An idea for this series of articles (this will probably be a long one) came from a few readers who wrote to me asking about the exact issue described by the title. I thought it might be useful to do a few writeups on some general strategies to employ. No gaurantees of course.
Each of these strategies, like so many other things in life, would work when executed well but might fail when improperly done. Also, they might be mutually conflicting, so it's important to keep an open mind. For example, I can tell you trade aggressively in one article, and to be patient for value to emerge in another article. It can be confusing; the right thing to do often comes from experience and gut instinct, and the worst thing is to be paralysed by confusion like a deer in the headlights. Indeed, what I often do is to mix-and-match, but always keeping an eye on the balance between fundamentals, sentiment and valuation, as well as constantly scouring for alternative better stocks to plough into.
The title is similar to that of William O'Neill's book; however I can think of no other way to name it. I cannot profess to have made copious amounts of money off stocks but a crystallisation of my experiences and philosophies over the years would nonetheless be useful for future reference.It is no coincidence that the first strategy is titled Back To The Basics. So many books have been written on this, that I shall not elaborate on how fundamentals drive share prices, how earnings are all-important, etc etc. Everybody probably knows this to death, thanks to Warren Buffett's real-life example.
But really, everybody knows this, how many people practise this? There are many who simply give up on interpreting the fundamentals and understanding industry dynamics, the demand and supply balance (or lack of), the competition, the company financial specifics ---- and resort to price-volume charts exclusively to predict the future. I have never said charts are completely useless --- after all a perspective of price history and buying interest is given by charts --- but technicals without fundamentals forms an incomplete framework for decision-making.
Understanding the fundamentals is actually not that difficult. If one is prepared to focus on the fundamentals, he can already cut down a lot of time diverted to learning chart-reading, for example. The key thing is making the most of your limited time doing something that really can make a difference to your investing effectiveness. And the key thing to fundamentals is understanding the industry, from upstream to downstream, the entire value chain, and where your particular company lies along the value chain, what chance does it have of maintaining its niche or competitiveness vis-a-vis competitors through good times and bad. Find the one or two indicators that best characterise the company's performance. For example, for palm oil stocks, it will be palm oil prices; for hotels, it will be tourism growth and REVPAR growth (read it up); for upstream oil stocks, it will be oil prices; for refining stocks, it will be refining margins; for shipbuilding stocks, it will be steel prices. If one gets the understanding and the indicators-to-watch part right, he'll be halfway done on the fundamentals aspect already, without having to labour through the financials which should take care of themselves (though it'll be good to analyse them too).
Back to the basics also means an understanding of what a share actually means to the holder. A piece of the business, yes, but the key thing is: what does it actually mean? What good is a share unless it brings one tangible benefits, which means tangible cashflow, which means dividends or other distributions. Going back to basics means understanding the valuation models of a stock, which always stresses dividends or cashflow. Assessing the sustainability and growth potential of this cashflow, together with the willingness of the majority owners to share this with the minority holders, is what investing is all about. Based on this, one can actually already filter down to a useful list of stocks that can commit to growing and paying out good dividends.
The key reason why mastering the basics is so important is that it provides a margin of safety. This is not the margin of safety as defined by Ben Graham; rather, it is the conviction and patience that an understanding of the business imparts to the investor. He can not only be relatively insulated from price volatility so long as he knows the core business is intact, but more importantly, he will know what to look out for if he suspects the price volatility indicates an underlying decay in fundamentals. He can then take active action to track and possibly exit the stock. Forming investment decisions based on price movements without fundamentals understanding is like driving a car watching the traffic ahead of oneself but without a map of the neighbourhood or any idea of his final destination.
The thing about fundamentals is: it can be very difficult to pick up from a standing start. There are many things in life that are difficult to do, and yet worth doing. For a start, read all the IPO prospectuses you can find on various industries for their description of the business and the industry. Read all the business magazines you can get your hands on. Find some books that actually discuss dynamics of various industries (eg. "The Five Rules for Successful Stock Investing"). That would take some dedication but at the end of the day it is something nobody can take away from you, and it becomes your competitive advantage. It is also the reason why I am willing to share so much of my experiences with readers while knowing that it is difficult to replicate all this knowledge in them without them putting a lot of hard work themselves in building up their own mental frameworks.
Thursday, May 22, 2008
How To Make Money In Stocks Part 2: The Time Horizon Premium
There are several premiums that can be reaped which appeal to the investor. A key one among these is the time horizon premium.This is nothing new in the investment world. Those willing to put their money in fixed deposits with long maturities can get better rates than for say, checking accounts. For bonds, typically the yield (interest rate) rises with increasing time maturity. The difference in yields between long and short-term instruments is to compensate investors for having their money committed for longer periods.
There are risks with having excessively long-term horizons. One of these is opportunity cost of better alternative investments. The second is liquidity mismanagement. Some might have become familiar with the structured investment vehicles, or SIVs, that have run into problems recently. These SIVs typically borrow short-term money to invest in long-term bonds and other instruments to take advantage of the higher yields. Now they find that it is difficult to roll over their short-term debt, and hence face the prospect of having to dispose of their long-term investments at firesale prices.
But really, for the individual retail investor like you and me, the need for short-term cashflow circulation should not be an issue as long as we do not incur big obligations (eg. oversized housing loans, margin debt). As long as we do not foresee any need to sell off our stocks at short notice to finance something, what is there to stop us from having a longer investment horizon, or holding period?
Note that this does not equate to a slavish adherence to the "buy-and-hold" philosophy. It does not mean that one can just sleep on his stock over a long period and expect to reap the "patience premium". To do so might entail frustration if the individual fails to monitor the company closely and it subsequently falters. Reaping the time horizon premium is not about laziness.
Rather, it is about an intelligent bet where one sets out deliberately to capture the time horizon premium at the expense of shorter-horizon players who are constrained by the need for short-term liquidity. I have often wondered why risk is defined as price volatility. Surely, day-to-day up-down swings should not be that important for the long-term player, as has been pointed out by Warren Buffett himself. And indeed, it is not important ...... except for the many institutions that need to manage asset-liability risk exposure and therefore cannot afford to see their asset prices swing violently to the point of defying prediction and "risking" the danger of they being forced to sell at the worst point (the price trough) to meet their short-term liability funding needs. These institutions include banks, hedge funds, the abovementioned SIVs and other structured vehicles, and even some pension funds, insurance companies and unit trusts (to meet redemptions). The concept of risk is defined for them, and it is not that relevant for the investor with a long-term horizon (read my article on risk). It is my belief that there really needs to be an alternative definition, but meanwhile let's just profit from it.
As long as one understands the long-term value in a company, then market swings which force short horizon-holders to sell good and bad stocks alike will produce the best opportunities for reaping this time horizon premium. In this kind of situations, the investor should be patient in holding, since he can afford to do so without need for immediate return. This, I believe, is essentially what Buffett means by "buy-and-hold" and his Mr Market analogies. The key thing to note about this strategy is that unlike bonds or fixed-deposits, there are no clear contractual promises about reaping this time premium: that is why it is important to monitor the investment consistently.
There are risks with having excessively long-term horizons. One of these is opportunity cost of better alternative investments. The second is liquidity mismanagement. Some might have become familiar with the structured investment vehicles, or SIVs, that have run into problems recently. These SIVs typically borrow short-term money to invest in long-term bonds and other instruments to take advantage of the higher yields. Now they find that it is difficult to roll over their short-term debt, and hence face the prospect of having to dispose of their long-term investments at firesale prices.
But really, for the individual retail investor like you and me, the need for short-term cashflow circulation should not be an issue as long as we do not incur big obligations (eg. oversized housing loans, margin debt). As long as we do not foresee any need to sell off our stocks at short notice to finance something, what is there to stop us from having a longer investment horizon, or holding period?
Note that this does not equate to a slavish adherence to the "buy-and-hold" philosophy. It does not mean that one can just sleep on his stock over a long period and expect to reap the "patience premium". To do so might entail frustration if the individual fails to monitor the company closely and it subsequently falters. Reaping the time horizon premium is not about laziness.
Rather, it is about an intelligent bet where one sets out deliberately to capture the time horizon premium at the expense of shorter-horizon players who are constrained by the need for short-term liquidity. I have often wondered why risk is defined as price volatility. Surely, day-to-day up-down swings should not be that important for the long-term player, as has been pointed out by Warren Buffett himself. And indeed, it is not important ...... except for the many institutions that need to manage asset-liability risk exposure and therefore cannot afford to see their asset prices swing violently to the point of defying prediction and "risking" the danger of they being forced to sell at the worst point (the price trough) to meet their short-term liability funding needs. These institutions include banks, hedge funds, the abovementioned SIVs and other structured vehicles, and even some pension funds, insurance companies and unit trusts (to meet redemptions). The concept of risk is defined for them, and it is not that relevant for the investor with a long-term horizon (read my article on risk). It is my belief that there really needs to be an alternative definition, but meanwhile let's just profit from it.
As long as one understands the long-term value in a company, then market swings which force short horizon-holders to sell good and bad stocks alike will produce the best opportunities for reaping this time horizon premium. In this kind of situations, the investor should be patient in holding, since he can afford to do so without need for immediate return. This, I believe, is essentially what Buffett means by "buy-and-hold" and his Mr Market analogies. The key thing to note about this strategy is that unlike bonds or fixed-deposits, there are no clear contractual promises about reaping this time premium: that is why it is important to monitor the investment consistently.
How To Make Money In Stocks Part 3: The Illiquidity Premium
There is a premium for illiquidity that can be reaped and should be priced into a thinly-traded stock. This is acknowledged both qualitatively and quantitatively even by academic valuation theory, but common sense will suffice, actually.
For a stock that nobody is really interested in, for one reason or another --- even though it does have a certain intrinsic value --- the tendency is for the stock to sink under its own weight below intrinsic value.
Firstly, there is unlikely to attract any speculative elements --- hence little overshooting above value; secondly, even institutions tend not to like these stocks because of the fact that they need good daily trading volume so that they can sell without too much market impact should a cash call arise; thirdly, many investors shun these stocks because of opportunity cost of holding; fourthly, many retail investors simply don't know much about these illiquid stocks because brokerages do not provide research on them. Clearly, there is an opportunity for the diligent individual here.
The opportunity arises because the individual's intended appetite is small, which facilitates entry and exit without too much market impact. He avoids initial overvaluation because of limited speculation in the stock. If he is willing to research into these companies, he can find hidden opportunities in a truly inefficient segment of the market. And because he has done research, he can hold with conviction and not be too bothered by persistent thoughts of opportunity costs. This is the essence of reaping the illiquidity premium.
The premium is the difference between the intrinsic value of the stock and its market price which is likely to be substantially lower. If things go well, and the market wakes up to the stock's possibilities due to say, a strong dividend or some new developments as a catalyst, the illiquidity premium is the first to be reaped. Then follows brokerage reports which excite the market and introduce institutional interest and then speculative elements, with PE revaluation on top of optimistic forward earnings projections. One may view the illiquidity premium as the margin of safety for the stock so that even if all the above does not materialise, there is still a buffer between buy-in price and intrinsic value that protects downside to an extent.
This is somewhat allied to the time horizon premium earlier mentioned, for one especially needs to have a long investment horizon to reap good rewards off illiquid stocks. It is important to do some in-depth research and to have a sense of value to unearth the correct illiquid stocks to invest in.
Personally, I've had good experiences with illiquid stocks (before they became liquid): stocks like Boustead, Easycall (now China Education), Hiap Seng, Heeton, OKP, MTQ. Even when the illiquidity premium does not manifest, the losses are minimal: stocks like Tsit Wing, Bonvests, Pertama, for example. Some of these I will relate in my Investing Journey series another day.
Another situation where this illiquidity might reward boldness: when there is market-wide illiquidity, characterised by low trading volumes and often large bid-ask spreads for many stocks. That, of course, means there is marketwide uncertainty, and the market can be illiquid for an extended period of time as it resolves the uncertainty --- which means again, there is illiquidity premium to be reaped.
Another way of seeing this is that the investor is rewarded for supplying much-needed liquidity to the market. Sir John Templeton has a nice saying that he would like to be a philanthropist in the market and always provide other people with what they need in earnest. That is, to be a buyer when others are desperately selling and a seller when others are greedy searching for stocks to buy. There is no better way to describe the illiquidity premium than that.
For a stock that nobody is really interested in, for one reason or another --- even though it does have a certain intrinsic value --- the tendency is for the stock to sink under its own weight below intrinsic value.
Firstly, there is unlikely to attract any speculative elements --- hence little overshooting above value; secondly, even institutions tend not to like these stocks because of the fact that they need good daily trading volume so that they can sell without too much market impact should a cash call arise; thirdly, many investors shun these stocks because of opportunity cost of holding; fourthly, many retail investors simply don't know much about these illiquid stocks because brokerages do not provide research on them. Clearly, there is an opportunity for the diligent individual here.
The opportunity arises because the individual's intended appetite is small, which facilitates entry and exit without too much market impact. He avoids initial overvaluation because of limited speculation in the stock. If he is willing to research into these companies, he can find hidden opportunities in a truly inefficient segment of the market. And because he has done research, he can hold with conviction and not be too bothered by persistent thoughts of opportunity costs. This is the essence of reaping the illiquidity premium.
The premium is the difference between the intrinsic value of the stock and its market price which is likely to be substantially lower. If things go well, and the market wakes up to the stock's possibilities due to say, a strong dividend or some new developments as a catalyst, the illiquidity premium is the first to be reaped. Then follows brokerage reports which excite the market and introduce institutional interest and then speculative elements, with PE revaluation on top of optimistic forward earnings projections. One may view the illiquidity premium as the margin of safety for the stock so that even if all the above does not materialise, there is still a buffer between buy-in price and intrinsic value that protects downside to an extent.
This is somewhat allied to the time horizon premium earlier mentioned, for one especially needs to have a long investment horizon to reap good rewards off illiquid stocks. It is important to do some in-depth research and to have a sense of value to unearth the correct illiquid stocks to invest in.
Personally, I've had good experiences with illiquid stocks (before they became liquid): stocks like Boustead, Easycall (now China Education), Hiap Seng, Heeton, OKP, MTQ. Even when the illiquidity premium does not manifest, the losses are minimal: stocks like Tsit Wing, Bonvests, Pertama, for example. Some of these I will relate in my Investing Journey series another day.
Another situation where this illiquidity might reward boldness: when there is market-wide illiquidity, characterised by low trading volumes and often large bid-ask spreads for many stocks. That, of course, means there is marketwide uncertainty, and the market can be illiquid for an extended period of time as it resolves the uncertainty --- which means again, there is illiquidity premium to be reaped.
Another way of seeing this is that the investor is rewarded for supplying much-needed liquidity to the market. Sir John Templeton has a nice saying that he would like to be a philanthropist in the market and always provide other people with what they need in earnest. That is, to be a buyer when others are desperately selling and a seller when others are greedy searching for stocks to buy. There is no better way to describe the illiquidity premium than that.
How To Make Money In Stocks Part 4: Keeping It Simple
"Complexity is not a cause of confusion. It is a result of it." This is a saying by Anonymous, the best I could find and the best reflection of my views. In the wake of the subprime crisis that all unanimously agree has arisen from the quantitative complexities of derivatives like CDOs and CDO-squared that baffle CEOs from proper risk management, mesmerise institional funds into blindly buying, and confuse regulators into despairing acquiescence, I think many more people would start to appreciate the beauty of simplicity. Or was that last 55-word sentence a bit hard to swallow as well?
The pinnacle of achieving simplicity will be the ability to reduce stock market behaviour and strategies to a series of equations that can be consistently applied to make money, but as I understand no academic has been able to achieve it yet (though nobody who's done it would really want to make it public). But in the absence of such a Unified Theory of the Global Stock Market, it'll be good to develop a few mental frameworks to facilitate one's assessment of the overall market and the various sectors and how they will develop in the foreseaable future: a sort of guide on the direction of change, since absolute valuation is obviously not viable. In short, develop a framework to integrate various fundamental developments and then translate them into a sector- and stock-picking strategy that will best ride on your simplified reading of the future.
The idea of simplicity ties in with my views on mental focus. Without reducing the everyday noise to a series of indicators to focus on, decision-making can be fragmented and lack conviction. In fact, everyone can have different frameworks for decision-making (which is why I shall not try to impose any of mine here) and still succeed because there're so many roads to Rome ie. so many different ways of making money in the stock market.
I was reading a book on trend-following where traders like John W. Henry and Richard Dennis basically used one simple decision-making tool to trade: the price. Their belief is that the price reflects the public and hidden fundamentals. It is deceptively simple and yet they make great money because they understand the risks of this framework, and cut loss promptly when wrong. This is an example of one-reason decision-making (they just need a single piece of information for making a decision); the academic term is "fast and frugal heuristics", where one employs a minimum of time, knowledge and information to make adaptive choices in real environments. This is an example of simplicity at its barest bones.What I plan to write on more in this article is actually what NOT to do. I believe that if one learns to avoid the bad things, the good stuff will naturally come (that's partly the reason for my HotStocksNot blog).
Many people tend to venture into areas where retail investors with shallow pockets face no competitive strengths, partly out of curiosity, and for the more enterprising --- out of desire for more knowledge and to maximise profits. But it is easy to entangle oneself in complexities that favour more well-equipped professionals, and diworsify one's mental focus. My "one-audience" view is that therefore, it's best to avoid when in doubt, though there might be exceptions.
Below are some of these "complicating" ventures that can prove stumbling-blocks:
1) Foreign markets. It is tempting to buy overseas stocks, especially the temptation to associate oneself with the brand names that one hears about all the time (say, Apple). But one is most likely to buy into the liquid overseas stocks where there is no discovery premium and potential gains are likely to be compressed (efficient market), simply because he has limited research facilities on these overseas stocks as well as probably high trading costs. There are a myriad of other issues, such as the fact that domestic investors are likely to be more protected in times of trouble. So, what for? Outsource it to professional unit trusts, with research facilities and administrative clout, in this aspect.
2) Derivative instruments. They are highly quantitative, and more than once have surprised punters with their behaviour (eg. puts that go down when markets drop). Their time decay aspects are often overlooked as people often only look at the underlying asset aspect, with the result that one can often be fundamentally correct on the underlying asset while still losing money due to unfavourable short-term movements. It is an example of layering complexity on complexity: one needs to be sure about the underlying asset short-term characteristics, and then be sure of the derivative pricing quantitatives.
3) Leverage. Use it sparingly and only when you have strong conviction and strict cut-loss rules. If you feel your competitive strength is in understanding the true long-term strength of the company, why complicate it by applying leverage and implictly betting that (a) this long-term strength will be recognised in the short-term and (b) your buy-in timing is spot-on and that the stock will not do a correction before reversing back upward?
4) Short-selling. This stems from a desire to take advantage of market downtrend ie. to continue to make consistent profits even as the market turns. In other words, it has a tendency to stem from greed. Again, leverage is involved, and one needs to understand the calculation of margin. For short-selling, if the position moves against you, it can be a double hit on the margin because numerator (equity) declines while denominator (total asset market value) rises (as opposed to buying on margin where while numerator declines, denominator will also decline). Always understand the risks and work out the possibilities.
Within the Singapore stock market and within the simple buy-and-sell approach, there are already so many possibilites. Why make life more complicated? Those seeking to "learn new things" should go back to school. Those looking to generate new conversation topics (by taking up new instruments) should attend cooking classes. Those looking for excitement should wait for the casinos to open.
The pinnacle of achieving simplicity will be the ability to reduce stock market behaviour and strategies to a series of equations that can be consistently applied to make money, but as I understand no academic has been able to achieve it yet (though nobody who's done it would really want to make it public). But in the absence of such a Unified Theory of the Global Stock Market, it'll be good to develop a few mental frameworks to facilitate one's assessment of the overall market and the various sectors and how they will develop in the foreseaable future: a sort of guide on the direction of change, since absolute valuation is obviously not viable. In short, develop a framework to integrate various fundamental developments and then translate them into a sector- and stock-picking strategy that will best ride on your simplified reading of the future.
The idea of simplicity ties in with my views on mental focus. Without reducing the everyday noise to a series of indicators to focus on, decision-making can be fragmented and lack conviction. In fact, everyone can have different frameworks for decision-making (which is why I shall not try to impose any of mine here) and still succeed because there're so many roads to Rome ie. so many different ways of making money in the stock market.
I was reading a book on trend-following where traders like John W. Henry and Richard Dennis basically used one simple decision-making tool to trade: the price. Their belief is that the price reflects the public and hidden fundamentals. It is deceptively simple and yet they make great money because they understand the risks of this framework, and cut loss promptly when wrong. This is an example of one-reason decision-making (they just need a single piece of information for making a decision); the academic term is "fast and frugal heuristics", where one employs a minimum of time, knowledge and information to make adaptive choices in real environments. This is an example of simplicity at its barest bones.What I plan to write on more in this article is actually what NOT to do. I believe that if one learns to avoid the bad things, the good stuff will naturally come (that's partly the reason for my HotStocksNot blog).
Many people tend to venture into areas where retail investors with shallow pockets face no competitive strengths, partly out of curiosity, and for the more enterprising --- out of desire for more knowledge and to maximise profits. But it is easy to entangle oneself in complexities that favour more well-equipped professionals, and diworsify one's mental focus. My "one-audience" view is that therefore, it's best to avoid when in doubt, though there might be exceptions.
Below are some of these "complicating" ventures that can prove stumbling-blocks:
1) Foreign markets. It is tempting to buy overseas stocks, especially the temptation to associate oneself with the brand names that one hears about all the time (say, Apple). But one is most likely to buy into the liquid overseas stocks where there is no discovery premium and potential gains are likely to be compressed (efficient market), simply because he has limited research facilities on these overseas stocks as well as probably high trading costs. There are a myriad of other issues, such as the fact that domestic investors are likely to be more protected in times of trouble. So, what for? Outsource it to professional unit trusts, with research facilities and administrative clout, in this aspect.
2) Derivative instruments. They are highly quantitative, and more than once have surprised punters with their behaviour (eg. puts that go down when markets drop). Their time decay aspects are often overlooked as people often only look at the underlying asset aspect, with the result that one can often be fundamentally correct on the underlying asset while still losing money due to unfavourable short-term movements. It is an example of layering complexity on complexity: one needs to be sure about the underlying asset short-term characteristics, and then be sure of the derivative pricing quantitatives.
3) Leverage. Use it sparingly and only when you have strong conviction and strict cut-loss rules. If you feel your competitive strength is in understanding the true long-term strength of the company, why complicate it by applying leverage and implictly betting that (a) this long-term strength will be recognised in the short-term and (b) your buy-in timing is spot-on and that the stock will not do a correction before reversing back upward?
4) Short-selling. This stems from a desire to take advantage of market downtrend ie. to continue to make consistent profits even as the market turns. In other words, it has a tendency to stem from greed. Again, leverage is involved, and one needs to understand the calculation of margin. For short-selling, if the position moves against you, it can be a double hit on the margin because numerator (equity) declines while denominator (total asset market value) rises (as opposed to buying on margin where while numerator declines, denominator will also decline). Always understand the risks and work out the possibilities.
Within the Singapore stock market and within the simple buy-and-sell approach, there are already so many possibilites. Why make life more complicated? Those seeking to "learn new things" should go back to school. Those looking to generate new conversation topics (by taking up new instruments) should attend cooking classes. Those looking for excitement should wait for the casinos to open.
How To Make Money In Stocks Part 5: Learning to sell
It is my belief that if the retail investor does his research properly and bases his buying decisions on long-term business fundamentals coupled with a reasonable valuation, his downside is limited and he can expect the stock to eventually rise, whether on market realisation of the business potential, or on the margins hitting a sweet spot of the business cycle, or on management/fund buyouts reflecting insider/institutional awareness of the intrinsic value of the business.
The key word is "eventually", because the time the investor has to wait for the stock to rise is unknown. But my point remains --- the patient investor will eventually see the stock gain some buying interest.
When that happens, another aspect of time becomes important for the investor: how long will the stock enjoy its place in the sun? Will it be just a short pump-and-dump operation by the big holders, or could the stock become one of those rare Cinderella stories and live happily forever?
There is a new branch of finance, known as behavioural finance, which essentially recognises the "humanness" of market participants that adversely affects their decision-making (as opposed to standard finance that assumes a "rational" investor).
Behavioural finance sheds some light on human tendencies when faced with the above scenario. People tend to be overly-optimistic and have a fear of regret (ie. the stock soars after they sell) which leads them to hold rather than make any active decision to sell.
Hence, it is important to be aware of our own human nature and to consciously lean against its biases. In the case of what action to take when a particular stock holding rises substantially, sometimes it's better to let the profits run, sometimes it's better to lock in the profits, again there is no fixed rule, but it is my experience that selling is the most difficult thing to do for many people --- which is why patient investors might not make money in the end. Therefore an element of selling discipline is important to lock in the profits when they arise.
There are several other key factors why learning to sell is important, besides the abovementioned psychological bias.
Firstly, fundamental cyclical effects. This is a real danger of holding on too long to a stock that has risen substantially, and is particularly relevant for cyclical stocks like shipping, property, commodities, technology ...... or indeed in most sectors where product demand is discretionary and pricing is commodity-like (ie. the business is a price-taker rather than price-setter). Where profitability is highly dependent on industry prices which are in turn determined by demand-supply dynamics, the entire sector can come in for strong market attention when the pieces come into place at a particular part of the business cycle eg. technology at the early stages of recovery when inventory is low, production capacity is thin and consumer demand is growing at an increasing rate. The stock surges in response. But as manufacturers ramp up capacity and squeeze the margins, the product ASPs (average selling prices) can quickly fall even as raw material prices rise. If one misses selling at the sweet spot, he can be stuck for ages when the stock normalises. This is because capacity, once increased, is difficult to reduce until there is painful industry restructuring where smaller players exit ie. when losses become too hard to tolerate. The problem is that the level of tolerance of many business owners is very high.The second main issue is market liquidity. How many times have we seen this: stock A, previously illiquid, gains some market attention on initiation of broker coverage (perhaps because the company is placing out new shares). The stock rises on optimism about the strength of its prospects, and fundamental investors accumulate. As volume picks up, the stock breaks past all resistances, attracting technical traders. The momentum carries it on day after day. Then it peaks, strangely on a day when good news came out and the stock failed to react. Classic "buy on rumour, sell on news". The stock retraces all the way back to where it came from, and liquidity dries away leaving the stock to the effects of gravity. And soon it becomes anonymous again as a new wave of market favourites take over. The loss of market liquidity, sometimes unrelated to intrinsic fundamentals but nearly always linked to sudden market-wide realisation of expensive valuations plus withdrawal of strong-hand support, is another reversion-to-mean effect that is often difficult to reverse and exacts high opportunity cost for the late-to-sell investor.
The devastating psychological effects on the investor should he endure an up-down cycle without anything to show for it cannot be ignored either. Those who have experienced it will know what I mean. Failing to sell at the peak, he will find it harder to sell at 10% down, even harder to sell at 20% down and hence arises the terrible situation where the more the stock drops, the more unlikely the investor will sell. That is because he had already mentally anchored his wealth at the peak of the stock's valuation. It is important not to let this happen too often, because it can eat into one's confidence and affect future decision-making.
The above reasons suggest that profit-taking, though not always leading to an implementation decision, should always be at the back of the investor's mind when a particular stock holding surges. Quite often, the most painful thing to do is the right one. Introducing some selling discipline, such as selling a portion of one's holdings once the stock reaches a particular valuation waypoint, say 15X PE (or whatever one deems a fair valuation), might be useful in altering the psychological state-of-mind and facilitate further liquidation on perceived peaking of fundamentals and/or momentum etc. This is in recognition of the fact that selling is as much a psychological issue as one based on financial evaluations. And then again, letting the profits run might be the best thing to do in some cases. Without adding to the confusion, I will just point out that it happens less often and also that some find it prudent to set some moving sell-point that is say, 10% below the peak, so that even if one intends to ride the long-term momentum, he will be stopped out by a sizeable adjustment from the peak.
The level of tolerance, and hence the maximum drawdown limit where one sets his sell-point, varies from individual to individual and from stock to stock, depending on the level of confidence about its long-term strength.
The key word is "eventually", because the time the investor has to wait for the stock to rise is unknown. But my point remains --- the patient investor will eventually see the stock gain some buying interest.
When that happens, another aspect of time becomes important for the investor: how long will the stock enjoy its place in the sun? Will it be just a short pump-and-dump operation by the big holders, or could the stock become one of those rare Cinderella stories and live happily forever?
There is a new branch of finance, known as behavioural finance, which essentially recognises the "humanness" of market participants that adversely affects their decision-making (as opposed to standard finance that assumes a "rational" investor).
Behavioural finance sheds some light on human tendencies when faced with the above scenario. People tend to be overly-optimistic and have a fear of regret (ie. the stock soars after they sell) which leads them to hold rather than make any active decision to sell.
Hence, it is important to be aware of our own human nature and to consciously lean against its biases. In the case of what action to take when a particular stock holding rises substantially, sometimes it's better to let the profits run, sometimes it's better to lock in the profits, again there is no fixed rule, but it is my experience that selling is the most difficult thing to do for many people --- which is why patient investors might not make money in the end. Therefore an element of selling discipline is important to lock in the profits when they arise.
There are several other key factors why learning to sell is important, besides the abovementioned psychological bias.
Firstly, fundamental cyclical effects. This is a real danger of holding on too long to a stock that has risen substantially, and is particularly relevant for cyclical stocks like shipping, property, commodities, technology ...... or indeed in most sectors where product demand is discretionary and pricing is commodity-like (ie. the business is a price-taker rather than price-setter). Where profitability is highly dependent on industry prices which are in turn determined by demand-supply dynamics, the entire sector can come in for strong market attention when the pieces come into place at a particular part of the business cycle eg. technology at the early stages of recovery when inventory is low, production capacity is thin and consumer demand is growing at an increasing rate. The stock surges in response. But as manufacturers ramp up capacity and squeeze the margins, the product ASPs (average selling prices) can quickly fall even as raw material prices rise. If one misses selling at the sweet spot, he can be stuck for ages when the stock normalises. This is because capacity, once increased, is difficult to reduce until there is painful industry restructuring where smaller players exit ie. when losses become too hard to tolerate. The problem is that the level of tolerance of many business owners is very high.The second main issue is market liquidity. How many times have we seen this: stock A, previously illiquid, gains some market attention on initiation of broker coverage (perhaps because the company is placing out new shares). The stock rises on optimism about the strength of its prospects, and fundamental investors accumulate. As volume picks up, the stock breaks past all resistances, attracting technical traders. The momentum carries it on day after day. Then it peaks, strangely on a day when good news came out and the stock failed to react. Classic "buy on rumour, sell on news". The stock retraces all the way back to where it came from, and liquidity dries away leaving the stock to the effects of gravity. And soon it becomes anonymous again as a new wave of market favourites take over. The loss of market liquidity, sometimes unrelated to intrinsic fundamentals but nearly always linked to sudden market-wide realisation of expensive valuations plus withdrawal of strong-hand support, is another reversion-to-mean effect that is often difficult to reverse and exacts high opportunity cost for the late-to-sell investor.
The devastating psychological effects on the investor should he endure an up-down cycle without anything to show for it cannot be ignored either. Those who have experienced it will know what I mean. Failing to sell at the peak, he will find it harder to sell at 10% down, even harder to sell at 20% down and hence arises the terrible situation where the more the stock drops, the more unlikely the investor will sell. That is because he had already mentally anchored his wealth at the peak of the stock's valuation. It is important not to let this happen too often, because it can eat into one's confidence and affect future decision-making.
The above reasons suggest that profit-taking, though not always leading to an implementation decision, should always be at the back of the investor's mind when a particular stock holding surges. Quite often, the most painful thing to do is the right one. Introducing some selling discipline, such as selling a portion of one's holdings once the stock reaches a particular valuation waypoint, say 15X PE (or whatever one deems a fair valuation), might be useful in altering the psychological state-of-mind and facilitate further liquidation on perceived peaking of fundamentals and/or momentum etc. This is in recognition of the fact that selling is as much a psychological issue as one based on financial evaluations. And then again, letting the profits run might be the best thing to do in some cases. Without adding to the confusion, I will just point out that it happens less often and also that some find it prudent to set some moving sell-point that is say, 10% below the peak, so that even if one intends to ride the long-term momentum, he will be stopped out by a sizeable adjustment from the peak.
The level of tolerance, and hence the maximum drawdown limit where one sets his sell-point, varies from individual to individual and from stock to stock, depending on the level of confidence about its long-term strength.
Wednesday, May 21, 2008
投資哲學
建立投資策略非常重要。技術分析準確度只有55％（如加入買賣費用，懂走勢同唔懂走勢嘅投資者成績冇分別）。真正有用嘅係趨勢唔係走勢。
例如：
一、遠見（Vision）。
簡單例子，1967年美國人收入係港人五十倍，未來應睇好美國還是香港？1978年香港人收入係中國人五十倍，到咗2007年港人收入仍係內地人五到十倍（視不同行業而定），你點睇中港經濟？
二、才能（Talents）。
好多人以為係天賜，其實可以自行發展。甲、乙兩人，甲每天花一小時睇《信報》，乙每天花一小時睇其他報紙嘅八卦新聞，十年後誰跑出？甲還是乙？二十年後誰較富有？甲還是乙？三十年後誰生活無憂？甲還是乙？
三、創意（Creative）。
甲性格係事事關心，世界上發生任何事佢都關心，包括近期台灣富商與女明星關係、小甜甜爭產案、徐步高殺人事件……。乙卻專注在本業、學習本業技巧及理財之道，將過去嘅失敗例子銘記於心，最後熟能生巧，在投資上發揮自己創意……。十年二十年後，甲乙兩人誰跑出？
四、持久力。
一個牛市短則三年、一般五年、長則七年；面對自己睇好嘅股票上升便忙於止賺，卻不肯由頭揸到尾，忘記「止蝕唔止賺」嘅格言。過去有幾多人買入好股後，因太早沽出而錯過賺大錢機會？
五、抉擇。
面對虧損，能否果斷地、堅決地執行止蝕？面對環境改變，有冇糾正自己從前的錯誤決定？以上五點決定你係邊一類人（一贏、二平、七輸錢）。
例如：
一、遠見（Vision）。
簡單例子，1967年美國人收入係港人五十倍，未來應睇好美國還是香港？1978年香港人收入係中國人五十倍，到咗2007年港人收入仍係內地人五到十倍（視不同行業而定），你點睇中港經濟？
二、才能（Talents）。
好多人以為係天賜，其實可以自行發展。甲、乙兩人，甲每天花一小時睇《信報》，乙每天花一小時睇其他報紙嘅八卦新聞，十年後誰跑出？甲還是乙？二十年後誰較富有？甲還是乙？三十年後誰生活無憂？甲還是乙？
三、創意（Creative）。
甲性格係事事關心，世界上發生任何事佢都關心，包括近期台灣富商與女明星關係、小甜甜爭產案、徐步高殺人事件……。乙卻專注在本業、學習本業技巧及理財之道，將過去嘅失敗例子銘記於心，最後熟能生巧，在投資上發揮自己創意……。十年二十年後，甲乙兩人誰跑出？
四、持久力。
一個牛市短則三年、一般五年、長則七年；面對自己睇好嘅股票上升便忙於止賺，卻不肯由頭揸到尾，忘記「止蝕唔止賺」嘅格言。過去有幾多人買入好股後，因太早沽出而錯過賺大錢機會？
五、抉擇。
面對虧損，能否果斷地、堅決地執行止蝕？面對環境改變，有冇糾正自己從前的錯誤決定？以上五點決定你係邊一類人（一贏、二平、七輸錢）。
Tuesday, May 20, 2008
巴菲特的建言
There was a one-hour interview on CNBC with Warren Buffet, the richest man who has donated $31 billion to charity.
His advice to young people:"Stay away from credit cards and invest in yourself and Remember:
他給時下年輕人的建議是「遠離信用卡的物慾, 多投資自己並且牢記」
A.
Money doesn't create man but it is the man who created money.
(錢是人創造出來的,但是錢不會創造人.)
B.
Live your life as simple as you are.
(過你自己想過的簡單生活吧!)
C.
Don't do what others say, just listen them, but do what you feel good
(別人說的話聽聽可以,但不一定要照做,做你自己覺得很棒的事.)
D.
Don't go on brand name; just wear those things in which u feel comfortable.
(別走入名牌的迷思,穿你覺得舒服的服飾即可.)
E.
Don't waste your money on unnecessary things; just spend on them who really in need rather.(與其把錢花在不必要的事情上,倒不如把錢花在真正需要的地方.)
F.
After all it's your life then why give chance to others to rule our life.
(總而言之,這是你的人生,幹嘛讓其他人來指揮你的人生呢?)
His advice to young people:"Stay away from credit cards and invest in yourself and Remember:
他給時下年輕人的建議是「遠離信用卡的物慾, 多投資自己並且牢記」
A.
Money doesn't create man but it is the man who created money.
(錢是人創造出來的,但是錢不會創造人.)
B.
Live your life as simple as you are.
(過你自己想過的簡單生活吧!)
C.
Don't do what others say, just listen them, but do what you feel good
(別人說的話聽聽可以,但不一定要照做,做你自己覺得很棒的事.)
D.
Don't go on brand name; just wear those things in which u feel comfortable.
(別走入名牌的迷思,穿你覺得舒服的服飾即可.)
E.
Don't waste your money on unnecessary things; just spend on them who really in need rather.(與其把錢花在不必要的事情上,倒不如把錢花在真正需要的地方.)
F.
After all it's your life then why give chance to others to rule our life.
(總而言之,這是你的人生,幹嘛讓其他人來指揮你的人生呢?)
技術分析的唯一精髓秘訣
這是一篇老文章，是本人對技術分析的一點感悟。今天將其再度重發，希望能夠為朋友們提供些拋磚引玉的借鑑參考意義。
技術分析，以它的簡單性、直觀性、客觀性、綜觀性、公開性、公平性、公正性七性合一的優點，而深為廣大股民所喜歡，更是為股評家所喜用，但若問， 技術分析的真諦精髓是什麼？相信答案會各式各樣，甚至，有的著書立說者會說出一大堆不著邊際的見解。
其實，在股市中，技術分析早已經偏離了方向，有的甚至 滑入左道旁門的誤區。
要我說很簡單，技術分析的精髓秘訣——我認為也是唯一秘訣：
就是吃準股性規律，在可預見可操作的股價拐點處為買賣提供可量化的技術性依據。
吃準了股性就等於摸準了脈搏踩對了點，一切問題都迎刃而解了，一切問題都簡單化了。
如果能夠深入理解悟透這一涵義，那麼，腦子裡就沒有了紛繁而又 具體的固定的僵化的技術和招數，更高的境界就能夠達到見招拆招無招勝有招，股性就變成活靈活現可以感覺的東西，分析與操作也就走入了捷徑。
無論指數還是各股，都有各自的股性特點，就像人一樣，每個人都有自己的秉性特點。有的人反覆無常難以琢磨沒有人情味，你就覺得他很煩很不好相處，既然不好與之交往，也就敬而遠之；有的人很厚重很穩健很有人情味，性情率真容易打交道，與之交往，就會覺得愉快舒心。
看股票就如同看人，選股票，就如同選朋友。當我們將每一隻股票擬人化，將它們看做有靈性的生命體時，透過技術的視角審視一番，就很容易把握其股性特點，研究到深透驚細的見宏知微的妙境時，就可以左右逢源隨心所欲的波段滾打低吸高拋。 如此，技術分析就可謂用活了，用到位了，用起來就會得心應手，效果就會很好。
技術數據和圖表，它就像一面鏡子，它會如實公正的對股價波動做出即時反映，這種反映既是滯後的被動的，也是超前的能動的。
如果你認為技術只是滯後被動的反應股價波動，那麼，你就只會得到滯後的死的信息，從而被動挨打；如果你悟到了技術是超前能動的反應股價波動，那麼，你就會 看到超前的活信息，從而主動從容。
同時，技術分析的運用不可僵化教條。試想，每隻股票股性各異，那麼，反映股價波動趨向的技術依據怎麼是千篇一律亙古不變 的呢？ 比如股價移動平均線，它不單是對股價滯後被動的反應，還與股價在互動中形成相對穩定互相制約的共振特點，從而成為審視股價未來趨向的一面鏡子，透過這面鏡子，我們就可以超前感知股價的動向，為交易提供一個可量化的參考依據。
我對均線的理解是：
（1）同一階段的不同各股，與之能夠形成比較穩定有序互動特點的均線會有不同。
（2）同一各股不同階段，與之能夠形成比較穩定有序互動特點的均線會有不同。
（3）同一各股不同週期的K線界面中，與之能夠形成比較穩定有序互動特點的均線會有不同。
要善於在不同各股、不同階段、不同週期背景下，尋找和把握適用的與股價形成相對穩定有序的互動共振的反映股性特徵的均線，這是均線制勝的根本原則和 技巧。
由此，本人多次談到大盤的關鍵點關鍵位，大多都是根據當時態勢下大盤與特定均線互動共振的股性規律來得出的結論，當然，有的因為本人應用失誤和認識 不到位，所謂的關鍵點關鍵位並不關鍵，但也不可否認，有的關鍵點關鍵位關鍵到立桿見影的神奇妙用和作用。因此，我感覺均線的選用對頭適用才是最關鍵的。
那麼，均線的運用大致有如下幾個實用的規則：
（1）某一條均線成為股價可靠支撐線，那麼，當某個階段股價有效跌破該均線後，再度反抽到該均線時大多會止升回跌。
（2）某一條均線成為股價階段性壓力線，那麼，當隨後階段股價有效升越該均線後，再度反抽到該均線時大多會止跌回升。
（3）某一階段若一批股票依託某一條或一組均線拉起上攻行情，緊隨其後若很多各股都形成了這種態勢，則大勢可能仍將向上，而類似形態各股的買點機會也比較可信，並具有可操作性。
（4）大週期循環中，若歷史上某一條或一組均線與股票共振的買點形態又在目前大面積出現，那麼，大勢仍將可能繼續向上，而各股形態的機會也比較可信，並具有可操作性。
上述均線規則在目前大勢向上各股分化輪動的背景下，是比較適用和具有可操作性的，只要靈活運用舉一反三，不難在實戰中找到具有規律性波動特點的各股，並穩准的把握其機會。
其實，其他指標的運用也是同樣道理，比如本人經常用到的MACD指標，這是一個及時並能夠超前反映股價即將變盤轉向的工具，但大家在應用方法上出了 問題，所以，常常是不得要領甚至作反了。
我常講要善於在大週期K線圖中（周K線和月K線）把握MACD死叉後的買點和金叉後的賣點，得到許多人的置疑，其實，恰恰這一反映股性特點股性規律的現象被我掌握並很好的運用，所以，我有時就能夠快市場半拍走在市場的前頭，而眾人還不能理解。
多麼簡單的一個方法和道理，人們卻不能悟透。所以，在大家要超越自己眼裡和腦海裡有如死的教條的技術分析，那些理論的教條，有些甚至是看似合理卻違背規律的「經典」。
其實，一切都是活的，固定是相對的，變化是絕對的，用死的教條僵化的去審視活靈活現千姿百態的股價波動，當然就看不到活的股性，注定要碰壁的。
這不但是均 線分析、MACD分析，而且是一切技術分析都應該避免的，惟此，技術分析才能用活，才能抓住技術分析活的靈魂，技術分析才能真正發揮用武之地。
技術分析，以它的簡單性、直觀性、客觀性、綜觀性、公開性、公平性、公正性七性合一的優點，而深為廣大股民所喜歡，更是為股評家所喜用，但若問， 技術分析的真諦精髓是什麼？相信答案會各式各樣，甚至，有的著書立說者會說出一大堆不著邊際的見解。
其實，在股市中，技術分析早已經偏離了方向，有的甚至 滑入左道旁門的誤區。
要我說很簡單，技術分析的精髓秘訣——我認為也是唯一秘訣：
就是吃準股性規律，在可預見可操作的股價拐點處為買賣提供可量化的技術性依據。
吃準了股性就等於摸準了脈搏踩對了點，一切問題都迎刃而解了，一切問題都簡單化了。
如果能夠深入理解悟透這一涵義，那麼，腦子裡就沒有了紛繁而又 具體的固定的僵化的技術和招數，更高的境界就能夠達到見招拆招無招勝有招，股性就變成活靈活現可以感覺的東西，分析與操作也就走入了捷徑。
無論指數還是各股，都有各自的股性特點，就像人一樣，每個人都有自己的秉性特點。有的人反覆無常難以琢磨沒有人情味，你就覺得他很煩很不好相處，既然不好與之交往，也就敬而遠之；有的人很厚重很穩健很有人情味，性情率真容易打交道，與之交往，就會覺得愉快舒心。
看股票就如同看人，選股票，就如同選朋友。當我們將每一隻股票擬人化，將它們看做有靈性的生命體時，透過技術的視角審視一番，就很容易把握其股性特點，研究到深透驚細的見宏知微的妙境時，就可以左右逢源隨心所欲的波段滾打低吸高拋。 如此，技術分析就可謂用活了，用到位了，用起來就會得心應手，效果就會很好。
技術數據和圖表，它就像一面鏡子，它會如實公正的對股價波動做出即時反映，這種反映既是滯後的被動的，也是超前的能動的。
如果你認為技術只是滯後被動的反應股價波動，那麼，你就只會得到滯後的死的信息，從而被動挨打；如果你悟到了技術是超前能動的反應股價波動，那麼，你就會 看到超前的活信息，從而主動從容。
同時，技術分析的運用不可僵化教條。試想，每隻股票股性各異，那麼，反映股價波動趨向的技術依據怎麼是千篇一律亙古不變 的呢？ 比如股價移動平均線，它不單是對股價滯後被動的反應，還與股價在互動中形成相對穩定互相制約的共振特點，從而成為審視股價未來趨向的一面鏡子，透過這面鏡子，我們就可以超前感知股價的動向，為交易提供一個可量化的參考依據。
我對均線的理解是：
（1）同一階段的不同各股，與之能夠形成比較穩定有序互動特點的均線會有不同。
（2）同一各股不同階段，與之能夠形成比較穩定有序互動特點的均線會有不同。
（3）同一各股不同週期的K線界面中，與之能夠形成比較穩定有序互動特點的均線會有不同。
要善於在不同各股、不同階段、不同週期背景下，尋找和把握適用的與股價形成相對穩定有序的互動共振的反映股性特徵的均線，這是均線制勝的根本原則和 技巧。
由此，本人多次談到大盤的關鍵點關鍵位，大多都是根據當時態勢下大盤與特定均線互動共振的股性規律來得出的結論，當然，有的因為本人應用失誤和認識 不到位，所謂的關鍵點關鍵位並不關鍵，但也不可否認，有的關鍵點關鍵位關鍵到立桿見影的神奇妙用和作用。因此，我感覺均線的選用對頭適用才是最關鍵的。
那麼，均線的運用大致有如下幾個實用的規則：
（1）某一條均線成為股價可靠支撐線，那麼，當某個階段股價有效跌破該均線後，再度反抽到該均線時大多會止升回跌。
（2）某一條均線成為股價階段性壓力線，那麼，當隨後階段股價有效升越該均線後，再度反抽到該均線時大多會止跌回升。
（3）某一階段若一批股票依託某一條或一組均線拉起上攻行情，緊隨其後若很多各股都形成了這種態勢，則大勢可能仍將向上，而類似形態各股的買點機會也比較可信，並具有可操作性。
（4）大週期循環中，若歷史上某一條或一組均線與股票共振的買點形態又在目前大面積出現，那麼，大勢仍將可能繼續向上，而各股形態的機會也比較可信，並具有可操作性。
上述均線規則在目前大勢向上各股分化輪動的背景下，是比較適用和具有可操作性的，只要靈活運用舉一反三，不難在實戰中找到具有規律性波動特點的各股，並穩准的把握其機會。
其實，其他指標的運用也是同樣道理，比如本人經常用到的MACD指標，這是一個及時並能夠超前反映股價即將變盤轉向的工具，但大家在應用方法上出了 問題，所以，常常是不得要領甚至作反了。
我常講要善於在大週期K線圖中（周K線和月K線）把握MACD死叉後的買點和金叉後的賣點，得到許多人的置疑，其實，恰恰這一反映股性特點股性規律的現象被我掌握並很好的運用，所以，我有時就能夠快市場半拍走在市場的前頭，而眾人還不能理解。
多麼簡單的一個方法和道理，人們卻不能悟透。所以，在大家要超越自己眼裡和腦海裡有如死的教條的技術分析，那些理論的教條，有些甚至是看似合理卻違背規律的「經典」。
其實，一切都是活的，固定是相對的，變化是絕對的，用死的教條僵化的去審視活靈活現千姿百態的股價波動，當然就看不到活的股性，注定要碰壁的。
這不但是均 線分析、MACD分析，而且是一切技術分析都應該避免的，惟此，技術分析才能用活，才能抓住技術分析活的靈魂，技術分析才能真正發揮用武之地。
六位投資大師的經驗對照
1、華倫.巴菲特（股神）
投資策略及理論：
以價值投資為根基的增長投資策略。看重的是個股品質。
理論闡述：
價值投資的精髓在於，質好價低的個股內在價值在足夠長的時間內總會體現在股價上，利用這種特性，使本金穩定地復利增長。
具體做法：
買入具有增長潛力但股價偏低的股票，並長線持有。是長線投資致富之道，在於每年保持穩定增長，利用復式滾存的驚人威力，為自己制造財富。
遵守的規則與禁忌：
八項選股准則：
1、必須是消費壟斷企業。
2、產品簡單、易了解、前景看好。
3、有穩定的經營歷史。
4、管理層理性、忠誠，以股東的利益為先。
5、財務穩健。
6、經營效率高，收益好。
7、資本支出少，自由現金流量充裕。
8、價格合理。
四不：
1、不要投機。
2、不讓股市牽著你的鼻子。
3、不買不熟悉的股票。
4、不宜太過分散投資。
對大勢與個股關系的看法：
只注重個股品質，不理會大勢趨向。
對股市預測的看法：
股市預測的唯一價值，就是讓風水師從中獲利。
對投資工具的看法：
投資是買下一家公司，而不是股票。杜絕投機，當投機看起來輕易可得時，它是最危險的。
名言及觀念：
＂時間是好投資者的朋友，壞投資者的敵人。＂
＂投資必須是理性的，如果你不能了解它，就不要投資。＂
＂要想成功，你就必須逆向使用華爾街投資的兩大死敵：恐懼與貪婪。你不得不在別人恐懼時進發，在別人貪婪時收手。＂
其它及成就： 1930年出生於美國，猶太人，是價值投資之父、本傑明。格雷厄姆的學生。1956年以100美元入股，2008年身家達560億美元，52年每年復式增長53%。
2、安得烈.科斯托蘭尼（德國股神）
投資策略及理論：
以“科斯托蘭尼雞蛋”表達的暴漲暴跌理論為基礎，在市場轉折前夕進出，逆向操作，忍受市場最後的下跌，遠離市場最後的輝煌。看重的是市場趨勢。
理論闡述：
＂科斯托蘭尼雞蛋”表達為：在證券市場，升跌是分不開的伙伴，如果分不清下跌的終點，就看不出上升的起點。同樣道理，如果分不清上升的終點，也就不能預測到下跌的起點。
每一次市場大升大跌都由三個階段組成：
1、修正階段。
2、調整或相隨階段。
3、過熱階段。
成功的關鍵就是在兩個過熱階段逆向操作。
具體做法：
根據＂科斯托蘭尼雞蛋＂理論逆向操作，在下跌的過熱階段買進，即使價格繼續下挫，也不必害怕，在上漲的修正階段繼續買進，在上漲的相隨階段，只觀察，被動隨行情波動，到了上漲的過熱階段，投資者普遍亢奮時，退出市場。
遵守的規則與禁忌：
十律：
1、有主見，三思而後行：是否該買，什麼行業，哪個國家？
2、要有足夠的資金，以免遭受壓力。
3、要有耐性，因為任何事情都不可預期，發展方向都和大家想像的不同。
4、如果相信自己的判斷，便必須堅定不移。
5、要靈活，並時刻考慮到想法中可能有錯誤。
6、如果看到出現新的局面，應該賣出。
7、不時查看購買的股票清單，並檢查現在還可買進哪些股票。
8、只有看到遠大的發展前景時，才可買進。
9、時刻考慮所有風險，甚至是最不可能出現的風險和因素。
10、即使自己是對的，也要保持謙遜。
十戒：
1、不要跟著建議跑，不要想能聽到內幕消息。
2、不要相信買方和賣方為什麼要買賣，不要相信他們比自己知道更多。
3、不要想把賠掉的再賺回來。
4、不要考慮過去的指數。
5、不要忘記自己所持股票，不要因妄想而不作決定。
6、不要太過留意股價變化，不要對任何風吹草動作出反應。
7、不要在剛賺錢或虧錢時作最後結論。
8、不要因只想賺錢就賣掉股票。
9、不要受政治好惡而影響投資情緒。
10、獲利時，不要太過自負。
對大勢與個股關系的看法：
中短期走勢與心理因素有關，既隨大勢，對長期走勢而言，心理因素不再重要，而在乎於股票本身的基本因素和盈利能力。
對股市預測的看法：
想要用科學方法預測股市行情又或未來走勢的人，不是江湖騙子，就是蠢蛋，要不然就是兼具此兩種身份的人。
對投資工具的看法：
科斯托蘭尼認為投機不等於賭博，因為在他的概念中的投機是有想法，有計劃的行為。
名言及觀念：
＂只有少數人能投機成功，關鍵在於與眾不同，並相信自己：我知道，其他人都是傻瓜。＂
＂供求決定股價升跌，其中並無神秘。＂
＂會影響股市行情的，是投資大眾對重大事件的反應，而非重大事件本身。＂
＂買股票時，需要想像力，賣股票時，需要理智。＂
＂貨幣+心理=趨勢＂＂2+2=5-1＂
其它及成就：
1906出生於匈牙利，猶太人，1924開始，縱橫投資界80年，經歷兩次破產後，賺得一生享用不盡的財富。被譽為＂二十世紀股市見證人＂。
3、喬治．索羅斯（國際狙擊手）
投資策略及理論：
以＂反射理論＂和＂大起大落理論＂為理論基礎，在市場轉折處進出，利用＂羊群效應＂逆市主動操控市場進行市場投機。看重的是市場趨勢。
理論闡述：
索羅斯的核心投資理論就是＂反射理論＂，簡單說是指投資者與市場之間的一個互
動影響。理論依據是人正確認識世界是不可能的，投資者都是持＂偏見＂進入市場的，而＂偏見＂正是了解金融市場動力的關鍵所在。當＂流行偏見＂只屬於小眾時，影響力尚小，但不同投資者的偏見在互動中產生群體影響力，將會演變成具主導地位的觀念。就是＂羊群效應＂。
具體做法：
在將要“大起”的市場中投入巨額資本引誘投資者一並狂熱買進，從而進一步帶動市場價格上揚，直至價格走向瘋狂。在市場行將崩潰之時，率先帶頭拋售做空，基於市場已在頂峰，脆弱而不堪一擊，故任何風吹草動都可以引起恐慌性拋售，從而又進一步加劇下跌幅度，直至崩盤。在
漲跌的轉折處進出賺取投機差價。
遵守的規則與禁忌：
沒有嚴格的原則或規律可循，只憑直覺及進攻策略執行一舉致勝的＂森林法則＂。
＂森林法則＂即：
1、耐心等待時機出現。
2、專挑弱者攻擊。
3、進攻時須狠，而且須全力而為。
4、若事情不如意料時，保命是第一考慮。
對大勢與個股關系的看法：
注重市場氣氛，看重大勢輕個股。認為市場短期走勢只是一種＂羊群效應＂，與個股品質無關。
對股市預測的看法：
不預測，在市場機會臨近時，主動出擊引導市場。
對投資工具的看法：
沒有特定的投資風格，不按照既定的原則行事，但卻留意游戲規則的改變。 ＂對衝基金＂這種循環抵押的借貸方式不斷放大杠杆效應，應用這枝杠杆，只要找好支點，它甚至可以撬動整個國際貨幣體系。
名言及觀念：
＂炒作就像動物世界的森林法則，專門攻擊弱者，這種做法往往能夠百發百中。＂
＂任何人都有弱點，同樣，任何經濟體系也都有弱點，那常常是最堅不可摧的一點。＂
＂羊群效應是我們每一次投機能夠成功的關鍵，如果這種效應不存在或相當微弱，幾乎可以肯定我們難以成功。＂
其它及成就：
1930年出生於匈牙利，猶太人，1968年創立＂第一老鷹基金＂，1993年登上華爾街百大富豪榜首，1992年狙擊英鎊勁賺20億美元，1997年狙擊泰銖，掀起亞洲金融風暴。
4、是川銀藏（日本股神）
投資策略及理論：
以價值投資為根基的＂烏龜三原則＂投資策略。既看重個股品質也看重市場趨勢。
理論闡述：
烏龜三原則的啟示來至於龜兔賽跑的故事，動作慢的烏龜能取得最後勝利，全靠穩打穩扎，謹慎小心。同樣包含了價值投資的精髓。
＂烏龜三原則＂即：
1、選擇未來大有前途，卻尚未被世人察覺的潛力股，長期持有。
2、每日密切注視經濟與股市行情的變動，而且自己下工夫研究。在耐心等待股價上升的同時，防止市場突變，錯失賣出時機。
3、不可過份樂觀，不要以為股市會永遠漲個不停，在市況熾熱時，應反行其道趁高套利。
具體做法：
勤奮做功課，收集各種重要統計資料，詳細分析，找出經濟變化的動向，再以研究成果作武器炒股。遵循＂烏龜三原則＂，只吃八分飽。
遵守的規則與禁忌：二忠告：
第一忠告、投資股票必須在自有資金的範圍內。
第二忠告、不要受報紙雜志的消息所迷惑，未經考慮就投入資金。
五原則：
1、選股不要靠人推薦，要自己下工夫研究後選擇。
2、自己要能預測一、兩年後的經濟變化。
3、每只股票都有其適當的價位，股價超越其應有的水平，便絕不應高追。
4、股價最終還是由業績決定，被故意舞高的股票應遠離。
5、任何時候都可能發生難以預料的事，故必須緊記：投資股票永遠有風險。
對大勢與個股關系的看法：大勢與個股品質並重。
對股市預測的看法：
通過對研究基本功的鍛煉，能預測經濟動向，從而在一定程度上預測到股市的大方向。
對投資工具的看法：
投資和投機兼顧一身，目的就是順應市場。
名言及觀念：
＂股市是謠言最多的地方，如果每聽到什麼謠言，就要買進賣出的話，那麼錢再多，也不夠賠。＂
其它及成就：1897年出生於日本，1931年以70日元起家，在股市中大賺超過300億日元。
5、彼得．林奇（股聖）
投資策略及理論：
以價值投資為根基的實用投資策略。看重的是個股品質。
理論闡述：
價值投資的精髓在於，質好價低的個股內在價值在足夠長的時間內總會體現在股價上，利用這種特性，使本金穩定地復利增長。
具體做法：
其投資智慧是從最簡單的生活方式中體驗的。從生活中發掘有潛能的股份。投資具有潛力，且未被市場留意的公司，長線持有，利用復式滾存穩步增長。
遵守的規則與禁忌：
林奇選股品味：
1、傻名字。
2、乏味。
3、令人厭煩。
4、有庇護的獨立子公司。
5、乏人關注的潛力股。
6、充滿謠言的公司。
7、大家不想關注的行業。
8、增長處於零的行業。
9、具保護壁壘的行業。
10、消耗性大的消費品。
11、直接受惠高技術的客戶。
12、連其雇員也購買的股票。
13、會回購自己股份的公司。
令林奇退避三舍的公司：
1、當炒股。
2、某龍頭企業二世。
3、不務正業的公司。
4、突然人氣急升的股票。
5、欠缺議價力的供應商。
6、名字古怪的公司。
對大勢與個股關系的看法：
林奇認為贏輸實際和市場的關系不大，股市不過是用來驗證一下是否有人在做傻事的地方。不能依賴市場來帶動手裡的股票上揚。
對股市預測的看法：
從不相信誰能預測市場。
對投資工具的看法：
對林奇來說，投資只是賭博的一種，沒有百分百安全的投資工具。
名言及觀念：
＂不做研究就投資，和玩撲克牌不看牌面一樣盲目。＂
投資前三個問題：
1、你有物業嗎？
2、你有余錢投資嗎？
3、你有賺錢能力嗎？
不少投資者選購股票的認真程度竟不如日常的消費購物，如果把購物時貨比三家的認真用於選股，會節省更多的錢。
其它及成就：
1944年出生於美國，1977年接管富達麥哲倫基金，13年資產從1800萬美元增至140億美元，年復式增長29%。
6、約翰.坦伯頓（環球投資之父）
投資策略及理論：
以價值投資為根基的逆市投資策略。看重的是個股品質。
理論闡述：
價值投資的精髓在於，質好價低的個股內在價值在足夠長的時間內總會體現在股價上，利用這種特性，使本金穩定地復利增長。
具體做法：
永遠在市場最悲觀的時候進場。在市場中尋找價廉物美的股票。投資股票好比購物，要四處比價，用心發掘最好的商品。投資者應運用相同概念在股市中。買低於帳面值的股票，長線持有。信奉復利的威力。
遵守的規則與禁忌：
16條投資成功法則：
1、投資，不要投機。
2、實踐價值投資法。
3、購買品質。
4、低買。
5、沒有白吃的晚餐。
6、做好功課。
7、分散投資。
8、注意實際回報。
9、從錯誤中學習。
10、監控自己的投資。
11、保持彈性。
12、謙虛。
13、不要驚慌。
14、對投資持正面態度。
15、禱告有益投資。
16、跑贏專業機構投資者。
對大勢與個股關系的看法：
基本上股價的短期波動常常會受投資者的情緒影響，但長期來說，企業價值始終會在股價上反映出來。投資者應該投資個別股票，而非市場趨勢或經濟前景。對股市預測的看法：就算是專家也未必能預測市場。
對投資工具的看法：
要靈活應變，當運用的投資策略效果很不俗時，仍需小心，要預備隨時改變，坦伯頓認為沒有一套投資策略是經常有效，在不同的市況應運用不同的投資方法。
名言及觀念：
＂最好的投資時機，是當所有人都恐慌退縮的時候。＂
＂投資價值被低估的股票，其挑戰是如何判斷它真是具潛力的超值股，還是它的價值就只是如此而已。＂
投資者很容易在賺了錢之後，對市場過度樂觀，在賠了錢的時候，過度悲觀。
其它及成就：
1912年出生於美國，是價值投資之父、本傑明.格雷厄姆的學生。1954年成立坦伯頓增長基金，45年每年平均復式增長15.2%。
投資策略及理論：
以價值投資為根基的增長投資策略。看重的是個股品質。
理論闡述：
價值投資的精髓在於，質好價低的個股內在價值在足夠長的時間內總會體現在股價上，利用這種特性，使本金穩定地復利增長。
具體做法：
買入具有增長潛力但股價偏低的股票，並長線持有。是長線投資致富之道，在於每年保持穩定增長，利用復式滾存的驚人威力，為自己制造財富。
遵守的規則與禁忌：
八項選股准則：
1、必須是消費壟斷企業。
2、產品簡單、易了解、前景看好。
3、有穩定的經營歷史。
4、管理層理性、忠誠，以股東的利益為先。
5、財務穩健。
6、經營效率高，收益好。
7、資本支出少，自由現金流量充裕。
8、價格合理。
四不：
1、不要投機。
2、不讓股市牽著你的鼻子。
3、不買不熟悉的股票。
4、不宜太過分散投資。
對大勢與個股關系的看法：
只注重個股品質，不理會大勢趨向。
對股市預測的看法：
股市預測的唯一價值，就是讓風水師從中獲利。
對投資工具的看法：
投資是買下一家公司，而不是股票。杜絕投機，當投機看起來輕易可得時，它是最危險的。
名言及觀念：
＂時間是好投資者的朋友，壞投資者的敵人。＂
＂投資必須是理性的，如果你不能了解它，就不要投資。＂
＂要想成功，你就必須逆向使用華爾街投資的兩大死敵：恐懼與貪婪。你不得不在別人恐懼時進發，在別人貪婪時收手。＂
其它及成就： 1930年出生於美國，猶太人，是價值投資之父、本傑明。格雷厄姆的學生。1956年以100美元入股，2008年身家達560億美元，52年每年復式增長53%。
2、安得烈.科斯托蘭尼（德國股神）
投資策略及理論：
以“科斯托蘭尼雞蛋”表達的暴漲暴跌理論為基礎，在市場轉折前夕進出，逆向操作，忍受市場最後的下跌，遠離市場最後的輝煌。看重的是市場趨勢。
理論闡述：
＂科斯托蘭尼雞蛋”表達為：在證券市場，升跌是分不開的伙伴，如果分不清下跌的終點，就看不出上升的起點。同樣道理，如果分不清上升的終點，也就不能預測到下跌的起點。
每一次市場大升大跌都由三個階段組成：
1、修正階段。
2、調整或相隨階段。
3、過熱階段。
成功的關鍵就是在兩個過熱階段逆向操作。
具體做法：
根據＂科斯托蘭尼雞蛋＂理論逆向操作，在下跌的過熱階段買進，即使價格繼續下挫，也不必害怕，在上漲的修正階段繼續買進，在上漲的相隨階段，只觀察，被動隨行情波動，到了上漲的過熱階段，投資者普遍亢奮時，退出市場。
遵守的規則與禁忌：
十律：
1、有主見，三思而後行：是否該買，什麼行業，哪個國家？
2、要有足夠的資金，以免遭受壓力。
3、要有耐性，因為任何事情都不可預期，發展方向都和大家想像的不同。
4、如果相信自己的判斷，便必須堅定不移。
5、要靈活，並時刻考慮到想法中可能有錯誤。
6、如果看到出現新的局面，應該賣出。
7、不時查看購買的股票清單，並檢查現在還可買進哪些股票。
8、只有看到遠大的發展前景時，才可買進。
9、時刻考慮所有風險，甚至是最不可能出現的風險和因素。
10、即使自己是對的，也要保持謙遜。
十戒：
1、不要跟著建議跑，不要想能聽到內幕消息。
2、不要相信買方和賣方為什麼要買賣，不要相信他們比自己知道更多。
3、不要想把賠掉的再賺回來。
4、不要考慮過去的指數。
5、不要忘記自己所持股票，不要因妄想而不作決定。
6、不要太過留意股價變化，不要對任何風吹草動作出反應。
7、不要在剛賺錢或虧錢時作最後結論。
8、不要因只想賺錢就賣掉股票。
9、不要受政治好惡而影響投資情緒。
10、獲利時，不要太過自負。
對大勢與個股關系的看法：
中短期走勢與心理因素有關，既隨大勢，對長期走勢而言，心理因素不再重要，而在乎於股票本身的基本因素和盈利能力。
對股市預測的看法：
想要用科學方法預測股市行情又或未來走勢的人，不是江湖騙子，就是蠢蛋，要不然就是兼具此兩種身份的人。
對投資工具的看法：
科斯托蘭尼認為投機不等於賭博，因為在他的概念中的投機是有想法，有計劃的行為。
名言及觀念：
＂只有少數人能投機成功，關鍵在於與眾不同，並相信自己：我知道，其他人都是傻瓜。＂
＂供求決定股價升跌，其中並無神秘。＂
＂會影響股市行情的，是投資大眾對重大事件的反應，而非重大事件本身。＂
＂買股票時，需要想像力，賣股票時，需要理智。＂
＂貨幣+心理=趨勢＂＂2+2=5-1＂
其它及成就：
1906出生於匈牙利，猶太人，1924開始，縱橫投資界80年，經歷兩次破產後，賺得一生享用不盡的財富。被譽為＂二十世紀股市見證人＂。
3、喬治．索羅斯（國際狙擊手）
投資策略及理論：
以＂反射理論＂和＂大起大落理論＂為理論基礎，在市場轉折處進出，利用＂羊群效應＂逆市主動操控市場進行市場投機。看重的是市場趨勢。
理論闡述：
索羅斯的核心投資理論就是＂反射理論＂，簡單說是指投資者與市場之間的一個互
動影響。理論依據是人正確認識世界是不可能的，投資者都是持＂偏見＂進入市場的，而＂偏見＂正是了解金融市場動力的關鍵所在。當＂流行偏見＂只屬於小眾時，影響力尚小，但不同投資者的偏見在互動中產生群體影響力，將會演變成具主導地位的觀念。就是＂羊群效應＂。
具體做法：
在將要“大起”的市場中投入巨額資本引誘投資者一並狂熱買進，從而進一步帶動市場價格上揚，直至價格走向瘋狂。在市場行將崩潰之時，率先帶頭拋售做空，基於市場已在頂峰，脆弱而不堪一擊，故任何風吹草動都可以引起恐慌性拋售，從而又進一步加劇下跌幅度，直至崩盤。在
漲跌的轉折處進出賺取投機差價。
遵守的規則與禁忌：
沒有嚴格的原則或規律可循，只憑直覺及進攻策略執行一舉致勝的＂森林法則＂。
＂森林法則＂即：
1、耐心等待時機出現。
2、專挑弱者攻擊。
3、進攻時須狠，而且須全力而為。
4、若事情不如意料時，保命是第一考慮。
對大勢與個股關系的看法：
注重市場氣氛，看重大勢輕個股。認為市場短期走勢只是一種＂羊群效應＂，與個股品質無關。
對股市預測的看法：
不預測，在市場機會臨近時，主動出擊引導市場。
對投資工具的看法：
沒有特定的投資風格，不按照既定的原則行事，但卻留意游戲規則的改變。 ＂對衝基金＂這種循環抵押的借貸方式不斷放大杠杆效應，應用這枝杠杆，只要找好支點，它甚至可以撬動整個國際貨幣體系。
名言及觀念：
＂炒作就像動物世界的森林法則，專門攻擊弱者，這種做法往往能夠百發百中。＂
＂任何人都有弱點，同樣，任何經濟體系也都有弱點，那常常是最堅不可摧的一點。＂
＂羊群效應是我們每一次投機能夠成功的關鍵，如果這種效應不存在或相當微弱，幾乎可以肯定我們難以成功。＂
其它及成就：
1930年出生於匈牙利，猶太人，1968年創立＂第一老鷹基金＂，1993年登上華爾街百大富豪榜首，1992年狙擊英鎊勁賺20億美元，1997年狙擊泰銖，掀起亞洲金融風暴。
4、是川銀藏（日本股神）
投資策略及理論：
以價值投資為根基的＂烏龜三原則＂投資策略。既看重個股品質也看重市場趨勢。
理論闡述：
烏龜三原則的啟示來至於龜兔賽跑的故事，動作慢的烏龜能取得最後勝利，全靠穩打穩扎，謹慎小心。同樣包含了價值投資的精髓。
＂烏龜三原則＂即：
1、選擇未來大有前途，卻尚未被世人察覺的潛力股，長期持有。
2、每日密切注視經濟與股市行情的變動，而且自己下工夫研究。在耐心等待股價上升的同時，防止市場突變，錯失賣出時機。
3、不可過份樂觀，不要以為股市會永遠漲個不停，在市況熾熱時，應反行其道趁高套利。
具體做法：
勤奮做功課，收集各種重要統計資料，詳細分析，找出經濟變化的動向，再以研究成果作武器炒股。遵循＂烏龜三原則＂，只吃八分飽。
遵守的規則與禁忌：二忠告：
第一忠告、投資股票必須在自有資金的範圍內。
第二忠告、不要受報紙雜志的消息所迷惑，未經考慮就投入資金。
五原則：
1、選股不要靠人推薦，要自己下工夫研究後選擇。
2、自己要能預測一、兩年後的經濟變化。
3、每只股票都有其適當的價位，股價超越其應有的水平，便絕不應高追。
4、股價最終還是由業績決定，被故意舞高的股票應遠離。
5、任何時候都可能發生難以預料的事，故必須緊記：投資股票永遠有風險。
對大勢與個股關系的看法：大勢與個股品質並重。
對股市預測的看法：
通過對研究基本功的鍛煉，能預測經濟動向，從而在一定程度上預測到股市的大方向。
對投資工具的看法：
投資和投機兼顧一身，目的就是順應市場。
名言及觀念：
＂股市是謠言最多的地方，如果每聽到什麼謠言，就要買進賣出的話，那麼錢再多，也不夠賠。＂
其它及成就：1897年出生於日本，1931年以70日元起家，在股市中大賺超過300億日元。
5、彼得．林奇（股聖）
投資策略及理論：
以價值投資為根基的實用投資策略。看重的是個股品質。
理論闡述：
價值投資的精髓在於，質好價低的個股內在價值在足夠長的時間內總會體現在股價上，利用這種特性，使本金穩定地復利增長。
具體做法：
其投資智慧是從最簡單的生活方式中體驗的。從生活中發掘有潛能的股份。投資具有潛力，且未被市場留意的公司，長線持有，利用復式滾存穩步增長。
遵守的規則與禁忌：
林奇選股品味：
1、傻名字。
2、乏味。
3、令人厭煩。
4、有庇護的獨立子公司。
5、乏人關注的潛力股。
6、充滿謠言的公司。
7、大家不想關注的行業。
8、增長處於零的行業。
9、具保護壁壘的行業。
10、消耗性大的消費品。
11、直接受惠高技術的客戶。
12、連其雇員也購買的股票。
13、會回購自己股份的公司。
令林奇退避三舍的公司：
1、當炒股。
2、某龍頭企業二世。
3、不務正業的公司。
4、突然人氣急升的股票。
5、欠缺議價力的供應商。
6、名字古怪的公司。
對大勢與個股關系的看法：
林奇認為贏輸實際和市場的關系不大，股市不過是用來驗證一下是否有人在做傻事的地方。不能依賴市場來帶動手裡的股票上揚。
對股市預測的看法：
從不相信誰能預測市場。
對投資工具的看法：
對林奇來說，投資只是賭博的一種，沒有百分百安全的投資工具。
名言及觀念：
＂不做研究就投資，和玩撲克牌不看牌面一樣盲目。＂
投資前三個問題：
1、你有物業嗎？
2、你有余錢投資嗎？
3、你有賺錢能力嗎？
不少投資者選購股票的認真程度竟不如日常的消費購物，如果把購物時貨比三家的認真用於選股，會節省更多的錢。
其它及成就：
1944年出生於美國，1977年接管富達麥哲倫基金，13年資產從1800萬美元增至140億美元，年復式增長29%。
6、約翰.坦伯頓（環球投資之父）
投資策略及理論：
以價值投資為根基的逆市投資策略。看重的是個股品質。
理論闡述：
價值投資的精髓在於，質好價低的個股內在價值在足夠長的時間內總會體現在股價上，利用這種特性，使本金穩定地復利增長。
具體做法：
永遠在市場最悲觀的時候進場。在市場中尋找價廉物美的股票。投資股票好比購物，要四處比價，用心發掘最好的商品。投資者應運用相同概念在股市中。買低於帳面值的股票，長線持有。信奉復利的威力。
遵守的規則與禁忌：
16條投資成功法則：
1、投資，不要投機。
2、實踐價值投資法。
3、購買品質。
4、低買。
5、沒有白吃的晚餐。
6、做好功課。
7、分散投資。
8、注意實際回報。
9、從錯誤中學習。
10、監控自己的投資。
11、保持彈性。
12、謙虛。
13、不要驚慌。
14、對投資持正面態度。
15、禱告有益投資。
16、跑贏專業機構投資者。
對大勢與個股關系的看法：
基本上股價的短期波動常常會受投資者的情緒影響，但長期來說，企業價值始終會在股價上反映出來。投資者應該投資個別股票，而非市場趨勢或經濟前景。對股市預測的看法：就算是專家也未必能預測市場。
對投資工具的看法：
要靈活應變，當運用的投資策略效果很不俗時，仍需小心，要預備隨時改變，坦伯頓認為沒有一套投資策略是經常有效，在不同的市況應運用不同的投資方法。
名言及觀念：
＂最好的投資時機，是當所有人都恐慌退縮的時候。＂
＂投資價值被低估的股票，其挑戰是如何判斷它真是具潛力的超值股，還是它的價值就只是如此而已。＂
投資者很容易在賺了錢之後，對市場過度樂觀，在賠了錢的時候，過度悲觀。
其它及成就：
1912年出生於美國，是價值投資之父、本傑明.格雷厄姆的學生。1954年成立坦伯頓增長基金，45年每年平均復式增長15.2%。
投資是最好的第二專長
投資大師曾說過一段有趣的話：『認為自己比市場其他人聰明的人，這種人才是最大的傻瓜。』
到底投資大師說這句話的意涵是什麼？這倒有著各種不同的解讀。不過，有一件事倒是不容置疑的，那就是這句話絕對適用於短線想低買高賣的投機客。因為，短線客所謂低買高賣的操作，指的就是在股價短暫下跌時買進，一旦反彈則在高價賣出來賺取短線的價差。由於，這種股價漲跌不是因著股票基本面的變化，而是因著市場面與消息面甚至所謂的心理面的變化而定，因此，恰如高山的天氣一般總是變化莫測瞬息萬變的。而短線客之所以樂於進行這樣的操作，基本上就是自認為可以較其他投資人輕易掌握住市場的變化，或是擁有著特殊的分析技術曉得運用線型或指標，或是其可以預測市場心理。換句話說，就是自認為擁有著較其他投資人聰明的投資操作技術與先見之明啦。
其實，類似的情形不僅見於一般投資人，也常見在創投業與分析師身上。台灣創投業這幾年可說是經營的頗辛苦的，因此一再要求政府放寬其在投資上的限制。然而，他們卻又不願將投資稅率上的優惠予以放棄，不願如同國外一般將創投公司回歸成為一般的投資公司。創投這幾年的困境其實也跟他們的投資理念有關，因為，創投以投資未上市與新創企業為標地。而這種投資分析方式就要強調先見之明，強調要比其他投資人更早掌握住新興產業的發展契機。然而，創投業這幾年的平均每股盈餘，卻遠低於上市公司績優企業的平均每股盈餘。換句話說，隨著台灣資本市場越趨成熟，創業投資公司已如同先進國家般，只剩下小角色在玩了。因為，大型投資機構發現如果有著正確的投資觀念與做法，那麼長期獲利的情形會超過專門研究前瞻產業與投資機會的創投。 既然，以預測產業與企業前景作為投資準則的所謂專業創投公司，其長期報酬率並不突出。那麼以短線預測作為操作的投顧或投資人其長期投資成效又如何呢？只要回顧過去十幾年台灣各大主力大戶的悽慘下場，再瞧瞧投顧一大堆老師被警告、罰款甚至停業、判刑的新聞，或許自詡短線高手的投資人會有著一番警惕。因為，這些號稱短線操作的行家長期下來卻落得上述窘況，那麼只學了半調子的散戶投資人又會有什麼下場呢？
其實，投資大師從來不去管短線的投資時機，因為這種投機操作行為宛如飛蛾撲火般，只會消滅理智的心自取虧損而已。投資大師在投資時也從不自認比市場其他分析師聰明或者消息更靈通，所以葛拉漢他只運用財報所揭示的資訊，根本不理市場小道消息或所謂的內部消息。投資大師同樣也不自詡是個未來趨勢專家或者產業與個股走勢預測大師，他只從物超所值的角度著手，或只投資不需要預測前景的股票。什麼是物超所值的股票呢？要如何判別呢？這也不難，那就是當股價低於淨現值六成的時候。意即當股價達低到扣除商譽與其他無法變現的資產設備，再將企業可變現的價值打個六折時，就是買進股票的時候。這種投資做法簡單易懂人人會作，只是大多數聰明的投資人作不到。為什麼呢？因為這樣一來可以買的股票與時機極少，會讓絕大多數積極聰明的投資人等到打瞌睡。就以台灣股市為例，就是數年前當各銀行股股價被稱為水餃股的時候啦！
投資大師另一個投資理念與做法就是投資不需要進行企業預測的股票。哪一種股票的未來獲利幾乎可以不需要作任何預測而仍能穩定成長呢？基本上，絕對都是各產業的霸主，而且是未來十年都有著『拔劍四顧眼茫然』感嘆著不知有威脅的競爭者在哪裡的遺憾。真的有這種企業嗎？看看台塑、統一超商、、等就可看出些端倪來。雖然這些企業仍會隨著景氣而有所起伏，但每一年都仍保有著絕對的競爭力與極高的每股盈餘。而投資大師所要作的就是平時鎖定這些股票，而後在不景氣的時候逢低大量買進即可。
從投資大師上述兩種投資理念中，我們就會曉得他們從來不自認比其他投資人聰明。因為，不用市場所不知的資訊，也不挑戰超乎人類未來預測能力的分析，只是找出績優企業或者物超所值的股票，靜待投資良機的來臨。這些都是一般投資人可以輕易作到的事，而投資大師也因著這種簡單做法創造出其偉大不平凡的投資成就來。所以，還要自認比其他投資人更聰明更會分析預測嗎？這似乎沒有什麼必要吧！
到底投資大師說這句話的意涵是什麼？這倒有著各種不同的解讀。不過，有一件事倒是不容置疑的，那就是這句話絕對適用於短線想低買高賣的投機客。因為，短線客所謂低買高賣的操作，指的就是在股價短暫下跌時買進，一旦反彈則在高價賣出來賺取短線的價差。由於，這種股價漲跌不是因著股票基本面的變化，而是因著市場面與消息面甚至所謂的心理面的變化而定，因此，恰如高山的天氣一般總是變化莫測瞬息萬變的。而短線客之所以樂於進行這樣的操作，基本上就是自認為可以較其他投資人輕易掌握住市場的變化，或是擁有著特殊的分析技術曉得運用線型或指標，或是其可以預測市場心理。換句話說，就是自認為擁有著較其他投資人聰明的投資操作技術與先見之明啦。
其實，類似的情形不僅見於一般投資人，也常見在創投業與分析師身上。台灣創投業這幾年可說是經營的頗辛苦的，因此一再要求政府放寬其在投資上的限制。然而，他們卻又不願將投資稅率上的優惠予以放棄，不願如同國外一般將創投公司回歸成為一般的投資公司。創投這幾年的困境其實也跟他們的投資理念有關，因為，創投以投資未上市與新創企業為標地。而這種投資分析方式就要強調先見之明，強調要比其他投資人更早掌握住新興產業的發展契機。然而，創投業這幾年的平均每股盈餘，卻遠低於上市公司績優企業的平均每股盈餘。換句話說，隨著台灣資本市場越趨成熟，創業投資公司已如同先進國家般，只剩下小角色在玩了。因為，大型投資機構發現如果有著正確的投資觀念與做法，那麼長期獲利的情形會超過專門研究前瞻產業與投資機會的創投。 既然，以預測產業與企業前景作為投資準則的所謂專業創投公司，其長期報酬率並不突出。那麼以短線預測作為操作的投顧或投資人其長期投資成效又如何呢？只要回顧過去十幾年台灣各大主力大戶的悽慘下場，再瞧瞧投顧一大堆老師被警告、罰款甚至停業、判刑的新聞，或許自詡短線高手的投資人會有著一番警惕。因為，這些號稱短線操作的行家長期下來卻落得上述窘況，那麼只學了半調子的散戶投資人又會有什麼下場呢？
其實，投資大師從來不去管短線的投資時機，因為這種投機操作行為宛如飛蛾撲火般，只會消滅理智的心自取虧損而已。投資大師在投資時也從不自認比市場其他分析師聰明或者消息更靈通，所以葛拉漢他只運用財報所揭示的資訊，根本不理市場小道消息或所謂的內部消息。投資大師同樣也不自詡是個未來趨勢專家或者產業與個股走勢預測大師，他只從物超所值的角度著手，或只投資不需要預測前景的股票。什麼是物超所值的股票呢？要如何判別呢？這也不難，那就是當股價低於淨現值六成的時候。意即當股價達低到扣除商譽與其他無法變現的資產設備，再將企業可變現的價值打個六折時，就是買進股票的時候。這種投資做法簡單易懂人人會作，只是大多數聰明的投資人作不到。為什麼呢？因為這樣一來可以買的股票與時機極少，會讓絕大多數積極聰明的投資人等到打瞌睡。就以台灣股市為例，就是數年前當各銀行股股價被稱為水餃股的時候啦！
投資大師另一個投資理念與做法就是投資不需要進行企業預測的股票。哪一種股票的未來獲利幾乎可以不需要作任何預測而仍能穩定成長呢？基本上，絕對都是各產業的霸主，而且是未來十年都有著『拔劍四顧眼茫然』感嘆著不知有威脅的競爭者在哪裡的遺憾。真的有這種企業嗎？看看台塑、統一超商、、等就可看出些端倪來。雖然這些企業仍會隨著景氣而有所起伏，但每一年都仍保有著絕對的競爭力與極高的每股盈餘。而投資大師所要作的就是平時鎖定這些股票，而後在不景氣的時候逢低大量買進即可。
從投資大師上述兩種投資理念中，我們就會曉得他們從來不自認比其他投資人聰明。因為，不用市場所不知的資訊，也不挑戰超乎人類未來預測能力的分析，只是找出績優企業或者物超所值的股票，靜待投資良機的來臨。這些都是一般投資人可以輕易作到的事，而投資大師也因著這種簡單做法創造出其偉大不平凡的投資成就來。所以，還要自認比其他投資人更聰明更會分析預測嗎？這似乎沒有什麼必要吧！
股票分析貴在專一而不在多
只要是炒股的人，學習各種分析方法的熱情都是相當高的，大大小小的股民培訓班層出不窮，參加培訓的新股民不少，但老股民更多，培訓的內容一般分為初級、中級、進階三個等級，把股市的方方面面都培訓到位。
在股市征戰數年，不可能連KDJ、MACD、每股收益、市盈率這些最基本的分析都不知道吧？
既然知道應用這些最基本的分析指標，何不把它們運用熟練呢？回答是“這些指標沒用”。那麼，這些最基本的指標沒用，誰敢肯定更深的指標就一定有用？指標其實都大同小異，研究透了其中一個指標，其他指標其實都可觸類旁通。
何況牛市有限，生命有限，等到我們把全部分析方法都學會的時候，只怕早已“黃花凋零”。 然而，是不是把所有的技術指標、所有的基本面分析都研究透了，就能獲得高收益。問題的癥結不在於是否能把全部分析法學會，而是能否靈活運用這些方法。
跟老股民聊天是最辛苦的，他們跟你聊天時總是眉飛色舞、頭頭是道，為自己手中的個股進行全方位的診斷，最後還要問一句：“你認為我的股票該拋嗎？”分析得再多，連買賣問題都不能解決，分析又有什麼用？
投資大師巴菲特的投資哲學很簡單，他只是挖掘被低估且有發展潛力的個股，然後長期持有。
索羅斯是個投機大鱷，他的絕招就是在股票市場和期貨間進行跨市套利。然而他們有一個共同點 不追求全盤學透證券知識，只追求自己獨到的絕招。
大家不妨去觀察一下身邊的股市高手是不是如此？
其實，撇開復雜的技術分析和基本面分析，我們完全可以找到更簡單有效的方式，那就是量價時空關係，不同的行情、不同的股票、不同的價位分別以不同的分析方式對待。
如果低位放量不漲，多半是主力吸收籌碼；
如果拉升的過程中成交量均勻且籌碼鎖定良好，突然下跌多半是洗盤；
高位放量滯漲意味著主力很可能出貨，需要小心；
高位突然企穩但成交量並沒隨之放大且下方籌碼在減少，則意味著主力資金的誘多。
在股市征戰數年，不可能連KDJ、MACD、每股收益、市盈率這些最基本的分析都不知道吧？
既然知道應用這些最基本的分析指標，何不把它們運用熟練呢？回答是“這些指標沒用”。那麼，這些最基本的指標沒用，誰敢肯定更深的指標就一定有用？指標其實都大同小異，研究透了其中一個指標，其他指標其實都可觸類旁通。
何況牛市有限，生命有限，等到我們把全部分析方法都學會的時候，只怕早已“黃花凋零”。 然而，是不是把所有的技術指標、所有的基本面分析都研究透了，就能獲得高收益。問題的癥結不在於是否能把全部分析法學會，而是能否靈活運用這些方法。
跟老股民聊天是最辛苦的，他們跟你聊天時總是眉飛色舞、頭頭是道，為自己手中的個股進行全方位的診斷，最後還要問一句：“你認為我的股票該拋嗎？”分析得再多，連買賣問題都不能解決，分析又有什麼用？
投資大師巴菲特的投資哲學很簡單，他只是挖掘被低估且有發展潛力的個股，然後長期持有。
索羅斯是個投機大鱷，他的絕招就是在股票市場和期貨間進行跨市套利。然而他們有一個共同點 不追求全盤學透證券知識，只追求自己獨到的絕招。
大家不妨去觀察一下身邊的股市高手是不是如此？
其實，撇開復雜的技術分析和基本面分析，我們完全可以找到更簡單有效的方式，那就是量價時空關係，不同的行情、不同的股票、不同的價位分別以不同的分析方式對待。
如果低位放量不漲，多半是主力吸收籌碼；
如果拉升的過程中成交量均勻且籌碼鎖定良好，突然下跌多半是洗盤；
高位放量滯漲意味著主力很可能出貨，需要小心；
高位突然企穩但成交量並沒隨之放大且下方籌碼在減少，則意味著主力資金的誘多。
Sunday, May 18, 2008
專注，而不是玩弄花款
不論是工作、投資、弄菜、吃飯，重點不是鑽研花款，而是專心地做好每一件事。
不少新手常以為藍籌的回報一定比二三線股票為差。
事實上是，計入盈利、股價、股息等等因素的穩定性後，大藍籌(尤是金融、地產、公用事業)的長期回報比起中小型股票為佳。
投資宗師(如Warren Buffett、Tony Measor等)多年來一直「Buy & Hold」大藍籌優質公司，並且持之以恆。
修學律宗的有源請教大珠慧海禪師說：「和尚修道，有沒有秘密用功的法門？」
大珠：「有！」
有源：「如何秘密用功？」
大珠：「肚子餓時吃飯，身體睏時睡覺。」
有源不解地說道：「一般人生活都要吃飯睡覺，和禪師的用功不是都相同嗎？」
禪師：「不同。」
有源：「有什麼不同？」
禪師：「一般人吃飯時百般挑剔，嫌肥揀瘦，不肯吃飽，睡時胡思亂想，千般計較。」
吃飯睡覺是多麼簡單的事，可是今天究竟有多少人能舒舒服服的吃飯，安安逸逸的睡覺？可見最平常的事到達平常心的境界，是須經過無數不平常的修持。
禪師們多在「用功」，快快樂樂的把飯吃飽，安安靜靜的把覺睡好。
不少新手常以為藍籌的回報一定比二三線股票為差。
事實上是，計入盈利、股價、股息等等因素的穩定性後，大藍籌(尤是金融、地產、公用事業)的長期回報比起中小型股票為佳。
投資宗師(如Warren Buffett、Tony Measor等)多年來一直「Buy & Hold」大藍籌優質公司，並且持之以恆。
修學律宗的有源請教大珠慧海禪師說：「和尚修道，有沒有秘密用功的法門？」
大珠：「有！」
有源：「如何秘密用功？」
大珠：「肚子餓時吃飯，身體睏時睡覺。」
有源不解地說道：「一般人生活都要吃飯睡覺，和禪師的用功不是都相同嗎？」
禪師：「不同。」
有源：「有什麼不同？」
禪師：「一般人吃飯時百般挑剔，嫌肥揀瘦，不肯吃飽，睡時胡思亂想，千般計較。」
吃飯睡覺是多麼簡單的事，可是今天究竟有多少人能舒舒服服的吃飯，安安逸逸的睡覺？可見最平常的事到達平常心的境界，是須經過無數不平常的修持。
禪師們多在「用功」，快快樂樂的把飯吃飽，安安靜靜的把覺睡好。
真正的對手
投資人的主要的對手有兩個:
1) 市場
2) 自己
但很多時人們往往忘記投資的本質，令很多很簡單的事情複雜化，並與真理越走越遠。
原因有很多，除了市場有太多雜音之外，有人玩弄知識和小聰明，有人迷失與生俱來的「Common Sense」，有人盲從並不願自行思考。
一句話: 「自亂陣腳」
十分矛盾的是，對手的另一身份其實是師友，這很視乎閣下能否察覺出來。
投資的成績表其實是由市場派發，沒有其他人(包括各大師)能斷其對錯，亦沒有特定的考試時間。
閣下可以做的是從過往錯誤中學習。最愚蠢的做法不外乎認為市場時常錯價(當然，市場有時會失效)，而且盲目地認為自己一定比市場聰明得多。
至於自己，則要「Know Thyself」，並且有心理準備自己可能會犯錯。
狂妄自大、是非黑白不分會自我滅亡。
相反，謙遜開明則有助投資人走向正道。
有時套用一些自然定律，不難悟出投資市場的「Common Sense」，多觀察、多反複自行辯論、多讀歷史、多了解人性、多修心養性......別忘記，閣下只是宇宙的一小部份，並永遠不能獨立於大自然。
1) 市場
2) 自己
但很多時人們往往忘記投資的本質，令很多很簡單的事情複雜化，並與真理越走越遠。
原因有很多，除了市場有太多雜音之外，有人玩弄知識和小聰明，有人迷失與生俱來的「Common Sense」，有人盲從並不願自行思考。
一句話: 「自亂陣腳」
十分矛盾的是，對手的另一身份其實是師友，這很視乎閣下能否察覺出來。
投資的成績表其實是由市場派發，沒有其他人(包括各大師)能斷其對錯，亦沒有特定的考試時間。
閣下可以做的是從過往錯誤中學習。最愚蠢的做法不外乎認為市場時常錯價(當然，市場有時會失效)，而且盲目地認為自己一定比市場聰明得多。
至於自己，則要「Know Thyself」，並且有心理準備自己可能會犯錯。
狂妄自大、是非黑白不分會自我滅亡。
相反，謙遜開明則有助投資人走向正道。
有時套用一些自然定律，不難悟出投資市場的「Common Sense」，多觀察、多反複自行辯論、多讀歷史、多了解人性、多修心養性......別忘記，閣下只是宇宙的一小部份，並永遠不能獨立於大自然。
三七分法免走極端
1968年我老曹剛入行之時，對股票其實一竅不通。第一隻買入股票叫城市酒店。至於點樣將5000元本金在五年內（1972年）變成50萬元？我老曹亦記唔起矣。並唔係自己較別人聰明，亦非我老曹曾接受高深教育，而係剛剛趕上香港股票市場最大一個牛市，恒生指數1970年由100點升到1973年3月1774點。當年認識一位十分有分量股票分析員就係森池兄，佢英資證券公司打工，曉分析，因此曉驚。1972年底森池兄同我老曹同時睇淡，在1972年底恒生指數1100點便沽清貨，然後雙雙睇住1973年1月至3月恒生指數由1100點升到1774點。
由此證明，賺錢同高深教育並無關係。我老曹住5000元賺到50萬元理由係無知，人炒自己又炒，呢段日子相信激死唔少有學識之士。認識森池兄之後，我老曹曉驚，反而賺少60％，不過亦因此避過1973年3月至74年7月大跌市。
1974年7月恒生指數回落到450點附近，我老曹以為見底，加上當年我老曹唔識揀股（stock-picking），決定買入當年炒股和記企業（今天和黃前身），而森池兄則選太古地產（即今天太古前身）。我老曹將50萬元分五次入市，由7元開始、6元、5元、4元、3元每次投入10萬元左右買入和記股份，結果十萬股和記，然後睇住佢跌到每股1.1元，全副身家只值11萬元；反之，森池兄所選太古地產因仍派高息，所以跌幅唔大，損失十分有限。呢一役教曉我老曹要做好資料分析，1974年底我老曹失業後便加入《信報》，1975年起便痛下苦功鑽研投資技巧，唔再盲目相信運氣，開始作理性分析。
今天我老曹投資策略有：
一、止蝕唔止賺；
二、有智慧不如趁勢；
三、溝上唔溝落，
都係當年學曉，一直沿用到今天。亦有D情況，有些股份回落15％止蝕後，便掉頭上升，止蝕變成錯誤決定。不過，人生充滿矛盾及無奈，在整個人生過程中，犯錯係免不了.
成功背後是冗長乏味的工作
我老曹今年快六十歲，從事投資已四十年，雖然唔敢誇口「master of the market」，但總算明白乜係「投資」。順勢之時，錢真係會自己流入你袋；反之，逆勢之時，無論你幾努力，結果一樣輸多少。漸漸明白「謀事在人，成事在天」道理，人算不如天算，唔怕你機關算盡，你係鬥唔過個天。
大部分成功者性格都係嚴守紀律，唔任意妄為，同時持之以恒、唔冒大風險。獲少利之時學曉咬住唔放。大部分成功故事背後，都係冗長及乏味工作，而非投機倒把結果。如能養成獨立思考的習慣，以及培養出同群眾持相反意見勇氣，你已成功一半。
其後我老曹認識郭得勝先生，佢教曉我老曹「三七分」，即睇好之時70％股份、30％現金，睇淡之時70％現金、30％股份，做人唔好太極端。之後遇上1982年北京宣布1997年收回香港主權，我老曹便開始採用佢「三七分」法，把30％資金投資海外、70％留在香港；到1997年改為70％投資海外、30％投資香港；2003年才把70％資金投資香港、30％仍留在海外。去年10月改70％現金、30％股票。呢招「三七分」法十分好用，不但避免自己諗法走向極端，同時為我老曹帶來唔少財富。
由此證明，賺錢同高深教育並無關係。我老曹住5000元賺到50萬元理由係無知，人炒自己又炒，呢段日子相信激死唔少有學識之士。認識森池兄之後，我老曹曉驚，反而賺少60％，不過亦因此避過1973年3月至74年7月大跌市。
1974年7月恒生指數回落到450點附近，我老曹以為見底，加上當年我老曹唔識揀股（stock-picking），決定買入當年炒股和記企業（今天和黃前身），而森池兄則選太古地產（即今天太古前身）。我老曹將50萬元分五次入市，由7元開始、6元、5元、4元、3元每次投入10萬元左右買入和記股份，結果十萬股和記，然後睇住佢跌到每股1.1元，全副身家只值11萬元；反之，森池兄所選太古地產因仍派高息，所以跌幅唔大，損失十分有限。呢一役教曉我老曹要做好資料分析，1974年底我老曹失業後便加入《信報》，1975年起便痛下苦功鑽研投資技巧，唔再盲目相信運氣，開始作理性分析。
今天我老曹投資策略有：
一、止蝕唔止賺；
二、有智慧不如趁勢；
三、溝上唔溝落，
都係當年學曉，一直沿用到今天。亦有D情況，有些股份回落15％止蝕後，便掉頭上升，止蝕變成錯誤決定。不過，人生充滿矛盾及無奈，在整個人生過程中，犯錯係免不了.
成功背後是冗長乏味的工作
我老曹今年快六十歲，從事投資已四十年，雖然唔敢誇口「master of the market」，但總算明白乜係「投資」。順勢之時，錢真係會自己流入你袋；反之，逆勢之時，無論你幾努力，結果一樣輸多少。漸漸明白「謀事在人，成事在天」道理，人算不如天算，唔怕你機關算盡，你係鬥唔過個天。
大部分成功者性格都係嚴守紀律，唔任意妄為，同時持之以恒、唔冒大風險。獲少利之時學曉咬住唔放。大部分成功故事背後，都係冗長及乏味工作，而非投機倒把結果。如能養成獨立思考的習慣，以及培養出同群眾持相反意見勇氣，你已成功一半。
其後我老曹認識郭得勝先生，佢教曉我老曹「三七分」，即睇好之時70％股份、30％現金，睇淡之時70％現金、30％股份，做人唔好太極端。之後遇上1982年北京宣布1997年收回香港主權，我老曹便開始採用佢「三七分」法，把30％資金投資海外、70％留在香港；到1997年改為70％投資海外、30％投資香港；2003年才把70％資金投資香港、30％仍留在海外。去年10月改70％現金、30％股票。呢招「三七分」法十分好用，不但避免自己諗法走向極端，同時為我老曹帶來唔少財富。
劉德華投資之道
今天翻開「SCMP」，有一篇訪問劉德華先生有關其投資之道，令筆者既吃驚又不感意外。
通常一般傳媒以「投資電影公司失利」來定位劉德華的理財能力，但事實上又是如何?
自1980年初出道以來，劉天王一直用儲下來的錢做兩樣野:
1) 投資物業，並聘請專業團隊助其分析和交易
2) 不斷投資於匯控,按1980年初匯控每股HK$5計(相等於現今的HK$6.67)，上星期五(5月2日)匯控收市價(HK$136.3)亦暗示很好的長期回報，還未計入不斷增加的豐厚股息收入。
當記者問及劉德華的投資心得，他說不要盲目跟隨群眾的做法，正當每人都走去買股票和炒樓之時，跌市不遠矣。
另外，他只於低位買貨。「Don't follow what the other people are doing. when everyone is buying property, property prices will fall soon. When everyone is buying stocks, the market will collapse.」「I always buy when the market is down」
只是一項物業投資，已賺了約HK$15.6M，其資產值真是深不可測。「I have invested in overseas properties, including a plot of land in LA for US$16M. I sold it to a Taiwanese businessman, earning about US$2M」
筆者心想，坊間不少人一直低估劉德華的智慧。人家投資電影失利數千萬港元，但從演唱會以及廣告收入多年來賺回的，相信遠超於傳媒所提及的電影損失金額。是你們眼光狹窄，還是劉德華深不可測?為何筆者之前說「不感意外」?
若果大家留心一點，劉德華在其主演的電影內早已道出其投資哲學......「又唔係鸁緊，買黎做mud? 」「你要過足癮輸呀，定係悶悶地蠃?」
通常一般傳媒以「投資電影公司失利」來定位劉德華的理財能力，但事實上又是如何?
自1980年初出道以來，劉天王一直用儲下來的錢做兩樣野:
1) 投資物業，並聘請專業團隊助其分析和交易
2) 不斷投資於匯控,按1980年初匯控每股HK$5計(相等於現今的HK$6.67)，上星期五(5月2日)匯控收市價(HK$136.3)亦暗示很好的長期回報，還未計入不斷增加的豐厚股息收入。
當記者問及劉德華的投資心得，他說不要盲目跟隨群眾的做法，正當每人都走去買股票和炒樓之時，跌市不遠矣。
另外，他只於低位買貨。「Don't follow what the other people are doing. when everyone is buying property, property prices will fall soon. When everyone is buying stocks, the market will collapse.」「I always buy when the market is down」
只是一項物業投資，已賺了約HK$15.6M，其資產值真是深不可測。「I have invested in overseas properties, including a plot of land in LA for US$16M. I sold it to a Taiwanese businessman, earning about US$2M」
筆者心想，坊間不少人一直低估劉德華的智慧。人家投資電影失利數千萬港元，但從演唱會以及廣告收入多年來賺回的，相信遠超於傳媒所提及的電影損失金額。是你們眼光狹窄，還是劉德華深不可測?為何筆者之前說「不感意外」?
若果大家留心一點，劉德華在其主演的電影內早已道出其投資哲學......「又唔係鸁緊，買黎做mud? 」「你要過足癮輸呀，定係悶悶地蠃?」
Tuesday, May 6, 2008
怎样减少亏损?
股票投资者，最先要学的，不是怎样赚钱，而是怎样不亏本。
作为散户，我们都是局外人，公司里总有一些黑暗的角落，是我们看不到的，看走了眼，买错股，蒙受亏蚀，是很平常的事。要每一次买进都赚钱，是不可能的，只要做到赚多亏少，就可以致富。
要做到赚多亏少，首先要学习的，是怎样减少亏蚀额。以下是我的一些经验：
1 采取反向策略，尽量买低，越低越好。
大部份股票，在一年中，最高价与最低价相差数十巴仙至数百巴仙不等，你能否赚钱，就看你是在那个价格买进。假如该年的最高价5令吉，最低价为2令吉，价差为2令吉（5令吉－2令吉＝3令吉）。如果你在下价区（2令吉至3令吉）买进，你赚钱的机会，比在高价区（4令吉至5令吉）高一倍。在低价区买进在低价区买进，即使股市逆转，你也有足够的时间抛出，亏蚀的可能性就大大减低。要在低价区买进，就一定要养成反向的习惯，在股市低潮时进场。这种情形，就好像百货公司大减价时去买东西一样。但大部份人刚好相反，股价不动就不买，股价高涨时才追买，难怪多数人亏多赚少。一般的货物，价格越便宜越多人买，只有股票，是越低买的人越少，越高越多人买。
2 建立缓冲区：
刚买进股票时，赚与亏的机会是50%对50%，因为股价上升与下跌的机会相等。股价上升风险减低当股价上升了一截之后，你的风险就相应的减低。当股价上升了50%以上时，你已在安全区了。就好像在战场中，你和敌区之间，有一个阔达5公里的缓冲区，敌人的子弹已射不到你了，你已在安全地带。股票投资的第一个原则是“不亏本”。既然你已在安全区，照理应该任由股价奔跑，以获巨利才对，但大部份人却进行套利，失去了赚得更多的机会。“套利总不会错的”这句话，使人杀掉会生金蛋的鹅。正确的做法是：在建立缓冲区之后，如果公司业绩继续改善，就不脱售。如果它有潜能上升200巴仙的话，为什么要在上升100巴仙之后就脱售，正如一只西瓜，若有可能长大至5公斤，为什么在2公斤时摘掉？这就是我在彦武钢铁的股价上升了一倍以后也不要脱售的原因。
3 将股价与基本面挂勾：跟上述情况相反的，如果公司亏蚀，而且短期内没可能扭转，即使股价已跌了一截，也要卖掉，否则，可能亏得更多，甚至血本无归。
4 设止蚀线：例如跌10%就脱售。
5 假如你左右为难无法决定，就卖一半。
作为散户，我们都是局外人，公司里总有一些黑暗的角落，是我们看不到的，看走了眼，买错股，蒙受亏蚀，是很平常的事。要每一次买进都赚钱，是不可能的，只要做到赚多亏少，就可以致富。
要做到赚多亏少，首先要学习的，是怎样减少亏蚀额。以下是我的一些经验：
1 采取反向策略，尽量买低，越低越好。
大部份股票，在一年中，最高价与最低价相差数十巴仙至数百巴仙不等，你能否赚钱，就看你是在那个价格买进。假如该年的最高价5令吉，最低价为2令吉，价差为2令吉（5令吉－2令吉＝3令吉）。如果你在下价区（2令吉至3令吉）买进，你赚钱的机会，比在高价区（4令吉至5令吉）高一倍。在低价区买进在低价区买进，即使股市逆转，你也有足够的时间抛出，亏蚀的可能性就大大减低。要在低价区买进，就一定要养成反向的习惯，在股市低潮时进场。这种情形，就好像百货公司大减价时去买东西一样。但大部份人刚好相反，股价不动就不买，股价高涨时才追买，难怪多数人亏多赚少。一般的货物，价格越便宜越多人买，只有股票，是越低买的人越少，越高越多人买。
2 建立缓冲区：
刚买进股票时，赚与亏的机会是50%对50%，因为股价上升与下跌的机会相等。股价上升风险减低当股价上升了一截之后，你的风险就相应的减低。当股价上升了50%以上时，你已在安全区了。就好像在战场中，你和敌区之间，有一个阔达5公里的缓冲区，敌人的子弹已射不到你了，你已在安全地带。股票投资的第一个原则是“不亏本”。既然你已在安全区，照理应该任由股价奔跑，以获巨利才对，但大部份人却进行套利，失去了赚得更多的机会。“套利总不会错的”这句话，使人杀掉会生金蛋的鹅。正确的做法是：在建立缓冲区之后，如果公司业绩继续改善，就不脱售。如果它有潜能上升200巴仙的话，为什么要在上升100巴仙之后就脱售，正如一只西瓜，若有可能长大至5公斤，为什么在2公斤时摘掉？这就是我在彦武钢铁的股价上升了一倍以后也不要脱售的原因。
3 将股价与基本面挂勾：跟上述情况相反的，如果公司亏蚀，而且短期内没可能扭转，即使股价已跌了一截，也要卖掉，否则，可能亏得更多，甚至血本无归。
4 设止蚀线：例如跌10%就脱售。
5 假如你左右为难无法决定，就卖一半。
谁赚走了股市的钱？
股市的投资者，很明显的分为两个阵营。
一个阵营是由组织严密，财力雄厚的投资机构组成，他们就是“大户”。
另一个阵营是由财力薄弱的一般股友组成，他们就是“散户”。
在股市中，他们不是对立，而是共存的。
股市犹如一座宝藏股市好比是一座宝藏，大户和散户，好比是两支队伍，同时出发去寻宝。到底是谁捷足先登？
现在让我们看看谁占优势：
投资机构包括单位信托、资产管理公司、外围投资基金、公积金局、保险公司、信托公司及专业投资人等等。
这些机构的特点是：
⑴ 拥有雄厚的财力。可以大量买进，甚至长期有计划地搜购。往往在股价跌至低点时，仍有能力乘低吸购，以降低平均投资成本。成本低，自然较易赚钱。
⑵ 聘用专才管理投资组合。这些人才不但有高学历，而且经验丰富，在买进之前，对购买对象作有系统及深入的研究与分析，认识深入，胜算自然较高。资讯充足快捷
⑶ 资讯充足及快捷。全面搜集世界、国家、行业及个别公司的资料，并且不断地跟进，以了解最新的发展，作为投资参考。
⑷ 由于财雄势大，他们也受到上市公司领导人的重视。通常他们在大量买进之前，都会见公司的领导人及参观公司的设施，实地了解公司，获取第一手资料。这样，自然能作出较为准确的判断，减少投资失误。
散户则刚好相反：
⑴ 资金有限，而且往往在高价时把钱全部投进去，到股市跌至低点时再也没能力买进，结果是投资成本奇高。成本高，不但难赚钱，而且即使有赚，也属有限。
⑵ 投资知识贫乏，对所买股票不甚了解，甚至一无所知。往往只听到一些传言，就冲动去买进，结果抱满了垃圾股，胜算自然较低。
⑶ 对于世界、国家、行业及个别公司的资讯，永远是后知后觉，或是根本不理不睬，不知己亦不知彼，如何能打胜仗？
⑷ 散户由于所持股数有限，通常都没有机会会见公司的领导人，很难获取第一手资料。对比之下，谁先寻到宝藏，一目了然。
是的，股市的钱，大部分是由投资机构赚去。散户所得，只是一些残羹剩肴。更糟糕的是，散户甚至连残羹剩肴也捞不到。散户倾向投机由于财力有限、知识贫乏、资讯不足、后知后觉，大部分散户倾向投机。
长期投机，有如长赌，长赌必输。所以，能在股市赚钱的散户寥寥无几。
散户如要在股市突围，较可靠的途径是：
⑴ 学习投资机构那样，在买进之前，做足功课。不买你不了解的公司的股票。
⑵ 如果你不懂得或是没有时间做功课，一个可行的方法是选定一批“五星级股票”。当股市逆转时，从中选购几个。
⑶ 贴身跟踪公司的进展。只要公司盈利继续增长，就紧握不放，放长线钓大鱼。若公司转盈为亏，立刻溜之大吉，切勿留恋。
⑷ 永不投机。
如能做到上述四点，你也可以找到宝藏。
一个阵营是由组织严密，财力雄厚的投资机构组成，他们就是“大户”。
另一个阵营是由财力薄弱的一般股友组成，他们就是“散户”。
在股市中，他们不是对立，而是共存的。
股市犹如一座宝藏股市好比是一座宝藏，大户和散户，好比是两支队伍，同时出发去寻宝。到底是谁捷足先登？
现在让我们看看谁占优势：
投资机构包括单位信托、资产管理公司、外围投资基金、公积金局、保险公司、信托公司及专业投资人等等。
这些机构的特点是：
⑴ 拥有雄厚的财力。可以大量买进，甚至长期有计划地搜购。往往在股价跌至低点时，仍有能力乘低吸购，以降低平均投资成本。成本低，自然较易赚钱。
⑵ 聘用专才管理投资组合。这些人才不但有高学历，而且经验丰富，在买进之前，对购买对象作有系统及深入的研究与分析，认识深入，胜算自然较高。资讯充足快捷
⑶ 资讯充足及快捷。全面搜集世界、国家、行业及个别公司的资料，并且不断地跟进，以了解最新的发展，作为投资参考。
⑷ 由于财雄势大，他们也受到上市公司领导人的重视。通常他们在大量买进之前，都会见公司的领导人及参观公司的设施，实地了解公司，获取第一手资料。这样，自然能作出较为准确的判断，减少投资失误。
散户则刚好相反：
⑴ 资金有限，而且往往在高价时把钱全部投进去，到股市跌至低点时再也没能力买进，结果是投资成本奇高。成本高，不但难赚钱，而且即使有赚，也属有限。
⑵ 投资知识贫乏，对所买股票不甚了解，甚至一无所知。往往只听到一些传言，就冲动去买进，结果抱满了垃圾股，胜算自然较低。
⑶ 对于世界、国家、行业及个别公司的资讯，永远是后知后觉，或是根本不理不睬，不知己亦不知彼，如何能打胜仗？
⑷ 散户由于所持股数有限，通常都没有机会会见公司的领导人，很难获取第一手资料。对比之下，谁先寻到宝藏，一目了然。
是的，股市的钱，大部分是由投资机构赚去。散户所得，只是一些残羹剩肴。更糟糕的是，散户甚至连残羹剩肴也捞不到。散户倾向投机由于财力有限、知识贫乏、资讯不足、后知后觉，大部分散户倾向投机。
长期投机，有如长赌，长赌必输。所以，能在股市赚钱的散户寥寥无几。
散户如要在股市突围，较可靠的途径是：
⑴ 学习投资机构那样，在买进之前，做足功课。不买你不了解的公司的股票。
⑵ 如果你不懂得或是没有时间做功课，一个可行的方法是选定一批“五星级股票”。当股市逆转时，从中选购几个。
⑶ 贴身跟踪公司的进展。只要公司盈利继续增长，就紧握不放，放长线钓大鱼。若公司转盈为亏，立刻溜之大吉，切勿留恋。
⑷ 永不投机。
如能做到上述四点，你也可以找到宝藏。
“不劳而获”赚钱法
每一个人，在年青时，都应有“防老”意识。
最好是一开始工作时，就作好“防老”规划。
防老规划不影响生活素质“防老”规划，必须以不影响青、中年时期的生活素质为原则。
以牺牲青、中年时期的生活素质，换取晚年生活的保障，不值得。
现在过得不好，将来过得再好，又有什么意义？
晚年要过好日子，其实，不必付出现在过苦日子的代价。
先“苦”后“甜”是落后的想法。
只要有恒心，方向正确，“防老”可以很轻松。请注意“恒心”和“方向”。
“恒心”是化梦想为现实的纪律精神。
“方向”是化梦想为现实的道路。
有恒心，方向错误，事倍功半。有恒心，方向正确，事半功倍。
走错方向，空有恒心，难以达到目的地——“财务独立”。
有恒心，方向正确，走起来轻松愉快，晚年生活丰富多彩。
防老规划的目标是“财务独立”。
实现“财务独立”只能智取，不能力併。“力併”是拼命节省，拼命储蓄。“智取”是“不劳而获”赚钱法。请不要误会，以为我反对储蓄。我只是反对通过拼命节省过苦哈哈日子的储蓄方式。
储蓄是累积原始资本的必须步骤。请你由工作时开始，每个月从你的薪金中拨出百份之二十，存入银行户口，只化掉剩下的百份之八十。先储蓄，再化钱，绝不妥协。储蓄到一个数目，就投资。这个“数目”，可大可小。我的原则是，银行中只能存有足够三个月生活费的钱，超过此数必须拿去投资。切勿将大笔的钱，长期存放银行。
最近跟一名退休银行家喝拉茶聊天。他对我说：“长期把大笔款项存在银行中，笨！”此话出自退休银行家之口，实不寻常。问题是“投资什么？”。
投资于使你“不劳而获”的项目。是的，要懂得“不劳而获”，才能做到“财务独立”。
假如你在三十年前，在吉隆坡的孟沙区，以一万令吉，买进一间单层排屋，现在价值四十万令吉，你赚了三十九万令吉。你付出了多少“劳”力，来赚这三十九万令吉？
没有，你根本没有付出“劳”力。这就叫“不劳而获”赚钱法。
是谁替你赚这三十九万令吉？
答案是“通货膨胀”。
一提到通货膨胀，大家都谈虎色变。通胀猛于虎也！但是，通胀却是投资的好朋友。在通胀之下，你“不劳而获”，轻轻松松赚个盘满钵满。
受苦的是下层阶级。投资于房地产如此，投资于股票亦然。
一万股云顶现值数百万假如你在三十多年前，以一万多令吉买进一万股云顶，从来不卖，现在价值数百万令吉。这数百万令吉的进账，是“不劳而获”的。这“不劳而获”，是来自云顶盈利的持续成长。“成长”是关键所在。
现在你对“防老”规划，应该有一个清楚的概念了。
第一、在不影响生活素质下，定期储蓄。
第二、储蓄到一个数目（由数百至数千），立刻投资, 股票是一个很好的对象，因为可大可小。
第三、只投资于有成长潜能的项目。
第四、长期持有。
第五、切勿停留在储蓄阶段。不懂得什么项目（股票）有成长潜能？马上着手研究吧。
钱是要靠你自己去赚的。
别人没有替你赚钱的义务。
你的人生，由你自己负责。
最好是一开始工作时，就作好“防老”规划。
防老规划不影响生活素质“防老”规划，必须以不影响青、中年时期的生活素质为原则。
以牺牲青、中年时期的生活素质，换取晚年生活的保障，不值得。
现在过得不好，将来过得再好，又有什么意义？
晚年要过好日子，其实，不必付出现在过苦日子的代价。
先“苦”后“甜”是落后的想法。
只要有恒心，方向正确，“防老”可以很轻松。请注意“恒心”和“方向”。
“恒心”是化梦想为现实的纪律精神。
“方向”是化梦想为现实的道路。
有恒心，方向错误，事倍功半。有恒心，方向正确，事半功倍。
走错方向，空有恒心，难以达到目的地——“财务独立”。
有恒心，方向正确，走起来轻松愉快，晚年生活丰富多彩。
防老规划的目标是“财务独立”。
实现“财务独立”只能智取，不能力併。“力併”是拼命节省，拼命储蓄。“智取”是“不劳而获”赚钱法。请不要误会，以为我反对储蓄。我只是反对通过拼命节省过苦哈哈日子的储蓄方式。
储蓄是累积原始资本的必须步骤。请你由工作时开始，每个月从你的薪金中拨出百份之二十，存入银行户口，只化掉剩下的百份之八十。先储蓄，再化钱，绝不妥协。储蓄到一个数目，就投资。这个“数目”，可大可小。我的原则是，银行中只能存有足够三个月生活费的钱，超过此数必须拿去投资。切勿将大笔的钱，长期存放银行。
最近跟一名退休银行家喝拉茶聊天。他对我说：“长期把大笔款项存在银行中，笨！”此话出自退休银行家之口，实不寻常。问题是“投资什么？”。
投资于使你“不劳而获”的项目。是的，要懂得“不劳而获”，才能做到“财务独立”。
假如你在三十年前，在吉隆坡的孟沙区，以一万令吉，买进一间单层排屋，现在价值四十万令吉，你赚了三十九万令吉。你付出了多少“劳”力，来赚这三十九万令吉？
没有，你根本没有付出“劳”力。这就叫“不劳而获”赚钱法。
是谁替你赚这三十九万令吉？
答案是“通货膨胀”。
一提到通货膨胀，大家都谈虎色变。通胀猛于虎也！但是，通胀却是投资的好朋友。在通胀之下，你“不劳而获”，轻轻松松赚个盘满钵满。
受苦的是下层阶级。投资于房地产如此，投资于股票亦然。
一万股云顶现值数百万假如你在三十多年前，以一万多令吉买进一万股云顶，从来不卖，现在价值数百万令吉。这数百万令吉的进账，是“不劳而获”的。这“不劳而获”，是来自云顶盈利的持续成长。“成长”是关键所在。
现在你对“防老”规划，应该有一个清楚的概念了。
第一、在不影响生活素质下，定期储蓄。
第二、储蓄到一个数目（由数百至数千），立刻投资, 股票是一个很好的对象，因为可大可小。
第三、只投资于有成长潜能的项目。
第四、长期持有。
第五、切勿停留在储蓄阶段。不懂得什么项目（股票）有成长潜能？马上着手研究吧。
钱是要靠你自己去赚的。
别人没有替你赚钱的义务。
你的人生，由你自己负责。
钱的三种用途
假如你手头有1万令吉，你会怎样用它？
用钱也好像赚钱一样，花样百出。怎样用法，是个人的选择，无所谓好不。
对我来说，钱的用途有三。
第一种：存银行，这是下策。
理由：通货膨胀率高过银行定期存款利率。把钱长期存放银行，最后得不偿失。是的，存款人是会得到一点利息。但在现实生活中，发达的多数是付利息的人，因为他们懂得利用别人的钱去赚钱。收利息人很少有发达的，因为他只懂得利用自己的钱去赚钱，自己的钱有限，所得回酬微不足道，怎能发达？做生意、投资而发达的人，我见得多了，可从来没听说过有靠利息收入而发达的。投资家向银行借钱投资，获丰厚回酬而致富，所借的正是你存在银行的钱，你为什么不自己投资而致富？长期把钱存放银行，吃亏的既然是存款人，为什么还有那么多人排除去存款？答案是（1）不懂得投资；（2）因为害怕失掉。钱赚来不易，害怕失掉它，这是投资的最大心理障碍。吃亏总比亏掉好，所以大部份人选择定存。
第二种：花掉，这是中策。
三十年前，7万令吉就可以买到一间独立式洋楼。三十年后的今天，7万令吉只够买一间廉价屋。通货膨胀是金钱之大敌，它在人们不知不觉中，吃掉金钱的价值。如果你不会投资，与其把钱长期存在银行，不如把钱花掉更合算。同样数目的钱，现在所能买到的东西，肯定比将来的多。
第三种：投资，这是上策。
把钱投资在可以增值的资产，或是可以使钱生子又生孙的事业上，似雪球般越滚越大，抵消通膨而有余。钱永远不够你只应把相当于六个月生活费的钱存放在银行，其余的应全部用来投资。一有多余的钱就投资，不要等待存到所谓“足够”时才投资。因为钱永远是不够的。切勿把钱花在购买消费性的资产上，如汽车，它的贬值比货币的贬值更快，你会遭受通膨加贬值的双重损失。
采用上策，你有机会成为富人.
采用中策，你享受了人生。
采用下策，你注定一辈子平凡。
你属于那一种人，决定于你采用何“策”。
用钱也好像赚钱一样，花样百出。怎样用法，是个人的选择，无所谓好不。
对我来说，钱的用途有三。
第一种：存银行，这是下策。
理由：通货膨胀率高过银行定期存款利率。把钱长期存放银行，最后得不偿失。是的，存款人是会得到一点利息。但在现实生活中，发达的多数是付利息的人，因为他们懂得利用别人的钱去赚钱。收利息人很少有发达的，因为他只懂得利用自己的钱去赚钱，自己的钱有限，所得回酬微不足道，怎能发达？做生意、投资而发达的人，我见得多了，可从来没听说过有靠利息收入而发达的。投资家向银行借钱投资，获丰厚回酬而致富，所借的正是你存在银行的钱，你为什么不自己投资而致富？长期把钱存放银行，吃亏的既然是存款人，为什么还有那么多人排除去存款？答案是（1）不懂得投资；（2）因为害怕失掉。钱赚来不易，害怕失掉它，这是投资的最大心理障碍。吃亏总比亏掉好，所以大部份人选择定存。
第二种：花掉，这是中策。
三十年前，7万令吉就可以买到一间独立式洋楼。三十年后的今天，7万令吉只够买一间廉价屋。通货膨胀是金钱之大敌，它在人们不知不觉中，吃掉金钱的价值。如果你不会投资，与其把钱长期存在银行，不如把钱花掉更合算。同样数目的钱，现在所能买到的东西，肯定比将来的多。
第三种：投资，这是上策。
把钱投资在可以增值的资产，或是可以使钱生子又生孙的事业上，似雪球般越滚越大，抵消通膨而有余。钱永远不够你只应把相当于六个月生活费的钱存放在银行，其余的应全部用来投资。一有多余的钱就投资，不要等待存到所谓“足够”时才投资。因为钱永远是不够的。切勿把钱花在购买消费性的资产上，如汽车，它的贬值比货币的贬值更快，你会遭受通膨加贬值的双重损失。
采用上策，你有机会成为富人.
采用中策，你享受了人生。
采用下策，你注定一辈子平凡。
你属于那一种人，决定于你采用何“策”。
Monday, May 5, 2008
Elliot Waves and the Fibonacci Sequence
Ralph Nelson Elliot was born in 1871 in Kansas, and became an accountant in the closing years of the 19th century.
In the late 1920’s, Elliot developed anemia, probably as a result of an infection sustained in Latin America. He was apparently bedridden for several years and during this period began his study of the stock market. Elliot subsequently declared that he had deduced “a law-abiding rhythmic pattern of waves,” which he explained in the late 1930’s in articles for Financial World (a leading stock market magazine of the time) and in a book published in 1938, entitled The Wave Principle. He died in 1948.
Elliot believed that the stock market moves through a “Super Cycle” of from 15 to 20 years, which in turn moves within a “Grand Super Cycle” of at least 50 years, which moves within an even longer cycle of approximately 200 years. Each cycle contains smaller cycles, ending in the “sub-Minuette,” which lasts only a few hours.
A cycle, according to Elliot, is formed by movements of stock prices that occur in patterns that he called waves, hence his approach is known today as Elliot Wave Theory.
Each cycle contains eight waves, declared Elliot, five of which are dominated by “impulse waves,” that is, waves that push prices up, and three of which are bearish, i.e., dominated by “corrective waves,” during which gains are lost to varying degrees.
To anticipate waves, Elliot cited the Fibonacci sequence of numbers, which begins with “0” and “1,” followed by the sum of the two preceding numbers, i.e., 0, 1, 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 13, 21, 34, 55, 89, 133, 233, 377, 610, 987, 1597...
There are scattered references to this sequence in the literature of ancient India, but the concept was independently introduced to Western civilization in the early 13th century by an Italian mathematician, Leonardo Fibonacci, also known as Leonardo of Pisa. He put forth the concept to predict the growth of a hypothetical population of rabbits. Over the past century, Fibonacci’s discovery has found many uses in high-level mathematics and the sciences.
Elliot wrote that stock prices follow the pattern set forth by the Fibonacci sequence, but his explanations of the process are contradictory in many details and do not strictly adhere to a Fibonacci analysis.
Elliot, as noted above, asserted that a price cycle will have five waves that are primarily bullish (that is, dominated by “impulse” waves) and three waves that are bearish (that is, with “corrective” waves predominating). This does not mean that the first five waves will be uniformly upward and followed by three downward waves. Rather, the first waves will consist of a sequence of upward movements followed by relatively shallow pull-packs. The market will then peak, to be followed by a period of price declines with temporary bear rallies during which prices will regain some lost ground only to return to the downside.
By writing in terms of waves within cycles, which in turn are in larger cycles, and by introducing Fibonacci numbers into the discussion, Elliot broke new ground. However, his general idea was not new. In fact, it is standard Dow Theory in that it reflects that a bull market will have a series of peaks that reach new highs, interspersed by declines that stay above previously lows, until such point that the bull market peaks. At this juncture, some of the gains of the bull market will be surrendered (there will be a correction) as prices decline but with the decline interrupted by a bear rally of limited duration (reaching a point below the previous high). While traditional technicians explain this phenomenon by speaking in terms of market psychology inducing changes in the supply and demand of stocks, Elliot cited “the laws of nature” as reflected by, among other factors, Fibonacci numbers.
Wave theory was popularized among the general public in the early 1980’s by Robert Prechter, the author of an investment newsletter who made headlines when he correctly anticipated the start of the bull market in 1982. However, Prechter was blindsided by the market crash of October 1987 and further damaged his reputation when he subsequently became inordinately bearish, going so far as to predict that the Dow Jones indexes would bottom-out at levels not seen since the Truman Administration. Thereafter, Elliot’s renown has been essentially limited to committed technicians.
Elliot took a very long-term view of cycles, which might be easy to dismiss; after all, 200 years seems to be beyond the concern of even the most steadfast of “buy and hold” investors. Nonetheless, Elliot must be given credit for introducing a broad historical approach to stock market analysis.
Elliot's analysis is flawed in that it does not provide a clear roadmap as claimed (such roadmap is an impossibility) and, moreover, his writings are nebulous, contradictory or non-objective on many points. Nonetheless, Elliot broadened the field of stock market analysis by introducing a very long-term historical viewpoint and he also deserves credit for introducing Fibonacci numbers, which subsequently developed into a fertile ground for investment research.
In the late 1920’s, Elliot developed anemia, probably as a result of an infection sustained in Latin America. He was apparently bedridden for several years and during this period began his study of the stock market. Elliot subsequently declared that he had deduced “a law-abiding rhythmic pattern of waves,” which he explained in the late 1930’s in articles for Financial World (a leading stock market magazine of the time) and in a book published in 1938, entitled The Wave Principle. He died in 1948.
Elliot believed that the stock market moves through a “Super Cycle” of from 15 to 20 years, which in turn moves within a “Grand Super Cycle” of at least 50 years, which moves within an even longer cycle of approximately 200 years. Each cycle contains smaller cycles, ending in the “sub-Minuette,” which lasts only a few hours.
A cycle, according to Elliot, is formed by movements of stock prices that occur in patterns that he called waves, hence his approach is known today as Elliot Wave Theory.
Each cycle contains eight waves, declared Elliot, five of which are dominated by “impulse waves,” that is, waves that push prices up, and three of which are bearish, i.e., dominated by “corrective waves,” during which gains are lost to varying degrees.
To anticipate waves, Elliot cited the Fibonacci sequence of numbers, which begins with “0” and “1,” followed by the sum of the two preceding numbers, i.e., 0, 1, 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 13, 21, 34, 55, 89, 133, 233, 377, 610, 987, 1597...
There are scattered references to this sequence in the literature of ancient India, but the concept was independently introduced to Western civilization in the early 13th century by an Italian mathematician, Leonardo Fibonacci, also known as Leonardo of Pisa. He put forth the concept to predict the growth of a hypothetical population of rabbits. Over the past century, Fibonacci’s discovery has found many uses in high-level mathematics and the sciences.
Elliot wrote that stock prices follow the pattern set forth by the Fibonacci sequence, but his explanations of the process are contradictory in many details and do not strictly adhere to a Fibonacci analysis.
Elliot, as noted above, asserted that a price cycle will have five waves that are primarily bullish (that is, dominated by “impulse” waves) and three waves that are bearish (that is, with “corrective” waves predominating). This does not mean that the first five waves will be uniformly upward and followed by three downward waves. Rather, the first waves will consist of a sequence of upward movements followed by relatively shallow pull-packs. The market will then peak, to be followed by a period of price declines with temporary bear rallies during which prices will regain some lost ground only to return to the downside.
By writing in terms of waves within cycles, which in turn are in larger cycles, and by introducing Fibonacci numbers into the discussion, Elliot broke new ground. However, his general idea was not new. In fact, it is standard Dow Theory in that it reflects that a bull market will have a series of peaks that reach new highs, interspersed by declines that stay above previously lows, until such point that the bull market peaks. At this juncture, some of the gains of the bull market will be surrendered (there will be a correction) as prices decline but with the decline interrupted by a bear rally of limited duration (reaching a point below the previous high). While traditional technicians explain this phenomenon by speaking in terms of market psychology inducing changes in the supply and demand of stocks, Elliot cited “the laws of nature” as reflected by, among other factors, Fibonacci numbers.
Wave theory was popularized among the general public in the early 1980’s by Robert Prechter, the author of an investment newsletter who made headlines when he correctly anticipated the start of the bull market in 1982. However, Prechter was blindsided by the market crash of October 1987 and further damaged his reputation when he subsequently became inordinately bearish, going so far as to predict that the Dow Jones indexes would bottom-out at levels not seen since the Truman Administration. Thereafter, Elliot’s renown has been essentially limited to committed technicians.
Elliot took a very long-term view of cycles, which might be easy to dismiss; after all, 200 years seems to be beyond the concern of even the most steadfast of “buy and hold” investors. Nonetheless, Elliot must be given credit for introducing a broad historical approach to stock market analysis.
Elliot's analysis is flawed in that it does not provide a clear roadmap as claimed (such roadmap is an impossibility) and, moreover, his writings are nebulous, contradictory or non-objective on many points. Nonetheless, Elliot broadened the field of stock market analysis by introducing a very long-term historical viewpoint and he also deserves credit for introducing Fibonacci numbers, which subsequently developed into a fertile ground for investment research.
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