Singapore's huge petrochemical industry has started to feel the pinch of a cyclical downturn in the past few months. And it's expected to drag on for four years, hitting the multi-billion-dollar crackers that Shell and ExxonMobil will start up here in 2010 and 2011.
To survive the Gulf competition, local producers have to look to opportunities. One way is to integrate refineries and look for synergies.
'After a four-year boom, margins have started falling in the past three months,' an industry source said.
There has been a 'triple whammy', arising first from the glut of capacity added by new petrochemical plants, especially in the Middle East, he told BT. 'Second, we've started seeing a slowdown in demand from markets like China, linked to a slowdown in demand for finished products in the US.
'And third, high crude prices - which spiked above US$135 recently - have hit feedstock costs for Singapore crackers, which has led to margin erosions.'
Last week, Stan Park, deputy managing director of Petrochemical Corporation of Singapore (PCS), told BT that margins at its Jurong Island crackers have been squeezed by the rapid rise in oil prices, which account for more than 90 per cent of operating costs. Naphtha, a product of oil refining, has shot up 20 per cent this year alone.
The warnings from Singapore players come as the Asian Petrochemical Industry Conference (Apic), which started here yesterday, heard that the boom of the past four years is over.
'We've already seen a decline in profits this year as new capacity starts up,' said Steve Zinger, Asian managing director of consultancy Chemical Market Associates.
'In the next 12 months alone, there will be Middle East ethylene capacity additions of 9 million tonnes per annum, which is larger than global demand growth of 5-6 million tonnes per annum (tpa).'
On top of this, new Asian capacity will start up around 2009/2010. In 2009, China will invest in about 9 million tonnes of new capacity, including three coal-fired petrochemical plants, while Vietnam and Indonesia are also considering investments.
With capacity supply exceeding demand, 'we expect the downturn to last for four more years, with a recovery in 2013-2015', Mr Zinger said.
An avalanche of new Gulf capacity, especially in Saudi Arabia and Iran, will overwhelm petrochemical supply at a time when economic growth is slowing worldwide.
The upcoming 9 million tpa in the Gulf this year dwarfs Singapore's current capacity of 2.3 million tpa, comprising PCS's 1.4 million tpa and ExxonMobil's 900,000 tpa.
It is also more than double the 4.1 million tpa total here when Shell's new US$3 billion, 800,000 tpa cracker and Exxon's US$5 billion-plus, 1 million tpa cracker, start up.
But the industry downturn will not affect construction of these two projects. 'Our investment decisions are not timed for market cycles,' said an official. 'If you put steel into the ground, it's for the long term.'
The downturn will, however, put a dampener on the Economic Development Board's (EDB) hopes for two more petrochemical crackers here.
Furthermore, high oil prices will not only hurt naphtha-fuelled crackers like those in Singapore, but give a competitive advantage to natural gas-fuelled crackers like those in the Middle East and the US.
As Mr Zinger pointed out, this means the Middle East can produce ethylene at US$200 a tonne, which is US$600 a tonne cheaper than in Europe and North-east Asia and US$400 a tonne cheaper than in South-east Asia.
To survive the Gulf competition, local producers have to look to opportunities, he suggests. One way is to integrate refineries and look for synergies, which Shell and ExxonMobil have done here to boost operational efficiencies and cut costs.
In the meantime, a shake-out of less cost-efficient producers is expected.
Sunday, June 1, 2008
Bank loans grow at slowest pace in a year
Singapore bank loans grew at its weakest pace in a year in April as lending to businesses slowed, providing new signs that sluggish global demand could drag on the economy.
Bank loans in April rose 0.6 per cent to $251.1 billion in April from $249.5 billion in March, the central bank said yesterday, the slowest monthly growth since April 2007 when loans grew 0.2 per cent.
Loans to businesses fell across most industries from manufacturing to financial institutions, although the weakness was offset by the construction industry where loans grew 3.2 per cent.
Most analysts expect loan growth in Singapore to slow this year as a looming US recession slows Asia’s economies.
‘Business activity is definitely slowing down. It could be an initial sign of slower growth,’ said Kit Wei Zheng, a Citigroup economist.
From a year ago, total loans rose nearly 25 per cent from $201.8 billion, mostly boosted by construction where lending grew 1.5 times. The industry has boomed in the past year, supported by the construction of two casinos worth around US$7.7 billion.
Analysts estimate that loan growth at the South- east Asian country’s three banks, DBS Group, Oversea-Chinese Banking Corp and United Overseas Bank is expected to slow to 12-13 per cent this year after expanding 20 per cent in 2007.
However, economists said a recovery in the three-month Singapore Interbank Offered Rate, a benchmark for mortgage loans, would ease the squeeze on banks’ profit margins. The rate fell to 1.1875 in April, its lowest level in more than four years.
Loans to manufacturers fell 1.2 per cent in April to $11.1 billion from March, while lending to financial institutions declined by 3.6 per cent.
Housing and bridging loans to consumers rose 0.5 per cent to $74.6 billion despite a slowing property market, although Citigroup’s Mr Kit said the increase was probably not a result of new transactions but buyers paying off purchases closed previously under a deferred payment scheme. - Reuters
Bank loans in April rose 0.6 per cent to $251.1 billion in April from $249.5 billion in March, the central bank said yesterday, the slowest monthly growth since April 2007 when loans grew 0.2 per cent.
Loans to businesses fell across most industries from manufacturing to financial institutions, although the weakness was offset by the construction industry where loans grew 3.2 per cent.
Most analysts expect loan growth in Singapore to slow this year as a looming US recession slows Asia’s economies.
‘Business activity is definitely slowing down. It could be an initial sign of slower growth,’ said Kit Wei Zheng, a Citigroup economist.
From a year ago, total loans rose nearly 25 per cent from $201.8 billion, mostly boosted by construction where lending grew 1.5 times. The industry has boomed in the past year, supported by the construction of two casinos worth around US$7.7 billion.
Analysts estimate that loan growth at the South- east Asian country’s three banks, DBS Group, Oversea-Chinese Banking Corp and United Overseas Bank is expected to slow to 12-13 per cent this year after expanding 20 per cent in 2007.
However, economists said a recovery in the three-month Singapore Interbank Offered Rate, a benchmark for mortgage loans, would ease the squeeze on banks’ profit margins. The rate fell to 1.1875 in April, its lowest level in more than four years.
Loans to manufacturers fell 1.2 per cent in April to $11.1 billion from March, while lending to financial institutions declined by 3.6 per cent.
Housing and bridging loans to consumers rose 0.5 per cent to $74.6 billion despite a slowing property market, although Citigroup’s Mr Kit said the increase was probably not a result of new transactions but buyers paying off purchases closed previously under a deferred payment scheme. - Reuters
Banks hid $35 billion in write-downs
Several investment banks have failed to disclose a total of $35 billion in write-downs on their income statements, according to Bloomberg News.
Accounting rules allow financial organizations to report losses incurred by long-term assets, such as bonds, on their balance sheets instead of their income statements, allowing some banks to hide the full extent of the losses they have incurred due to write-downs, Bloomberg reported.
Among those entities failing to disclose write-downs on their income statements are Citigroup Inc. of New York. The investment bank, which has already reported $40.9 billion in losses tied to write-downs tied to the subprime meltdown, failed to disclose another $2 billion in write-downs it reported to the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc. of New York, which has disclosed $31.7 billion in credit losses, has incurred another $5.3 billion that it kept off its income statement.
Washington Mutual Inc. of Seattle, which has suffered $8.3 billion in losses tied to subprime holdings, has withheld disclosing $0.8 billion.
These previously undisclosed write-downs follow on the heels of the devaluation of $344 billion in assets through write-downs and credit losses throughout the banking industry.
Accounting rules allow financial organizations to report losses incurred by long-term assets, such as bonds, on their balance sheets instead of their income statements, allowing some banks to hide the full extent of the losses they have incurred due to write-downs, Bloomberg reported.
Among those entities failing to disclose write-downs on their income statements are Citigroup Inc. of New York. The investment bank, which has already reported $40.9 billion in losses tied to write-downs tied to the subprime meltdown, failed to disclose another $2 billion in write-downs it reported to the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc. of New York, which has disclosed $31.7 billion in credit losses, has incurred another $5.3 billion that it kept off its income statement.
Washington Mutual Inc. of Seattle, which has suffered $8.3 billion in losses tied to subprime holdings, has withheld disclosing $0.8 billion.
These previously undisclosed write-downs follow on the heels of the devaluation of $344 billion in assets through write-downs and credit losses throughout the banking industry.
Saturday, May 31, 2008
US weakness is greatest threat to global economy: Draghi
The global economy is threatened by continuing weaknesses in the U.S. economy and rising energy and raw materials prices, European Central Bank Governing Council member Mario Draghi said on Saturday.
Draghi told a Bank of Italy meeting that ECB policy remained "firmly focused on the objective of price stability".
"The greatest threat to the world economy now comes from the build-up of inflationary pressures and the possible worsening of the American slowdown," Draghi, who is also Bank of Italy governor, said in his address to the bank.
Draghi told a Bank of Italy meeting that ECB policy remained "firmly focused on the objective of price stability".
"The greatest threat to the world economy now comes from the build-up of inflationary pressures and the possible worsening of the American slowdown," Draghi, who is also Bank of Italy governor, said in his address to the bank.
摩根士丹利：越南面临货币危机
摩根士丹利表示，越南面临类似1997年泰铢的“货币危机”。
而评级机构惠誉昨天则将越南债务评级展望调为负面。
可能会贬值39%
据彭博社报道，摩根士丹利表示，越南正步向类似泰铢1997年所面临的“货币危机”，因为通货膨胀上扬、贸易逆差扩大之际，越南央行让越南盾汇价维持在过高的水平。
20个月无本金交割远期外汇显示，市场押注越南盾兑美元未来一年会贬值39%。
摩根士丹利香港分析员Stewart Newnham发布报告说，越南的经常项目逆差、外汇储备余额、通胀和越南盾处于“倒错”的水准。
越南国家银行行长阮文富拒绝对摩根士丹利的报告作出回应。但越南国家银行的银行管理部主管阮全辉27日在该行网站上发表声明说，尽管由于越南正经历1992年以来最严重的通胀，导致对美元的需求加速增长，但央行有能力确保一个“有序的汇率”。
阮全辉重申，越南政府准备继续在汇率的浮动区间内实施“稳健的外汇政策”。
越南盾兑美元今年以来贬值1.3%。越南央行每日制定参考汇率，波动幅度限于1%。12个月期无本金交割远期外汇合约本周下跌22%至2万2550越南盾。
通胀高达25％
另据报道，惠誉昨天将越南的债务展望调降，指其银行系统的稳定性可能面对风险，因为政府对高达25％的通货膨胀反应过慢。
惠誉将越南的评级从稳定调降为负面，其外汇长期评级为BB-，低于投资等级3个级别。不过，越南政府表示，惠誉的判断太消极。
越南的通货膨胀上升至1992年以来的高点，而贸易逆差则扩大3倍，今年以来，越南股市指数下跌了55%，与2007年的情形正好相反，当年越南加入世界贸易组织（WTO），同时，当年越南的经济增长则达到1996年以来的最高速度。
胡志明市亚洲商业银行总裁赖祥海表示，“相对于全球经济而言，越南变得更为开放，在贸易方面依赖性提高，因此当全球经济面对严峻问题的时候，对越南可能造成更大的负面冲击”，“我们面对一些严峻的问题，但我们并不认为这些问题会维持很长时间。”亚洲商业银行是越南最大的非国有银行。
此外，另一家评级公司标准普尔也在本月较早的时候，将越南的外汇债务评级展望调降至负面。
而评级机构惠誉昨天则将越南债务评级展望调为负面。
可能会贬值39%
据彭博社报道，摩根士丹利表示，越南正步向类似泰铢1997年所面临的“货币危机”，因为通货膨胀上扬、贸易逆差扩大之际，越南央行让越南盾汇价维持在过高的水平。
20个月无本金交割远期外汇显示，市场押注越南盾兑美元未来一年会贬值39%。
摩根士丹利香港分析员Stewart Newnham发布报告说，越南的经常项目逆差、外汇储备余额、通胀和越南盾处于“倒错”的水准。
越南国家银行行长阮文富拒绝对摩根士丹利的报告作出回应。但越南国家银行的银行管理部主管阮全辉27日在该行网站上发表声明说，尽管由于越南正经历1992年以来最严重的通胀，导致对美元的需求加速增长，但央行有能力确保一个“有序的汇率”。
阮全辉重申，越南政府准备继续在汇率的浮动区间内实施“稳健的外汇政策”。
越南盾兑美元今年以来贬值1.3%。越南央行每日制定参考汇率，波动幅度限于1%。12个月期无本金交割远期外汇合约本周下跌22%至2万2550越南盾。
通胀高达25％
另据报道，惠誉昨天将越南的债务展望调降，指其银行系统的稳定性可能面对风险，因为政府对高达25％的通货膨胀反应过慢。
惠誉将越南的评级从稳定调降为负面，其外汇长期评级为BB-，低于投资等级3个级别。不过，越南政府表示，惠誉的判断太消极。
越南的通货膨胀上升至1992年以来的高点，而贸易逆差则扩大3倍，今年以来，越南股市指数下跌了55%，与2007年的情形正好相反，当年越南加入世界贸易组织（WTO），同时，当年越南的经济增长则达到1996年以来的最高速度。
胡志明市亚洲商业银行总裁赖祥海表示，“相对于全球经济而言，越南变得更为开放，在贸易方面依赖性提高，因此当全球经济面对严峻问题的时候，对越南可能造成更大的负面冲击”，“我们面对一些严峻的问题，但我们并不认为这些问题会维持很长时间。”亚洲商业银行是越南最大的非国有银行。
此外，另一家评级公司标准普尔也在本月较早的时候，将越南的外汇债务评级展望调降至负面。
Friday, May 30, 2008
李光耀的投资智慧
股票投资者要通过股市这条投资管道累积财富，就一定要不断的提升自己的投资智慧，这样才有可能长期在股市生存。
理由是人的意志力很脆弱，需要不断的充电，才不会乖离正道，才能保持活力，走更远的路。
要在股市成功，需具备两个条件：
第一、投资态度要正确，态度错误，等于方向错误的旅客，永远无法抵达目的地。
第二、要有坚忍不拔的毅力。在漫长的投资路上，难免遭受种种的挫折，没有毅力，最易半途而废。
提升智慧的最好方法，是向有智慧的人学习。所以，我对成功投资家的报道，以及他们的言论，即使只是吉光片羽，也从不放过。
以成功、有智慧的人为榜样，可以帮助我们减少错误。
比如新加坡资政李光耀，我们知道他是杰出的政治家，但很少人注意到，他也是个极有智慧的投资家。
他也是新加坡政府投资机构主席，这个机构掌管政府1000亿美元，主要是在全球投资股票。
日前来自新加坡的一项报道，该机构已投资180亿美元于CITIGROUP和UBS。
反向投资典型例子
美国次级房贷风暴，使这两家银行蒙受巨大亏损、资金短缺，邀请财资雄厚的新加坡政府投资机构注资，该机构趁机入股两银行。
我们可以从该机构的投资两银行，以及李资政的谈话，学习到以下三点：
第一、该机构是在两银行业务受到重挫，股价大跌时投资于两银行，这是“反向”投资的典型例子。
这完全符合股神巴菲特的投资策略：当优秀的企业受到重挫，但有起死回生的能力时，正是趁低入股有关企业的良机。
入股后，长期持有，当有关企业恢复健全的财务状况时，股价必然大幅度回升，投资者可获厚利。
第二、放长线钓大鱼
李资政说，该机构将以5至10年的时间，来衡量这项投资的成功程度。
他又说，该机构准备持有两银行的股权20至30年。
这跟一般人视股票为短期投资的态度，刚好相反。
这是股市投资成败的关键所在。
第三、该则新闻报道说，该机构由1981年成立至2005年的25年中，每年的平均回酬为9.5%。
获取暴利确实不易
要知道，作为由李资政领导的政府机构，必然聘有大批投资精英为该机构服务，即使有这么多人才参与，该机构每年仅取得9.5%的回酬（相信是复数成长率）。可见投资要获取暴利的确不易。
当然，在这期间内，世界经济发生惊天动地的变化，包括911事件和金融风暴，该机构仍能取得9.5%回酬，已属难能可贵。
有趣的是这个回酬率跟这个期间内，世界财富的增长率，大致相同。
美国过去200年的股市回酬，约为10%，若扣除平均约3%的通货膨胀率，实质回酬约为7%。
由此可见，新加坡政府投资机构所取得的9.5%回酬率是合理的。
投资须脚踏实地
我引用以上的数字，旨在指出一个事实，那就是许多股票投资者视股市为快捷致富的管道，希望从股市取得超常的回酬，是不实际的态度。
除了极少数特殊的案例以外，绝大多数投资者都不可能取得暴利。
作为脚踏实地的投资者，如果能取得比经济成长更高的回酬，已算是很特出的表现，要赚取暴利，最后必然因为涉险而受伤。
股神巴菲特以取得15%的复利回酬为目标，已是很高的标准。20%的复数增长，使他成为世界首富。
理由是人的意志力很脆弱，需要不断的充电，才不会乖离正道，才能保持活力，走更远的路。
要在股市成功，需具备两个条件：
第一、投资态度要正确，态度错误，等于方向错误的旅客，永远无法抵达目的地。
第二、要有坚忍不拔的毅力。在漫长的投资路上，难免遭受种种的挫折，没有毅力，最易半途而废。
提升智慧的最好方法，是向有智慧的人学习。所以，我对成功投资家的报道，以及他们的言论，即使只是吉光片羽，也从不放过。
以成功、有智慧的人为榜样，可以帮助我们减少错误。
比如新加坡资政李光耀，我们知道他是杰出的政治家，但很少人注意到，他也是个极有智慧的投资家。
他也是新加坡政府投资机构主席，这个机构掌管政府1000亿美元，主要是在全球投资股票。
日前来自新加坡的一项报道，该机构已投资180亿美元于CITIGROUP和UBS。
反向投资典型例子
美国次级房贷风暴，使这两家银行蒙受巨大亏损、资金短缺，邀请财资雄厚的新加坡政府投资机构注资，该机构趁机入股两银行。
我们可以从该机构的投资两银行，以及李资政的谈话，学习到以下三点：
第一、该机构是在两银行业务受到重挫，股价大跌时投资于两银行，这是“反向”投资的典型例子。
这完全符合股神巴菲特的投资策略：当优秀的企业受到重挫，但有起死回生的能力时，正是趁低入股有关企业的良机。
入股后，长期持有，当有关企业恢复健全的财务状况时，股价必然大幅度回升，投资者可获厚利。
第二、放长线钓大鱼
李资政说，该机构将以5至10年的时间，来衡量这项投资的成功程度。
他又说，该机构准备持有两银行的股权20至30年。
这跟一般人视股票为短期投资的态度，刚好相反。
这是股市投资成败的关键所在。
第三、该则新闻报道说，该机构由1981年成立至2005年的25年中，每年的平均回酬为9.5%。
获取暴利确实不易
要知道，作为由李资政领导的政府机构，必然聘有大批投资精英为该机构服务，即使有这么多人才参与，该机构每年仅取得9.5%的回酬（相信是复数成长率）。可见投资要获取暴利的确不易。
当然，在这期间内，世界经济发生惊天动地的变化，包括911事件和金融风暴，该机构仍能取得9.5%回酬，已属难能可贵。
有趣的是这个回酬率跟这个期间内，世界财富的增长率，大致相同。
美国过去200年的股市回酬，约为10%，若扣除平均约3%的通货膨胀率，实质回酬约为7%。
由此可见，新加坡政府投资机构所取得的9.5%回酬率是合理的。
投资须脚踏实地
我引用以上的数字，旨在指出一个事实，那就是许多股票投资者视股市为快捷致富的管道，希望从股市取得超常的回酬，是不实际的态度。
除了极少数特殊的案例以外，绝大多数投资者都不可能取得暴利。
作为脚踏实地的投资者，如果能取得比经济成长更高的回酬，已算是很特出的表现，要赚取暴利，最后必然因为涉险而受伤。
股神巴菲特以取得15%的复利回酬为目标，已是很高的标准。20%的复数增长，使他成为世界首富。
巴菲特暢談全球投資趨勢
一年一度的波克夏股東會，熱鬧登場，獨家採訪巴菲特股東會.
看景氣：美國經濟確實走上衰退
看美元：美政府會持續讓美元走弱
看未來：歐洲是波克夏未來加碼重點
看中國：股價回檔不排除再度買進
看日本：密切關注保險產業
看能源：不認為石油會用完
去年此時，巴菲特以為只要通膨及失業率不惡化，美國經濟就能保有一定的成長力，不致衰退，想不到物價大漲加上次貸風暴漸深，讓這兩個前提完全破功。
但全球金融業風雨飄搖，卻給了他絕佳「瞎拼」的機會，他開始執行自己定下的教條：「別人貪婪時，你該小心點；但大家都害怕時，你盡可以貪婪些！」
這位77歲的大小孩，不僅搶走了比爾蓋茲霸占13年的世界首富寶座，在全球食品業的勢力也愈來愈深，箭牌口香糖、M&M巧克力、OREO夾心餅乾、麥斯威爾咖啡，這些屹立百年的美國大品牌，都被波克夏這家50年不到的公司，一一吃下。行有餘力，巴菲特更到歐洲踢館，到德國買保險公司，到英國競標人家不要的便宜貨。
有了這個「奧瑪哈先知」（Oracle of Omaha）神功護體，華爾街的狂風暴雨，幾乎對波克夏的股東毫無影響，年度歡樂盛事如常舉行。巴菲特，一如往年，好整以暇地花了5個小時，回答所有股東的疑難雜症。不過在評論華爾街金融機構賺錢不擇手段的行徑時，原本慈祥和緩的語氣，多了3分嚴肅及沉重，就像老師一樣，對遠在千里之外的「金融精英」循循善誘。
以下是股東會及波克夏全球記者會的摘要：
問：次貸風暴發展至今，各界對後續說法不一，你能不能以你智慧的眼光，幫我們看看未來的發展及後續效應？美國經濟已經走入衰退了嗎？聯準會的處置引起多方撻伐，你的意見如何？
認同美經濟衰退，短期內美元將持續走弱
巴菲特：就華爾街金融業的角度來看，次貸危機帶來的衝擊應該已經告一段落了，但一般房屋貸款的小民來說，痛苦還長得很。老實說，這次美國房貸問題擴及面積之廣，確實是前所未見的，從加州、內華達州，特別是拉斯維加斯，一直蔓延到東岸。
根據我的定義，美國經濟確實已經走向衰退，最簡單的例子，你問問身旁的人，現在的經濟情況有比3個月前好嗎？有比6個月前或是8個月前好嗎？我想大部分美國企業的回答應該都是否定的，否則就不會有這麼多抱怨了。
波克夏旗下有不少跟房地產相關的公司〔註：包括蕭氏地毯、摩爾塗料等〕，我們這些相關公司獲利就會衰退不少。
房貸危機影響之廣，連波克夏旗下的建商克雷頓（Clayton）也踩到了一些地雷，哈！我們很快就處理掉了，並且確保這其中產生的虧損，不會轉嫁到房貸者所要繳交的利息上。
我認為，政府確實應該利用政策工具幫背房貸的蝸牛族度過難關，但不能直接幫他們還錢，必須要他們了解錯誤決定所必須付出的代價，下次他們在借錢時，才會有風險意識。
問：你在股東信上解釋了美元走弱的原因，你認為未來美金會繼續走弱嗎？波克夏近年來向全球發展，你們會對弱勢美元進行避險嗎？會用哪些工具進行避險？
巴菲特：我認為美國政府會繼續讓美元持續走弱，但這並不會妨礙我們向海外發展，我們也不太會因為美元繼續走弱，而進行太多的避險動作，因為就長線來看，美元還會是最重要的貨幣，我們持股都擺得很長，因此並不擔心短期美元弱勢的問題。
而且，我們投資的公司——如可口可樂，其版圖已經遍布全球，各種幣值的營收都有，其實根本不用進行避險，波克夏也一樣，我們近年來到亞洲、歐洲發展，營收也遍布全球，這就是大型企業的好處。
雖然我對美元頗有信心，但如果我是火星人，今天才降臨地球，我才不會把所有財產放在美元上！波克夏未來一定要賺全球財，分散營收來源到全球，未來3年內，我希望還能購併一到兩家的非美國企業。中國、印度雖有不錯的公司，但因為他們對外資持股都有上限的規定，對我們構成一定的困擾。
波克夏未來會多花心思在歐洲公司，希望能藉由購併歐洲公司或是在歐洲成立據點，多賺一些歐元進來，分散我們目前以美元為主的營收，因此在股東會結束之後，5月中我將有一趟歐洲之行，主要放在歐陸國家，義大利、西班牙、德國等，我們對德國的保險產業頗有興趣，這次訪問會多看看。
雖然這次我們沒去英國，但波克夏對蘇格蘭皇家銀行將分割的保險部門也很有興趣，只是英國法規實在太繁複，稅也太重了些。
問：在整個次貸危機的處理過程中，不少人責怪聯準會，你認為聯準會處理得好不好？另外，波克夏是否一度想要買次貸受傷最重的貝爾斯登投資機構？
巴菲特：我認為聯準會在貝爾斯登事件中的處置非常不錯，因為碰到這樣的問題，最要緊的是別讓恐慌的氣氛擴大，聯準會先金援再幫他們找買主的作法是對的，因為如果貝爾斯登垮了，隔天就會有另一家跟著出事，金融機構就會發生接連倒閉的骨牌效應，到時候狀況會相當、相當難收拾。
至於波克夏在這件事情的角色，在事件發生的時候，我確實接到很高層很高層的電話，問我們的意願，波克夏確實想要伸手救援，但要650億美元，金額太大了，我們在截止之前，實在無法籌到這麼多錢，所以只能放棄。我覺得，貝爾斯登被JP Morgan買下，算是找到了不錯的歸宿。
我們居住的美國社會，基礎非常不錯，只要不要偏離太多，我們的兒子、孫子未來的日子，一定會過得比我們現在好，政策方面自有專業人士掌握，我相信他們應該會有好方法。惟一我認為政府應該做的，就是向金字塔頂端的超級有錢人多課一點稅，讓中產階級少繳一點稅。
看景氣：美國經濟確實走上衰退
看美元：美政府會持續讓美元走弱
看未來：歐洲是波克夏未來加碼重點
看中國：股價回檔不排除再度買進
看日本：密切關注保險產業
看能源：不認為石油會用完
去年此時，巴菲特以為只要通膨及失業率不惡化，美國經濟就能保有一定的成長力，不致衰退，想不到物價大漲加上次貸風暴漸深，讓這兩個前提完全破功。
但全球金融業風雨飄搖，卻給了他絕佳「瞎拼」的機會，他開始執行自己定下的教條：「別人貪婪時，你該小心點；但大家都害怕時，你盡可以貪婪些！」
這位77歲的大小孩，不僅搶走了比爾蓋茲霸占13年的世界首富寶座，在全球食品業的勢力也愈來愈深，箭牌口香糖、M&M巧克力、OREO夾心餅乾、麥斯威爾咖啡，這些屹立百年的美國大品牌，都被波克夏這家50年不到的公司，一一吃下。行有餘力，巴菲特更到歐洲踢館，到德國買保險公司，到英國競標人家不要的便宜貨。
有了這個「奧瑪哈先知」（Oracle of Omaha）神功護體，華爾街的狂風暴雨，幾乎對波克夏的股東毫無影響，年度歡樂盛事如常舉行。巴菲特，一如往年，好整以暇地花了5個小時，回答所有股東的疑難雜症。不過在評論華爾街金融機構賺錢不擇手段的行徑時，原本慈祥和緩的語氣，多了3分嚴肅及沉重，就像老師一樣，對遠在千里之外的「金融精英」循循善誘。
以下是股東會及波克夏全球記者會的摘要：
問：次貸風暴發展至今，各界對後續說法不一，你能不能以你智慧的眼光，幫我們看看未來的發展及後續效應？美國經濟已經走入衰退了嗎？聯準會的處置引起多方撻伐，你的意見如何？
認同美經濟衰退，短期內美元將持續走弱
巴菲特：就華爾街金融業的角度來看，次貸危機帶來的衝擊應該已經告一段落了，但一般房屋貸款的小民來說，痛苦還長得很。老實說，這次美國房貸問題擴及面積之廣，確實是前所未見的，從加州、內華達州，特別是拉斯維加斯，一直蔓延到東岸。
根據我的定義，美國經濟確實已經走向衰退，最簡單的例子，你問問身旁的人，現在的經濟情況有比3個月前好嗎？有比6個月前或是8個月前好嗎？我想大部分美國企業的回答應該都是否定的，否則就不會有這麼多抱怨了。
波克夏旗下有不少跟房地產相關的公司〔註：包括蕭氏地毯、摩爾塗料等〕，我們這些相關公司獲利就會衰退不少。
房貸危機影響之廣，連波克夏旗下的建商克雷頓（Clayton）也踩到了一些地雷，哈！我們很快就處理掉了，並且確保這其中產生的虧損，不會轉嫁到房貸者所要繳交的利息上。
我認為，政府確實應該利用政策工具幫背房貸的蝸牛族度過難關，但不能直接幫他們還錢，必須要他們了解錯誤決定所必須付出的代價，下次他們在借錢時，才會有風險意識。
問：你在股東信上解釋了美元走弱的原因，你認為未來美金會繼續走弱嗎？波克夏近年來向全球發展，你們會對弱勢美元進行避險嗎？會用哪些工具進行避險？
巴菲特：我認為美國政府會繼續讓美元持續走弱，但這並不會妨礙我們向海外發展，我們也不太會因為美元繼續走弱，而進行太多的避險動作，因為就長線來看，美元還會是最重要的貨幣，我們持股都擺得很長，因此並不擔心短期美元弱勢的問題。
而且，我們投資的公司——如可口可樂，其版圖已經遍布全球，各種幣值的營收都有，其實根本不用進行避險，波克夏也一樣，我們近年來到亞洲、歐洲發展，營收也遍布全球，這就是大型企業的好處。
雖然我對美元頗有信心，但如果我是火星人，今天才降臨地球，我才不會把所有財產放在美元上！波克夏未來一定要賺全球財，分散營收來源到全球，未來3年內，我希望還能購併一到兩家的非美國企業。中國、印度雖有不錯的公司，但因為他們對外資持股都有上限的規定，對我們構成一定的困擾。
波克夏未來會多花心思在歐洲公司，希望能藉由購併歐洲公司或是在歐洲成立據點，多賺一些歐元進來，分散我們目前以美元為主的營收，因此在股東會結束之後，5月中我將有一趟歐洲之行，主要放在歐陸國家，義大利、西班牙、德國等，我們對德國的保險產業頗有興趣，這次訪問會多看看。
雖然這次我們沒去英國，但波克夏對蘇格蘭皇家銀行將分割的保險部門也很有興趣，只是英國法規實在太繁複，稅也太重了些。
問：在整個次貸危機的處理過程中，不少人責怪聯準會，你認為聯準會處理得好不好？另外，波克夏是否一度想要買次貸受傷最重的貝爾斯登投資機構？
巴菲特：我認為聯準會在貝爾斯登事件中的處置非常不錯，因為碰到這樣的問題，最要緊的是別讓恐慌的氣氛擴大，聯準會先金援再幫他們找買主的作法是對的，因為如果貝爾斯登垮了，隔天就會有另一家跟著出事，金融機構就會發生接連倒閉的骨牌效應，到時候狀況會相當、相當難收拾。
至於波克夏在這件事情的角色，在事件發生的時候，我確實接到很高層很高層的電話，問我們的意願，波克夏確實想要伸手救援，但要650億美元，金額太大了，我們在截止之前，實在無法籌到這麼多錢，所以只能放棄。我覺得，貝爾斯登被JP Morgan買下，算是找到了不錯的歸宿。
我們居住的美國社會，基礎非常不錯，只要不要偏離太多，我們的兒子、孫子未來的日子，一定會過得比我們現在好，政策方面自有專業人士掌握，我相信他們應該會有好方法。惟一我認為政府應該做的，就是向金字塔頂端的超級有錢人多課一點稅，讓中產階級少繳一點稅。
It Ain't Over
Why Yogi Berra has it right, and Paulson, Dimon and the Street are wrong. AIG's terrific knack for losing money.
WHOM DO YOU TRUST? HENRY PAULSON, JAMES DIMON OR YOGI BERRA?
Granted, it's a tough call. Here you have such luminaries as Mr. Paulson, who, as we're sure you know -- but the stylebook mandates that we identify him regardless -- is top dog at the U.S. Treasury, and Mr. Dimon, JPMorgan Chase's big boss, saying the credit crisis is over. Obviously a numbers man, Mr. Dimon even ventured that it was 75% to 85% over.
Our immediate reaction was, if Hank and Jamie say it's over, it must be over. And we can't tell you how happy that made us, so we won't bother to.
But then, before we even had time to lift a glass in celebration, we remembered the prophetic words of Yogi when that widely revered sawed-off sage proclaimed: "It ain't over till it's over."
And we're quite confident he would agree that "it ain't over till it's over" might well be applicable to describing a grave financial exigency. Like, for instance, the present one, which has a shot, when the final tally is in on the full extent of the damage it is wreaking, to go down as the mother of all credit crises.
So with all due respect to Messrs. Paulson and Dimon, after due reflection, we believe Yogi had it right: It (in this case, the credit crisis) ain't over. And reinforcing that less than cheery conviction is the colossal loss that American International Group -- AIG -- the mammoth insurer, reported after the close last Thursday. The quarter ended March was awash in red ink, a vivid $7.8 billion worth.
We've no doubt Mr. Paulson and Mr. Dimon remain steadfast in their contention that the worst is over, although there are rumors being bruited about that Mr. Dimon now gauges the crisis to be 72%-82% over, a modest haircut from his original assessment but sufficient to demonstrate his legendary flexibility.
In March 2001, the Nasdaq was off by more than 70% from its peak set only a scant year earlier. Investors became increasingly convinced that lightning had already struck, the landscape was littered with shattered stocks and a turn had to be in the offing. Were they ever wrong! Instead, recession reared its ugly head, profits posted their biggest declines since the 1920s and Nasdaq fell another 50% before hitting bottom deep into 2002.
The most conspicuous of which is that, just as in March 2001 when the Nasdaq was off 72% from its top, so the home builders today are down eerily the same percentage from their all-time high.
The biggest flaw in the notion that the worst is over, in her view, is that the source of the problem -- home-price deflation -- is not only continuing but intensifying. "According to the latest Case-Shiller Index," she notes, "home prices are now deflating at a 32% annual rate, versus 8% six months ago. And the deflation is sure to intensify as the 4.6 million new and existing homes still sitting on the market find a clearing price."
She exhorts us to "Think of it...that 4.6 million inventory is nearly double the 2.6 million average inventory in the 20 years leading up to the bubble. More disturbing still, a record 2.27 million of those homes are sitting empty!"
For good measure, Stephanie adds that those melancholy figures fail to include all the homes "stuck in purgatory at banks, which are now collecting keys faster than they can list the properties." The Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., she relates, reckons that "other real estate owned" by banks is up more than double the year-ago total.
And, she concludes, "As long as the largest asset on household -- and bank -- balance sheets continues to deflate, the credit and consumption hits will keep coming." In short, the worst sure ain't over.
IF, WE'RE DEAD WRONG and the worst really is over, we wish that some illustrious personage -- say Mr. Paulson or Mr. Dimon -- would take a few minutes out of his busy, busy schedule to pass the good news along to Ben Bernanke. For if the credit crisis truly is winding down, why in the world is Mr. Bernanke's Fed running around like a proverbial chicken without its head and still working feverishly to prop up the banks?
The only possible explanation is that Ben has been so preoccupied trying to appease one angry congressional committee or another and taking bows for preserving the remains of what used to be Bear Stearns, he hasn't been able to stop for breath and see for himself that the bad old credit crisis has up and left.
Any day now, thanks to Bernanke & Co.'s importuning, Congress will furnish the OK to the Fed's latest stab at giving aid and comfort to those hyperventilating banks still suffering the consequences of years of avaricious bingeing. On the surface, what the Fed is requesting seems modest enough: It wants to pay interest on the commercial bank reserves it holds. The change was supposed to take place in 2011, but our beloved central bank, unaware that the crisis has passed, is eager for it to happen pronto.
Innocuous as it may seem, the proposal, warn Paul Brodsky and Lee Quaintance, is destined to exert a significant and not universally happy impact. Paul and Lee run the hedge fund QB Partners, and from time to time we've cited their intriguing takes on the economy and investing. Currently, banks hold as few reserves as possible at the Fed because of zero interest. Once the go-ahead is granted to pay interest on those reserves, the Fed will expand its balance sheet and the banks will get a bit of change and buy time to work off their mess of so-called Level 3 assets.
In case you've forgotten or blessedly never knew, Level 3 assets are packages of all sorts of different stuff, from credit-card receivables to leveraged loans, and absent any way of pricing them, their supposed value is what management says it is, or as one cynic put it, they're marked to make-believe. There are many billions of them, and these days they're the epitome of illiquidity.
The bottom line, according to Lee and Paul, is that the winners will be the large banks, the Fed and, since it's the latest wrinkle in what they dub the Fed's "monetary inflation strategy," debtors generally. Commodity prices and gold, they predict, will go up.
The losers? Oh, pretty much the rest of us, natch, who happen to be stuck with a debasing currency.
WHOM DO YOU TRUST? HENRY PAULSON, JAMES DIMON OR YOGI BERRA?
Granted, it's a tough call. Here you have such luminaries as Mr. Paulson, who, as we're sure you know -- but the stylebook mandates that we identify him regardless -- is top dog at the U.S. Treasury, and Mr. Dimon, JPMorgan Chase's big boss, saying the credit crisis is over. Obviously a numbers man, Mr. Dimon even ventured that it was 75% to 85% over.
Our immediate reaction was, if Hank and Jamie say it's over, it must be over. And we can't tell you how happy that made us, so we won't bother to.
But then, before we even had time to lift a glass in celebration, we remembered the prophetic words of Yogi when that widely revered sawed-off sage proclaimed: "It ain't over till it's over."
And we're quite confident he would agree that "it ain't over till it's over" might well be applicable to describing a grave financial exigency. Like, for instance, the present one, which has a shot, when the final tally is in on the full extent of the damage it is wreaking, to go down as the mother of all credit crises.
So with all due respect to Messrs. Paulson and Dimon, after due reflection, we believe Yogi had it right: It (in this case, the credit crisis) ain't over. And reinforcing that less than cheery conviction is the colossal loss that American International Group -- AIG -- the mammoth insurer, reported after the close last Thursday. The quarter ended March was awash in red ink, a vivid $7.8 billion worth.
We've no doubt Mr. Paulson and Mr. Dimon remain steadfast in their contention that the worst is over, although there are rumors being bruited about that Mr. Dimon now gauges the crisis to be 72%-82% over, a modest haircut from his original assessment but sufficient to demonstrate his legendary flexibility.
In March 2001, the Nasdaq was off by more than 70% from its peak set only a scant year earlier. Investors became increasingly convinced that lightning had already struck, the landscape was littered with shattered stocks and a turn had to be in the offing. Were they ever wrong! Instead, recession reared its ugly head, profits posted their biggest declines since the 1920s and Nasdaq fell another 50% before hitting bottom deep into 2002.
The most conspicuous of which is that, just as in March 2001 when the Nasdaq was off 72% from its top, so the home builders today are down eerily the same percentage from their all-time high.
The biggest flaw in the notion that the worst is over, in her view, is that the source of the problem -- home-price deflation -- is not only continuing but intensifying. "According to the latest Case-Shiller Index," she notes, "home prices are now deflating at a 32% annual rate, versus 8% six months ago. And the deflation is sure to intensify as the 4.6 million new and existing homes still sitting on the market find a clearing price."
She exhorts us to "Think of it...that 4.6 million inventory is nearly double the 2.6 million average inventory in the 20 years leading up to the bubble. More disturbing still, a record 2.27 million of those homes are sitting empty!"
For good measure, Stephanie adds that those melancholy figures fail to include all the homes "stuck in purgatory at banks, which are now collecting keys faster than they can list the properties." The Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., she relates, reckons that "other real estate owned" by banks is up more than double the year-ago total.
And, she concludes, "As long as the largest asset on household -- and bank -- balance sheets continues to deflate, the credit and consumption hits will keep coming." In short, the worst sure ain't over.
IF, WE'RE DEAD WRONG and the worst really is over, we wish that some illustrious personage -- say Mr. Paulson or Mr. Dimon -- would take a few minutes out of his busy, busy schedule to pass the good news along to Ben Bernanke. For if the credit crisis truly is winding down, why in the world is Mr. Bernanke's Fed running around like a proverbial chicken without its head and still working feverishly to prop up the banks?
The only possible explanation is that Ben has been so preoccupied trying to appease one angry congressional committee or another and taking bows for preserving the remains of what used to be Bear Stearns, he hasn't been able to stop for breath and see for himself that the bad old credit crisis has up and left.
Any day now, thanks to Bernanke & Co.'s importuning, Congress will furnish the OK to the Fed's latest stab at giving aid and comfort to those hyperventilating banks still suffering the consequences of years of avaricious bingeing. On the surface, what the Fed is requesting seems modest enough: It wants to pay interest on the commercial bank reserves it holds. The change was supposed to take place in 2011, but our beloved central bank, unaware that the crisis has passed, is eager for it to happen pronto.
Innocuous as it may seem, the proposal, warn Paul Brodsky and Lee Quaintance, is destined to exert a significant and not universally happy impact. Paul and Lee run the hedge fund QB Partners, and from time to time we've cited their intriguing takes on the economy and investing. Currently, banks hold as few reserves as possible at the Fed because of zero interest. Once the go-ahead is granted to pay interest on those reserves, the Fed will expand its balance sheet and the banks will get a bit of change and buy time to work off their mess of so-called Level 3 assets.
In case you've forgotten or blessedly never knew, Level 3 assets are packages of all sorts of different stuff, from credit-card receivables to leveraged loans, and absent any way of pricing them, their supposed value is what management says it is, or as one cynic put it, they're marked to make-believe. There are many billions of them, and these days they're the epitome of illiquidity.
The bottom line, according to Lee and Paul, is that the winners will be the large banks, the Fed and, since it's the latest wrinkle in what they dub the Fed's "monetary inflation strategy," debtors generally. Commodity prices and gold, they predict, will go up.
The losers? Oh, pretty much the rest of us, natch, who happen to be stuck with a debasing currency.
Crude Villains?
A hedge-fund pro says big institutional investors are behind run-ups in oil and other commodities. Where's Will Rogers when you need him?
IF STUPIDITY GOT US INTO THIS MESS, THEN WHY CAN'T it get us out?"
What made the stock market metamorphose from spirited advance into straggly decline was that the euphoria induced by the conviction that the worst of the credit crunch was over and the menace of recession was receding ran smack up against reality and, as in any collision between evanescent vapor and gritty substance, it's no contest which gets creamed.
That last item -- the rising ardor in Washington to do something to shackle the big, bad speculators in commodities and especially oil and gas -- drew some fuel from both interested and disinterested parties. Good old OPEC, in the person of its secretary-general, Abdalla Salem El-Badri, denied that it had the slightest thing to do with soaring crude prices. Gosh, who could ever harbor such an unkind thought? The blame, El-Badri emphasized, should be laid squarely at the door of those market-kiting speculators.
He is not, in case you wondered, the disinterested party mentioned above. That designation, by his own vouching, belongs to a fellow named Michael Masters, proprietor of a hedge fund unsurprisingly called Masters Capital Management, who testified last week before a Senate subcommittee. The burden of his presentation was that such deep-pocket investors as corporate and government pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, university endowments and kindred institutions are in no small measure responsible for the spectacular run-ups in commodities, particularly food and, of course, oil.
Mr. Masters seems well versed in the fine points of commodities trading, and he's passionate in his belief that the major stimulus for the fiery gains in oil and food are those big-bucks players. His testimony created a bit of a buzz in the Street, and it's certainly worth a read. That speculators -- especially in the past five or six months, when their normal haunts, the equity markets, were frequently in the dumps -- have been active in the futures arena is no secret. Ironically, we recall a similar plaint -- but in reverse -- made to us by a prominent Texas oil guy who beefed bitterly that speculators were behind the then sharply depressed price of oil.
To Peter, the big move in crude and gasoline is symptomatic of the bill that has come due for years of reckless consumption and dollar devaluation that have priced us out of markets to which we once held "unchallenged title." Signs of America's falling standard of living are everywhere, he laments.
And he posits that the current round of belt-tightening is "simply the down payment on the government's massive bailout of Wall Street investment banks and mortgage lenders." And he morosely predicts, "As the Fed creates money to buy bad mortgages and other shaky securities held by banks and brokerage firms, the value of the savings and wages" of us poor slobs will continue to shrivel.
That means that the cost of a good many more of the things that we take for granted will shoot up. "Four dollar gasoline," he warns, "is just the beginning."
IF STUPIDITY GOT US INTO THIS MESS, THEN WHY CAN'T it get us out?"
What made the stock market metamorphose from spirited advance into straggly decline was that the euphoria induced by the conviction that the worst of the credit crunch was over and the menace of recession was receding ran smack up against reality and, as in any collision between evanescent vapor and gritty substance, it's no contest which gets creamed.
That last item -- the rising ardor in Washington to do something to shackle the big, bad speculators in commodities and especially oil and gas -- drew some fuel from both interested and disinterested parties. Good old OPEC, in the person of its secretary-general, Abdalla Salem El-Badri, denied that it had the slightest thing to do with soaring crude prices. Gosh, who could ever harbor such an unkind thought? The blame, El-Badri emphasized, should be laid squarely at the door of those market-kiting speculators.
He is not, in case you wondered, the disinterested party mentioned above. That designation, by his own vouching, belongs to a fellow named Michael Masters, proprietor of a hedge fund unsurprisingly called Masters Capital Management, who testified last week before a Senate subcommittee. The burden of his presentation was that such deep-pocket investors as corporate and government pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, university endowments and kindred institutions are in no small measure responsible for the spectacular run-ups in commodities, particularly food and, of course, oil.
Mr. Masters seems well versed in the fine points of commodities trading, and he's passionate in his belief that the major stimulus for the fiery gains in oil and food are those big-bucks players. His testimony created a bit of a buzz in the Street, and it's certainly worth a read. That speculators -- especially in the past five or six months, when their normal haunts, the equity markets, were frequently in the dumps -- have been active in the futures arena is no secret. Ironically, we recall a similar plaint -- but in reverse -- made to us by a prominent Texas oil guy who beefed bitterly that speculators were behind the then sharply depressed price of oil.
To Peter, the big move in crude and gasoline is symptomatic of the bill that has come due for years of reckless consumption and dollar devaluation that have priced us out of markets to which we once held "unchallenged title." Signs of America's falling standard of living are everywhere, he laments.
And he posits that the current round of belt-tightening is "simply the down payment on the government's massive bailout of Wall Street investment banks and mortgage lenders." And he morosely predicts, "As the Fed creates money to buy bad mortgages and other shaky securities held by banks and brokerage firms, the value of the savings and wages" of us poor slobs will continue to shrivel.
That means that the cost of a good many more of the things that we take for granted will shoot up. "Four dollar gasoline," he warns, "is just the beginning."
Where the Financial Crisis Is Headed Next
Three years ago, hedge-fund manager Sy Jacobs told Barron's that serious trouble was brewing in the housing market, predicting that "the bursting of the housing bubble [would] be a dominant theme for investing in financial stocks in the next decade." He was right.
Jacobs, 47, is the founder of New York's JAM Asset Management. Its annualized return since inception in 1995 (through April 30) was 16.6%.
To find out where Jacobs sees new problems emerging in the financials -- surprisingly, they're not in the subprime arena -- read on.
Barron's:
You were early in detecting the serious problems in subprime mortgages. That turned out to be a great call.
Jacobs:
About three years ago, we were worried about subprime specifically. And that view very much paid off for us as we were short a host of such companies. More than a year ago, in another interview with Barron's, we said subprime was already in a full meltdown mode, but the idea that subprime was somehow isolated was still popular. Our message was that the mortgage-credit tail was going to wag the capital-market and economic dog. That's coming to pass now.
Looking ahead, what do you see for the financials?
We believe the recent rally in financial stocks -- and for the whole market -- is a bit of a head fake that will prove to be a bear-market rally.
What's your premise?
After first ignoring subprime, people now are too focused on it and they're missing the broader storm coming -- that's the head fake. While the bursting of the housing bubble produced all sorts of headline-making losses for some, it is just starting to drag down the rest of the economy. Separate from subprime, you are seeing diminished ability for consumers to spend their home equity. The securitization market, which banks and finance companies use to get funding, has slowed. So we see consumer and business spending slowing; the economy will falter.
In a recent letter to your investment partners, you noted that you were very concerned about the health of construction loans. Could you elaborate on that concern for us?
I spent a week recently in California, visiting some troubled, or soon-to-be-troubled, banks. With home sales down so much, construction lending is becoming a problem. You have a lot of developers and home builders stuck with homes that aren't moving. And they are sitting on lots that have loans against them. Subprime is such a small piece of the banking industry, but construction lending is a core product. If the housing market stays weak for much longer -- and it seems to be getting weaker -- construction-loan losses are going to be a big problem.
After the brutal real-estate recession that occurred in the early 1990s, there was a sense that banks had finally learned their lesson and would be much better fortified for the next downturn. I take it you don't think that's true.
I take a pretty cynical view of whether bankers have gotten smarter. We've had a real-estate bull market ever since the early 1990s. I think you are going to see the same thing again. The number of banks that get taken over by the FDIC and disappear may not be as high as it was in the late-1980s and early 1990s because there is strength in the energy patch now. But real-estate lending institutions are the bulk of the community-bank world, and I think you are going to see a lot of banks disappear.
What's your sense of the prevailing views of the financials right now?
People are trying so hard to believe that the Bear Stearns crisis in March was some sort of financial crescendo and represents the bell that gets rung at the bottom, as if that happens. But just because we got saved from what would have happened that Monday if Bear went down doesn't mean we are saved from all the forces that conspired to get Bear Stearns to the brink in the first place. Bear was not the sacrificial lamb to the market gods. It got knocked down by the same winds that are affecting everybody else. Credit destruction is a process -- not an incident. And avoiding that particular meltdown doesn't mean that things are getting better -- and yet that is how financial stocks in particular and the market in general have acted ever since.
You're a fundamental stockpicker, but are there any interesting trends you see in the financials?
One of our themes on the long side is that local plain-vanilla, over-capitalized community banks, especially thrifts, are in a position to gain back market share in the lending business. And they have real deposit franchises that they can fund themselves with. They have been losing market share to the Countrywide Financials of the world for a generation. Now, though, they are going to gain a lot of that market share back, because they suddenly have a funding advantage, relative to the larger financial firms that have been securitizing their loans. That market has been discredited. We're long lots of micro-cap ways to play this, but they're too illiquid to mention here.
Jacobs, 47, is the founder of New York's JAM Asset Management. Its annualized return since inception in 1995 (through April 30) was 16.6%.
To find out where Jacobs sees new problems emerging in the financials -- surprisingly, they're not in the subprime arena -- read on.
Barron's:
You were early in detecting the serious problems in subprime mortgages. That turned out to be a great call.
Jacobs:
About three years ago, we were worried about subprime specifically. And that view very much paid off for us as we were short a host of such companies. More than a year ago, in another interview with Barron's, we said subprime was already in a full meltdown mode, but the idea that subprime was somehow isolated was still popular. Our message was that the mortgage-credit tail was going to wag the capital-market and economic dog. That's coming to pass now.
Looking ahead, what do you see for the financials?
We believe the recent rally in financial stocks -- and for the whole market -- is a bit of a head fake that will prove to be a bear-market rally.
What's your premise?
After first ignoring subprime, people now are too focused on it and they're missing the broader storm coming -- that's the head fake. While the bursting of the housing bubble produced all sorts of headline-making losses for some, it is just starting to drag down the rest of the economy. Separate from subprime, you are seeing diminished ability for consumers to spend their home equity. The securitization market, which banks and finance companies use to get funding, has slowed. So we see consumer and business spending slowing; the economy will falter.
In a recent letter to your investment partners, you noted that you were very concerned about the health of construction loans. Could you elaborate on that concern for us?
I spent a week recently in California, visiting some troubled, or soon-to-be-troubled, banks. With home sales down so much, construction lending is becoming a problem. You have a lot of developers and home builders stuck with homes that aren't moving. And they are sitting on lots that have loans against them. Subprime is such a small piece of the banking industry, but construction lending is a core product. If the housing market stays weak for much longer -- and it seems to be getting weaker -- construction-loan losses are going to be a big problem.
After the brutal real-estate recession that occurred in the early 1990s, there was a sense that banks had finally learned their lesson and would be much better fortified for the next downturn. I take it you don't think that's true.
I take a pretty cynical view of whether bankers have gotten smarter. We've had a real-estate bull market ever since the early 1990s. I think you are going to see the same thing again. The number of banks that get taken over by the FDIC and disappear may not be as high as it was in the late-1980s and early 1990s because there is strength in the energy patch now. But real-estate lending institutions are the bulk of the community-bank world, and I think you are going to see a lot of banks disappear.
What's your sense of the prevailing views of the financials right now?
People are trying so hard to believe that the Bear Stearns crisis in March was some sort of financial crescendo and represents the bell that gets rung at the bottom, as if that happens. But just because we got saved from what would have happened that Monday if Bear went down doesn't mean we are saved from all the forces that conspired to get Bear Stearns to the brink in the first place. Bear was not the sacrificial lamb to the market gods. It got knocked down by the same winds that are affecting everybody else. Credit destruction is a process -- not an incident. And avoiding that particular meltdown doesn't mean that things are getting better -- and yet that is how financial stocks in particular and the market in general have acted ever since.
You're a fundamental stockpicker, but are there any interesting trends you see in the financials?
One of our themes on the long side is that local plain-vanilla, over-capitalized community banks, especially thrifts, are in a position to gain back market share in the lending business. And they have real deposit franchises that they can fund themselves with. They have been losing market share to the Countrywide Financials of the world for a generation. Now, though, they are going to gain a lot of that market share back, because they suddenly have a funding advantage, relative to the larger financial firms that have been securitizing their loans. That market has been discredited. We're long lots of micro-cap ways to play this, but they're too illiquid to mention here.
Thursday, May 29, 2008
巴菲特：學投資很簡單 願意讀書就行
巴菲特是這樣概括他的日常工作：“我的工作是閱讀”。
可見巴菲特對閱讀是多麼重視。
巴菲特大量閱讀與上市公司業務與財務相關的書籍和資料，在此基礎上才非常審慎地作出投資判斷。巴菲特以他研究GEICO保險公司為例解釋閱讀對于投資的重要性：“我閱讀了許多資料。我在圖書館待到最晚時間才離開。……我從BESTS（一家保險評級服務機構）開始閱讀了許多保險公司的資料，還閱讀了一些相關的書籍和公司年度報告。我一有機會就與保險業專家以及保險公司經理們進行溝通”。
當然巴菲特閱讀最多的是企業的財務報告。“我閱讀我所關注的公司年報，同時我也閱讀它的競爭對手的年報，這些是我最主要的閱讀材料”。
但巴菲特並不僅僅閱讀上市公司年報這些公開披露信息，他從年報中發現感興趣的公司後，會閱讀非常多的相關書籍和資料，並且進行調查研究，尋找年報後面隱藏的真相：“我看待上市公司信息披露(大部分是不公開的)的態度，與我看待冰山一樣(大部分隱藏在水面以下)。”
巴菲特這樣解釋他如何把閱讀和調研結合在一起的：“你可以選擇一些盡管你對其財務狀況並非十分了解但你對其產品非常熟悉的公司。然後找到這家公司的大量年報，以及最近5到10年間所有關于這家公司的文章，深入鑽研，讓你自己沉浸于其中。當你讀完這些材料之後，問問自己：我還有什麼地方不知道卻必須知道的東西？很多年前，我經常四處奔走，對這家公司的競爭對手、雇員等相關方面進行訪談。……我一直不停地打聽詢問有關情況。這是一個調查的過程，就像一個新聞記者採訪那樣。最後你想寫出一個故事。一些公司故事容易寫出來，但一些公司的故事很難寫出來，我們在投資中尋找的是那些故事容易寫出來的公司。”
在1999年伯克希爾股東大會上查理‧芒格說：“我認為我和巴菲特從一些非常優秀的財經書籍和雜志中學習到的東西比其他渠道要多得多。我認為，沒有大量的廣泛閱讀，你根本不可能成為一個真正的成功投資者”。
可見，巴菲特的投資成功秘訣是大量閱讀加調查研究。大量閱讀是掌握大量相關信息，調查研究是實事求是，而大量閱讀是基礎和前提。
你想學習巴菲特，首先問問自己，你經常讀書嗎？
下面向您介紹一下巴菲特推薦閱讀的書籍。
有許多讀者來信問應該閱讀什麼投資著作？
我經常以巴菲特本人的話來回答：
“要想成功地進行投資，你不需要懂得什麼Beta值、有效市場、現代投資組合理論、期權定價或是新興市場。事實上大家最好對這些東西一無所知。當然我的這種看法與大多數商學院的主流觀點有著根本的不同，這些商學院的金融課程主要就是那些東西。我們認為，學習投資的學生們只需要接受兩門課程的良好教育就足夠了，一門是如何評估企業的價值，另一門是如何思考市場價格。”
“由于價值非常簡單，所以沒有教授願意教授它。如果你已經取得博士學位，而且用很多年學習運用數學模型進行複雜的計算，然後你再來學習價值投資，這就好像一個基督徒去神學院學習，卻發現只要懂得十誡就足夠了。”
巴菲特對商學院的教育體系提出了尖銳批評：“商學院非常重視複雜的模式，卻忽視了簡單的模式，但是，簡單的模式卻往往更有效”。巴菲特甚至認為成功的投資並不需要高等數學知識，“如果高等數學是必需的，我就得回去送報紙了，我從來沒發現在投資中高等數學有什麼作用”。“你不需要成為一個火箭專家。投資並非一個智商為160的人就能擊敗智商為130的人的游戲”。
正如巴菲特所說，學習投資很簡單，只要願意讀書就行了。
當然巴菲特閱讀的不僅僅是格雷厄姆一個人的著作“如果我只學習格雷厄姆一個人的思想，就不會像今天這麼富有。”
那麼巴菲特推薦投資者閱讀的書籍有哪些呢？
給大家列一份巴菲特推薦閱讀的書籍作為新年禮物吧。
1、《証券分析》（格雷厄姆著）。格雷厄姆的經典名著，專業投資者必讀之書，巴菲特認為每一個投資者都應該閱讀此書十遍以上。
2、《聰明的投資者》（格雷厄姆著）。格雷厄姆專門為業余投資者所著，巴菲特稱之為“有史以來最偉大的投資著作”。
3、《怎樣選擇成長股》（費舍爾著）。巴菲特稱自己的投資策略是“85%的格雷厄姆和15%的費舍爾”。他說：“運用費舍爾的技巧，可以了解這一行……有助于做出一個聰明的投資決定”。
4、《巴菲特致股東的信：股份公司教程》。本書搜集整理了20多年巴菲特致股東的信中的精華段落，巴菲特認為此書是整理其投資哲學的一流工作。
可見巴菲特對閱讀是多麼重視。
巴菲特大量閱讀與上市公司業務與財務相關的書籍和資料，在此基礎上才非常審慎地作出投資判斷。巴菲特以他研究GEICO保險公司為例解釋閱讀對于投資的重要性：“我閱讀了許多資料。我在圖書館待到最晚時間才離開。……我從BESTS（一家保險評級服務機構）開始閱讀了許多保險公司的資料，還閱讀了一些相關的書籍和公司年度報告。我一有機會就與保險業專家以及保險公司經理們進行溝通”。
當然巴菲特閱讀最多的是企業的財務報告。“我閱讀我所關注的公司年報，同時我也閱讀它的競爭對手的年報，這些是我最主要的閱讀材料”。
但巴菲特並不僅僅閱讀上市公司年報這些公開披露信息，他從年報中發現感興趣的公司後，會閱讀非常多的相關書籍和資料，並且進行調查研究，尋找年報後面隱藏的真相：“我看待上市公司信息披露(大部分是不公開的)的態度，與我看待冰山一樣(大部分隱藏在水面以下)。”
巴菲特這樣解釋他如何把閱讀和調研結合在一起的：“你可以選擇一些盡管你對其財務狀況並非十分了解但你對其產品非常熟悉的公司。然後找到這家公司的大量年報，以及最近5到10年間所有關于這家公司的文章，深入鑽研，讓你自己沉浸于其中。當你讀完這些材料之後，問問自己：我還有什麼地方不知道卻必須知道的東西？很多年前，我經常四處奔走，對這家公司的競爭對手、雇員等相關方面進行訪談。……我一直不停地打聽詢問有關情況。這是一個調查的過程，就像一個新聞記者採訪那樣。最後你想寫出一個故事。一些公司故事容易寫出來，但一些公司的故事很難寫出來，我們在投資中尋找的是那些故事容易寫出來的公司。”
在1999年伯克希爾股東大會上查理‧芒格說：“我認為我和巴菲特從一些非常優秀的財經書籍和雜志中學習到的東西比其他渠道要多得多。我認為，沒有大量的廣泛閱讀，你根本不可能成為一個真正的成功投資者”。
可見，巴菲特的投資成功秘訣是大量閱讀加調查研究。大量閱讀是掌握大量相關信息，調查研究是實事求是，而大量閱讀是基礎和前提。
你想學習巴菲特，首先問問自己，你經常讀書嗎？
下面向您介紹一下巴菲特推薦閱讀的書籍。
有許多讀者來信問應該閱讀什麼投資著作？
我經常以巴菲特本人的話來回答：
“要想成功地進行投資，你不需要懂得什麼Beta值、有效市場、現代投資組合理論、期權定價或是新興市場。事實上大家最好對這些東西一無所知。當然我的這種看法與大多數商學院的主流觀點有著根本的不同，這些商學院的金融課程主要就是那些東西。我們認為，學習投資的學生們只需要接受兩門課程的良好教育就足夠了，一門是如何評估企業的價值，另一門是如何思考市場價格。”
“由于價值非常簡單，所以沒有教授願意教授它。如果你已經取得博士學位，而且用很多年學習運用數學模型進行複雜的計算，然後你再來學習價值投資，這就好像一個基督徒去神學院學習，卻發現只要懂得十誡就足夠了。”
巴菲特對商學院的教育體系提出了尖銳批評：“商學院非常重視複雜的模式，卻忽視了簡單的模式，但是，簡單的模式卻往往更有效”。巴菲特甚至認為成功的投資並不需要高等數學知識，“如果高等數學是必需的，我就得回去送報紙了，我從來沒發現在投資中高等數學有什麼作用”。“你不需要成為一個火箭專家。投資並非一個智商為160的人就能擊敗智商為130的人的游戲”。
正如巴菲特所說，學習投資很簡單，只要願意讀書就行了。
當然巴菲特閱讀的不僅僅是格雷厄姆一個人的著作“如果我只學習格雷厄姆一個人的思想，就不會像今天這麼富有。”
那麼巴菲特推薦投資者閱讀的書籍有哪些呢？
給大家列一份巴菲特推薦閱讀的書籍作為新年禮物吧。
1、《証券分析》（格雷厄姆著）。格雷厄姆的經典名著，專業投資者必讀之書，巴菲特認為每一個投資者都應該閱讀此書十遍以上。
2、《聰明的投資者》（格雷厄姆著）。格雷厄姆專門為業余投資者所著，巴菲特稱之為“有史以來最偉大的投資著作”。
3、《怎樣選擇成長股》（費舍爾著）。巴菲特稱自己的投資策略是“85%的格雷厄姆和15%的費舍爾”。他說：“運用費舍爾的技巧，可以了解這一行……有助于做出一個聰明的投資決定”。
4、《巴菲特致股東的信：股份公司教程》。本書搜集整理了20多年巴菲特致股東的信中的精華段落，巴菲特認為此書是整理其投資哲學的一流工作。
Wednesday, May 28, 2008
耐心等下一輪反彈
道瓊斯指數兩度升上13000 點之上後就急速回跌，形成一個小雙頂的走勢，對圖表派的股民而 言，壓力很大。
不過，只是小雙頂，不是大雙頂，沒甚麼特別需要擔心。熊市一期的反彈浪依然 持續，現在只不過是反彈浪中的調整，耐心地等下一輪反彈。經過幾天的急跌，昨日指終於反彈, 還得賴亞太股市集體反彈帶來反彈力, 但是股民信心仍然不夠.
不過，只是小雙頂，不是大雙頂，沒甚麼特別需要擔心。熊市一期的反彈浪依然 持續，現在只不過是反彈浪中的調整，耐心地等下一輪反彈。經過幾天的急跌，昨日指終於反彈, 還得賴亞太股市集體反彈帶來反彈力, 但是股民信心仍然不夠.
巴菲特告诉我们什么与为什么
在过去的很多年以来，股神一直是巴菲特的头衔。人们希望知道为什么一个职业投资家可以构建如此庞大的帝国。而在目前金融市场动荡之际，这种愿望更加迫切，现在整个华尔街都在寻找一个领袖，一个真正的领导者。
这是巴菲特旗下哈萨维公司的年报为什么如此受关注的原因，这不仅仅是一家市值超过2000亿美元的公司，更重要的是年报中有巴菲特写给股东的信，在信里巴菲特告诉我们他正在做一些什么，以及将要做什么，甚至是做错了什么。
"好日子到头了"
"好日子到头了。"巴菲特在信中的这句话是指保险业，当时如果我们看到整个金融业在2007年的表现，那么这句话看上去有着更加深刻的含义。
在信中，巴菲特引用万国银行(Wells Fargo)首席执行官John Stumpf的那句话，"有趣的是这个行业(金融行业)总是能在找到新的办法亏钱，甚至在之前的方法还行之有效的时候。"
这次他提到的是被人诟病的房地产信贷行业。巴菲特批评那些金融企业在发放房地产信贷的时候完全不考虑借款者的收入以及资产状况，而只是一厢情愿地相信只要房价上涨一切问题都会迎刃而解。"一旦房价下跌，那些荒诞的金融闹剧就暴露无遗。"巴菲特在信中表示。
保险行业是哈萨维的主业，但巴菲特觉得形势并不乐观。"保险业的盈利水平，当然也包括我们，将在2008年出现大幅下降。"巴菲特在信中表示，未来几年该行业的盈利水平都将受到挑战。
巴菲特并没有指出具体的原因，就保险业的特性而言，这可能是因为经济增长前景不容乐观。
投资美国以外
巴菲特在2005年开始建立了大约价值210亿的美元空头头寸，但到了2007年，这些头寸几乎都已经不存在了。这并不意味着他开始看好美元，而可能是发现了更好的投资渠道。
"Berkshire会尝试进一步增加我们的直接和间接海外投资收益。"巴菲特在信中表示。目前巴菲特的股票投资中包括21.4亿美元投于韩国钢铁生产商浦项制铁、15.8亿美元投资于法国药厂Sanofi-Aventis SA，以及21.6亿美元投资于英国连锁超市Tesco。间接投资当然包括可口可乐、Kraft食品和宝洁等在美国以外拥有大量业务的美国公司。
巴菲特倾向于非美国公司和资产的原因是美国庞大的赤字以及不断下跌的美元。美国2007年贸易赤字虽然下降了6.2%，但依然达到了7116亿美元，相当于每个美国人2300美元，在巴菲特看来这种贸易赤字水平无疑是太高。
这似乎与美联储主席伯南克的观点有些出入，伯南克上周四在国会听证时称美元下跌是目前美国经济难得的亮点，因为美元贬值有助于出口和增加工作机会、缓解贸易逆差。
哈萨维去年在货币投资上的直接收益是23亿美元，而现在直接的货币投资只限于对巴西雷亚尔上。
价值投资，即使是衍生品
在2月初，巴菲特表示他愿意为贷款担保公司价值8000亿美元的信贷资产提供再保险服务，曾令市场感到震惊，因为当时市场对这些资产避之唯恐不及。
从哈萨维的年报中我们可以看出，这家公司在2007年就已经增加了对于衍生品的投入。截至2007年底，其衍生品合约持仓金额从一年前的240亿美元上升到了400亿美元。
这包括哈萨维自己创设的54类合约。比如一些衍生品合约保护投资者在2013年之前不会受到相关高收益债券违约的伤害。根据哈萨维的资料，目前公司在这些合约得到了32亿美元的收入，赔付的金额为4.72亿美元，巴菲特预计最坏的情况是赔付金额可能大到47亿美元。
另外一些合约是关于标普500指数的卖出期权，这些合约的到期日介于2019年到2027年，合约执行价格就是合约签发时标普500指数的点位。
这些合约在2007年并没有给哈萨维带来收益，事实上哈萨维在衍生品合约中损失了8900万美元。巴菲特警告称投资者应该时刻为衍生品投资巨额的收益或损失做好准备，巨额意味着在单一季度金额很可能达到10亿美元以上。
不过对于巴菲特而言，投资是长期的，所以并不会计较短期得失。这些投资意味着他看好长期经济将依旧增长。他表示他完全能接受仅仅一场风暴就能让他损失60亿美元的保险投资，这同样是他衍生品投资商的哲学。
错误的投资
即使精明如巴菲特，依然可能犯下致命的错误，在1993年，哈萨维以4.33亿美元买下来一家名为Dexter Shoe Co的制鞋公司。而这笔投资最终的损失达到了35亿美元。
在这笔投资中巴菲特犯下了两个错误：他没有意识到那些看起来坚不可摧的竞争优势可以在几年内消失无踪;而他不是用现金，而是用哈萨维1.6%的股权买入这家一文不值的公司，而这些股权目前价值35亿美元。
"直到现在，Dexter依然是我在投资上犯下的最大的错误，"巴菲特在信中表示，"而在未来我还将犯更多的错误。"
当你看完巴菲特的信，其实他只是告诉我们一个很简单的道理：他是一个价值投资者，他也将一直是，他告诉我们这是投资，买入那些真正有价值的资产，而不是去赌博，当然也不要害怕风险，甚至是错误。
这是巴菲特旗下哈萨维公司的年报为什么如此受关注的原因，这不仅仅是一家市值超过2000亿美元的公司，更重要的是年报中有巴菲特写给股东的信，在信里巴菲特告诉我们他正在做一些什么，以及将要做什么，甚至是做错了什么。
"好日子到头了"
"好日子到头了。"巴菲特在信中的这句话是指保险业，当时如果我们看到整个金融业在2007年的表现，那么这句话看上去有着更加深刻的含义。
在信中，巴菲特引用万国银行(Wells Fargo)首席执行官John Stumpf的那句话，"有趣的是这个行业(金融行业)总是能在找到新的办法亏钱，甚至在之前的方法还行之有效的时候。"
这次他提到的是被人诟病的房地产信贷行业。巴菲特批评那些金融企业在发放房地产信贷的时候完全不考虑借款者的收入以及资产状况，而只是一厢情愿地相信只要房价上涨一切问题都会迎刃而解。"一旦房价下跌，那些荒诞的金融闹剧就暴露无遗。"巴菲特在信中表示。
保险行业是哈萨维的主业，但巴菲特觉得形势并不乐观。"保险业的盈利水平，当然也包括我们，将在2008年出现大幅下降。"巴菲特在信中表示，未来几年该行业的盈利水平都将受到挑战。
巴菲特并没有指出具体的原因，就保险业的特性而言，这可能是因为经济增长前景不容乐观。
投资美国以外
巴菲特在2005年开始建立了大约价值210亿的美元空头头寸，但到了2007年，这些头寸几乎都已经不存在了。这并不意味着他开始看好美元，而可能是发现了更好的投资渠道。
"Berkshire会尝试进一步增加我们的直接和间接海外投资收益。"巴菲特在信中表示。目前巴菲特的股票投资中包括21.4亿美元投于韩国钢铁生产商浦项制铁、15.8亿美元投资于法国药厂Sanofi-Aventis SA，以及21.6亿美元投资于英国连锁超市Tesco。间接投资当然包括可口可乐、Kraft食品和宝洁等在美国以外拥有大量业务的美国公司。
巴菲特倾向于非美国公司和资产的原因是美国庞大的赤字以及不断下跌的美元。美国2007年贸易赤字虽然下降了6.2%，但依然达到了7116亿美元，相当于每个美国人2300美元，在巴菲特看来这种贸易赤字水平无疑是太高。
这似乎与美联储主席伯南克的观点有些出入，伯南克上周四在国会听证时称美元下跌是目前美国经济难得的亮点，因为美元贬值有助于出口和增加工作机会、缓解贸易逆差。
哈萨维去年在货币投资上的直接收益是23亿美元，而现在直接的货币投资只限于对巴西雷亚尔上。
价值投资，即使是衍生品
在2月初，巴菲特表示他愿意为贷款担保公司价值8000亿美元的信贷资产提供再保险服务，曾令市场感到震惊，因为当时市场对这些资产避之唯恐不及。
从哈萨维的年报中我们可以看出，这家公司在2007年就已经增加了对于衍生品的投入。截至2007年底，其衍生品合约持仓金额从一年前的240亿美元上升到了400亿美元。
这包括哈萨维自己创设的54类合约。比如一些衍生品合约保护投资者在2013年之前不会受到相关高收益债券违约的伤害。根据哈萨维的资料，目前公司在这些合约得到了32亿美元的收入，赔付的金额为4.72亿美元，巴菲特预计最坏的情况是赔付金额可能大到47亿美元。
另外一些合约是关于标普500指数的卖出期权，这些合约的到期日介于2019年到2027年，合约执行价格就是合约签发时标普500指数的点位。
这些合约在2007年并没有给哈萨维带来收益，事实上哈萨维在衍生品合约中损失了8900万美元。巴菲特警告称投资者应该时刻为衍生品投资巨额的收益或损失做好准备，巨额意味着在单一季度金额很可能达到10亿美元以上。
不过对于巴菲特而言，投资是长期的，所以并不会计较短期得失。这些投资意味着他看好长期经济将依旧增长。他表示他完全能接受仅仅一场风暴就能让他损失60亿美元的保险投资，这同样是他衍生品投资商的哲学。
错误的投资
即使精明如巴菲特，依然可能犯下致命的错误，在1993年，哈萨维以4.33亿美元买下来一家名为Dexter Shoe Co的制鞋公司。而这笔投资最终的损失达到了35亿美元。
在这笔投资中巴菲特犯下了两个错误：他没有意识到那些看起来坚不可摧的竞争优势可以在几年内消失无踪;而他不是用现金，而是用哈萨维1.6%的股权买入这家一文不值的公司，而这些股权目前价值35亿美元。
"直到现在，Dexter依然是我在投资上犯下的最大的错误，"巴菲特在信中表示，"而在未来我还将犯更多的错误。"
当你看完巴菲特的信，其实他只是告诉我们一个很简单的道理：他是一个价值投资者，他也将一直是，他告诉我们这是投资，买入那些真正有价值的资产，而不是去赌博，当然也不要害怕风险，甚至是错误。
巴菲特：经理人需要DNA里都有防御风险的概念
巴菲特说，经理人需要是那些DNA里都有防御风险概念的人，并且不会跟风投资所谓高回报的公司。巴菲特认为，去年金融业发生的情况有些是有苗头的。“不能认识到模型里没有显示出来的风险是致命的。”巴菲特说
巴菲特相信，最坏的全球信贷紧缩时期已经过去，但后遗症将继续困扰普通的家庭。巴菲特警告：“类似的情况很可能在未来再次发生。这种状况也会持续一段时间。”巴菲特表示，他还没想到即时的解决办法。
这是巴菲特在伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司 (Berkshire Hathaway)于5月3日召开的股东大会上发表的观点。
贪婪与风险
房地产泡沫蔓延到其他经济领域的广度让巴菲特感到出乎意料。巴菲特不记得历史上有过其他类似的泡沫。
巴菲特说，是的，虽然有少数银行家似乎能够对风险保持警惕。“我们从去年的情况可以清楚地看到，如果执行官知道发生了什么事情，他不会放任自流。”巴菲特说，有时承认自己不知道发生了什么事情反而没那么难为情。
巴菲特的长期业务合作伙伴查理·芒格(Charlie Munger)指责华尔街，贪婪和纵欲的疯狂文化已导致过度的信用危机，对这个国家是非常不利的。
芒格说，信用危机的广度使得安然危机现在看起来简直像是一个“茶聚”。安然丑闻之后，美国政府出台了新法律，以打击金融诈骗。“现在看来，他们是用玩具枪击中了大象。”芒格说。
巴菲特说，金融机构很难规范。美国政府成立了一个组织，即所谓的OFHEO(联邦房地产监管办公室)，有200名工作人员，专门监管Fannie Mae和Freddie Mac。他们的工作只是监管这两家公司，看他们是否做了他们该做的事情。然而，后来还是发生了两桩历史上最大的会计虚报案。
巴菲特说，经理人需要是那些DNA里都有防御风险概念的人，并且不会跟风投资所谓高回报的公司。巴菲特认为，去年金融业发生的情况有些是有苗头的。所有银行都有一些运行的金融模型，但拥有模型并不等于他们知道面临了什么严重的风险。
“不能认识到模型里没有显示出来的风险是致命的。”巴菲特说。
查理·芒格称，伯克希尔希望永远规避风险。他说：“我们的行为方式使得没人质疑我们的信用。对风险的双层叠式防御在伯克希尔就像呼吸一样重要。”芒格说，他(巴菲特)可称为风险经理。与之相反的做法是可以有个首席风险官，但他只不过在你做傻事的时候让你感觉好一点。华尔街的银行变得贪婪和无节制，不考虑风险。
分散风险反而带来更大风险
将华尔街和伯克希尔对待风险的态度相比，就能够看出为什么巴菲特是资本世界的一代宗师。
在伯克希尔，巴菲特放弃赚取回报率较高的99%的机会，甚至或许是99.9%，但他不会感到不舒服。巴菲特表示，很多人几乎在伯克希尔拥有他们的全部身家，包括我自己，如果把这些都放置于风险之中，我们都不会感到舒服。
“我们会处理自己的风险，而不是把它传播到更大的范围去。”巴菲特说，“我们看到有些公司认为自己已经把风险转嫁出去，其实并不是最明智的。”
所谓的债务抵押债券(CDO， Collateralized Debt Obligation)的功能之一就是将风险放到一个更大的范围内加以分散。但事实证明，所谓的分散风险在整个系统都出现问题时根本失效，带来的反而是更大的风险。芒格认为，让衍生品交易发展到这种地步简直是疯狂的。
巴菲特对风险的强调直接影响到其接班人的选定。他已经钦点了4位投资经理，在他去世之后，可以运行伯克希尔公司的投资。巴菲特没有点出这4人的名字，只是说需要有好的职业经历，但人品素质尤其重要。
“有人天生就能够判断什么是重大风险。”巴菲特说。
以按揭贷款为基础的金融衍生品简直是疯狂
巴菲特认为，美联储帮助贝尔斯登(Bear Stearns)免于破产是正确的。贝尔斯登有14.5万亿美元的衍生品合约，如果它倒闭了，这些合同将不得不在很短时间内撤销。巴菲特说：“这会是一个壮观的前所未有的比例。”
而芒格认为，让公司不断膨胀到没办法破产的地步，这简直是疯了，让衍生品交易发展到这种地步也是疯狂的。
巴菲特说，银行发明的这种以按揭贷款为基础的证券组合的金融衍生产品简直是疯狂的。
“如果要了解CDO，需要阅读15000字的材料。”巴菲特说，“如果采用了较低级的一块CDO，并采用了50个，成为一个CDO方阵，那需要阅读高达75万字的材料才能理解一种证券工具。我的意思是，这不可能做得到。当开始购买其他工具的期货商品时，没有人知道他们在这样做什么。很荒谬。”
巴菲特认为，要求银行必须评估所持债券的市场价值可能有帮助。芒格说，自由市场不是万能的，有一些创新应被禁止。芒格说，如果将风险分散多元化 (diversification)这个词禁止，这个世界可能要运转得更好。
芒格透露，巴菲特在很多时候作决定非常快，这是非常不凡的地方，原因之一就是巴菲特将不会允许他自己过多考虑某些东西。
有打算购买中国或印度企业
关于伯克希尔会不会购买中国或印度的企业，巴菲特说，他们有这个打算，但中国和印度的法律和规定使得伯克希尔很难获得利润。以保险业为例，对外国投资者都有25%的上限。
巴菲特说，未来他希望伯克希尔集中在海外市场，而不是美国。伯克希尔未来或将在海外购买一两个公司。巴菲特说，他还不确定是德国公司、英国公司或者其他国家的一些公司。因为，那些国家的货币对美元汇率下跌的可能性非常小。巴菲特说，美国政府所采取的政策将使得美元进一步走软，他觉得没有必要对非美元的货币投资进行对冲。
巴菲特相信，最坏的全球信贷紧缩时期已经过去，但后遗症将继续困扰普通的家庭。巴菲特警告：“类似的情况很可能在未来再次发生。这种状况也会持续一段时间。”巴菲特表示，他还没想到即时的解决办法。
这是巴菲特在伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司 (Berkshire Hathaway)于5月3日召开的股东大会上发表的观点。
贪婪与风险
房地产泡沫蔓延到其他经济领域的广度让巴菲特感到出乎意料。巴菲特不记得历史上有过其他类似的泡沫。
巴菲特说，是的，虽然有少数银行家似乎能够对风险保持警惕。“我们从去年的情况可以清楚地看到，如果执行官知道发生了什么事情，他不会放任自流。”巴菲特说，有时承认自己不知道发生了什么事情反而没那么难为情。
巴菲特的长期业务合作伙伴查理·芒格(Charlie Munger)指责华尔街，贪婪和纵欲的疯狂文化已导致过度的信用危机，对这个国家是非常不利的。
芒格说，信用危机的广度使得安然危机现在看起来简直像是一个“茶聚”。安然丑闻之后，美国政府出台了新法律，以打击金融诈骗。“现在看来，他们是用玩具枪击中了大象。”芒格说。
巴菲特说，金融机构很难规范。美国政府成立了一个组织，即所谓的OFHEO(联邦房地产监管办公室)，有200名工作人员，专门监管Fannie Mae和Freddie Mac。他们的工作只是监管这两家公司，看他们是否做了他们该做的事情。然而，后来还是发生了两桩历史上最大的会计虚报案。
巴菲特说，经理人需要是那些DNA里都有防御风险概念的人，并且不会跟风投资所谓高回报的公司。巴菲特认为，去年金融业发生的情况有些是有苗头的。所有银行都有一些运行的金融模型，但拥有模型并不等于他们知道面临了什么严重的风险。
“不能认识到模型里没有显示出来的风险是致命的。”巴菲特说。
查理·芒格称，伯克希尔希望永远规避风险。他说：“我们的行为方式使得没人质疑我们的信用。对风险的双层叠式防御在伯克希尔就像呼吸一样重要。”芒格说，他(巴菲特)可称为风险经理。与之相反的做法是可以有个首席风险官，但他只不过在你做傻事的时候让你感觉好一点。华尔街的银行变得贪婪和无节制，不考虑风险。
分散风险反而带来更大风险
将华尔街和伯克希尔对待风险的态度相比，就能够看出为什么巴菲特是资本世界的一代宗师。
在伯克希尔，巴菲特放弃赚取回报率较高的99%的机会，甚至或许是99.9%，但他不会感到不舒服。巴菲特表示，很多人几乎在伯克希尔拥有他们的全部身家，包括我自己，如果把这些都放置于风险之中，我们都不会感到舒服。
“我们会处理自己的风险，而不是把它传播到更大的范围去。”巴菲特说，“我们看到有些公司认为自己已经把风险转嫁出去，其实并不是最明智的。”
所谓的债务抵押债券(CDO， Collateralized Debt Obligation)的功能之一就是将风险放到一个更大的范围内加以分散。但事实证明，所谓的分散风险在整个系统都出现问题时根本失效，带来的反而是更大的风险。芒格认为，让衍生品交易发展到这种地步简直是疯狂的。
巴菲特对风险的强调直接影响到其接班人的选定。他已经钦点了4位投资经理，在他去世之后，可以运行伯克希尔公司的投资。巴菲特没有点出这4人的名字，只是说需要有好的职业经历，但人品素质尤其重要。
“有人天生就能够判断什么是重大风险。”巴菲特说。
以按揭贷款为基础的金融衍生品简直是疯狂
巴菲特认为，美联储帮助贝尔斯登(Bear Stearns)免于破产是正确的。贝尔斯登有14.5万亿美元的衍生品合约，如果它倒闭了，这些合同将不得不在很短时间内撤销。巴菲特说：“这会是一个壮观的前所未有的比例。”
而芒格认为，让公司不断膨胀到没办法破产的地步，这简直是疯了，让衍生品交易发展到这种地步也是疯狂的。
巴菲特说，银行发明的这种以按揭贷款为基础的证券组合的金融衍生产品简直是疯狂的。
“如果要了解CDO，需要阅读15000字的材料。”巴菲特说，“如果采用了较低级的一块CDO，并采用了50个，成为一个CDO方阵，那需要阅读高达75万字的材料才能理解一种证券工具。我的意思是，这不可能做得到。当开始购买其他工具的期货商品时，没有人知道他们在这样做什么。很荒谬。”
巴菲特认为，要求银行必须评估所持债券的市场价值可能有帮助。芒格说，自由市场不是万能的，有一些创新应被禁止。芒格说，如果将风险分散多元化 (diversification)这个词禁止，这个世界可能要运转得更好。
芒格透露，巴菲特在很多时候作决定非常快，这是非常不凡的地方，原因之一就是巴菲特将不会允许他自己过多考虑某些东西。
有打算购买中国或印度企业
关于伯克希尔会不会购买中国或印度的企业，巴菲特说，他们有这个打算，但中国和印度的法律和规定使得伯克希尔很难获得利润。以保险业为例，对外国投资者都有25%的上限。
巴菲特说，未来他希望伯克希尔集中在海外市场，而不是美国。伯克希尔未来或将在海外购买一两个公司。巴菲特说，他还不确定是德国公司、英国公司或者其他国家的一些公司。因为，那些国家的货币对美元汇率下跌的可能性非常小。巴菲特说，美国政府所采取的政策将使得美元进一步走软，他觉得没有必要对非美元的货币投资进行对冲。
巴菲特衍生品投资中亏损了16亿美元
英国《金融时报》Francesco Guerrera、Justin Baer, 5 May 2008 纽约报道.
沃伦•巴菲特旗下的伯克希尔哈撒韦公司(Berkshire Hathaway)第一季度在衍生品合约方面蒙受16亿美元的非现金损失——巴菲特曾经将该类资产称为“大规模杀伤性金融武器”。
伯克希尔哈撒韦在奥马哈召开公司年会前夕宣布了此笔意外投资损失，这导致该公司第一季度利润较上年同期的26亿美元猛降64%，至9.4亿美元。
巴菲特在一份声明中将利润下降归咎于会计准则，这些准则迫使公司减记未实现的衍生品利得或损失。
伯克希尔哈撒韦的投资亏损，主要集中在两个领域。该公司在标准普尔500指数(S&P 500)及其它3种指数卖出合约方面计入了12亿美元的未实现损失。
沃伦•巴菲特旗下的伯克希尔哈撒韦公司(Berkshire Hathaway)第一季度在衍生品合约方面蒙受16亿美元的非现金损失——巴菲特曾经将该类资产称为“大规模杀伤性金融武器”。
伯克希尔哈撒韦在奥马哈召开公司年会前夕宣布了此笔意外投资损失，这导致该公司第一季度利润较上年同期的26亿美元猛降64%，至9.4亿美元。
巴菲特在一份声明中将利润下降归咎于会计准则，这些准则迫使公司减记未实现的衍生品利得或损失。
伯克希尔哈撒韦的投资亏损，主要集中在两个领域。该公司在标准普尔500指数(S&P 500)及其它3种指数卖出合约方面计入了12亿美元的未实现损失。
巴菲特放弃救市计划的启示
2008年3月3日 ，“股神”巴菲特在接受美国CNBC电视台采访时表示：“我已经决定放弃拯救涉及8000亿美元资产的计划”。
他表示，即使从常识角度而言，美国经济当前处于衰退状态也是很清楚的，“但本轮衰退的程度有多深，目前还很难判断”。
2月初，巴菲特曾公开宣称，有一个拯救陷入困境的债券保险业者的计划。市场人士当时认为，巴菲特此时出手，代表近来重创国际金融市场的美国次贷危机可能已接近尾声。但事隔一个月，其投资策略发生180度的急转，说明其在投资策略中会很快地认识到问题的严重性并及时转变，说明其对风险市场投资的灵活性、多变性。
巴菲特是以价值投资而取得成功的典范，他对吉列、华盛顿邮报、可口可乐及对中国石油的投资均表现为长期持股，这些价值投资体现的是公司价值迟早要通过市场表现出来。而在中国石油H股到达13港元时，他果断在市场疯狂上涨时全线获利而走，因为他已认识到其估值过高和好的机构退出时机来临。
反观中国A股市场，许多机构在6000点对一些估值超过100至1000倍的上市公司进行大量加仓，而当时市场时机为机构资金提供了较好的减仓时机。时过境迁，如今你想实现机构行为的出仓恐怕不仅没有好价钱卖，恐怕也难以大幅获利而走。
QDII海外市场的全线重挫、新基金在高位接盘出现的净值大跌等均说明过分贪婪、过分自信和对时机把握方面的缺陷。
此次巴菲特一月之内投资策略的转变，是其在资本市场运作中认识未来风险或巨大不确定性的表现，此时作为价值投资的他能果断退出，正是在投资市场中的量力而行、不打无准备之战役的体现。
巴菲特在香港卖出中国石油H股后，在韩国市场却找到了3倍PE的公司投资，而目前认为15倍左右的美国市场股价仍不便宜，说明其投资所保持的耐心和对上市公司估值独到的见解。
从中国A股目前估值来看，一些公司股价虽然达到了200多元，但其EPS仅3.05元，动态PE高达70多倍，每年的分红也难以达到银行存款一年期利息;有的还不分红。而香港市场中的汇丰控股EPS为12港元左右，每季度分红就接近每股3元左右，PE仅为9.5倍。
从巴菲特弃8000亿美元救市计划来看，我们应认真学习其投资的灵活性、对上市公司估值投资回报的考虑、对风险市场不确定性较大时及时退出的战略，
巴菲特放弃8000亿美元救市计划，在某种程度上为中国A股市场的投资者敲响了警钟，国际成熟资本市场许多优质公司如壳牌、汇丰、渣打等PE均在10倍以下，其风险程度较低，而取决于其市场表现的不仅仅是EPS，更重要的是分红率(股息率)及投资回报。
对比国际成熟市场，配合巴菲特在估值或价值投资上考虑分红、成长性及近期应对经济不确定性采取的灵活性来看，中国投资者仍有许多东西要学习借鉴。
他表示，即使从常识角度而言，美国经济当前处于衰退状态也是很清楚的，“但本轮衰退的程度有多深，目前还很难判断”。
2月初，巴菲特曾公开宣称，有一个拯救陷入困境的债券保险业者的计划。市场人士当时认为，巴菲特此时出手，代表近来重创国际金融市场的美国次贷危机可能已接近尾声。但事隔一个月，其投资策略发生180度的急转，说明其在投资策略中会很快地认识到问题的严重性并及时转变，说明其对风险市场投资的灵活性、多变性。
巴菲特是以价值投资而取得成功的典范，他对吉列、华盛顿邮报、可口可乐及对中国石油的投资均表现为长期持股，这些价值投资体现的是公司价值迟早要通过市场表现出来。而在中国石油H股到达13港元时，他果断在市场疯狂上涨时全线获利而走，因为他已认识到其估值过高和好的机构退出时机来临。
反观中国A股市场，许多机构在6000点对一些估值超过100至1000倍的上市公司进行大量加仓，而当时市场时机为机构资金提供了较好的减仓时机。时过境迁，如今你想实现机构行为的出仓恐怕不仅没有好价钱卖，恐怕也难以大幅获利而走。
QDII海外市场的全线重挫、新基金在高位接盘出现的净值大跌等均说明过分贪婪、过分自信和对时机把握方面的缺陷。
此次巴菲特一月之内投资策略的转变，是其在资本市场运作中认识未来风险或巨大不确定性的表现，此时作为价值投资的他能果断退出，正是在投资市场中的量力而行、不打无准备之战役的体现。
巴菲特在香港卖出中国石油H股后，在韩国市场却找到了3倍PE的公司投资，而目前认为15倍左右的美国市场股价仍不便宜，说明其投资所保持的耐心和对上市公司估值独到的见解。
从中国A股目前估值来看，一些公司股价虽然达到了200多元，但其EPS仅3.05元，动态PE高达70多倍，每年的分红也难以达到银行存款一年期利息;有的还不分红。而香港市场中的汇丰控股EPS为12港元左右，每季度分红就接近每股3元左右，PE仅为9.5倍。
从巴菲特弃8000亿美元救市计划来看，我们应认真学习其投资的灵活性、对上市公司估值投资回报的考虑、对风险市场不确定性较大时及时退出的战略，
巴菲特放弃8000亿美元救市计划，在某种程度上为中国A股市场的投资者敲响了警钟，国际成熟资本市场许多优质公司如壳牌、汇丰、渣打等PE均在10倍以下，其风险程度较低，而取决于其市场表现的不仅仅是EPS，更重要的是分红率(股息率)及投资回报。
对比国际成熟市场，配合巴菲特在估值或价值投资上考虑分红、成长性及近期应对经济不确定性采取的灵活性来看，中国投资者仍有许多东西要学习借鉴。
巴菲特应对股灾的经验
1) 是灾中要冷静：惊慌容易失措
1987年的股灾之前，美国股市连续上涨5年，是一场空前的大牛市。
1984年到1986年，美国股市持续大涨，累计涨幅2.46倍，道琼斯指数从不到1000点上涨到是让人吃惊的2258点。
但就在人们陶醉在股市连续5年持续上涨的喜悦之中时，一场股灾突然降临了。
1987年10月19日，这是历史第一个黑色星期一，一天之内，道•琼斯指数跌了508点，跌幅高达22.6％。
股市暴跌，巴菲特的伯克希尔公司股票也未能幸免。巴菲特个人99%的财富都是他控股的上市公司伯克希尔公司的股票。暴跌这一天之内巴菲特财富就损失了3.42亿美元。在短短一周之内伯克希尔公司的股价就暴跌了25%，
那么，身处股市暴雪中的巴菲特如何反应呢？
在暴跌那一到，可能巴菲特是整个美国唯一一个没有时时关注正在崩溃的股市的人。
他的办公室里根本没有电脑，也没有股市行情机，他根本不看股市行情。
整整一天，他和往常一样安安静静呆在办公室里，打电话，看报纸，看上市公司的年报。
过了两天，有位记者问巴菲特：这次股灾崩盘，意味着什么？
巴菲特的回答只有一句话：也许意味着股市过去涨的太高了。
巴菲特没有恐慌地四处打听消息，也没有恐慌地抛售股票，面对大跌，面对自己的财富大幅缩水，面对他持有的重仓股大幅暴跌，他非常平静。
原因很简单：他坚信他持有的这些上市公司具有长期的持续竞争优势，具有良好的发展前景，具有很高的投资价值，他坚信股灾和天灾一样，只是一时的，最终股灾会过去，股市会恢复正常，他持股的公司股价最终会反映其内在价值。
2) 是灾前要谨慎：一次大意可能让你一生后悔。
巴菲特碰到的另一次股灾是1999年。
结果股灾来了。2000、2001、2003三年美国股市大跌9.1%、11.9%、22.1%，累计跌幅超过一半.
这三年股灾期间巴菲特的业绩上涨10%以上,，以60%的优势大幅度战胜市场。
为什么？
因为巴菲特早已经做好了应对股灾的准备。
从1995年到1999年美国股市累计上涨超过2.5倍，是一个前所未有的大牛市。最重要的推动力是网络和高科技股票的猛涨。而巴菲特却拒绝投资高科技股票，继续坚决持有可口可乐、美国运通、吉列等传统行业公司股票，结果1999年，标准普尔500指数上涨21%，而巴菲特的业绩却只有0.5%，不但输给了市场，而且输得非常惨，相差20%以上，这是巴菲特输给市场业绩最差的一年。
1987年的股灾之前，美国股市连续上涨5年，是一场空前的大牛市。
1984年到1986年，美国股市持续大涨，累计涨幅2.46倍，道琼斯指数从不到1000点上涨到是让人吃惊的2258点。
但就在人们陶醉在股市连续5年持续上涨的喜悦之中时，一场股灾突然降临了。
1987年10月19日，这是历史第一个黑色星期一，一天之内，道•琼斯指数跌了508点，跌幅高达22.6％。
股市暴跌，巴菲特的伯克希尔公司股票也未能幸免。巴菲特个人99%的财富都是他控股的上市公司伯克希尔公司的股票。暴跌这一天之内巴菲特财富就损失了3.42亿美元。在短短一周之内伯克希尔公司的股价就暴跌了25%，
那么，身处股市暴雪中的巴菲特如何反应呢？
在暴跌那一到，可能巴菲特是整个美国唯一一个没有时时关注正在崩溃的股市的人。
他的办公室里根本没有电脑，也没有股市行情机，他根本不看股市行情。
整整一天，他和往常一样安安静静呆在办公室里，打电话，看报纸，看上市公司的年报。
过了两天，有位记者问巴菲特：这次股灾崩盘，意味着什么？
巴菲特的回答只有一句话：也许意味着股市过去涨的太高了。
巴菲特没有恐慌地四处打听消息，也没有恐慌地抛售股票，面对大跌，面对自己的财富大幅缩水，面对他持有的重仓股大幅暴跌，他非常平静。
原因很简单：他坚信他持有的这些上市公司具有长期的持续竞争优势，具有良好的发展前景，具有很高的投资价值，他坚信股灾和天灾一样，只是一时的，最终股灾会过去，股市会恢复正常，他持股的公司股价最终会反映其内在价值。
2) 是灾前要谨慎：一次大意可能让你一生后悔。
巴菲特碰到的另一次股灾是1999年。
结果股灾来了。2000、2001、2003三年美国股市大跌9.1%、11.9%、22.1%，累计跌幅超过一半.
这三年股灾期间巴菲特的业绩上涨10%以上,，以60%的优势大幅度战胜市场。
为什么？
因为巴菲特早已经做好了应对股灾的准备。
从1995年到1999年美国股市累计上涨超过2.5倍，是一个前所未有的大牛市。最重要的推动力是网络和高科技股票的猛涨。而巴菲特却拒绝投资高科技股票，继续坚决持有可口可乐、美国运通、吉列等传统行业公司股票，结果1999年，标准普尔500指数上涨21%，而巴菲特的业绩却只有0.5%，不但输给了市场，而且输得非常惨，相差20%以上，这是巴菲特输给市场业绩最差的一年。
5分钟 知吉凶
我有一种本领，只要与人交谈5分钟，就知道一个人在股票投资上，是赚钱还是亏本。
当然，这5分钟的“股谈”，必须是在毫无准备，完全不设防的情况下作出。
而投资的盈亏，是指长期投资的结果，并非短期的成绩。
如果在5分钟内，他所谈的或所问的，都离不了股市会不会起、有什么“贴士”、某股将会被炒、热钱进来“推”某股、小道消息谓某股将会飞涨……之类的课题、对“炒”和“玩”股口沫横飞，对公司的基本面只字不提，他的投资多数亏本。
如果他一见到我，就不断追问：这个行业的景气如何、公司的产品销路如何、公司的管理层是否精明和可靠、公司过去的盈利表现如何、盈利能否持续、成长潜能何在？公司的前景展望如何？
对于股市起落、小道消息、有无人炒作等，只字不提， 这个人多数能在股市中赚钱。每一个人都有自尊心、都爱面子，很少人肯认“输”。所以，谈到股票投资，个个都是赢家，实际上，人人都在“暗捶”。
内容反映态度
依我的观察，根据谈股的内容所作出的盈亏揣测，准确性出奇的高。这一点也不奇怪，因为谈话的内容，反映了一个人的投资态度。那些开口是“炒”，闭口是“玩”的人，都是顽固的投机者，他们投机成瘾，已到了无可救药的地步。
长期投机，无异长赌，长赌必输。
那些谈话内容，完全环绕着基本面，对股市动向，股票炒作，只字不提，这类股友，都是严肃的长期投资者。这类投资者，抱着正确的投资理念，他们深切了解，买股票就是买公司的股份，买股份就是跟人合股做生意，投资的成败，取决于公司的业绩表现。所以，他们把注意力，投注在公司上，而不是投注在股价的变动上。
常理推测结果
他们坚决相信：只要公司业绩标青，股价自然会起，根本不必担心。
不看业绩看股价，是舍本逐末。
所以，5分钟的“股谈”，就能辨别投资者在股市的表现，而且准确性奇高，并不是有特异功能，而且根据常理推测所得的结果。
一个人，做一件事，如果做了10年、8年，还是没有成绩，就必然会放弃，或是改弦易辙，这才是合乎常理的做法。
但是，一些人在股市中投机，经过10年、8年，结算一下，还是亏本，这说明了这种方法是错误的。既然如此，就应该放弃，改变路线，采取更有赚钱把握的方法，才是合理的行为。
但是，许多人在投机10年、8年之后，伤痕累累，仍不肯悔改，还要继续投机下去，实在令人费解。
当然，这5分钟的“股谈”，必须是在毫无准备，完全不设防的情况下作出。
而投资的盈亏，是指长期投资的结果，并非短期的成绩。
如果在5分钟内，他所谈的或所问的，都离不了股市会不会起、有什么“贴士”、某股将会被炒、热钱进来“推”某股、小道消息谓某股将会飞涨……之类的课题、对“炒”和“玩”股口沫横飞，对公司的基本面只字不提，他的投资多数亏本。
如果他一见到我，就不断追问：这个行业的景气如何、公司的产品销路如何、公司的管理层是否精明和可靠、公司过去的盈利表现如何、盈利能否持续、成长潜能何在？公司的前景展望如何？
对于股市起落、小道消息、有无人炒作等，只字不提， 这个人多数能在股市中赚钱。每一个人都有自尊心、都爱面子，很少人肯认“输”。所以，谈到股票投资，个个都是赢家，实际上，人人都在“暗捶”。
内容反映态度
依我的观察，根据谈股的内容所作出的盈亏揣测，准确性出奇的高。这一点也不奇怪，因为谈话的内容，反映了一个人的投资态度。那些开口是“炒”，闭口是“玩”的人，都是顽固的投机者，他们投机成瘾，已到了无可救药的地步。
长期投机，无异长赌，长赌必输。
那些谈话内容，完全环绕着基本面，对股市动向，股票炒作，只字不提，这类股友，都是严肃的长期投资者。这类投资者，抱着正确的投资理念，他们深切了解，买股票就是买公司的股份，买股份就是跟人合股做生意，投资的成败，取决于公司的业绩表现。所以，他们把注意力，投注在公司上，而不是投注在股价的变动上。
常理推测结果
他们坚决相信：只要公司业绩标青，股价自然会起，根本不必担心。
不看业绩看股价，是舍本逐末。
所以，5分钟的“股谈”，就能辨别投资者在股市的表现，而且准确性奇高，并不是有特异功能，而且根据常理推测所得的结果。
一个人，做一件事，如果做了10年、8年，还是没有成绩，就必然会放弃，或是改弦易辙，这才是合乎常理的做法。
但是，一些人在股市中投机，经过10年、8年，结算一下，还是亏本，这说明了这种方法是错误的。既然如此，就应该放弃，改变路线，采取更有赚钱把握的方法，才是合理的行为。
但是，许多人在投机10年、8年之后，伤痕累累，仍不肯悔改，还要继续投机下去，实在令人费解。
Bush vs. Buffett
It's amazing how Wall Street and and the government have managed to keep the stock market up to benefit Wall Street even though the general population is suffering from high gas prices, high food prices, unemployment, home foreclosures, layoffs, loss of manufacturing jobs, decrease in dollar value and an expansion of by the terrorists of their wars to numerous other countries.
You can expect more laughable conclusions that "the crises is over" "the recession is not as bad" on a daily basis in the never ending effort to prop up the market. People will be on bread lines and the same commentators will be saying the crises is over.
Warren Buffet is very reliable - look at his record.
Bush and his appointees are not - look at their record on what they have said versus what they have actually done. The bottom line is Americans need to start reading their news and evaluating it.
You can expect more laughable conclusions that "the crises is over" "the recession is not as bad" on a daily basis in the never ending effort to prop up the market. People will be on bread lines and the same commentators will be saying the crises is over.
Warren Buffet is very reliable - look at his record.
Bush and his appointees are not - look at their record on what they have said versus what they have actually done. The bottom line is Americans need to start reading their news and evaluating it.
Greenspan vs. Buffett: 'The Oracle' Has Finger on Consumers' (Weakening) Pulse
If there's a duel between financial heavyweights Alan Greenspan and Warren Buffett, the most recent data says "the Oracle" is right.
"I still believe there is a greater than 50% probability of recession," Greenspan tells The Financial Times. "[But] that probability has receded a little and ... the probability of a severe recession has come down markedly."
On the other hand, "I believe that we are already in a recession," Buffett tells Germany's Der Spiegel. "It will be deeper and longer than what many think."
American consumers seem to agree with Buffett: May consumer confidence came it at 57.2 this morning, below expectations and at the lowest level since October 1992.
Consumer confidence is obviously tied to the housing market, which Greenspan says is likely to fall another 10%, bringing the peak-to-trough decline to 25%.
Hopefully Greenspan isn't underestimating the decline -- as he was wont to do while still Fed chairman: The Case/Shiller Index says home prices fell 14.1% in the first quarter, the worst drop in the history of the index, going back to 1988.
Separately, this morning's April new home sales report showed an unexpected 3.3% rise, but that's only after March figures were revised down and April sales remain near a 17-year low.
"I still believe there is a greater than 50% probability of recession," Greenspan tells The Financial Times. "[But] that probability has receded a little and ... the probability of a severe recession has come down markedly."
On the other hand, "I believe that we are already in a recession," Buffett tells Germany's Der Spiegel. "It will be deeper and longer than what many think."
American consumers seem to agree with Buffett: May consumer confidence came it at 57.2 this morning, below expectations and at the lowest level since October 1992.
Consumer confidence is obviously tied to the housing market, which Greenspan says is likely to fall another 10%, bringing the peak-to-trough decline to 25%.
Hopefully Greenspan isn't underestimating the decline -- as he was wont to do while still Fed chairman: The Case/Shiller Index says home prices fell 14.1% in the first quarter, the worst drop in the history of the index, going back to 1988.
Separately, this morning's April new home sales report showed an unexpected 3.3% rise, but that's only after March figures were revised down and April sales remain near a 17-year low.
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