A hedge-fund pro says big institutional investors are behind run-ups in oil and other commodities. Where's Will Rogers when you need him?
IF STUPIDITY GOT US INTO THIS MESS, THEN WHY CAN'T it get us out?"
What made the stock market metamorphose from spirited advance into straggly decline was that the euphoria induced by the conviction that the worst of the credit crunch was over and the menace of recession was receding ran smack up against reality and, as in any collision between evanescent vapor and gritty substance, it's no contest which gets creamed.
That last item -- the rising ardor in Washington to do something to shackle the big, bad speculators in commodities and especially oil and gas -- drew some fuel from both interested and disinterested parties. Good old OPEC, in the person of its secretary-general, Abdalla Salem El-Badri, denied that it had the slightest thing to do with soaring crude prices. Gosh, who could ever harbor such an unkind thought? The blame, El-Badri emphasized, should be laid squarely at the door of those market-kiting speculators.
He is not, in case you wondered, the disinterested party mentioned above. That designation, by his own vouching, belongs to a fellow named Michael Masters, proprietor of a hedge fund unsurprisingly called Masters Capital Management, who testified last week before a Senate subcommittee. The burden of his presentation was that such deep-pocket investors as corporate and government pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, university endowments and kindred institutions are in no small measure responsible for the spectacular run-ups in commodities, particularly food and, of course, oil.
Mr. Masters seems well versed in the fine points of commodities trading, and he's passionate in his belief that the major stimulus for the fiery gains in oil and food are those big-bucks players. His testimony created a bit of a buzz in the Street, and it's certainly worth a read. That speculators -- especially in the past five or six months, when their normal haunts, the equity markets, were frequently in the dumps -- have been active in the futures arena is no secret. Ironically, we recall a similar plaint -- but in reverse -- made to us by a prominent Texas oil guy who beefed bitterly that speculators were behind the then sharply depressed price of oil.
To Peter, the big move in crude and gasoline is symptomatic of the bill that has come due for years of reckless consumption and dollar devaluation that have priced us out of markets to which we once held "unchallenged title." Signs of America's falling standard of living are everywhere, he laments.
And he posits that the current round of belt-tightening is "simply the down payment on the government's massive bailout of Wall Street investment banks and mortgage lenders." And he morosely predicts, "As the Fed creates money to buy bad mortgages and other shaky securities held by banks and brokerage firms, the value of the savings and wages" of us poor slobs will continue to shrivel.
That means that the cost of a good many more of the things that we take for granted will shoot up. "Four dollar gasoline," he warns, "is just the beginning."
Friday, May 30, 2008
Where the Financial Crisis Is Headed Next
Three years ago, hedge-fund manager Sy Jacobs told Barron's that serious trouble was brewing in the housing market, predicting that "the bursting of the housing bubble [would] be a dominant theme for investing in financial stocks in the next decade." He was right.
Jacobs, 47, is the founder of New York's JAM Asset Management. Its annualized return since inception in 1995 (through April 30) was 16.6%.
To find out where Jacobs sees new problems emerging in the financials -- surprisingly, they're not in the subprime arena -- read on.
Barron's:
You were early in detecting the serious problems in subprime mortgages. That turned out to be a great call.
Jacobs:
About three years ago, we were worried about subprime specifically. And that view very much paid off for us as we were short a host of such companies. More than a year ago, in another interview with Barron's, we said subprime was already in a full meltdown mode, but the idea that subprime was somehow isolated was still popular. Our message was that the mortgage-credit tail was going to wag the capital-market and economic dog. That's coming to pass now.
Looking ahead, what do you see for the financials?
We believe the recent rally in financial stocks -- and for the whole market -- is a bit of a head fake that will prove to be a bear-market rally.
What's your premise?
After first ignoring subprime, people now are too focused on it and they're missing the broader storm coming -- that's the head fake. While the bursting of the housing bubble produced all sorts of headline-making losses for some, it is just starting to drag down the rest of the economy. Separate from subprime, you are seeing diminished ability for consumers to spend their home equity. The securitization market, which banks and finance companies use to get funding, has slowed. So we see consumer and business spending slowing; the economy will falter.
In a recent letter to your investment partners, you noted that you were very concerned about the health of construction loans. Could you elaborate on that concern for us?
I spent a week recently in California, visiting some troubled, or soon-to-be-troubled, banks. With home sales down so much, construction lending is becoming a problem. You have a lot of developers and home builders stuck with homes that aren't moving. And they are sitting on lots that have loans against them. Subprime is such a small piece of the banking industry, but construction lending is a core product. If the housing market stays weak for much longer -- and it seems to be getting weaker -- construction-loan losses are going to be a big problem.
After the brutal real-estate recession that occurred in the early 1990s, there was a sense that banks had finally learned their lesson and would be much better fortified for the next downturn. I take it you don't think that's true.
I take a pretty cynical view of whether bankers have gotten smarter. We've had a real-estate bull market ever since the early 1990s. I think you are going to see the same thing again. The number of banks that get taken over by the FDIC and disappear may not be as high as it was in the late-1980s and early 1990s because there is strength in the energy patch now. But real-estate lending institutions are the bulk of the community-bank world, and I think you are going to see a lot of banks disappear.
What's your sense of the prevailing views of the financials right now?
People are trying so hard to believe that the Bear Stearns crisis in March was some sort of financial crescendo and represents the bell that gets rung at the bottom, as if that happens. But just because we got saved from what would have happened that Monday if Bear went down doesn't mean we are saved from all the forces that conspired to get Bear Stearns to the brink in the first place. Bear was not the sacrificial lamb to the market gods. It got knocked down by the same winds that are affecting everybody else. Credit destruction is a process -- not an incident. And avoiding that particular meltdown doesn't mean that things are getting better -- and yet that is how financial stocks in particular and the market in general have acted ever since.
You're a fundamental stockpicker, but are there any interesting trends you see in the financials?
One of our themes on the long side is that local plain-vanilla, over-capitalized community banks, especially thrifts, are in a position to gain back market share in the lending business. And they have real deposit franchises that they can fund themselves with. They have been losing market share to the Countrywide Financials of the world for a generation. Now, though, they are going to gain a lot of that market share back, because they suddenly have a funding advantage, relative to the larger financial firms that have been securitizing their loans. That market has been discredited. We're long lots of micro-cap ways to play this, but they're too illiquid to mention here.
Jacobs, 47, is the founder of New York's JAM Asset Management. Its annualized return since inception in 1995 (through April 30) was 16.6%.
To find out where Jacobs sees new problems emerging in the financials -- surprisingly, they're not in the subprime arena -- read on.
Barron's:
You were early in detecting the serious problems in subprime mortgages. That turned out to be a great call.
Jacobs:
About three years ago, we were worried about subprime specifically. And that view very much paid off for us as we were short a host of such companies. More than a year ago, in another interview with Barron's, we said subprime was already in a full meltdown mode, but the idea that subprime was somehow isolated was still popular. Our message was that the mortgage-credit tail was going to wag the capital-market and economic dog. That's coming to pass now.
Looking ahead, what do you see for the financials?
We believe the recent rally in financial stocks -- and for the whole market -- is a bit of a head fake that will prove to be a bear-market rally.
What's your premise?
After first ignoring subprime, people now are too focused on it and they're missing the broader storm coming -- that's the head fake. While the bursting of the housing bubble produced all sorts of headline-making losses for some, it is just starting to drag down the rest of the economy. Separate from subprime, you are seeing diminished ability for consumers to spend their home equity. The securitization market, which banks and finance companies use to get funding, has slowed. So we see consumer and business spending slowing; the economy will falter.
In a recent letter to your investment partners, you noted that you were very concerned about the health of construction loans. Could you elaborate on that concern for us?
I spent a week recently in California, visiting some troubled, or soon-to-be-troubled, banks. With home sales down so much, construction lending is becoming a problem. You have a lot of developers and home builders stuck with homes that aren't moving. And they are sitting on lots that have loans against them. Subprime is such a small piece of the banking industry, but construction lending is a core product. If the housing market stays weak for much longer -- and it seems to be getting weaker -- construction-loan losses are going to be a big problem.
After the brutal real-estate recession that occurred in the early 1990s, there was a sense that banks had finally learned their lesson and would be much better fortified for the next downturn. I take it you don't think that's true.
I take a pretty cynical view of whether bankers have gotten smarter. We've had a real-estate bull market ever since the early 1990s. I think you are going to see the same thing again. The number of banks that get taken over by the FDIC and disappear may not be as high as it was in the late-1980s and early 1990s because there is strength in the energy patch now. But real-estate lending institutions are the bulk of the community-bank world, and I think you are going to see a lot of banks disappear.
What's your sense of the prevailing views of the financials right now?
People are trying so hard to believe that the Bear Stearns crisis in March was some sort of financial crescendo and represents the bell that gets rung at the bottom, as if that happens. But just because we got saved from what would have happened that Monday if Bear went down doesn't mean we are saved from all the forces that conspired to get Bear Stearns to the brink in the first place. Bear was not the sacrificial lamb to the market gods. It got knocked down by the same winds that are affecting everybody else. Credit destruction is a process -- not an incident. And avoiding that particular meltdown doesn't mean that things are getting better -- and yet that is how financial stocks in particular and the market in general have acted ever since.
You're a fundamental stockpicker, but are there any interesting trends you see in the financials?
One of our themes on the long side is that local plain-vanilla, over-capitalized community banks, especially thrifts, are in a position to gain back market share in the lending business. And they have real deposit franchises that they can fund themselves with. They have been losing market share to the Countrywide Financials of the world for a generation. Now, though, they are going to gain a lot of that market share back, because they suddenly have a funding advantage, relative to the larger financial firms that have been securitizing their loans. That market has been discredited. We're long lots of micro-cap ways to play this, but they're too illiquid to mention here.
Thursday, May 29, 2008
巴菲特：學投資很簡單 願意讀書就行
巴菲特是這樣概括他的日常工作：“我的工作是閱讀”。
可見巴菲特對閱讀是多麼重視。
巴菲特大量閱讀與上市公司業務與財務相關的書籍和資料，在此基礎上才非常審慎地作出投資判斷。巴菲特以他研究GEICO保險公司為例解釋閱讀對于投資的重要性：“我閱讀了許多資料。我在圖書館待到最晚時間才離開。……我從BESTS（一家保險評級服務機構）開始閱讀了許多保險公司的資料，還閱讀了一些相關的書籍和公司年度報告。我一有機會就與保險業專家以及保險公司經理們進行溝通”。
當然巴菲特閱讀最多的是企業的財務報告。“我閱讀我所關注的公司年報，同時我也閱讀它的競爭對手的年報，這些是我最主要的閱讀材料”。
但巴菲特並不僅僅閱讀上市公司年報這些公開披露信息，他從年報中發現感興趣的公司後，會閱讀非常多的相關書籍和資料，並且進行調查研究，尋找年報後面隱藏的真相：“我看待上市公司信息披露(大部分是不公開的)的態度，與我看待冰山一樣(大部分隱藏在水面以下)。”
巴菲特這樣解釋他如何把閱讀和調研結合在一起的：“你可以選擇一些盡管你對其財務狀況並非十分了解但你對其產品非常熟悉的公司。然後找到這家公司的大量年報，以及最近5到10年間所有關于這家公司的文章，深入鑽研，讓你自己沉浸于其中。當你讀完這些材料之後，問問自己：我還有什麼地方不知道卻必須知道的東西？很多年前，我經常四處奔走，對這家公司的競爭對手、雇員等相關方面進行訪談。……我一直不停地打聽詢問有關情況。這是一個調查的過程，就像一個新聞記者採訪那樣。最後你想寫出一個故事。一些公司故事容易寫出來，但一些公司的故事很難寫出來，我們在投資中尋找的是那些故事容易寫出來的公司。”
在1999年伯克希爾股東大會上查理‧芒格說：“我認為我和巴菲特從一些非常優秀的財經書籍和雜志中學習到的東西比其他渠道要多得多。我認為，沒有大量的廣泛閱讀，你根本不可能成為一個真正的成功投資者”。
可見，巴菲特的投資成功秘訣是大量閱讀加調查研究。大量閱讀是掌握大量相關信息，調查研究是實事求是，而大量閱讀是基礎和前提。
你想學習巴菲特，首先問問自己，你經常讀書嗎？
下面向您介紹一下巴菲特推薦閱讀的書籍。
有許多讀者來信問應該閱讀什麼投資著作？
我經常以巴菲特本人的話來回答：
“要想成功地進行投資，你不需要懂得什麼Beta值、有效市場、現代投資組合理論、期權定價或是新興市場。事實上大家最好對這些東西一無所知。當然我的這種看法與大多數商學院的主流觀點有著根本的不同，這些商學院的金融課程主要就是那些東西。我們認為，學習投資的學生們只需要接受兩門課程的良好教育就足夠了，一門是如何評估企業的價值，另一門是如何思考市場價格。”
“由于價值非常簡單，所以沒有教授願意教授它。如果你已經取得博士學位，而且用很多年學習運用數學模型進行複雜的計算，然後你再來學習價值投資，這就好像一個基督徒去神學院學習，卻發現只要懂得十誡就足夠了。”
巴菲特對商學院的教育體系提出了尖銳批評：“商學院非常重視複雜的模式，卻忽視了簡單的模式，但是，簡單的模式卻往往更有效”。巴菲特甚至認為成功的投資並不需要高等數學知識，“如果高等數學是必需的，我就得回去送報紙了，我從來沒發現在投資中高等數學有什麼作用”。“你不需要成為一個火箭專家。投資並非一個智商為160的人就能擊敗智商為130的人的游戲”。
正如巴菲特所說，學習投資很簡單，只要願意讀書就行了。
當然巴菲特閱讀的不僅僅是格雷厄姆一個人的著作“如果我只學習格雷厄姆一個人的思想，就不會像今天這麼富有。”
那麼巴菲特推薦投資者閱讀的書籍有哪些呢？
給大家列一份巴菲特推薦閱讀的書籍作為新年禮物吧。
1、《証券分析》（格雷厄姆著）。格雷厄姆的經典名著，專業投資者必讀之書，巴菲特認為每一個投資者都應該閱讀此書十遍以上。
2、《聰明的投資者》（格雷厄姆著）。格雷厄姆專門為業余投資者所著，巴菲特稱之為“有史以來最偉大的投資著作”。
3、《怎樣選擇成長股》（費舍爾著）。巴菲特稱自己的投資策略是“85%的格雷厄姆和15%的費舍爾”。他說：“運用費舍爾的技巧，可以了解這一行……有助于做出一個聰明的投資決定”。
4、《巴菲特致股東的信：股份公司教程》。本書搜集整理了20多年巴菲特致股東的信中的精華段落，巴菲特認為此書是整理其投資哲學的一流工作。
可見巴菲特對閱讀是多麼重視。
巴菲特大量閱讀與上市公司業務與財務相關的書籍和資料，在此基礎上才非常審慎地作出投資判斷。巴菲特以他研究GEICO保險公司為例解釋閱讀對于投資的重要性：“我閱讀了許多資料。我在圖書館待到最晚時間才離開。……我從BESTS（一家保險評級服務機構）開始閱讀了許多保險公司的資料，還閱讀了一些相關的書籍和公司年度報告。我一有機會就與保險業專家以及保險公司經理們進行溝通”。
當然巴菲特閱讀最多的是企業的財務報告。“我閱讀我所關注的公司年報，同時我也閱讀它的競爭對手的年報，這些是我最主要的閱讀材料”。
但巴菲特並不僅僅閱讀上市公司年報這些公開披露信息，他從年報中發現感興趣的公司後，會閱讀非常多的相關書籍和資料，並且進行調查研究，尋找年報後面隱藏的真相：“我看待上市公司信息披露(大部分是不公開的)的態度，與我看待冰山一樣(大部分隱藏在水面以下)。”
巴菲特這樣解釋他如何把閱讀和調研結合在一起的：“你可以選擇一些盡管你對其財務狀況並非十分了解但你對其產品非常熟悉的公司。然後找到這家公司的大量年報，以及最近5到10年間所有關于這家公司的文章，深入鑽研，讓你自己沉浸于其中。當你讀完這些材料之後，問問自己：我還有什麼地方不知道卻必須知道的東西？很多年前，我經常四處奔走，對這家公司的競爭對手、雇員等相關方面進行訪談。……我一直不停地打聽詢問有關情況。這是一個調查的過程，就像一個新聞記者採訪那樣。最後你想寫出一個故事。一些公司故事容易寫出來，但一些公司的故事很難寫出來，我們在投資中尋找的是那些故事容易寫出來的公司。”
在1999年伯克希爾股東大會上查理‧芒格說：“我認為我和巴菲特從一些非常優秀的財經書籍和雜志中學習到的東西比其他渠道要多得多。我認為，沒有大量的廣泛閱讀，你根本不可能成為一個真正的成功投資者”。
可見，巴菲特的投資成功秘訣是大量閱讀加調查研究。大量閱讀是掌握大量相關信息，調查研究是實事求是，而大量閱讀是基礎和前提。
你想學習巴菲特，首先問問自己，你經常讀書嗎？
下面向您介紹一下巴菲特推薦閱讀的書籍。
有許多讀者來信問應該閱讀什麼投資著作？
我經常以巴菲特本人的話來回答：
“要想成功地進行投資，你不需要懂得什麼Beta值、有效市場、現代投資組合理論、期權定價或是新興市場。事實上大家最好對這些東西一無所知。當然我的這種看法與大多數商學院的主流觀點有著根本的不同，這些商學院的金融課程主要就是那些東西。我們認為，學習投資的學生們只需要接受兩門課程的良好教育就足夠了，一門是如何評估企業的價值，另一門是如何思考市場價格。”
“由于價值非常簡單，所以沒有教授願意教授它。如果你已經取得博士學位，而且用很多年學習運用數學模型進行複雜的計算，然後你再來學習價值投資，這就好像一個基督徒去神學院學習，卻發現只要懂得十誡就足夠了。”
巴菲特對商學院的教育體系提出了尖銳批評：“商學院非常重視複雜的模式，卻忽視了簡單的模式，但是，簡單的模式卻往往更有效”。巴菲特甚至認為成功的投資並不需要高等數學知識，“如果高等數學是必需的，我就得回去送報紙了，我從來沒發現在投資中高等數學有什麼作用”。“你不需要成為一個火箭專家。投資並非一個智商為160的人就能擊敗智商為130的人的游戲”。
正如巴菲特所說，學習投資很簡單，只要願意讀書就行了。
當然巴菲特閱讀的不僅僅是格雷厄姆一個人的著作“如果我只學習格雷厄姆一個人的思想，就不會像今天這麼富有。”
那麼巴菲特推薦投資者閱讀的書籍有哪些呢？
給大家列一份巴菲特推薦閱讀的書籍作為新年禮物吧。
1、《証券分析》（格雷厄姆著）。格雷厄姆的經典名著，專業投資者必讀之書，巴菲特認為每一個投資者都應該閱讀此書十遍以上。
2、《聰明的投資者》（格雷厄姆著）。格雷厄姆專門為業余投資者所著，巴菲特稱之為“有史以來最偉大的投資著作”。
3、《怎樣選擇成長股》（費舍爾著）。巴菲特稱自己的投資策略是“85%的格雷厄姆和15%的費舍爾”。他說：“運用費舍爾的技巧，可以了解這一行……有助于做出一個聰明的投資決定”。
4、《巴菲特致股東的信：股份公司教程》。本書搜集整理了20多年巴菲特致股東的信中的精華段落，巴菲特認為此書是整理其投資哲學的一流工作。
Wednesday, May 28, 2008
耐心等下一輪反彈
道瓊斯指數兩度升上13000 點之上後就急速回跌，形成一個小雙頂的走勢，對圖表派的股民而 言，壓力很大。
不過，只是小雙頂，不是大雙頂，沒甚麼特別需要擔心。熊市一期的反彈浪依然 持續，現在只不過是反彈浪中的調整，耐心地等下一輪反彈。經過幾天的急跌，昨日指終於反彈, 還得賴亞太股市集體反彈帶來反彈力, 但是股民信心仍然不夠.
不過，只是小雙頂，不是大雙頂，沒甚麼特別需要擔心。熊市一期的反彈浪依然 持續，現在只不過是反彈浪中的調整，耐心地等下一輪反彈。經過幾天的急跌，昨日指終於反彈, 還得賴亞太股市集體反彈帶來反彈力, 但是股民信心仍然不夠.
巴菲特告诉我们什么与为什么
在过去的很多年以来，股神一直是巴菲特的头衔。人们希望知道为什么一个职业投资家可以构建如此庞大的帝国。而在目前金融市场动荡之际，这种愿望更加迫切，现在整个华尔街都在寻找一个领袖，一个真正的领导者。
这是巴菲特旗下哈萨维公司的年报为什么如此受关注的原因，这不仅仅是一家市值超过2000亿美元的公司，更重要的是年报中有巴菲特写给股东的信，在信里巴菲特告诉我们他正在做一些什么，以及将要做什么，甚至是做错了什么。
"好日子到头了"
"好日子到头了。"巴菲特在信中的这句话是指保险业，当时如果我们看到整个金融业在2007年的表现，那么这句话看上去有着更加深刻的含义。
在信中，巴菲特引用万国银行(Wells Fargo)首席执行官John Stumpf的那句话，"有趣的是这个行业(金融行业)总是能在找到新的办法亏钱，甚至在之前的方法还行之有效的时候。"
这次他提到的是被人诟病的房地产信贷行业。巴菲特批评那些金融企业在发放房地产信贷的时候完全不考虑借款者的收入以及资产状况，而只是一厢情愿地相信只要房价上涨一切问题都会迎刃而解。"一旦房价下跌，那些荒诞的金融闹剧就暴露无遗。"巴菲特在信中表示。
保险行业是哈萨维的主业，但巴菲特觉得形势并不乐观。"保险业的盈利水平，当然也包括我们，将在2008年出现大幅下降。"巴菲特在信中表示，未来几年该行业的盈利水平都将受到挑战。
巴菲特并没有指出具体的原因，就保险业的特性而言，这可能是因为经济增长前景不容乐观。
投资美国以外
巴菲特在2005年开始建立了大约价值210亿的美元空头头寸，但到了2007年，这些头寸几乎都已经不存在了。这并不意味着他开始看好美元，而可能是发现了更好的投资渠道。
"Berkshire会尝试进一步增加我们的直接和间接海外投资收益。"巴菲特在信中表示。目前巴菲特的股票投资中包括21.4亿美元投于韩国钢铁生产商浦项制铁、15.8亿美元投资于法国药厂Sanofi-Aventis SA，以及21.6亿美元投资于英国连锁超市Tesco。间接投资当然包括可口可乐、Kraft食品和宝洁等在美国以外拥有大量业务的美国公司。
巴菲特倾向于非美国公司和资产的原因是美国庞大的赤字以及不断下跌的美元。美国2007年贸易赤字虽然下降了6.2%，但依然达到了7116亿美元，相当于每个美国人2300美元，在巴菲特看来这种贸易赤字水平无疑是太高。
这似乎与美联储主席伯南克的观点有些出入，伯南克上周四在国会听证时称美元下跌是目前美国经济难得的亮点，因为美元贬值有助于出口和增加工作机会、缓解贸易逆差。
哈萨维去年在货币投资上的直接收益是23亿美元，而现在直接的货币投资只限于对巴西雷亚尔上。
价值投资，即使是衍生品
在2月初，巴菲特表示他愿意为贷款担保公司价值8000亿美元的信贷资产提供再保险服务，曾令市场感到震惊，因为当时市场对这些资产避之唯恐不及。
从哈萨维的年报中我们可以看出，这家公司在2007年就已经增加了对于衍生品的投入。截至2007年底，其衍生品合约持仓金额从一年前的240亿美元上升到了400亿美元。
这包括哈萨维自己创设的54类合约。比如一些衍生品合约保护投资者在2013年之前不会受到相关高收益债券违约的伤害。根据哈萨维的资料，目前公司在这些合约得到了32亿美元的收入，赔付的金额为4.72亿美元，巴菲特预计最坏的情况是赔付金额可能大到47亿美元。
另外一些合约是关于标普500指数的卖出期权，这些合约的到期日介于2019年到2027年，合约执行价格就是合约签发时标普500指数的点位。
这些合约在2007年并没有给哈萨维带来收益，事实上哈萨维在衍生品合约中损失了8900万美元。巴菲特警告称投资者应该时刻为衍生品投资巨额的收益或损失做好准备，巨额意味着在单一季度金额很可能达到10亿美元以上。
不过对于巴菲特而言，投资是长期的，所以并不会计较短期得失。这些投资意味着他看好长期经济将依旧增长。他表示他完全能接受仅仅一场风暴就能让他损失60亿美元的保险投资，这同样是他衍生品投资商的哲学。
错误的投资
即使精明如巴菲特，依然可能犯下致命的错误，在1993年，哈萨维以4.33亿美元买下来一家名为Dexter Shoe Co的制鞋公司。而这笔投资最终的损失达到了35亿美元。
在这笔投资中巴菲特犯下了两个错误：他没有意识到那些看起来坚不可摧的竞争优势可以在几年内消失无踪;而他不是用现金，而是用哈萨维1.6%的股权买入这家一文不值的公司，而这些股权目前价值35亿美元。
"直到现在，Dexter依然是我在投资上犯下的最大的错误，"巴菲特在信中表示，"而在未来我还将犯更多的错误。"
当你看完巴菲特的信，其实他只是告诉我们一个很简单的道理：他是一个价值投资者，他也将一直是，他告诉我们这是投资，买入那些真正有价值的资产，而不是去赌博，当然也不要害怕风险，甚至是错误。
这是巴菲特旗下哈萨维公司的年报为什么如此受关注的原因，这不仅仅是一家市值超过2000亿美元的公司，更重要的是年报中有巴菲特写给股东的信，在信里巴菲特告诉我们他正在做一些什么，以及将要做什么，甚至是做错了什么。
"好日子到头了"
"好日子到头了。"巴菲特在信中的这句话是指保险业，当时如果我们看到整个金融业在2007年的表现，那么这句话看上去有着更加深刻的含义。
在信中，巴菲特引用万国银行(Wells Fargo)首席执行官John Stumpf的那句话，"有趣的是这个行业(金融行业)总是能在找到新的办法亏钱，甚至在之前的方法还行之有效的时候。"
这次他提到的是被人诟病的房地产信贷行业。巴菲特批评那些金融企业在发放房地产信贷的时候完全不考虑借款者的收入以及资产状况，而只是一厢情愿地相信只要房价上涨一切问题都会迎刃而解。"一旦房价下跌，那些荒诞的金融闹剧就暴露无遗。"巴菲特在信中表示。
保险行业是哈萨维的主业，但巴菲特觉得形势并不乐观。"保险业的盈利水平，当然也包括我们，将在2008年出现大幅下降。"巴菲特在信中表示，未来几年该行业的盈利水平都将受到挑战。
巴菲特并没有指出具体的原因，就保险业的特性而言，这可能是因为经济增长前景不容乐观。
投资美国以外
巴菲特在2005年开始建立了大约价值210亿的美元空头头寸，但到了2007年，这些头寸几乎都已经不存在了。这并不意味着他开始看好美元，而可能是发现了更好的投资渠道。
"Berkshire会尝试进一步增加我们的直接和间接海外投资收益。"巴菲特在信中表示。目前巴菲特的股票投资中包括21.4亿美元投于韩国钢铁生产商浦项制铁、15.8亿美元投资于法国药厂Sanofi-Aventis SA，以及21.6亿美元投资于英国连锁超市Tesco。间接投资当然包括可口可乐、Kraft食品和宝洁等在美国以外拥有大量业务的美国公司。
巴菲特倾向于非美国公司和资产的原因是美国庞大的赤字以及不断下跌的美元。美国2007年贸易赤字虽然下降了6.2%，但依然达到了7116亿美元，相当于每个美国人2300美元，在巴菲特看来这种贸易赤字水平无疑是太高。
这似乎与美联储主席伯南克的观点有些出入，伯南克上周四在国会听证时称美元下跌是目前美国经济难得的亮点，因为美元贬值有助于出口和增加工作机会、缓解贸易逆差。
哈萨维去年在货币投资上的直接收益是23亿美元，而现在直接的货币投资只限于对巴西雷亚尔上。
价值投资，即使是衍生品
在2月初，巴菲特表示他愿意为贷款担保公司价值8000亿美元的信贷资产提供再保险服务，曾令市场感到震惊，因为当时市场对这些资产避之唯恐不及。
从哈萨维的年报中我们可以看出，这家公司在2007年就已经增加了对于衍生品的投入。截至2007年底，其衍生品合约持仓金额从一年前的240亿美元上升到了400亿美元。
这包括哈萨维自己创设的54类合约。比如一些衍生品合约保护投资者在2013年之前不会受到相关高收益债券违约的伤害。根据哈萨维的资料，目前公司在这些合约得到了32亿美元的收入，赔付的金额为4.72亿美元，巴菲特预计最坏的情况是赔付金额可能大到47亿美元。
另外一些合约是关于标普500指数的卖出期权，这些合约的到期日介于2019年到2027年，合约执行价格就是合约签发时标普500指数的点位。
这些合约在2007年并没有给哈萨维带来收益，事实上哈萨维在衍生品合约中损失了8900万美元。巴菲特警告称投资者应该时刻为衍生品投资巨额的收益或损失做好准备，巨额意味着在单一季度金额很可能达到10亿美元以上。
不过对于巴菲特而言，投资是长期的，所以并不会计较短期得失。这些投资意味着他看好长期经济将依旧增长。他表示他完全能接受仅仅一场风暴就能让他损失60亿美元的保险投资，这同样是他衍生品投资商的哲学。
错误的投资
即使精明如巴菲特，依然可能犯下致命的错误，在1993年，哈萨维以4.33亿美元买下来一家名为Dexter Shoe Co的制鞋公司。而这笔投资最终的损失达到了35亿美元。
在这笔投资中巴菲特犯下了两个错误：他没有意识到那些看起来坚不可摧的竞争优势可以在几年内消失无踪;而他不是用现金，而是用哈萨维1.6%的股权买入这家一文不值的公司，而这些股权目前价值35亿美元。
"直到现在，Dexter依然是我在投资上犯下的最大的错误，"巴菲特在信中表示，"而在未来我还将犯更多的错误。"
当你看完巴菲特的信，其实他只是告诉我们一个很简单的道理：他是一个价值投资者，他也将一直是，他告诉我们这是投资，买入那些真正有价值的资产，而不是去赌博，当然也不要害怕风险，甚至是错误。
巴菲特：经理人需要DNA里都有防御风险的概念
巴菲特说，经理人需要是那些DNA里都有防御风险概念的人，并且不会跟风投资所谓高回报的公司。巴菲特认为，去年金融业发生的情况有些是有苗头的。“不能认识到模型里没有显示出来的风险是致命的。”巴菲特说
巴菲特相信，最坏的全球信贷紧缩时期已经过去，但后遗症将继续困扰普通的家庭。巴菲特警告：“类似的情况很可能在未来再次发生。这种状况也会持续一段时间。”巴菲特表示，他还没想到即时的解决办法。
这是巴菲特在伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司 (Berkshire Hathaway)于5月3日召开的股东大会上发表的观点。
贪婪与风险
房地产泡沫蔓延到其他经济领域的广度让巴菲特感到出乎意料。巴菲特不记得历史上有过其他类似的泡沫。
巴菲特说，是的，虽然有少数银行家似乎能够对风险保持警惕。“我们从去年的情况可以清楚地看到，如果执行官知道发生了什么事情，他不会放任自流。”巴菲特说，有时承认自己不知道发生了什么事情反而没那么难为情。
巴菲特的长期业务合作伙伴查理·芒格(Charlie Munger)指责华尔街，贪婪和纵欲的疯狂文化已导致过度的信用危机，对这个国家是非常不利的。
芒格说，信用危机的广度使得安然危机现在看起来简直像是一个“茶聚”。安然丑闻之后，美国政府出台了新法律，以打击金融诈骗。“现在看来，他们是用玩具枪击中了大象。”芒格说。
巴菲特说，金融机构很难规范。美国政府成立了一个组织，即所谓的OFHEO(联邦房地产监管办公室)，有200名工作人员，专门监管Fannie Mae和Freddie Mac。他们的工作只是监管这两家公司，看他们是否做了他们该做的事情。然而，后来还是发生了两桩历史上最大的会计虚报案。
巴菲特说，经理人需要是那些DNA里都有防御风险概念的人，并且不会跟风投资所谓高回报的公司。巴菲特认为，去年金融业发生的情况有些是有苗头的。所有银行都有一些运行的金融模型，但拥有模型并不等于他们知道面临了什么严重的风险。
“不能认识到模型里没有显示出来的风险是致命的。”巴菲特说。
查理·芒格称，伯克希尔希望永远规避风险。他说：“我们的行为方式使得没人质疑我们的信用。对风险的双层叠式防御在伯克希尔就像呼吸一样重要。”芒格说，他(巴菲特)可称为风险经理。与之相反的做法是可以有个首席风险官，但他只不过在你做傻事的时候让你感觉好一点。华尔街的银行变得贪婪和无节制，不考虑风险。
分散风险反而带来更大风险
将华尔街和伯克希尔对待风险的态度相比，就能够看出为什么巴菲特是资本世界的一代宗师。
在伯克希尔，巴菲特放弃赚取回报率较高的99%的机会，甚至或许是99.9%，但他不会感到不舒服。巴菲特表示，很多人几乎在伯克希尔拥有他们的全部身家，包括我自己，如果把这些都放置于风险之中，我们都不会感到舒服。
“我们会处理自己的风险，而不是把它传播到更大的范围去。”巴菲特说，“我们看到有些公司认为自己已经把风险转嫁出去，其实并不是最明智的。”
所谓的债务抵押债券(CDO， Collateralized Debt Obligation)的功能之一就是将风险放到一个更大的范围内加以分散。但事实证明，所谓的分散风险在整个系统都出现问题时根本失效，带来的反而是更大的风险。芒格认为，让衍生品交易发展到这种地步简直是疯狂的。
巴菲特对风险的强调直接影响到其接班人的选定。他已经钦点了4位投资经理，在他去世之后，可以运行伯克希尔公司的投资。巴菲特没有点出这4人的名字，只是说需要有好的职业经历，但人品素质尤其重要。
“有人天生就能够判断什么是重大风险。”巴菲特说。
以按揭贷款为基础的金融衍生品简直是疯狂
巴菲特认为，美联储帮助贝尔斯登(Bear Stearns)免于破产是正确的。贝尔斯登有14.5万亿美元的衍生品合约，如果它倒闭了，这些合同将不得不在很短时间内撤销。巴菲特说：“这会是一个壮观的前所未有的比例。”
而芒格认为，让公司不断膨胀到没办法破产的地步，这简直是疯了，让衍生品交易发展到这种地步也是疯狂的。
巴菲特说，银行发明的这种以按揭贷款为基础的证券组合的金融衍生产品简直是疯狂的。
“如果要了解CDO，需要阅读15000字的材料。”巴菲特说，“如果采用了较低级的一块CDO，并采用了50个，成为一个CDO方阵，那需要阅读高达75万字的材料才能理解一种证券工具。我的意思是，这不可能做得到。当开始购买其他工具的期货商品时，没有人知道他们在这样做什么。很荒谬。”
巴菲特认为，要求银行必须评估所持债券的市场价值可能有帮助。芒格说，自由市场不是万能的，有一些创新应被禁止。芒格说，如果将风险分散多元化 (diversification)这个词禁止，这个世界可能要运转得更好。
芒格透露，巴菲特在很多时候作决定非常快，这是非常不凡的地方，原因之一就是巴菲特将不会允许他自己过多考虑某些东西。
有打算购买中国或印度企业
关于伯克希尔会不会购买中国或印度的企业，巴菲特说，他们有这个打算，但中国和印度的法律和规定使得伯克希尔很难获得利润。以保险业为例，对外国投资者都有25%的上限。
巴菲特说，未来他希望伯克希尔集中在海外市场，而不是美国。伯克希尔未来或将在海外购买一两个公司。巴菲特说，他还不确定是德国公司、英国公司或者其他国家的一些公司。因为，那些国家的货币对美元汇率下跌的可能性非常小。巴菲特说，美国政府所采取的政策将使得美元进一步走软，他觉得没有必要对非美元的货币投资进行对冲。
巴菲特相信，最坏的全球信贷紧缩时期已经过去，但后遗症将继续困扰普通的家庭。巴菲特警告：“类似的情况很可能在未来再次发生。这种状况也会持续一段时间。”巴菲特表示，他还没想到即时的解决办法。
这是巴菲特在伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司 (Berkshire Hathaway)于5月3日召开的股东大会上发表的观点。
贪婪与风险
房地产泡沫蔓延到其他经济领域的广度让巴菲特感到出乎意料。巴菲特不记得历史上有过其他类似的泡沫。
巴菲特说，是的，虽然有少数银行家似乎能够对风险保持警惕。“我们从去年的情况可以清楚地看到，如果执行官知道发生了什么事情，他不会放任自流。”巴菲特说，有时承认自己不知道发生了什么事情反而没那么难为情。
巴菲特的长期业务合作伙伴查理·芒格(Charlie Munger)指责华尔街，贪婪和纵欲的疯狂文化已导致过度的信用危机，对这个国家是非常不利的。
芒格说，信用危机的广度使得安然危机现在看起来简直像是一个“茶聚”。安然丑闻之后，美国政府出台了新法律，以打击金融诈骗。“现在看来，他们是用玩具枪击中了大象。”芒格说。
巴菲特说，金融机构很难规范。美国政府成立了一个组织，即所谓的OFHEO(联邦房地产监管办公室)，有200名工作人员，专门监管Fannie Mae和Freddie Mac。他们的工作只是监管这两家公司，看他们是否做了他们该做的事情。然而，后来还是发生了两桩历史上最大的会计虚报案。
巴菲特说，经理人需要是那些DNA里都有防御风险概念的人，并且不会跟风投资所谓高回报的公司。巴菲特认为，去年金融业发生的情况有些是有苗头的。所有银行都有一些运行的金融模型，但拥有模型并不等于他们知道面临了什么严重的风险。
“不能认识到模型里没有显示出来的风险是致命的。”巴菲特说。
查理·芒格称，伯克希尔希望永远规避风险。他说：“我们的行为方式使得没人质疑我们的信用。对风险的双层叠式防御在伯克希尔就像呼吸一样重要。”芒格说，他(巴菲特)可称为风险经理。与之相反的做法是可以有个首席风险官，但他只不过在你做傻事的时候让你感觉好一点。华尔街的银行变得贪婪和无节制，不考虑风险。
分散风险反而带来更大风险
将华尔街和伯克希尔对待风险的态度相比，就能够看出为什么巴菲特是资本世界的一代宗师。
在伯克希尔，巴菲特放弃赚取回报率较高的99%的机会，甚至或许是99.9%，但他不会感到不舒服。巴菲特表示，很多人几乎在伯克希尔拥有他们的全部身家，包括我自己，如果把这些都放置于风险之中，我们都不会感到舒服。
“我们会处理自己的风险，而不是把它传播到更大的范围去。”巴菲特说，“我们看到有些公司认为自己已经把风险转嫁出去，其实并不是最明智的。”
所谓的债务抵押债券(CDO， Collateralized Debt Obligation)的功能之一就是将风险放到一个更大的范围内加以分散。但事实证明，所谓的分散风险在整个系统都出现问题时根本失效，带来的反而是更大的风险。芒格认为，让衍生品交易发展到这种地步简直是疯狂的。
巴菲特对风险的强调直接影响到其接班人的选定。他已经钦点了4位投资经理，在他去世之后，可以运行伯克希尔公司的投资。巴菲特没有点出这4人的名字，只是说需要有好的职业经历，但人品素质尤其重要。
“有人天生就能够判断什么是重大风险。”巴菲特说。
以按揭贷款为基础的金融衍生品简直是疯狂
巴菲特认为，美联储帮助贝尔斯登(Bear Stearns)免于破产是正确的。贝尔斯登有14.5万亿美元的衍生品合约，如果它倒闭了，这些合同将不得不在很短时间内撤销。巴菲特说：“这会是一个壮观的前所未有的比例。”
而芒格认为，让公司不断膨胀到没办法破产的地步，这简直是疯了，让衍生品交易发展到这种地步也是疯狂的。
巴菲特说，银行发明的这种以按揭贷款为基础的证券组合的金融衍生产品简直是疯狂的。
“如果要了解CDO，需要阅读15000字的材料。”巴菲特说，“如果采用了较低级的一块CDO，并采用了50个，成为一个CDO方阵，那需要阅读高达75万字的材料才能理解一种证券工具。我的意思是，这不可能做得到。当开始购买其他工具的期货商品时，没有人知道他们在这样做什么。很荒谬。”
巴菲特认为，要求银行必须评估所持债券的市场价值可能有帮助。芒格说，自由市场不是万能的，有一些创新应被禁止。芒格说，如果将风险分散多元化 (diversification)这个词禁止，这个世界可能要运转得更好。
芒格透露，巴菲特在很多时候作决定非常快，这是非常不凡的地方，原因之一就是巴菲特将不会允许他自己过多考虑某些东西。
有打算购买中国或印度企业
关于伯克希尔会不会购买中国或印度的企业，巴菲特说，他们有这个打算，但中国和印度的法律和规定使得伯克希尔很难获得利润。以保险业为例，对外国投资者都有25%的上限。
巴菲特说，未来他希望伯克希尔集中在海外市场，而不是美国。伯克希尔未来或将在海外购买一两个公司。巴菲特说，他还不确定是德国公司、英国公司或者其他国家的一些公司。因为，那些国家的货币对美元汇率下跌的可能性非常小。巴菲特说，美国政府所采取的政策将使得美元进一步走软，他觉得没有必要对非美元的货币投资进行对冲。
巴菲特衍生品投资中亏损了16亿美元
英国《金融时报》Francesco Guerrera、Justin Baer, 5 May 2008 纽约报道.
沃伦•巴菲特旗下的伯克希尔哈撒韦公司(Berkshire Hathaway)第一季度在衍生品合约方面蒙受16亿美元的非现金损失——巴菲特曾经将该类资产称为“大规模杀伤性金融武器”。
伯克希尔哈撒韦在奥马哈召开公司年会前夕宣布了此笔意外投资损失，这导致该公司第一季度利润较上年同期的26亿美元猛降64%，至9.4亿美元。
巴菲特在一份声明中将利润下降归咎于会计准则，这些准则迫使公司减记未实现的衍生品利得或损失。
伯克希尔哈撒韦的投资亏损，主要集中在两个领域。该公司在标准普尔500指数(S&P 500)及其它3种指数卖出合约方面计入了12亿美元的未实现损失。
沃伦•巴菲特旗下的伯克希尔哈撒韦公司(Berkshire Hathaway)第一季度在衍生品合约方面蒙受16亿美元的非现金损失——巴菲特曾经将该类资产称为“大规模杀伤性金融武器”。
伯克希尔哈撒韦在奥马哈召开公司年会前夕宣布了此笔意外投资损失，这导致该公司第一季度利润较上年同期的26亿美元猛降64%，至9.4亿美元。
巴菲特在一份声明中将利润下降归咎于会计准则，这些准则迫使公司减记未实现的衍生品利得或损失。
伯克希尔哈撒韦的投资亏损，主要集中在两个领域。该公司在标准普尔500指数(S&P 500)及其它3种指数卖出合约方面计入了12亿美元的未实现损失。
巴菲特放弃救市计划的启示
2008年3月3日 ，“股神”巴菲特在接受美国CNBC电视台采访时表示：“我已经决定放弃拯救涉及8000亿美元资产的计划”。
他表示，即使从常识角度而言，美国经济当前处于衰退状态也是很清楚的，“但本轮衰退的程度有多深，目前还很难判断”。
2月初，巴菲特曾公开宣称，有一个拯救陷入困境的债券保险业者的计划。市场人士当时认为，巴菲特此时出手，代表近来重创国际金融市场的美国次贷危机可能已接近尾声。但事隔一个月，其投资策略发生180度的急转，说明其在投资策略中会很快地认识到问题的严重性并及时转变，说明其对风险市场投资的灵活性、多变性。
巴菲特是以价值投资而取得成功的典范，他对吉列、华盛顿邮报、可口可乐及对中国石油的投资均表现为长期持股，这些价值投资体现的是公司价值迟早要通过市场表现出来。而在中国石油H股到达13港元时，他果断在市场疯狂上涨时全线获利而走，因为他已认识到其估值过高和好的机构退出时机来临。
反观中国A股市场，许多机构在6000点对一些估值超过100至1000倍的上市公司进行大量加仓，而当时市场时机为机构资金提供了较好的减仓时机。时过境迁，如今你想实现机构行为的出仓恐怕不仅没有好价钱卖，恐怕也难以大幅获利而走。
QDII海外市场的全线重挫、新基金在高位接盘出现的净值大跌等均说明过分贪婪、过分自信和对时机把握方面的缺陷。
此次巴菲特一月之内投资策略的转变，是其在资本市场运作中认识未来风险或巨大不确定性的表现，此时作为价值投资的他能果断退出，正是在投资市场中的量力而行、不打无准备之战役的体现。
巴菲特在香港卖出中国石油H股后，在韩国市场却找到了3倍PE的公司投资，而目前认为15倍左右的美国市场股价仍不便宜，说明其投资所保持的耐心和对上市公司估值独到的见解。
从中国A股目前估值来看，一些公司股价虽然达到了200多元，但其EPS仅3.05元，动态PE高达70多倍，每年的分红也难以达到银行存款一年期利息;有的还不分红。而香港市场中的汇丰控股EPS为12港元左右，每季度分红就接近每股3元左右，PE仅为9.5倍。
从巴菲特弃8000亿美元救市计划来看，我们应认真学习其投资的灵活性、对上市公司估值投资回报的考虑、对风险市场不确定性较大时及时退出的战略，
巴菲特放弃8000亿美元救市计划，在某种程度上为中国A股市场的投资者敲响了警钟，国际成熟资本市场许多优质公司如壳牌、汇丰、渣打等PE均在10倍以下，其风险程度较低，而取决于其市场表现的不仅仅是EPS，更重要的是分红率(股息率)及投资回报。
对比国际成熟市场，配合巴菲特在估值或价值投资上考虑分红、成长性及近期应对经济不确定性采取的灵活性来看，中国投资者仍有许多东西要学习借鉴。
他表示，即使从常识角度而言，美国经济当前处于衰退状态也是很清楚的，“但本轮衰退的程度有多深，目前还很难判断”。
2月初，巴菲特曾公开宣称，有一个拯救陷入困境的债券保险业者的计划。市场人士当时认为，巴菲特此时出手，代表近来重创国际金融市场的美国次贷危机可能已接近尾声。但事隔一个月，其投资策略发生180度的急转，说明其在投资策略中会很快地认识到问题的严重性并及时转变，说明其对风险市场投资的灵活性、多变性。
巴菲特是以价值投资而取得成功的典范，他对吉列、华盛顿邮报、可口可乐及对中国石油的投资均表现为长期持股，这些价值投资体现的是公司价值迟早要通过市场表现出来。而在中国石油H股到达13港元时，他果断在市场疯狂上涨时全线获利而走，因为他已认识到其估值过高和好的机构退出时机来临。
反观中国A股市场，许多机构在6000点对一些估值超过100至1000倍的上市公司进行大量加仓，而当时市场时机为机构资金提供了较好的减仓时机。时过境迁，如今你想实现机构行为的出仓恐怕不仅没有好价钱卖，恐怕也难以大幅获利而走。
QDII海外市场的全线重挫、新基金在高位接盘出现的净值大跌等均说明过分贪婪、过分自信和对时机把握方面的缺陷。
此次巴菲特一月之内投资策略的转变，是其在资本市场运作中认识未来风险或巨大不确定性的表现，此时作为价值投资的他能果断退出，正是在投资市场中的量力而行、不打无准备之战役的体现。
巴菲特在香港卖出中国石油H股后，在韩国市场却找到了3倍PE的公司投资，而目前认为15倍左右的美国市场股价仍不便宜，说明其投资所保持的耐心和对上市公司估值独到的见解。
从中国A股目前估值来看，一些公司股价虽然达到了200多元，但其EPS仅3.05元，动态PE高达70多倍，每年的分红也难以达到银行存款一年期利息;有的还不分红。而香港市场中的汇丰控股EPS为12港元左右，每季度分红就接近每股3元左右，PE仅为9.5倍。
从巴菲特弃8000亿美元救市计划来看，我们应认真学习其投资的灵活性、对上市公司估值投资回报的考虑、对风险市场不确定性较大时及时退出的战略，
巴菲特放弃8000亿美元救市计划，在某种程度上为中国A股市场的投资者敲响了警钟，国际成熟资本市场许多优质公司如壳牌、汇丰、渣打等PE均在10倍以下，其风险程度较低，而取决于其市场表现的不仅仅是EPS，更重要的是分红率(股息率)及投资回报。
对比国际成熟市场，配合巴菲特在估值或价值投资上考虑分红、成长性及近期应对经济不确定性采取的灵活性来看，中国投资者仍有许多东西要学习借鉴。
巴菲特应对股灾的经验
1) 是灾中要冷静：惊慌容易失措
1987年的股灾之前，美国股市连续上涨5年，是一场空前的大牛市。
1984年到1986年，美国股市持续大涨，累计涨幅2.46倍，道琼斯指数从不到1000点上涨到是让人吃惊的2258点。
但就在人们陶醉在股市连续5年持续上涨的喜悦之中时，一场股灾突然降临了。
1987年10月19日，这是历史第一个黑色星期一，一天之内，道•琼斯指数跌了508点，跌幅高达22.6％。
股市暴跌，巴菲特的伯克希尔公司股票也未能幸免。巴菲特个人99%的财富都是他控股的上市公司伯克希尔公司的股票。暴跌这一天之内巴菲特财富就损失了3.42亿美元。在短短一周之内伯克希尔公司的股价就暴跌了25%，
那么，身处股市暴雪中的巴菲特如何反应呢？
在暴跌那一到，可能巴菲特是整个美国唯一一个没有时时关注正在崩溃的股市的人。
他的办公室里根本没有电脑，也没有股市行情机，他根本不看股市行情。
整整一天，他和往常一样安安静静呆在办公室里，打电话，看报纸，看上市公司的年报。
过了两天，有位记者问巴菲特：这次股灾崩盘，意味着什么？
巴菲特的回答只有一句话：也许意味着股市过去涨的太高了。
巴菲特没有恐慌地四处打听消息，也没有恐慌地抛售股票，面对大跌，面对自己的财富大幅缩水，面对他持有的重仓股大幅暴跌，他非常平静。
原因很简单：他坚信他持有的这些上市公司具有长期的持续竞争优势，具有良好的发展前景，具有很高的投资价值，他坚信股灾和天灾一样，只是一时的，最终股灾会过去，股市会恢复正常，他持股的公司股价最终会反映其内在价值。
2) 是灾前要谨慎：一次大意可能让你一生后悔。
巴菲特碰到的另一次股灾是1999年。
结果股灾来了。2000、2001、2003三年美国股市大跌9.1%、11.9%、22.1%，累计跌幅超过一半.
这三年股灾期间巴菲特的业绩上涨10%以上,，以60%的优势大幅度战胜市场。
为什么？
因为巴菲特早已经做好了应对股灾的准备。
从1995年到1999年美国股市累计上涨超过2.5倍，是一个前所未有的大牛市。最重要的推动力是网络和高科技股票的猛涨。而巴菲特却拒绝投资高科技股票，继续坚决持有可口可乐、美国运通、吉列等传统行业公司股票，结果1999年，标准普尔500指数上涨21%，而巴菲特的业绩却只有0.5%，不但输给了市场，而且输得非常惨，相差20%以上，这是巴菲特输给市场业绩最差的一年。
1987年的股灾之前，美国股市连续上涨5年，是一场空前的大牛市。
1984年到1986年，美国股市持续大涨，累计涨幅2.46倍，道琼斯指数从不到1000点上涨到是让人吃惊的2258点。
但就在人们陶醉在股市连续5年持续上涨的喜悦之中时，一场股灾突然降临了。
1987年10月19日，这是历史第一个黑色星期一，一天之内，道•琼斯指数跌了508点，跌幅高达22.6％。
股市暴跌，巴菲特的伯克希尔公司股票也未能幸免。巴菲特个人99%的财富都是他控股的上市公司伯克希尔公司的股票。暴跌这一天之内巴菲特财富就损失了3.42亿美元。在短短一周之内伯克希尔公司的股价就暴跌了25%，
那么，身处股市暴雪中的巴菲特如何反应呢？
在暴跌那一到，可能巴菲特是整个美国唯一一个没有时时关注正在崩溃的股市的人。
他的办公室里根本没有电脑，也没有股市行情机，他根本不看股市行情。
整整一天，他和往常一样安安静静呆在办公室里，打电话，看报纸，看上市公司的年报。
过了两天，有位记者问巴菲特：这次股灾崩盘，意味着什么？
巴菲特的回答只有一句话：也许意味着股市过去涨的太高了。
巴菲特没有恐慌地四处打听消息，也没有恐慌地抛售股票，面对大跌，面对自己的财富大幅缩水，面对他持有的重仓股大幅暴跌，他非常平静。
原因很简单：他坚信他持有的这些上市公司具有长期的持续竞争优势，具有良好的发展前景，具有很高的投资价值，他坚信股灾和天灾一样，只是一时的，最终股灾会过去，股市会恢复正常，他持股的公司股价最终会反映其内在价值。
2) 是灾前要谨慎：一次大意可能让你一生后悔。
巴菲特碰到的另一次股灾是1999年。
结果股灾来了。2000、2001、2003三年美国股市大跌9.1%、11.9%、22.1%，累计跌幅超过一半.
这三年股灾期间巴菲特的业绩上涨10%以上,，以60%的优势大幅度战胜市场。
为什么？
因为巴菲特早已经做好了应对股灾的准备。
从1995年到1999年美国股市累计上涨超过2.5倍，是一个前所未有的大牛市。最重要的推动力是网络和高科技股票的猛涨。而巴菲特却拒绝投资高科技股票，继续坚决持有可口可乐、美国运通、吉列等传统行业公司股票，结果1999年，标准普尔500指数上涨21%，而巴菲特的业绩却只有0.5%，不但输给了市场，而且输得非常惨，相差20%以上，这是巴菲特输给市场业绩最差的一年。
5分钟 知吉凶
我有一种本领，只要与人交谈5分钟，就知道一个人在股票投资上，是赚钱还是亏本。
当然，这5分钟的“股谈”，必须是在毫无准备，完全不设防的情况下作出。
而投资的盈亏，是指长期投资的结果，并非短期的成绩。
如果在5分钟内，他所谈的或所问的，都离不了股市会不会起、有什么“贴士”、某股将会被炒、热钱进来“推”某股、小道消息谓某股将会飞涨……之类的课题、对“炒”和“玩”股口沫横飞，对公司的基本面只字不提，他的投资多数亏本。
如果他一见到我，就不断追问：这个行业的景气如何、公司的产品销路如何、公司的管理层是否精明和可靠、公司过去的盈利表现如何、盈利能否持续、成长潜能何在？公司的前景展望如何？
对于股市起落、小道消息、有无人炒作等，只字不提， 这个人多数能在股市中赚钱。每一个人都有自尊心、都爱面子，很少人肯认“输”。所以，谈到股票投资，个个都是赢家，实际上，人人都在“暗捶”。
内容反映态度
依我的观察，根据谈股的内容所作出的盈亏揣测，准确性出奇的高。这一点也不奇怪，因为谈话的内容，反映了一个人的投资态度。那些开口是“炒”，闭口是“玩”的人，都是顽固的投机者，他们投机成瘾，已到了无可救药的地步。
长期投机，无异长赌，长赌必输。
那些谈话内容，完全环绕着基本面，对股市动向，股票炒作，只字不提，这类股友，都是严肃的长期投资者。这类投资者，抱着正确的投资理念，他们深切了解，买股票就是买公司的股份，买股份就是跟人合股做生意，投资的成败，取决于公司的业绩表现。所以，他们把注意力，投注在公司上，而不是投注在股价的变动上。
常理推测结果
他们坚决相信：只要公司业绩标青，股价自然会起，根本不必担心。
不看业绩看股价，是舍本逐末。
所以，5分钟的“股谈”，就能辨别投资者在股市的表现，而且准确性奇高，并不是有特异功能，而且根据常理推测所得的结果。
一个人，做一件事，如果做了10年、8年，还是没有成绩，就必然会放弃，或是改弦易辙，这才是合乎常理的做法。
但是，一些人在股市中投机，经过10年、8年，结算一下，还是亏本，这说明了这种方法是错误的。既然如此，就应该放弃，改变路线，采取更有赚钱把握的方法，才是合理的行为。
但是，许多人在投机10年、8年之后，伤痕累累，仍不肯悔改，还要继续投机下去，实在令人费解。
当然，这5分钟的“股谈”，必须是在毫无准备，完全不设防的情况下作出。
而投资的盈亏，是指长期投资的结果，并非短期的成绩。
如果在5分钟内，他所谈的或所问的，都离不了股市会不会起、有什么“贴士”、某股将会被炒、热钱进来“推”某股、小道消息谓某股将会飞涨……之类的课题、对“炒”和“玩”股口沫横飞，对公司的基本面只字不提，他的投资多数亏本。
如果他一见到我，就不断追问：这个行业的景气如何、公司的产品销路如何、公司的管理层是否精明和可靠、公司过去的盈利表现如何、盈利能否持续、成长潜能何在？公司的前景展望如何？
对于股市起落、小道消息、有无人炒作等，只字不提， 这个人多数能在股市中赚钱。每一个人都有自尊心、都爱面子，很少人肯认“输”。所以，谈到股票投资，个个都是赢家，实际上，人人都在“暗捶”。
内容反映态度
依我的观察，根据谈股的内容所作出的盈亏揣测，准确性出奇的高。这一点也不奇怪，因为谈话的内容，反映了一个人的投资态度。那些开口是“炒”，闭口是“玩”的人，都是顽固的投机者，他们投机成瘾，已到了无可救药的地步。
长期投机，无异长赌，长赌必输。
那些谈话内容，完全环绕着基本面，对股市动向，股票炒作，只字不提，这类股友，都是严肃的长期投资者。这类投资者，抱着正确的投资理念，他们深切了解，买股票就是买公司的股份，买股份就是跟人合股做生意，投资的成败，取决于公司的业绩表现。所以，他们把注意力，投注在公司上，而不是投注在股价的变动上。
常理推测结果
他们坚决相信：只要公司业绩标青，股价自然会起，根本不必担心。
不看业绩看股价，是舍本逐末。
所以，5分钟的“股谈”，就能辨别投资者在股市的表现，而且准确性奇高，并不是有特异功能，而且根据常理推测所得的结果。
一个人，做一件事，如果做了10年、8年，还是没有成绩，就必然会放弃，或是改弦易辙，这才是合乎常理的做法。
但是，一些人在股市中投机，经过10年、8年，结算一下，还是亏本，这说明了这种方法是错误的。既然如此，就应该放弃，改变路线，采取更有赚钱把握的方法，才是合理的行为。
但是，许多人在投机10年、8年之后，伤痕累累，仍不肯悔改，还要继续投机下去，实在令人费解。
Bush vs. Buffett
It's amazing how Wall Street and and the government have managed to keep the stock market up to benefit Wall Street even though the general population is suffering from high gas prices, high food prices, unemployment, home foreclosures, layoffs, loss of manufacturing jobs, decrease in dollar value and an expansion of by the terrorists of their wars to numerous other countries.
You can expect more laughable conclusions that "the crises is over" "the recession is not as bad" on a daily basis in the never ending effort to prop up the market. People will be on bread lines and the same commentators will be saying the crises is over.
Warren Buffet is very reliable - look at his record.
Bush and his appointees are not - look at their record on what they have said versus what they have actually done. The bottom line is Americans need to start reading their news and evaluating it.
You can expect more laughable conclusions that "the crises is over" "the recession is not as bad" on a daily basis in the never ending effort to prop up the market. People will be on bread lines and the same commentators will be saying the crises is over.
Warren Buffet is very reliable - look at his record.
Bush and his appointees are not - look at their record on what they have said versus what they have actually done. The bottom line is Americans need to start reading their news and evaluating it.
Greenspan vs. Buffett: 'The Oracle' Has Finger on Consumers' (Weakening) Pulse
If there's a duel between financial heavyweights Alan Greenspan and Warren Buffett, the most recent data says "the Oracle" is right.
"I still believe there is a greater than 50% probability of recession," Greenspan tells The Financial Times. "[But] that probability has receded a little and ... the probability of a severe recession has come down markedly."
On the other hand, "I believe that we are already in a recession," Buffett tells Germany's Der Spiegel. "It will be deeper and longer than what many think."
American consumers seem to agree with Buffett: May consumer confidence came it at 57.2 this morning, below expectations and at the lowest level since October 1992.
Consumer confidence is obviously tied to the housing market, which Greenspan says is likely to fall another 10%, bringing the peak-to-trough decline to 25%.
Hopefully Greenspan isn't underestimating the decline -- as he was wont to do while still Fed chairman: The Case/Shiller Index says home prices fell 14.1% in the first quarter, the worst drop in the history of the index, going back to 1988.
Separately, this morning's April new home sales report showed an unexpected 3.3% rise, but that's only after March figures were revised down and April sales remain near a 17-year low.
"I still believe there is a greater than 50% probability of recession," Greenspan tells The Financial Times. "[But] that probability has receded a little and ... the probability of a severe recession has come down markedly."
On the other hand, "I believe that we are already in a recession," Buffett tells Germany's Der Spiegel. "It will be deeper and longer than what many think."
American consumers seem to agree with Buffett: May consumer confidence came it at 57.2 this morning, below expectations and at the lowest level since October 1992.
Consumer confidence is obviously tied to the housing market, which Greenspan says is likely to fall another 10%, bringing the peak-to-trough decline to 25%.
Hopefully Greenspan isn't underestimating the decline -- as he was wont to do while still Fed chairman: The Case/Shiller Index says home prices fell 14.1% in the first quarter, the worst drop in the history of the index, going back to 1988.
Separately, this morning's April new home sales report showed an unexpected 3.3% rise, but that's only after March figures were revised down and April sales remain near a 17-year low.
Monday, May 26, 2008
When there's nothing to do, do absolutely nothing !
The concept of "doing nothing", which is seemingly innocuous but can be highly profitable ! Warren Buffett advises that if there's nothing to do, then just sit on your butt and wait.
This concept is, of course, totally contrary to a trader's mentality where there MUST be action every minute or hour in order to take advantage of price action, usually gleaned from careful studying of charts and indicators.
Most investors cannot resist the urge to constantly buy and sell or to just do something; somehow inactivity makes us feel as though we are not doing enough to earn money from the stock market !
The problem with this feeling (of inactivity) is that it stems partly from how our brains are wired with regards to stereotypes about working hard and earning our keep. At our day jobs (in office), we know we must work hard and be constantly doing something in order to justify our salaries and to let our boss see that we are putting in hard work (so as to earn that big fat bonus or promotion); this ultimately translates into us thinking intuitively that we must always be doing something in order to make ourselves feel that we are getting ahead in life.
When applied to value investing, this is totally contrary as most of the "action" occurs when one thoroughly analyzes a company and makes a decision to buy based on margin of safety.
The rest of the time is just monitoring the company's progress and checking out other companies to invest in - certainly not the most exciting thing to be doing as it does not involve the heart-thumping adrenaline-pumping action of the stock market.
But what actually drives people to be constantly trading or feel that they should be doing something ?
I think this can be attributed to a couple of reasons:-
1) Insufficient research which causes people to jump hurriedly into an investment without doing an objective and rational review of the business. This activity may have started out innocently enough but ended up in disaster should the analysis be faulty.
2) Emotions ruling your mind when you hear of other people making good money; hence you feel you need to jump on the bandwagon too.
3) Thinking you can time and beat the market by always buying low and selling high.All these flawed concepts can make one end up a lot poorer.
Thus, it is always better to exercise caution, patience and good judgement and remember that it is better to do nothing rather than the WRONG thing !
This concept is, of course, totally contrary to a trader's mentality where there MUST be action every minute or hour in order to take advantage of price action, usually gleaned from careful studying of charts and indicators.
Most investors cannot resist the urge to constantly buy and sell or to just do something; somehow inactivity makes us feel as though we are not doing enough to earn money from the stock market !
The problem with this feeling (of inactivity) is that it stems partly from how our brains are wired with regards to stereotypes about working hard and earning our keep. At our day jobs (in office), we know we must work hard and be constantly doing something in order to justify our salaries and to let our boss see that we are putting in hard work (so as to earn that big fat bonus or promotion); this ultimately translates into us thinking intuitively that we must always be doing something in order to make ourselves feel that we are getting ahead in life.
When applied to value investing, this is totally contrary as most of the "action" occurs when one thoroughly analyzes a company and makes a decision to buy based on margin of safety.
The rest of the time is just monitoring the company's progress and checking out other companies to invest in - certainly not the most exciting thing to be doing as it does not involve the heart-thumping adrenaline-pumping action of the stock market.
But what actually drives people to be constantly trading or feel that they should be doing something ?
I think this can be attributed to a couple of reasons:-
1) Insufficient research which causes people to jump hurriedly into an investment without doing an objective and rational review of the business. This activity may have started out innocently enough but ended up in disaster should the analysis be faulty.
2) Emotions ruling your mind when you hear of other people making good money; hence you feel you need to jump on the bandwagon too.
3) Thinking you can time and beat the market by always buying low and selling high.All these flawed concepts can make one end up a lot poorer.
Thus, it is always better to exercise caution, patience and good judgement and remember that it is better to do nothing rather than the WRONG thing !
曾渊沧@股友通讯录-五月份
上一期的通讯，我提出道氏理论（Dow Theory）熊市二期的反弹幅度应该是熊市一期下跌幅度的50%至67%之间。折算起来，海峡时报指数应该反弹至3200 点至3400 点。
结果，海峡时报指数在升破3200 点之后，乏力再上，倒跌了，跌破3200 点，你也许会问，熊市二期是不是已经见顶了？根据道氏理论，海峡时报指数升穿3200 点就已符合了熊市二期反弹的目标之一。
熊市二期的反弹是不是已经完成？得看成交额。如果成交额大，则见顶的机会大。为什么？
因为成交额代表小股民的参于度。成交额大代表小股民已积极回到市场参于炒卖。如果是这样，熊市见顶的机会就很大。
为什么成交额这么重要？
原因是熊市二期反弹的理论基础是：大市在牛市见顶回落时，不是所有的大户都能察觉而套利退场，不少大户也同样地与小股民一起被套牢了。
大户满手蟹货如何松绑？方法之一就是炒高股价，让那些贪心的小股民进场接自己手上的股票。所以，成交额大表示小股民已再度入场，成交额小表示小股民对这个反弹市依然没有信心，不敢入市。
小股民不大举入市，大户如何脱身？大户脱不了身，熊氏二期的反弹就仍未结束，大户仍会寻找机会再将股价炒上。当然，炒上之前，先一上一下的多次将股价舞上舞下，使到小股民不舍得离场。
一旦小股民对股市完全失去信心，大量离场，成交非常低，大户想吸引小股民回到股市得再花许多钱长时间地炒上股价，这得花很多钱。聪明的大户不会这么做，将股价一会儿推高，一会儿推低，就能够吸引一批玩短期炒卖的股民天天守在股市，他们都希望能成功地捕捉每一回合的
升与跌，赚%，甚至1%已很满足。
因此，短期而言，股市应该只是一个上上下下的波动市，幅度约200 点之间。
如果你静观其变，你的身家可能又上又下，但很快又恢复原状。如果你想捕捉短期波幅，低买高卖，则祝你好运。这段时期是考验耐性的时候，就算你想捕捉短期的波幅，也应该有足够的
耐性，等大市下跌150 点才入市。上升150 点则暂时卖掉，不好见升就追，见低就惊慌沽售。
如果你这么做，很经常会天天输钱，左一巴掌右一巴掌打昏你。你一见高就追，一追大市就回跌，一见回跌就怕，卖了，大市又回升。
目前石油价格不断地创新高，但是，记住，这完全是炒卖所致，是一场泡沫。
世界石油并无短缺，因此，参于炒卖有关股票如探油。探油行业的股票风险相当高，熊市期间保守一点比较好，少赚好过亏损。
结果，海峡时报指数在升破3200 点之后，乏力再上，倒跌了，跌破3200 点，你也许会问，熊市二期是不是已经见顶了？根据道氏理论，海峡时报指数升穿3200 点就已符合了熊市二期反弹的目标之一。
熊市二期的反弹是不是已经完成？得看成交额。如果成交额大，则见顶的机会大。为什么？
因为成交额代表小股民的参于度。成交额大代表小股民已积极回到市场参于炒卖。如果是这样，熊市见顶的机会就很大。
为什么成交额这么重要？
原因是熊市二期反弹的理论基础是：大市在牛市见顶回落时，不是所有的大户都能察觉而套利退场，不少大户也同样地与小股民一起被套牢了。
大户满手蟹货如何松绑？方法之一就是炒高股价，让那些贪心的小股民进场接自己手上的股票。所以，成交额大表示小股民已再度入场，成交额小表示小股民对这个反弹市依然没有信心，不敢入市。
小股民不大举入市，大户如何脱身？大户脱不了身，熊氏二期的反弹就仍未结束，大户仍会寻找机会再将股价炒上。当然，炒上之前，先一上一下的多次将股价舞上舞下，使到小股民不舍得离场。
一旦小股民对股市完全失去信心，大量离场，成交非常低，大户想吸引小股民回到股市得再花许多钱长时间地炒上股价，这得花很多钱。聪明的大户不会这么做，将股价一会儿推高，一会儿推低，就能够吸引一批玩短期炒卖的股民天天守在股市，他们都希望能成功地捕捉每一回合的
升与跌，赚%，甚至1%已很满足。
因此，短期而言，股市应该只是一个上上下下的波动市，幅度约200 点之间。
如果你静观其变，你的身家可能又上又下，但很快又恢复原状。如果你想捕捉短期波幅，低买高卖，则祝你好运。这段时期是考验耐性的时候，就算你想捕捉短期的波幅，也应该有足够的
耐性，等大市下跌150 点才入市。上升150 点则暂时卖掉，不好见升就追，见低就惊慌沽售。
如果你这么做，很经常会天天输钱，左一巴掌右一巴掌打昏你。你一见高就追，一追大市就回跌，一见回跌就怕，卖了，大市又回升。
目前石油价格不断地创新高，但是，记住，这完全是炒卖所致，是一场泡沫。
世界石油并无短缺，因此，参于炒卖有关股票如探油。探油行业的股票风险相当高，熊市期间保守一点比较好，少赚好过亏损。
Sunday, May 25, 2008
No more Fedspeak on further interest rate cuts
Sounding a gong couldn't have made it clearer. Federal Reserve officials are putting out the word that further interest rate cuts are unlikely.
Fed Governor Kevin Warsh ditched the central bank's cryptic word tangles and actually waxed poetic. "Even if the economy were to weaken somewhat further, we should be inclined to resist expected, reflexive calls to trot out the hammer again," Warsh said, referring to the Fed's key interest rate.
Speaking more central-bankerly, the Fed's No. 2 official, Vice Chairman Donald Kohn, said the current stance of interest-rate policy "appears to be appropriately calibrated for now." Janet Yellen, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, called the current level of rates "appropriate."
They are amplifying a signal sent by Chairman Ben Bernanke and his colleagues last month that the Fed's most aggressive rate-cutting campaign in two decades may be winding down — finally. The cuts started in September and take months to work their way through the economy.
That does not mean the economy, badly bruised by housing, credit and financial woes, is out of the woods. The Fed, though, is hoping its powerful doses of cuts, along with the government's relief plan of tax rebates and breaks will help lift the economy in the second half of this year.
Zooming prices for energy and food and other commodity prices are raising some concerns that inflation could take off. Further reductions in interest rates would aggravate the situation.
In fact, the Fed's last rate reduction in late April was "a close call," according to recently released documents.
Many economists believe the Fed will hold its key rate steady at 2 percent, a four-year-low, at its next meeting on June 24-25 and probably through much, if not all, of 2008.
Fed Governor Kevin Warsh ditched the central bank's cryptic word tangles and actually waxed poetic. "Even if the economy were to weaken somewhat further, we should be inclined to resist expected, reflexive calls to trot out the hammer again," Warsh said, referring to the Fed's key interest rate.
Speaking more central-bankerly, the Fed's No. 2 official, Vice Chairman Donald Kohn, said the current stance of interest-rate policy "appears to be appropriately calibrated for now." Janet Yellen, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, called the current level of rates "appropriate."
They are amplifying a signal sent by Chairman Ben Bernanke and his colleagues last month that the Fed's most aggressive rate-cutting campaign in two decades may be winding down — finally. The cuts started in September and take months to work their way through the economy.
That does not mean the economy, badly bruised by housing, credit and financial woes, is out of the woods. The Fed, though, is hoping its powerful doses of cuts, along with the government's relief plan of tax rebates and breaks will help lift the economy in the second half of this year.
Zooming prices for energy and food and other commodity prices are raising some concerns that inflation could take off. Further reductions in interest rates would aggravate the situation.
In fact, the Fed's last rate reduction in late April was "a close call," according to recently released documents.
Many economists believe the Fed will hold its key rate steady at 2 percent, a four-year-low, at its next meeting on June 24-25 and probably through much, if not all, of 2008.
Buffett blames banks for credit crisis
Blame for the sub-prime crisis lies at the feet of banks who took too many risks in mortgage lending, U.S. billionaire investor Warren Buffett told newspaper El Pais in an interview published on Sunday.
"The banks exposed themselves too much, they took on too much risk .... It's their fault. There's no need to blame anyone else," he said.
Buffett, dubbed the world's richest person by Forbes magazine, said he believed the situation in financial markets would not deteriorate further.
"I don't think the situation will get worse in financial markets. General conditions in the business world will get worse, but it will only last a while," he said, adding he had no idea when an upturn would come.
Buffett gave the interview on a recent visit to Madrid, as part of a European tour including Switzerland, Germany, Italy and Spain on the look out for new investments.
He said the idea of the trip was to increase awareness amongst European businesses of his holding company Berkshire Hathaway Inc, which holds stakes in businesses ranging from American Express Co to Coca-Cola Co.
He said he wanted business owners to think of him when they were looking to sell.
"We want to buy big companies that earn at least 50 million euros ($78.6 million) before taxes, and there's more of those in Europe than in other parts of the world," he said.
He would not be drawn on what companies in particular he was looking at, other than saying he was not interested in distressed businesses.
"The banks exposed themselves too much, they took on too much risk .... It's their fault. There's no need to blame anyone else," he said.
Buffett, dubbed the world's richest person by Forbes magazine, said he believed the situation in financial markets would not deteriorate further.
"I don't think the situation will get worse in financial markets. General conditions in the business world will get worse, but it will only last a while," he said, adding he had no idea when an upturn would come.
Buffett gave the interview on a recent visit to Madrid, as part of a European tour including Switzerland, Germany, Italy and Spain on the look out for new investments.
He said the idea of the trip was to increase awareness amongst European businesses of his holding company Berkshire Hathaway Inc, which holds stakes in businesses ranging from American Express Co to Coca-Cola Co.
He said he wanted business owners to think of him when they were looking to sell.
"We want to buy big companies that earn at least 50 million euros ($78.6 million) before taxes, and there's more of those in Europe than in other parts of the world," he said.
He would not be drawn on what companies in particular he was looking at, other than saying he was not interested in distressed businesses.
Buffett sees "long, deep" U.S. recession
The United States is already in a recession and it will be longer as well as deeper than many people expect, U.S. investor Warren Buffett said in an interview published in German magazine Der Spiegel on Saturday.
He said the United States was "already in recession" and added: "Perhaps not in the sense that economists would define it" with two consecutive quarters of negative growth.
"But the people are already feeling the effects," said Buffett, the world's richest man. "It will be deeper and last longer than many think."
But he said that won't stop him from investing in selected companies and said he remained interested in well-managed German family-owned companies.
"If the world were falling apart I'd still invest in companies," he said.
Buffett also renewed his criticism of derivatives trading.
"It's not right that hundreds of thousands of jobs are being eliminated, that entire industrial sectors in the real economy are being wiped out by financial bets even though the sectors are actually in good health."
Buffett complained about the lack of effective controls.
"That's the problem," he said. "You can't steer it, you can't regulate it anymore.
You can't get the genie back in the bottle."
He said the United States was "already in recession" and added: "Perhaps not in the sense that economists would define it" with two consecutive quarters of negative growth.
"But the people are already feeling the effects," said Buffett, the world's richest man. "It will be deeper and last longer than many think."
But he said that won't stop him from investing in selected companies and said he remained interested in well-managed German family-owned companies.
"If the world were falling apart I'd still invest in companies," he said.
Buffett also renewed his criticism of derivatives trading.
"It's not right that hundreds of thousands of jobs are being eliminated, that entire industrial sectors in the real economy are being wiped out by financial bets even though the sectors are actually in good health."
Buffett complained about the lack of effective controls.
"That's the problem," he said. "You can't steer it, you can't regulate it anymore.
You can't get the genie back in the bottle."
Thursday, May 22, 2008
How To Make Money In Stocks Part 1: Back to the Basics
An idea for this series of articles (this will probably be a long one) came from a few readers who wrote to me asking about the exact issue described by the title. I thought it might be useful to do a few writeups on some general strategies to employ. No gaurantees of course.
Each of these strategies, like so many other things in life, would work when executed well but might fail when improperly done. Also, they might be mutually conflicting, so it's important to keep an open mind. For example, I can tell you trade aggressively in one article, and to be patient for value to emerge in another article. It can be confusing; the right thing to do often comes from experience and gut instinct, and the worst thing is to be paralysed by confusion like a deer in the headlights. Indeed, what I often do is to mix-and-match, but always keeping an eye on the balance between fundamentals, sentiment and valuation, as well as constantly scouring for alternative better stocks to plough into.
The title is similar to that of William O'Neill's book; however I can think of no other way to name it. I cannot profess to have made copious amounts of money off stocks but a crystallisation of my experiences and philosophies over the years would nonetheless be useful for future reference.It is no coincidence that the first strategy is titled Back To The Basics. So many books have been written on this, that I shall not elaborate on how fundamentals drive share prices, how earnings are all-important, etc etc. Everybody probably knows this to death, thanks to Warren Buffett's real-life example.
But really, everybody knows this, how many people practise this? There are many who simply give up on interpreting the fundamentals and understanding industry dynamics, the demand and supply balance (or lack of), the competition, the company financial specifics ---- and resort to price-volume charts exclusively to predict the future. I have never said charts are completely useless --- after all a perspective of price history and buying interest is given by charts --- but technicals without fundamentals forms an incomplete framework for decision-making.
Understanding the fundamentals is actually not that difficult. If one is prepared to focus on the fundamentals, he can already cut down a lot of time diverted to learning chart-reading, for example. The key thing is making the most of your limited time doing something that really can make a difference to your investing effectiveness. And the key thing to fundamentals is understanding the industry, from upstream to downstream, the entire value chain, and where your particular company lies along the value chain, what chance does it have of maintaining its niche or competitiveness vis-a-vis competitors through good times and bad. Find the one or two indicators that best characterise the company's performance. For example, for palm oil stocks, it will be palm oil prices; for hotels, it will be tourism growth and REVPAR growth (read it up); for upstream oil stocks, it will be oil prices; for refining stocks, it will be refining margins; for shipbuilding stocks, it will be steel prices. If one gets the understanding and the indicators-to-watch part right, he'll be halfway done on the fundamentals aspect already, without having to labour through the financials which should take care of themselves (though it'll be good to analyse them too).
Back to the basics also means an understanding of what a share actually means to the holder. A piece of the business, yes, but the key thing is: what does it actually mean? What good is a share unless it brings one tangible benefits, which means tangible cashflow, which means dividends or other distributions. Going back to basics means understanding the valuation models of a stock, which always stresses dividends or cashflow. Assessing the sustainability and growth potential of this cashflow, together with the willingness of the majority owners to share this with the minority holders, is what investing is all about. Based on this, one can actually already filter down to a useful list of stocks that can commit to growing and paying out good dividends.
The key reason why mastering the basics is so important is that it provides a margin of safety. This is not the margin of safety as defined by Ben Graham; rather, it is the conviction and patience that an understanding of the business imparts to the investor. He can not only be relatively insulated from price volatility so long as he knows the core business is intact, but more importantly, he will know what to look out for if he suspects the price volatility indicates an underlying decay in fundamentals. He can then take active action to track and possibly exit the stock. Forming investment decisions based on price movements without fundamentals understanding is like driving a car watching the traffic ahead of oneself but without a map of the neighbourhood or any idea of his final destination.
The thing about fundamentals is: it can be very difficult to pick up from a standing start. There are many things in life that are difficult to do, and yet worth doing. For a start, read all the IPO prospectuses you can find on various industries for their description of the business and the industry. Read all the business magazines you can get your hands on. Find some books that actually discuss dynamics of various industries (eg. "The Five Rules for Successful Stock Investing"). That would take some dedication but at the end of the day it is something nobody can take away from you, and it becomes your competitive advantage. It is also the reason why I am willing to share so much of my experiences with readers while knowing that it is difficult to replicate all this knowledge in them without them putting a lot of hard work themselves in building up their own mental frameworks.
Each of these strategies, like so many other things in life, would work when executed well but might fail when improperly done. Also, they might be mutually conflicting, so it's important to keep an open mind. For example, I can tell you trade aggressively in one article, and to be patient for value to emerge in another article. It can be confusing; the right thing to do often comes from experience and gut instinct, and the worst thing is to be paralysed by confusion like a deer in the headlights. Indeed, what I often do is to mix-and-match, but always keeping an eye on the balance between fundamentals, sentiment and valuation, as well as constantly scouring for alternative better stocks to plough into.
The title is similar to that of William O'Neill's book; however I can think of no other way to name it. I cannot profess to have made copious amounts of money off stocks but a crystallisation of my experiences and philosophies over the years would nonetheless be useful for future reference.It is no coincidence that the first strategy is titled Back To The Basics. So many books have been written on this, that I shall not elaborate on how fundamentals drive share prices, how earnings are all-important, etc etc. Everybody probably knows this to death, thanks to Warren Buffett's real-life example.
But really, everybody knows this, how many people practise this? There are many who simply give up on interpreting the fundamentals and understanding industry dynamics, the demand and supply balance (or lack of), the competition, the company financial specifics ---- and resort to price-volume charts exclusively to predict the future. I have never said charts are completely useless --- after all a perspective of price history and buying interest is given by charts --- but technicals without fundamentals forms an incomplete framework for decision-making.
Understanding the fundamentals is actually not that difficult. If one is prepared to focus on the fundamentals, he can already cut down a lot of time diverted to learning chart-reading, for example. The key thing is making the most of your limited time doing something that really can make a difference to your investing effectiveness. And the key thing to fundamentals is understanding the industry, from upstream to downstream, the entire value chain, and where your particular company lies along the value chain, what chance does it have of maintaining its niche or competitiveness vis-a-vis competitors through good times and bad. Find the one or two indicators that best characterise the company's performance. For example, for palm oil stocks, it will be palm oil prices; for hotels, it will be tourism growth and REVPAR growth (read it up); for upstream oil stocks, it will be oil prices; for refining stocks, it will be refining margins; for shipbuilding stocks, it will be steel prices. If one gets the understanding and the indicators-to-watch part right, he'll be halfway done on the fundamentals aspect already, without having to labour through the financials which should take care of themselves (though it'll be good to analyse them too).
Back to the basics also means an understanding of what a share actually means to the holder. A piece of the business, yes, but the key thing is: what does it actually mean? What good is a share unless it brings one tangible benefits, which means tangible cashflow, which means dividends or other distributions. Going back to basics means understanding the valuation models of a stock, which always stresses dividends or cashflow. Assessing the sustainability and growth potential of this cashflow, together with the willingness of the majority owners to share this with the minority holders, is what investing is all about. Based on this, one can actually already filter down to a useful list of stocks that can commit to growing and paying out good dividends.
The key reason why mastering the basics is so important is that it provides a margin of safety. This is not the margin of safety as defined by Ben Graham; rather, it is the conviction and patience that an understanding of the business imparts to the investor. He can not only be relatively insulated from price volatility so long as he knows the core business is intact, but more importantly, he will know what to look out for if he suspects the price volatility indicates an underlying decay in fundamentals. He can then take active action to track and possibly exit the stock. Forming investment decisions based on price movements without fundamentals understanding is like driving a car watching the traffic ahead of oneself but without a map of the neighbourhood or any idea of his final destination.
The thing about fundamentals is: it can be very difficult to pick up from a standing start. There are many things in life that are difficult to do, and yet worth doing. For a start, read all the IPO prospectuses you can find on various industries for their description of the business and the industry. Read all the business magazines you can get your hands on. Find some books that actually discuss dynamics of various industries (eg. "The Five Rules for Successful Stock Investing"). That would take some dedication but at the end of the day it is something nobody can take away from you, and it becomes your competitive advantage. It is also the reason why I am willing to share so much of my experiences with readers while knowing that it is difficult to replicate all this knowledge in them without them putting a lot of hard work themselves in building up their own mental frameworks.
How To Make Money In Stocks Part 2: The Time Horizon Premium
There are several premiums that can be reaped which appeal to the investor. A key one among these is the time horizon premium.This is nothing new in the investment world. Those willing to put their money in fixed deposits with long maturities can get better rates than for say, checking accounts. For bonds, typically the yield (interest rate) rises with increasing time maturity. The difference in yields between long and short-term instruments is to compensate investors for having their money committed for longer periods.
There are risks with having excessively long-term horizons. One of these is opportunity cost of better alternative investments. The second is liquidity mismanagement. Some might have become familiar with the structured investment vehicles, or SIVs, that have run into problems recently. These SIVs typically borrow short-term money to invest in long-term bonds and other instruments to take advantage of the higher yields. Now they find that it is difficult to roll over their short-term debt, and hence face the prospect of having to dispose of their long-term investments at firesale prices.
But really, for the individual retail investor like you and me, the need for short-term cashflow circulation should not be an issue as long as we do not incur big obligations (eg. oversized housing loans, margin debt). As long as we do not foresee any need to sell off our stocks at short notice to finance something, what is there to stop us from having a longer investment horizon, or holding period?
Note that this does not equate to a slavish adherence to the "buy-and-hold" philosophy. It does not mean that one can just sleep on his stock over a long period and expect to reap the "patience premium". To do so might entail frustration if the individual fails to monitor the company closely and it subsequently falters. Reaping the time horizon premium is not about laziness.
Rather, it is about an intelligent bet where one sets out deliberately to capture the time horizon premium at the expense of shorter-horizon players who are constrained by the need for short-term liquidity. I have often wondered why risk is defined as price volatility. Surely, day-to-day up-down swings should not be that important for the long-term player, as has been pointed out by Warren Buffett himself. And indeed, it is not important ...... except for the many institutions that need to manage asset-liability risk exposure and therefore cannot afford to see their asset prices swing violently to the point of defying prediction and "risking" the danger of they being forced to sell at the worst point (the price trough) to meet their short-term liability funding needs. These institutions include banks, hedge funds, the abovementioned SIVs and other structured vehicles, and even some pension funds, insurance companies and unit trusts (to meet redemptions). The concept of risk is defined for them, and it is not that relevant for the investor with a long-term horizon (read my article on risk). It is my belief that there really needs to be an alternative definition, but meanwhile let's just profit from it.
As long as one understands the long-term value in a company, then market swings which force short horizon-holders to sell good and bad stocks alike will produce the best opportunities for reaping this time horizon premium. In this kind of situations, the investor should be patient in holding, since he can afford to do so without need for immediate return. This, I believe, is essentially what Buffett means by "buy-and-hold" and his Mr Market analogies. The key thing to note about this strategy is that unlike bonds or fixed-deposits, there are no clear contractual promises about reaping this time premium: that is why it is important to monitor the investment consistently.
There are risks with having excessively long-term horizons. One of these is opportunity cost of better alternative investments. The second is liquidity mismanagement. Some might have become familiar with the structured investment vehicles, or SIVs, that have run into problems recently. These SIVs typically borrow short-term money to invest in long-term bonds and other instruments to take advantage of the higher yields. Now they find that it is difficult to roll over their short-term debt, and hence face the prospect of having to dispose of their long-term investments at firesale prices.
But really, for the individual retail investor like you and me, the need for short-term cashflow circulation should not be an issue as long as we do not incur big obligations (eg. oversized housing loans, margin debt). As long as we do not foresee any need to sell off our stocks at short notice to finance something, what is there to stop us from having a longer investment horizon, or holding period?
Note that this does not equate to a slavish adherence to the "buy-and-hold" philosophy. It does not mean that one can just sleep on his stock over a long period and expect to reap the "patience premium". To do so might entail frustration if the individual fails to monitor the company closely and it subsequently falters. Reaping the time horizon premium is not about laziness.
Rather, it is about an intelligent bet where one sets out deliberately to capture the time horizon premium at the expense of shorter-horizon players who are constrained by the need for short-term liquidity. I have often wondered why risk is defined as price volatility. Surely, day-to-day up-down swings should not be that important for the long-term player, as has been pointed out by Warren Buffett himself. And indeed, it is not important ...... except for the many institutions that need to manage asset-liability risk exposure and therefore cannot afford to see their asset prices swing violently to the point of defying prediction and "risking" the danger of they being forced to sell at the worst point (the price trough) to meet their short-term liability funding needs. These institutions include banks, hedge funds, the abovementioned SIVs and other structured vehicles, and even some pension funds, insurance companies and unit trusts (to meet redemptions). The concept of risk is defined for them, and it is not that relevant for the investor with a long-term horizon (read my article on risk). It is my belief that there really needs to be an alternative definition, but meanwhile let's just profit from it.
As long as one understands the long-term value in a company, then market swings which force short horizon-holders to sell good and bad stocks alike will produce the best opportunities for reaping this time horizon premium. In this kind of situations, the investor should be patient in holding, since he can afford to do so without need for immediate return. This, I believe, is essentially what Buffett means by "buy-and-hold" and his Mr Market analogies. The key thing to note about this strategy is that unlike bonds or fixed-deposits, there are no clear contractual promises about reaping this time premium: that is why it is important to monitor the investment consistently.
How To Make Money In Stocks Part 3: The Illiquidity Premium
There is a premium for illiquidity that can be reaped and should be priced into a thinly-traded stock. This is acknowledged both qualitatively and quantitatively even by academic valuation theory, but common sense will suffice, actually.
For a stock that nobody is really interested in, for one reason or another --- even though it does have a certain intrinsic value --- the tendency is for the stock to sink under its own weight below intrinsic value.
Firstly, there is unlikely to attract any speculative elements --- hence little overshooting above value; secondly, even institutions tend not to like these stocks because of the fact that they need good daily trading volume so that they can sell without too much market impact should a cash call arise; thirdly, many investors shun these stocks because of opportunity cost of holding; fourthly, many retail investors simply don't know much about these illiquid stocks because brokerages do not provide research on them. Clearly, there is an opportunity for the diligent individual here.
The opportunity arises because the individual's intended appetite is small, which facilitates entry and exit without too much market impact. He avoids initial overvaluation because of limited speculation in the stock. If he is willing to research into these companies, he can find hidden opportunities in a truly inefficient segment of the market. And because he has done research, he can hold with conviction and not be too bothered by persistent thoughts of opportunity costs. This is the essence of reaping the illiquidity premium.
The premium is the difference between the intrinsic value of the stock and its market price which is likely to be substantially lower. If things go well, and the market wakes up to the stock's possibilities due to say, a strong dividend or some new developments as a catalyst, the illiquidity premium is the first to be reaped. Then follows brokerage reports which excite the market and introduce institutional interest and then speculative elements, with PE revaluation on top of optimistic forward earnings projections. One may view the illiquidity premium as the margin of safety for the stock so that even if all the above does not materialise, there is still a buffer between buy-in price and intrinsic value that protects downside to an extent.
This is somewhat allied to the time horizon premium earlier mentioned, for one especially needs to have a long investment horizon to reap good rewards off illiquid stocks. It is important to do some in-depth research and to have a sense of value to unearth the correct illiquid stocks to invest in.
Personally, I've had good experiences with illiquid stocks (before they became liquid): stocks like Boustead, Easycall (now China Education), Hiap Seng, Heeton, OKP, MTQ. Even when the illiquidity premium does not manifest, the losses are minimal: stocks like Tsit Wing, Bonvests, Pertama, for example. Some of these I will relate in my Investing Journey series another day.
Another situation where this illiquidity might reward boldness: when there is market-wide illiquidity, characterised by low trading volumes and often large bid-ask spreads for many stocks. That, of course, means there is marketwide uncertainty, and the market can be illiquid for an extended period of time as it resolves the uncertainty --- which means again, there is illiquidity premium to be reaped.
Another way of seeing this is that the investor is rewarded for supplying much-needed liquidity to the market. Sir John Templeton has a nice saying that he would like to be a philanthropist in the market and always provide other people with what they need in earnest. That is, to be a buyer when others are desperately selling and a seller when others are greedy searching for stocks to buy. There is no better way to describe the illiquidity premium than that.
For a stock that nobody is really interested in, for one reason or another --- even though it does have a certain intrinsic value --- the tendency is for the stock to sink under its own weight below intrinsic value.
Firstly, there is unlikely to attract any speculative elements --- hence little overshooting above value; secondly, even institutions tend not to like these stocks because of the fact that they need good daily trading volume so that they can sell without too much market impact should a cash call arise; thirdly, many investors shun these stocks because of opportunity cost of holding; fourthly, many retail investors simply don't know much about these illiquid stocks because brokerages do not provide research on them. Clearly, there is an opportunity for the diligent individual here.
The opportunity arises because the individual's intended appetite is small, which facilitates entry and exit without too much market impact. He avoids initial overvaluation because of limited speculation in the stock. If he is willing to research into these companies, he can find hidden opportunities in a truly inefficient segment of the market. And because he has done research, he can hold with conviction and not be too bothered by persistent thoughts of opportunity costs. This is the essence of reaping the illiquidity premium.
The premium is the difference between the intrinsic value of the stock and its market price which is likely to be substantially lower. If things go well, and the market wakes up to the stock's possibilities due to say, a strong dividend or some new developments as a catalyst, the illiquidity premium is the first to be reaped. Then follows brokerage reports which excite the market and introduce institutional interest and then speculative elements, with PE revaluation on top of optimistic forward earnings projections. One may view the illiquidity premium as the margin of safety for the stock so that even if all the above does not materialise, there is still a buffer between buy-in price and intrinsic value that protects downside to an extent.
This is somewhat allied to the time horizon premium earlier mentioned, for one especially needs to have a long investment horizon to reap good rewards off illiquid stocks. It is important to do some in-depth research and to have a sense of value to unearth the correct illiquid stocks to invest in.
Personally, I've had good experiences with illiquid stocks (before they became liquid): stocks like Boustead, Easycall (now China Education), Hiap Seng, Heeton, OKP, MTQ. Even when the illiquidity premium does not manifest, the losses are minimal: stocks like Tsit Wing, Bonvests, Pertama, for example. Some of these I will relate in my Investing Journey series another day.
Another situation where this illiquidity might reward boldness: when there is market-wide illiquidity, characterised by low trading volumes and often large bid-ask spreads for many stocks. That, of course, means there is marketwide uncertainty, and the market can be illiquid for an extended period of time as it resolves the uncertainty --- which means again, there is illiquidity premium to be reaped.
Another way of seeing this is that the investor is rewarded for supplying much-needed liquidity to the market. Sir John Templeton has a nice saying that he would like to be a philanthropist in the market and always provide other people with what they need in earnest. That is, to be a buyer when others are desperately selling and a seller when others are greedy searching for stocks to buy. There is no better way to describe the illiquidity premium than that.
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