发掘明日之星
试问有哪只蓝筹股，不是由中小型公司长大的？1972年的长实、新地、80年代的恒地、华创，90年代的利丰、港交所、思捷等等，无一例外。
身为香港人，不应动辄怨天尤人。这弹丸之地，人口约700万却拥有数万个亿万富翁，相信是全世界亿万富翁最集中的大城市。过去六十年，我们一直享受东西最好的部分，例如1947年至1977年的三十年间，中国大陆经历国共内战到文化大革命，饱受风霜之际，香港却受惠于西方国家和日本战后重建的商机。如投资者于70年代初期开始持有优质股,以其纯利平均每年上升两成计，当年1万元投资今天已变成237万元。
当香港生产成本日渐昂贵、前路茫茫时，我们又刚好赶上1978年中国宣布改革开放，受惠于中国经济的兴起。因为中国这个13亿人口的市场，将为众多中小企业提供养分，令它们快速长大，我们仍有机会在众多细价股中，发掘十年后的长实或利丰。
任何企业一如人生，都有成长期、成熟期及回落期，所以不要呆呆地嫉妒巴菲特，他长期持有的可口可乐，近年纯利的年增长率只有8%，本港却有不少企业的纯利每年增长率达25%。所以香港人真要学会感恩。
拣选未来有机会成为蓝筹股的股份有如发掘“明星”，主要看潜质。有的人可以成为明星，甚至取代今日的巨星，但不是人人皆有条件。市场瞬息万变，股价反映的是前景而非过去的光辉，故我们必须利用宏观经济学，从大趋势中寻找“明日之星”，而不要追求“过气明星”。
“明日之星”通常是一些被大证券公司忽视而行业正从谷底回升者。大型证券行或基金通常都不会投资二线股，也不会花太多时间研究，令这类股份透明度不足，而报道金融新闻的媒体亦太懒惰，没有努力发掘沙堆中的钻石。每次有中小型股份纯利爆炸性上升之时，都令大部分投资者大吃一惊。
或者你并不相信，普通投资者赚取第一桶金的方法就是投资二线股。巴菲特如何发达？各位研究他所持有的股份时，应发现他买入股份的时期，它们都只是中价股而不是大蓝筹。他的利润一样是来自中价股变高价股！
选股正确加上时间正确，“明日之星”于十多年内为你带来百倍回报，并非不可能的事；也只有如此，才可令细钱变大钱！但亦不要把所有垃圾股都视作前途无限，一只股价低于1元的蚊型股，没有可能自动变成“Good buy”。
成为“明日之星”者，须具备两大元素：公司除须拥有良好的管理层外，更要有趋势之助。如果思捷当年没有收购德国思捷，过去十年该公司如何随欧盟零售市场成长而壮大自己？近年欧元一升再升，更提高了思捷的边际利润。利丰亦一样，如果美国市场不是自1997年至今大量从亚洲区进口廉价产品，利丰纯利增长又哪会如此迅速？随着中国逐步融入世贸(WTO)，现时最具“明星相”的，还数内地企业。
注定命苦的行业
这个世界上有人可以靠做工业发达,也有人可以靠经营地产发达，甚至可以靠金融或投资买卖发达。至于农业，恕我老曹孤陋寡闻，似乎未听过有人因而致富。
我老曹的外祖父是地主(此乃1951年母亲带我来港的部分理由)，有80亩田，如以今时今日美国1英亩田值1,000美元计，即只有8万美元身家，约62.4万港元，并不富裕。听母亲说，她在16岁前从未穿过一件无破无烂的衣服。
我母亲认为耕田的人世世代代贫穷,自小便发誓“唔嫁耕田佬”。来到香港,她要求子女勤力读书，因为只有将书读好，才能脱贫。新中国成立快60年，改革开放政策落实近30年，中国6.5亿农民的日子如何？
农民生计并非中国独有的问题，欧美国家政府亦须向农民提供大量补贴，让他们的农产品可以向全球低价倾销,令落后国家的农民付出多多但收获甚少。至今各国对解决农产品补贴的问题仍毫无进展。与农业相关的股份，何来投资价值？
这个世界上，有的行业命运注定崎岖颠簸。1984年至2004年，地产发展业的边际利润高达35%，银行业亦有19.6%，零售业及传媒业的边际利润却分别只有4.2%和4.6%。
2003年下半年，零售业虽因“自由行”而偶发性地出现过一段好日子，但随着租金上升以及激烈的竞争，又重返微利甚至亏损的轨道。零售股最大的缺点是进入门槛不高，因此行业无法长期保持高边际利润。80年代香港曾有过一阵内部消费热，但至今成功的零售股有多少？近年，内地零售股全面被看高一线，市盈率炒至半天高，到底是否昙花一现的概念？我老曹对零售股一向戒心较大。
至于传媒，更是高投入、低回报的行业。除电视广播(0511)因有半垄断地位而可获较高的边际利润外，其他经营者尤其是报刊早已进入恶性竞争。大家数数过去十年，有多少份报章消失？1997年至今，报章广告费的跌幅大于楼价，2003年下半年起楼价已大幅反弹，但报纸广告费反弹乏力，现在还有三份免费报纸在争夺广告，经营之难可想而知。
饮食业亦是劳心劳力的行业,成功与否取决于老板是否亲力亲为。从买手、厨房、楼面、装修、公关等各方面，事事严格监管。只要稍一松懈，很容易便出事。例如进货，海鱼与养鱼的价钱相差很大，买手有否使诈？厨房方面，用二两翅还是一两半翅，厨师有否倒来益食家？楼面员工招呼客人是否殷勤？公关经理的交际手腕又如何？
过去三十年，我老曹见尽饮食业由冒起到上市，然后又再衰落。出名的有新光酒楼、汉宝龙虾大王、潮州城酒楼、金龙船酒家等等，一旦做大，水准便下降，盛极而衰，全都走不出这个框框。只有镛记因只此一间另无分店，生意才能历久不衰。所以，饮食股亦是少涉足为佳。
另外，有的行业是因为法例改变，而变得生存艰难，最典型的例子是电讯业。过去全港独家的香港电话公司，纯利有政府保证为股东资金的16%，如赚取的盈利不足此数，即可申请加价。那时候打电话往加拿大，每分钟收费16元，你亦只能乖乖付款。惟随着电讯市场开放，新竞争者陆续加入，今天致电加拿大的收费大降九成半，尚有甚么暴利可赚？当年大家只管炒呀炒，有多少人留意行业生态已经改变？
KISS理论
著名投资者彼得·林奇(Peter Lynch)告诉我们，最好的选股方法是运用自己的眼、耳、口、鼻，而非听信大行推介。
1977年，彼得·林奇33岁时，成为麦哲伦基金(Megellan)经理。十三年后，他退休时，已成功地令1977年的每1万美元投资变成28.8万美元，升幅达二十倍！如何做到？他的投资方法，绝无花巧，就是“KISS”——Keep it simple, stupid！
彼得·林奇的名言：每年只可花三分钟在预测上，超过三分钟时间则全部是浪费。他致力投资于一些自己有所认识的行业。最为人津津乐道的事件，是麦哲伦基金大量投资Hanes一役。理由是彼得·林奇的贤内助说，Hanes生产的丝袜裤子最合穿，于是他便去调查，发现大部分女性都穿该品牌的裤袜。然后，他再问该品牌竞争对手Kaiser Roth的员工，请其品评两者优劣，因而得出答案。
Hanes的股价，自从麦哲伦基金买入后上升五倍，其后更被Sara Lee公司看中收购。彼得·林奇不是坐在冷气房间只看分析报告的人，他愿意真正去了解一间公司的产品，让他在众多基金经理中突围而出。
投资大师巴菲特“KISS”得更彻底，钟情于一些连傻瓜都可以营运得好的公司。例如他喜欢饮可口可乐、阅读《华盛顿邮报》，自己用口品尝、用眼看过，于是在60年代，重注购入可口可乐和《华盛顿邮报》的股票。今天两者均为他带来极可观的回报。
80年代，我老曹有位朋友代表香港一家工厂到外国接订单时，发现沃尔玛(Walmart)的经营方法极成功，于是一有钱便买沃尔玛股份。十年前聘用他的工厂迁入内地，令他丢掉饭碗，但他半点不担心，因为手上的沃尔玛股份已足以养活他一生。
至于未来，我则看好经营医疗产品的股份,尤其是用于诊断的医疗产品,例如蛋白芯片、三维扫描器(3D Scanners)等等。由于已发展国家人口日渐老化，新兴工业国人均收入又大升，大部分人皆越来越注重防范疾病。
例如我老曹每年皆验血一次，以便及早找出疾病和医治；平均每两年做一次全身磁力共振，以便及早知道脑血管、心脏血管及脊骨等是否有问题；平均每隔五年做一次大肠检查，看看有没有息肉，以防肠癌。至于血糖，更差不多每天都验，血压、心跳等则每月由医生代为检查一次。上述动作，我老曹由四十岁开始便做，至今已二十年。身体健康一如财富，需要小心打理并及早“止蚀”。
随着科学的进步，有大量诊断用的医疗产品出现，不但为拥有专利权的公司带来惊人的利润，而且许多疾病已能及早诊断。我老曹相信，下一轮吃香的行业，极有可能是拥有丰富医疗知识的专业人士。今日，大量新的医疗技术和产品面世，例如生物标识晶片(biomarker chip)，可通过血液样本测试，找出癌细胞留下的碎片记忆，如及早发现，可能毋须住院，只是吃药就可将刚形成的癌细胞杀死。我身边的朋友，不少就是利用上述技术在癌病发作初期已将癌细胞找出来,及时治疗，今天仍活得很健康。
本港部分私家医院，近年更装置CT Scanners(Computerised Tomography Scanners)，利用电脑断层摄影技术，进行全身透视摄影。最新的256薄片Scanner可在十分四秒内创造出一张彩色三维影像，观察心脏内动脉阻塞情况，毋须专家，普通人在电视荧幕上亦可看到。
过去人类花上四十年的时间研究，虽仍未能发明到医治脑充血、心脏病及癌病药物，但已创制出在疾病初期的诊断仪器。生产上述产品的公司，未来纯利升幅应该可人。
由此观之，平时多加留意行业趋势、传媒报道，以及了解上市公司所提供的产品及服务，再作简单的常识分析，便可获得灵感，找到绝佳的投资机会。例如2003 年7月，内地开始实施“自由行”，不少人投资本港零售股而大大赚了一笔；眼见内地房地产有市有价，投资于在本港上市的内地房地产股亦可赚一笔。此外，中央几年前宣布支持造船业，近年则支持环保事业，都可能带来机会。
如果认为上述方法仍然太复杂，可以买内地金融股。因为金融乃百业之母，在人民币升值、中国经济高增长的支持下，长期而言，内地金融股的业绩不会太差。投资者只要不是高价追入，投资成功不难。
此外，大部分公司都摆脱不了行业周期的影响，因此，投资者应学习冬天买草席、夏天买棉胎。
向四个大师偷师
社会上理财成功者只占两成，失败者却占八成。成败的关键非关运气与才智，而是做人的态度。
成功者多有梦想，做事有目标，善于建立良好的人际关系，亦勇于行动。如事情太多，他们会安排好优先次序，只处理重要的事，不浪费时间在无谓的事情上。情绪低落时，他们会数数自己所获得的恩典，而非抱怨自己的不幸，尽量不批评、不指责、不投诉。
在投资市场上，以清晰头脑配合一定的资本，再加上懂得风险管理，严守纪律、勇于止蚀、抵受得住获利回吐的引诱，你已接近成功。如果你是失败者的一员，请以一个成功人士为学习的对象，学习他的思想、他的行为，甚至多结识些成功人士，亦可令自己成功。社会上多了一个成功者，自然少了一个失败者。
著名投资者，如年逾90的坦普顿(John Templeton)，虽早已将以他命名的坦普顿基金出售，但他仍然是精明的投资者。
1939年，坦普顿向其上司借入1万美元投资股票；四年后他不但还清负债，更赚了4万美元。他的投资策略非常容易理解，坦普顿是世界上第一个严格执行“止蚀唔止赚”的投资者，他永远将风险局限在在投入资金15%之内，利润则多多益善。
坦普顿从来不相信技术分析，并认为一个人如要投资成功，必须由基础分析开始。他投资而不投机，习惯将一半收入储蓄起来，买入的股份一般都持有六至七年。在他将其管理的基金在90年代卖予富兰克林集团前的五十年，他成功地令资金以每年14%的幅度增长；即1946年投资1万美元于坦普顿增长基金上，到 1996年已约值700万美元，成绩仅次于巴菲特！
他认为今日投资早已全球化，发达机会较40、50年代的美国更多，最好的投资地区是那些尊重市场经济的地方。1936年，坦普顿曾到过印度和香港，那时香港仍较印度穷；1986年旧地重游，香港已十分发达，但加尔各答变化却不大，区别是香港政府早已尊重市场经济，而印度政府1986年仍信奉社会主义。其后印度政府开始尊重市场经济，过去二十年印度经济亦改善许多。
由于坦普顿一向低调，没有人知道他拥有多少财富，但他出售坦普顿基金时，家财已数以十亿美元计，相信今天其财富应在100亿美元以上。能成为巨富，都有些共同特性。例如1930年出生的巴菲特经历过大萧条，今天拥有400亿美元身家，凭藉的是集中、专注、扣准的投资态度。
Jack of all trade, master of none！经常转换工作岗位的人,通常难有成就。巴菲特愿意花上大半生于投资行业，自然成为此行业的专门人才，有出色表现。他只集中于4只股份：美国运通、可口可乐、富国银行、吉列刀片(已被宝洁收购)，已可致富。
在人人为科网股疯狂之时，巴菲特无所事事(do nothing)，就算受到猛烈批评，但他仍坚持只买“财务良好公司”的策略。结果，其投资旗舰巴郡(Berkshire Hathaway)的股价由2000年6月至2004年12月上升一倍，当日的批评者却因沉迷于泡沫而损失惨重。证明投资成功不在分散，而在眼光准确。
与巴菲特同年出生的索罗斯(George Soros)，亦曾在第二次世界大战时期受希特勒的迫害，现有身家达72亿美元。1992年，他抛空价值100亿美元的英镑时，曾评估过风险，发现最大的潜在损失只是4亿美元，但回报无限，可谓四两拨千斤。
另外，还有1936年出生、曾一度破产的伊坎(Carl Icahn)，成功靠投资翻身，今天手握85亿美元财富。当年伊坎购买Tapan时，该股的每股资产净值为20美元，股价却仅为7.5美元；他以每股7.89美元购入的Baird and Warner，同样每股资产净值达14美元。这些分析员在跌市中不建议买入的股份，伊坎却趁熊市大量吸纳，最后获得巨额财富。
成功的投资者，毋须在市场上百战百胜，而是遵守一个投资计划，信奉一套理念和系统，严守纪律，并戒除贪念与恐惧
Thursday, September 18, 2008
长期投资的四个误区
无论是主动还是被动的，“长期投资”这个词如今正在被越来越多的国内投资者所接受。在当前跌跌不休的国内证券市场上，“长期投资”似乎成为用来说服投资者继续留在这个变化莫测的市场中的最佳理由。扪心自问，有多少投资者真正理解了长期投资的本质？充斥市场的种种言论，无不反映出对长期投资理念的一知半解，甚至是不求甚解，也由此产生出许多对长期投资的认识误区。
误区一：盲目持有而不考虑宏观经济基本面变化
一般来说，只要时间足够长，股票指数总是会创出新高的，这其实一点也不神秘，有时仅仅是通货膨胀的作用就可以轻易做到这一点。但是因此不考虑一个国家或者地区的经济基本面而盲目的长期持有，这是长期投资的一大误区。如果一家公司所处国家或地区经济基本面出现不利局面，“倾巢之下，岂有完卵”，整个市场的系统性风险将侵蚀掉绝大多数投资者的投资收益。
误区二：盲目持有而不考虑企业质地
市场上有一类我们称之为“买股票买成股东”的投资者，他们往往盲目推崇或者错误理解长期投资理念，不分青红皂白的买入持有，以为只要捂着手上的股票，股价迟早能回来或者赚钱。其实这是一个极大的谬误。我们为什么要长期投资，是希望长期内企业能够不断成长，并分享到财富增长的成果，但我们很多投资者却把捂着基本面没有改善希望的垃圾股也算做长期投资，这是一种误区。
误区三：盲目持有而不考虑企业基本面发生根本变化
企业成长过程中的各种宏观环境会不断变化，企业竞争中可能犯种种的战略错误，企业也不可避免的有其特定生命周期规律，这些都决定了常盛不衰的企业是极为少见的。一直维持高速增长的公司更是不可能的。道琼斯工业指数自1896年设立以来，至今只有GE是唯一没有变更的成份公司。美国情况如此，中国目前发展变化极快的市场背景下更是如此。今天的绩优股很有可能就变成明天的垃圾股，所以选择了一只好股票，以为就可以一劳永逸一直持有下去就是长期投资，这是另一种误区。
误区四：盲目持有而不考虑估值水平
基金经理彼得·林奇曾说过：好公司也要在很好的位置去购买。长期投资的前提是持有那些长期价值低估而且具有竞争优势的好公司；如果股价已经充分反映而且透支合理价值，就不值得长期投资了，在这个时候，投资者应该做的是卖出而不是继续持有，更不应该买入。以为只要是好企业的股票，不问价格就买入持有，也是国内投资者对于长期投资的常见误区。
中国经历了十几年的经济高速增长，也涌现出一大批优秀的上市公司，但从股市中获得丰厚回报的投资者却很少，其中“过于慷慨”的出价是一个重要的原因。我们的市场中一直有一种论调：那就是我们的经济成长这么好，我们的股市就应该涨，出现大幅下跌就一定是不正常的，这其实是缺乏对估值水平的判断和考虑。
误区一：盲目持有而不考虑宏观经济基本面变化
一般来说，只要时间足够长，股票指数总是会创出新高的，这其实一点也不神秘，有时仅仅是通货膨胀的作用就可以轻易做到这一点。但是因此不考虑一个国家或者地区的经济基本面而盲目的长期持有，这是长期投资的一大误区。如果一家公司所处国家或地区经济基本面出现不利局面，“倾巢之下，岂有完卵”，整个市场的系统性风险将侵蚀掉绝大多数投资者的投资收益。
误区二：盲目持有而不考虑企业质地
市场上有一类我们称之为“买股票买成股东”的投资者，他们往往盲目推崇或者错误理解长期投资理念，不分青红皂白的买入持有，以为只要捂着手上的股票，股价迟早能回来或者赚钱。其实这是一个极大的谬误。我们为什么要长期投资，是希望长期内企业能够不断成长，并分享到财富增长的成果，但我们很多投资者却把捂着基本面没有改善希望的垃圾股也算做长期投资，这是一种误区。
误区三：盲目持有而不考虑企业基本面发生根本变化
企业成长过程中的各种宏观环境会不断变化，企业竞争中可能犯种种的战略错误，企业也不可避免的有其特定生命周期规律，这些都决定了常盛不衰的企业是极为少见的。一直维持高速增长的公司更是不可能的。道琼斯工业指数自1896年设立以来，至今只有GE是唯一没有变更的成份公司。美国情况如此，中国目前发展变化极快的市场背景下更是如此。今天的绩优股很有可能就变成明天的垃圾股，所以选择了一只好股票，以为就可以一劳永逸一直持有下去就是长期投资，这是另一种误区。
误区四：盲目持有而不考虑估值水平
基金经理彼得·林奇曾说过：好公司也要在很好的位置去购买。长期投资的前提是持有那些长期价值低估而且具有竞争优势的好公司；如果股价已经充分反映而且透支合理价值，就不值得长期投资了，在这个时候，投资者应该做的是卖出而不是继续持有，更不应该买入。以为只要是好企业的股票，不问价格就买入持有，也是国内投资者对于长期投资的常见误区。
中国经历了十几年的经济高速增长，也涌现出一大批优秀的上市公司，但从股市中获得丰厚回报的投资者却很少，其中“过于慷慨”的出价是一个重要的原因。我们的市场中一直有一种论调：那就是我们的经济成长这么好，我们的股市就应该涨，出现大幅下跌就一定是不正常的，这其实是缺乏对估值水平的判断和考虑。
美国政府会否技术性破产？
谢国忠：麦凯恩和奥巴马的解决方案都没说到点子上，却一味许诺更多的甜头
背景】美国总统候选人奥巴马和麦凯恩停止互攻，纪念“9·11”。最新民调显示，麦凯恩略胜一筹。
2008年9月11日，正值美国世贸中心与五角大楼遭受恐怖袭击七周年，民主党总统候选人奥巴马和共和党总统候选人麦凯恩，在纽约世贸中心大楼原址，共同出席了纪念仪式。为了表示对遇难者的尊重，两人同意在11日这一天停止播放相互攻击的广告。
盖洛普民意测验中心11日公布的最新民调显示，美国共和党总统候选人麦凯恩目前的民意支持率为48%，民主党总统候选人奥巴马为43%，虽然两人的支持率都比昨天各降1个百分点，但麦凯恩仍维持5个百分点的领先幅度。
《财经》杂志特约经济学家谢国忠认为，美国经济陷入困境的原因，除了格林斯潘主导的货币政策的失败，还有美国人提前消费的理念。两位总统候选人的方案，都无法实质解决美国在金融、医疗和社会保障方面的多重危机，美元弱势几成定局。社会保障危机可能使美国政府陷入技术意义上的破产。
谢国忠指出，美国经济正面临“大萧条”以来最严重的一场危机。要解决这一危机，需要作出非常大的牺牲。但是，政客们都没有说到点子上，还在许诺更多的甜头。他们要给什么呢？美元。多印钞票的结果是，痛楚在所有持有美元的人中传播，其中许多是外国人。当外国投资者意识到这点，开始抛售美元，而美元开始做自由落体的时候，这种游戏就玩不转了。
他认为，美国陷入今天的困境，是因为花了太多的钱，这些钱比他们创造的财富还要多。不幸的是，两个政党都承诺将在医疗保健、教育、救助抵押贷款违约者和减税上投入更多资金，这与美国应该做的事背道而驰。
不管是谁赢，要让经济回转都极为困难。谢国忠的观点是，美国已然居于债务泡沫之中，格林斯潘可能要为此负最大责任。在执掌美联储的18年间，他一直倾向于放松银根，对衍生品未能实施积极有力的监管，对次级债的猛增也手下留情。但是，如果不是美国家庭借贷心切，泡沫并不一定会产生。
那么，美国人为什么要借这么多钱，超出所能地花钱呢？谢国忠认为，根源在于，大多数美国人，在面临日益加速的全球化时，都想维持他们的生活水平。但是，自由贸易中是存在输家的。美国的经济增长得不够快，收入差距的拉大速度却很快。基尼系数从1990年的0.428上升到2005年的0.469。基尼系数的陡增说明了，美国大部分人的生活水平都相对下降了。
同时，谢国忠也指出，美国的医疗费用迅速上涨，已经超过了GDP的16%，比起25年前高出1倍。医疗费用居高不下，又导致低收入人群比高收入人群的负担更为沉重。受到全球化和医疗费用的阻碍，一般的美国家庭要靠收入增长来提高生活水平，是非常困难的。但是，美国人仍然相信生活水平应该永远在提高。房价被高估，没有关系，反正可以借债。正因如此，“人人都过得更好”这样的神话就有了支撑。
谢国忠说，的确，泡沫的出现加速了经济增长，并使生活水平的提高更为可能。但为此付出的代价，却是巨大的贸易逆差和不断积累的外债。这时“金融创新”出现了。通过多样化和套期保值等手段，“金融创新”使人们低估借债的风险，减少借贷融资需要的权益资本。当危机来临时，所有的事情都扯了进来，多样化在这个时候只是帮了倒忙，而套期保值在你真正需要的时候却不听使唤了。
他还提醒，除了金融危机和医疗危机，一场社会保障危机也俨然将至。“婴儿潮” 一代正要步入退休年龄。美国的社会保障体系是“现收现付型”，也就是说，一个人所做的贡献并没有被储蓄起来，而是花在了别人身上。估计这一体系的短缺在 GDP的2-3倍。美国政府可能会陷入技术意义上的破产。下届政府必须为此采取行动。
金融危机蔓延、医疗费用直线上升、社会保障体系濒临崩溃……面对这些紧迫、棘手的问题，谢国忠认为，奥巴马和麦凯恩提出的那一点方案里，这些问题并没有解决，反而更为复杂。
他举例说，在医疗方面，各候选人都试图通过政府支出来拓宽保险覆盖面，而不去尝试降低费用。虽然拓宽保险覆盖面能够促进社会公正，但是，也将使医疗危机在未来几年内更加复杂。美国的医疗成本在GDP中的占比每年以0.25%的幅度上升。两位候选人提出的计划将会加快这一趋势。如果医疗费用的增长速度仍然这么快，美国经济是不可能复苏的。
在社会保障方面，谢国忠说，共和党人主张私有化，民主党人则欲对高收入人群征税。二者都没有提及缩小受益面，而这才是惟一的出路。
背景】美国总统候选人奥巴马和麦凯恩停止互攻，纪念“9·11”。最新民调显示，麦凯恩略胜一筹。
2008年9月11日，正值美国世贸中心与五角大楼遭受恐怖袭击七周年，民主党总统候选人奥巴马和共和党总统候选人麦凯恩，在纽约世贸中心大楼原址，共同出席了纪念仪式。为了表示对遇难者的尊重，两人同意在11日这一天停止播放相互攻击的广告。
盖洛普民意测验中心11日公布的最新民调显示，美国共和党总统候选人麦凯恩目前的民意支持率为48%，民主党总统候选人奥巴马为43%，虽然两人的支持率都比昨天各降1个百分点，但麦凯恩仍维持5个百分点的领先幅度。
《财经》杂志特约经济学家谢国忠认为，美国经济陷入困境的原因，除了格林斯潘主导的货币政策的失败，还有美国人提前消费的理念。两位总统候选人的方案，都无法实质解决美国在金融、医疗和社会保障方面的多重危机，美元弱势几成定局。社会保障危机可能使美国政府陷入技术意义上的破产。
谢国忠指出，美国经济正面临“大萧条”以来最严重的一场危机。要解决这一危机，需要作出非常大的牺牲。但是，政客们都没有说到点子上，还在许诺更多的甜头。他们要给什么呢？美元。多印钞票的结果是，痛楚在所有持有美元的人中传播，其中许多是外国人。当外国投资者意识到这点，开始抛售美元，而美元开始做自由落体的时候，这种游戏就玩不转了。
他认为，美国陷入今天的困境，是因为花了太多的钱，这些钱比他们创造的财富还要多。不幸的是，两个政党都承诺将在医疗保健、教育、救助抵押贷款违约者和减税上投入更多资金，这与美国应该做的事背道而驰。
不管是谁赢，要让经济回转都极为困难。谢国忠的观点是，美国已然居于债务泡沫之中，格林斯潘可能要为此负最大责任。在执掌美联储的18年间，他一直倾向于放松银根，对衍生品未能实施积极有力的监管，对次级债的猛增也手下留情。但是，如果不是美国家庭借贷心切，泡沫并不一定会产生。
那么，美国人为什么要借这么多钱，超出所能地花钱呢？谢国忠认为，根源在于，大多数美国人，在面临日益加速的全球化时，都想维持他们的生活水平。但是，自由贸易中是存在输家的。美国的经济增长得不够快，收入差距的拉大速度却很快。基尼系数从1990年的0.428上升到2005年的0.469。基尼系数的陡增说明了，美国大部分人的生活水平都相对下降了。
同时，谢国忠也指出，美国的医疗费用迅速上涨，已经超过了GDP的16%，比起25年前高出1倍。医疗费用居高不下，又导致低收入人群比高收入人群的负担更为沉重。受到全球化和医疗费用的阻碍，一般的美国家庭要靠收入增长来提高生活水平，是非常困难的。但是，美国人仍然相信生活水平应该永远在提高。房价被高估，没有关系，反正可以借债。正因如此，“人人都过得更好”这样的神话就有了支撑。
谢国忠说，的确，泡沫的出现加速了经济增长，并使生活水平的提高更为可能。但为此付出的代价，却是巨大的贸易逆差和不断积累的外债。这时“金融创新”出现了。通过多样化和套期保值等手段，“金融创新”使人们低估借债的风险，减少借贷融资需要的权益资本。当危机来临时，所有的事情都扯了进来，多样化在这个时候只是帮了倒忙，而套期保值在你真正需要的时候却不听使唤了。
他还提醒，除了金融危机和医疗危机，一场社会保障危机也俨然将至。“婴儿潮” 一代正要步入退休年龄。美国的社会保障体系是“现收现付型”，也就是说，一个人所做的贡献并没有被储蓄起来，而是花在了别人身上。估计这一体系的短缺在 GDP的2-3倍。美国政府可能会陷入技术意义上的破产。下届政府必须为此采取行动。
金融危机蔓延、医疗费用直线上升、社会保障体系濒临崩溃……面对这些紧迫、棘手的问题，谢国忠认为，奥巴马和麦凯恩提出的那一点方案里，这些问题并没有解决，反而更为复杂。
他举例说，在医疗方面，各候选人都试图通过政府支出来拓宽保险覆盖面，而不去尝试降低费用。虽然拓宽保险覆盖面能够促进社会公正，但是，也将使医疗危机在未来几年内更加复杂。美国的医疗成本在GDP中的占比每年以0.25%的幅度上升。两位候选人提出的计划将会加快这一趋势。如果医疗费用的增长速度仍然这么快，美国经济是不可能复苏的。
在社会保障方面，谢国忠说，共和党人主张私有化，民主党人则欲对高收入人群征税。二者都没有提及缩小受益面，而这才是惟一的出路。
谢国忠：美国会如何应对危机
在雷曼兄弟的事情上，美国政府正试图划出救助的底线。如果它坚持现在的新立场，这将标志着一场金融风暴的开始。因为没有进行去杠杆化，这场持续一年的危机正在变成慢动作。金融部门的负债已经从2007年第二季度的14.8万亿美元上升到了2008年第一季度的15.9万亿美元。
正常的金融危机意味着金融体系的去杠杆化。如果去杠杆化真在美国发生，我们必须面对三个问题：为雷曼兄弟解困而产生的流动性问题、风险资产的重新定价以及严峻的经济低迷局势。
这场市场风暴实际上是为了解决雷曼兄弟6000亿美元资产所导致的流动性担忧以及AIG可能面临的上述困境。笔者认为，这种资产拯救不会挫伤任何人。美联储已经拓展了他的最后贷款人职责，以至于很难看出流动性问题会像一个世纪前那样导致整个经济系统的下滑。但令人担心的因素仍然存在。
资产的重新定价会冲销掉几个金融机构的偿付能力。如果雷曼兄弟卖掉它的CDO部分和其他有问题的资产，这个价格就会是市场价格了，当然有可能接近于零。这将迫使其他机构按市值定价。有多少机构会因此倒下呢？我们不知道。此外，70万亿美元的CDS也需要重新定价。
资产重新定价还可能对经济产生大的影响。廉价的信用已经助长了美国的消费。信用之所以廉价，是因为美联储和华尔街轻易创造了那些低估了风险同时又让人很难懂的产品。资产重新定价意味着美国家庭的信用将大幅度减少。美国经济可能会面临10多年前在亚洲发生的一切：GDP衰退4％~5％。
我相信，整个美国金融体系也许已经是负资产。如果杠杆资产贬值10％，也许就没有任何资产了。美国金融体系过度杠杆化，以至于难以承受大幅的资产价格贬值。10年前，美国金融产业的杠杆化是GDP的70％，5年前是100％，2007年则是137％。我们可以争论杠杆化的比例是否应该回到100％或者70％，这个数字也许在两者之间。因此，去杠杆化的规模应该超过6万亿美元，这相当于雷曼兄弟受困资产的10倍。那么多的去杠杆化意味着资产价格将出现大的缩减。但是，美国金融体系杠杆化太多了，以至于很难承受。这也许意味着整个金融体系已经破产。
现在有两种方法对付这场危机。正确的路径是让市场出清，为不良资产建立一个可流动市场。市场和经济都会很快见底。十年前亚洲就是这样做的。另外的选择是，把不良资产隐藏起来，然后允许金融机构在利润和损失抵消之间慢慢恢复。目前来看，美国正在像日本15年前做的那样，选择的是第二种路径。不同的是，美国由于贸易逆差或者低储蓄率，现在是通货膨胀，而日本当时是通货紧缩。
让雷曼兄弟倒闭似乎表明美国政府正寻求一个市场化的解决方案。我并不十分确信这一点。去杠杆化的比例太大，以至于市场难以消化。美国政府也许会重新回到援助行动的循环中来。他们会让AIG倒掉吗？如果他们救助了AIG，那我们就又重新回到了老样子。
美国唯一的解决办法是印钱来掩盖金融机构的流动性问题，让他们加班来清理损失。而市场为此将卖掉美元，买进黄金。
美国正在这场危机的处理中蹒跚而行。这使得这种选择非常重要。15年前，日本将利率降到了零，来稳定破产的金融机构，然后用财政资金来稳定需求。这导致了“失去的十年”，企业和银行在此期间慢慢恢复生存能力。这实际上是一个把政府的钱转移到公司资产平衡表上的缓慢过程。这种平衡只有在高额的贸易顺差、高储蓄率等基础上才有可能。
美国的经常账户占GDP的5％。政府负债水平已经很高。因此日本的解决方案并不可行。唯一剩下的武器就是美元了。美国可以印刷美元，然后让世界共同来分担。接下来几年，美国可能面临的是负的真实利率、高通胀、弱美元。债券市场的潜在崩溃可能摧毁这个平衡。所以，只要美国国债收益率保持低水平，美国就没有动力让美元强势。只有等各国中央银行抛售美国国债时，美国才可能改变它的政策。
正常的金融危机意味着金融体系的去杠杆化。如果去杠杆化真在美国发生，我们必须面对三个问题：为雷曼兄弟解困而产生的流动性问题、风险资产的重新定价以及严峻的经济低迷局势。
这场市场风暴实际上是为了解决雷曼兄弟6000亿美元资产所导致的流动性担忧以及AIG可能面临的上述困境。笔者认为，这种资产拯救不会挫伤任何人。美联储已经拓展了他的最后贷款人职责，以至于很难看出流动性问题会像一个世纪前那样导致整个经济系统的下滑。但令人担心的因素仍然存在。
资产的重新定价会冲销掉几个金融机构的偿付能力。如果雷曼兄弟卖掉它的CDO部分和其他有问题的资产，这个价格就会是市场价格了，当然有可能接近于零。这将迫使其他机构按市值定价。有多少机构会因此倒下呢？我们不知道。此外，70万亿美元的CDS也需要重新定价。
资产重新定价还可能对经济产生大的影响。廉价的信用已经助长了美国的消费。信用之所以廉价，是因为美联储和华尔街轻易创造了那些低估了风险同时又让人很难懂的产品。资产重新定价意味着美国家庭的信用将大幅度减少。美国经济可能会面临10多年前在亚洲发生的一切：GDP衰退4％~5％。
我相信，整个美国金融体系也许已经是负资产。如果杠杆资产贬值10％，也许就没有任何资产了。美国金融体系过度杠杆化，以至于难以承受大幅的资产价格贬值。10年前，美国金融产业的杠杆化是GDP的70％，5年前是100％，2007年则是137％。我们可以争论杠杆化的比例是否应该回到100％或者70％，这个数字也许在两者之间。因此，去杠杆化的规模应该超过6万亿美元，这相当于雷曼兄弟受困资产的10倍。那么多的去杠杆化意味着资产价格将出现大的缩减。但是，美国金融体系杠杆化太多了，以至于很难承受。这也许意味着整个金融体系已经破产。
现在有两种方法对付这场危机。正确的路径是让市场出清，为不良资产建立一个可流动市场。市场和经济都会很快见底。十年前亚洲就是这样做的。另外的选择是，把不良资产隐藏起来，然后允许金融机构在利润和损失抵消之间慢慢恢复。目前来看，美国正在像日本15年前做的那样，选择的是第二种路径。不同的是，美国由于贸易逆差或者低储蓄率，现在是通货膨胀，而日本当时是通货紧缩。
让雷曼兄弟倒闭似乎表明美国政府正寻求一个市场化的解决方案。我并不十分确信这一点。去杠杆化的比例太大，以至于市场难以消化。美国政府也许会重新回到援助行动的循环中来。他们会让AIG倒掉吗？如果他们救助了AIG，那我们就又重新回到了老样子。
美国唯一的解决办法是印钱来掩盖金融机构的流动性问题，让他们加班来清理损失。而市场为此将卖掉美元，买进黄金。
美国正在这场危机的处理中蹒跚而行。这使得这种选择非常重要。15年前，日本将利率降到了零，来稳定破产的金融机构，然后用财政资金来稳定需求。这导致了“失去的十年”，企业和银行在此期间慢慢恢复生存能力。这实际上是一个把政府的钱转移到公司资产平衡表上的缓慢过程。这种平衡只有在高额的贸易顺差、高储蓄率等基础上才有可能。
美国的经常账户占GDP的5％。政府负债水平已经很高。因此日本的解决方案并不可行。唯一剩下的武器就是美元了。美国可以印刷美元，然后让世界共同来分担。接下来几年，美国可能面临的是负的真实利率、高通胀、弱美元。债券市场的潜在崩溃可能摧毁这个平衡。所以，只要美国国债收益率保持低水平，美国就没有动力让美元强势。只有等各国中央银行抛售美国国债时，美国才可能改变它的政策。
IMF head: worst of financial crisis may lie ahead
The worst of the financial crisis may still lie ahead and more major financial institutions may face trouble in coming months, IMF director general Dominique Strauss-Kahn said on Wednesday.
"The roots of the crisis are behind us, the roots being the fall in housing prices. The consequences for some financial institutions are still in front of us. We have to expect that there may be in the coming weeks and coming months other financial institutions with some problems," he said.
Still, the world economy was very resilient and should rebound in 2009, Strauss-Kahn said to reporters after a meeting with Gulf Arab finance ministers and central bank governors.
"The roots of the crisis are behind us, the roots being the fall in housing prices. The consequences for some financial institutions are still in front of us. We have to expect that there may be in the coming weeks and coming months other financial institutions with some problems," he said.
Still, the world economy was very resilient and should rebound in 2009, Strauss-Kahn said to reporters after a meeting with Gulf Arab finance ministers and central bank governors.
美国证券交易委员会：将从周四起实施禁止卖空行为的措施
美国证券交易委员会(Securities and Exchange Commission,简称SEC)周三宣布相关措施，通过对卖空方及其经纪商的平仓要求来限制滥用没有预先借贷的卖空活动。
SEC表示，卖空方及其经纪商必须在结算日（交易后的三天）交割为卖空借入的证券，否则将面临惩罚。
SEC将这一更严格的交割要求作为暂行规定，并将从周四美东时间上午12:01开始适用于所有上市公司证券交易。
SEC表示，卖空方及其经纪商必须在结算日（交易后的三天）交割为卖空借入的证券，否则将面临惩罚。
SEC将这一更严格的交割要求作为暂行规定，并将从周四美东时间上午12:01开始适用于所有上市公司证券交易。
Wednesday, September 17, 2008
SEC issues rules against abusive short sales
New rules aimed against abusive naked short selling of stock in all publicly traded companies were issued by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on Wednesday.
The SEC's new rules, which include a requirement to deliver a security by the settlement date, are effective on Thursday.
"These several actions today make it crystal clear that the SEC has zero tolerance for abusive naked short selling," SEC Chairman Christopher Cox said in a statement.
Short sellers and their broker dealers are now required to deliver securities by the close of business on the settlement date, which is three days after the sale, or they will face penalties.
Broker-dealers failing to comply will be prohibited from further short sales in the same security unless the shares are pre-borrowed. That prohibition on the broker-dealer's activity will also apply to all short sales for any customer.
The SEC also adopted a rule that deems it fraudulent for customers to deceive broker-dealers about the intention or ability to deliver securities in time for settlement.
The third measure the SEC adopted requires option market makers to deliver securities by settlement date.
A "naked" short sale occurs when an investor sells stock that has not yet been borrowed.
Broker-dealers will sometimes accidentally fail to deliver stock to investors who have arranged to borrow it. If this is done intentionally, it is already illegal.
The SEC's new rules, which include a requirement to deliver a security by the settlement date, are effective on Thursday.
"These several actions today make it crystal clear that the SEC has zero tolerance for abusive naked short selling," SEC Chairman Christopher Cox said in a statement.
Short sellers and their broker dealers are now required to deliver securities by the close of business on the settlement date, which is three days after the sale, or they will face penalties.
Broker-dealers failing to comply will be prohibited from further short sales in the same security unless the shares are pre-borrowed. That prohibition on the broker-dealer's activity will also apply to all short sales for any customer.
The SEC also adopted a rule that deems it fraudulent for customers to deceive broker-dealers about the intention or ability to deliver securities in time for settlement.
The third measure the SEC adopted requires option market makers to deliver securities by settlement date.
A "naked" short sale occurs when an investor sells stock that has not yet been borrowed.
Broker-dealers will sometimes accidentally fail to deliver stock to investors who have arranged to borrow it. If this is done intentionally, it is already illegal.
Tuesday, September 16, 2008
冷眼分享集: 一念定吉凶
人生之吉凶，往往就在一念之間。
一念，就是一個念頭的生起，這一念，就是個出發點，這個出發點決定了以后的方向。
千里之行，能否到達目的地，不是決定于路途之遠近，而是決定于起步時所定的方向。
人生之路有如飛机之航線，假如你的目的地是倫敦，你鎖定了航線的度數，即使在黑夜中，完全看不到机艙外的海洋與陸地，十七小時后也可以平安地由吉隆坡飛抵倫敦。
假如你起飛時定錯了航線的度數，開始時可能只相差那麼區區的數度，但在十七小時之后，飛机降落的地點，可能相差1萬公里，不是在倫敦，而是在北极降陸。
差之毫厘，失之千里，此之謂也。
在股市投資中，決定成敗的因素很多，但是追根究底，往往只是一念之差。
這一念之差，在數十年之后可能使你腰纏萬貫或是身敗名裂。
投資還是投机？
這一“念”是“投資”還是“投机”？如果你的選擇是“投机”的話，你一開始就定錯方向，往后你無論盡多大的努力，耗盡多少的心机，最后一無所得還算你幸運，最怕是落得傾家蕩產，身敗名裂。
如果你選擇的是投資，而且是長期投資的話，你的方向選對了。
方向錯誤徒勞無功
即使途中因故障而被迫在半途緊急降陸，但只要修好机器，繼續沿正确的方向飛行，最后必能達到目的地，不是不到，只是遲到。
這是老机長告訴我的話，也正是我四十年股市投資的經驗之談。
所以，如果你要在股市作千里之行，如果你想通過股市累積財富，使你有能力供兒女受高等教育，使你老年生活有保障。
那麼，你首先要做的，不是研究股市，更不是研究企業，而是端正你的念頭，确定正确的方向。
方向正确，研究才有用。
方向不正确，無論怎樣研究，最后都是徒勞無功。
投机的特征：
（1）假如你買進時對企業一無所知，你希望靠別人把臭股炒起，使你獲利，你是在投机。
（2）你相信快速致富－－最好是無本致富，大玩對敲，那是最坏的投机。
（3）根据謠言而不是根据事實決定買進賣方。
（4）感情用事，EQ(情緒商數)高過IQ(智商)。
（5）冥頑不靈，死性不改，投机到底。
（6）為了找刺激，不是為了求財而買股。
（7）永遠不做功課，以別人的意見為意見，自己沒有主見。
（8）為自己的失敗找理由。
（9）相信“好股沒人炒，不會起，有個屁用”之類的話。
投資的特征：
（1）相信天下沒有白吃的午餐。 要賺錢，必須付出心血和心力。
（2）相信股票只有長期投資才能獲利。種油棕要三年才結果，買屋子要三年才交屋，股票守三年才有利可圖是不是很合理呢？
（3）不信謠言。
（4）IQ高過EQ。
（5）投資是為求財，不是求氣。
（6）從失敗中吸取教訓，不重蹈覆轍。
（7）永遠不忘記買股票就是買公司的股份，公司的業績比股市的興衰重要。
（8）不為失敗找藉口來掩飾自己的過錯。
（9）勤做功課－－全力研究企業。
成敗只在一念之間，你選擇投資還是投机，由你自己決定。
一念，就是一個念頭的生起，這一念，就是個出發點，這個出發點決定了以后的方向。
千里之行，能否到達目的地，不是決定于路途之遠近，而是決定于起步時所定的方向。
人生之路有如飛机之航線，假如你的目的地是倫敦，你鎖定了航線的度數，即使在黑夜中，完全看不到机艙外的海洋與陸地，十七小時后也可以平安地由吉隆坡飛抵倫敦。
假如你起飛時定錯了航線的度數，開始時可能只相差那麼區區的數度，但在十七小時之后，飛机降落的地點，可能相差1萬公里，不是在倫敦，而是在北极降陸。
差之毫厘，失之千里，此之謂也。
在股市投資中，決定成敗的因素很多，但是追根究底，往往只是一念之差。
這一念之差，在數十年之后可能使你腰纏萬貫或是身敗名裂。
投資還是投机？
這一“念”是“投資”還是“投机”？如果你的選擇是“投机”的話，你一開始就定錯方向，往后你無論盡多大的努力，耗盡多少的心机，最后一無所得還算你幸運，最怕是落得傾家蕩產，身敗名裂。
如果你選擇的是投資，而且是長期投資的話，你的方向選對了。
方向錯誤徒勞無功
即使途中因故障而被迫在半途緊急降陸，但只要修好机器，繼續沿正确的方向飛行，最后必能達到目的地，不是不到，只是遲到。
這是老机長告訴我的話，也正是我四十年股市投資的經驗之談。
所以，如果你要在股市作千里之行，如果你想通過股市累積財富，使你有能力供兒女受高等教育，使你老年生活有保障。
那麼，你首先要做的，不是研究股市，更不是研究企業，而是端正你的念頭，确定正确的方向。
方向正确，研究才有用。
方向不正确，無論怎樣研究，最后都是徒勞無功。
投机的特征：
（1）假如你買進時對企業一無所知，你希望靠別人把臭股炒起，使你獲利，你是在投机。
（2）你相信快速致富－－最好是無本致富，大玩對敲，那是最坏的投机。
（3）根据謠言而不是根据事實決定買進賣方。
（4）感情用事，EQ(情緒商數)高過IQ(智商)。
（5）冥頑不靈，死性不改，投机到底。
（6）為了找刺激，不是為了求財而買股。
（7）永遠不做功課，以別人的意見為意見，自己沒有主見。
（8）為自己的失敗找理由。
（9）相信“好股沒人炒，不會起，有個屁用”之類的話。
投資的特征：
（1）相信天下沒有白吃的午餐。 要賺錢，必須付出心血和心力。
（2）相信股票只有長期投資才能獲利。種油棕要三年才結果，買屋子要三年才交屋，股票守三年才有利可圖是不是很合理呢？
（3）不信謠言。
（4）IQ高過EQ。
（5）投資是為求財，不是求氣。
（6）從失敗中吸取教訓，不重蹈覆轍。
（7）永遠不忘記買股票就是買公司的股份，公司的業績比股市的興衰重要。
（8）不為失敗找藉口來掩飾自己的過錯。
（9）勤做功課－－全力研究企業。
成敗只在一念之間，你選擇投資還是投机，由你自己決定。
FDIC显然没有足够的资金：你在美国银行的存款可能不保
“世纪金融危机”袭击美国之后，许多美国人开始担心他们银行存款的安全性。虽然FDIC（美国联邦存款保险公司）对个人存款帐户的保险额高达10万美元，但是显然美国人已经对FDIC失去信任。今年夏天大批美国民众在IndyMac零售支行前焦急排队的场景正印证了这种担忧。
美国财长鲍尔森在周一的新闻发布会上称美国的银行系统是安全健康的，试图打消普通美国民众的这种担心。
“没有什么比金融市场的稳定有序更重要的了，”鲍尔森说，“现在是美国金融市场的艰难时刻，但美国人民应该对我们金融系统的健康有活力充满信心。”
但美国民众的担心是有理由的。纽约大学商学院的Nouriel Roubini教授指出，美国全国的存款额高达1兆亿美元，但FDIC只有500亿美元的资金来为这些存款提供保险。“FDIC显然没有足够的资金，除非美国国会立即行动对FDIC注资，” Nouriel Roubini教授说。
Nouriel Roubini教授表示他并不想增加民众的恐慌。但他是少数几个准确预测此次信贷危机严重程度的市场观察家之一。他建议那些在户头里有数额超过10万美元的储户分散资金至不同的银行，以降低风险。
美国财长鲍尔森在周一的新闻发布会上称美国的银行系统是安全健康的，试图打消普通美国民众的这种担心。
“没有什么比金融市场的稳定有序更重要的了，”鲍尔森说，“现在是美国金融市场的艰难时刻，但美国人民应该对我们金融系统的健康有活力充满信心。”
但美国民众的担心是有理由的。纽约大学商学院的Nouriel Roubini教授指出，美国全国的存款额高达1兆亿美元，但FDIC只有500亿美元的资金来为这些存款提供保险。“FDIC显然没有足够的资金，除非美国国会立即行动对FDIC注资，” Nouriel Roubini教授说。
Nouriel Roubini教授表示他并不想增加民众的恐慌。但他是少数几个准确预测此次信贷危机严重程度的市场观察家之一。他建议那些在户头里有数额超过10万美元的储户分散资金至不同的银行，以降低风险。
US in 'once-in-a-century' financial crisis : Greenspan
The United States is mired in a "once-in-a century" financial crisis which is now more than likely to spark a recession, former Federal Reserve chief Alan Greenspan said Sunday.
The talismanic ex-central banker said that the crisis was the worst he had seen in his career, still had a long way to go and would continue to effect home prices in the United States.
"First of all, let's recognize that this is a once-in-a-half-century, probably once-in-a-century type of event," Greenspan said on ABC's "This Week."
Asked whether the crisis, which has seen the US government step in to bail out mortgage giants Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, was the worst of his career, Greenspan replied "Oh, by far."
"There's no question that this is in the process of outstripping anything I've seen, and it still is not resolved and it still has a way to go," Greenspan said.
"And indeed, it will continue to be a corrosive force until the price of homes in the United States stabilizes.
"That will induce a series of events around the globe which will stabilize the system."
Greenspan was also asked whether the United States had a greater-than 50 percent chance of escaping a recession.
"No, I think it's less than 50 percent.
"I can't believe we could have a once-in-a-century type of financial crisis without a significant impact on the real economy globally, and I think that indeed is what is in the process of occurring."
The former Federal Reserve chairman also predicted that the financial crisis would see the failure of more major financial institutions, even as embattled Wall Street investment giant Lehman Brothers scrambled to find a buyer.
"In and of itself that does not need to be a problem.
"It depends on how it is handled and how the liquidations take place. And indeed we shouldn't try to protect every single institution."
On Saturday, Democrat Barack Obama's campaign seized on a warning from Greenspan about John McCain's tax plans to portray the Republican as economically reckless.
In an interview with Bloomberg Television Friday, Greenspan said the nation could not afford 3.3 trillion dollars of tax cuts proposed by McCain without matching cuts in spending.
Greenspan, a long-time friend of McCain and a Republican, said about the Arizona senator's plans to extend massive tax cuts imposed by President George W. Bush: "I'm not in favor of financing tax cuts with borrowed money."
McCain has said he would pay for his cuts by ending pet funding projects for US lawmakers' districts known as "earmarks."
The talismanic ex-central banker said that the crisis was the worst he had seen in his career, still had a long way to go and would continue to effect home prices in the United States.
"First of all, let's recognize that this is a once-in-a-half-century, probably once-in-a-century type of event," Greenspan said on ABC's "This Week."
Asked whether the crisis, which has seen the US government step in to bail out mortgage giants Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, was the worst of his career, Greenspan replied "Oh, by far."
"There's no question that this is in the process of outstripping anything I've seen, and it still is not resolved and it still has a way to go," Greenspan said.
"And indeed, it will continue to be a corrosive force until the price of homes in the United States stabilizes.
"That will induce a series of events around the globe which will stabilize the system."
Greenspan was also asked whether the United States had a greater-than 50 percent chance of escaping a recession.
"No, I think it's less than 50 percent.
"I can't believe we could have a once-in-a-century type of financial crisis without a significant impact on the real economy globally, and I think that indeed is what is in the process of occurring."
The former Federal Reserve chairman also predicted that the financial crisis would see the failure of more major financial institutions, even as embattled Wall Street investment giant Lehman Brothers scrambled to find a buyer.
"In and of itself that does not need to be a problem.
"It depends on how it is handled and how the liquidations take place. And indeed we shouldn't try to protect every single institution."
On Saturday, Democrat Barack Obama's campaign seized on a warning from Greenspan about John McCain's tax plans to portray the Republican as economically reckless.
In an interview with Bloomberg Television Friday, Greenspan said the nation could not afford 3.3 trillion dollars of tax cuts proposed by McCain without matching cuts in spending.
Greenspan, a long-time friend of McCain and a Republican, said about the Arizona senator's plans to extend massive tax cuts imposed by President George W. Bush: "I'm not in favor of financing tax cuts with borrowed money."
McCain has said he would pay for his cuts by ending pet funding projects for US lawmakers' districts known as "earmarks."
纽约经济学家再次预警美国将现W形衰退
著名经济学家Nouriel Roubini两年前就美国房地产市场的次贷问题向人们预警。人们之前对此置若罔闻，真实是天大的错误；如今他认为美国经济衰退走势将是“ W”形而不是“U”形.
著名经济学家、纽约大学经济学教授Nouriel Roubini可谓经济学界预言家。在过去两年里， Roubini就向人们预警：次贷危机中房价可能会下跌20%，绝对是一次严重的银行业危机和信用崩溃。 房利美和房地美事件再次证明，人们之前对 Nouriel Roubini 的警告置若罔闻，是天大的错误。
Roubini曾对经济形势作了以下预测：金融危机将导致至少1万亿美元的损失，而且损失很可能接近2万亿美元；房地美和房利美将无力偿债，财政部纾困计划对与政府关系密切的华尔街富人有利；数十家大型区域/全国银行因房地产曝险太高而破产；四大投资银行-美林证券、雷曼兄弟、摩根士丹利和高盛不是破产，就是必须与传统商业银行合并；经济衰退将走U形，持续 12-18个月；股市将下跌40%；原油和大宗商品价格下挫20%-30%；类似的房地产、资产、信用泡沫将出现在英国、西班牙、爱尔兰、意大利、和葡萄牙，造成它们经济成长急降或步入衰退。
Roubini毕业于哈佛大学，因其在博客上对亚洲金融危机精辟见解获得华盛顿政治精英们的关注，被克林顿政府聘为白宫经济顾问。以下是Roubini先生对经济形势最新的预测(节选自《巴伦周刊》)：
问：不幸被您言中太多了，实际情况可能更糟糕，未来最坏情况会如何？
Roubini: 如今，我们正在经历危机第二波冲击，相比危机始发时，现在已进入“后衰退时期”，这个时期从2008年年初算起要只持续到2009年年终。这也是银行业危机集中爆发的时期，届时数百家银行恐怕要破产、清算。
问：都有哪些银行？
Roubini: 我在这里不方便点名，但确实有很多银行会因次贷危机倒闭。你会发现它们损失越来越多，因为截至目前，它们只对次贷作了减记，还没对客户信用作减记处理，这部分损失更大，所以我们外人看到的减记和亏损远小于真实情况。银行财务官们一大半精力不是花在财务重整上，而是千方百计地进行暗箱操作，以使这些本该存在的数字从财务报表上消失。他们想掩盖众所周知的事实——很多房地产相关证券的资产价值为零。
问：目前来看，代表实体经济的GDP没有连续两个季度出现负增长，怎么能说衰退呢？
Roubini: 并不是说经济增长连续两个季度为负才叫衰退。美国国家经济研究局不是经常在强调就业率吗？目前就业率已连续7个月下滑。同样下滑的还有批发和零售数据，以及居民收入。
也许衰退早在1月份就开始了，你可以在2～4月份的GDP增长报告中读到衰退的信息。尽管整体经济在第二季度有所反弹，可市场复苏没那么简单，经济走势也许会是“ W”形而不是“U”形，因为第三季度政府退税效果已完全消失，其他一些给消费带来负面影响的因素都是长期的。
问：都有哪些因素？
Roubini: 美国人总是过度消费而不注重储蓄，美国人平均债务已高达可支配收入的140%，这个数字在2000年才只有100%。以前房价只涨不跌，房子就是美国人的自动提款机，抵押机构对这类贷款申请条件的审核也特别宽松。如今房价下跌，银行已经收紧了房屋抵押贷款。另外，股市下跌以及房屋抵押贷款的崩盘，让许多人意识到信用危机已经降临，他们的消费水平必然会因此下降。液化天然气已经涨到了每加仑4美元，可能有人说，“油价是涨了，但会带来新的工作机会，收入也会因通胀而提高，所以消费自然会跟着上升。”然而，他们可能没有注意到，私营部门的就业率已经连续下滑好几个月了。
更令人担心的是，退税政策的效果几乎趋于消弭，6月商品零售额仅增长了0.1%，如果不是退税，商品零售额可能是负增长。预计未来一段时间，美国人会紧缩开支，到时候退税支票就不会对消费产生正面效应了。
问：您对伯南克主席的政策怎么看？
Roubini: 迄今为止，联储的表现用不合格来形容再贴切不过。一年前他们就说房价下跌马上会停止，可现在呢？他们给市场的信号是问题仅仅留在次级债务领域，其实风险已经深入到次级债、次优债、优先债、房地产、信用卡、车贷、学生信贷和房屋净值贷款、杠杆借贷、市政债和公司债等领域。数数看，有多少联储没有告知人们。
联储另一个过错是，过去数年，房地产贡献了全国1/3就业增长率，他们居然认为房屋市场崩盘不会对经济其他方面产生影响。今天来看，央行过去的政策信号完全没有可信度，他们对市场今日的“成就”有不可推卸的责任。千篇一律的说辞已经伤害到了支持者们，联储似乎已经丧失了严谨的风格。不过还好，他们总是在不断改进。
问：伯南克一年前在做什么？
Roubini: 从格林斯潘时代危机就开启了，就是2001年高科技泡沫破灭之后，格林斯潘开始降息之时。利率水平太低，也持续太久，2004年基准利率仅为1%，随后提升到适当水平的行动又太缓慢。另外，他们不计后果地放松监管，这可能是布什政府放任经济政策、迷信市场自我调节机制才引起的，这就意味着市场没有监管者，也缺乏交易规范。银行和经纪商的风险管理模型根本就没有起到作用，因为市场向好时，CEO们更愿意去采取积极进取的发展战略而不会去听风险官的意见，可他们又不能准确判断熊市何时到来。对这种随波逐流的态度，花旗卸任CEO有句名言：“音乐响了你就得跳舞。”
问：如今监管者正在努力补救当年政策的疏漏，您怎么看现行的措施？
Roubini：似乎在走另一个极端，而且像是调控过头了。他们试图拯救所有破产者，想要干预每一个市场。证券及外汇交易委员会指控有人涉嫌操纵价格，但政府才是真正的价格操纵者，监管者需要反思对待房利美和房地美的拯救态度，还有贝尔斯登。他们拿问题证券来换取长期国债，这公平吗？这是所得私人化、损失社会化的措施，这是华尔街和富人们的社会主义福利。
问： 您的意思是政府应该让贝尔斯登倒闭，但不包括房利美和房地美？
Roubini:如果贝尔斯登倒闭会引发整个银行系统的恐慌。但其实，有更公平的办法来处理贝尔斯登和房利美、房地美事件。如果公众资金被拿来涉险，只能是在股东们已经被拖垮、管理层无能为力的情况下，而贝尔斯登的债权人应当承担相应损失。为什么是联储花290亿美元去购买那些垃圾债券，而不是贝尔斯登的购买者JP摩根？
问：因为两者相似吗？
Roubini: 的确。政府帮了所有人。 不然，就算房利美和房地美的无担保债权人都应该承担损失。有时候动用公款去拯救金融机构是必要的，但你不能拿公众的钱去救那些犯错的公司。可政府不仅帮了股东、帮了债权人还在某种程度上帮了那些犯错的管理层。
问：从哪个角度来说，政府不应该帮助那些问题公司？
Roubini: 许多公共机构都是由于自身原因走向破产的，联邦储蓄保险公司只有530亿美元的资金，仅仅为帮助房地美的存款人就动用了15%。它保费的收入并不高，现在只能要求国会增加对它的拨款了。还有，联邦储蓄保险公司声明只有9家机构在其关注名单上，而在6月事件爆发前，房地美不在其中，大家可以想象，这个公司背后实际蕴含着多大风险。有专家研究表明，联邦储蓄保险公司担保的8500家银行中至少有8%(大概有700家)遇到类似的大麻烦。另外，还有8% 到 16% 的银行机构处于危险的边缘，所以可能有700家倒闭有700家将步其后尘。 现在联邦储蓄保险公司居然还只关注9家机构，真是大笑话。
问：对纳税人影响如何？
Roubini：纳税人将会得到长长的账单。我估计，这次危机导致的损失高达1万亿甚至2万亿美元之多。今年2月份，我这么说，大家还都取笑我，但几周后国际货币基金组织的数据就出来了，大概在9450亿美元，高盛预测是1.1万亿美元，UBS认为是1万亿美元。对冲基金经理约翰.鲍尔森估计为1.3万亿美元，而就在上个月，有人预测为1.6万亿美元。这样看来，1万亿美元只不过是最低估计，但迄今为止银行只有3000亿美元的次级债减记。
问：银行业走出危机需要多长时间？
Roubini: 很难说。一些小银行正走向倒闭。光去年就有超过200家次贷贷款人倒闭，许多社区银行都濒临破产。之所以如此，在于社区银行融资服务很广：从住房、店铺，到小镇、房地产以及购物中心。有房地产危机的地方，就有社区银行倒闭。另外，区域性银行也不好过，如今大概三分之一的区域性银行都度日如年。
即使那些金融巨头们也可能遭此厄运，虽然人们都认为，它们有足够的规模来抵御危机。拿花旗集团来说，在1991年发生小型房地产危机之时，当时每季度房屋价格下跌仅4%，花旗就濒临破产，从而求助于联储，才有安然度过那段危机以及后来合并旅行者集团。
问：您似乎对批评乐此不疲？
Roubini: 不是，其实我是一个非常主流的经济学家，因为有意大利和美国的教育经历。我的兴趣在国际市场经济和国际金融领域，我也不是纯粹的悲观主义者或者看空者。 抛开我们将要面临的衰退和全球性危机而言，只要这种低迷结束，国际经济还会稳定增长。只是因为美国经济和金融存在明显问题，我这才看空市场。新兴市场国家，比如中国、印度以及其他国家，将从根本上改变世界经济和政治格局。与单极世界相比，世界不同力量之间将变得更加均衡。美国政府需要研究的一个重要课题就是：如何让22亿多的中印两国人口融入世界经济？发达国家将会因此产生过渡成本以及工作机会地转移， 但我对全球经济是绝对看好，对中长期，我都是坚定的看多者。
美元讽刺性反弹
近来美元持续走强的理由在于美国经济衰退和信贷危机已经扩大到其他主要工业国，导致它们的货币兑美元下挫。
近来美元走强，大多数分析人士预测美元反弹还将持续一段时间。其理由在于美国经济衰退和信贷危机已经扩大到其他主要工业国。这些国家丧失了对美国的先前优势，它们的货币兑美元因此都出现了不同程度的下挫。
“最近趁低吸纳美元的资金占了多数，大家预期美元将暂时走出底部。这是因为过去一段时间经济形势的变化，让人觉得欧元区、英国等地区的情况也许比美国还要糟糕。”某货币交易策略分析师说，“不过，这只是一个暂时现象，也许两三个月。总的来说，美元必将走向衰落。”
各国汇率政策的变化也极为重要，交易者纷纷将目光投向了各国央行的工作会议，他们希望能从中发现未来汇率政策变化的蛛丝马迹。目前，美联储维持2%的利率不变，其他央行也对利率调整持谨慎态度。但随着时间推移，美元加息预期上涨。有分析师认为，今年底或明年初，美联储至少需加息25个基点。
这位人士指出，“7月份非制造业指数可能与现在持平甚至略有上升，但个人收入和个人消费支出情况不容乐观，而房地产市场还没有复苏迹象。支撑美元上涨的动力目前只是其他经济体危机的爆发。”问题是这种相对衰退会持续多长时间，而其他经济体也可能因为完全不同的货币政策和财政政策而走一条跟美国完全不同的道路，那么寄望美元进入升值通道的美元资产持有者可能会失望。
著名经济学家、纽约大学经济学教授Nouriel Roubini可谓经济学界预言家。在过去两年里， Roubini就向人们预警：次贷危机中房价可能会下跌20%，绝对是一次严重的银行业危机和信用崩溃。 房利美和房地美事件再次证明，人们之前对 Nouriel Roubini 的警告置若罔闻，是天大的错误。
Roubini曾对经济形势作了以下预测：金融危机将导致至少1万亿美元的损失，而且损失很可能接近2万亿美元；房地美和房利美将无力偿债，财政部纾困计划对与政府关系密切的华尔街富人有利；数十家大型区域/全国银行因房地产曝险太高而破产；四大投资银行-美林证券、雷曼兄弟、摩根士丹利和高盛不是破产，就是必须与传统商业银行合并；经济衰退将走U形，持续 12-18个月；股市将下跌40%；原油和大宗商品价格下挫20%-30%；类似的房地产、资产、信用泡沫将出现在英国、西班牙、爱尔兰、意大利、和葡萄牙，造成它们经济成长急降或步入衰退。
Roubini毕业于哈佛大学，因其在博客上对亚洲金融危机精辟见解获得华盛顿政治精英们的关注，被克林顿政府聘为白宫经济顾问。以下是Roubini先生对经济形势最新的预测(节选自《巴伦周刊》)：
问：不幸被您言中太多了，实际情况可能更糟糕，未来最坏情况会如何？
Roubini: 如今，我们正在经历危机第二波冲击，相比危机始发时，现在已进入“后衰退时期”，这个时期从2008年年初算起要只持续到2009年年终。这也是银行业危机集中爆发的时期，届时数百家银行恐怕要破产、清算。
问：都有哪些银行？
Roubini: 我在这里不方便点名，但确实有很多银行会因次贷危机倒闭。你会发现它们损失越来越多，因为截至目前，它们只对次贷作了减记，还没对客户信用作减记处理，这部分损失更大，所以我们外人看到的减记和亏损远小于真实情况。银行财务官们一大半精力不是花在财务重整上，而是千方百计地进行暗箱操作，以使这些本该存在的数字从财务报表上消失。他们想掩盖众所周知的事实——很多房地产相关证券的资产价值为零。
问：目前来看，代表实体经济的GDP没有连续两个季度出现负增长，怎么能说衰退呢？
Roubini: 并不是说经济增长连续两个季度为负才叫衰退。美国国家经济研究局不是经常在强调就业率吗？目前就业率已连续7个月下滑。同样下滑的还有批发和零售数据，以及居民收入。
也许衰退早在1月份就开始了，你可以在2～4月份的GDP增长报告中读到衰退的信息。尽管整体经济在第二季度有所反弹，可市场复苏没那么简单，经济走势也许会是“ W”形而不是“U”形，因为第三季度政府退税效果已完全消失，其他一些给消费带来负面影响的因素都是长期的。
问：都有哪些因素？
Roubini: 美国人总是过度消费而不注重储蓄，美国人平均债务已高达可支配收入的140%，这个数字在2000年才只有100%。以前房价只涨不跌，房子就是美国人的自动提款机，抵押机构对这类贷款申请条件的审核也特别宽松。如今房价下跌，银行已经收紧了房屋抵押贷款。另外，股市下跌以及房屋抵押贷款的崩盘，让许多人意识到信用危机已经降临，他们的消费水平必然会因此下降。液化天然气已经涨到了每加仑4美元，可能有人说，“油价是涨了，但会带来新的工作机会，收入也会因通胀而提高，所以消费自然会跟着上升。”然而，他们可能没有注意到，私营部门的就业率已经连续下滑好几个月了。
更令人担心的是，退税政策的效果几乎趋于消弭，6月商品零售额仅增长了0.1%，如果不是退税，商品零售额可能是负增长。预计未来一段时间，美国人会紧缩开支，到时候退税支票就不会对消费产生正面效应了。
问：您对伯南克主席的政策怎么看？
Roubini: 迄今为止，联储的表现用不合格来形容再贴切不过。一年前他们就说房价下跌马上会停止，可现在呢？他们给市场的信号是问题仅仅留在次级债务领域，其实风险已经深入到次级债、次优债、优先债、房地产、信用卡、车贷、学生信贷和房屋净值贷款、杠杆借贷、市政债和公司债等领域。数数看，有多少联储没有告知人们。
联储另一个过错是，过去数年，房地产贡献了全国1/3就业增长率，他们居然认为房屋市场崩盘不会对经济其他方面产生影响。今天来看，央行过去的政策信号完全没有可信度，他们对市场今日的“成就”有不可推卸的责任。千篇一律的说辞已经伤害到了支持者们，联储似乎已经丧失了严谨的风格。不过还好，他们总是在不断改进。
问：伯南克一年前在做什么？
Roubini: 从格林斯潘时代危机就开启了，就是2001年高科技泡沫破灭之后，格林斯潘开始降息之时。利率水平太低，也持续太久，2004年基准利率仅为1%，随后提升到适当水平的行动又太缓慢。另外，他们不计后果地放松监管，这可能是布什政府放任经济政策、迷信市场自我调节机制才引起的，这就意味着市场没有监管者，也缺乏交易规范。银行和经纪商的风险管理模型根本就没有起到作用，因为市场向好时，CEO们更愿意去采取积极进取的发展战略而不会去听风险官的意见，可他们又不能准确判断熊市何时到来。对这种随波逐流的态度，花旗卸任CEO有句名言：“音乐响了你就得跳舞。”
问：如今监管者正在努力补救当年政策的疏漏，您怎么看现行的措施？
Roubini：似乎在走另一个极端，而且像是调控过头了。他们试图拯救所有破产者，想要干预每一个市场。证券及外汇交易委员会指控有人涉嫌操纵价格，但政府才是真正的价格操纵者，监管者需要反思对待房利美和房地美的拯救态度，还有贝尔斯登。他们拿问题证券来换取长期国债，这公平吗？这是所得私人化、损失社会化的措施，这是华尔街和富人们的社会主义福利。
问： 您的意思是政府应该让贝尔斯登倒闭，但不包括房利美和房地美？
Roubini:如果贝尔斯登倒闭会引发整个银行系统的恐慌。但其实，有更公平的办法来处理贝尔斯登和房利美、房地美事件。如果公众资金被拿来涉险，只能是在股东们已经被拖垮、管理层无能为力的情况下，而贝尔斯登的债权人应当承担相应损失。为什么是联储花290亿美元去购买那些垃圾债券，而不是贝尔斯登的购买者JP摩根？
问：因为两者相似吗？
Roubini: 的确。政府帮了所有人。 不然，就算房利美和房地美的无担保债权人都应该承担损失。有时候动用公款去拯救金融机构是必要的，但你不能拿公众的钱去救那些犯错的公司。可政府不仅帮了股东、帮了债权人还在某种程度上帮了那些犯错的管理层。
问：从哪个角度来说，政府不应该帮助那些问题公司？
Roubini: 许多公共机构都是由于自身原因走向破产的，联邦储蓄保险公司只有530亿美元的资金，仅仅为帮助房地美的存款人就动用了15%。它保费的收入并不高，现在只能要求国会增加对它的拨款了。还有，联邦储蓄保险公司声明只有9家机构在其关注名单上，而在6月事件爆发前，房地美不在其中，大家可以想象，这个公司背后实际蕴含着多大风险。有专家研究表明，联邦储蓄保险公司担保的8500家银行中至少有8%(大概有700家)遇到类似的大麻烦。另外，还有8% 到 16% 的银行机构处于危险的边缘，所以可能有700家倒闭有700家将步其后尘。 现在联邦储蓄保险公司居然还只关注9家机构，真是大笑话。
问：对纳税人影响如何？
Roubini：纳税人将会得到长长的账单。我估计，这次危机导致的损失高达1万亿甚至2万亿美元之多。今年2月份，我这么说，大家还都取笑我，但几周后国际货币基金组织的数据就出来了，大概在9450亿美元，高盛预测是1.1万亿美元，UBS认为是1万亿美元。对冲基金经理约翰.鲍尔森估计为1.3万亿美元，而就在上个月，有人预测为1.6万亿美元。这样看来，1万亿美元只不过是最低估计，但迄今为止银行只有3000亿美元的次级债减记。
问：银行业走出危机需要多长时间？
Roubini: 很难说。一些小银行正走向倒闭。光去年就有超过200家次贷贷款人倒闭，许多社区银行都濒临破产。之所以如此，在于社区银行融资服务很广：从住房、店铺，到小镇、房地产以及购物中心。有房地产危机的地方，就有社区银行倒闭。另外，区域性银行也不好过，如今大概三分之一的区域性银行都度日如年。
即使那些金融巨头们也可能遭此厄运，虽然人们都认为，它们有足够的规模来抵御危机。拿花旗集团来说，在1991年发生小型房地产危机之时，当时每季度房屋价格下跌仅4%，花旗就濒临破产，从而求助于联储，才有安然度过那段危机以及后来合并旅行者集团。
问：您似乎对批评乐此不疲？
Roubini: 不是，其实我是一个非常主流的经济学家，因为有意大利和美国的教育经历。我的兴趣在国际市场经济和国际金融领域，我也不是纯粹的悲观主义者或者看空者。 抛开我们将要面临的衰退和全球性危机而言，只要这种低迷结束，国际经济还会稳定增长。只是因为美国经济和金融存在明显问题，我这才看空市场。新兴市场国家，比如中国、印度以及其他国家，将从根本上改变世界经济和政治格局。与单极世界相比，世界不同力量之间将变得更加均衡。美国政府需要研究的一个重要课题就是：如何让22亿多的中印两国人口融入世界经济？发达国家将会因此产生过渡成本以及工作机会地转移， 但我对全球经济是绝对看好，对中长期，我都是坚定的看多者。
美元讽刺性反弹
近来美元持续走强的理由在于美国经济衰退和信贷危机已经扩大到其他主要工业国，导致它们的货币兑美元下挫。
近来美元走强，大多数分析人士预测美元反弹还将持续一段时间。其理由在于美国经济衰退和信贷危机已经扩大到其他主要工业国。这些国家丧失了对美国的先前优势，它们的货币兑美元因此都出现了不同程度的下挫。
“最近趁低吸纳美元的资金占了多数，大家预期美元将暂时走出底部。这是因为过去一段时间经济形势的变化，让人觉得欧元区、英国等地区的情况也许比美国还要糟糕。”某货币交易策略分析师说，“不过，这只是一个暂时现象，也许两三个月。总的来说，美元必将走向衰落。”
各国汇率政策的变化也极为重要，交易者纷纷将目光投向了各国央行的工作会议，他们希望能从中发现未来汇率政策变化的蛛丝马迹。目前，美联储维持2%的利率不变，其他央行也对利率调整持谨慎态度。但随着时间推移，美元加息预期上涨。有分析师认为，今年底或明年初，美联储至少需加息25个基点。
这位人士指出，“7月份非制造业指数可能与现在持平甚至略有上升，但个人收入和个人消费支出情况不容乐观，而房地产市场还没有复苏迹象。支撑美元上涨的动力目前只是其他经济体危机的爆发。”问题是这种相对衰退会持续多长时间，而其他经济体也可能因为完全不同的货币政策和财政政策而走一条跟美国完全不同的道路，那么寄望美元进入升值通道的美元资产持有者可能会失望。
Monday, September 15, 2008
可怜的大股东
假如你翻阅上市公司的年报有关股东的资料的话，你会发现，尽管一家公司的股东人数，由1千名（上市条例规定不得少过1千人）至数万名不等，但90%以上所持之股数都很小，由数股至十数万股不等，绝大部份的股票是操在10%或更少的大股东手中，他们都上榜“30名最大股东”名单内。
上市条例对大股东的定义为持有5%以上股权的人，而在大股东中，真正控制公司的，是拥有控制性股权的股东，他们拥有的股权，由30%、40%至60%、70%不等，但不能超过75%，本文所指的，就是此类大股东。
大股东给人的印象是高高在上，在社会上地位崇高，在公司内呼风唤雨，威风八面，实际的情况也是如此。不过，这不等于他们可以为所欲为，实际上，在很多方面，他们是受到很多条例的约束的。
这些约束，来自两方面：
一方面是来自监管机构，尤其是证券监督委员会，马来西亚股票交易所和公司注册官。
由于一小部份上市公司的大股东，滥用上市的便利，损害了投资大众的利益，为了保护投资者，证券监管机构不但制定种种条例，以约束大股东的行为，同时还不断的监视股市的操作，以确保股票交易在公平及公开的情况下进行。
小股东勇于维护权益
另一方面，大股东面对的压力，是来自小股东，包括维护小股东权益的组织在内。
现在的小股东，已不如从前那么温驯，随着知识水准的不断提高，他们已更了解自己的权益，也更勇于维护本身的权益。
监管机构和小股东，都对大股东的所作所为，虎视眈眈，大股东在采取任何涉及股东利益的措施之前，就不得不小心翼翼，以免受到两方面的“夹攻”，故大股东的行动，并不如大家想象的那么自由。
从上市公司在年报上都特别提到“投资者公关”(IR)公司越来越多，可以看出上市公司，尤其是大股东，已越来越重视股东及投资界的看法，主动设法改善跟小股东及投资界的关系。
小股东买卖股票谁也管不了，大股东当然也有权脱售股权，却必须及时公布脱售的数目，而投资界对于大股东的售股行动，极为重视，往往以此作为买进或卖出的参考，故大股东脱售（或买进更多），都小心翼翼，不如小股东那么潇洒。
大股东大量售股，常被解释为对公司前途缺乏信心，往往对股价产生负面的影响，金务大（Gamuda）的大股东脱售部份股权，股价应声而跌，至今仍欲振乏力，便是个典型的例子。
大股东的私人公司，如果与上市公司有业务上的来往，都必须得到股东大会的批准。
上市公司若作重大的投资，也必须得到股东点头，才能进行。若有关投资与大股东有关，需交给小股东去投票决定，大股东不能投票，大股东必须看小股东的脸色行事，这可说是小股东最威水的时刻。为了争取小股东的支持，大股东需雇用顾问，以说服小股东支持有关提案——费用当然由上市公司支付。
小股东即使只持有一股，也有权出席常年股东大会，并且有权向大股东询问公司的事务。一些小股东，对公司的业务，一窍不通，所提出的是不关痛痒的小问题，坐在台上的拥有数亿股的大股东，也不得不洗耳恭听，有时小股东故意刁难，或是纠缠不清，大股东也不得不忍气吞声，还要声平气和地回答。我一向同情小股东，认为他们是可怜的，但当我在股东大会上目睹上述情况，心里就不禁要说：“可怜的大股东”。
小股东可以将资金分散至数家公司，但大股东通常是把资金，孤注一掷，投注在他所控制的公司，当公司出问题时，小股东只损失了一小部份，大股东却全军覆没，你说谁最可怜？
一家公司的股数可能多达数亿股，大股东持有一半，往往多达2、3亿股。
导致股价下跌的，多数是惊慌失措的小股东，他们抛售10万、8万股，股价可能已下挫50仙，小股东亏损数万，大股东损失上亿，面对这种情形，大股东也无可奈何，所以，主宰股市的，与其说是大股东，毋宁说是小股东。
大股东真可怜！
上市条例对大股东的定义为持有5%以上股权的人，而在大股东中，真正控制公司的，是拥有控制性股权的股东，他们拥有的股权，由30%、40%至60%、70%不等，但不能超过75%，本文所指的，就是此类大股东。
大股东给人的印象是高高在上，在社会上地位崇高，在公司内呼风唤雨，威风八面，实际的情况也是如此。不过，这不等于他们可以为所欲为，实际上，在很多方面，他们是受到很多条例的约束的。
这些约束，来自两方面：
一方面是来自监管机构，尤其是证券监督委员会，马来西亚股票交易所和公司注册官。
由于一小部份上市公司的大股东，滥用上市的便利，损害了投资大众的利益，为了保护投资者，证券监管机构不但制定种种条例，以约束大股东的行为，同时还不断的监视股市的操作，以确保股票交易在公平及公开的情况下进行。
小股东勇于维护权益
另一方面，大股东面对的压力，是来自小股东，包括维护小股东权益的组织在内。
现在的小股东，已不如从前那么温驯，随着知识水准的不断提高，他们已更了解自己的权益，也更勇于维护本身的权益。
监管机构和小股东，都对大股东的所作所为，虎视眈眈，大股东在采取任何涉及股东利益的措施之前，就不得不小心翼翼，以免受到两方面的“夹攻”，故大股东的行动，并不如大家想象的那么自由。
从上市公司在年报上都特别提到“投资者公关”(IR)公司越来越多，可以看出上市公司，尤其是大股东，已越来越重视股东及投资界的看法，主动设法改善跟小股东及投资界的关系。
小股东买卖股票谁也管不了，大股东当然也有权脱售股权，却必须及时公布脱售的数目，而投资界对于大股东的售股行动，极为重视，往往以此作为买进或卖出的参考，故大股东脱售（或买进更多），都小心翼翼，不如小股东那么潇洒。
大股东大量售股，常被解释为对公司前途缺乏信心，往往对股价产生负面的影响，金务大（Gamuda）的大股东脱售部份股权，股价应声而跌，至今仍欲振乏力，便是个典型的例子。
大股东的私人公司，如果与上市公司有业务上的来往，都必须得到股东大会的批准。
上市公司若作重大的投资，也必须得到股东点头，才能进行。若有关投资与大股东有关，需交给小股东去投票决定，大股东不能投票，大股东必须看小股东的脸色行事，这可说是小股东最威水的时刻。为了争取小股东的支持，大股东需雇用顾问，以说服小股东支持有关提案——费用当然由上市公司支付。
小股东即使只持有一股，也有权出席常年股东大会，并且有权向大股东询问公司的事务。一些小股东，对公司的业务，一窍不通，所提出的是不关痛痒的小问题，坐在台上的拥有数亿股的大股东，也不得不洗耳恭听，有时小股东故意刁难，或是纠缠不清，大股东也不得不忍气吞声，还要声平气和地回答。我一向同情小股东，认为他们是可怜的，但当我在股东大会上目睹上述情况，心里就不禁要说：“可怜的大股东”。
小股东可以将资金分散至数家公司，但大股东通常是把资金，孤注一掷，投注在他所控制的公司，当公司出问题时，小股东只损失了一小部份，大股东却全军覆没，你说谁最可怜？
一家公司的股数可能多达数亿股，大股东持有一半，往往多达2、3亿股。
导致股价下跌的，多数是惊慌失措的小股东，他们抛售10万、8万股，股价可能已下挫50仙，小股东亏损数万，大股东损失上亿，面对这种情形，大股东也无可奈何，所以，主宰股市的，与其说是大股东，毋宁说是小股东。
大股东真可怜！
Today Iceland: Tomorrow Turkey, Hungary, Australia, New Zealand, Spain, U.S.?
Nouriel Roubini | Mar 28, 2006
The recent speculative attack against the Icelandic currency and the incipient run on its banks is no news (actually a deja-vu as my co-author Brad Setser says) to students of financial crises in emerging market economies; Brad and I wrote an entire book about it. A combination of a large and growing current account deficit, driven in part by a credit boom and an asset bubble (with housing bubbles leading to an excessive growth in real estate investment and an excessive increase in private consumption and fall in private savings) can be deadly if it goes bust and it triggers a domestic and/or international run on a banking system with large foreign currency liabilities and little liquid reserves. The combination of weakening fundamentals and illiquid banks can lead to a panicky currency and liquidity run: we saw it in Mexico in 1994, in East Asia in 1997-98, in Brazil in 1999 and in 2001-2002, in Turkey in 2001. Add to these problems, a fiscal imbalance and high public debt and you may even get a sovereign debt crisis, as in Ecuador, Russia, Argentina, Uruguay.
So, today it is Iceland to be in trouble. But which other economies - emerging or advanced - look in part like Iceland today? The list is clear: Turkey, Hungary, Australia, New Zealand, Spain, United States. What all these countries have had in common in recent years?
First, a large (relative to GDP) current account deficit, a large (relative to exports) external debt and a significantly overvalued exchange rate.
Second, an asset bubble in the housing sector.
Third, a fall in the private savings rate and an increase in the consumption to GDP rate, as well as a boom in real estate investment that are all driven by the housing bubble; these, in turn, lead to a worsening of the current account.
Fourth, a credit boom that has fed this asset bubble and that can make their banking system vulnerable to a housing bust.
Fifth, a partial cross border financing of the current account deficit via the short-term cross border flows to the banking system that currently is mostly in domestic currency (but that in some cases used to be in foreign currency).
Sixth, a relatively low stock of liquid foreign exchange reserves relative to the cross border foreign currency liabilities of the country (the U.S. and advanced economies being an exception as they have little forex reserves but also little foreign currency debt).
On top of all these vulnerabilities, some but not all of these countries - the U.S. in particular - have also a large fiscal deficit.
Thus, is it pure financial "panic" that explains the recent contagion from the Icelandic currency to the currency and debt markets of Turkey, Hungary, Australia, New Zealand? Suddenly, in all these countries investors are realizing that the force of gravity of a large current account deficit eventually dominates the carrry trade of interest rate differentials. It is true that the large current account deficits of these countries and their housing bubbles have been known for a while. But markets and investors have a strange way of sometimes waking up - as they did in Thailand in 1997 - and realize that the problems in one country - Iceland today (Thailand in 1997) - are very similar to those in other countries (East Asia in 1997 and the "usual suspects" above today).
Does this mean that the eventual trigger for the adjustment of the U.S. dollar has arrived? Not yet for the U.S. dollar; but certaintly you see now the beginning of the stress on the currencies of Hungary, Turkey, Australia, New Zealand. The U.S. is only partiallly different: still the dominant reserve currency; still being supported by massive intervention by China, other Asian countries, oil exporters and other emerging economies with current account surpluses; still with limited reserves but also with limited foreign currency debt.
But you can play your luck only for so long, especially when - unlike all these other economies - you also have a large and growing fiscal deficit and you are increasingly financing it with new short term debt that is 100% purchased - on net - by non-residents that are now subject to a serious currency risk. It used to be argued that short term foreign currency debt is dangerous when you have little foreign currency reserves as liquidity runs can occur; while domestic currency debt is less risky as you do not have the same rollover/liqudity risk; it was also argued that, as the currency risk is held by the non-residents holding your local currency debt, no nasty balance sheet effects of a devaluation can occur.
But these argument are probably flawed: if most of your domestic debt is in local currency and is held by non-residents, these investors face a large currency risk. Thus, once they start to expect a large depreciation of your currency, their incentive to hedge their currency risk and dump your assets and your currency becomes very large. Then, both a currency crisis and a run on your assets - be it liquid bank deposits or short term government debt -may occur - with nasty effects on your financial system and the ability of your government to finance itself. So, the fact that U.S., Spain, Australia, New Zealand and now even emerging markets such as Turkey and Hungary are financing themselves in local currency may be of little comfort. Runs on currency and liquid local assets may still occur with severe and disruptive effects on currency values, bond markets, equity markets and the housing market.
I have been warning for a while - as Morris Goldstein did - that the new crises in emerging market economies may take a different form from the traditional ones where large stocks of short-term foreign currency debt and low levels of forex reserves could cause a run and an external debt crisis. Instead, runs on the short-term domestic local currency debts of governments and banks could still occur - even in the absence of those traditional external vulnerabilities - and lead to a new type of financial crises. The developing events in Iceland and, possibly, in other emerging market economies, suggest that it was wishful thinking to believe that currency crisies, contagion, financial crises and runs were a thing of the past.
In the meanwhile U.S. policymakers - both at Treasury and even some, but not all, at the Fed - live in this LaLa Land dream that the U.S. current account deficits and fiscal deficits do not matter and that the U.S. external deficit is all caused by a global savings glut or is actually a "capital account surplus" as it allegedly represents the foreigners' desire to hold U.S. assets. They - and financial markets and investors - may soon wake up from this unreal dream and face a nightmare where the U.S. looks like Iceland more than they have ever fathomed.
The recent speculative attack against the Icelandic currency and the incipient run on its banks is no news (actually a deja-vu as my co-author Brad Setser says) to students of financial crises in emerging market economies; Brad and I wrote an entire book about it. A combination of a large and growing current account deficit, driven in part by a credit boom and an asset bubble (with housing bubbles leading to an excessive growth in real estate investment and an excessive increase in private consumption and fall in private savings) can be deadly if it goes bust and it triggers a domestic and/or international run on a banking system with large foreign currency liabilities and little liquid reserves. The combination of weakening fundamentals and illiquid banks can lead to a panicky currency and liquidity run: we saw it in Mexico in 1994, in East Asia in 1997-98, in Brazil in 1999 and in 2001-2002, in Turkey in 2001. Add to these problems, a fiscal imbalance and high public debt and you may even get a sovereign debt crisis, as in Ecuador, Russia, Argentina, Uruguay.
So, today it is Iceland to be in trouble. But which other economies - emerging or advanced - look in part like Iceland today? The list is clear: Turkey, Hungary, Australia, New Zealand, Spain, United States. What all these countries have had in common in recent years?
First, a large (relative to GDP) current account deficit, a large (relative to exports) external debt and a significantly overvalued exchange rate.
Second, an asset bubble in the housing sector.
Third, a fall in the private savings rate and an increase in the consumption to GDP rate, as well as a boom in real estate investment that are all driven by the housing bubble; these, in turn, lead to a worsening of the current account.
Fourth, a credit boom that has fed this asset bubble and that can make their banking system vulnerable to a housing bust.
Fifth, a partial cross border financing of the current account deficit via the short-term cross border flows to the banking system that currently is mostly in domestic currency (but that in some cases used to be in foreign currency).
Sixth, a relatively low stock of liquid foreign exchange reserves relative to the cross border foreign currency liabilities of the country (the U.S. and advanced economies being an exception as they have little forex reserves but also little foreign currency debt).
On top of all these vulnerabilities, some but not all of these countries - the U.S. in particular - have also a large fiscal deficit.
Thus, is it pure financial "panic" that explains the recent contagion from the Icelandic currency to the currency and debt markets of Turkey, Hungary, Australia, New Zealand? Suddenly, in all these countries investors are realizing that the force of gravity of a large current account deficit eventually dominates the carrry trade of interest rate differentials. It is true that the large current account deficits of these countries and their housing bubbles have been known for a while. But markets and investors have a strange way of sometimes waking up - as they did in Thailand in 1997 - and realize that the problems in one country - Iceland today (Thailand in 1997) - are very similar to those in other countries (East Asia in 1997 and the "usual suspects" above today).
Does this mean that the eventual trigger for the adjustment of the U.S. dollar has arrived? Not yet for the U.S. dollar; but certaintly you see now the beginning of the stress on the currencies of Hungary, Turkey, Australia, New Zealand. The U.S. is only partiallly different: still the dominant reserve currency; still being supported by massive intervention by China, other Asian countries, oil exporters and other emerging economies with current account surpluses; still with limited reserves but also with limited foreign currency debt.
But you can play your luck only for so long, especially when - unlike all these other economies - you also have a large and growing fiscal deficit and you are increasingly financing it with new short term debt that is 100% purchased - on net - by non-residents that are now subject to a serious currency risk. It used to be argued that short term foreign currency debt is dangerous when you have little foreign currency reserves as liquidity runs can occur; while domestic currency debt is less risky as you do not have the same rollover/liqudity risk; it was also argued that, as the currency risk is held by the non-residents holding your local currency debt, no nasty balance sheet effects of a devaluation can occur.
But these argument are probably flawed: if most of your domestic debt is in local currency and is held by non-residents, these investors face a large currency risk. Thus, once they start to expect a large depreciation of your currency, their incentive to hedge their currency risk and dump your assets and your currency becomes very large. Then, both a currency crisis and a run on your assets - be it liquid bank deposits or short term government debt -may occur - with nasty effects on your financial system and the ability of your government to finance itself. So, the fact that U.S., Spain, Australia, New Zealand and now even emerging markets such as Turkey and Hungary are financing themselves in local currency may be of little comfort. Runs on currency and liquid local assets may still occur with severe and disruptive effects on currency values, bond markets, equity markets and the housing market.
I have been warning for a while - as Morris Goldstein did - that the new crises in emerging market economies may take a different form from the traditional ones where large stocks of short-term foreign currency debt and low levels of forex reserves could cause a run and an external debt crisis. Instead, runs on the short-term domestic local currency debts of governments and banks could still occur - even in the absence of those traditional external vulnerabilities - and lead to a new type of financial crises. The developing events in Iceland and, possibly, in other emerging market economies, suggest that it was wishful thinking to believe that currency crisies, contagion, financial crises and runs were a thing of the past.
In the meanwhile U.S. policymakers - both at Treasury and even some, but not all, at the Fed - live in this LaLa Land dream that the U.S. current account deficits and fiscal deficits do not matter and that the U.S. external deficit is all caused by a global savings glut or is actually a "capital account surplus" as it allegedly represents the foreigners' desire to hold U.S. assets. They - and financial markets and investors - may soon wake up from this unreal dream and face a nightmare where the U.S. looks like Iceland more than they have ever fathomed.
Dr. Doom
On Sept. 7, 2006, Nouriel Roubini, an economics professor at New York University, stood before an audience of economists at the International Monetary Fund and announced that a crisis was brewing. In the coming months and years, he warned, the United States was likely to face a once-in-a-lifetime housing bust, an oil shock, sharply declining consumer confidence and, ultimately, a deep recession. He laid out a bleak sequence of events: homeowners defaulting on mortgages, trillions of dollars of mortgage-backed securities unraveling worldwide and the global financial system shuddering to a halt. These developments, he went on, could cripple or destroy hedge funds, investment banks and other major financial institutions like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
Letters: Dr. Doom (August 31, 2008) The audience seemed skeptical, even dismissive. As Roubini stepped down from the lectern after his talk, the moderator of the event quipped, “I think perhaps we will need a stiff drink after that.” People laughed — and not without reason. At the time, unemployment and inflation remained low, and the economy, while weak, was still growing, despite rising oil prices and a softening housing market. And then there was the espouser of doom himself: Roubini was known to be a perpetual pessimist, what economists call a “permabear.” When the economist Anirvan Banerji delivered his response to Roubini’s talk, he noted that Roubini’s predictions did not make use of mathematical models and dismissed his hunches as those of a career naysayer.
But Roubini was soon vindicated. In the year that followed, subprime lenders began entering bankruptcy, hedge funds began going under and the stock market plunged. There was declining employment, a deteriorating dollar, ever-increasing evidence of a huge housing bust and a growing air of panic in financial markets as the credit crisis deepened. By late summer, the Federal Reserve was rushing to the rescue, making the first of many unorthodox interventions in the economy, including cutting the lending rate by 50 basis points and buying up tens of billions of dollars in mortgage-backed securities. When Roubini returned to the I.M.F. last September, he delivered a second talk, predicting a growing crisis of solvency that would infect every sector of the financial system. This time, no one laughed. “He sounded like a madman in 2006,” recalls the I.M.F. economist Prakash Loungani, who invited Roubini on both occasions. “He was a prophet when he returned in 2007.”
Over the past year, whenever optimists have declared the worst of the economic crisis behind us, Roubini has countered with steadfast pessimism. In February, when the conventional wisdom held that the venerable investment firms of Wall Street would weather the crisis, Roubini warned that one or more of them would go “belly up” — and six weeks later, Bear Stearns collapsed. Following the Fed’s further extraordinary actions in the spring — including making lines of credit available to selected investment banks and brokerage houses — many economists made note of the ensuing economic rally and proclaimed the credit crisis over and a recession averted. Roubini, who dismissed the rally as nothing more than a “delusional complacency” encouraged by a “bunch of self-serving spinmasters,” stuck to his script of “nightmare” events: waves of corporate bankrupticies, collapses in markets like commercial real estate and municipal bonds and, most alarming, the possible bankruptcy of a large regional or national bank that would trigger a panic by depositors. Not all of these developments have come to pass (and perhaps never will), but the demise last month of the California bank IndyMac — one of the largest such failures in U.S. history — drew only more attention to Roubini’s seeming prescience.
As a result, Roubini, a respected but formerly obscure academic, has become a major figure in the public debate about the economy: the seer who saw it coming. He has been summoned to speak before Congress, the Council on Foreign Relations and the World Economic Forum at Davos. He is now a sought-after adviser, spending much of his time shuttling between meetings with central bank governors and finance ministers in Europe and Asia. Though he continues to issue colorful doomsday prophecies of a decidedly nonmainstream sort — especially on his popular and polemical blog, where he offers visions of “equity market slaughter” and the “Coming Systemic Bust of the U.S. Banking System” — the mainstream economic establishment appears to be moving closer, however fitfully, to his way of seeing things. “I have in the last few months become more pessimistic than the consensus,” the former Treasury secretary Lawrence Summers told me earlier this year. “Certainly, Nouriel’s writings have been a contributor to that.”
On a cold and dreary day last winter, I met Roubini over lunch in the TriBeCa neighborhood of New York City. “I’m not a pessimist by nature,” he insisted. “I’m not someone who sees things in a bleak way.” Just looking at him, I found the assertion hard to credit. With a dour manner and an aura of gloom about him, Roubini gives the impression of being permanently pained, as if the burden of what he knows is almost too much for him to bear. He rarely smiles, and when he does, his face, topped by an unruly mop of brown hair, contorts into something more closely resembling a grimace.
When I pressed him on his claim that he wasn’t pessimistic, he paused for a moment and then relented a little. “I have more concerns about potential risks and vulnerabilities than most people,” he said, with glum understatement. But these concerns, he argued, make him more of a realist than a pessimist and put him in the role of the cleareyed outsider — unsettling complacency and puncturing pieties.
Roubini, who is 50, has been an outsider his entire life. He was born in Istanbul, the child of Iranian Jews, and his family moved to Tehran when he was 2, then to Tel Aviv and finally to Italy, where he grew up and attended college. He moved to the United States to pursue his doctorate in international economics at Harvard. Along the way he became fluent in Farsi, Hebrew, Italian and English. His accent, an inimitable polyglot growl, radiates a weariness that comes with being what he calls a “global nomad.”
As a graduate student at Harvard, Roubini was an unusual talent, according to his adviser, the Columbia economist Jeffrey Sachs. He was as comfortable in the world of arcane mathematics as he was studying political and economic institutions. “It’s a mix of skills that rarely comes packaged in one person,” Sachs told me. After completing his Ph.D. in 1988, Roubini joined the economics department at Yale, where he first met and began sharing ideas with Robert Shiller, the economist now known for his prescient warnings about the 1990s tech bubble.
The ’90s were an eventful time for an international economist like Roubini. Throughout the decade, one emerging economy after another was beset by crisis, beginning with Mexico’s in 1994. Panics swept Asia, including Thailand, Indonesia and Korea, in 1997 and 1998. The economies of Brazil and Russia imploded in 1998. Argentina’s followed in 2000. Roubini began studying these countries and soon identified what he saw as their common weaknesses. On the eve of the crises that befell them, he noticed, most had huge current-account deficits (meaning, basically, that they spent far more than they made), and they typically financed these deficits by borrowing from abroad in ways that exposed them to the national equivalent of bank runs. Most of these countries also had poorly regulated banking systems plagued by excessive borrowing and reckless lending. Corporate governance was often weak, with cronyism in abundance.
Roubini’s work was distinguished not only by his conclusions but also by his approach. By making extensive use of transnational comparisons and historical analogies, he was employing a subjective, nontechnical framework, the sort embraced by popular economists like the Times Op-Ed columnist Paul Krugman and Joseph Stiglitz in order to reach a nonacademic audience. Roubini takes pains to note that he remains a rigorous scholarly economist — “When I weigh evidence,” he told me, “I’m drawing on 20 years of accumulated experience using models” — but his approach is not the contemporary scholarly ideal in which an economist builds a model in order to constrain his subjective impressions and abide by a discrete set of data. As Shiller told me, “Nouriel has a different way of seeing things than most economists: he gets into everything.”
Roubini likens his style to that of a policy maker like Alan Greenspan, the former Fed chairman who was said (perhaps apocryphally) to pore over vast quantities of technical economic data while sitting in the bathtub, looking to sniff out where the economy was headed. Roubini also cites, as a more ideologically congenial example, the sweeping, cosmopolitan approach of the legendary economist John Maynard Keynes, whom Roubini, with only slight exaggeration, calls “the most brilliant economist who never wrote down an equation.” The book that Roubini ultimately wrote (with the economist Brad Setser) on the emerging market crises, “Bailouts or Bail-Ins?” contains not a single equation in its 400-plus pages.
After analyzing the markets that collapsed in the ’90s, Roubini set out to determine which country’s economy would be the next to succumb to the same pressures. His surprising answer: the United States’. “The United States,” Roubini remembers thinking, “looked like the biggest emerging market of all.” Of course, the United States wasn’t an emerging market; it was (and still is) the largest economy in the world. But Roubini was unnerved by what he saw in the U.S. economy, in particular its 2004 current-account deficit of $600 billion. He began writing extensively about the dangers of that deficit and then branched out, researching the various effects of the credit boom — including the biggest housing bubble in the nation’s history — that began after the Federal Reserve cut rates to close to zero in 2003. Roubini became convinced that the housing bubble was going to pop.
By late 2004 he had started to write about a “nightmare hard landing scenario for the United States.” He predicted that foreign investors would stop financing the fiscal and current-account deficit and abandon the dollar, wreaking havoc on the economy. He said that these problems, which he called the “twin financial train wrecks,” might manifest themselves in 2005 or, at the latest, 2006. “You have been warned here first,” he wrote ominously on his blog. But by the end of 2006, the train wrecks hadn’t occurred.
Recessions are signal events in any modern economy. And yet remarkably, the profession of economics is quite bad at predicting them. A recent study looked at “consensus forecasts” (the predictions of large groups of economists) that were made in advance of 60 different national recessions that hit around the world in the ’90s: in 97 percent of the cases, the study found, the economists failed to predict the coming contraction a year in advance. On those rare occasions when economists did successfully predict recessions, they significantly underestimated the severity of the downturns. Worse, many of the economists failed to anticipate recessions that occurred as soon as two months later.
The dismal science, it seems, is an optimistic profession. Many economists, Roubini among them, argue that some of the optimism is built into the very machinery, the mathematics, of modern economic theory. Econometric models typically rely on the assumption that the near future is likely to be similar to the recent past, and thus it is rare that the models anticipate breaks in the economy. And if the models can’t foresee a relatively minor break like a recession, they have even more trouble modeling and predicting a major rupture like a full-blown financial crisis. Only a handful of 20th-century economists have even bothered to study financial panics. (The most notable example is probably the late economist Hyman Minksy, of whom Roubini is an avid reader.) “These are things most economists barely understand,” Roubini told me. “We’re in uncharted territory where standard economic theory isn’t helpful.”
True though this may be, Roubini’s critics do not agree that his approach is any more accurate. Anirvan Banerji, the economist who challenged Roubini’s first I.M.F. talk, points out that Roubini has been peddling pessimism for years; Banerji contends that Roubini’s apparent foresight is nothing more than an unhappy coincidence of events. “Even a stopped clock is right twice a day,” he told me. “The justification for his bearish call has evolved over the years,” Banerji went on, ticking off the different reasons that Roubini has used to justify his predictions of recessions and crises: rising trade deficits, exploding current-account deficits, Hurricane Katrina, soaring oil prices. All of Roubini’s predictions, Banerji observed, have been based on analogies with past experience. “This forecasting by analogy is a tempting thing to do,” he said. “But you have to pick the right analogy. The danger of this more subjective approach is that instead of letting the objective facts shape your views, you will choose the facts that confirm your existing views.”
Kenneth Rogoff, an economist at Harvard who has known Roubini for decades, told me that he sees great value in Roubini’s willingness to entertain possible situations that are far outside the consensus view of most economists. “If you’re sitting around at the European Central Bank,” he said, “and you’re asking what’s the worst thing that could happen, the first thing people will say is, ‘Let’s see what Nouriel says.’ ” But Rogoff cautioned against equating that skill with forecasting. Roubini, in other words, might be the kind of economist you want to consult about the possibility of the collapse of the municipal-bond market, but he is not necessarily the kind you ask to predict, say, the rise in global demand for paper clips.
His defenders contend that Roubini is not unduly pessimistic. Jeffrey Sachs, his former adviser, told me that “if the underlying conditions call for optimism, Nouriel would be optimistic.” And to be sure, Roubini is capable of being optimistic — or at least of steering clear of absolute worst-case prognostications. He agrees, for example, with the conventional economic wisdom that oil will drop below $100 a barrel in the coming months as global demand weakens. “I’m not comfortable saying that we’re going to end up in the Great Depression,” he told me. “I’m a reasonable person.”
What economic developments does Roubini see on the horizon? And what does he think we should do about them? The first step, he told me in a recent conversation, is to acknowledge the extent of the problem. “We are in a recession, and denying it is nonsense,” he said. When Jim Nussle, the White House budget director, announced last month that the nation had “avoided a recession,” Roubini was incredulous. For months, he has been predicting that the United States will suffer through an 18-month recession that will eventually rank as the “worst since the Great Depression.” Though he is confident that the economy will enter a technical recovery toward the end of next year, he says that job losses, corporate bankruptcies and other drags on growth will continue to take a toll for years.
Roubini has counseled various policy makers, including Federal Reserve governors and senior Treasury Department officials, to mount an aggressive response to the crisis. He applauded when the Federal Reserve cut interest rates to 2 percent from 5.25 percent beginning last summer. He also supported the Fed’s willingness to engineer a takeover of Bear Stearns. Roubini argues that the Fed’s actions averted catastrophe, though he says he believes that future bailouts should focus on mortgage owners, not investors. Accordingly, he sees the choice facing the United States as stark but simple: either the government backs up a trillion-plus dollars’ worth of high-risk mortgages (in exchange for the lenders’ agreement to reduce monthly mortgage payments), or the banks and other institutions holding those mortgages — or the complex securities derived from them — go under. “You either nationalize the banks or you nationalize the mortgages,” he said. “Otherwise, they’re all toast.”
For months Roubini has been arguing that the true cost of the housing crisis will not be a mere $300 billion — the amount allowed for by the housing legislation sponsored by Representative Barney Frank and Senator Christopher Dodd — but something between a trillion and a trillion and a half dollars. But most important, in Roubini’s opinion, is to realize that the problem is deeper than the housing crisis. “Reckless people have deluded themselves that this was a subprime crisis,” he told me. “But we have problems with credit-card debt, student-loan debt, auto loans, commercial real estate loans, home-equity loans, corporate debt and loans that financed leveraged buyouts.” All of these forms of debt, he argues, suffer from some or all of the same traits that first surfaced in the housing market: shoddy underwriting, securitization, negligence on the part of the credit-rating agencies and lax government oversight. “We have a subprime financial system,” he said, “not a subprime mortgage market.”
Roubini argues that most of the losses from this bad debt have yet to be written off, and the toll from bad commercial real estate loans alone may help send hundreds of local banks into the arms of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. “A good third of the regional banks won’t make it,” he predicted. In turn, these bailouts will add hundreds of billions of dollars to an already gargantuan federal debt, and someone, somewhere, is going to have to finance that debt, along with all the other debt accumulated by consumers and corporations. “Our biggest financiers are China, Russia and the gulf states,” Roubini noted. “These are rivals, not allies.”
The United States, Roubini went on, will likely muddle through the crisis but will emerge from it a different nation, with a different place in the world. “Once you run current-account deficits, you depend on the kindness of strangers,” he said, pausing to let out a resigned sigh. “This might be the beginning of the end of the American empire.”
Letters: Dr. Doom (August 31, 2008) The audience seemed skeptical, even dismissive. As Roubini stepped down from the lectern after his talk, the moderator of the event quipped, “I think perhaps we will need a stiff drink after that.” People laughed — and not without reason. At the time, unemployment and inflation remained low, and the economy, while weak, was still growing, despite rising oil prices and a softening housing market. And then there was the espouser of doom himself: Roubini was known to be a perpetual pessimist, what economists call a “permabear.” When the economist Anirvan Banerji delivered his response to Roubini’s talk, he noted that Roubini’s predictions did not make use of mathematical models and dismissed his hunches as those of a career naysayer.
But Roubini was soon vindicated. In the year that followed, subprime lenders began entering bankruptcy, hedge funds began going under and the stock market plunged. There was declining employment, a deteriorating dollar, ever-increasing evidence of a huge housing bust and a growing air of panic in financial markets as the credit crisis deepened. By late summer, the Federal Reserve was rushing to the rescue, making the first of many unorthodox interventions in the economy, including cutting the lending rate by 50 basis points and buying up tens of billions of dollars in mortgage-backed securities. When Roubini returned to the I.M.F. last September, he delivered a second talk, predicting a growing crisis of solvency that would infect every sector of the financial system. This time, no one laughed. “He sounded like a madman in 2006,” recalls the I.M.F. economist Prakash Loungani, who invited Roubini on both occasions. “He was a prophet when he returned in 2007.”
Over the past year, whenever optimists have declared the worst of the economic crisis behind us, Roubini has countered with steadfast pessimism. In February, when the conventional wisdom held that the venerable investment firms of Wall Street would weather the crisis, Roubini warned that one or more of them would go “belly up” — and six weeks later, Bear Stearns collapsed. Following the Fed’s further extraordinary actions in the spring — including making lines of credit available to selected investment banks and brokerage houses — many economists made note of the ensuing economic rally and proclaimed the credit crisis over and a recession averted. Roubini, who dismissed the rally as nothing more than a “delusional complacency” encouraged by a “bunch of self-serving spinmasters,” stuck to his script of “nightmare” events: waves of corporate bankrupticies, collapses in markets like commercial real estate and municipal bonds and, most alarming, the possible bankruptcy of a large regional or national bank that would trigger a panic by depositors. Not all of these developments have come to pass (and perhaps never will), but the demise last month of the California bank IndyMac — one of the largest such failures in U.S. history — drew only more attention to Roubini’s seeming prescience.
As a result, Roubini, a respected but formerly obscure academic, has become a major figure in the public debate about the economy: the seer who saw it coming. He has been summoned to speak before Congress, the Council on Foreign Relations and the World Economic Forum at Davos. He is now a sought-after adviser, spending much of his time shuttling between meetings with central bank governors and finance ministers in Europe and Asia. Though he continues to issue colorful doomsday prophecies of a decidedly nonmainstream sort — especially on his popular and polemical blog, where he offers visions of “equity market slaughter” and the “Coming Systemic Bust of the U.S. Banking System” — the mainstream economic establishment appears to be moving closer, however fitfully, to his way of seeing things. “I have in the last few months become more pessimistic than the consensus,” the former Treasury secretary Lawrence Summers told me earlier this year. “Certainly, Nouriel’s writings have been a contributor to that.”
On a cold and dreary day last winter, I met Roubini over lunch in the TriBeCa neighborhood of New York City. “I’m not a pessimist by nature,” he insisted. “I’m not someone who sees things in a bleak way.” Just looking at him, I found the assertion hard to credit. With a dour manner and an aura of gloom about him, Roubini gives the impression of being permanently pained, as if the burden of what he knows is almost too much for him to bear. He rarely smiles, and when he does, his face, topped by an unruly mop of brown hair, contorts into something more closely resembling a grimace.
When I pressed him on his claim that he wasn’t pessimistic, he paused for a moment and then relented a little. “I have more concerns about potential risks and vulnerabilities than most people,” he said, with glum understatement. But these concerns, he argued, make him more of a realist than a pessimist and put him in the role of the cleareyed outsider — unsettling complacency and puncturing pieties.
Roubini, who is 50, has been an outsider his entire life. He was born in Istanbul, the child of Iranian Jews, and his family moved to Tehran when he was 2, then to Tel Aviv and finally to Italy, where he grew up and attended college. He moved to the United States to pursue his doctorate in international economics at Harvard. Along the way he became fluent in Farsi, Hebrew, Italian and English. His accent, an inimitable polyglot growl, radiates a weariness that comes with being what he calls a “global nomad.”
As a graduate student at Harvard, Roubini was an unusual talent, according to his adviser, the Columbia economist Jeffrey Sachs. He was as comfortable in the world of arcane mathematics as he was studying political and economic institutions. “It’s a mix of skills that rarely comes packaged in one person,” Sachs told me. After completing his Ph.D. in 1988, Roubini joined the economics department at Yale, where he first met and began sharing ideas with Robert Shiller, the economist now known for his prescient warnings about the 1990s tech bubble.
The ’90s were an eventful time for an international economist like Roubini. Throughout the decade, one emerging economy after another was beset by crisis, beginning with Mexico’s in 1994. Panics swept Asia, including Thailand, Indonesia and Korea, in 1997 and 1998. The economies of Brazil and Russia imploded in 1998. Argentina’s followed in 2000. Roubini began studying these countries and soon identified what he saw as their common weaknesses. On the eve of the crises that befell them, he noticed, most had huge current-account deficits (meaning, basically, that they spent far more than they made), and they typically financed these deficits by borrowing from abroad in ways that exposed them to the national equivalent of bank runs. Most of these countries also had poorly regulated banking systems plagued by excessive borrowing and reckless lending. Corporate governance was often weak, with cronyism in abundance.
Roubini’s work was distinguished not only by his conclusions but also by his approach. By making extensive use of transnational comparisons and historical analogies, he was employing a subjective, nontechnical framework, the sort embraced by popular economists like the Times Op-Ed columnist Paul Krugman and Joseph Stiglitz in order to reach a nonacademic audience. Roubini takes pains to note that he remains a rigorous scholarly economist — “When I weigh evidence,” he told me, “I’m drawing on 20 years of accumulated experience using models” — but his approach is not the contemporary scholarly ideal in which an economist builds a model in order to constrain his subjective impressions and abide by a discrete set of data. As Shiller told me, “Nouriel has a different way of seeing things than most economists: he gets into everything.”
Roubini likens his style to that of a policy maker like Alan Greenspan, the former Fed chairman who was said (perhaps apocryphally) to pore over vast quantities of technical economic data while sitting in the bathtub, looking to sniff out where the economy was headed. Roubini also cites, as a more ideologically congenial example, the sweeping, cosmopolitan approach of the legendary economist John Maynard Keynes, whom Roubini, with only slight exaggeration, calls “the most brilliant economist who never wrote down an equation.” The book that Roubini ultimately wrote (with the economist Brad Setser) on the emerging market crises, “Bailouts or Bail-Ins?” contains not a single equation in its 400-plus pages.
After analyzing the markets that collapsed in the ’90s, Roubini set out to determine which country’s economy would be the next to succumb to the same pressures. His surprising answer: the United States’. “The United States,” Roubini remembers thinking, “looked like the biggest emerging market of all.” Of course, the United States wasn’t an emerging market; it was (and still is) the largest economy in the world. But Roubini was unnerved by what he saw in the U.S. economy, in particular its 2004 current-account deficit of $600 billion. He began writing extensively about the dangers of that deficit and then branched out, researching the various effects of the credit boom — including the biggest housing bubble in the nation’s history — that began after the Federal Reserve cut rates to close to zero in 2003. Roubini became convinced that the housing bubble was going to pop.
By late 2004 he had started to write about a “nightmare hard landing scenario for the United States.” He predicted that foreign investors would stop financing the fiscal and current-account deficit and abandon the dollar, wreaking havoc on the economy. He said that these problems, which he called the “twin financial train wrecks,” might manifest themselves in 2005 or, at the latest, 2006. “You have been warned here first,” he wrote ominously on his blog. But by the end of 2006, the train wrecks hadn’t occurred.
Recessions are signal events in any modern economy. And yet remarkably, the profession of economics is quite bad at predicting them. A recent study looked at “consensus forecasts” (the predictions of large groups of economists) that were made in advance of 60 different national recessions that hit around the world in the ’90s: in 97 percent of the cases, the study found, the economists failed to predict the coming contraction a year in advance. On those rare occasions when economists did successfully predict recessions, they significantly underestimated the severity of the downturns. Worse, many of the economists failed to anticipate recessions that occurred as soon as two months later.
The dismal science, it seems, is an optimistic profession. Many economists, Roubini among them, argue that some of the optimism is built into the very machinery, the mathematics, of modern economic theory. Econometric models typically rely on the assumption that the near future is likely to be similar to the recent past, and thus it is rare that the models anticipate breaks in the economy. And if the models can’t foresee a relatively minor break like a recession, they have even more trouble modeling and predicting a major rupture like a full-blown financial crisis. Only a handful of 20th-century economists have even bothered to study financial panics. (The most notable example is probably the late economist Hyman Minksy, of whom Roubini is an avid reader.) “These are things most economists barely understand,” Roubini told me. “We’re in uncharted territory where standard economic theory isn’t helpful.”
True though this may be, Roubini’s critics do not agree that his approach is any more accurate. Anirvan Banerji, the economist who challenged Roubini’s first I.M.F. talk, points out that Roubini has been peddling pessimism for years; Banerji contends that Roubini’s apparent foresight is nothing more than an unhappy coincidence of events. “Even a stopped clock is right twice a day,” he told me. “The justification for his bearish call has evolved over the years,” Banerji went on, ticking off the different reasons that Roubini has used to justify his predictions of recessions and crises: rising trade deficits, exploding current-account deficits, Hurricane Katrina, soaring oil prices. All of Roubini’s predictions, Banerji observed, have been based on analogies with past experience. “This forecasting by analogy is a tempting thing to do,” he said. “But you have to pick the right analogy. The danger of this more subjective approach is that instead of letting the objective facts shape your views, you will choose the facts that confirm your existing views.”
Kenneth Rogoff, an economist at Harvard who has known Roubini for decades, told me that he sees great value in Roubini’s willingness to entertain possible situations that are far outside the consensus view of most economists. “If you’re sitting around at the European Central Bank,” he said, “and you’re asking what’s the worst thing that could happen, the first thing people will say is, ‘Let’s see what Nouriel says.’ ” But Rogoff cautioned against equating that skill with forecasting. Roubini, in other words, might be the kind of economist you want to consult about the possibility of the collapse of the municipal-bond market, but he is not necessarily the kind you ask to predict, say, the rise in global demand for paper clips.
His defenders contend that Roubini is not unduly pessimistic. Jeffrey Sachs, his former adviser, told me that “if the underlying conditions call for optimism, Nouriel would be optimistic.” And to be sure, Roubini is capable of being optimistic — or at least of steering clear of absolute worst-case prognostications. He agrees, for example, with the conventional economic wisdom that oil will drop below $100 a barrel in the coming months as global demand weakens. “I’m not comfortable saying that we’re going to end up in the Great Depression,” he told me. “I’m a reasonable person.”
What economic developments does Roubini see on the horizon? And what does he think we should do about them? The first step, he told me in a recent conversation, is to acknowledge the extent of the problem. “We are in a recession, and denying it is nonsense,” he said. When Jim Nussle, the White House budget director, announced last month that the nation had “avoided a recession,” Roubini was incredulous. For months, he has been predicting that the United States will suffer through an 18-month recession that will eventually rank as the “worst since the Great Depression.” Though he is confident that the economy will enter a technical recovery toward the end of next year, he says that job losses, corporate bankruptcies and other drags on growth will continue to take a toll for years.
Roubini has counseled various policy makers, including Federal Reserve governors and senior Treasury Department officials, to mount an aggressive response to the crisis. He applauded when the Federal Reserve cut interest rates to 2 percent from 5.25 percent beginning last summer. He also supported the Fed’s willingness to engineer a takeover of Bear Stearns. Roubini argues that the Fed’s actions averted catastrophe, though he says he believes that future bailouts should focus on mortgage owners, not investors. Accordingly, he sees the choice facing the United States as stark but simple: either the government backs up a trillion-plus dollars’ worth of high-risk mortgages (in exchange for the lenders’ agreement to reduce monthly mortgage payments), or the banks and other institutions holding those mortgages — or the complex securities derived from them — go under. “You either nationalize the banks or you nationalize the mortgages,” he said. “Otherwise, they’re all toast.”
For months Roubini has been arguing that the true cost of the housing crisis will not be a mere $300 billion — the amount allowed for by the housing legislation sponsored by Representative Barney Frank and Senator Christopher Dodd — but something between a trillion and a trillion and a half dollars. But most important, in Roubini’s opinion, is to realize that the problem is deeper than the housing crisis. “Reckless people have deluded themselves that this was a subprime crisis,” he told me. “But we have problems with credit-card debt, student-loan debt, auto loans, commercial real estate loans, home-equity loans, corporate debt and loans that financed leveraged buyouts.” All of these forms of debt, he argues, suffer from some or all of the same traits that first surfaced in the housing market: shoddy underwriting, securitization, negligence on the part of the credit-rating agencies and lax government oversight. “We have a subprime financial system,” he said, “not a subprime mortgage market.”
Roubini argues that most of the losses from this bad debt have yet to be written off, and the toll from bad commercial real estate loans alone may help send hundreds of local banks into the arms of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. “A good third of the regional banks won’t make it,” he predicted. In turn, these bailouts will add hundreds of billions of dollars to an already gargantuan federal debt, and someone, somewhere, is going to have to finance that debt, along with all the other debt accumulated by consumers and corporations. “Our biggest financiers are China, Russia and the gulf states,” Roubini noted. “These are rivals, not allies.”
The United States, Roubini went on, will likely muddle through the crisis but will emerge from it a different nation, with a different place in the world. “Once you run current-account deficits, you depend on the kindness of strangers,” he said, pausing to let out a resigned sigh. “This might be the beginning of the end of the American empire.”
Nouriel Roubini
Roubini received his Ph.D. in international economics from Harvard University in 1988. According to his advisor, Jeffrey Sachs, he was unusual in his talent with both mathematics and intuitive understanding of economic institutions.
Currently, Professor Roubini is a Professor at the Stern School of Business at New York University.
Roubini is known for his predictions of financial crisis, notably at the IMF in 2006, where he was received skeptically, with one commentator noting his lack of mathematical models. As of 2008 many of his predictions have come to fruition. Formerly an obscure academic, he has received invitations to speak before influential organizations such as United States Congress and the Council on Foreign Relations. As of August 2008, he remains pessimistic on the future of the US economy. He has said that "we have a subprime financial system, not a subprime mortgage market". He does not believe that the United States is entering the next Great Depression, but has said that he believes it will be the worst recession since then. He has clarified that his pessimism is focused on the short-run rather than the medium or long-run.
In the 1990s, Roubini studied the collapse of emerging economies. Consistent with the unusual talent noted by Sachs, he used an intuitive, historical approach backed up an understanding of theoretical models to analyze these countries and came to conclusion that a common denominator was large current account deficits financed by loans from abroad. He began to think that the United States might be the next to suffer, and began writing about the possible collapse in 2004.
Currently, Professor Roubini is a Professor at the Stern School of Business at New York University.
Roubini is known for his predictions of financial crisis, notably at the IMF in 2006, where he was received skeptically, with one commentator noting his lack of mathematical models. As of 2008 many of his predictions have come to fruition. Formerly an obscure academic, he has received invitations to speak before influential organizations such as United States Congress and the Council on Foreign Relations. As of August 2008, he remains pessimistic on the future of the US economy. He has said that "we have a subprime financial system, not a subprime mortgage market". He does not believe that the United States is entering the next Great Depression, but has said that he believes it will be the worst recession since then. He has clarified that his pessimism is focused on the short-run rather than the medium or long-run.
In the 1990s, Roubini studied the collapse of emerging economies. Consistent with the unusual talent noted by Sachs, he used an intuitive, historical approach backed up an understanding of theoretical models to analyze these countries and came to conclusion that a common denominator was large current account deficits financed by loans from abroad. He began to think that the United States might be the next to suffer, and began writing about the possible collapse in 2004.
投资股票？购买地皮？
“你还有投资股票吗？”
在我退休后，朋友见面，常常这样问我。他们有此一问，是可以理解的，他们都认为我写了三十多年的股评，又闯荡股市三十多年，现在我既然由职场退休，理所当然的，也该退出股市。
大多数人都认为股票投资风险高，即使是在职之人，也会被烧伤。有稳定的收入，烧伤了生活不受影响，退休之人没有收入，老本亏光了晚景肯定凄凉。故一股人都认为退休人士不适合搞股票。
股市中人，十之八九以亏本收场，幸存者仅十之一、二，难怪他们对股市没有好感。
买产业收租作为养老金，乃一般人之最爱，因产业具有很高的稳定性和保值功能，至於股票，波动大，风险高，不能给人们安全感；故选择股票为投资工具的银发族，少之又少。
将资金全投入股市
我认同产业比股票更稳定的说法，但我认为理想的投资工具，除了稳定性之处，还应具备变现性高，容易融资及有更高回酬机会等特点，而这是产业所缺的。
我在十多年前将在吉隆坡的几间店铺卖掉，将资金全部投入股市，知道的朋友，都不以为然，然而我始终没有后悔过，因为我从股票投资所取得的回酬，远非产业所能望其项背。从事股票投资三十多年，我依然不认为股票投资“危险”。
百分之九十的股市中人亏本，是因为百分之九十的人都在“玩”股票，“玩”就是投机，投机形同赌博，十赌九输，理所当然。只有百分之十的人赚钱，因为只有百分之十是认真的投资者。
大部份人只相信眼睛看得到的东西，对于看不到，只能想像得到的东西，多数缺乏信心。
买产业心里较踏实
他们相信产业，因为他们亲眼看到稳如磐石的建筑物；至於股票所代表的有形资产，如园丘、机器、厂房……，他们少有机会看到，只能想像得到，想像中的东西，当然不比目睹的可靠。所以，买产业，他们心里踏实，买股票，他们总是觉得不实在。假账的发生，更加深了他们的疑虑。他们不信任年报所提供的资讯，又叫他们如何相信股票可以成为很好的投资？
假如你有二万令吉，让你选择购买一英亩油粽园，或是购买二万股某只油棕股票，我敢肯定一百个人中，有九十九个选择油棕园，只有一个选择股票，而那一个人就是我。
实际上，你若以每股一令吉的价格买进这只股－－捷博（Cepat），等於你以一万令吉买进一英亩油棕，比以二万令吉直接买一英亩油棕园便宜一倍。
想像不如眼见真实
然而以二万令吉买进的油棕园，你亲眼看到每一棵树，心里自然感到踏实；至於捷博的二万英亩优良的油棕园（另有七千四百英亩待种农业地），远在沙巴，投资者很难想像这些油棕园是什么样子的。
你以一万令吉买进一万股捷博后，实际上你已拥有二万英亩中的一英亩，但这一英亩何在？你感到模糊。想像的到底不如眼见的真实，所以他们宁可放弃捷博股票而选择价格高一倍的二万令吉一亩的油棕园。
其实，只要以下列简单的公式：“油棕股票市价×股数÷所拥有油棕面积＝每亩油棕买价”就可以计算出以市价买油棕股，等於购买油棕园的每亩价格，再跟目前东西马油棕园的转手价相比，就可以算出你所买油棕股的价格是否合理。
购买油棕股比亲自种油棕有更多的好处。上市种植公司拥有东西马最优良的农业地，雇用最有经验的人才来整理，故产量较高。种油棕，要等三年才开花结果，五年后才看到利润；上市公司的油棕园都是在丰收中的，马上可以享受股息，何必等三、五年？更何况油棕股涨价后较易套现，不像油棕园，资金长期被套牢。
所以，我宁愿买种植股，不原亲力亲为种油棕。
好股如好友不离不弃
我有一位印度朋友，在担任园丘经理时，独沽一味，累积了不少优质种植股，现在年逾八旬，股息源源而来，晚年生活无忧，谁说股票不适合退休人士投资？
人的一生，有如春夏秋冬，青年时春耕，中午时夏耘，然后退休时才有秋收，晚年乃能冬藏。我们在青、中年时打拼，积极投资，累积优质股，老年时股息源源而来，我们将无后顾之忧。好股如好友，不离不弃，陪伴我们渡过黄金岁月。股票伴我老！
在我退休后，朋友见面，常常这样问我。他们有此一问，是可以理解的，他们都认为我写了三十多年的股评，又闯荡股市三十多年，现在我既然由职场退休，理所当然的，也该退出股市。
大多数人都认为股票投资风险高，即使是在职之人，也会被烧伤。有稳定的收入，烧伤了生活不受影响，退休之人没有收入，老本亏光了晚景肯定凄凉。故一股人都认为退休人士不适合搞股票。
股市中人，十之八九以亏本收场，幸存者仅十之一、二，难怪他们对股市没有好感。
买产业收租作为养老金，乃一般人之最爱，因产业具有很高的稳定性和保值功能，至於股票，波动大，风险高，不能给人们安全感；故选择股票为投资工具的银发族，少之又少。
将资金全投入股市
我认同产业比股票更稳定的说法，但我认为理想的投资工具，除了稳定性之处，还应具备变现性高，容易融资及有更高回酬机会等特点，而这是产业所缺的。
我在十多年前将在吉隆坡的几间店铺卖掉，将资金全部投入股市，知道的朋友，都不以为然，然而我始终没有后悔过，因为我从股票投资所取得的回酬，远非产业所能望其项背。从事股票投资三十多年，我依然不认为股票投资“危险”。
百分之九十的股市中人亏本，是因为百分之九十的人都在“玩”股票，“玩”就是投机，投机形同赌博，十赌九输，理所当然。只有百分之十的人赚钱，因为只有百分之十是认真的投资者。
大部份人只相信眼睛看得到的东西，对于看不到，只能想像得到的东西，多数缺乏信心。
买产业心里较踏实
他们相信产业，因为他们亲眼看到稳如磐石的建筑物；至於股票所代表的有形资产，如园丘、机器、厂房……，他们少有机会看到，只能想像得到，想像中的东西，当然不比目睹的可靠。所以，买产业，他们心里踏实，买股票，他们总是觉得不实在。假账的发生，更加深了他们的疑虑。他们不信任年报所提供的资讯，又叫他们如何相信股票可以成为很好的投资？
假如你有二万令吉，让你选择购买一英亩油粽园，或是购买二万股某只油棕股票，我敢肯定一百个人中，有九十九个选择油棕园，只有一个选择股票，而那一个人就是我。
实际上，你若以每股一令吉的价格买进这只股－－捷博（Cepat），等於你以一万令吉买进一英亩油棕，比以二万令吉直接买一英亩油棕园便宜一倍。
想像不如眼见真实
然而以二万令吉买进的油棕园，你亲眼看到每一棵树，心里自然感到踏实；至於捷博的二万英亩优良的油棕园（另有七千四百英亩待种农业地），远在沙巴，投资者很难想像这些油棕园是什么样子的。
你以一万令吉买进一万股捷博后，实际上你已拥有二万英亩中的一英亩，但这一英亩何在？你感到模糊。想像的到底不如眼见的真实，所以他们宁可放弃捷博股票而选择价格高一倍的二万令吉一亩的油棕园。
其实，只要以下列简单的公式：“油棕股票市价×股数÷所拥有油棕面积＝每亩油棕买价”就可以计算出以市价买油棕股，等於购买油棕园的每亩价格，再跟目前东西马油棕园的转手价相比，就可以算出你所买油棕股的价格是否合理。
购买油棕股比亲自种油棕有更多的好处。上市种植公司拥有东西马最优良的农业地，雇用最有经验的人才来整理，故产量较高。种油棕，要等三年才开花结果，五年后才看到利润；上市公司的油棕园都是在丰收中的，马上可以享受股息，何必等三、五年？更何况油棕股涨价后较易套现，不像油棕园，资金长期被套牢。
所以，我宁愿买种植股，不原亲力亲为种油棕。
好股如好友不离不弃
我有一位印度朋友，在担任园丘经理时，独沽一味，累积了不少优质种植股，现在年逾八旬，股息源源而来，晚年生活无忧，谁说股票不适合退休人士投资？
人的一生，有如春夏秋冬，青年时春耕，中午时夏耘，然后退休时才有秋收，晚年乃能冬藏。我们在青、中年时打拼，积极投资，累积优质股，老年时股息源源而来，我们将无后顾之忧。好股如好友，不离不弃，陪伴我们渡过黄金岁月。股票伴我老！
Crisis on Wall Street: Roubini Predicts Another 20 Percent Stock Drop, Sale of Goldman, Morgan
After failing to find a buyer this weekend, Lehman Brothers filed for the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history while Merrill Lynch agreed to be acquired by Bank of America for $50 billion. Such extraordinary events set the stage for a wild Monday on Wall Street, and most likely beyond.
These incredible, once unthinkable developments have caught a lot of people off guard, but not Nouriel Roubini, of NYU's Stern School and RGE Monitor, whose alarming predictions about the housing market and finanical system have been coming to pass with alarming frequqency.
This morning, Roubini forecast another 20% drop in stock prices, and reiterated a prior view that there will be no major independent broker/dealers standing before this crisis ends. In other words, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley should be seeking suitors today, or face a similar fate as Lehman later.
These incredible, once unthinkable developments have caught a lot of people off guard, but not Nouriel Roubini, of NYU's Stern School and RGE Monitor, whose alarming predictions about the housing market and finanical system have been coming to pass with alarming frequqency.
This morning, Roubini forecast another 20% drop in stock prices, and reiterated a prior view that there will be no major independent broker/dealers standing before this crisis ends. In other words, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley should be seeking suitors today, or face a similar fate as Lehman later.
走出股市迷魂阵
我在奥运前夕去了北京一趟，游览了部份重建后的圆明园。
给我印象最深的，倒不是圆明园的断垣残柱，而是一座“迷魂阵”。
这座迷魂阵占地不到一英亩，由一组高可及胸的矮墙组成，中央是一座建在高台上的亭子，环绕亭子的是矮墙围成的通道，只有一条可通往亭子，其馀都是死巷，皇帝坐在亭子中，任何人在规定的时间内到达亭子，可得赏赐。
我发现，那些不假思索，信步入阵的旅行团团友，顺着通道前进，都被堵在死巷中。兜来兜去，总无法到达亭子。
只有极少数，不急于入阵，却在阵外仔细观察阵的结构，然后才从容不迫地入阵，慢步向前，很快地就到达亭子。比那些“盲侠”快了几倍。
股市就是一座奇大无比的迷魂阵，假如你不假思索就进入的话，多数会被困在“死巷”中，要到达“财富”之亭的机会很渺茫。
假如你抱着从容的态度，先在阵外高地，俯视股市，看清楚其真面目，然后才悠哉闲哉地入阵，必能顺利登上“财富”之亭。
对大部份人来说，股市有如一堆乱麻，很难理出一个头绪来。
结果是大部份置身股市迷魂阵的人，都感到无所适从。
实际上，只有你以简御繁，就不难看清楚股市的真面目。
只要你遵循以下的三个原则，股市迷魂阵困不住你。
第一个原则就是养成独立思考的习惯，不随波逐流。
大部份人最易犯的错误是“盲从”，“盲从”就是“盲目跟从”，也就是闭着眼睛跟着别人走，自己没有主张，殊不知这个“别人”，其实也不比自己更高明，结果当然是卡在“死巷”中。
就好像圆明园的游人，看见别人一窝蜂般进入“迷魂阵”，就毫不犹豫地跟着进去，殊不知这些“群众”，其实对这阵的结构，也是一无所知，结果当然都被困在“死巷”中，只有极少数的游人，不跟随“群众”入阵，反而站在阵外，花一点时间，观察迷魂阵的结构，看清楚通道的方向，然后才从容地入阵，结果是后发先至。
但股市的迷魂阵，比圆明园的迷魂阵复杂得多。
因为圆明园迷魂阵是由固定的矮墙组成，矮墙是不会变动的，只要从高处俯视，就会一目了然，你绝对不会迷路。
但是，股市的迷魂阵，是由无数的乱象组成，这些乱象不断地变动，你很容易眼光瞭乱，看不清通道。
在这种情形之下，大部份人选择最容易走的道路——跟着别人走，结果是别人错，他也错。
要减少错误最好的方法，是遵循第二个原则。逆向思考走出困局
第二个原则为：反向。
“反向”有如鱼网的“纲”，“纲”就是提网的总绳，只要抓紧“纲”，整副鱼网就在你掌握中。
渔人在撒网时，因为抓紧“纲”，所以才能把撒出去的鱼网收回来，网中之鱼才无法逃脱。
在股市中，只要你“反向”成自然永远朝群众相反的方向走，股市的迷魂阵困不了你。
巴菲特说“别人贪婪时，你恐惧，别人恐惧时，你贪婪”，就是“反向”的最佳注脚。
然而，除非你配合基本面，“反向”也未必成功。
当一只股票由5令吉跌到1令吉时，如果你食古不化，根据“反向”的策略买进的话，你还是可能亏本。因为假使这只股票的公司已走向破产时，股价可能跌到5仙，甚至跌到零。以1令吉买进的人还是会亏大本。
所以，在应用“反向”策略时，一定要特别小心。
惟有一只股票的基本面保持不变时，才可以在股价大跌时买进。
如果基本面已改变，就必须重新评估，然后才决定是否值得买进。
问题是大部份人都没有评估股票价值的能力。
要评估股票的价值，必须做很多很多的功课，大部份人不会做功课，或是不肯花时间做功课。
为了避免买错，散户最好遵循第三个原则。
第三个原则为：只买五星级股票。
视垃圾股为瘟疫，绝不沾手。
无论“消息”多么好，也不动心。
记住：有些钱不是散户赚的，如果你因为不听“消息”而错过一次赚钱的机会的话，你不应感到痛心，而应感到庆幸，因为你可能已避开了九个陷阱。
因为在十个“消息”中，可能有九个是假的，是别人放出来引诱你上当的。
坚持只买五星级股票，你可以避开陷阱。
养成“千山我独行”的作风，对股价，坚持“反向”，对企业，坚持“五星”，你可以放心的走进股市的迷魂阵。
因为你一定能走出迷魂阵。
给我印象最深的，倒不是圆明园的断垣残柱，而是一座“迷魂阵”。
这座迷魂阵占地不到一英亩，由一组高可及胸的矮墙组成，中央是一座建在高台上的亭子，环绕亭子的是矮墙围成的通道，只有一条可通往亭子，其馀都是死巷，皇帝坐在亭子中，任何人在规定的时间内到达亭子，可得赏赐。
我发现，那些不假思索，信步入阵的旅行团团友，顺着通道前进，都被堵在死巷中。兜来兜去，总无法到达亭子。
只有极少数，不急于入阵，却在阵外仔细观察阵的结构，然后才从容不迫地入阵，慢步向前，很快地就到达亭子。比那些“盲侠”快了几倍。
股市就是一座奇大无比的迷魂阵，假如你不假思索就进入的话，多数会被困在“死巷”中，要到达“财富”之亭的机会很渺茫。
假如你抱着从容的态度，先在阵外高地，俯视股市，看清楚其真面目，然后才悠哉闲哉地入阵，必能顺利登上“财富”之亭。
对大部份人来说，股市有如一堆乱麻，很难理出一个头绪来。
结果是大部份置身股市迷魂阵的人，都感到无所适从。
实际上，只有你以简御繁，就不难看清楚股市的真面目。
只要你遵循以下的三个原则，股市迷魂阵困不住你。
第一个原则就是养成独立思考的习惯，不随波逐流。
大部份人最易犯的错误是“盲从”，“盲从”就是“盲目跟从”，也就是闭着眼睛跟着别人走，自己没有主张，殊不知这个“别人”，其实也不比自己更高明，结果当然是卡在“死巷”中。
就好像圆明园的游人，看见别人一窝蜂般进入“迷魂阵”，就毫不犹豫地跟着进去，殊不知这些“群众”，其实对这阵的结构，也是一无所知，结果当然都被困在“死巷”中，只有极少数的游人，不跟随“群众”入阵，反而站在阵外，花一点时间，观察迷魂阵的结构，看清楚通道的方向，然后才从容地入阵，结果是后发先至。
但股市的迷魂阵，比圆明园的迷魂阵复杂得多。
因为圆明园迷魂阵是由固定的矮墙组成，矮墙是不会变动的，只要从高处俯视，就会一目了然，你绝对不会迷路。
但是，股市的迷魂阵，是由无数的乱象组成，这些乱象不断地变动，你很容易眼光瞭乱，看不清通道。
在这种情形之下，大部份人选择最容易走的道路——跟着别人走，结果是别人错，他也错。
要减少错误最好的方法，是遵循第二个原则。逆向思考走出困局
第二个原则为：反向。
“反向”有如鱼网的“纲”，“纲”就是提网的总绳，只要抓紧“纲”，整副鱼网就在你掌握中。
渔人在撒网时，因为抓紧“纲”，所以才能把撒出去的鱼网收回来，网中之鱼才无法逃脱。
在股市中，只要你“反向”成自然永远朝群众相反的方向走，股市的迷魂阵困不了你。
巴菲特说“别人贪婪时，你恐惧，别人恐惧时，你贪婪”，就是“反向”的最佳注脚。
然而，除非你配合基本面，“反向”也未必成功。
当一只股票由5令吉跌到1令吉时，如果你食古不化，根据“反向”的策略买进的话，你还是可能亏本。因为假使这只股票的公司已走向破产时，股价可能跌到5仙，甚至跌到零。以1令吉买进的人还是会亏大本。
所以，在应用“反向”策略时，一定要特别小心。
惟有一只股票的基本面保持不变时，才可以在股价大跌时买进。
如果基本面已改变，就必须重新评估，然后才决定是否值得买进。
问题是大部份人都没有评估股票价值的能力。
要评估股票的价值，必须做很多很多的功课，大部份人不会做功课，或是不肯花时间做功课。
为了避免买错，散户最好遵循第三个原则。
第三个原则为：只买五星级股票。
视垃圾股为瘟疫，绝不沾手。
无论“消息”多么好，也不动心。
记住：有些钱不是散户赚的，如果你因为不听“消息”而错过一次赚钱的机会的话，你不应感到痛心，而应感到庆幸，因为你可能已避开了九个陷阱。
因为在十个“消息”中，可能有九个是假的，是别人放出来引诱你上当的。
坚持只买五星级股票，你可以避开陷阱。
养成“千山我独行”的作风，对股价，坚持“反向”，对企业，坚持“五星”，你可以放心的走进股市的迷魂阵。
因为你一定能走出迷魂阵。
Sunday, September 14, 2008
股票升跌的背后
没有永远上升的股票，也没有永远下跌的股票。如果股票永远上升，股票任何时候的卖出者，都是输钱者，因为卖出者无法用同样多的钱买回同样多的股票；同理，如果股票永远下跌，任何时候的卖出者都是“盈利”者，因为卖出者都可以用同样多的钱买回更多的股票。股票永远上升不会有“赚钱”者，股票永远下跌不会有“赔钱者”。要有人赚钱，有人赔钱，股票必须升升跌跌。
股票的升跌实际是股票价格的升跌，人们喜欢用资金净流入和资金净流出来描述。价格升了，在股票数量没变少的情况下，必然是资金的净流入。实际情况其实不是这样，因为有人为操控。股票的价格是由收市价格来计的，当高度控盘的股票资金净流出时，它还是可以让股价上升的，庄家出货，用的就是这个道理。
张三和李四会以什么价格成交股票，这个价格由什么决定？我们可以预测这个价格吗？价格是由人的需求级次决定。股票不能吃、不能用，我们买卖它的目的就是为了赚钱，就是为了不劳而获、分配财富（分析股票要付出劳动，这个劳动不创造任何价值）。我们接受某个价格，就是因为我们相信别人会接受比这个价格更高的价格（斗傻理论），当我们自己怀疑自己，认为别人不会接受比现在更高价格时，我们就会将股票卖出。
股票价格是由人的需求级次决定的，严格地讲是由集合人的需求级次决定的，为了影响股票价格，庄家必须影响人的需求级次。什么可以影响人的需求级次，一是不断上升的股价，把人贪婪的本性激发出来，二是媒体发布各种收购合并、整体上市等消息，把人对股票的需求级次提高。曾经有人问我，为什么垃圾股的股价比好股票的股价还高，我反问他为什么妓女比良家妇女赚的钱还多？为什么道德败坏的人往往比品德好的人更有前途？其实，这些东西的答案都在人性里。
股票价格是不可以预测的，但判断股票价格有个标准，预测股票就是这个标准。影响股票价格的有两股力量，一股是使股价上升的力量，另一股是使股价下跌的力量。设某个国家现在股票市值为12万亿，平均P/E为42倍，这个国家的股票指数还会涨吗？如果会涨，它可能涨多少？它可能会跌吗？如果会跌，它可能跌到多少？如果这个国家的股票指数现在是3000点，理论上它可以涨到任何点位，比如，4000点，。。。甚至10000点。如果由3000点涨到10000点，那时的P/E会从现在的42倍涨到140倍，那时的市值从12万亿，即使没有增发股票，也会涨到36万亿。这里必须分开两种情况，一是股票95%以上都被极少数人控制，在这种情况下，市值的上涨根本就不需要资金的“流入”，而只须庄家来回通过不同的帐户自买自卖（所谓的对敲盘）。如果股票比较均匀地分布在不同的人的手里，股票市值的增加，必然意味股票占用资金的增加。在股票被庄家控盘的情况下，庄家最怕的是折价配股，因为一配股庄家就必须跟着配，否则就会被摊薄。
股票从3000点升到10000点再也升不动了不是因为没有资金，因为资金还在那里，人们不愿意继续买入股票，是因为人对股票的需求级次下降了。在10000点，那些持有股票的人可能有麻烦。没有人接他们手里的货，这些股票又没有息可派，他们只能盼星星、盼月亮，最后当然是股票价格的狂跌，直到跌回它的起点。
股票的升跌实际是股票价格的升跌，人们喜欢用资金净流入和资金净流出来描述。价格升了，在股票数量没变少的情况下，必然是资金的净流入。实际情况其实不是这样，因为有人为操控。股票的价格是由收市价格来计的，当高度控盘的股票资金净流出时，它还是可以让股价上升的，庄家出货，用的就是这个道理。
张三和李四会以什么价格成交股票，这个价格由什么决定？我们可以预测这个价格吗？价格是由人的需求级次决定。股票不能吃、不能用，我们买卖它的目的就是为了赚钱，就是为了不劳而获、分配财富（分析股票要付出劳动，这个劳动不创造任何价值）。我们接受某个价格，就是因为我们相信别人会接受比这个价格更高的价格（斗傻理论），当我们自己怀疑自己，认为别人不会接受比现在更高价格时，我们就会将股票卖出。
股票价格是由人的需求级次决定的，严格地讲是由集合人的需求级次决定的，为了影响股票价格，庄家必须影响人的需求级次。什么可以影响人的需求级次，一是不断上升的股价，把人贪婪的本性激发出来，二是媒体发布各种收购合并、整体上市等消息，把人对股票的需求级次提高。曾经有人问我，为什么垃圾股的股价比好股票的股价还高，我反问他为什么妓女比良家妇女赚的钱还多？为什么道德败坏的人往往比品德好的人更有前途？其实，这些东西的答案都在人性里。
股票价格是不可以预测的，但判断股票价格有个标准，预测股票就是这个标准。影响股票价格的有两股力量，一股是使股价上升的力量，另一股是使股价下跌的力量。设某个国家现在股票市值为12万亿，平均P/E为42倍，这个国家的股票指数还会涨吗？如果会涨，它可能涨多少？它可能会跌吗？如果会跌，它可能跌到多少？如果这个国家的股票指数现在是3000点，理论上它可以涨到任何点位，比如，4000点，。。。甚至10000点。如果由3000点涨到10000点，那时的P/E会从现在的42倍涨到140倍，那时的市值从12万亿，即使没有增发股票，也会涨到36万亿。这里必须分开两种情况，一是股票95%以上都被极少数人控制，在这种情况下，市值的上涨根本就不需要资金的“流入”，而只须庄家来回通过不同的帐户自买自卖（所谓的对敲盘）。如果股票比较均匀地分布在不同的人的手里，股票市值的增加，必然意味股票占用资金的增加。在股票被庄家控盘的情况下，庄家最怕的是折价配股，因为一配股庄家就必须跟着配，否则就会被摊薄。
股票从3000点升到10000点再也升不动了不是因为没有资金，因为资金还在那里，人们不愿意继续买入股票，是因为人对股票的需求级次下降了。在10000点，那些持有股票的人可能有麻烦。没有人接他们手里的货，这些股票又没有息可派，他们只能盼星星、盼月亮，最后当然是股票价格的狂跌，直到跌回它的起点。
斗傻理论
投资市场，千奇百怪，如果你用常理去看投机行为，及用最理性的分析工具去解释各种市场，你会很难接受现实，运用最理性的分析工具在市场里面可能是大输家。譬如一只股票，由10元开始上升，很短时间之内，升到100元，市盈率由5倍升到50倍。你会觉得十分不合理，因为短时间之内升10倍，不合理竺市盈率50倍更加不合理。但如果你去沽空这只股票，它可能由100元再狂升至200元。用合理的分析会使你破产。投资市场使不少投资专家，经济学家，资讯充足的大机构，阴沟里翻船，输得一败涂地。因为他们太过理性，投资市场很多时候却不讲理性。大家在市场都好似捉弄人一样．见到价升，越升越不合理，但大家却似失了理智一样，越升越买，越买越大。在跌价时，亦可以是越跌越多人沽，越沽越大价钱。
高价追货，低价沽货可能是不合理的，但有人这样做，却赚大钱，高价追货，更高价沽出，低价沽空，还有更低价呢？高价买入，还有比你更傻的人在更高价去抢你的货。市场上永远都有更傻的投资人士。
炒楼就是一个典型例子，越贵越多人炒．永远都有人高价买入，然后以更高价卖出获利。
投资战略启示
不错，市场很多时都不可以用常理推测。人心狂热的时候，什么理智都已经被抛诸脑后。但是大家都起哄犯傻却是市场危险之处。单凭理智可能有很多时候走失时机，赚不到钱，但如果在市场投资时丧失了理智，只靠冲动本能做买卖，并无节制，毫无分析将市场过滤，一旦市场崩溃，这些傻傻的投资人士都是第一批被淘汰出局的人，是损失最惨重的市场牺牲品。市场并没有永远上升，或者永远下跌的可能，在沉醉于获利、赚钱越来越多，市价日日上升的美梦时，保持一点冷静理智，人傻自己不傻才是最出色的投资人。即使有时走失机会也胜过一次意外，水远不能翻身。大家对一些已经升到毫无节制的股市、期货市场、外汇市场，都要冷静理智。见过不少人股市获利时全副身家投入，结果股灾之后，他们发觉最傻的就是自己。
高价追货，低价沽货可能是不合理的，但有人这样做，却赚大钱，高价追货，更高价沽出，低价沽空，还有更低价呢？高价买入，还有比你更傻的人在更高价去抢你的货。市场上永远都有更傻的投资人士。
炒楼就是一个典型例子，越贵越多人炒．永远都有人高价买入，然后以更高价卖出获利。
投资战略启示
不错，市场很多时都不可以用常理推测。人心狂热的时候，什么理智都已经被抛诸脑后。但是大家都起哄犯傻却是市场危险之处。单凭理智可能有很多时候走失时机，赚不到钱，但如果在市场投资时丧失了理智，只靠冲动本能做买卖，并无节制，毫无分析将市场过滤，一旦市场崩溃，这些傻傻的投资人士都是第一批被淘汰出局的人，是损失最惨重的市场牺牲品。市场并没有永远上升，或者永远下跌的可能，在沉醉于获利、赚钱越来越多，市价日日上升的美梦时，保持一点冷静理智，人傻自己不傻才是最出色的投资人。即使有时走失机会也胜过一次意外，水远不能翻身。大家对一些已经升到毫无节制的股市、期货市场、外汇市场，都要冷静理智。见过不少人股市获利时全副身家投入，结果股灾之后，他们发觉最傻的就是自己。
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)