks has absolutely no factual basis or justification. This way of recapitalizing financial institutions is a total rip-off that will mostly benefit – at a huge expense for the US taxpayer - the common and preferred shareholders and even unsecured creditors of the banks. Even the late addition of some warrants that the government will get in exchange of this massive injection of
public money is only a cosmetic fig leaf of dubious value as the form and size of such warrants is totally vague and fuzzy.
So this rescue plan is a huge and massive bailout of the shareholders and the unsecured creditors of the financial firms (not just banks but also other non bank financial institutions); with $700 billion of taxpayer money the pockets of reckless bankers and investors have been made fatter under the fake argument that bailing out Wall Street was necessary to rescue Main Street from a severe recession. Instead, the restoration of the financial health of distressed financial firms could have been achieved with a cheaper and better use of public money.
Indeed, the plan also does not address the need to recapitalize those financial institutions that are badly undercapitalized: this could have been achieved by using some of the $700 billion to inject public funds in ways other and more effective than a purchase of toxic assets: via public injections of preferred shares into these firms; via required matching injections of Tier 1 capital by current shareholders to make sure that such shareholders take first tier loss in the presence of public recapitalization; via suspension of dividends payments; via a conversion of some of the unsecured debt into equity (a debt for equity swap). All these actions would have implied a much lower fiscal costs for the government as they
would have forced the shareholders and creditors of the banks to contribute to the recapitalization of the banks. So less than $700 billion of public money could have been spent if the private shareholders and creditors had been forced to contribute to the recapitalization; and whatever the size of the public contribution were to be its distribution between purchases of bad assets and more efficient and fair forms of
recapitalization (preferred shares, common shares, sub debt) should have been different.”
In my humble opinion the bailout plan is badly flawed. But what else would you expect from the people Fred Sheehan quoted above! The plan is poorly designed because it fails to address how the excessive leverage in the system can be reduced at a measured pace and it also prevents the market from clearing at prices which would induce the private sector (private equity firms, sovereign and hedge funds) to recapitalize the financial sector. Also, compared to total credit market debt of $51 trillion, a CDS market of $ 62 trillion and a global derivatives market of notional
$1,400 trillion, a bailout with just $700 billion is really just a drop in the bucket. Finally, I very much doubt that the bailout plan does anything to resolve the stress in money and the interbank markets.
David Rosenberg observed that “the spread between 3-month Treasuries and Eurodollars, the so-called TED spread, is the widest in history going back to the mid 1970s, telling us that banks are not lending to each other.
We had news of a large commercial bank failure, and equity stake holders are growing increasingly concerned about several other large deposit taking institutions. Make no mistake, the financial sector is in the midst of a massive deleveraging cycle, and that means it is only a matter of time before the capital market screws – from lines of credit to car loans – are turned even tighter for consumers and nonfinancial businesses”
But enough academic talk! More important for us are the investment implications of the bailout plan (no matter how poorly designed) and the increasingly poor economic conditions around the world. Recently, a reader of this comment (I read all emails I receive), suggested that there is no logic in my call for a stronger US dollar. I think I have tried to demonstrate in earlier reports that in an environment of a relative shrinking global liquidity (declining US current account deficit) the US
dollar should strengthen. However, I should also like to point out that in the world of investments logic should be used only very carefully. For instance, there is no logic in my mind why the Nikkei rose in 1989 to 39,000, why Hong Kong property prices continued to rise into 1997, why the NASDAQ rose above 5,000 in March 2000 and why the recent Damien Hirst sale was such a success. In fact, I need to admit that thinking logically cost me a fortune in 1999 because I had shorted high
tech stocks already in 1998! Also, if you try to understand women logically you will never understand them – now I know that I shall again receive hundreds of emails about not being “politically correct” but trust me; I love them and I speak from some modest experience. I also have to admit that men are no better. As Charles McKay already observed at the beginning of the 19th century, “Men, it has been well said, think in herds;it will be seen that they go mad in herds while they recover their senses slowly and one by one.” Markets can simply move in a direction that seems illogical to us. Take as an example the correlation between US fiscal imbalances and the US dollar. According to Deutsche Bank, there have been two regimes of correlation between US fiscal balance and the dollar: negative -0.63 during 1973-1988 and positive +0.42 since 1988, thereby supporting both views that larger deficits can result in a weaker or a stronger dollar.
Similarly, the US current account deficit exploded between 1981 and 1986 and the US dollar strengthened while after 1986 the current account deficit shrank and the dollar weakened. I suppose that market movements depend largely on the starting point of a market. In 1979, the USD was grossly undervalued and oversold and in 1985 it was grossly overvalued and overbought. Other important factors are of course interest rate differentials, which worked in favor of the USD between 1979 and 1985.
But what I want to emphasize is that whereas in the very long run markets are probably rational and their movements logical, in the short to intermediate term they can be irrational and illogical. Personally, I did not understand why the Baltic Dry Index managed to make a new high in May 2007, when a global economic slowdown was already evident. More rational was the performance of shipping stocks, which failed to confirm the new high in the Baltic Dry Index.
As an aside, I think investors should pay close attention to the reaction of markets to news. If the news is very good and a market or a stock fails to make a new high some caution is in order. Conversely, if the news is very bad and a market or stock fails to make a new low it might be a sign that the bad news has already been discounted by the market.
But getting back to the US dollar, one reason it may perform relatively well is that although the financial news coming out of the US is horrible, financial conditions in Europe could be even worse. According to Daniel Gross, director of the Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels, “the crucial problem on this side of the Atlantic is that the largest European banks have become not only too big to fail, but also too big to be saved. For example, the total liabilities of Deutsche Bank (leverage ratio over 50!) amount to about €2,000bn (more than Fannie Mae) or more than 80 per cent of the gross domestic product of Germany. This is simply too much for the Bundesbank or even the German state, given that the German budget is bound by the rules of the European Union’s stability pact and the German government cannot order (unlike the US Treasury) its central bank to issue more currency. Similarly, the total liabilities of Barclays of around £1,300bn (leverage ratio 60!) are roughly
equivalent to the GDP of the UK. Fortis Bank has a leverage ratio of “only” 33, but its liabilities are three times the GDP of its home country of Belgium” (emphasis added). In addition, I am not sure investors fully appreciate that earnings in emerging economies could be decimated next year.
I should add that earnings in Latin America are way above the trend-line of the last 20 years and vulnerable to significant downward adjustments.
So, whereas we are all aware of the problems in the US, emerging market investors who were dreaming of the decoupling theme could be in for some rude surprises (a friend of mine, Jim Walker, a top economist in Asia, thinks that in 2009 economic growth in Asia could decline to just 2%). Obviously, disappointing growth, which also seems to be indicated by the collapse in the Baltic Dry Index, would also weigh in on emerging market currencies.
Concerning the US stock market we note that there are several indicators, which suggest that a bottom should be reached shortly or has already been reached. New yearly lows exceed new highs by a wide margin, volume has picked up and volatility is extremely high.
In addition, sentiment is now extremely bearish. I should add that the same way in a bull market sentiment can remain positive for a long time, in bear markets sentiment can stay negative for an extended period of time (please note how bullish sentiment remained extremely high in 2004 as the bull market was unfolding)
Lastly, as I indicated in earlier reports, a precondition for a low was the breakdown of until recently strong stocks such as Apple, Research in Motion, Amazon.com as well as of cyclical stocks such as steels, shipping and iron ore companies. So, whereas I find it hard to make a case for a strong bull market (new highs are almost out of the question) I could easily envision a powerful bear market rally beginning in October, which could propel the S&P 500 up between 10% and 15% and the extremely over-sold emerging markets by 20% or so.
As always, I continue to recommend investors to accumulate physical gold.
Tuesday, October 7, 2008
Monday, October 6, 2008
央行发言人称从未发布中国2000亿助美救市消息
多家中国媒体今天都引述报道称央行新闻发言人白力对于“中国央行2000亿助美救市消息”，表示“我是第一次听说这种说法”。
联合早报网今天也对此报道做了转载，不过中国央行职员却致电给本网，表示媒体在转载该报道有误。
本网在网上搜讯该文章时发现，海外媒体今天都曾引述晨报和第一财经日报对该消息的报道，不过央行的说法在两则报道都不相同。
凤凰网在凌晨4时26分引述晨报的报道，该媒体如此报道：“晨报就此事致电央行新闻处发言人白力，他却表示是“第一次听说这种说法”。他还说:“我们从未发表过任何有关认购的信息，而对于救市计划通过的回应我们已经在银行网站上予以发布”。他同时告诉记者，虽然对于该媒体报道的信源不得而知，但是他认为，中国参与稳定国际金融市场的工作，应当不会是仅仅购买美国国债这么简单。”
该报道也被多家中国及国外媒体转载。
较迟第一财经日报的报道：“不过，在记者致电央行新闻发言人时，其表示不能证实该消息，不予置评。”
另外，法制晚报在中午时发表的报道则引述白力称：“今日上午，记者致电央行新闻发言人白力，他告诉记者，他们也注意到了这一消息，目前唯一可以确定的是，央行未做过此类表态。 不过白力告诉记者，关于美国救市举措，央行的态度还是希望美国金融市场稳定，希望美国经济健康发展。 白力说，中国方面希望这一法案能尽快得以实施并收到积极成效，以稳定美国金融市场和全球金融市场，恢复投资者信心。在稳定金融市场方面，中美两国有着共同利益。”
5日，香港明报的报道道称，一旦美国开始筹集资金“救市”，中国将可能认购多达2000亿美元美国国债，协助美国渡过难关。
该媒体报道分析认为，作为美国国债近年最大买家的中国，已成为美国救市融资的成败关键。据该媒体称，“中国已向美国承诺购入救市方案所需的融资金额中的2000亿美元”，并同时透露“救巿方案首阶段筹集的2500亿美元，中国会购入其中700亿至800亿美元美国国债”。但在报道这一消息时，该媒体并未说明这则消息的来源。
联合早报网今天也对此报道做了转载，不过中国央行职员却致电给本网，表示媒体在转载该报道有误。
本网在网上搜讯该文章时发现，海外媒体今天都曾引述晨报和第一财经日报对该消息的报道，不过央行的说法在两则报道都不相同。
凤凰网在凌晨4时26分引述晨报的报道，该媒体如此报道：“晨报就此事致电央行新闻处发言人白力，他却表示是“第一次听说这种说法”。他还说:“我们从未发表过任何有关认购的信息，而对于救市计划通过的回应我们已经在银行网站上予以发布”。他同时告诉记者，虽然对于该媒体报道的信源不得而知，但是他认为，中国参与稳定国际金融市场的工作，应当不会是仅仅购买美国国债这么简单。”
该报道也被多家中国及国外媒体转载。
较迟第一财经日报的报道：“不过，在记者致电央行新闻发言人时，其表示不能证实该消息，不予置评。”
另外，法制晚报在中午时发表的报道则引述白力称：“今日上午，记者致电央行新闻发言人白力，他告诉记者，他们也注意到了这一消息，目前唯一可以确定的是，央行未做过此类表态。 不过白力告诉记者，关于美国救市举措，央行的态度还是希望美国金融市场稳定，希望美国经济健康发展。 白力说，中国方面希望这一法案能尽快得以实施并收到积极成效，以稳定美国金融市场和全球金融市场，恢复投资者信心。在稳定金融市场方面，中美两国有着共同利益。”
5日，香港明报的报道道称，一旦美国开始筹集资金“救市”，中国将可能认购多达2000亿美元美国国债，协助美国渡过难关。
该媒体报道分析认为，作为美国国债近年最大买家的中国，已成为美国救市融资的成败关键。据该媒体称，“中国已向美国承诺购入救市方案所需的融资金额中的2000亿美元”，并同时透露“救巿方案首阶段筹集的2500亿美元，中国会购入其中700亿至800亿美元美国国债”。但在报道这一消息时，该媒体并未说明这则消息的来源。
世界金融危机中国将成赢家？
中国总理温家宝上周末在天津出席世界经济论坛之“夏季达沃斯年会”时高调提出：面对当前的危机，各国要加强合作，只有合作才能有力地应对危机；在经济困难面前，信心比货币、黄金还要贵重。
在谈到国内经济时，他形容中国劳动力和资金供给充裕，基本面没有变化，消费和投资需求持续增长的潜力还很大。
当时，国内主流媒体尚未积极解读温总理的这场演讲的含义。但到最近这一两天，中国的所谓合作即出手参与国际救市的信号已明朗化。
更多媒体刊载了更早前，温家宝9月24日在纽约与美国经济金融界知名人士对话的全文。其中包括温家宝的话：“中国对外传递的是稳定和合作的信号。尽管我们也存在对资金安全问题的关切，但我们对美国经济还是有信心，愿发挥自己的作用。”
官方媒体新华社在9月30日的电讯中报道上述对话，标题是《温家宝总理：已准备好参与国际救市》。
拥有世界第一，总额超过1万8000亿美元的雄厚外汇储备；又持有仅次于日本的美国债券数额，在本次世界金融危机不断深化的当儿，美国金融深陷泥泽，外界的期盼慢慢转移到中国身上。美国联储局前主席格林斯潘形容，这是“百年一遇”的金融危机，对中国而言，这可能也是一个参与世界金融体系，拥有美国金融资产，直接与华尔街金融挂钩的历史性时机。
目前，中国准备出手已没有悬念，问题是在于中国可能出手的时机与方式，以及过程中如何做明智的投资判断，并应对处理西方世界对中国的战略性的疑虑。显然下周四的中共十七届三中全会，将是讨论这一议题的时机。
上个月中，香港凤凰卫视的财经评论员认为，中国可以考虑与新加坡淡马锡控股合作。
在微观的领域里，中国也在积极观察国际局势，以求在未来的全球金融监管秩序中，占据更有利位置。在上周末的达沃斯年会里，美国花旗银行总裁罗兹证实，中国银监会和央行以及美联储正紧密合作，可能会采取一些措施。银监会主席刘明康也透露，中国将充分利用这次机会来提升银监会的信息体系，银行业也正准备吸纳最近在华尔街失业的国际人才，请他们担任独立董事或者是高管层成员。
换句话说，一些原本在华尔街工作的金融人员，风暴后可能发现自己正前往中国觅职。
无论如何，金融危机可能催生的国际金融秩序重组，乃至政治格局的变化正引起注意。西方的学者与媒体已表示警惕，哈佛大学历史教授弗格森最近在《华盛顿邮报》撰文说，这场危机削减了美国称霸全球论调的可信性，中国经济将提早超越美国。
国际投行高盛证券2006年曾预计，中国将在2040年超越美国。到了今年4月，这个年份提前到2027年。弗格森认为这个日子可能更早来到。
中国在迎接改革开放30周年纪念的时间点上，突然面对这场金融海啸的危机与机遇，看似奇异的巧合。不过，不能忽视的是中国经济与社会基础也还不牢固，国内存在贫富差距，收入分配不合理，内需不振，出口疲软，楼市股市低迷，食品安全危机，以及因食品安全丑闻引发的政府信用危机，环境恶化等一系列亟待处理的问题。全球危机的一个间接效应，是在西方国家自顾不暇时，他们难免减少对中国民主与人权做文章，但这就意味着，催促中国改变的外在压力减少了，而中国需要允许来自社会内部的压力来推进自身的继续改革。中国能否笑到最后，将决定它是不是真正的赢家。
在谈到国内经济时，他形容中国劳动力和资金供给充裕，基本面没有变化，消费和投资需求持续增长的潜力还很大。
当时，国内主流媒体尚未积极解读温总理的这场演讲的含义。但到最近这一两天，中国的所谓合作即出手参与国际救市的信号已明朗化。
更多媒体刊载了更早前，温家宝9月24日在纽约与美国经济金融界知名人士对话的全文。其中包括温家宝的话：“中国对外传递的是稳定和合作的信号。尽管我们也存在对资金安全问题的关切，但我们对美国经济还是有信心，愿发挥自己的作用。”
官方媒体新华社在9月30日的电讯中报道上述对话，标题是《温家宝总理：已准备好参与国际救市》。
拥有世界第一，总额超过1万8000亿美元的雄厚外汇储备；又持有仅次于日本的美国债券数额，在本次世界金融危机不断深化的当儿，美国金融深陷泥泽，外界的期盼慢慢转移到中国身上。美国联储局前主席格林斯潘形容，这是“百年一遇”的金融危机，对中国而言，这可能也是一个参与世界金融体系，拥有美国金融资产，直接与华尔街金融挂钩的历史性时机。
目前，中国准备出手已没有悬念，问题是在于中国可能出手的时机与方式，以及过程中如何做明智的投资判断，并应对处理西方世界对中国的战略性的疑虑。显然下周四的中共十七届三中全会，将是讨论这一议题的时机。
上个月中，香港凤凰卫视的财经评论员认为，中国可以考虑与新加坡淡马锡控股合作。
在微观的领域里，中国也在积极观察国际局势，以求在未来的全球金融监管秩序中，占据更有利位置。在上周末的达沃斯年会里，美国花旗银行总裁罗兹证实，中国银监会和央行以及美联储正紧密合作，可能会采取一些措施。银监会主席刘明康也透露，中国将充分利用这次机会来提升银监会的信息体系，银行业也正准备吸纳最近在华尔街失业的国际人才，请他们担任独立董事或者是高管层成员。
换句话说，一些原本在华尔街工作的金融人员，风暴后可能发现自己正前往中国觅职。
无论如何，金融危机可能催生的国际金融秩序重组，乃至政治格局的变化正引起注意。西方的学者与媒体已表示警惕，哈佛大学历史教授弗格森最近在《华盛顿邮报》撰文说，这场危机削减了美国称霸全球论调的可信性，中国经济将提早超越美国。
国际投行高盛证券2006年曾预计，中国将在2040年超越美国。到了今年4月，这个年份提前到2027年。弗格森认为这个日子可能更早来到。
中国在迎接改革开放30周年纪念的时间点上，突然面对这场金融海啸的危机与机遇，看似奇异的巧合。不过，不能忽视的是中国经济与社会基础也还不牢固，国内存在贫富差距，收入分配不合理，内需不振，出口疲软，楼市股市低迷，食品安全危机，以及因食品安全丑闻引发的政府信用危机，环境恶化等一系列亟待处理的问题。全球危机的一个间接效应，是在西方国家自顾不暇时，他们难免减少对中国民主与人权做文章，但这就意味着，催促中国改变的外在压力减少了，而中国需要允许来自社会内部的压力来推进自身的继续改革。中国能否笑到最后，将决定它是不是真正的赢家。
新興市場的風險
一直有留意本部落格的讀者應該不難察覺筆者近月來開始對亞洲市場的看法變得十分審慎，可以借機再道出固中原因:
1) 2006年至2007年，遊資太多以及弱美元令全球資金炒賣各新興市場的房地產、股市，並有不少熱錢投資於區內的基建、生產線、地產發展等商業投資項目。
2) 弱美元，再加上經濟前景不俗令不少亞洲企業借入大量美元債
3) 在新興市場的需求強勁，再加上全球資金炒賣的推波助瀾下，各商品價格暴升至經濟不能維持的水平，亦即大泡沫
4) 過度投資亦導致生產量開始過剩的情況，其後的需求放緩是十分可怕的情況
5) 去到2007年末，2008年初，房地產和股票的價格達到過熱的水平，其中以中印兩地的泡沬更是大得可怕。
正所謂物極必反，不管源頭是美國經濟放緩、歐洲經濟放緩、全球金融危機、商品價格所導致的通漲問題、或是有人獲利回吐也好，最後都是導致最麻煩的情況 --- 熱錢流走(沒錯，全球最有錢的還是歐美的投資者和企業)
接著的反高潮是不能避免(問題是震盪有多少)，資產價格大瀉、貸款放緩、需求放緩、企業盈利率下跌、亞洲貨幣貶值、以亞洲貨幣計的債務大增、失業率上升(低增值製造業職位的穩定性不高)、銀行壞帳大增.......
上述負面趨勢當然有停止的一天，不過還是要等待美國經濟復蘇所推動的亞洲出口增長，另外又要等待亞洲資產價格大幅調整、利息見底、銀行壞帳以及失業率見頂吧!
沒錯，內需以及政府持有的財富是能夠減低上述的震盪，但仍無法阻止大形勢的發生。De-Coupling還是說笑好吧，全球經濟一脈相連(萬物相依而生)，除非自己完全不出口，不進口。
這就是經濟的現實!
1) 2006年至2007年，遊資太多以及弱美元令全球資金炒賣各新興市場的房地產、股市，並有不少熱錢投資於區內的基建、生產線、地產發展等商業投資項目。
2) 弱美元，再加上經濟前景不俗令不少亞洲企業借入大量美元債
3) 在新興市場的需求強勁，再加上全球資金炒賣的推波助瀾下，各商品價格暴升至經濟不能維持的水平，亦即大泡沫
4) 過度投資亦導致生產量開始過剩的情況，其後的需求放緩是十分可怕的情況
5) 去到2007年末，2008年初，房地產和股票的價格達到過熱的水平，其中以中印兩地的泡沬更是大得可怕。
正所謂物極必反，不管源頭是美國經濟放緩、歐洲經濟放緩、全球金融危機、商品價格所導致的通漲問題、或是有人獲利回吐也好，最後都是導致最麻煩的情況 --- 熱錢流走(沒錯，全球最有錢的還是歐美的投資者和企業)
接著的反高潮是不能避免(問題是震盪有多少)，資產價格大瀉、貸款放緩、需求放緩、企業盈利率下跌、亞洲貨幣貶值、以亞洲貨幣計的債務大增、失業率上升(低增值製造業職位的穩定性不高)、銀行壞帳大增.......
上述負面趨勢當然有停止的一天，不過還是要等待美國經濟復蘇所推動的亞洲出口增長，另外又要等待亞洲資產價格大幅調整、利息見底、銀行壞帳以及失業率見頂吧!
沒錯，內需以及政府持有的財富是能夠減低上述的震盪，但仍無法阻止大形勢的發生。De-Coupling還是說笑好吧，全球經濟一脈相連(萬物相依而生)，除非自己完全不出口，不進口。
這就是經濟的現實!
Roubini: 'Much More Radical' Action Needed as Bailout Fails to Lift Confidence
The House passed the bailout bill Friday with much pomp, circumstance and by a wide margin. President Bush quickly signed it into law.
So how did the market react? If you have to ask, you probably can't afford it anymore.
Wells Fargo's bid for Wachovia and hopes the dismal September jobs number would spur the Fed to cut rates helped push the Dow as high as 10,796 ahead of the House's midday vote. But the index tumbled after the affirmative vote, closing down 1.5% to 10,325. Following a similar pattern, the S&P shed 1.4% and the Nasdaq lost 1.5%.
For the week, the worst for stocks since September 2001, the Dow lost 7.3%, the S&P shed 9.4% and the Nasdaq shed 10.8%.
One explanation for the market's reaction: The bailout won't work as structured and now the government is going to throw (another) $850 billion down the rat hole ($700B bailout + $150B in tax breaks and pork).
More alarming than the stock market's decline, credit spreads widened further with LIBOR - a key measure of bank-to-bank lending - hitting an all-time high Friday, Bloomberg reports.
"Unfortunately, we are one accident away from a systemic financial meltdown," says NYU economics professor Nouriel Roubini of RGE Monitor, whose predictions about this credit cycle have been scary - and frighteningly accurate. "It is a situation of generalized panic."
In a conference call Thursday evening, Roubini noted government interventions this year have been getting increasingly bigger - starting with the $29 billion for Bear Stearns-JPMorgan in March to $700 billion today - with increasingly diminished returns, as detailed here.
So what, if anything, can the government do at this point to restore investor confidence, which was the underlying point of this exercise?
Forget rate cuts, or even a bank holiday, as some are chattering about. Roubini says the government needs to take "much more radical" action:
Provide blanket FDIC insurance on all deposits, without limitations. This will stress the Fed's balance sheet but will stop a "silent run on the banking system" that's occurring because large institutions don't want exposure to any banks above the (new) $250,000 insurance cap, Roubini says. "[They] don't know who's next to go belly up and want to pull out."
Do "triage" on the banking system to separate those banks that are merely "distressed but solvent" and can survive with liquidity injections vs. those that should be shut down.
At this point it's pretty foolish to rule anything out, including the possibility of a crash. About the only thing to be optimistic about is that it's always darkest before the dawn and it's very dark right now.
So how did the market react? If you have to ask, you probably can't afford it anymore.
Wells Fargo's bid for Wachovia and hopes the dismal September jobs number would spur the Fed to cut rates helped push the Dow as high as 10,796 ahead of the House's midday vote. But the index tumbled after the affirmative vote, closing down 1.5% to 10,325. Following a similar pattern, the S&P shed 1.4% and the Nasdaq lost 1.5%.
For the week, the worst for stocks since September 2001, the Dow lost 7.3%, the S&P shed 9.4% and the Nasdaq shed 10.8%.
One explanation for the market's reaction: The bailout won't work as structured and now the government is going to throw (another) $850 billion down the rat hole ($700B bailout + $150B in tax breaks and pork).
More alarming than the stock market's decline, credit spreads widened further with LIBOR - a key measure of bank-to-bank lending - hitting an all-time high Friday, Bloomberg reports.
"Unfortunately, we are one accident away from a systemic financial meltdown," says NYU economics professor Nouriel Roubini of RGE Monitor, whose predictions about this credit cycle have been scary - and frighteningly accurate. "It is a situation of generalized panic."
In a conference call Thursday evening, Roubini noted government interventions this year have been getting increasingly bigger - starting with the $29 billion for Bear Stearns-JPMorgan in March to $700 billion today - with increasingly diminished returns, as detailed here.
So what, if anything, can the government do at this point to restore investor confidence, which was the underlying point of this exercise?
Forget rate cuts, or even a bank holiday, as some are chattering about. Roubini says the government needs to take "much more radical" action:
Provide blanket FDIC insurance on all deposits, without limitations. This will stress the Fed's balance sheet but will stop a "silent run on the banking system" that's occurring because large institutions don't want exposure to any banks above the (new) $250,000 insurance cap, Roubini says. "[They] don't know who's next to go belly up and want to pull out."
Do "triage" on the banking system to separate those banks that are merely "distressed but solvent" and can survive with liquidity injections vs. those that should be shut down.
At this point it's pretty foolish to rule anything out, including the possibility of a crash. About the only thing to be optimistic about is that it's always darkest before the dawn and it's very dark right now.
海峡时报指数(STI)
本栏于上周一(9月29日)曾预估指数仍然可能回扯以填补介于2605.09点至2622.41点及介于2655.43点至2673.21点间的缺口，过后再向下跌穿2307.79点朝2277.91点前进。可是指数却不争气，见报当天仅回扯2449.20点就迅速回落，30日终于跌穿上述的2307.79点更直下2239.75点，已经低过2006年6月的低点了。
从技术分析看来，回扯填补介于2504.35点至2544.13点间的缺口的机会依然存在，不过，若从其长期周期分析，则指数当朝1750点的支撑线前进，一旦穿下此价位，指数将挑战2001年9月的低点了。然而，这还需要一段时间呢。
从技术分析看来，回扯填补介于2504.35点至2544.13点间的缺口的机会依然存在，不过，若从其长期周期分析，则指数当朝1750点的支撑线前进，一旦穿下此价位，指数将挑战2001年9月的低点了。然而，这还需要一段时间呢。
本周股市需好消息刺激
投资者度过了历史性的一周、一个月、一个季度：拯救华尔街方案上周一被否决、周五重新通过，造成股市激烈波动。
刚过去的季度，写下各地股市历史上重大的一章。我国海峡时报指数暴跌588.63点（约20％），以下跌点数来说，这无疑是它历史上最黑暗的季度。
目前投资者最需要一些利好消息提振士气，但本周要迎接的消息看来却是乏善可陈。交易员相信，市场将关注美国发布的经济数据，期待出现“意外的惊喜”，以得到鼓舞。
回顾上周股市，投资者不等拯救方案正式通过便已打退堂鼓，海峡指数宣告连续五周受挫，连续四个月败北，最终写下它史上下跌点数最大的季度。过去两周经历7000亿美元拯救方案的酝酿和各地禁止卖空、国际信贷迅速干涸、投资银行时代结束等，海指期间共失去261.95点或超过10％，第三季创纪录下跌点数，一半在这两周造成。
信贷吃紧让市场对船厂和房地产股感到畏惧，海指因而面对巨大压力，它最终跌破2300点的支持线，上周五闭市报2297.12点，全周则跌114.34点或4.7％。
展望本周，因美国纽约股市上周五尾市挫跌，三个主要指数皆跌1.3％以上，失去一个可能稳定本地股价的因素。上周五，道琼斯指数挫跌157.47点或1.5％，标准普尔500指数败跌15.05点或1.35％，纳斯达克综合指数也失去29.33点或1.48％。
为什么的拯救方案通过了，美国华尔街的股价还继续挫跌？分析员指出，市场认为修订后的方案恐怕无法扭转局势，而且“迟”水救不了“急”火，因信贷吃紧地情况已堪称“水深火热”，并且已冲击全球；
另外，上周五本地股市败跌，因投资者既然认定方案将通过，就该“见好就收”，赶紧乘高卖出，因为经济前景实在欠佳，股价接下来难保不会被经济衰退、倒闭事件等坏消息打击。
美国上周五也发布5年半来最高的月度失业数字，使美国经济即将衰退的看法，又取得多一个佐证。
美国总统布什上周在方案立法后说：“我们已向全世界显示，美国将稳定我们的金融市场，并维持它在环球经济的领导角色。”
但法国巴黎银行在纽约的经济师安娜对路透社表示：“这（拯救方案）可能来得有点太迟了。如果它早一点敲定，就比较可能对信心的恢复有较大的作用。”
分析员认为，拯救方案是否能取得预期的效果，目前还不清楚。JP摩根资产管理公司首席市场策略师大卫凯利指出：“问题远比答案还要多。银行因此能够剔除问题贷款，但它们究竟还有多少意愿去发放新贷款？”
在本地，联昌国际研究部区域经济师宋生文上周对法新社表示：“这个方案不是什么灵丹妙药。它有如为病人输血。但病人还是病得很重。”
投资者将密切关注美国本周五将发布的劳动市场数据，以及供应管理学院的服务业报告。
投资者可能观望
宋生文说，投资者将期望该数据能提供“意外的惊喜”。但若数据让人失望，则股市将下跌。投资者本周因此将会采取观望态度。
本地方面，我国政府周五将发布第三季经济增长预估数字。据经济师预测，我国经济将进入技术性的衰退，即连续两个季度出现季对季的收缩。金管局本周五也将发布半年一次的货币政策声明。
刚过去的季度，写下各地股市历史上重大的一章。我国海峡时报指数暴跌588.63点（约20％），以下跌点数来说，这无疑是它历史上最黑暗的季度。
目前投资者最需要一些利好消息提振士气，但本周要迎接的消息看来却是乏善可陈。交易员相信，市场将关注美国发布的经济数据，期待出现“意外的惊喜”，以得到鼓舞。
回顾上周股市，投资者不等拯救方案正式通过便已打退堂鼓，海峡指数宣告连续五周受挫，连续四个月败北，最终写下它史上下跌点数最大的季度。过去两周经历7000亿美元拯救方案的酝酿和各地禁止卖空、国际信贷迅速干涸、投资银行时代结束等，海指期间共失去261.95点或超过10％，第三季创纪录下跌点数，一半在这两周造成。
信贷吃紧让市场对船厂和房地产股感到畏惧，海指因而面对巨大压力，它最终跌破2300点的支持线，上周五闭市报2297.12点，全周则跌114.34点或4.7％。
展望本周，因美国纽约股市上周五尾市挫跌，三个主要指数皆跌1.3％以上，失去一个可能稳定本地股价的因素。上周五，道琼斯指数挫跌157.47点或1.5％，标准普尔500指数败跌15.05点或1.35％，纳斯达克综合指数也失去29.33点或1.48％。
为什么的拯救方案通过了，美国华尔街的股价还继续挫跌？分析员指出，市场认为修订后的方案恐怕无法扭转局势，而且“迟”水救不了“急”火，因信贷吃紧地情况已堪称“水深火热”，并且已冲击全球；
另外，上周五本地股市败跌，因投资者既然认定方案将通过，就该“见好就收”，赶紧乘高卖出，因为经济前景实在欠佳，股价接下来难保不会被经济衰退、倒闭事件等坏消息打击。
美国上周五也发布5年半来最高的月度失业数字，使美国经济即将衰退的看法，又取得多一个佐证。
美国总统布什上周在方案立法后说：“我们已向全世界显示，美国将稳定我们的金融市场，并维持它在环球经济的领导角色。”
但法国巴黎银行在纽约的经济师安娜对路透社表示：“这（拯救方案）可能来得有点太迟了。如果它早一点敲定，就比较可能对信心的恢复有较大的作用。”
分析员认为，拯救方案是否能取得预期的效果，目前还不清楚。JP摩根资产管理公司首席市场策略师大卫凯利指出：“问题远比答案还要多。银行因此能够剔除问题贷款，但它们究竟还有多少意愿去发放新贷款？”
在本地，联昌国际研究部区域经济师宋生文上周对法新社表示：“这个方案不是什么灵丹妙药。它有如为病人输血。但病人还是病得很重。”
投资者将密切关注美国本周五将发布的劳动市场数据，以及供应管理学院的服务业报告。
投资者可能观望
宋生文说，投资者将期望该数据能提供“意外的惊喜”。但若数据让人失望，则股市将下跌。投资者本周因此将会采取观望态度。
本地方面，我国政府周五将发布第三季经济增长预估数字。据经济师预测，我国经济将进入技术性的衰退，即连续两个季度出现季对季的收缩。金管局本周五也将发布半年一次的货币政策声明。
Sunday, October 5, 2008
Soros' Reflexivity, financial markets, and economic theory
Soros' writings focus heavily on the concept of reflexivity, where the biases of individuals enter into market transactions, potentially changing the fundamentals of the economy. Soros argues that such transitions in the fundamentals of the economy are typically marked by disequilibrium rather than equilibrium, and that the conventional economic theory of the market (the 'efficient market hypothesis') does not apply in these situations. Soros has popularized the concepts of dynamic disequilibrium, static disequilibrium, and near-equilibrium conditions.
Reflexivity is based on three main ideas:
1. Reflexivity is best observed under special conditions where investor bias grows and spreads throughout the investment arena. Examples of factors that may give rise to this bias include (a) equity leveraging or (b) the trend-following habits of speculators.
2. Reflexivity appears intermittently since it is most likely to be revealed under certain conditions; i.e., the equilibrium process's character is best considered in terms of probabilities.
3. Investors' observation of and participation in the capital markets may at times influence valuations AND fundamental conditions or outcomes.
A current example of reflexivity in modern financial markets is that of the debt and equity of housing markets. Lenders began to make more money available to more people in the 1990s to buy houses. More people bought houses with this larger amount of money, thus increasing the prices of these houses. Lenders looked at their balance sheets which not only showed that they had made more loans, but that their equity backing the loans--the value of the houses, had gone up (because more money was chasing the same amount of housing, relatively). Thus they lent out more money because their balance sheets looked good, and prices went up more, and they lent more, etc. Prices increased rapidly, and lending standards were relaxed. The salient issue regarding reflexivity is that it explains why markets gyrate over time, and do not just stick to equilibrium--they tend to overshoot or undershoot.
View of potential problems in the free market system
Despite working as an investor and currency speculator, he argues that the current system of financial speculation undermines healthy economic development in many underdeveloped countries. Soros blames many of the world's problems on the failures inherent in what he characterizes as market fundamentalism. His opposition to many aspects of globalization has made him a controversial figure.
Victor Niederhoffer said of Soros: "Most of all, George believed even then in a mixed economy, one with a strong central international government to correct for the excesses of self-interest."
Soros claims to draw a distinction between being a participant in the market and working to change the rules that market participants must follow.
Reflexivity is based on three main ideas:
1. Reflexivity is best observed under special conditions where investor bias grows and spreads throughout the investment arena. Examples of factors that may give rise to this bias include (a) equity leveraging or (b) the trend-following habits of speculators.
2. Reflexivity appears intermittently since it is most likely to be revealed under certain conditions; i.e., the equilibrium process's character is best considered in terms of probabilities.
3. Investors' observation of and participation in the capital markets may at times influence valuations AND fundamental conditions or outcomes.
A current example of reflexivity in modern financial markets is that of the debt and equity of housing markets. Lenders began to make more money available to more people in the 1990s to buy houses. More people bought houses with this larger amount of money, thus increasing the prices of these houses. Lenders looked at their balance sheets which not only showed that they had made more loans, but that their equity backing the loans--the value of the houses, had gone up (because more money was chasing the same amount of housing, relatively). Thus they lent out more money because their balance sheets looked good, and prices went up more, and they lent more, etc. Prices increased rapidly, and lending standards were relaxed. The salient issue regarding reflexivity is that it explains why markets gyrate over time, and do not just stick to equilibrium--they tend to overshoot or undershoot.
View of potential problems in the free market system
Despite working as an investor and currency speculator, he argues that the current system of financial speculation undermines healthy economic development in many underdeveloped countries. Soros blames many of the world's problems on the failures inherent in what he characterizes as market fundamentalism. His opposition to many aspects of globalization has made him a controversial figure.
Victor Niederhoffer said of Soros: "Most of all, George believed even then in a mixed economy, one with a strong central international government to correct for the excesses of self-interest."
Soros claims to draw a distinction between being a participant in the market and working to change the rules that market participants must follow.
索氏投资理论的诞生
索罗斯开始从哲学的角度思考金融市场的运作。思考的越多、越深入，索罗斯越感到自已被以往的经济学理论所愚弄。
传统的经济学家认为市场是具有理性的，其运作有其内在的逻辑性。由于投资者对上市公司的情况能够作充分的了解，所以每一只股票的价格都可以通过一系列理性的计算得到精确的确定。当投资者入市操作时，可以根据这种认知理智地挑选出最佳品种的股票进行投资。而股票的价格将与公司未来的收入预期保持理性的相关关系，这就是有效市场假设，它假设了一个完美无瑕的、基于理性的市场，也假设了所有的股票价格都能反映当前可掌握的信息。另外，一些传统的经济学家还认为，金融市场总是“正确”的。市场价格总能正确地折射或反映未来的发展趋势，即使这种趋势仍不明朗。
索罗斯经过对华尔街的考察，发现以往的那些经济理论是多么的不切实际。他认为金融市场是动荡的、混乱的，市场中买人卖出决策并不是建立在理想的假设基础之上，而是基于投资者的预期，数学公式是不能控制金融市场的。而人们对任何事物能实际获得的认知都并不是非常完美的，投资者对某一股票的偏见，不论其肯定或否定，都将导致股票价格的上升或下跌，因此市场价格也并非总是正确的、总能反映市场未来的发展趋势的，它常常因投资者以俯赅全的推测而忽略某些未来因素可能产生的影响。实际上，并非目前的预测与未来的事件吻合，而是目前的预测造就了未来的事件。所以，投资者在获得相关信息之后做出的反应并不能决定股票价格。其决定因素与其说是投资者根据客观数据作出的预期，还不如说是根据他们自己心理感觉作出的预期。投资者付出的价格已不仅仅是股票自身价值的被动反映，还成为决定股票价值的积极因素。同时，索罗斯还认为，由于市场的运作是从事实到观念，再从观念到事实，一旦投资者的观念与事实之间的差距太大，无法得到自我纠正，市场就会处于剧烈的波动和不稳定的状态，这时市场就易出现“盛——衰"序列。投资者的赢利之道就在于推断出即将发生的预料之外的情况，判断盛衰过程的出现，逆潮流而动。但同时，索罗斯也提出，投资者的偏见会导致市场跟风行为，而不均衡的跟风行为会因过度投机而最终导致市场崩溃。
索罗斯在形成自己独特的投资理论后，毫不犹豫地摒弃了传统的投资理论，决定在风云变换的金融市场上用实践去检验他的投资理论。
1981年1月，里根就任总统。索罗斯通过对里根新政策的分析，确信美国经济将会开始一个新的"盛——衰"序列，索罗斯开始果断投资。正如索罗斯所预测的，美国经济在里根的新政策刺激下，开始走向繁荣。"盛——衰"序列的繁荣期已经初现，1982年夏天，贷款利率下降，股票不断上涨，这使得索罗斯的量子基金获得了巨额回报。到1982年年底，量子基金上涨了56．9％，净资产从1．933亿美元猛增至3．028亿美元。索罗斯渐渐从1981年的阴影中走出来。
随着美国经济的发展，美元表现得越来越坚挺，美国的贸易逆差以惊人的速度上升，预算赤字也在逐年增加，索罗斯确信美国正在走向萧条，一场经济风暴将会危及美国经济。他决定在这场即将到来的风暴中大大地搏击一场。他密切关注着政府及其市场的动向。
随着石油输出国组织的解体，原油价格开始下跌，这给美元带来巨大的贬值压力。同时石油输出国组织的解体，美国通货膨胀开始下降，相应地利率也将下降，这也将促使美元的贬值。索罗斯预测美国政府将采取措施支持美元贬值。同时，他还预测德国马克和日元即将升值，他决定做一次大手笔。
从1985年9月开始，索罗斯开始做多马克和日元。他先期持有的马克和日元的多头头寸达7亿美元，已超过了量子基金的全部价值。由于他坚信他的投资决策是正确的，在先期遭受了一些损失的情况下，他又大胆增加了差不多8亿美元的多头头寸。
索罗斯一直增加投入，是因为他认为浮动汇率的短期变化只发生在转折点上，一旦趋势形成，它就消失了。他要趁其他投机者还没有意识到这一转折点之时，利用美元的下跌赚更多的钱。当然，索罗斯增加投人的前提是他深信逆转已不复存在，因为一旦趋势逆转，哪怕是暂时的，他也将拥抱灾难。
到了1985年9月22日，事情逐渐朝索罗斯预测的方向发展。美国新任财长詹姆土·贝克和法国、西德、日本、英国的四位财政部部长在纽约的普拉扎宾馆开会，商讨美元贬值问题。会后五国财长签订了《普拉扎协议》。该协议准出通过"更紧密地合作"来"有序地对非美元货币进行估价"。这意味着中央银行必须低估美元价值，迫使美元贬值。
《普拉扎协议》公布后的第一天，美元被宣布从239B元降到222．5日元，即下降了4．3％，这一天的美元贬值使索罗斯一夜之间赚了4000万美元。接下来的几个星期，美元继续贬值。10月底，美元已跌落13％，且美元兑换205日元。到了1986年9月，美元更是跌至1美元兑换153日元。索罗斯在这场大手笔的金融行动中前后总计赚了大约1．5亿美元。这使得量子基金在华尔街名声大噪。
传统的经济学家认为市场是具有理性的，其运作有其内在的逻辑性。由于投资者对上市公司的情况能够作充分的了解，所以每一只股票的价格都可以通过一系列理性的计算得到精确的确定。当投资者入市操作时，可以根据这种认知理智地挑选出最佳品种的股票进行投资。而股票的价格将与公司未来的收入预期保持理性的相关关系，这就是有效市场假设，它假设了一个完美无瑕的、基于理性的市场，也假设了所有的股票价格都能反映当前可掌握的信息。另外，一些传统的经济学家还认为，金融市场总是“正确”的。市场价格总能正确地折射或反映未来的发展趋势，即使这种趋势仍不明朗。
索罗斯经过对华尔街的考察，发现以往的那些经济理论是多么的不切实际。他认为金融市场是动荡的、混乱的，市场中买人卖出决策并不是建立在理想的假设基础之上，而是基于投资者的预期，数学公式是不能控制金融市场的。而人们对任何事物能实际获得的认知都并不是非常完美的，投资者对某一股票的偏见，不论其肯定或否定，都将导致股票价格的上升或下跌，因此市场价格也并非总是正确的、总能反映市场未来的发展趋势的，它常常因投资者以俯赅全的推测而忽略某些未来因素可能产生的影响。实际上，并非目前的预测与未来的事件吻合，而是目前的预测造就了未来的事件。所以，投资者在获得相关信息之后做出的反应并不能决定股票价格。其决定因素与其说是投资者根据客观数据作出的预期，还不如说是根据他们自己心理感觉作出的预期。投资者付出的价格已不仅仅是股票自身价值的被动反映，还成为决定股票价值的积极因素。同时，索罗斯还认为，由于市场的运作是从事实到观念，再从观念到事实，一旦投资者的观念与事实之间的差距太大，无法得到自我纠正，市场就会处于剧烈的波动和不稳定的状态，这时市场就易出现“盛——衰"序列。投资者的赢利之道就在于推断出即将发生的预料之外的情况，判断盛衰过程的出现，逆潮流而动。但同时，索罗斯也提出，投资者的偏见会导致市场跟风行为，而不均衡的跟风行为会因过度投机而最终导致市场崩溃。
索罗斯在形成自己独特的投资理论后，毫不犹豫地摒弃了传统的投资理论，决定在风云变换的金融市场上用实践去检验他的投资理论。
1981年1月，里根就任总统。索罗斯通过对里根新政策的分析，确信美国经济将会开始一个新的"盛——衰"序列，索罗斯开始果断投资。正如索罗斯所预测的，美国经济在里根的新政策刺激下，开始走向繁荣。"盛——衰"序列的繁荣期已经初现，1982年夏天，贷款利率下降，股票不断上涨，这使得索罗斯的量子基金获得了巨额回报。到1982年年底，量子基金上涨了56．9％，净资产从1．933亿美元猛增至3．028亿美元。索罗斯渐渐从1981年的阴影中走出来。
随着美国经济的发展，美元表现得越来越坚挺，美国的贸易逆差以惊人的速度上升，预算赤字也在逐年增加，索罗斯确信美国正在走向萧条，一场经济风暴将会危及美国经济。他决定在这场即将到来的风暴中大大地搏击一场。他密切关注着政府及其市场的动向。
随着石油输出国组织的解体，原油价格开始下跌，这给美元带来巨大的贬值压力。同时石油输出国组织的解体，美国通货膨胀开始下降，相应地利率也将下降，这也将促使美元的贬值。索罗斯预测美国政府将采取措施支持美元贬值。同时，他还预测德国马克和日元即将升值，他决定做一次大手笔。
从1985年9月开始，索罗斯开始做多马克和日元。他先期持有的马克和日元的多头头寸达7亿美元，已超过了量子基金的全部价值。由于他坚信他的投资决策是正确的，在先期遭受了一些损失的情况下，他又大胆增加了差不多8亿美元的多头头寸。
索罗斯一直增加投入，是因为他认为浮动汇率的短期变化只发生在转折点上，一旦趋势形成，它就消失了。他要趁其他投机者还没有意识到这一转折点之时，利用美元的下跌赚更多的钱。当然，索罗斯增加投人的前提是他深信逆转已不复存在，因为一旦趋势逆转，哪怕是暂时的，他也将拥抱灾难。
到了1985年9月22日，事情逐渐朝索罗斯预测的方向发展。美国新任财长詹姆土·贝克和法国、西德、日本、英国的四位财政部部长在纽约的普拉扎宾馆开会，商讨美元贬值问题。会后五国财长签订了《普拉扎协议》。该协议准出通过"更紧密地合作"来"有序地对非美元货币进行估价"。这意味着中央银行必须低估美元价值，迫使美元贬值。
《普拉扎协议》公布后的第一天，美元被宣布从239B元降到222．5日元，即下降了4．3％，这一天的美元贬值使索罗斯一夜之间赚了4000万美元。接下来的几个星期，美元继续贬值。10月底，美元已跌落13％，且美元兑换205日元。到了1986年9月，美元更是跌至1美元兑换153日元。索罗斯在这场大手笔的金融行动中前后总计赚了大约1．5亿美元。这使得量子基金在华尔街名声大噪。
美国能屈尊接受外来援助吗？
各界热议美国金融危机解决之道，悲观情绪弥漫。
美国彼得森国际经济研究所日前举办研讨会，讨论“万亿美元俱乐部”国家对世界经济的影响。“万亿美元俱乐部”指GDP超过1万亿美元的新兴国家。彼得森国际经济研究所所长弗雷德·伯格斯腾在会上表示，中国无疑是“万亿美元俱乐部”中单个影响力最大、最重要的国家，中国经济增长占全球经济增长的比重高达 25%；中国的初级产品制造量是西方国家的3-5倍，这对世界经济结构将产生巨大影响。
近日，银行家称当前的金融危机是大萧条以来最严重的一次，美国将进入缓慢增长期。
“公平地讲，我们正处在自大萧条以来最严重的金融危机中。”花旗集团高级副总裁威廉·罗兹（William Rhodes）说。去年年初，他曾成功地预测到次贷危机的到来。在次贷危机影响开始前，他提出必须采取紧急措施来恢复对金融市场的信心。他说，“我们现在开始感受到危机对实体经济的影响。”他预测，未来几个季度，美国经济增长可能放缓。
摩根士丹利亚洲董事长史蒂芬·罗奇（Stephen Roach）呼吁用“有力和有效的”行动使经济形势得到控制。他说，近几年持续的房地产和信贷泡沫表明，美国住房市场的疲软很可能会蔓延到个人消费领域。
《财经》杂志特约经济学家谢国忠认为，7000亿美元援救计划只能短期提振市场信心，无法扭转美国经济颓势；他认为，排斥来自非西方国家的投资，才是美国解决当前问题的主要障碍。
他讽刺说，作为世界上最大的债务国，美国表现得却像最大的债权国。
有的学者和政府官员们对保尔森和伯南克处理危机的方式赞不绝口。谢国忠并不同意。他认为，二人都没有找到这场危机的根源。这场危机标志着“格林斯潘债务王国”的倒塌。华尔街贵族们通过将债务反复打包——它们被称作衍生品，每年获得数十亿美元收入。但是，政府不可能维持住这个大泡沫。
谢国忠认为，危机过后，金融体系必会改弦更张。政府应该查封所有破产的金融机构，清理股东和债权人，迅速降低杠杆率，吸引国外投资，以重建规模更小但生机盎然的金融体系。事实却相反，美国政府还在指望制造泡沫的人来解决问题。
他指出，即便B计划为不良资产的损失埋了单，美国经济的杠杆率仍然很高。重组美国经济需要大笔资金。美国人即使勒紧皮带，提高储蓄，这个过程也会很漫长，难以平稳市场情绪。美国所需资金的一半，需要借助外国资本。因此，必须让美国的债权人——大多是外国央行，成为美国几大金融机构的主要所有者。
谢国忠强调，问题的关键是，美国要改变对待外国投资的政策。美国人不太适应亚洲国家以及石油出口国成为其公司的所有者，但是，它别无选择。在对待国外投资者方面，美国应该向英国学习。
谢国忠说，虽然上述建议对全世界而言会是共赢的，但是，被采纳的可能性很低。美国的自我评价仍然不太现实。美国需要更多的磨砺，来改变他们的认识。
他表示，B计划将最终导致美元体系崩溃，美国出现恶性通货膨胀。全世界都应该极力防止出现这样悲惨的结局。中国、日本、科威特、沙特阿拉伯、阿联酋等有巨额外汇储备的国家，应该同美国政府坐下来一起商讨，找出美国资产重组的方案。这些国家应该将它们的美元债权，交换成股权类资产。
美国彼得森国际经济研究所日前举办研讨会，讨论“万亿美元俱乐部”国家对世界经济的影响。“万亿美元俱乐部”指GDP超过1万亿美元的新兴国家。彼得森国际经济研究所所长弗雷德·伯格斯腾在会上表示，中国无疑是“万亿美元俱乐部”中单个影响力最大、最重要的国家，中国经济增长占全球经济增长的比重高达 25%；中国的初级产品制造量是西方国家的3-5倍，这对世界经济结构将产生巨大影响。
近日，银行家称当前的金融危机是大萧条以来最严重的一次，美国将进入缓慢增长期。
“公平地讲，我们正处在自大萧条以来最严重的金融危机中。”花旗集团高级副总裁威廉·罗兹（William Rhodes）说。去年年初，他曾成功地预测到次贷危机的到来。在次贷危机影响开始前，他提出必须采取紧急措施来恢复对金融市场的信心。他说，“我们现在开始感受到危机对实体经济的影响。”他预测，未来几个季度，美国经济增长可能放缓。
摩根士丹利亚洲董事长史蒂芬·罗奇（Stephen Roach）呼吁用“有力和有效的”行动使经济形势得到控制。他说，近几年持续的房地产和信贷泡沫表明，美国住房市场的疲软很可能会蔓延到个人消费领域。
《财经》杂志特约经济学家谢国忠认为，7000亿美元援救计划只能短期提振市场信心，无法扭转美国经济颓势；他认为，排斥来自非西方国家的投资，才是美国解决当前问题的主要障碍。
他讽刺说，作为世界上最大的债务国，美国表现得却像最大的债权国。
有的学者和政府官员们对保尔森和伯南克处理危机的方式赞不绝口。谢国忠并不同意。他认为，二人都没有找到这场危机的根源。这场危机标志着“格林斯潘债务王国”的倒塌。华尔街贵族们通过将债务反复打包——它们被称作衍生品，每年获得数十亿美元收入。但是，政府不可能维持住这个大泡沫。
谢国忠认为，危机过后，金融体系必会改弦更张。政府应该查封所有破产的金融机构，清理股东和债权人，迅速降低杠杆率，吸引国外投资，以重建规模更小但生机盎然的金融体系。事实却相反，美国政府还在指望制造泡沫的人来解决问题。
他指出，即便B计划为不良资产的损失埋了单，美国经济的杠杆率仍然很高。重组美国经济需要大笔资金。美国人即使勒紧皮带，提高储蓄，这个过程也会很漫长，难以平稳市场情绪。美国所需资金的一半，需要借助外国资本。因此，必须让美国的债权人——大多是外国央行，成为美国几大金融机构的主要所有者。
谢国忠强调，问题的关键是，美国要改变对待外国投资的政策。美国人不太适应亚洲国家以及石油出口国成为其公司的所有者，但是，它别无选择。在对待国外投资者方面，美国应该向英国学习。
谢国忠说，虽然上述建议对全世界而言会是共赢的，但是，被采纳的可能性很低。美国的自我评价仍然不太现实。美国需要更多的磨砺，来改变他们的认识。
他表示，B计划将最终导致美元体系崩溃，美国出现恶性通货膨胀。全世界都应该极力防止出现这样悲惨的结局。中国、日本、科威特、沙特阿拉伯、阿联酋等有巨额外汇储备的国家，应该同美国政府坐下来一起商讨，找出美国资产重组的方案。这些国家应该将它们的美元债权，交换成股权类资产。
格林斯潘接受美国全国广播公司采访
美国联邦储备委员会前主席艾伦·格林斯潘14日说，美国正陷于“百年一遇”的金融危机中；这场危机引发经济衰退的可能性正在增大。
格林斯潘在接受美国全国广播公司采访时说，这是他职业生涯中所见最严重的一次金融危机，可能仍将持续相当长时间，并继续影响美国房地产价格。
格林斯潘认为，这场危机将持续成为一股“腐蚀性”力量，直至美国房地产价格稳定下来；危机还将诱发全球一系列经济动荡。
当被问及美国躲过经济衰退的几率能否超过5成时，格林斯潘回答说，他认为这一几率小于50%。
“我不相信，一场百年一遇的金融危机不对实体经济造成重创，我认为这正在发生，”他说。
格林斯潘还预测，将有更多大型金融机构在这场危机中倒下。
格林斯潘在接受美国全国广播公司采访时说，这是他职业生涯中所见最严重的一次金融危机，可能仍将持续相当长时间，并继续影响美国房地产价格。
格林斯潘认为，这场危机将持续成为一股“腐蚀性”力量，直至美国房地产价格稳定下来；危机还将诱发全球一系列经济动荡。
当被问及美国躲过经济衰退的几率能否超过5成时，格林斯潘回答说，他认为这一几率小于50%。
“我不相信，一场百年一遇的金融危机不对实体经济造成重创，我认为这正在发生，”他说。
格林斯潘还预测，将有更多大型金融机构在这场危机中倒下。
The Theory of Reflexivity by George Soros
When Rudi Dornbusch invited me to speak at this conference, he gave me a totally free hand in deciding what I wanted to talk about. Well, I want to discuss a subject which fascinates me but doesn’t seem to interest others very much. That is my theory of reflexivity which has guided me both in making money and in giving money away, but has received very little serious consideration from anybody else. It is really a very curious situation. I am taken very seriously; indeed, a bit too seriously. But the theory that I take seriously and, in fact, rely on in my decision-making process is pretty completely ignored. I have written a book about it which was first published in 1987 under the title The Alchemy of Finance; but it received practically no critical examination. It has been out of print for the last several years but demand has been building up as a result of my increased visibility, not to say notoriety, and now the book is being re-issued. I think this is a good time to get the theory seriously considered.
I was invited to testify before Congress last week and this is how I started my testimony. I quote: “I must state at the outset that I am in fundamental disagreement with the prevailing wisdom. The generally accepted theory is that financial markets tend towards equilibrium, and on the whole, discount the future correctly. I operate using a different theory, according to which financial markets cannot possibly discount the future correctly because they do not merely discount the future; they help to shape it. In certain circumstances, financial markets can affect the so-called fundamentals which they are supposed to reflect. When that happens, markets enter into a state of dynamic disequilibrium and behave quite differently from what would be considered normal by the theory of efficient markets. Such boom/bust sequences do not arise very often, but when they do, they can be very disruptive, exactly because they affect the fundamentals of the economy.” I did not have time to expound my theory before Congress, so I am taking advantage of my captive audience to do so now. My apologies for inflicting a very theoretical discussion on you.
The theory holds, in the most general terms, that the way philosophy and natural science have taught us to look at the world is basically inappropriate when we are considering events which have thinking participants. Both philosophy and natural science have gone to great lengths to separate events from the observations which relate to them. Events are facts and observations are true or false, depending on whether or not they correspond to the facts.
This way of looking at things can be very productive. The achievements of natural science are truly awesome, and the separation between fact and statement provides a very reliable criterion of truth. So I am in no way critical of this approach. The separation between fact and statement was probably a greater advance in the field of thinking than the invention of the wheel in the field of transportation.
But exactly because the approach has been so successful, it has been carried too far. Applied to events which have thinking participants, it provides a distorted picture of reality. The key feature of these events is that the participants’ thinking affects the situation to which it refers. Facts and thoughts cannot be separated in the same way as they are in natural science or, more exactly, by separating them we introduce a distortion which is not present in natural science, because in natural science thoughts and statements are outside the subject matter, whereas in the social sciences they constitute part of the subject matter. If the study of events is confined to the study of facts, an important element, namely, the participants’ thinking, is left out of account. Strange as it may seem, that is exactly what has happened, particularly in economics, which is the most scientific of the social sciences.
Classical economics was modeled on Newtonian physics. It sought to establish the equilibrium position and it used differential equations to do so. To make this intellectual feat possible, economic theory assumed perfect knowledge on the part of the participants. Perfect knowledge meant that the participants’ thinking corresponded to the facts and therefore it could be ignored. Unfortunately, reality never quite conformed to the theory. Up to a point, the discrepancies could be dismissed by saying that the equilibrium situation represented the final outcome and the divergence from equilibrium represented temporary noise. But, eventually, the assumption of perfect knowledge became untenable and it was replaced by a methodological device which was invented by my professor at the London School of Economics, Lionel Robbins, who asserted that the task of economics is to study the relationship between supply and demand; therefore it must take supply and demand as given. This methodological device has managed to protect equilibrium theory from the onslaught of reality down to the present day.
I don't know too much about the prevailing theory about financial markets but, from what little I know, it continues to maintain the approach established by classical economics. This means that financial markets are envisaged as playing an essentially passive role; they discount the future and they do so with remarkable accuracy. There is some kind of magic involved and that is, of course, the magic of the marketplace where all the participants, taken together, are endowed with an intelligence far superior to that which could be attained by any particular individual. I think this interpretation of the way financial markets operate is severely distorted. That is why I have not bothered to familiarize myself with efficient market theory and modern portfolio theory, and that is why I take such a jaundiced view of derivative instruments which are based on what I consider a fundamentally flawed principle. Another reason is that I am rather poor in mathematics.
It may seem strange that a patently false theory should gain such widespread acceptance, except for one consideration; that is, that all our theories about social events are distorted in some way or another. And that is the starting point of my theory, the theory of reflexivity, which holds that our thinking is inherently biased. Thinking participants cannot act on the basis of knowledge. Knowledge presupposes facts which occur independently of the statements which refer to them; but being a participant implies that one’s decisions influence the outcome. Therefore, the situation participants have to deal with does not consist of facts independently given but facts which will be shaped by the decision of the participants. There is an active relationship between thinking and reality, as well as the passive one which is the only one recognized by natural science and, by way of a false analogy, also by economic theory.
I call the passive relationship the “cognitive function” and the active relationship the “participating function,” and the interaction between the two functions I call “reflexivity.” Reflexivity is, in effect, a two-way feedback mechanism in which reality helps shape the participants’ thinking and the participants’ thinking helps shape reality in an unending process in which thinking and reality may come to approach each other but can never become identical. Knowledge implies a correspondence between statements and facts, thoughts and reality, which is not possible in this situation. The key element is the lack of correspondence, the inherent divergence, between the participants’ views and the actual state of affairs. It is this divergence, which I have called the “participant’s bias,” which provides the clue to understanding the course of events. That, in very general terms, is the gist of my theory of reflexivity.
The theory has far-reaching implications. It draws a sharp distinction between natural science and social science, and it introduces an element of indeterminacy into social events which is missing in the events studied by natural science. It interprets social events as a never-ending historical process and not as an equilibrium situation. The process cannot be explained and predicted with the help of universally valid laws, in the manner of natural science, because of the element of indeterminacy introduced by the participants’ bias. The implications are so far-reaching that I can’t even begin to enumerate them. They range from the inherent instability of financial markets to the concept of an open society which is based on the recognition that nobody has access to the ultimate truth. The theory gives rise to a new morality as well as a new epistemology. As you probably know, I am the founder—and the funder—of the Open Society Foundation. That is why I feel justified in claiming that the theory of reflexivity has guided me both in making and in spending money.
But is it possible to come up with a valid new theory about the relationship between thinking and reality? It seems highly unlikely. The subject has been so thoroughly explored that probably everything that can be said has been said. In my defense, I did not produce the theory in a vacuum. The logical indeterminacy of self-referring statements was first discussed by Epimenides, the Cretan philosopher, who said, “Cretans always lie,” and the paradox of the liar was the basis of Bertrand Russell's theory of classes. But I am claiming more than a logical indeterminacy. Reflexivity is a two-way feedback mechanism, which is responsible for a causal indeterminacy as well as a logical one. The causal indeterminacy resembles Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, but there is a major difference: Heisenberg’s theory deals with observations, whereas reflexivity deals with the role of thinking in generating observable phenomena.
I am thrilled by the possibility that I may have reached a profound new insight, but I am also scared because such claims are usually made by insane people and there are many more insane people in the world than there are people who have reached a profound new insight. I wonder whether my insight has an objective validity or only a subjective significance.
That is why I am so eager to submit my ideas to a critical examination and that is why I find the present situation, where I am taken so seriously but my theory is not, so frustrating. As I have said before, the theory of reflexivity has received practically no serious consideration. It is treated as the self-indulgence of a man who made a lot of money in the stock market. It is generally summed up by saying that markets are influenced by psychological factors, and that is pretty trite. But that is not what the theory says. It says that, in certain cases, the participants’ bias can change the fundamentals which are supposed to determine market prices.
I ask myself, why did I fail to communicate this point? The answer I come up with is that I tried to say too much, too soon. I tried to propound a general theory of reflexivity at a time when reflexivity as a phenomenon is not even recognized. In retrospect, I think I should have started more modestly; I should have tried to prove the existence of reflexivity as a phenomenon before I tried to revise our view of the world based on that phenomenon. It can be done relatively easily, and the financial markets provide an excellent laboratory in which to do it. And that is what I should like to do here today.
What I need to do is to demonstrate that there are instances where the participants’ bias is capable of affecting not only market prices but also the so-called fundamentals that market prices are supposed to reflect. I have collected and analyzed such instances in The Alchemy of Finance, so all I need to do here is simply to enumerate them. In the case of stocks, I have analyzed two particular instances which demonstrate my case perfectly; one is the conglomerate boom and bust of the late 1960s, and the other is the boom and bust of real estate investment trusts in the early 70s. I cite may other instances, such as the leveraged buyout boom of the 1980s and the boom/bust sequences engendered by foreign investors. But these cases are less clear cut.
The common thread in the two instances I have mentioned is so-called equity leveraging; that is to say, companies can use inflated expectations to issue new stock at inflated prices, and the resulting increase in earnings per share can go a long way to validate the inflated expectations. But equity leveraging is only one of many possible mechanisms for transmitting the participants’ bias to the underlying fundamentals. Consider, for instance, the boom in international lending which occurred in the 1970s and led to the bust of 1982. In the boom, banks relied on so-called debt ratios, which they considered as objective measurements of the ability of the borrowing countries to service their debt, and it turned out that these debt ratios were themselves influenced by the lending activity of the banks.
In all these cases, the participants’ bias involved an actual fallacy: in the case of the conglomerate and mortgage trust booms, the growth in earnings per share was treated as if it were independent of equity leveraging; and in the case of the international lending boom, the debt ratio was treated as if it were independent of the lending activities of the banks. But there are other cases where no such fallacy is involved. For instance, in a freely-fluctuating currency market, a change in exchange rates has the capacity to affect the so-called fundamentals which are supposed to determine exchange rates, such as the rate of inflation in the countries concerned; so that any divergence from a theoretical equilibrium has the capacity to validate itself. This self-validating capacity encourages trend-following speculation, and trend-following speculation generates divergences from whatever may be considered the theoretical equilibrium. The circular reasoning is complete. The outcome is that freely-fluctuating currency markets tend to produce excessive fluctuations and trend-following speculation tends to be justified.
I believe that these examples are sufficient to demonstrate that reflexivity is real; it is not merely a different way of looking at events; it is a different way in which events unfold. It doesn't occur in every case but, when it does, it changes the character of the situation. Instead of a tendency towards some kind of theoretical equilibrium, the participants’ views and the actual state of affairs enter into a process of dynamic disequilibrium which may be mutually self-reinforcing at first, moving both thinking and reality in a certain direction, but is bound to become unsustainable in the long run and engender a move in the opposite direction. The net result is that neither the participants’ views nor the actual state of affairs returns to the condition from which it started. Once the phenomenon of reflexivity has been isolated and recognized, it can be seen to be at work in a wide variety of situations. I studied one such situation in The Alchemy of Finance which was particularly relevant at the time the book was written. I called it “Reagan’s Imperial Circle.” It consisted of financing a massive armaments program with money borrowed from abroad, particularly from Japan. I showed that the process was initially self-reinforcing but it was bound to become unsustainable. A similar situation has arisen recently with the reunification of Germany, which eventually led to the breakdown of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism. The ERM operated in near- equilibrium conditions for about a decade before the reunification of Germany created a dynamic disequilibrium.
What renders reflexivity significant is that it occurs only intermittently. If it were present in all situations all the time, it would merely constitute a different way of looking at events and not a different way for events to evolve. That is the point I failed to make sufficiently clear in my book. I presented my theory of reflexivity as a general theory in which the absence of reflexivity appears as a special case. I was, of course, trying to imitate Keynes, who proposed his general theory of employment in which full employment was a special case. But Keynes proposed his theory when unemployment was a well-established fact, whereas I proposed the theory of reflexivity before the phenomenon has been recognized. In doing so, I both overstated and understated my case. I overstated it by arguing that the methods and criteria of the natural sciences are totally inapplicable to the study of social phenomena. I called social science a false metaphor. That is an exaggeration because there are many normal, everyday, repetitive situations which can be explained and predicted by universally valid laws whose validity can be tested by scientific method. And even historical, reflexive processes have certain repetitive aspects which lend themselves to statistical generalizations. For instance, the trade cycle follows a certain repetitive pattern, although each instance may have some unique features and there is a lot more to be gained from understanding the unique features than the repetitive pattern.
I have also understated my case by presenting reflexivity as a different way of looking at the structure of social events rather than a different way in which events unfold when reflexivity comes into play. I made the point that, in natural science, one set of facts follows another irrespective of what anybody thinks; whereas in the events studied by social science, there is a two-way interaction between perception and facts. I also drew a distinction between humdrum, everyday events in which the element of indeterminacy introduced by the reflexive connection can be treated as mere noise, and historical events where the reflexive interaction brings about an irreversible change both in the participants' views and the actual state of affairs. All this is very profound and very significant, but the really interesting undertaking is to study the difference between humdrum and historical events and to gain a better understanding of historical processes.
I have done a lot of work in that direction since I wrote The Alchemy of Finance, not so much in the financial markets as in the historical arena. I have come to distinguish between normal conditions and far-from-equilibrium conditions. In normal conditions, there is a tendency for the participants’ views and the actual state of affairs to converge or, at least, there are mechanisms at work to prevent them from drifting too far apart. I call these conditions “normal,” because that is what our intellectual traditions—including philosophy and scientific method —have prepared us for. I contrast them with far-from- equilibrium conditions, where the participants’ views are far removed from the actual state of affairs and there is no tendency for the two of them to come together. I have always found the far-from-equilibrium conditions much more fascinating, and I have studied them both in theory and in practice.
There are two very different kinds of far-from-equilibrium conditions: one is associated with the absence of change, and the other with revolutionary change. These two opposite poles act as “strange attractors”—an expression with which has become familiar since chaos theory has come into vogue.
So we can observe three very different conditions in history: the “normal,” in which the participants’ views and the actual state of affairs tend to converge; and two far-from- equilibrium conditions, one of apparent changelessness, in which thinking and reality are very far apart and show no tendency to converge, and one of revolutionary change in which the actual situation is so novel and unexpected and changing so rapidly that the participants’ views cannot keep up with it.
Interestingly, the rise and fall of the Soviet system presents both extremes. During Stalin’s time, reality and dogma were very far apart, but both of them were very rigid and showed no tendency to come together. Indeed, the divergence increased with the passage of time. When the system finally collapsed, people could not cope with the pace of change and events spun out of control. That is what we have witnessed recently.
But the two extremes can also be observed in totally unrelated contexts. Take, for instance, the banking industry in the United States. After the breakdown of the banking system in the Great Depression, it became closely regulated and very rigid; but when the restrictions were relaxed, the industry swung to the other extreme and entered a period of revolutionary change. I can locate the transition point with great precision: it was on that evening in 1973 when the management of First National City Bank held an unprecedented meeting for securities analysts in order to promote the stock as a growth stock. The pattern in the rise and fall of the Soviet system closely parallels the pattern in the fall and rise of the American banking system.
These three conditions are perhaps better explained by using an analogy. The analogy is with water, which also can be found in nature in three conditions: as a liquid, a solid or a gas. The three historical conditions I am trying to describe are as far apart as water, ice and steam. In the case of H2O, we can define exactly the three conditions; it has to do with temperature. Can we establish a similar demarcation line among the three conditions of historical change? I believe we can, and it has to do with the values that guide people in their actions. But I am not yet ready to give a firm answer. That is the problem that I am currently working on. But I feel rather exposed in dealing with such an esoteric issue. I need to know whether what I have said so far makes any sense; that is why I have imposed on you by giving you this rather heavy theoretical lecture, and I would welcome your comments either here or on another occasion.
I was invited to testify before Congress last week and this is how I started my testimony. I quote: “I must state at the outset that I am in fundamental disagreement with the prevailing wisdom. The generally accepted theory is that financial markets tend towards equilibrium, and on the whole, discount the future correctly. I operate using a different theory, according to which financial markets cannot possibly discount the future correctly because they do not merely discount the future; they help to shape it. In certain circumstances, financial markets can affect the so-called fundamentals which they are supposed to reflect. When that happens, markets enter into a state of dynamic disequilibrium and behave quite differently from what would be considered normal by the theory of efficient markets. Such boom/bust sequences do not arise very often, but when they do, they can be very disruptive, exactly because they affect the fundamentals of the economy.” I did not have time to expound my theory before Congress, so I am taking advantage of my captive audience to do so now. My apologies for inflicting a very theoretical discussion on you.
The theory holds, in the most general terms, that the way philosophy and natural science have taught us to look at the world is basically inappropriate when we are considering events which have thinking participants. Both philosophy and natural science have gone to great lengths to separate events from the observations which relate to them. Events are facts and observations are true or false, depending on whether or not they correspond to the facts.
This way of looking at things can be very productive. The achievements of natural science are truly awesome, and the separation between fact and statement provides a very reliable criterion of truth. So I am in no way critical of this approach. The separation between fact and statement was probably a greater advance in the field of thinking than the invention of the wheel in the field of transportation.
But exactly because the approach has been so successful, it has been carried too far. Applied to events which have thinking participants, it provides a distorted picture of reality. The key feature of these events is that the participants’ thinking affects the situation to which it refers. Facts and thoughts cannot be separated in the same way as they are in natural science or, more exactly, by separating them we introduce a distortion which is not present in natural science, because in natural science thoughts and statements are outside the subject matter, whereas in the social sciences they constitute part of the subject matter. If the study of events is confined to the study of facts, an important element, namely, the participants’ thinking, is left out of account. Strange as it may seem, that is exactly what has happened, particularly in economics, which is the most scientific of the social sciences.
Classical economics was modeled on Newtonian physics. It sought to establish the equilibrium position and it used differential equations to do so. To make this intellectual feat possible, economic theory assumed perfect knowledge on the part of the participants. Perfect knowledge meant that the participants’ thinking corresponded to the facts and therefore it could be ignored. Unfortunately, reality never quite conformed to the theory. Up to a point, the discrepancies could be dismissed by saying that the equilibrium situation represented the final outcome and the divergence from equilibrium represented temporary noise. But, eventually, the assumption of perfect knowledge became untenable and it was replaced by a methodological device which was invented by my professor at the London School of Economics, Lionel Robbins, who asserted that the task of economics is to study the relationship between supply and demand; therefore it must take supply and demand as given. This methodological device has managed to protect equilibrium theory from the onslaught of reality down to the present day.
I don't know too much about the prevailing theory about financial markets but, from what little I know, it continues to maintain the approach established by classical economics. This means that financial markets are envisaged as playing an essentially passive role; they discount the future and they do so with remarkable accuracy. There is some kind of magic involved and that is, of course, the magic of the marketplace where all the participants, taken together, are endowed with an intelligence far superior to that which could be attained by any particular individual. I think this interpretation of the way financial markets operate is severely distorted. That is why I have not bothered to familiarize myself with efficient market theory and modern portfolio theory, and that is why I take such a jaundiced view of derivative instruments which are based on what I consider a fundamentally flawed principle. Another reason is that I am rather poor in mathematics.
It may seem strange that a patently false theory should gain such widespread acceptance, except for one consideration; that is, that all our theories about social events are distorted in some way or another. And that is the starting point of my theory, the theory of reflexivity, which holds that our thinking is inherently biased. Thinking participants cannot act on the basis of knowledge. Knowledge presupposes facts which occur independently of the statements which refer to them; but being a participant implies that one’s decisions influence the outcome. Therefore, the situation participants have to deal with does not consist of facts independently given but facts which will be shaped by the decision of the participants. There is an active relationship between thinking and reality, as well as the passive one which is the only one recognized by natural science and, by way of a false analogy, also by economic theory.
I call the passive relationship the “cognitive function” and the active relationship the “participating function,” and the interaction between the two functions I call “reflexivity.” Reflexivity is, in effect, a two-way feedback mechanism in which reality helps shape the participants’ thinking and the participants’ thinking helps shape reality in an unending process in which thinking and reality may come to approach each other but can never become identical. Knowledge implies a correspondence between statements and facts, thoughts and reality, which is not possible in this situation. The key element is the lack of correspondence, the inherent divergence, between the participants’ views and the actual state of affairs. It is this divergence, which I have called the “participant’s bias,” which provides the clue to understanding the course of events. That, in very general terms, is the gist of my theory of reflexivity.
The theory has far-reaching implications. It draws a sharp distinction between natural science and social science, and it introduces an element of indeterminacy into social events which is missing in the events studied by natural science. It interprets social events as a never-ending historical process and not as an equilibrium situation. The process cannot be explained and predicted with the help of universally valid laws, in the manner of natural science, because of the element of indeterminacy introduced by the participants’ bias. The implications are so far-reaching that I can’t even begin to enumerate them. They range from the inherent instability of financial markets to the concept of an open society which is based on the recognition that nobody has access to the ultimate truth. The theory gives rise to a new morality as well as a new epistemology. As you probably know, I am the founder—and the funder—of the Open Society Foundation. That is why I feel justified in claiming that the theory of reflexivity has guided me both in making and in spending money.
But is it possible to come up with a valid new theory about the relationship between thinking and reality? It seems highly unlikely. The subject has been so thoroughly explored that probably everything that can be said has been said. In my defense, I did not produce the theory in a vacuum. The logical indeterminacy of self-referring statements was first discussed by Epimenides, the Cretan philosopher, who said, “Cretans always lie,” and the paradox of the liar was the basis of Bertrand Russell's theory of classes. But I am claiming more than a logical indeterminacy. Reflexivity is a two-way feedback mechanism, which is responsible for a causal indeterminacy as well as a logical one. The causal indeterminacy resembles Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, but there is a major difference: Heisenberg’s theory deals with observations, whereas reflexivity deals with the role of thinking in generating observable phenomena.
I am thrilled by the possibility that I may have reached a profound new insight, but I am also scared because such claims are usually made by insane people and there are many more insane people in the world than there are people who have reached a profound new insight. I wonder whether my insight has an objective validity or only a subjective significance.
That is why I am so eager to submit my ideas to a critical examination and that is why I find the present situation, where I am taken so seriously but my theory is not, so frustrating. As I have said before, the theory of reflexivity has received practically no serious consideration. It is treated as the self-indulgence of a man who made a lot of money in the stock market. It is generally summed up by saying that markets are influenced by psychological factors, and that is pretty trite. But that is not what the theory says. It says that, in certain cases, the participants’ bias can change the fundamentals which are supposed to determine market prices.
I ask myself, why did I fail to communicate this point? The answer I come up with is that I tried to say too much, too soon. I tried to propound a general theory of reflexivity at a time when reflexivity as a phenomenon is not even recognized. In retrospect, I think I should have started more modestly; I should have tried to prove the existence of reflexivity as a phenomenon before I tried to revise our view of the world based on that phenomenon. It can be done relatively easily, and the financial markets provide an excellent laboratory in which to do it. And that is what I should like to do here today.
What I need to do is to demonstrate that there are instances where the participants’ bias is capable of affecting not only market prices but also the so-called fundamentals that market prices are supposed to reflect. I have collected and analyzed such instances in The Alchemy of Finance, so all I need to do here is simply to enumerate them. In the case of stocks, I have analyzed two particular instances which demonstrate my case perfectly; one is the conglomerate boom and bust of the late 1960s, and the other is the boom and bust of real estate investment trusts in the early 70s. I cite may other instances, such as the leveraged buyout boom of the 1980s and the boom/bust sequences engendered by foreign investors. But these cases are less clear cut.
The common thread in the two instances I have mentioned is so-called equity leveraging; that is to say, companies can use inflated expectations to issue new stock at inflated prices, and the resulting increase in earnings per share can go a long way to validate the inflated expectations. But equity leveraging is only one of many possible mechanisms for transmitting the participants’ bias to the underlying fundamentals. Consider, for instance, the boom in international lending which occurred in the 1970s and led to the bust of 1982. In the boom, banks relied on so-called debt ratios, which they considered as objective measurements of the ability of the borrowing countries to service their debt, and it turned out that these debt ratios were themselves influenced by the lending activity of the banks.
In all these cases, the participants’ bias involved an actual fallacy: in the case of the conglomerate and mortgage trust booms, the growth in earnings per share was treated as if it were independent of equity leveraging; and in the case of the international lending boom, the debt ratio was treated as if it were independent of the lending activities of the banks. But there are other cases where no such fallacy is involved. For instance, in a freely-fluctuating currency market, a change in exchange rates has the capacity to affect the so-called fundamentals which are supposed to determine exchange rates, such as the rate of inflation in the countries concerned; so that any divergence from a theoretical equilibrium has the capacity to validate itself. This self-validating capacity encourages trend-following speculation, and trend-following speculation generates divergences from whatever may be considered the theoretical equilibrium. The circular reasoning is complete. The outcome is that freely-fluctuating currency markets tend to produce excessive fluctuations and trend-following speculation tends to be justified.
I believe that these examples are sufficient to demonstrate that reflexivity is real; it is not merely a different way of looking at events; it is a different way in which events unfold. It doesn't occur in every case but, when it does, it changes the character of the situation. Instead of a tendency towards some kind of theoretical equilibrium, the participants’ views and the actual state of affairs enter into a process of dynamic disequilibrium which may be mutually self-reinforcing at first, moving both thinking and reality in a certain direction, but is bound to become unsustainable in the long run and engender a move in the opposite direction. The net result is that neither the participants’ views nor the actual state of affairs returns to the condition from which it started. Once the phenomenon of reflexivity has been isolated and recognized, it can be seen to be at work in a wide variety of situations. I studied one such situation in The Alchemy of Finance which was particularly relevant at the time the book was written. I called it “Reagan’s Imperial Circle.” It consisted of financing a massive armaments program with money borrowed from abroad, particularly from Japan. I showed that the process was initially self-reinforcing but it was bound to become unsustainable. A similar situation has arisen recently with the reunification of Germany, which eventually led to the breakdown of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism. The ERM operated in near- equilibrium conditions for about a decade before the reunification of Germany created a dynamic disequilibrium.
What renders reflexivity significant is that it occurs only intermittently. If it were present in all situations all the time, it would merely constitute a different way of looking at events and not a different way for events to evolve. That is the point I failed to make sufficiently clear in my book. I presented my theory of reflexivity as a general theory in which the absence of reflexivity appears as a special case. I was, of course, trying to imitate Keynes, who proposed his general theory of employment in which full employment was a special case. But Keynes proposed his theory when unemployment was a well-established fact, whereas I proposed the theory of reflexivity before the phenomenon has been recognized. In doing so, I both overstated and understated my case. I overstated it by arguing that the methods and criteria of the natural sciences are totally inapplicable to the study of social phenomena. I called social science a false metaphor. That is an exaggeration because there are many normal, everyday, repetitive situations which can be explained and predicted by universally valid laws whose validity can be tested by scientific method. And even historical, reflexive processes have certain repetitive aspects which lend themselves to statistical generalizations. For instance, the trade cycle follows a certain repetitive pattern, although each instance may have some unique features and there is a lot more to be gained from understanding the unique features than the repetitive pattern.
I have also understated my case by presenting reflexivity as a different way of looking at the structure of social events rather than a different way in which events unfold when reflexivity comes into play. I made the point that, in natural science, one set of facts follows another irrespective of what anybody thinks; whereas in the events studied by social science, there is a two-way interaction between perception and facts. I also drew a distinction between humdrum, everyday events in which the element of indeterminacy introduced by the reflexive connection can be treated as mere noise, and historical events where the reflexive interaction brings about an irreversible change both in the participants' views and the actual state of affairs. All this is very profound and very significant, but the really interesting undertaking is to study the difference between humdrum and historical events and to gain a better understanding of historical processes.
I have done a lot of work in that direction since I wrote The Alchemy of Finance, not so much in the financial markets as in the historical arena. I have come to distinguish between normal conditions and far-from-equilibrium conditions. In normal conditions, there is a tendency for the participants’ views and the actual state of affairs to converge or, at least, there are mechanisms at work to prevent them from drifting too far apart. I call these conditions “normal,” because that is what our intellectual traditions—including philosophy and scientific method —have prepared us for. I contrast them with far-from- equilibrium conditions, where the participants’ views are far removed from the actual state of affairs and there is no tendency for the two of them to come together. I have always found the far-from-equilibrium conditions much more fascinating, and I have studied them both in theory and in practice.
There are two very different kinds of far-from-equilibrium conditions: one is associated with the absence of change, and the other with revolutionary change. These two opposite poles act as “strange attractors”—an expression with which has become familiar since chaos theory has come into vogue.
So we can observe three very different conditions in history: the “normal,” in which the participants’ views and the actual state of affairs tend to converge; and two far-from- equilibrium conditions, one of apparent changelessness, in which thinking and reality are very far apart and show no tendency to converge, and one of revolutionary change in which the actual situation is so novel and unexpected and changing so rapidly that the participants’ views cannot keep up with it.
Interestingly, the rise and fall of the Soviet system presents both extremes. During Stalin’s time, reality and dogma were very far apart, but both of them were very rigid and showed no tendency to come together. Indeed, the divergence increased with the passage of time. When the system finally collapsed, people could not cope with the pace of change and events spun out of control. That is what we have witnessed recently.
But the two extremes can also be observed in totally unrelated contexts. Take, for instance, the banking industry in the United States. After the breakdown of the banking system in the Great Depression, it became closely regulated and very rigid; but when the restrictions were relaxed, the industry swung to the other extreme and entered a period of revolutionary change. I can locate the transition point with great precision: it was on that evening in 1973 when the management of First National City Bank held an unprecedented meeting for securities analysts in order to promote the stock as a growth stock. The pattern in the rise and fall of the Soviet system closely parallels the pattern in the fall and rise of the American banking system.
These three conditions are perhaps better explained by using an analogy. The analogy is with water, which also can be found in nature in three conditions: as a liquid, a solid or a gas. The three historical conditions I am trying to describe are as far apart as water, ice and steam. In the case of H2O, we can define exactly the three conditions; it has to do with temperature. Can we establish a similar demarcation line among the three conditions of historical change? I believe we can, and it has to do with the values that guide people in their actions. But I am not yet ready to give a firm answer. That is the problem that I am currently working on. But I feel rather exposed in dealing with such an esoteric issue. I need to know whether what I have said so far makes any sense; that is why I have imposed on you by giving you this rather heavy theoretical lecture, and I would welcome your comments either here or on another occasion.
巴菲特独家解秘
1、你进行投资的基本原则是什么？
第一条原则：不许失败。第二条原则：永远记住第一条。本•格雷厄姆在《聪明的投资者》这本书的最后一章中道出了投资中最重要的四个字：保证安全。我认为100年以后，这个原则还会是投资的基础。理性的态度加上适当的知识结构，你就能成为一个成功的投资者。
2、听说你对大学里关于投资的理论嗤之以鼻。
在当今的大学里流行着一些投资理论，比如有效市场理论，这些理论依赖于推理而不是基于常识。这些课程只会让学生变得更加平庸。
3、在风云变幻的股市上，你如何看待市场和投资者的关系？
格雷厄姆曾用“市场先生”这种形象的说法，来说明市场行为。在他看来，股票市场应该被看作一个情绪容易波动的商业伙伴。这个伙伴每天都会出现，告诉你一个价格，他会以这个价格买你手中的股票，或把他手中的股票卖给你。这个伙伴每天都有一个新价格。我们要做市场先生的主人，而不是做他的奴隶。当我们投资股票时，我们实际上是投资股票所 代表的企业。当我们找到了喜欢的公司时，市场高低不会对我们的决策产生影响。我们一个一个地寻找公司，很少花时间考虑宏观因素。我们只考虑那些我们熟悉的 企业，而且价格和管理状况要让我们满意。凯恩斯说，不要试图去弄清楚市场在做什么。我们需要弄清楚的是企业。由于某些原因，人们热衷于寻找价格变动中的线 索，而不是价值。在这个世界上，最愚蠢的买股行为莫过于看到股价上升就按捺不住而出手。
4、价格和价值之间的差异在哪里？
价格是你将付出的，价值是你将得到的。在决定购买股票时，内在价值是一个重要的概念。没有公式能用来计算内在价值。你必须了解你要买的股票背后的企业。给企业估价既是一门艺术，也是一门科学。你没有必要等到最低价才去买，只要低于你所认定的价值就可以了。如果能以低于价值的价格买进，而且管理层是诚实可靠有能力的，你肯定会赚钱。
5、什么时候买入股票呢？
大多数人在别人也感兴趣的时候买入，实际上最好的买入时机是别人不感兴趣的时候。买热门股不会有好成绩的。投资不需要高智商。投资不是智商160的人战胜智商130的人的游戏。理性是最重要的。
6、哪些投票是最值得买入的？
利润和未来利润的前景决定了股票的价值。我们喜欢那种资本投入能产生高收益的并且很可能持续产生高收益的股票。我们买入可口可乐公司的股票时，它的市盈率大约是23倍。用我们的买入价和现在的收益比，市盈率只有五倍了。购买高利润公司的股票实际上是对通货膨胀的对冲。高利润公司信用评级很高，但它对债务资本的需求却相对较少。那些获利能力较差的公司最需要资金，却得不到足够资金的支持。
7、你如何看待投资中的风险因素？
我很重视确定性。如果你这样做了，风险因素就对你没有意义了。以低于价值的价格买入证券不是冒险。以《华盛顿邮报》为例，它就是一种无风险投资。1973年时，《华盛顿邮报》的市值为8000万美元，而且没有任何负债。如果你问商界人士，《华 盛顿邮报》值多少钱，他们一定会说值4亿美元。即使是凌晨2点在大西洋当中进行拍卖，也会有人来买。这种投资是非常安全的，令人不可思议。决定这个投资， 也不用花费多少精力。
8、如何看待经营中的借贷行为？
借来的钱就像是公司方向盘上的一柄利剑，它直指公司的心脏，车子总会遇到深坑，这时就会要了公司的命。理想的借贷方法应该保证市场的短期变化不会影响到你。
9、你也曾经是个套利者？
是的，因为我的母亲今晚不在场，我可以向你承认我曾经是个套利者。我早期在格雷厄姆•纽曼公司学会套利。套利的基本形式是在一个市场上以低价买进，然后在另一个市场上以高价卖出。在一个公司宣布以高于市场价的价格购并另一家公司时，我就进行套利。我关注他们宣布了什么，它值多少，我们要付出多少，我们要参与多少时间。我们要算出这一方案被通过的可能性。考虑这些时，参与公司的名头是否响亮并不在考虑之列。
10、什么时候下注最合适？
当球还在投手的手中时，我从不左右移动，只有当机会来临时才会做。
11、你如何对待各种预测专家和经纪人的意见？
如果你想理发，就不要问理发师你需不需要理发。当有人想让我采纳他们的意见时，我会告诫他们：“用我的头脑加上你们的钱，做得会更好。”你必须学会独立思考。我一直很不明白高智商的人为什么会轻易模仿别人。我们从不把好的主意告诉别人。
12、你对独立投资者有何建议？
对独立投资者来说，你应当了解企业运作的过程和企业语言（会计），具有一些比智商更重要的性格和品质。它会有助于你独立思考和避免各种各样的狂热，这种狂 热无时无刻不会影响市场。了解会计原理是保证不依赖别人的手段之一。当经理们报告企业情况时，通常会提供按会计原则制成的报表。不幸的是，如果他们想欺骗 你，报告也会符合会计原则。如果你不能弄清其中的奥妙，你就不应该从事证券投资这一行。
13、你如何评价华尔街那些淘金者？
只有在华尔街，开着劳斯莱斯的人才会向走在人行道上的人打听消息。其它领域的专业人员，比如牙医，会给普通人带来很多东西。但总的来说，人们从专业理财经理那里什么也得不到。华尔街喜欢把股票市场的活动描述为复杂的对社会有益的活动。然而事实与之相反，短期交易像一只看不见的脚，狠狠地踹在社会的身上。
14、你能谈谈你的选股方法吗？
选股的原则前面已经提到，就是你必须理性地投资。如果你不熟悉，就不要做它。我只做自己完全了解的事。以下是选股方法：第一步，在你了解的企业上画个圈， 然后剔除那些价值，管理和应变能力达不到标准的企业。第二步，选定一个企业进行评估。不要随便采纳别人对企业的评估，要自己分析它。比如，你将怎样 经营它？竞争对手是谁？客户是谁？走出门去并和他们交谈，分析你 想投资的公司和其它公司相比，优势和弱点在哪里？如果你这样做了，你就可能比公司的管理层更了解这家企业。这一原则也适用于技术类股票。我相信比尔•盖茨 也会用这些原则。他对技术的了解程度和我对可口可乐和吉列的了解程度差不多。如果有人说他能估出交易所上市的所有股票的价值，他一定高估了自己的能力。但 如果你集中精力去研究某些行业，你能学会许多和估价有关的东西。最重要的不是你的能力范围有多广，而是你的能力有多强。如果你知道你的能力的界限在哪里， 你就比那些能力范围比你大五倍而不清楚界限在哪里的人强多了。
15、你为什么不进行其它投资？
既然股市这么简单，这什么还要买房地产呢？根据价值进行投资是如此地简单易懂，以至于到大学拿一个经济学博士显得是一种浪费。进行投资就是在恰当的时间买进好股票并一直持有它，只要它还是一家好公司。
16、你在投资时追求什么？
这可以从伯克希尔登在《华尔街日报》上的一则广告来加以说明。广告说：以下是我们所寻求的东西：A 购买额大。（至少具有1000万美元的税后盈余，越大越好） B 可靠的持续获利能力。（对前景和突然好转的情形我们不感兴趣）C 企业股东权益回报水平良好而且债务水平很低或为零。 D 适当的管理。（我们不提供这项服务） E 简单的企业。（如果需要太复杂的技术，我们就无法了解）F 有明确出价。（我们不想把自己和出售者的时间浪费在讨论价格未定的交易上）
17、听说你对于投资中利用高深的数学很反感？
我从没发现自己要用到代数。当然你要算出企业的价值，然后把它除以它发行在外的普通股总数，这里要用到除法。如果你准备出去买一个农场，一栋住宅或一台干洗机，你有必要带帮人帮你计算吗？你做的买卖是否合算取决于那些企业的未来获利能力与你的买价相比如何？
18、你特别看重一个公司的节俭？
每当我听说又有一个公司进行成本削减计划时，就知道这又是一个不了解什么是成本的公司了。短期突击解决不了问题。真正优秀的经理不会在某个早晨醒过来以后说：“今天我要削减成本。”对一个绩优公司的老板来说，节俭要从自身做起。
19、你是否也有过失误？
是的，我也犯过许多错误，包括位于新英格兰的一家叫伯克希尔的纺织厂。这家落后的纺织企业最终被关闭，然而公司的结构和名称却得以保存，它成了一家投资企 业。在21岁时，我把自己所有财富的20%投资在一家加油站，那是一次最糟糕的决策。这次错误的机会成本大约是11亿美元。
20、你迄今购买的理想股票是什么？
我花了很多时间去研究沃尔特•迪斯尼公司。我最喜欢的公司是这样的：美丽的城堡，周围是一条又深又险的护城河，里面住着一位诚实而高贵的首领。护城河就像 一个强大的威慑，使得敌人不敢进攻。首领不断创造财富，但不独占它。换句话说，我们喜欢那种具有市场统治地位，别人难以模仿，耐久可靠的大公司。你的企业 要有一定的保护能力，使得对手难以进入并以低价与你竞争。当我买股票时，我就认为是买下了整个公司，就像在街边买了家商店。如果买下了商店，我就要了解它 的一切。1966年上半年迪斯尼的每股价格为53美元，看起来不太便宜，但以这个价格你能以8000万美元买下整个迪斯尼公司，等于你有了白雪公主和其他 一引起卡通人物，有了迪斯尼乐园，还有沃尔特•迪斯尼这个天才当合伙人。
21、你最看重所投资公司的什么方面？
在所有的企业中，每一星期每一个月每一年都会发生各种各样的变化。但真正重要的是找对企业。这方面一个经典的例子是可口可乐公司。它在1919年上市，发 行价是40美元1股。第二年，股价跌到每股19美元。如果公司发行上市时你就买进，一年之后，你就丧失一半的财富。但如果你持有到今天，并且把所有红利再 投入，它大约值180万美元。我们经历过萧条，也经历过战争，糖价也波动不定，发生过成千上万的事。但是看好产品的前景比在股市中进进出出多赚了多少。查 理•芒格叫我关注具有巨大获利能力和成长性的大公司的特点，但获利能力和成长性必须是确定的，不能象德州仪器公司或派拉蒙公司那样是虚构出来的。我曾告诉 通用食品的总裁，为什么在没有人对通用食品感兴趣的时候， 我会购买这家公司的股票。“你有响亮的品牌，你的利润占销售额的1/3，而其它食品公司只有 1/6到1/7，你有大量现金可用。如果你不知道怎么用，我相信有人会知道。”优秀的公司能连续20到30年保持成长。你买进以后，只要回家，高枕无忧地 让经理们做他们的事。
22、你最看重企业的什么方面呢？
我最看重企业商誉的价值。商誉就像企业之城的护城河。可口可乐拥有世界上最大的商誉价值。如果你送给我1000亿美元，让我打败可口可乐在软饮料市场的霸主地位，我会还给你，告诉你这是不可能的。除了商誉价值外，一个好企业还应具有价格的灵活性和调价能力。
23、你如何评价好的管理与好的公司？
我总把自己想象成拥有整个公司。如果管理层也这样想，并依此制定政策，这便是我喜欢的管理层。由于我不是糖果销售，辞书出版，服装和鞋类等业务的专家，所 以我喜欢那种专家型的经理。管理很重要，但好公司更重要。我们的结论是，如果让声名卓著的优秀管理人员来经营行业基本素质不太好的企业，企业的状况不会有 多大的改观。很少有例外。我喜欢那种即使没人管理也能赚钱的企业。那才是我想要的企业。
第一条原则：不许失败。第二条原则：永远记住第一条。本•格雷厄姆在《聪明的投资者》这本书的最后一章中道出了投资中最重要的四个字：保证安全。我认为100年以后，这个原则还会是投资的基础。理性的态度加上适当的知识结构，你就能成为一个成功的投资者。
2、听说你对大学里关于投资的理论嗤之以鼻。
在当今的大学里流行着一些投资理论，比如有效市场理论，这些理论依赖于推理而不是基于常识。这些课程只会让学生变得更加平庸。
3、在风云变幻的股市上，你如何看待市场和投资者的关系？
格雷厄姆曾用“市场先生”这种形象的说法，来说明市场行为。在他看来，股票市场应该被看作一个情绪容易波动的商业伙伴。这个伙伴每天都会出现，告诉你一个价格，他会以这个价格买你手中的股票，或把他手中的股票卖给你。这个伙伴每天都有一个新价格。我们要做市场先生的主人，而不是做他的奴隶。当我们投资股票时，我们实际上是投资股票所 代表的企业。当我们找到了喜欢的公司时，市场高低不会对我们的决策产生影响。我们一个一个地寻找公司，很少花时间考虑宏观因素。我们只考虑那些我们熟悉的 企业，而且价格和管理状况要让我们满意。凯恩斯说，不要试图去弄清楚市场在做什么。我们需要弄清楚的是企业。由于某些原因，人们热衷于寻找价格变动中的线 索，而不是价值。在这个世界上，最愚蠢的买股行为莫过于看到股价上升就按捺不住而出手。
4、价格和价值之间的差异在哪里？
价格是你将付出的，价值是你将得到的。在决定购买股票时，内在价值是一个重要的概念。没有公式能用来计算内在价值。你必须了解你要买的股票背后的企业。给企业估价既是一门艺术，也是一门科学。你没有必要等到最低价才去买，只要低于你所认定的价值就可以了。如果能以低于价值的价格买进，而且管理层是诚实可靠有能力的，你肯定会赚钱。
5、什么时候买入股票呢？
大多数人在别人也感兴趣的时候买入，实际上最好的买入时机是别人不感兴趣的时候。买热门股不会有好成绩的。投资不需要高智商。投资不是智商160的人战胜智商130的人的游戏。理性是最重要的。
6、哪些投票是最值得买入的？
利润和未来利润的前景决定了股票的价值。我们喜欢那种资本投入能产生高收益的并且很可能持续产生高收益的股票。我们买入可口可乐公司的股票时，它的市盈率大约是23倍。用我们的买入价和现在的收益比，市盈率只有五倍了。购买高利润公司的股票实际上是对通货膨胀的对冲。高利润公司信用评级很高，但它对债务资本的需求却相对较少。那些获利能力较差的公司最需要资金，却得不到足够资金的支持。
7、你如何看待投资中的风险因素？
我很重视确定性。如果你这样做了，风险因素就对你没有意义了。以低于价值的价格买入证券不是冒险。以《华盛顿邮报》为例，它就是一种无风险投资。1973年时，《华盛顿邮报》的市值为8000万美元，而且没有任何负债。如果你问商界人士，《华 盛顿邮报》值多少钱，他们一定会说值4亿美元。即使是凌晨2点在大西洋当中进行拍卖，也会有人来买。这种投资是非常安全的，令人不可思议。决定这个投资， 也不用花费多少精力。
8、如何看待经营中的借贷行为？
借来的钱就像是公司方向盘上的一柄利剑，它直指公司的心脏，车子总会遇到深坑，这时就会要了公司的命。理想的借贷方法应该保证市场的短期变化不会影响到你。
9、你也曾经是个套利者？
是的，因为我的母亲今晚不在场，我可以向你承认我曾经是个套利者。我早期在格雷厄姆•纽曼公司学会套利。套利的基本形式是在一个市场上以低价买进，然后在另一个市场上以高价卖出。在一个公司宣布以高于市场价的价格购并另一家公司时，我就进行套利。我关注他们宣布了什么，它值多少，我们要付出多少，我们要参与多少时间。我们要算出这一方案被通过的可能性。考虑这些时，参与公司的名头是否响亮并不在考虑之列。
10、什么时候下注最合适？
当球还在投手的手中时，我从不左右移动，只有当机会来临时才会做。
11、你如何对待各种预测专家和经纪人的意见？
如果你想理发，就不要问理发师你需不需要理发。当有人想让我采纳他们的意见时，我会告诫他们：“用我的头脑加上你们的钱，做得会更好。”你必须学会独立思考。我一直很不明白高智商的人为什么会轻易模仿别人。我们从不把好的主意告诉别人。
12、你对独立投资者有何建议？
对独立投资者来说，你应当了解企业运作的过程和企业语言（会计），具有一些比智商更重要的性格和品质。它会有助于你独立思考和避免各种各样的狂热，这种狂 热无时无刻不会影响市场。了解会计原理是保证不依赖别人的手段之一。当经理们报告企业情况时，通常会提供按会计原则制成的报表。不幸的是，如果他们想欺骗 你，报告也会符合会计原则。如果你不能弄清其中的奥妙，你就不应该从事证券投资这一行。
13、你如何评价华尔街那些淘金者？
只有在华尔街，开着劳斯莱斯的人才会向走在人行道上的人打听消息。其它领域的专业人员，比如牙医，会给普通人带来很多东西。但总的来说，人们从专业理财经理那里什么也得不到。华尔街喜欢把股票市场的活动描述为复杂的对社会有益的活动。然而事实与之相反，短期交易像一只看不见的脚，狠狠地踹在社会的身上。
14、你能谈谈你的选股方法吗？
选股的原则前面已经提到，就是你必须理性地投资。如果你不熟悉，就不要做它。我只做自己完全了解的事。以下是选股方法：第一步，在你了解的企业上画个圈， 然后剔除那些价值，管理和应变能力达不到标准的企业。第二步，选定一个企业进行评估。不要随便采纳别人对企业的评估，要自己分析它。比如，你将怎样 经营它？竞争对手是谁？客户是谁？走出门去并和他们交谈，分析你 想投资的公司和其它公司相比，优势和弱点在哪里？如果你这样做了，你就可能比公司的管理层更了解这家企业。这一原则也适用于技术类股票。我相信比尔•盖茨 也会用这些原则。他对技术的了解程度和我对可口可乐和吉列的了解程度差不多。如果有人说他能估出交易所上市的所有股票的价值，他一定高估了自己的能力。但 如果你集中精力去研究某些行业，你能学会许多和估价有关的东西。最重要的不是你的能力范围有多广，而是你的能力有多强。如果你知道你的能力的界限在哪里， 你就比那些能力范围比你大五倍而不清楚界限在哪里的人强多了。
15、你为什么不进行其它投资？
既然股市这么简单，这什么还要买房地产呢？根据价值进行投资是如此地简单易懂，以至于到大学拿一个经济学博士显得是一种浪费。进行投资就是在恰当的时间买进好股票并一直持有它，只要它还是一家好公司。
16、你在投资时追求什么？
这可以从伯克希尔登在《华尔街日报》上的一则广告来加以说明。广告说：以下是我们所寻求的东西：A 购买额大。（至少具有1000万美元的税后盈余，越大越好） B 可靠的持续获利能力。（对前景和突然好转的情形我们不感兴趣）C 企业股东权益回报水平良好而且债务水平很低或为零。 D 适当的管理。（我们不提供这项服务） E 简单的企业。（如果需要太复杂的技术，我们就无法了解）F 有明确出价。（我们不想把自己和出售者的时间浪费在讨论价格未定的交易上）
17、听说你对于投资中利用高深的数学很反感？
我从没发现自己要用到代数。当然你要算出企业的价值，然后把它除以它发行在外的普通股总数，这里要用到除法。如果你准备出去买一个农场，一栋住宅或一台干洗机，你有必要带帮人帮你计算吗？你做的买卖是否合算取决于那些企业的未来获利能力与你的买价相比如何？
18、你特别看重一个公司的节俭？
每当我听说又有一个公司进行成本削减计划时，就知道这又是一个不了解什么是成本的公司了。短期突击解决不了问题。真正优秀的经理不会在某个早晨醒过来以后说：“今天我要削减成本。”对一个绩优公司的老板来说，节俭要从自身做起。
19、你是否也有过失误？
是的，我也犯过许多错误，包括位于新英格兰的一家叫伯克希尔的纺织厂。这家落后的纺织企业最终被关闭，然而公司的结构和名称却得以保存，它成了一家投资企 业。在21岁时，我把自己所有财富的20%投资在一家加油站，那是一次最糟糕的决策。这次错误的机会成本大约是11亿美元。
20、你迄今购买的理想股票是什么？
我花了很多时间去研究沃尔特•迪斯尼公司。我最喜欢的公司是这样的：美丽的城堡，周围是一条又深又险的护城河，里面住着一位诚实而高贵的首领。护城河就像 一个强大的威慑，使得敌人不敢进攻。首领不断创造财富，但不独占它。换句话说，我们喜欢那种具有市场统治地位，别人难以模仿，耐久可靠的大公司。你的企业 要有一定的保护能力，使得对手难以进入并以低价与你竞争。当我买股票时，我就认为是买下了整个公司，就像在街边买了家商店。如果买下了商店，我就要了解它 的一切。1966年上半年迪斯尼的每股价格为53美元，看起来不太便宜，但以这个价格你能以8000万美元买下整个迪斯尼公司，等于你有了白雪公主和其他 一引起卡通人物，有了迪斯尼乐园，还有沃尔特•迪斯尼这个天才当合伙人。
21、你最看重所投资公司的什么方面？
在所有的企业中，每一星期每一个月每一年都会发生各种各样的变化。但真正重要的是找对企业。这方面一个经典的例子是可口可乐公司。它在1919年上市，发 行价是40美元1股。第二年，股价跌到每股19美元。如果公司发行上市时你就买进，一年之后，你就丧失一半的财富。但如果你持有到今天，并且把所有红利再 投入，它大约值180万美元。我们经历过萧条，也经历过战争，糖价也波动不定，发生过成千上万的事。但是看好产品的前景比在股市中进进出出多赚了多少。查 理•芒格叫我关注具有巨大获利能力和成长性的大公司的特点，但获利能力和成长性必须是确定的，不能象德州仪器公司或派拉蒙公司那样是虚构出来的。我曾告诉 通用食品的总裁，为什么在没有人对通用食品感兴趣的时候， 我会购买这家公司的股票。“你有响亮的品牌，你的利润占销售额的1/3，而其它食品公司只有 1/6到1/7，你有大量现金可用。如果你不知道怎么用，我相信有人会知道。”优秀的公司能连续20到30年保持成长。你买进以后，只要回家，高枕无忧地 让经理们做他们的事。
22、你最看重企业的什么方面呢？
我最看重企业商誉的价值。商誉就像企业之城的护城河。可口可乐拥有世界上最大的商誉价值。如果你送给我1000亿美元，让我打败可口可乐在软饮料市场的霸主地位，我会还给你，告诉你这是不可能的。除了商誉价值外，一个好企业还应具有价格的灵活性和调价能力。
23、你如何评价好的管理与好的公司？
我总把自己想象成拥有整个公司。如果管理层也这样想，并依此制定政策，这便是我喜欢的管理层。由于我不是糖果销售，辞书出版，服装和鞋类等业务的专家，所 以我喜欢那种专家型的经理。管理很重要，但好公司更重要。我们的结论是，如果让声名卓著的优秀管理人员来经营行业基本素质不太好的企业，企业的状况不会有 多大的改观。很少有例外。我喜欢那种即使没人管理也能赚钱的企业。那才是我想要的企业。
Hope in strong basics
HEAVILY exposed to the global economy, Singapore will see an economic slowdown that will last not just one or two quarters, but 'several quarters', said Finance Minister Tharman Shanmugaratnam on Sunday.
In tandem, unemployment is expected to increase.
But he also sounded a note of optimism, saying with its strong fundamentals, Singapore will ride out the crisis - and emerge better than most countries.
Mr Tharman was addressing some 300 grassroots leaders and residents of Toa Payoh East, after a three-hour walkabout which saw him, among other things, opening an exercise corner for the elderly.
Accompanied by MPs from the Bishan-Toa Payoh GRC including Toa Payoh East MP Josephine Teo, it was his first ministerial walkabout since taking charge of the finance portfolio this year.
During the 80-minute dialogue that followed, residents asked 13 questions ranging from foreign talent to greater rewards for grandparent caregivers.
But the focus was on the darkening economic outlook amid increasingly gloomy news from the United States - and the world - on what some have termed 'the worst financial crisis since the 1930s'.
So grassroot leader Raymond Teo, 39, wanted Mr Tharman's opinion of the US$700 billion (S$1 trillion) package to bail out the US troubled financial institutions, and how it impacts Singapore.
The minister expressed relief the US Congress had supported the package as it is a step forward.
But it is 'not a full solution' in addressing the real malaise - shortage of capital in the banks, he noted. This, the new US President would have to work out when he takes over in Jan.
And because the problems are 'deep and extensive', it will take 'a year or two' before the world emerges from the crisis, he later told reporters.
Meanwhile, the crisis has moved into what he calls 'its second phase'.
'It's no longer just a financial crisis,' he said. 'It is now an economic crisis.'
In tandem, unemployment is expected to increase.
But he also sounded a note of optimism, saying with its strong fundamentals, Singapore will ride out the crisis - and emerge better than most countries.
Mr Tharman was addressing some 300 grassroots leaders and residents of Toa Payoh East, after a three-hour walkabout which saw him, among other things, opening an exercise corner for the elderly.
Accompanied by MPs from the Bishan-Toa Payoh GRC including Toa Payoh East MP Josephine Teo, it was his first ministerial walkabout since taking charge of the finance portfolio this year.
During the 80-minute dialogue that followed, residents asked 13 questions ranging from foreign talent to greater rewards for grandparent caregivers.
But the focus was on the darkening economic outlook amid increasingly gloomy news from the United States - and the world - on what some have termed 'the worst financial crisis since the 1930s'.
So grassroot leader Raymond Teo, 39, wanted Mr Tharman's opinion of the US$700 billion (S$1 trillion) package to bail out the US troubled financial institutions, and how it impacts Singapore.
The minister expressed relief the US Congress had supported the package as it is a step forward.
But it is 'not a full solution' in addressing the real malaise - shortage of capital in the banks, he noted. This, the new US President would have to work out when he takes over in Jan.
And because the problems are 'deep and extensive', it will take 'a year or two' before the world emerges from the crisis, he later told reporters.
Meanwhile, the crisis has moved into what he calls 'its second phase'.
'It's no longer just a financial crisis,' he said. 'It is now an economic crisis.'
HIM's view
The market is very very sick! Despite the $700 bn package been announced there isn't a single bid of respect for a rally, instead a sell off was followed immediately after the announcement.
For the coming week, there should have more bad news coming out in Europe (the weekend meeting between the big four in Europe will probably provide nothing in concrete!) We believe there should be more shocking news coming from Europe financial industries before any concrete actions will be taken by the European Union bank, which again is behind the curve in taking action.
The 3rd quarter corporate results will also kick start next week, which will definitely provide more bad news. Plus more bad news from economic data, I simply do not see any chance of rebound from here! Technically, global indexes are all very negative and should be heading for another big sell off! I am expecting a continue selling in global stock markets and the selling may turn violent by end of the week, so do be careful!
Expect Dow Jones to continue coming down and may reach 9800 by end of the week. As for STI, it will break the recent low of 2239 and may be heading to 2200- 2180 level soon.
So, good luck to those who have short positions and be alert for action for those who have no positions.
If you are a short term trader, I am sure the next two weeks will be volatile and you should have plenty of opportunities to trade. As for medium term investors, my suggestion is to stay sideline and wait for a clearer picture.
The following are the support and resistance to watch for Dow Jones, Hang Seng and Nikkei next week.
For the coming week, there should have more bad news coming out in Europe (the weekend meeting between the big four in Europe will probably provide nothing in concrete!) We believe there should be more shocking news coming from Europe financial industries before any concrete actions will be taken by the European Union bank, which again is behind the curve in taking action.
The 3rd quarter corporate results will also kick start next week, which will definitely provide more bad news. Plus more bad news from economic data, I simply do not see any chance of rebound from here! Technically, global indexes are all very negative and should be heading for another big sell off! I am expecting a continue selling in global stock markets and the selling may turn violent by end of the week, so do be careful!
Expect Dow Jones to continue coming down and may reach 9800 by end of the week. As for STI, it will break the recent low of 2239 and may be heading to 2200- 2180 level soon.
So, good luck to those who have short positions and be alert for action for those who have no positions.
If you are a short term trader, I am sure the next two weeks will be volatile and you should have plenty of opportunities to trade. As for medium term investors, my suggestion is to stay sideline and wait for a clearer picture.
The following are the support and resistance to watch for Dow Jones, Hang Seng and Nikkei next week.
第三季经济增长预估10日公布
贸工部将在下个星期五（10月10日），发表今年第三季的国内生产总值(GDP)预估数字。公众可在当天上午8点上贸工部网站(www.mti.gov.sg)或统计局网站(www.singstat.gov.sg)或SPRInter网站(www.sprinter.gov.sg)查看。相信新加坡金融管理局到时也会发表半年一度的货币政策声明。
我国第二季经济增长2.1％，是五年来增长最缓慢的季度。政府较早前将全年增长预测调低到4至5％，但贸工部指出，全年实际增长可能会出现在新预测的较低部分。
金管局在8月份向24名经济师发出问卷，收集他们对我国经济前景的看法，得到20名经济师的回复，看法普遍较上一季调查更为不乐观。经济师再度调低对我国全年经济增长的预测，把增长率从较早时预测的5.5％调低到4.2％。花旗(Citi)新加坡经济师吉伟正则预测，我国今年全年的经济增长可能仅为2％左右。
我国第二季经济增长2.1％，是五年来增长最缓慢的季度。政府较早前将全年增长预测调低到4至5％，但贸工部指出，全年实际增长可能会出现在新预测的较低部分。
金管局在8月份向24名经济师发出问卷，收集他们对我国经济前景的看法，得到20名经济师的回复，看法普遍较上一季调查更为不乐观。经济师再度调低对我国全年经济增长的预测，把增长率从较早时预测的5.5％调低到4.2％。花旗(Citi)新加坡经济师吉伟正则预测，我国今年全年的经济增长可能仅为2％左右。
STI futures
STI futures can be bought and sold through SGX Derivatives Trading member broking companies, as well as your regular stockbrokers and/or remisiers licensed to market futures.
You may need to check with a few brokers before making your selection. Information that you should ask for includes: (1) the minimum capital required and how many contracts you will be allowed to trade with such capital; (2) broking commission; and (3) type of broking services provided.
Only when you are comfortable with your choice should you open an account.
For instance, the minimum capital required to open a futures account at Phillip Futures is $3,000.
For retail investors, the per transaction commission is around $12 for e-trading and $18 for call-in. Commissions may vary across the broking houses. The GST applies in both types of fees.
To open an account, you must complete two sets of documents and furnish the capital required before you start trading.
The first document is the Account Agreement Form for you to fill in your particulars, account information and operating procedures. The second is the Risk Disclosure Document required under the Securities and Futures Act.
To begin trading, you must deposit cash with your broker. Although SGX establishes the margin levels, your broker may have higher requirements than those set by the exchange.
You may need to check with a few brokers before making your selection. Information that you should ask for includes: (1) the minimum capital required and how many contracts you will be allowed to trade with such capital; (2) broking commission; and (3) type of broking services provided.
Only when you are comfortable with your choice should you open an account.
For instance, the minimum capital required to open a futures account at Phillip Futures is $3,000.
For retail investors, the per transaction commission is around $12 for e-trading and $18 for call-in. Commissions may vary across the broking houses. The GST applies in both types of fees.
To open an account, you must complete two sets of documents and furnish the capital required before you start trading.
The first document is the Account Agreement Form for you to fill in your particulars, account information and operating procedures. The second is the Risk Disclosure Document required under the Securities and Futures Act.
To begin trading, you must deposit cash with your broker. Although SGX establishes the margin levels, your broker may have higher requirements than those set by the exchange.
Bull or bear market, you can make money
STI Futures give retail investors a chance to profit even from a falling stock market
For the past months, many stock investors have been caught in a roller-coaster ride, no thanks to the current financial turmoil.
It is common to hear investors lamenting about how much they have sunk into the stock market, only to see the value of their stocks plummet.
How to get started
STI futures can be bought and sold through SGX Derivatives Trading member broking companies, as well as your regular stockbrokers and/or remisiers licensed to market futures.
You may need to check with a few brokers before making your selection. Information that you should ask for includes:
(1) the minimum capital required and how many contracts you will be allowed to trade with such capital;
(2) broking commission; and
(3) type of broking services provided.
If you have a stock portfolio and are bearish on where the market is heading, there are two things you can do: sell your stocks now, which may mean a loss, or just hope for the best.
Rather than do nothing, you may also want to check out the recently relaunched Straits Times Index (STI) Futures, which provide retail investors an opportunity to profit even from a falling market.
For those unfamiliar with the topic, the benchmark STI represents the performance of the top 30 stocks of the Singapore market, based on market capitalisation. They include Singapore Press Holdings, Singapore Exchange (SGX), SingTel and the local banks.
STI Futures are contracts or agreements between buyers and sellers to buy or sell the STI portfolio of 30 stocks at an agreed price (futures price) to be settled at a specific future date.
STI Futures were launched in 2000 but not many retail investors were aware of this tool. With the relaunch last Thursday, there will be firms that provide ready buy and sell prices for STI Futures. This will lead to greater liquidity of the product.
It is a useful tool for investors who wish to take a position on where the local market is heading - that is, whether they believe that the STI will trend up or down - by buying or selling STI Futures contracts.
This means trading based on broad market movements instead of single stock movements. This reduces the need for individual stock selection; your risk is also diversified over 30 stocks instead of being pegged to a single stock.
At the same time, it can help to protect you against, or help you profit from, fluctuations in the stock market.
Here are some things you need to know about STI Futures:
What is the value of one STI Futures contract?
The value of each STI Futures contract is equal to $10 multiplied by the current index trading level.
For instance, if the index is trading at 2,300, holding a futures contract will be equivalent to investing $23,000 in the stock portfolio of the 30 listed companies.
This means that when a STI Futures contract is traded, the seller has, in essence, agreed to sell $23,000 and the buyer has agreed to buy $23,000 worth of stocks, as measured by the STI.
How are STI Futures transacted?
You are not required to cough up the full payment equivalent to the contract value. But the buyer or seller must each put up an initial margin deposit with the broker in order to secure the contract.
This margin, which is decided by SGX, is typically about 5 to 15 per cent of the contract value. The prevailing initial margin is $1,625 for one contract.
The margin essentially means that the STI Futures allow the investor to trade a portfolio of 30 stocks at a mere fraction - about 5 to 15 per cent - of its value.
At the end of each trading day and all following days that your position remains open, the contract value is "marked-to-market".
Your account is credited or debited based on that day's trading session. If your margin deposit falls below a certain maintenance level - currently set at $1,300 - your broker will request additional funds to replenish your trading account. If your position generates a profit, you may withdraw any excess funds from your account.
Margin levels prescribed by SGX are based on the movement of the underlying stock market as represented by the STI. The margin levels, therefore, will fluctuate depending on the historical and prevailing movement of the STI.
Do I need to own any of the stocks included in the STI in order to trade the futures contract?
You do not need to own any stock in order to trade the STI Futures. In stock index futures trading, you do not actually deliver or receive any stocks.
How can I profit from trading the STI Futures?
Like trading stocks, the point is to buy low, sell high.
The STI Futures offer the flexibility of buying and selling in whatever order you want.
That is, you can "buy first, sell later" or you can "sell first, buy later". If you think prices are going up, you may establish a "long" (buy) position, and if you think prices are going down, you may initiate a "short" (sell) position.
In addition, with the STI comprising a portfolio of 30 stocks, you can effectively participate in the broad market movements without the hassle of stock-picking. Each index point movement has a value of $10.
In other words, you gain $10 per index point rise if you have a long position or per index point fall for a short position.
Below are two trading scenarios:
Scenario A
Day 1: You are bullish about the Singapore stock market and decide to buy a September STI Futures contract at 2,400.
Contract value = 2,400 x $10 x 1 contract = $24,000
Initial margin required (at $1,625 per lot) = $1,625
The STI rises that day.
End-of-Day 1 settlement price = 2,425
Daily marked-to-market profit = (2,425 - 2,400) x $10 x 1 = $250
You now have a paper profit of $250.
Margin account balance = $1,625 + $250 = $1,875
As you have not liquidated your contract, you have one lot of open position.
Day 2: Market rallies further to 2,438. You feel the price is good and decide to take profit, selling your September STI Futures contract at 2,438.
Daily marked-to-market profit = (2,438 - 2,425) x $10 = $130
Margin account balance = $1,875 + $130 = $2,005
Total net profit = $130 + $250 = $380
In this scenario, your bullish outlook holds and you ultimately make a net profit of $380 when you liquidate your position.
Scenario B
Day 1: You are bearish about the short-term prospects of the Singapore market and decide to sell a September STI Futures contract at 2,400.
Contract value = 2,400 x $10 x 1 contract = $24,000
Initial margin required (at $1,625 per lot) = $1,625
Contrary to your initial bearish view, the market turns bullish; the STI closes higher.
End-of-Day 1 settlement price = 2,435
Daily marked-to-market loss = (2,435 - 2,400) x $10 x 1 = $350
You now have a paper loss of $350.
Margin account balance = $1,625 - $350 = $1,275
Maintenance margin required (at $1,300 per lot) = $1,300
You have a margin call and must deposit additional funds now because your margin account balance of $1,275 is below the maintenance margin of $1,300.
You need to top up $350 to bring it back to the initial margin level of $1,625.
Day 2: The market shows a decline.
You want to cash in on this move by liquidating your position by buying a September STI Futures contract at 2,388.
Daily marked-to-market profit = (2,435 - 2,388) x $10 = $470
Total net profit = - $350 + $470 = $120
In this example, you ultimately make a net profit of $120 on Day 2 when you liquidate your position.
How long should I hold on to a position?
As stock markets can be volatile, you take advantage of price movements by getting in and out quickly. Depending on your personal preference and perspective, you may wish to adopt a short-term trading approach (taking a position for one day, one hour, or even just a few minutes); or medium-term approach (several days to several weeks); or long-term (months at a time).
What are the risks?
The initial margin deposit is relatively small compared to the contract's value. The transaction may lead to quick and substantial profits, but the reverse is true for losses too when prices do not move in the expected direction. Investors should also be mindful of margin calls if the margin account falls below the maintenance margin.
It is possible that you may lose more than the amount you have in your margin account under circumstances of extreme market movements. Investors are strongly advised by financial experts to use only excess funds that they can afford to invest.
For the past months, many stock investors have been caught in a roller-coaster ride, no thanks to the current financial turmoil.
It is common to hear investors lamenting about how much they have sunk into the stock market, only to see the value of their stocks plummet.
How to get started
STI futures can be bought and sold through SGX Derivatives Trading member broking companies, as well as your regular stockbrokers and/or remisiers licensed to market futures.
You may need to check with a few brokers before making your selection. Information that you should ask for includes:
(1) the minimum capital required and how many contracts you will be allowed to trade with such capital;
(2) broking commission; and
(3) type of broking services provided.
If you have a stock portfolio and are bearish on where the market is heading, there are two things you can do: sell your stocks now, which may mean a loss, or just hope for the best.
Rather than do nothing, you may also want to check out the recently relaunched Straits Times Index (STI) Futures, which provide retail investors an opportunity to profit even from a falling market.
For those unfamiliar with the topic, the benchmark STI represents the performance of the top 30 stocks of the Singapore market, based on market capitalisation. They include Singapore Press Holdings, Singapore Exchange (SGX), SingTel and the local banks.
STI Futures are contracts or agreements between buyers and sellers to buy or sell the STI portfolio of 30 stocks at an agreed price (futures price) to be settled at a specific future date.
STI Futures were launched in 2000 but not many retail investors were aware of this tool. With the relaunch last Thursday, there will be firms that provide ready buy and sell prices for STI Futures. This will lead to greater liquidity of the product.
It is a useful tool for investors who wish to take a position on where the local market is heading - that is, whether they believe that the STI will trend up or down - by buying or selling STI Futures contracts.
This means trading based on broad market movements instead of single stock movements. This reduces the need for individual stock selection; your risk is also diversified over 30 stocks instead of being pegged to a single stock.
At the same time, it can help to protect you against, or help you profit from, fluctuations in the stock market.
Here are some things you need to know about STI Futures:
What is the value of one STI Futures contract?
The value of each STI Futures contract is equal to $10 multiplied by the current index trading level.
For instance, if the index is trading at 2,300, holding a futures contract will be equivalent to investing $23,000 in the stock portfolio of the 30 listed companies.
This means that when a STI Futures contract is traded, the seller has, in essence, agreed to sell $23,000 and the buyer has agreed to buy $23,000 worth of stocks, as measured by the STI.
How are STI Futures transacted?
You are not required to cough up the full payment equivalent to the contract value. But the buyer or seller must each put up an initial margin deposit with the broker in order to secure the contract.
This margin, which is decided by SGX, is typically about 5 to 15 per cent of the contract value. The prevailing initial margin is $1,625 for one contract.
The margin essentially means that the STI Futures allow the investor to trade a portfolio of 30 stocks at a mere fraction - about 5 to 15 per cent - of its value.
At the end of each trading day and all following days that your position remains open, the contract value is "marked-to-market".
Your account is credited or debited based on that day's trading session. If your margin deposit falls below a certain maintenance level - currently set at $1,300 - your broker will request additional funds to replenish your trading account. If your position generates a profit, you may withdraw any excess funds from your account.
Margin levels prescribed by SGX are based on the movement of the underlying stock market as represented by the STI. The margin levels, therefore, will fluctuate depending on the historical and prevailing movement of the STI.
Do I need to own any of the stocks included in the STI in order to trade the futures contract?
You do not need to own any stock in order to trade the STI Futures. In stock index futures trading, you do not actually deliver or receive any stocks.
How can I profit from trading the STI Futures?
Like trading stocks, the point is to buy low, sell high.
The STI Futures offer the flexibility of buying and selling in whatever order you want.
That is, you can "buy first, sell later" or you can "sell first, buy later". If you think prices are going up, you may establish a "long" (buy) position, and if you think prices are going down, you may initiate a "short" (sell) position.
In addition, with the STI comprising a portfolio of 30 stocks, you can effectively participate in the broad market movements without the hassle of stock-picking. Each index point movement has a value of $10.
In other words, you gain $10 per index point rise if you have a long position or per index point fall for a short position.
Below are two trading scenarios:
Scenario A
Day 1: You are bullish about the Singapore stock market and decide to buy a September STI Futures contract at 2,400.
Contract value = 2,400 x $10 x 1 contract = $24,000
Initial margin required (at $1,625 per lot) = $1,625
The STI rises that day.
End-of-Day 1 settlement price = 2,425
Daily marked-to-market profit = (2,425 - 2,400) x $10 x 1 = $250
You now have a paper profit of $250.
Margin account balance = $1,625 + $250 = $1,875
As you have not liquidated your contract, you have one lot of open position.
Day 2: Market rallies further to 2,438. You feel the price is good and decide to take profit, selling your September STI Futures contract at 2,438.
Daily marked-to-market profit = (2,438 - 2,425) x $10 = $130
Margin account balance = $1,875 + $130 = $2,005
Total net profit = $130 + $250 = $380
In this scenario, your bullish outlook holds and you ultimately make a net profit of $380 when you liquidate your position.
Scenario B
Day 1: You are bearish about the short-term prospects of the Singapore market and decide to sell a September STI Futures contract at 2,400.
Contract value = 2,400 x $10 x 1 contract = $24,000
Initial margin required (at $1,625 per lot) = $1,625
Contrary to your initial bearish view, the market turns bullish; the STI closes higher.
End-of-Day 1 settlement price = 2,435
Daily marked-to-market loss = (2,435 - 2,400) x $10 x 1 = $350
You now have a paper loss of $350.
Margin account balance = $1,625 - $350 = $1,275
Maintenance margin required (at $1,300 per lot) = $1,300
You have a margin call and must deposit additional funds now because your margin account balance of $1,275 is below the maintenance margin of $1,300.
You need to top up $350 to bring it back to the initial margin level of $1,625.
Day 2: The market shows a decline.
You want to cash in on this move by liquidating your position by buying a September STI Futures contract at 2,388.
Daily marked-to-market profit = (2,435 - 2,388) x $10 = $470
Total net profit = - $350 + $470 = $120
In this example, you ultimately make a net profit of $120 on Day 2 when you liquidate your position.
How long should I hold on to a position?
As stock markets can be volatile, you take advantage of price movements by getting in and out quickly. Depending on your personal preference and perspective, you may wish to adopt a short-term trading approach (taking a position for one day, one hour, or even just a few minutes); or medium-term approach (several days to several weeks); or long-term (months at a time).
What are the risks?
The initial margin deposit is relatively small compared to the contract's value. The transaction may lead to quick and substantial profits, but the reverse is true for losses too when prices do not move in the expected direction. Investors should also be mindful of margin calls if the margin account falls below the maintenance margin.
It is possible that you may lose more than the amount you have in your margin account under circumstances of extreme market movements. Investors are strongly advised by financial experts to use only excess funds that they can afford to invest.
Saturday, October 4, 2008
闲言碎语巴菲特
老巴的核心，是尽可能的拥有能够提供FLOAT的公司控制权，然后把资金投入到自己能理解的，有特许经营权的长期稳定优秀的企业，长期持有。
获取 float 源的控制权，然后对这些 float 进行资本配置。
源源不断的 float 源头 + 一生二、二生三、三生万象的滚雪球能力。
巴菲特曾在接受媒体采访时说，他天生就是要做资本分配的。其实，人才正是巴菲特所取得的辉煌业绩中最重要的资本。对人才资本的管理，巴菲特也有自己一套独特的做法。他让公司的管理层放手经营，给他们以充分的信任，一切与公司具体经营管理相关的问题，他均不过问。但巴菲特又明察秋毫，对他的管理人取得的任何业绩，他都不会视而不见，并会在每年的致股东函中对他们通报表扬，毫不吝于言辞。
其实，巴菲特本人也是他管理的一部分。他知道自己能做什么，不能做什么，并懂得如何将自己的长处同他人的长处合理结合，以取得投资的最大成功。
（与人相处，发挥他人长处的能力非常强，依赖他人之长但又不失控制，因为资本总是处于控制地位的）
他明白自己不喜欢经常到世界各地出差、演讲、没完没了地开会、发展同客户和政府的关系；他经常在致股东函中谦虚地说，自己只会做资本分配这些简单的工作，具体如何成功运作一个公司，他还要依赖那些优秀管理人才。
（人有自知之明，知道自己的边界，知道如何用长避短）
“我惟一的任务就是给他们（管理层）加油，改善、强化公司文化，以及做资本分配的决定”
巴菲特在选股方面坚持一个重要理念，即投资股票一定要投资自己所熟悉的行业，并明白它们的真正价值。
巴菲特说，一个人要想投资长期成功，不在于你能力有多大，而在于你的边界要非常清晰，就是你知道你真正懂什么是企业，你真正看明白了哪个企业。你失败之所以失败，其实很大程度是你跨出了你的能力边界去做事，跨出了你熟悉的企业去投资，这个熟悉不是简单的熟悉，要长期研究，把它的产品、竞争对手、客户、竞争优势和各个方面研究非常透。
1.这句话非常经典，可以说很简单易懂，但也可能太深奥难懂。就象有些道理，年少时可能知道明白但并不真懂，也许在多年后真正经历了触动了才真正领悟。隔行如隔山，买猪肉的就根本不懂电脑程序员的活；有些你入行后不久就熟悉的业务、流程、规则，你可能觉得很简单，但也许你没入行前，这些东西对你就有如天书，而从投资方面来讲，也许就是你对该行业、企业的某个方面不熟悉、想当然，就导致你遭受巨大损失，因此，不只是巴菲特，包括罗杰斯等成功的投资大师都一再告诫，一定要知道自己在做着什么。
2.如果出现自己能力边界之外的行业或企业，但又认为该行业或企业有足够大的价值和吸引力，可以提高自己的能力，去深入研究该行业或企业，但一定要直到自己熟悉了，才能投资，至少熟悉之前，不能大量投资，只能试探性的投入，边实践边研究了解)
沃伦巴菲特："我们的注意力在公司的赚钱能力上，从现在开始的未来五年，十年的收益，如果我们认为它的价格跟赚钱能力比很值，我们就买，能够这样赚钱的公司是我们关注的，如果我们不了解，我们就不投资。我们不是说对每一种股票都一种观点，我们要确定我们选的是对的，但是对于不懂得我就不投资。如果有1000个股票，对999我都不知道，我只选那只我了解的。"
沃伦巴菲特："你必须知道你买的是什么。"
巴菲特坦言自己不懂A股，所以不投资。“熟悉”，更是一种安全边际
"如果我们不能在自己有信心的范围内找到需要的，我们不会扩大范围。我们只会等待。"
投资的首要条件是：做熟悉的事。
每天，巴菲特都在干些什么？也就是说，巴菲特的日常工作内容主要是什么？
然后，再看看我们的日常投资生活中，又都在干些什么？找黑马、探消息、猜大盘、讨论哪只涨得多和哪只跌得厉害......
巴菲特是这样概括他的日常工作："我的工作是阅读"。可见巴菲特对阅读是多么重视。
·巴菲特阅读最多的是企业的财务报告。"我阅读我所关注的公司年报，同时我也阅读它的竞争对手的年报，这些是我最主要的阅读材料"。
·巴菲特并不仅仅阅读上市公司年报这些公开披露信息，他从年报中发现感兴趣的公司后，会阅读非常多的相关书籍和资料，并且进行调查研究，寻找年报后面隐藏的真相："我看待上市公司信息披露(大部分是不公开的)的态度，与我看待冰山一样(大部分隐藏在水面以下)。"
巴菲特这样解释他如何把阅读和调研结合在一起的："你可以选择一些尽管你对其财务状况并非十分了解但你对其产品非常熟悉的公司。然后找到这家公司的大量年报，以及最近5到10年间所有关于这家公司的文章，深入钻研，让你自己沉浸于其中。当你读完这些材料之后，问问自己：我还有什么地方不知道却必须知道的东西？很多年前，我经常四处奔走，对这家公司的竞争对手、雇员等相关方面进行访谈。……我一直不停地打听询问有关情况。这是一个调查的过程，就像一个新闻记者采访那样。最后你想写出一个故事。一些公司故事容易写出来，但一些公司的故事很难写出来，我们在投资中寻找的是那些故事容易写出来的公司。"
记者："道听途说您一年看1万多份年报，真的么？"
沃伦巴菲特："读年报像其他人在读报纸一样，每年我都读成千上万，我不知道我读了多少，不过像中石油，我读了2002年4月的年报，而且又读了2003年的年报，然后我决定投资5亿给中石油，仅仅根据我读的年报，我没有见过管理层，也没有见过分析家的报告，但是非常通俗易懂，是很好的一个投资。"
记者："您最关心年报中的那些方面？"
沃伦巴菲特："学生总是问我这个问题，但是所有的年报都不同的，如果你要找个男人的话，什么样的吸引你，是有体育才能的，还是帅的，还是聪明的。所以同样看企业也有不同的方法，一个企业到另外一个企业，我看的是不同的东西。根本性的来说，我是看企业的价值。"
在采访中，巴菲特一再告诉记者，正确的投资就是寻找到价值被低估的公司，然后按合理的价格买入，而无论什么样的因素都不会影响公司内在价值。
沃伦巴菲特："我们不会因为外部宏观的影响改变我们的投资策略，总会有好的年和不好的年，那又怎么样，如果我找到一家很好的企业，美联储的主席说明年经济衰退要来了，我还是要买，对我们来说影响不大。"
股神如果不是买在最低卖在最高就是失败？
不笑不足以为道。
赵炳贤认为，巴菲特的战略成功有很重要的一点，就是他在每年年报中检讨自己，他为什么要检讨自己呢？他是要把自己置于一种很清醒的状态，给自己一种检讨的机制。我们知道在股票市场上，你赚钱赚多了，赚了一段时间，你就会放大自我，放大自己的判断力，放大自己的预测能力，然后就会吃亏，甚至会犯大错误。
(不要随意放大自己的能力边界)
人在成功的情况下是很难持续成功的，就是因为不能检讨自己，不能很清醒。巴菲特每年检讨自己，这是他年报一项重要的任务，而且是公开的检讨。所以这就可以使他一个人进行投资决策也可以保持很清醒的决策
估值是价值投资的前提、基础和核心。
1.指数升跌与投资决策无关．估值是唯一标准；
3.如果说卖掉的股票还在涨算是水平低下，那我们十几年来的水平就从没有一天高过，也似乎从没有太多提高；
4.我们在市场低迷时进场被套的次数与时间与市场高涨时踏空的次数与时间一样多，一样长；
记者："您认为中国有伟大的公司吗？"
沃伦巴菲特："是的，有很多好企业在中国，我们也拥有很多它们的股份，比如中石油，就像你知道得，这个公司市值第二大的，仅次于美孚石油，比通用电气还要高，我不知道今天是不是这样，几天前市值是这样的，你知道的，我看了很多家公司（老巴说他看了很多家A股公司了），但是，你们的股票市场发展非常强劲，可能现在有一些比较便宜的股票，也不像两年前那么便宜了，你们股票市场非常蓬勃，我通常是在人们对股票市场失去信心的时候购买，但是在中国的市场，人们总是很踊跃的购买，当然他们有很好的理由（人总喜欢自我肯定自我强化，估值标准可以不断改变提高甚至1天N变，总可为自己的所做列举出充分的理由，也许在未来的时候，才会后悔自己怎么会这么想，怎么找出或者相信这个这么笨的理由，就象祥林嫂说的“没想到春天也会有狼出现”），近年以来，我已经不像两年前那样，容易找到被低估的股票了。"
记者："A股已经有45%的股票市盈率已经超过100倍，人们很着迷于股市，您觉得这样的增幅对股市来说是健康的吗？"
沃伦巴菲特："是的，我建议要谨慎，任何时候，任何东西，有巨幅上涨的时候，人们就会被表象所迷惑，人们就会认为他们才干了两年就会赚那么多的钱（以为这是一种常态），我不知道中国股市的明后年是不是还会涨，但我知道价格越高越要加倍小心，不能掉以轻心，要更谨慎。"
获取 float 源的控制权，然后对这些 float 进行资本配置。
源源不断的 float 源头 + 一生二、二生三、三生万象的滚雪球能力。
巴菲特曾在接受媒体采访时说，他天生就是要做资本分配的。其实，人才正是巴菲特所取得的辉煌业绩中最重要的资本。对人才资本的管理，巴菲特也有自己一套独特的做法。他让公司的管理层放手经营，给他们以充分的信任，一切与公司具体经营管理相关的问题，他均不过问。但巴菲特又明察秋毫，对他的管理人取得的任何业绩，他都不会视而不见，并会在每年的致股东函中对他们通报表扬，毫不吝于言辞。
其实，巴菲特本人也是他管理的一部分。他知道自己能做什么，不能做什么，并懂得如何将自己的长处同他人的长处合理结合，以取得投资的最大成功。
（与人相处，发挥他人长处的能力非常强，依赖他人之长但又不失控制，因为资本总是处于控制地位的）
他明白自己不喜欢经常到世界各地出差、演讲、没完没了地开会、发展同客户和政府的关系；他经常在致股东函中谦虚地说，自己只会做资本分配这些简单的工作，具体如何成功运作一个公司，他还要依赖那些优秀管理人才。
（人有自知之明，知道自己的边界，知道如何用长避短）
“我惟一的任务就是给他们（管理层）加油，改善、强化公司文化，以及做资本分配的决定”
巴菲特在选股方面坚持一个重要理念，即投资股票一定要投资自己所熟悉的行业，并明白它们的真正价值。
巴菲特说，一个人要想投资长期成功，不在于你能力有多大，而在于你的边界要非常清晰，就是你知道你真正懂什么是企业，你真正看明白了哪个企业。你失败之所以失败，其实很大程度是你跨出了你的能力边界去做事，跨出了你熟悉的企业去投资，这个熟悉不是简单的熟悉，要长期研究，把它的产品、竞争对手、客户、竞争优势和各个方面研究非常透。
1.这句话非常经典，可以说很简单易懂，但也可能太深奥难懂。就象有些道理，年少时可能知道明白但并不真懂，也许在多年后真正经历了触动了才真正领悟。隔行如隔山，买猪肉的就根本不懂电脑程序员的活；有些你入行后不久就熟悉的业务、流程、规则，你可能觉得很简单，但也许你没入行前，这些东西对你就有如天书，而从投资方面来讲，也许就是你对该行业、企业的某个方面不熟悉、想当然，就导致你遭受巨大损失，因此，不只是巴菲特，包括罗杰斯等成功的投资大师都一再告诫，一定要知道自己在做着什么。
2.如果出现自己能力边界之外的行业或企业，但又认为该行业或企业有足够大的价值和吸引力，可以提高自己的能力，去深入研究该行业或企业，但一定要直到自己熟悉了，才能投资，至少熟悉之前，不能大量投资，只能试探性的投入，边实践边研究了解)
沃伦巴菲特："我们的注意力在公司的赚钱能力上，从现在开始的未来五年，十年的收益，如果我们认为它的价格跟赚钱能力比很值，我们就买，能够这样赚钱的公司是我们关注的，如果我们不了解，我们就不投资。我们不是说对每一种股票都一种观点，我们要确定我们选的是对的，但是对于不懂得我就不投资。如果有1000个股票，对999我都不知道，我只选那只我了解的。"
沃伦巴菲特："你必须知道你买的是什么。"
巴菲特坦言自己不懂A股，所以不投资。“熟悉”，更是一种安全边际
"如果我们不能在自己有信心的范围内找到需要的，我们不会扩大范围。我们只会等待。"
投资的首要条件是：做熟悉的事。
每天，巴菲特都在干些什么？也就是说，巴菲特的日常工作内容主要是什么？
然后，再看看我们的日常投资生活中，又都在干些什么？找黑马、探消息、猜大盘、讨论哪只涨得多和哪只跌得厉害......
巴菲特是这样概括他的日常工作："我的工作是阅读"。可见巴菲特对阅读是多么重视。
·巴菲特阅读最多的是企业的财务报告。"我阅读我所关注的公司年报，同时我也阅读它的竞争对手的年报，这些是我最主要的阅读材料"。
·巴菲特并不仅仅阅读上市公司年报这些公开披露信息，他从年报中发现感兴趣的公司后，会阅读非常多的相关书籍和资料，并且进行调查研究，寻找年报后面隐藏的真相："我看待上市公司信息披露(大部分是不公开的)的态度，与我看待冰山一样(大部分隐藏在水面以下)。"
巴菲特这样解释他如何把阅读和调研结合在一起的："你可以选择一些尽管你对其财务状况并非十分了解但你对其产品非常熟悉的公司。然后找到这家公司的大量年报，以及最近5到10年间所有关于这家公司的文章，深入钻研，让你自己沉浸于其中。当你读完这些材料之后，问问自己：我还有什么地方不知道却必须知道的东西？很多年前，我经常四处奔走，对这家公司的竞争对手、雇员等相关方面进行访谈。……我一直不停地打听询问有关情况。这是一个调查的过程，就像一个新闻记者采访那样。最后你想写出一个故事。一些公司故事容易写出来，但一些公司的故事很难写出来，我们在投资中寻找的是那些故事容易写出来的公司。"
记者："道听途说您一年看1万多份年报，真的么？"
沃伦巴菲特："读年报像其他人在读报纸一样，每年我都读成千上万，我不知道我读了多少，不过像中石油，我读了2002年4月的年报，而且又读了2003年的年报，然后我决定投资5亿给中石油，仅仅根据我读的年报，我没有见过管理层，也没有见过分析家的报告，但是非常通俗易懂，是很好的一个投资。"
记者："您最关心年报中的那些方面？"
沃伦巴菲特："学生总是问我这个问题，但是所有的年报都不同的，如果你要找个男人的话，什么样的吸引你，是有体育才能的，还是帅的，还是聪明的。所以同样看企业也有不同的方法，一个企业到另外一个企业，我看的是不同的东西。根本性的来说，我是看企业的价值。"
在采访中，巴菲特一再告诉记者，正确的投资就是寻找到价值被低估的公司，然后按合理的价格买入，而无论什么样的因素都不会影响公司内在价值。
沃伦巴菲特："我们不会因为外部宏观的影响改变我们的投资策略，总会有好的年和不好的年，那又怎么样，如果我找到一家很好的企业，美联储的主席说明年经济衰退要来了，我还是要买，对我们来说影响不大。"
股神如果不是买在最低卖在最高就是失败？
不笑不足以为道。
赵炳贤认为，巴菲特的战略成功有很重要的一点，就是他在每年年报中检讨自己，他为什么要检讨自己呢？他是要把自己置于一种很清醒的状态，给自己一种检讨的机制。我们知道在股票市场上，你赚钱赚多了，赚了一段时间，你就会放大自我，放大自己的判断力，放大自己的预测能力，然后就会吃亏，甚至会犯大错误。
(不要随意放大自己的能力边界)
人在成功的情况下是很难持续成功的，就是因为不能检讨自己，不能很清醒。巴菲特每年检讨自己，这是他年报一项重要的任务，而且是公开的检讨。所以这就可以使他一个人进行投资决策也可以保持很清醒的决策
估值是价值投资的前提、基础和核心。
1.指数升跌与投资决策无关．估值是唯一标准；
3.如果说卖掉的股票还在涨算是水平低下，那我们十几年来的水平就从没有一天高过，也似乎从没有太多提高；
4.我们在市场低迷时进场被套的次数与时间与市场高涨时踏空的次数与时间一样多，一样长；
记者："您认为中国有伟大的公司吗？"
沃伦巴菲特："是的，有很多好企业在中国，我们也拥有很多它们的股份，比如中石油，就像你知道得，这个公司市值第二大的，仅次于美孚石油，比通用电气还要高，我不知道今天是不是这样，几天前市值是这样的，你知道的，我看了很多家公司（老巴说他看了很多家A股公司了），但是，你们的股票市场发展非常强劲，可能现在有一些比较便宜的股票，也不像两年前那么便宜了，你们股票市场非常蓬勃，我通常是在人们对股票市场失去信心的时候购买，但是在中国的市场，人们总是很踊跃的购买，当然他们有很好的理由（人总喜欢自我肯定自我强化，估值标准可以不断改变提高甚至1天N变，总可为自己的所做列举出充分的理由，也许在未来的时候，才会后悔自己怎么会这么想，怎么找出或者相信这个这么笨的理由，就象祥林嫂说的“没想到春天也会有狼出现”），近年以来，我已经不像两年前那样，容易找到被低估的股票了。"
记者："A股已经有45%的股票市盈率已经超过100倍，人们很着迷于股市，您觉得这样的增幅对股市来说是健康的吗？"
沃伦巴菲特："是的，我建议要谨慎，任何时候，任何东西，有巨幅上涨的时候，人们就会被表象所迷惑，人们就会认为他们才干了两年就会赚那么多的钱（以为这是一种常态），我不知道中国股市的明后年是不是还会涨，但我知道价格越高越要加倍小心，不能掉以轻心，要更谨慎。"
长期价值投资的秘密
市场PE承受力：市场经常无效，悲观的时候只能承受较低PE，乐观的时候估值标准不断提高，可以承受较高的PE甚至市梦率，我们假设市场先生理性的时候给的PE为合理PE，而不理性的时候，实际PE就高于或低于合理PE。设想有一个市场PE承受力，合理值为1，乐观的时候高于1，悲观的时候小于1，个股的实际PE值=合理PE * 市场PE承受力。
牛久必熊，熊久必牛，牛熊往复交替，市场3-5年1轮回。牛熊的交替变化，也就是市场先生情绪乐观悲观的变化，也可以说是市场PE承受力的变化，虽然复杂，但也有期大概的周期。为了简化分析，我们假设这个变化是一个固定周期的正弦波。关于周期值，一些著名投资大师包括林园都指明：被严重低估的股票，股价都会在12个月内得到修正，无一例外。由此我们可以假设一个市场PE承受力的波动周期为4年，实际的情况可能长些或短些。最高值为1.6，最低为0.4，最高为最低的4倍，与A股市场高位60倍左右，低位15倍左右的情况大概类似。
市场PE承受力
在这里我们主要研究成长良好的企业，同时假设合理的PEG为1，也就是企业的增长率多少，合理PE就是多少倍。如30%增长给30倍合理PE。实际估值中，考虑的是3年复合增长率更合理。
我们研究的是：企业持续平稳增长（增长率稳定）、加速增长（增长率趋升）、加速增长后减速增长（增长率从高点回落）三种情况下，与市场PE承受力一起发生作用时，企业的股价变化情况。
稳定增长的情况，增长率为50%；2为增长率趋升的情况，3为增长率回落的情况。三种情况下，最后的各期（1-9期）增长率之和基本相等，所以最后第9期的EPS也基本相同。
相关数据
我们先来看看稳定增长情况下，股价是如何变化：
如果我们在时间点3或7处市场PE承受力低点买进，5或9的PE承受力高点出局，那么将有8倍的收益；而如果5处买进，7处卖出，将亏损大约45%；不管在3或5或7处买进，9处卖出，都可以获利，在3处买的获利大约是45倍，5处买入的获利大约是4倍，7处买入的获利大约是8倍。
结论：对于稳定增长企业，
(1)如果在市场比较低估的时候买进，持有1-2年以上时间，基本不会亏损，而且收益巨大，低风险高收益，只要企业持续稳定增长，持有时间越长收益越大。
(2)如果是在市场比较高估的时候买进，在接下来的熊市周期里将处于亏损状态，但只要持有时间超过3/4的PE承受力波动周期，就会盈利。相对于低估买进，高估时买进的风险高些，收益低些，但重要能长期持有可保证获利。
上面我们假设的稳定增长率是50%，如果增长率低一些或者高一些的情况会是如何？
稳定增长率为25%
稳定增长率为80%
上面两图是稳定增长率分别为25%和80%的情况。25%时，价格从高点回落的幅度比较大，大概有60%的跌幅；80%的情况下，价格最高点不是在PE承受力最大处（如图5中5处），而是PE承受力回落到合理值，也即时市场人气高点回落之后时（图5中6处），价格在图5中7处回落到最低点，回落幅度接近40%，但时间较短，只要坚持持有1/4多一点的PE承受力波动周期就可以解套。由此我们可以看出，企业的稳定增长率越高越好。在前面这些假设条件下，当增长率在150%时，股价不会出现回落的情况。但现实的实际情况却是，企业的增长率越高，就越难以持续。苏宁电器这几年每年100%的增长，使得其股价每年都在创新高，不管是在牛市还是熊市。
增长率趋升
可看到，增长率趋升时，即使在市场PE承受力高点时买进，其后中短期下跌的幅度和下跌时间都相对小和短。出现高估后，泡沫更容易更快地被挤掉。
我们再来看看增长率回落的情况：
增长率高位回落--增长率高位与市场PE承受力中值对应1
我们从图7可看到，当企业增长率高位与市场PE承受力中值对应时（随后市场PE承受力处于上升状态），如果股价高位买入，那么随后的股价回落幅度超过70%，而此后即使股价随市场PE承受力回升，也没有能够超越当时的高点。
我们再看看另外一种企业增长率高位与市场PE承受力中值对应时（随后市场PE承受力下降）的情况，如下图：
增长率回落 - 增长率高位与市场PE承受力中值对应2
看到，4点处买进，随后6、7点创了新高，但在8、9点迅速回落，9点的低点甚至低于5点的低点。
再看看增长率高位与市场PE承受力高低点分别对应时的情况：
增长率回落 - 增长率高位与市场PE承受力低点对应
当在市场悲观，低估时，而企业增长率又恰巧处于最高时买入，长期持有还可以保证不亏本，但其中从6到8点的价格回落幅度很大，属于增长率回落，PE回落，PE承受力回落的共振，也就是戴维斯双杀还要加上市场PE承受力的打击。
增长率回落 - 增长率高位与市场PE承受力高点对应
如果4点时的高位买进，随后的戴维斯双杀+PE承受力回落打击，股价回落幅度接近65%，因为EPS的增长积累，随后8点处的PE承受力回升还能使得4点的买入解套，但如果继续持有，到9、10点的股价又再次大幅回落，长期投资却是亏损结局。
研究结果：好公司+好价格+长期持有。
好公司：要挑选能长期稳定增长（加速增长的更好）的企业，周期性越弱越好，持续稳定增长能够跨越足够长的时间。挑选好公司是非常考眼光的。象茅台这样的确定性极高的长期持续稳定增长企业，真是稀缺资源。
好价格：好价格可以使得投资低风险高收益，同时可以在即使选错了增长率减速的企业时，也能避免戴维斯双杀+PE承受力回落打击，降低风险。所以巴菲特十分强调安全边际的重要性。
长期持有：对于稳定或加速增长的企业，越是长期持有，收益越大。即使因为暂时高估，然后受PE承受力回落的打击而导致股价暂时下跌，但是下一次PE承受力回升时，价格会将涨得更厉害。
牛久必熊，熊久必牛，牛熊往复交替，市场3-5年1轮回。牛熊的交替变化，也就是市场先生情绪乐观悲观的变化，也可以说是市场PE承受力的变化，虽然复杂，但也有期大概的周期。为了简化分析，我们假设这个变化是一个固定周期的正弦波。关于周期值，一些著名投资大师包括林园都指明：被严重低估的股票，股价都会在12个月内得到修正，无一例外。由此我们可以假设一个市场PE承受力的波动周期为4年，实际的情况可能长些或短些。最高值为1.6，最低为0.4，最高为最低的4倍，与A股市场高位60倍左右，低位15倍左右的情况大概类似。
市场PE承受力
在这里我们主要研究成长良好的企业，同时假设合理的PEG为1，也就是企业的增长率多少，合理PE就是多少倍。如30%增长给30倍合理PE。实际估值中，考虑的是3年复合增长率更合理。
我们研究的是：企业持续平稳增长（增长率稳定）、加速增长（增长率趋升）、加速增长后减速增长（增长率从高点回落）三种情况下，与市场PE承受力一起发生作用时，企业的股价变化情况。
稳定增长的情况，增长率为50%；2为增长率趋升的情况，3为增长率回落的情况。三种情况下，最后的各期（1-9期）增长率之和基本相等，所以最后第9期的EPS也基本相同。
相关数据
我们先来看看稳定增长情况下，股价是如何变化：
如果我们在时间点3或7处市场PE承受力低点买进，5或9的PE承受力高点出局，那么将有8倍的收益；而如果5处买进，7处卖出，将亏损大约45%；不管在3或5或7处买进，9处卖出，都可以获利，在3处买的获利大约是45倍，5处买入的获利大约是4倍，7处买入的获利大约是8倍。
结论：对于稳定增长企业，
(1)如果在市场比较低估的时候买进，持有1-2年以上时间，基本不会亏损，而且收益巨大，低风险高收益，只要企业持续稳定增长，持有时间越长收益越大。
(2)如果是在市场比较高估的时候买进，在接下来的熊市周期里将处于亏损状态，但只要持有时间超过3/4的PE承受力波动周期，就会盈利。相对于低估买进，高估时买进的风险高些，收益低些，但重要能长期持有可保证获利。
上面我们假设的稳定增长率是50%，如果增长率低一些或者高一些的情况会是如何？
稳定增长率为25%
稳定增长率为80%
上面两图是稳定增长率分别为25%和80%的情况。25%时，价格从高点回落的幅度比较大，大概有60%的跌幅；80%的情况下，价格最高点不是在PE承受力最大处（如图5中5处），而是PE承受力回落到合理值，也即时市场人气高点回落之后时（图5中6处），价格在图5中7处回落到最低点，回落幅度接近40%，但时间较短，只要坚持持有1/4多一点的PE承受力波动周期就可以解套。由此我们可以看出，企业的稳定增长率越高越好。在前面这些假设条件下，当增长率在150%时，股价不会出现回落的情况。但现实的实际情况却是，企业的增长率越高，就越难以持续。苏宁电器这几年每年100%的增长，使得其股价每年都在创新高，不管是在牛市还是熊市。
增长率趋升
可看到，增长率趋升时，即使在市场PE承受力高点时买进，其后中短期下跌的幅度和下跌时间都相对小和短。出现高估后，泡沫更容易更快地被挤掉。
我们再来看看增长率回落的情况：
增长率高位回落--增长率高位与市场PE承受力中值对应1
我们从图7可看到，当企业增长率高位与市场PE承受力中值对应时（随后市场PE承受力处于上升状态），如果股价高位买入，那么随后的股价回落幅度超过70%，而此后即使股价随市场PE承受力回升，也没有能够超越当时的高点。
我们再看看另外一种企业增长率高位与市场PE承受力中值对应时（随后市场PE承受力下降）的情况，如下图：
增长率回落 - 增长率高位与市场PE承受力中值对应2
看到，4点处买进，随后6、7点创了新高，但在8、9点迅速回落，9点的低点甚至低于5点的低点。
再看看增长率高位与市场PE承受力高低点分别对应时的情况：
增长率回落 - 增长率高位与市场PE承受力低点对应
当在市场悲观，低估时，而企业增长率又恰巧处于最高时买入，长期持有还可以保证不亏本，但其中从6到8点的价格回落幅度很大，属于增长率回落，PE回落，PE承受力回落的共振，也就是戴维斯双杀还要加上市场PE承受力的打击。
增长率回落 - 增长率高位与市场PE承受力高点对应
如果4点时的高位买进，随后的戴维斯双杀+PE承受力回落打击，股价回落幅度接近65%，因为EPS的增长积累，随后8点处的PE承受力回升还能使得4点的买入解套，但如果继续持有，到9、10点的股价又再次大幅回落，长期投资却是亏损结局。
研究结果：好公司+好价格+长期持有。
好公司：要挑选能长期稳定增长（加速增长的更好）的企业，周期性越弱越好，持续稳定增长能够跨越足够长的时间。挑选好公司是非常考眼光的。象茅台这样的确定性极高的长期持续稳定增长企业，真是稀缺资源。
好价格：好价格可以使得投资低风险高收益，同时可以在即使选错了增长率减速的企业时，也能避免戴维斯双杀+PE承受力回落打击，降低风险。所以巴菲特十分强调安全边际的重要性。
长期持有：对于稳定或加速增长的企业，越是长期持有，收益越大。即使因为暂时高估，然后受PE承受力回落的打击而导致股价暂时下跌，但是下一次PE承受力回升时，价格会将涨得更厉害。
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