12-Month Target Price: S$0.69
Market Value -Total: S$5,923.2 mln
NTA/Share (S$) 0.16
Book Value/Share (S$) 0.35
No. of outstanding shares (mln) 9,631.2
52-week Share Price Range (S$) 0.59-0.925
Major Shareholders: Genting Berhad 56.6
Recommendation & Investment Risks
• We maintain our Hold recommendation with a lower 12-month target price of S$0.69 (previously S$0.81).
• Our target price continues to be based on RNAV. We have valued the Sentosa project based on a combination of DCF with implied IRR of 15% and EV/EBITDA (target 14x 2010 discounted at 15%). We continue to attach a premium to RNAV to reflect potential
enhancements from future projects, but have lowered the premium to 10% from 20% given the delays in further liberalization in U.K.’s casino industry and the fact that new major projects are not likely in the immediate term.
• GIL’s earnings predictability is low as fair value gains/losses, project costs and exchange gains/losses can result in volatility in the bottomline. Nonetheless, the focus is not on near-term earnings but on the potential contribution from the Sentosa project as well as opportunities for GIL to participate in future liberalization of the casino industry in Asia and the U.K.
• Risks to our recommendation and target price include regulatory risk, and rising competition that comes with the regulatory reforms in U.K.’s casino industry and potential legalization of casino activities in various Asian countries. Additionally, successful execution of the Sentosa project is key.
Results Review & Earnings Outlook
• GIL’s recurring earnings were below our expectations due to the weaker than- expected performance of the U.K. casinos, following the gaming duty hike in Apr. 2007 and the smoking ban in Jul. 2007.
• The main interest in GIL is not on the existing operations, but rather the Singapore integrated resort (Resorts World at Sentosa). Construction for the project is on track and the resort is slated for a soft opening in early 2010. As at end 2007, over S$600 mln of contracts have been awarded and another S$1 bln will be awarded in 1H2008. Resorts World at Sentosa had earlier this month secured S$4 bln of credit facilities to part finance the S$6 bln project.
• GIL reported a net loss of S$381.5 mln due to a S$472.7 mln impairment charge for its U.K. operations. This largely relates to the valuation of Stanley Leisure following the gaming duty hike and smoking ban. At the operational level (excluding one-off items), the leisure & hospitality division was profitable (S$66.6 mln operating profit vs S$38.5 mln in 2006).
• We have lowered our earnings projections after factoring in a tougher operating environment for its U.K. casinos. Aside from the duty hike and smoking ban, there has been a slight slowdown in some of its markets as a result of the credit crunch, while overheads will be higher due to the opening of new casinos. GIL has been granted 6 new casino licenses – one was opened in May 2007 (Nottingham) and one in Dec. 2007 (Liverpool).
Wednesday, February 27, 2008
Inter-Roller : Abysmal Results
Comment on Results
IRL posted FY07 results that were below expectations, as earnings declined by 33% yoy to S$17.4m as revenue also dipped by 14% yoy to S$127m. Excluding an exceptional investment gain of S$13m, core net earnings would have fallen by 83% yoy. The Group also posted a very poor 4Q07, which saw the Group slip into losses for the first time since 3Q02, or more than 5 years ago, as the Group’s bottom line was impacted by higher material costs as well as forex losses of c. S$3m in the quarter. 4Q07 losses came in at S$4.2m versus a profit of S$4.4m a year ago.
A final net dividend of 0.5cts was declared.
Recommendation
Current order book stands at S$113m and the Group continues to bid for more contracts globally. Whilst FY08 revenue may improve from FY07, we are now increasingly more concerned about higher material costs squeezing the Group’s margins. We have lowered our FY08 earnings estimates by 40% to S$13.7m
to account for lower margins, although there still may be more downside risk to our estimates given the really weak 4Q results that we saw.
We downgrade the stock to a SELL, with a target price of S$0.42, based on 10x our new FY08 earnings estimates.
IRL posted FY07 results that were below expectations, as earnings declined by 33% yoy to S$17.4m as revenue also dipped by 14% yoy to S$127m. Excluding an exceptional investment gain of S$13m, core net earnings would have fallen by 83% yoy. The Group also posted a very poor 4Q07, which saw the Group slip into losses for the first time since 3Q02, or more than 5 years ago, as the Group’s bottom line was impacted by higher material costs as well as forex losses of c. S$3m in the quarter. 4Q07 losses came in at S$4.2m versus a profit of S$4.4m a year ago.
A final net dividend of 0.5cts was declared.
Recommendation
Current order book stands at S$113m and the Group continues to bid for more contracts globally. Whilst FY08 revenue may improve from FY07, we are now increasingly more concerned about higher material costs squeezing the Group’s margins. We have lowered our FY08 earnings estimates by 40% to S$13.7m
to account for lower margins, although there still may be more downside risk to our estimates given the really weak 4Q results that we saw.
We downgrade the stock to a SELL, with a target price of S$0.42, based on 10x our new FY08 earnings estimates.
12 Steps to Financial Disaster
I would tell audiences that we were facing not a bubble but a froth – lots of small, local bubbles that never grew to a scale that could threaten the health of the overall economy.” Alan Greenspan, The Age of Turbulence.
That used to be Mr Greenspan’s view of the US housing bubble. He was wrong, alas. So how bad might this downturn get? To answer this question we should ask a true bear. My favourite one is Nouriel Roubini of New York University’s Stern School of Business, founder of RGE monitor.
Recently, Professor Roubini’s scenarios have been dire enough to make the flesh creep. But his thinking deserves to be taken seriously. He first predicted a US recession in July 2006*. At that time, his view was extremely controversial. It is so no longer. Now he states that there is “a rising probability of a ‘catastrophic’ financial and economic outcome”**. The characteristics of this scenario are, he argues: “A vicious circle where a deep recession makes the financial losses more severe and where, in turn, large and growing financial losses and a financial meltdown make the recession even more severe.”
Prof Roubini is even fonder of lists than I am. Here are his 12 – yes, 12 – steps to financial disaster.
Step one is the worst housing recession in US history. House prices will, he says, fall by 20 to 30 per cent from their peak, which would wipe out between $4,000bn and $6,000bn in household wealth. Ten million households will end up with negative equity and so with a huge incentive to put the house keys in the post and depart for greener fields. Many more home-builders will be bankrupted.
Step two would be further losses, beyond the $250bn-$300bn now estimated, for subprime mortgages. About 60 per cent of all mortgage origination between 2005 and 2007 had “reckless or toxic features”, argues Prof Roubini. Goldman Sachs estimates mortgage losses at $400bn. But if home prices fell by more than 20 per cent, losses would be bigger. That would further impair the banks’ ability to offer credit.
Step three would be big losses on unsecured consumer debt: credit cards, auto loans, student loans and so forth. The “credit crunch” would then spread from mortgages to a wide range of consumer credit.
Step four would be the downgrading of the monoline insurers, which do not deserve the AAA rating on which their business depends. A further $150bn writedown of asset-backed securities would then ensue.
Step five would be the meltdown of the commercial property market, while step six would be bankruptcy of a large regional or national bank.
Step seven would be big losses on reckless leveraged buy-outs. Hundreds of billions of dollars of such loans are now stuck on the balance sheets of financial institutions.
Step eight would be a wave of corporate defaults. On average, US companies are in decent shape, but a “fat tail” of companies has low profitability and heavy debt. Such defaults would spread losses in “credit default swaps”, which insure such debt. The losses could be $250bn. Some insurers might go bankrupt.
Step nine would be a meltdown in the “shadow financial system”. Dealing with the distress of hedge funds, special investment vehicles and so forth will be made more difficult by the fact that they have no direct access to lending from central banks.
Step 10 would be a further collapse in stock prices. Failures of hedge funds, margin calls and shorting could lead to cascading falls in prices.
Step 11 would be a drying-up of liquidity in a range of financial markets, including interbank and money markets. Behind this would be a jump in concerns about solvency.
Step 12 would be “a vicious circle of losses, capital reduction, credit contraction, forced liquidation and fire sales of assets at below fundamental prices”.
These, then, are 12 steps to meltdown. In all, argues Prof Roubini: “Total losses in the financial system will add up to more than $1,000bn and the economic recession will become deeper more protracted and severe.” This, he suggests, is the “nightmare scenario” keeping Ben Bernanke and colleagues at the US Federal Reserve awake. It explains why, having failed to appreciate the dangers for so long, the Fed has lowered rates by 200 basis points this year. This is insurance against a financial meltdown.
Is this kind of scenario at least plausible? It is. Furthermore, we can be confident that it would, if it came to pass, end all stories about “decoupling”. If it lasts six quarters, as Prof Roubini warns, offsetting policy action in the rest of the world would be too little, too late.
Can the Fed head this danger off? In a subsequent piece, Prof Roubini gives eight reasons why it cannot***. (He really loves lists!) These are, in brief: US monetary easing is constrained by risks to the dollar and inflation; aggressive easing deals only with illiquidity, not insolvency; the monoline insurers will lose their credit ratings, with dire consequences; overall losses will be too large for sovereign wealth funds to deal with; public intervention is too small to stabilise housing losses; the Fed cannot address the problems of the shadow financial system; regulators cannot find a good middle way between transparency over losses and regulatory forbearance, both of which are needed; and, finally, the transactions-oriented financial system is itself in deep crisis.
The risks are indeed high and the ability of the authorities to deal with them more limited than most people hope. This is not to suggest that there are no ways out. Unfortunately, they are poisonous ones. In the last resort, governments resolve financial crises. This is an iron law. Rescues can occur via overt government assumption of bad debt, inflation, or both. Japan chose the first, much to the distaste of its ministry of finance. But Japan is a creditor country whose savers have complete confidence in the solvency of their government. The US, however, is a debtor. It must keep the trust of foreigners. Should it fail to do so, the inflationary solution becomes probable. This is quite enough to explain why gold costs $920 an ounce.
The connection between the bursting of the housing bubble and the fragility of the financial system has created huge dangers, for the US and the rest of the world. The US public sector is now coming to the rescue, led by the Fed. In the end, they will succeed. But the journey is likely to be wretchedly uncomfortable.
That used to be Mr Greenspan’s view of the US housing bubble. He was wrong, alas. So how bad might this downturn get? To answer this question we should ask a true bear. My favourite one is Nouriel Roubini of New York University’s Stern School of Business, founder of RGE monitor.
Recently, Professor Roubini’s scenarios have been dire enough to make the flesh creep. But his thinking deserves to be taken seriously. He first predicted a US recession in July 2006*. At that time, his view was extremely controversial. It is so no longer. Now he states that there is “a rising probability of a ‘catastrophic’ financial and economic outcome”**. The characteristics of this scenario are, he argues: “A vicious circle where a deep recession makes the financial losses more severe and where, in turn, large and growing financial losses and a financial meltdown make the recession even more severe.”
Prof Roubini is even fonder of lists than I am. Here are his 12 – yes, 12 – steps to financial disaster.
Step one is the worst housing recession in US history. House prices will, he says, fall by 20 to 30 per cent from their peak, which would wipe out between $4,000bn and $6,000bn in household wealth. Ten million households will end up with negative equity and so with a huge incentive to put the house keys in the post and depart for greener fields. Many more home-builders will be bankrupted.
Step two would be further losses, beyond the $250bn-$300bn now estimated, for subprime mortgages. About 60 per cent of all mortgage origination between 2005 and 2007 had “reckless or toxic features”, argues Prof Roubini. Goldman Sachs estimates mortgage losses at $400bn. But if home prices fell by more than 20 per cent, losses would be bigger. That would further impair the banks’ ability to offer credit.
Step three would be big losses on unsecured consumer debt: credit cards, auto loans, student loans and so forth. The “credit crunch” would then spread from mortgages to a wide range of consumer credit.
Step four would be the downgrading of the monoline insurers, which do not deserve the AAA rating on which their business depends. A further $150bn writedown of asset-backed securities would then ensue.
Step five would be the meltdown of the commercial property market, while step six would be bankruptcy of a large regional or national bank.
Step seven would be big losses on reckless leveraged buy-outs. Hundreds of billions of dollars of such loans are now stuck on the balance sheets of financial institutions.
Step eight would be a wave of corporate defaults. On average, US companies are in decent shape, but a “fat tail” of companies has low profitability and heavy debt. Such defaults would spread losses in “credit default swaps”, which insure such debt. The losses could be $250bn. Some insurers might go bankrupt.
Step nine would be a meltdown in the “shadow financial system”. Dealing with the distress of hedge funds, special investment vehicles and so forth will be made more difficult by the fact that they have no direct access to lending from central banks.
Step 10 would be a further collapse in stock prices. Failures of hedge funds, margin calls and shorting could lead to cascading falls in prices.
Step 11 would be a drying-up of liquidity in a range of financial markets, including interbank and money markets. Behind this would be a jump in concerns about solvency.
Step 12 would be “a vicious circle of losses, capital reduction, credit contraction, forced liquidation and fire sales of assets at below fundamental prices”.
These, then, are 12 steps to meltdown. In all, argues Prof Roubini: “Total losses in the financial system will add up to more than $1,000bn and the economic recession will become deeper more protracted and severe.” This, he suggests, is the “nightmare scenario” keeping Ben Bernanke and colleagues at the US Federal Reserve awake. It explains why, having failed to appreciate the dangers for so long, the Fed has lowered rates by 200 basis points this year. This is insurance against a financial meltdown.
Is this kind of scenario at least plausible? It is. Furthermore, we can be confident that it would, if it came to pass, end all stories about “decoupling”. If it lasts six quarters, as Prof Roubini warns, offsetting policy action in the rest of the world would be too little, too late.
Can the Fed head this danger off? In a subsequent piece, Prof Roubini gives eight reasons why it cannot***. (He really loves lists!) These are, in brief: US monetary easing is constrained by risks to the dollar and inflation; aggressive easing deals only with illiquidity, not insolvency; the monoline insurers will lose their credit ratings, with dire consequences; overall losses will be too large for sovereign wealth funds to deal with; public intervention is too small to stabilise housing losses; the Fed cannot address the problems of the shadow financial system; regulators cannot find a good middle way between transparency over losses and regulatory forbearance, both of which are needed; and, finally, the transactions-oriented financial system is itself in deep crisis.
The risks are indeed high and the ability of the authorities to deal with them more limited than most people hope. This is not to suggest that there are no ways out. Unfortunately, they are poisonous ones. In the last resort, governments resolve financial crises. This is an iron law. Rescues can occur via overt government assumption of bad debt, inflation, or both. Japan chose the first, much to the distaste of its ministry of finance. But Japan is a creditor country whose savers have complete confidence in the solvency of their government. The US, however, is a debtor. It must keep the trust of foreigners. Should it fail to do so, the inflationary solution becomes probable. This is quite enough to explain why gold costs $920 an ounce.
The connection between the bursting of the housing bubble and the fragility of the financial system has created huge dangers, for the US and the rest of the world. The US public sector is now coming to the rescue, led by the Fed. In the end, they will succeed. But the journey is likely to be wretchedly uncomfortable.
Tuesday, February 26, 2008
“Stress-testing” Singapore Inc
“What if” analysis should growth slow more than expected
Although our economics team maintains the fundamental view that Singapore’s growth can withstand a USA slowdown and will continue to grow at above 6% for 2008-09, we have done a bottom-up stress-test to assess the earnings risks and valuation contraction for the top-25 stocks listed in Singapore should global growth slow.
Bear case scenario: 13% downside to 2008 profit forecasts
If one assumes that the Singapore economy slows to 2-3% similar to the level experienced in 2002-03, we forecast that in aggregate there could be a 13% downside to the current 2008 earnings forecasts under the bear-case scenario.
De-rating possibilities? Looking through past experiences
Meanwhile, we have also provided a comparative valuation looking at the trough multiples that these stocks have traded in past bear markets (ie. 1998 Asian crisis, 2002/3 SARS, Sept 11) to assess the de-rating risks of the respective stocks.
Conclusion: Identifying risks sectors and safe havens
In conclusion, we note that the financials, airlines, shipbuilding and petrochemical sectors are most exposed to a global and Singapore growth slowdown.
Meanwhile, the telecoms and the REITs sectors are the most defensive with respectable dividend yields.
Singapore big cap stocks with the greatest earnings risks (>15%)
SGX -30% Less frenetic stock trading activities
SPC -30% Lower oil demand impacting refining margins
Noble -26% Lower tonnage traded and easing in freight rates
Cosco Corp -26% Lower shipyard revenue due to possible order delays
SIA -23% Revenue-led decline in operating margins
DBS -20% Falling loans growth and SIBOR decline
Keppel Land -20% Lower office rental and residential selling prices
ST Eng -20% High exposure to USA and European aerospace
UOB -15% Falling loans growth and SIBOR decline
OCBC -15% Falling loans growth
DBS
Earnings for DBS in geographic terms come from Singapore and HK. DBS's profits are sensitive to (1) slower loan growth from regional corporates, and (2) fall in SIBOR, caused by a drop in US interest rates, depressing its margins. Provisions are of lesser concern, in our view.
UOB
Earnings are mainly from Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand in that order of importance. Bear-scenario would mean slower loan growth from its bread-and-butter mortgage and SME
customers as well as fewer fees earned from sale of wealth management products. Less negative impact on margins from fall in SIBOR compared to DBS. Provisions are of lesser concern, in our view.
OCBC
Earnings are from Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia in that order of importance. Bear-scenario would mean slower loan growth and much lower investment returns earned at its 87%-held insurer Great Eastern Hldgs. Less impact than DBS as a falling SIBOR helps OCBC's margins. Provisions are of lesser concern, in our view.
SGX
About 20% of turnover activity comes from overseas companies listed on SGX, mostly from China, Indonesia, Thailand and India. A general fall in trading activity would have an outsized impact on profits due to the significant operational leverage of the exchange model.
CapitaMall Trust
Limited downside to 2008 estimates. 22% of the portfolio expires in 2008. If we assume expires are transacted at S$8psf (vs current assumption of S$10.50psf) our earnings would fall by less than 2%.
Ascendas
Limited downside to 2008 estimates. 11% of the portfolio is exposed to lease expiry during 2008. If we assume flat rental growth for this portion of the portfolio then our 2008 NPAT would fall by less than 1%.
CapitalCommercial Trust
Limited downside to 2008 estimates. 30% of the portfolio is expiring in 2008. If we assume expires are transacted at S$7psf (vs current assumption of S$10psf) our earnings would fall by less than 3%.
SPC
Downside to earnings due to 1) lower oil demand growth in US and Asia thus affecting oil price and refining margins; 2) new refinery coming onstream in India, thus potential oversupply of refined product in 2H08; 3) lower levels of maintenance shutdown by refineries in 2Q; 4) higher than normal levels of exports from Europe, especially fuel oil.
Economic decoupling?
Singapore: Benefiting from Diversification
We think Singapore is well positioned to cope with a slowdown in the US economy and we are therefore unlikely to see a repeat of the simultaneous recessions experienced back in 2001-02.
Our optimism firstly stems from the fact that the emergence of emerging markets and the commodities boom has led to a more diversified global economy. This has reduced the importance of the US as a final destination of goods.
Secondly, an on-going structural transformation means that Singapore has a more diversified set of growth drivers (eg, pharmaceuticals, financial services, tourism, education, etc…) that it can rely on to offset slower US/tech demand.
Thirdly, domestic demand is the middle of a robust expansion on account: (a) a tight labor market (which is underpinning consumer spending) and (b) the need to upgrade/expand the physical infrastructure and housing supply (which is underpinning construction).
As a consequence, we expect Singapore’s economy to be only mildly effected by the US downturn. We are forecasting GDP growth to average 6.3% in 2008- 09, compared to an estimate of 7.8% in 2007.
US economic slowdown hard to ignore
As one of Asia’s most trade-intensive economies, it is difficult for Singapore to ignore the impact of a US slowdown, nevertheless a recession. Measured as a proportion of GDP, exports to the US stood at 12.4% in 2006, which is the second highest in the region after Malaysia.
Repeat of simultaneous recessions in 2001-02 unlikely
We, however, think that the Singapore economy will not follow the US downwards like it did back in 2001-02, which was the last time both countries jointly fell into recession in the wake of NASDAQ/Internet/ICT meltdown. This is because: (1) the global economy is more diversified now and (2) Singapore’s domestic economy is in the midst of ongoing structural shift/upturn – where the electronics sector is being gradually replaced by new drivers of growth.
A more diversified global economy
Evidence that the world economy has become more diversified and/or the importance of the US has diminished can be shown two ways. Firstly, chart 2 shows that Singapore’s exports to the US are on the decline, accounting for 8.8% of total exports in 2007, compared to 15.4% in 2001. Secondly, chart 3 shows that despite a 2.8% contraction in exports to the US last year, total exports still grew 10.1% in 2007.
A large part of this diversification can be credited to a combination of a pick up in globalization in recent years (eg, China joining WTO), large emerging markets joining the global economy (eg, India and Eastern Europe) and the global commodities boom (eg, Russia, Brazil and Middle East). This combination has led to sharp shift in global spending power away from the US.
Structural transformation continues
Not only has the global economic landscape changed, there are significant shifts taking place in Singapore’s domestic economic landscape. In an effort to diversify its economic base and, more specifically, reduce its dependence on the volatile electronics sector, the following initiatives have been taken:
1. Manufacturing shifts away from electronics: The Economic Development Board has focused its efforts on attracting foreign multi-nationals involved in nonelectronics products such as chemicals, pharmaceuticals and higher value-added equipment, where pricing power is stronger and less volatile.
2. Boosting the services sector: In order to take advantage of the region’s economic revival, which is being powered by Asia’s giants China and India, the government continues to reposition itself into a key regional/global hub.
Key areas of focus include:
Financial services – The rise in the region’s wealth, particularly in China and India, has made Singapore an attractive place to expand wealth management operations. Hedge funds have also set up shop in Singapore.
Tourism – The decision to allow the building casinos shows that the government is keen to diversify its export base.
Business services – A number of other business services are thriving including include legal, accounting, logistics medical and back office services. Thanks to a strong education system and on the ground campuses of leading international business schools, Singapore continues to attract more foreign students.
Domestic demand is back
It should come as little surprise that Singapore’s ongoing diversification has not only resulted in a significant tightening in the job market but has also led to a huge influx of foreigner workers. Note the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate fell to 1.6% in 4Q07 (vs 1.7% in 3Q07).
In response, domestic demand (both consumption and investment) has been rapidly expanding. Nearly 80% of the rise in Singapore’s headline GDP growth can be directly attributed to domestic demand. More importantly, Singapore appears to be in the early stages of a long-run investment upturn. Chart 5 shows that construction activity has surged in response to a combination of increased demand for housing, an upgrading of the physical infrastructure by the government and on-going construction of the new integrated resorts and casino projects.
Well positioned to cope with a US slowdown this time
To be clear, we are not saying that a US slowdown doesn’t matter, it is a negative development as trade activity will be affected. However, it is unlikely to have the same impact on the Singapore economy as it did back in 2001-02, which was the last time the city-state experience a recession.
We think that the combination of new economic drivers coupled with the upturn in domestic demand should help Singapore offset weaker US demand. As a consequence, are forecasting GDP growth to average 6.3% over the 2008-09 period, compared to an estimate of 7.8% in 2007.
If anything, we think that Singapore’s authorities (behind close doors) may be actually glad to see external demand take a breather as inflation has been rekindled on the back of a tighter labor market.
Although our economics team maintains the fundamental view that Singapore’s growth can withstand a USA slowdown and will continue to grow at above 6% for 2008-09, we have done a bottom-up stress-test to assess the earnings risks and valuation contraction for the top-25 stocks listed in Singapore should global growth slow.
Bear case scenario: 13% downside to 2008 profit forecasts
If one assumes that the Singapore economy slows to 2-3% similar to the level experienced in 2002-03, we forecast that in aggregate there could be a 13% downside to the current 2008 earnings forecasts under the bear-case scenario.
De-rating possibilities? Looking through past experiences
Meanwhile, we have also provided a comparative valuation looking at the trough multiples that these stocks have traded in past bear markets (ie. 1998 Asian crisis, 2002/3 SARS, Sept 11) to assess the de-rating risks of the respective stocks.
Conclusion: Identifying risks sectors and safe havens
In conclusion, we note that the financials, airlines, shipbuilding and petrochemical sectors are most exposed to a global and Singapore growth slowdown.
Meanwhile, the telecoms and the REITs sectors are the most defensive with respectable dividend yields.
Singapore big cap stocks with the greatest earnings risks (>15%)
SGX -30% Less frenetic stock trading activities
SPC -30% Lower oil demand impacting refining margins
Noble -26% Lower tonnage traded and easing in freight rates
Cosco Corp -26% Lower shipyard revenue due to possible order delays
SIA -23% Revenue-led decline in operating margins
DBS -20% Falling loans growth and SIBOR decline
Keppel Land -20% Lower office rental and residential selling prices
ST Eng -20% High exposure to USA and European aerospace
UOB -15% Falling loans growth and SIBOR decline
OCBC -15% Falling loans growth
DBS
Earnings for DBS in geographic terms come from Singapore and HK. DBS's profits are sensitive to (1) slower loan growth from regional corporates, and (2) fall in SIBOR, caused by a drop in US interest rates, depressing its margins. Provisions are of lesser concern, in our view.
UOB
Earnings are mainly from Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand in that order of importance. Bear-scenario would mean slower loan growth from its bread-and-butter mortgage and SME
customers as well as fewer fees earned from sale of wealth management products. Less negative impact on margins from fall in SIBOR compared to DBS. Provisions are of lesser concern, in our view.
OCBC
Earnings are from Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia in that order of importance. Bear-scenario would mean slower loan growth and much lower investment returns earned at its 87%-held insurer Great Eastern Hldgs. Less impact than DBS as a falling SIBOR helps OCBC's margins. Provisions are of lesser concern, in our view.
SGX
About 20% of turnover activity comes from overseas companies listed on SGX, mostly from China, Indonesia, Thailand and India. A general fall in trading activity would have an outsized impact on profits due to the significant operational leverage of the exchange model.
CapitaMall Trust
Limited downside to 2008 estimates. 22% of the portfolio expires in 2008. If we assume expires are transacted at S$8psf (vs current assumption of S$10.50psf) our earnings would fall by less than 2%.
Ascendas
Limited downside to 2008 estimates. 11% of the portfolio is exposed to lease expiry during 2008. If we assume flat rental growth for this portion of the portfolio then our 2008 NPAT would fall by less than 1%.
CapitalCommercial Trust
Limited downside to 2008 estimates. 30% of the portfolio is expiring in 2008. If we assume expires are transacted at S$7psf (vs current assumption of S$10psf) our earnings would fall by less than 3%.
SPC
Downside to earnings due to 1) lower oil demand growth in US and Asia thus affecting oil price and refining margins; 2) new refinery coming onstream in India, thus potential oversupply of refined product in 2H08; 3) lower levels of maintenance shutdown by refineries in 2Q; 4) higher than normal levels of exports from Europe, especially fuel oil.
Economic decoupling?
Singapore: Benefiting from Diversification
We think Singapore is well positioned to cope with a slowdown in the US economy and we are therefore unlikely to see a repeat of the simultaneous recessions experienced back in 2001-02.
Our optimism firstly stems from the fact that the emergence of emerging markets and the commodities boom has led to a more diversified global economy. This has reduced the importance of the US as a final destination of goods.
Secondly, an on-going structural transformation means that Singapore has a more diversified set of growth drivers (eg, pharmaceuticals, financial services, tourism, education, etc…) that it can rely on to offset slower US/tech demand.
Thirdly, domestic demand is the middle of a robust expansion on account: (a) a tight labor market (which is underpinning consumer spending) and (b) the need to upgrade/expand the physical infrastructure and housing supply (which is underpinning construction).
As a consequence, we expect Singapore’s economy to be only mildly effected by the US downturn. We are forecasting GDP growth to average 6.3% in 2008- 09, compared to an estimate of 7.8% in 2007.
US economic slowdown hard to ignore
As one of Asia’s most trade-intensive economies, it is difficult for Singapore to ignore the impact of a US slowdown, nevertheless a recession. Measured as a proportion of GDP, exports to the US stood at 12.4% in 2006, which is the second highest in the region after Malaysia.
Repeat of simultaneous recessions in 2001-02 unlikely
We, however, think that the Singapore economy will not follow the US downwards like it did back in 2001-02, which was the last time both countries jointly fell into recession in the wake of NASDAQ/Internet/ICT meltdown. This is because: (1) the global economy is more diversified now and (2) Singapore’s domestic economy is in the midst of ongoing structural shift/upturn – where the electronics sector is being gradually replaced by new drivers of growth.
A more diversified global economy
Evidence that the world economy has become more diversified and/or the importance of the US has diminished can be shown two ways. Firstly, chart 2 shows that Singapore’s exports to the US are on the decline, accounting for 8.8% of total exports in 2007, compared to 15.4% in 2001. Secondly, chart 3 shows that despite a 2.8% contraction in exports to the US last year, total exports still grew 10.1% in 2007.
A large part of this diversification can be credited to a combination of a pick up in globalization in recent years (eg, China joining WTO), large emerging markets joining the global economy (eg, India and Eastern Europe) and the global commodities boom (eg, Russia, Brazil and Middle East). This combination has led to sharp shift in global spending power away from the US.
Structural transformation continues
Not only has the global economic landscape changed, there are significant shifts taking place in Singapore’s domestic economic landscape. In an effort to diversify its economic base and, more specifically, reduce its dependence on the volatile electronics sector, the following initiatives have been taken:
1. Manufacturing shifts away from electronics: The Economic Development Board has focused its efforts on attracting foreign multi-nationals involved in nonelectronics products such as chemicals, pharmaceuticals and higher value-added equipment, where pricing power is stronger and less volatile.
2. Boosting the services sector: In order to take advantage of the region’s economic revival, which is being powered by Asia’s giants China and India, the government continues to reposition itself into a key regional/global hub.
Key areas of focus include:
Financial services – The rise in the region’s wealth, particularly in China and India, has made Singapore an attractive place to expand wealth management operations. Hedge funds have also set up shop in Singapore.
Tourism – The decision to allow the building casinos shows that the government is keen to diversify its export base.
Business services – A number of other business services are thriving including include legal, accounting, logistics medical and back office services. Thanks to a strong education system and on the ground campuses of leading international business schools, Singapore continues to attract more foreign students.
Domestic demand is back
It should come as little surprise that Singapore’s ongoing diversification has not only resulted in a significant tightening in the job market but has also led to a huge influx of foreigner workers. Note the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate fell to 1.6% in 4Q07 (vs 1.7% in 3Q07).
In response, domestic demand (both consumption and investment) has been rapidly expanding. Nearly 80% of the rise in Singapore’s headline GDP growth can be directly attributed to domestic demand. More importantly, Singapore appears to be in the early stages of a long-run investment upturn. Chart 5 shows that construction activity has surged in response to a combination of increased demand for housing, an upgrading of the physical infrastructure by the government and on-going construction of the new integrated resorts and casino projects.
Well positioned to cope with a US slowdown this time
To be clear, we are not saying that a US slowdown doesn’t matter, it is a negative development as trade activity will be affected. However, it is unlikely to have the same impact on the Singapore economy as it did back in 2001-02, which was the last time the city-state experience a recession.
We think that the combination of new economic drivers coupled with the upturn in domestic demand should help Singapore offset weaker US demand. As a consequence, are forecasting GDP growth to average 6.3% over the 2008-09 period, compared to an estimate of 7.8% in 2007.
If anything, we think that Singapore’s authorities (behind close doors) may be actually glad to see external demand take a breather as inflation has been rekindled on the back of a tighter labor market.
SGX - More macro headwinds; some more downside likely
Downgrade SGX to Neutral as we believe slowing growth and high inflation in Singapore (our Economists recently lowered GDP growth estimates), coupled with US recession/credit market turmoil, will likely dampen market sentiment, turnover and SGX’s supportable valuations.
We have cut our FY08E/FY09E EPS by 7%/25% (16%/11% below consensus), and estimate daily stock turnover of S$2.1 bn in calendar 2008. We have reduced our 12-m TP to S$8.2 (21X calendar 2008E EPS) from S$15.3 (30X calendar 2008E EPS). SGX has risen 245% since we added it to our Buy List in October 2005, versus MSCI Singapore +69%.
Current view
We had been tempted to argue “it’s all in the price post recent selldown and share price will stabilize then rebound”, as we fundamentally like SGX’s strength in derivatives (19% of revenue; resilience amid market volatility) and product initiatives (OTC, commodities, futures, linkages).
However, we are mindful that exchanges are high-beta binary stocks whose share prices are either up or down and seldom stay flattish for a prolonged period. Given the open nature of Singapore economy and a US slowdown, we believe the risks for SGX’s earnings (no growth for core earnings in FY09E) and share price are still skewed to the downside in the near term. Our new/reset TP of S$8.2 implies 9% downside potential. We have also set a “suggested entry level” for SGX stock at S$5.7, based on 18X our worse-case EPS estimate (daily stock turnover of S$1.6 bn, assuming velocity reverts to historical average).
Things that could still get worse:
Worse-than-expected US recession;
hyperinflation and sharp slowdown in Singapore; sharp fall in turnover;
collateral impact of falling turnover on stable revenue.
What would make us more positive in due course:
Stabilization of inflation in Singapore; faster-than-expected US macro/credit market recovery; faster-than-expected revenue accretion of new products.
More macro headwinds; earnings/price target reset
High inflation and slowing growth in Singapore. Our Economics Team has recently lowered 2008 GDP growth forecast to 5.5% from 6.4% on the back of increased external risks. They also believe the inflation situation will worsen before some relief in 2H2008, and see CPI peaking at around 7% early this year and average 5.5% in 2008. Meanwhile, we also start to see signs of property market weakening, with transaction volumes falling sharply since July/August 2007. We believe slower growth and higher inflation do not provide for a positive backdrop for equities, and this in turn will likely dampen turnover.
US recession and credit market turmoil. We believe the subprime issue will likely be a long-tailed, slow-motioned problem. We also expect the US to slip into a recession this year. Given the open nature of the Singapore economy, a weak external environment will likely slow down the economic growth of Singapore despite still-robust domestic demand.
This in turn will likely reduce investor propensity to trade stocks, hence dampening SGX’s earnings and supportable valuations.
As a result of macro headwinds, we have reduced our FY08E/FY09E EPS estimates by 7%/25%, mainly reflecting lower turnover assumptions. We now expect daily stock turnover of S$2.1 bn in calendar 2008 (assuming no growth in market cap and a velocity of 60%), versus S$2.13 bn ytd and S$2.41 bn in calendar 2007.
Our net profit estimates are 16%/11% below consensus estimates in FY08E/FY09E. We expect core net profit growth (ex-exceptional gains) to fall from 48% in FY2008E to -4% in FY2009E.
We have also reduced 12-month price target to S$8.2 (21X 2008 EPS) from S$15.3 (30X calendar 2008E EPS).
Still binary situation; some more downside likely; to Neutral
We had been tempted to argue “it’s all in the price post recent selldown and share price will stabilize then rebound”, as we fundamentally like SGX’s strength in derivatives (19% of revenue; resilience amid market volatility) and product initiatives (OTC, commodities, futures, linkages).
However, we are mindful that exchanges are high-beta binary stocks whose share prices are either up or down and seldom stay flattish for a prolonged period.
And given the open nature of Singapore’s economy and a US slowdown, we believe the risks for turnover, SGX’s earnings and share prices are still skewed to the downside in the near term. As a result, we downgrade SGX to Neutral.
Our new/reset TP of S$8.2 implies 9% downside potential.
We have also set a “suggested entry level” for SGX stock at S$5.7, based on 18X our worse-case EPS estimate. This assumes turnover velocity would revert to historical mean (historical average velocity is 45%, but we assume 50% in our computation to account for the increased foreign listings in recent years which are more actively traded than domestic stocks) and market cap would fall 20%, which translates into daily stock turnover of S$1.6 bn.
Downside and upside risks
Things that could still get worse
• Prolonged and worse-than-expected US recession
• Hyperinflation and sharp slowdown in Singapore
• Sharp fall in stock and derivatives turnover in Singapore
• Collateral impact of falling turnover on stable revenue. Although stable revenue (e.g. listing fees, information revenue, depository/corporate action fees) is more resilient than transaction-based revenue, we believe it is ultimately still a function of market activities. If there were a prolonged slump in stock market and turnover, it would inevitably exert pressure on stable revenue (e.g. demand for market data/information would fall, there would be fewer corporate actions).
What would get us more positive in due course
• Stabilization of inflation in Singapore
• Faster-than-expected US macro recovery and credit market stabilization
• Faster-than-expected revenue accretion of new products (e.g. OTC/commodities, single stock derivatives, index futures) and linkages/cooperation with other exchanges (e.g. derivatives link with Tokyo Stock Exchange, trading link with Bursa Malaysia, business collaboration with Bombay Stock Exchange).
We have cut our FY08E/FY09E EPS by 7%/25% (16%/11% below consensus), and estimate daily stock turnover of S$2.1 bn in calendar 2008. We have reduced our 12-m TP to S$8.2 (21X calendar 2008E EPS) from S$15.3 (30X calendar 2008E EPS). SGX has risen 245% since we added it to our Buy List in October 2005, versus MSCI Singapore +69%.
Current view
We had been tempted to argue “it’s all in the price post recent selldown and share price will stabilize then rebound”, as we fundamentally like SGX’s strength in derivatives (19% of revenue; resilience amid market volatility) and product initiatives (OTC, commodities, futures, linkages).
However, we are mindful that exchanges are high-beta binary stocks whose share prices are either up or down and seldom stay flattish for a prolonged period. Given the open nature of Singapore economy and a US slowdown, we believe the risks for SGX’s earnings (no growth for core earnings in FY09E) and share price are still skewed to the downside in the near term. Our new/reset TP of S$8.2 implies 9% downside potential. We have also set a “suggested entry level” for SGX stock at S$5.7, based on 18X our worse-case EPS estimate (daily stock turnover of S$1.6 bn, assuming velocity reverts to historical average).
Things that could still get worse:
Worse-than-expected US recession;
hyperinflation and sharp slowdown in Singapore; sharp fall in turnover;
collateral impact of falling turnover on stable revenue.
What would make us more positive in due course:
Stabilization of inflation in Singapore; faster-than-expected US macro/credit market recovery; faster-than-expected revenue accretion of new products.
More macro headwinds; earnings/price target reset
High inflation and slowing growth in Singapore. Our Economics Team has recently lowered 2008 GDP growth forecast to 5.5% from 6.4% on the back of increased external risks. They also believe the inflation situation will worsen before some relief in 2H2008, and see CPI peaking at around 7% early this year and average 5.5% in 2008. Meanwhile, we also start to see signs of property market weakening, with transaction volumes falling sharply since July/August 2007. We believe slower growth and higher inflation do not provide for a positive backdrop for equities, and this in turn will likely dampen turnover.
US recession and credit market turmoil. We believe the subprime issue will likely be a long-tailed, slow-motioned problem. We also expect the US to slip into a recession this year. Given the open nature of the Singapore economy, a weak external environment will likely slow down the economic growth of Singapore despite still-robust domestic demand.
This in turn will likely reduce investor propensity to trade stocks, hence dampening SGX’s earnings and supportable valuations.
As a result of macro headwinds, we have reduced our FY08E/FY09E EPS estimates by 7%/25%, mainly reflecting lower turnover assumptions. We now expect daily stock turnover of S$2.1 bn in calendar 2008 (assuming no growth in market cap and a velocity of 60%), versus S$2.13 bn ytd and S$2.41 bn in calendar 2007.
Our net profit estimates are 16%/11% below consensus estimates in FY08E/FY09E. We expect core net profit growth (ex-exceptional gains) to fall from 48% in FY2008E to -4% in FY2009E.
We have also reduced 12-month price target to S$8.2 (21X 2008 EPS) from S$15.3 (30X calendar 2008E EPS).
Still binary situation; some more downside likely; to Neutral
We had been tempted to argue “it’s all in the price post recent selldown and share price will stabilize then rebound”, as we fundamentally like SGX’s strength in derivatives (19% of revenue; resilience amid market volatility) and product initiatives (OTC, commodities, futures, linkages).
However, we are mindful that exchanges are high-beta binary stocks whose share prices are either up or down and seldom stay flattish for a prolonged period.
And given the open nature of Singapore’s economy and a US slowdown, we believe the risks for turnover, SGX’s earnings and share prices are still skewed to the downside in the near term. As a result, we downgrade SGX to Neutral.
Our new/reset TP of S$8.2 implies 9% downside potential.
We have also set a “suggested entry level” for SGX stock at S$5.7, based on 18X our worse-case EPS estimate. This assumes turnover velocity would revert to historical mean (historical average velocity is 45%, but we assume 50% in our computation to account for the increased foreign listings in recent years which are more actively traded than domestic stocks) and market cap would fall 20%, which translates into daily stock turnover of S$1.6 bn.
Downside and upside risks
Things that could still get worse
• Prolonged and worse-than-expected US recession
• Hyperinflation and sharp slowdown in Singapore
• Sharp fall in stock and derivatives turnover in Singapore
• Collateral impact of falling turnover on stable revenue. Although stable revenue (e.g. listing fees, information revenue, depository/corporate action fees) is more resilient than transaction-based revenue, we believe it is ultimately still a function of market activities. If there were a prolonged slump in stock market and turnover, it would inevitably exert pressure on stable revenue (e.g. demand for market data/information would fall, there would be fewer corporate actions).
What would get us more positive in due course
• Stabilization of inflation in Singapore
• Faster-than-expected US macro recovery and credit market stabilization
• Faster-than-expected revenue accretion of new products (e.g. OTC/commodities, single stock derivatives, index futures) and linkages/cooperation with other exchanges (e.g. derivatives link with Tokyo Stock Exchange, trading link with Bursa Malaysia, business collaboration with Bombay Stock Exchange).
Sunday, February 24, 2008
undervalued Stocks
In the thick of the Asian financial crisis, some listed companies were actually trading below their net cash value; in other words, the leftover cash in their bank accounts after paying off all their liabilities was higher than market capitalisation.
Theoretically, someone who had the money could have gone into the market and bought up 100 per cent of the shares in order to gain control of the company. He could then have used the company's cash to pay off all its liabilities. The remaining sum of cash would still have been more than the amount he used to buy the 100 per cent stake, leaving him with some profit to pocket.In addition, there would have been other assets like buildings or investments which he could have liquidated. These would have been the icing on the cake!Of course, in practice it may not be so easy. There would be the controlling shareholder to contend with. And the traders out there, once they sense a big buyer, may pounce on the stock. But the point is: for companies whose market value is below its cash net of all liabilities, it may be an indication of market mispricing.
Back in June 2003 in this column, I highlighted three companies that were trading at near their cash value. I noted that in a prolonged bear market, investor aversion is so severe that very often stocks end up trading way below their asset values. And in extreme cases, the share price is even lower than the cash holdings of the company after netting all liabilities.'Of course, if the company has no intention to return the cash to shareholders and its operations are bleeding cash, then the share price may well have reason to be trading below the cash net of liabilities per share,' I wrote then. 'Unless there is a turnaround in the business, the cash will eventually be depleted.'
The three companies that had a high component of cash in their share price then were Auric Pacific, General Magnetics and k1 Ventures. Then, Auric's cash net of its total liabilities worked out to 99.7 cents a share. Its share price at the time was 90 cents. General Magnetics' net cash per share was 13 cents versus its share price of 14 cents. And k1 Ventures' net cash was 18.4 cents per share, compared with a share price of 20.5 cents.
Fast forward to today, and all three have underperformed the general market. So ultimately, it is the business that drives the share price. But still, there is something appealing about trying to identify companies with a strong balance sheet, and decent business, yet trading at a low valuation.
This week, I attempted to screen some of the stocks for such criteria.Most of the stocks which showed up on the list were China stocks, and most were loss making. This explains the deep discount in their share prices to their asset value.
For example, United Food barely had any liabilities in its accounts as at Sept 30, 2007. Its cash and deposits amounted to $92.4 million or about 8.3 cents a share. Take into consideration other assets like inventory, accounts receivable, properties and land use rights, and the net asset value per share for the stock came to 40.7 cents. In the market yesterday, United Food last traded at 14.5 cents. That's a discount of about 63 per cent. Is the market correct in factoring in such a big discount for the company when the business is producing a profit, albeit a declining one?Perhaps. As mentioned, the group's earnings have been declining for years now. The management has proved to be rather poor in charting out a viable strategy for the group and executing it. United Food and People's Food were established in China in the early 1990s and were listed in Singapore around the same time, in the early 2000s.In their latest third-quarter results, People's Food registered a net profit of 84.5 million yuan (S$16.7 million) on revenue of 1.8 billion yuan. United Food, on the other hand, managed only 14.8 million yuan of net earnings and revenue of just 745 million yuan. And there's no sign of things turning for the better as yet. The directors themselves are not positive about the group's prospects. Meanwhile, United Food's operations continued to drain cash. Its inventory and accounts receivable were rising despite lower sales. That's not a good sign. Still, at such a deep discount to its net asset value - assuming all the numbers are reliable - any positive news will give a big boost to the stock price.
In screening the stocks, I also considered whether the company is currently generating positive cash flow, and whether the management is positive about the immediate future. Presumably, if both are positive, and yet the stock is trading at a deep discount, then perhaps the stock deserves a closer look.
Based on the above criteria, China Flexible Packaging showed up on the radar. In its latest quarter, revenue grew 7 per cent to 284 million yuan, and net earnings edged up 9 per cent to 43 million yuan. Gross and net profit margins are 30 per cent and 15 per cent respectively. Its cash amounted to some 350 million yuan and its accounts payable and liabilities came to about 90 million yuan. The other assets are plants and equipment and accounts receivable. As mentioned, the group's operations are generating cash.
However, rising oil prices are a threat to the margin of the group. The group said it is working on ways to improve its efficiencies to mitigate higher raw material costs. It added that it is 'optimistic about the group's performance in 2008'.The 'consensus' estimate - I think there's only one analyst covering the stock - is 9.9 cents earnings per share for the year ending Oct 31, 2008. That's quite an ambitious 22 per cent increase from FY2007. If that happens, China Flexible Packaging would now be trading at four times its forecast earnings for FY2008.Meanwhile, the group has recommended a dividend of 1.91 cents per share. If approved next Friday at its AGM in Guangzhou, then the dividend yield works out to some 4.5 per cent. The thing is, the group has disappointed investors before. It remains to be seen if its optimism is justified. But with the current 30-plus per cent discount to its net asset value, the downside is perhaps limited.
The other two stocks which are trading at a discount, and yet have a positive operating cash flow as well as a positive management outlook, are Plastoform and China Powerplus. Their discounts, however, are not as steep as China Flexible Packaging's.
Theoretically, someone who had the money could have gone into the market and bought up 100 per cent of the shares in order to gain control of the company. He could then have used the company's cash to pay off all its liabilities. The remaining sum of cash would still have been more than the amount he used to buy the 100 per cent stake, leaving him with some profit to pocket.In addition, there would have been other assets like buildings or investments which he could have liquidated. These would have been the icing on the cake!Of course, in practice it may not be so easy. There would be the controlling shareholder to contend with. And the traders out there, once they sense a big buyer, may pounce on the stock. But the point is: for companies whose market value is below its cash net of all liabilities, it may be an indication of market mispricing.
Back in June 2003 in this column, I highlighted three companies that were trading at near their cash value. I noted that in a prolonged bear market, investor aversion is so severe that very often stocks end up trading way below their asset values. And in extreme cases, the share price is even lower than the cash holdings of the company after netting all liabilities.'Of course, if the company has no intention to return the cash to shareholders and its operations are bleeding cash, then the share price may well have reason to be trading below the cash net of liabilities per share,' I wrote then. 'Unless there is a turnaround in the business, the cash will eventually be depleted.'
The three companies that had a high component of cash in their share price then were Auric Pacific, General Magnetics and k1 Ventures. Then, Auric's cash net of its total liabilities worked out to 99.7 cents a share. Its share price at the time was 90 cents. General Magnetics' net cash per share was 13 cents versus its share price of 14 cents. And k1 Ventures' net cash was 18.4 cents per share, compared with a share price of 20.5 cents.
Fast forward to today, and all three have underperformed the general market. So ultimately, it is the business that drives the share price. But still, there is something appealing about trying to identify companies with a strong balance sheet, and decent business, yet trading at a low valuation.
This week, I attempted to screen some of the stocks for such criteria.Most of the stocks which showed up on the list were China stocks, and most were loss making. This explains the deep discount in their share prices to their asset value.
For example, United Food barely had any liabilities in its accounts as at Sept 30, 2007. Its cash and deposits amounted to $92.4 million or about 8.3 cents a share. Take into consideration other assets like inventory, accounts receivable, properties and land use rights, and the net asset value per share for the stock came to 40.7 cents. In the market yesterday, United Food last traded at 14.5 cents. That's a discount of about 63 per cent. Is the market correct in factoring in such a big discount for the company when the business is producing a profit, albeit a declining one?Perhaps. As mentioned, the group's earnings have been declining for years now. The management has proved to be rather poor in charting out a viable strategy for the group and executing it. United Food and People's Food were established in China in the early 1990s and were listed in Singapore around the same time, in the early 2000s.In their latest third-quarter results, People's Food registered a net profit of 84.5 million yuan (S$16.7 million) on revenue of 1.8 billion yuan. United Food, on the other hand, managed only 14.8 million yuan of net earnings and revenue of just 745 million yuan. And there's no sign of things turning for the better as yet. The directors themselves are not positive about the group's prospects. Meanwhile, United Food's operations continued to drain cash. Its inventory and accounts receivable were rising despite lower sales. That's not a good sign. Still, at such a deep discount to its net asset value - assuming all the numbers are reliable - any positive news will give a big boost to the stock price.
In screening the stocks, I also considered whether the company is currently generating positive cash flow, and whether the management is positive about the immediate future. Presumably, if both are positive, and yet the stock is trading at a deep discount, then perhaps the stock deserves a closer look.
Based on the above criteria, China Flexible Packaging showed up on the radar. In its latest quarter, revenue grew 7 per cent to 284 million yuan, and net earnings edged up 9 per cent to 43 million yuan. Gross and net profit margins are 30 per cent and 15 per cent respectively. Its cash amounted to some 350 million yuan and its accounts payable and liabilities came to about 90 million yuan. The other assets are plants and equipment and accounts receivable. As mentioned, the group's operations are generating cash.
However, rising oil prices are a threat to the margin of the group. The group said it is working on ways to improve its efficiencies to mitigate higher raw material costs. It added that it is 'optimistic about the group's performance in 2008'.The 'consensus' estimate - I think there's only one analyst covering the stock - is 9.9 cents earnings per share for the year ending Oct 31, 2008. That's quite an ambitious 22 per cent increase from FY2007. If that happens, China Flexible Packaging would now be trading at four times its forecast earnings for FY2008.Meanwhile, the group has recommended a dividend of 1.91 cents per share. If approved next Friday at its AGM in Guangzhou, then the dividend yield works out to some 4.5 per cent. The thing is, the group has disappointed investors before. It remains to be seen if its optimism is justified. But with the current 30-plus per cent discount to its net asset value, the downside is perhaps limited.
The other two stocks which are trading at a discount, and yet have a positive operating cash flow as well as a positive management outlook, are Plastoform and China Powerplus. Their discounts, however, are not as steep as China Flexible Packaging's.
Letter to Warren Buffett
Mr Buffett, I am one of your fans.
My investment proposition is true to my patriotic nature --- come to Singapore to explore the wonderful bargains available that will allow you to diversify out of the terrible sinking US dollar, which I understand is your prime objective now.
This is a long-term story, and I happen to know that you absolutely love the long-term. A big ship takes time to turn, so it'll take you a while to switch out of your US assets into the secular rise of Asia --- with its domestic consumption and infrastructure buildup themes --- but you'll see the investment returns well before your breath wears out.
Singapore stands poised at the heart of the Asian story. It is increasingly mentioned in the same breath as the other Asian financial capitals: Hong Kong, Shanghai, Tokyo, Sydney. It is the logistics heart of Southeast Asia and the transhipment and transit hub of resurgent Asia. Ditto its refining hub; add to that its positioning along the entire value chain from research to services to alternative fuels to trading, plus the abundant resources from its neighbours and you have the makings of an Asian Houston in the future.
You have a domestic reflation story, fuelled by government commitment to a rising population, new massive investments (two spanking new casinos) and a likely multi-decade remaking (together with associated investments) of the country towards services and away from manufacturing, and you have what you could call a country PE re-rating (upwards).
Currently it is a developed country growing at developing country pace (5-7%). It might be volatile, but that's not a problem with you, I would imagine, you of the Mr Market and his crazy moods analogy. That's the fundamental story for you.
You were recently quoted as saying that you don't believe a credit crunch will happen, and on this point I agree. There is plenty of cheap money around. Much of the current ready-to-invest money, however, resides in Asia's reserves and the Arabs' petro dollars, as evidenced by the sources of the buying sprees in the recent recapitalisation exercises of your US banks.
In the wake of the US financial problems which are leading to downward pressure on both US equities and bonds alike, and given the long-term falling US dollar which reduces attractiveness of treasuries, I would imagine (as you might have done so ten steps in advance of me) these money would go towards building up their own domestic economies (to cushion export stagnation) AND towards investing in still-buoyant themes --- which is of course Asia as a whole.
What Mr Market will not pay in these current times, way-above-market-valuation M&A deals will: just look at the tussle for Rio Tinto (or even Yahoo! in the US). Check out the Middle-East funds and how they're moving acquisition targets from the traditional West to Southeast Asia, China, India.
The general point in this is that Asia is the destination of significant liquidity in the absence of credible substitutes (since developed world equities and bonds have become risky), and there're still not many liquid and deep equities markets in Asia which thus limits their options.
That's where Singapore comes in, long-term liquidity-wise. And sentiment is depression-like, which must surely complete the holy triumvirate of favourable investment criteria in your eyes.
I can tell you from Ground Zero that the spectre of the Asian crisis ten years ago still weighs heavy on the guts of many who still want to wait for stock prices to hit rock-bottom before they want to buy.
My reading is that should the stock prices hit their predefined level, they will again find excuses not to buy. Thus it is the mirror image of the "buy high, sell higher" mentality in bull markets; now we have the "sell low, buy lower" hope. It would be impolite to brand both as "greater fool" behaviour, though I am tempted. I will instead call it "a decoupling of the right and left brains".
Local blue-chips have generally corrected 25% off their highs and now trade at 13-14X PE (historically 15-16X), while smaller companies have probably dropped 40-50% on average, in anticipation of a US recession.
Among them are China-linked stocks of which about half or more trade at single-digit PEs, even as their Shanghai or HK-listed counterparts continue to trade at three times that PE, and even as we await a wave of Chinese QDII funds fanning out to invest outside China.
The mouth-watering proposition here is that the earnings of most of these companies are not leverage-enhanced. They are funded mostly by equity, unlike many US companies which often jazz up asset ownership and profits with debt and financial restructuring. There is capacity for growth with such balance sheet cushion, as you obviously would understand. That is a cross-sectional view of the Ground Zero sentiment and valuation picture. It brings to mind one of your sayings: "Be fearful when others are greedy and greedy only when others are fearful".
My investment proposition is true to my patriotic nature --- come to Singapore to explore the wonderful bargains available that will allow you to diversify out of the terrible sinking US dollar, which I understand is your prime objective now.
This is a long-term story, and I happen to know that you absolutely love the long-term. A big ship takes time to turn, so it'll take you a while to switch out of your US assets into the secular rise of Asia --- with its domestic consumption and infrastructure buildup themes --- but you'll see the investment returns well before your breath wears out.
Singapore stands poised at the heart of the Asian story. It is increasingly mentioned in the same breath as the other Asian financial capitals: Hong Kong, Shanghai, Tokyo, Sydney. It is the logistics heart of Southeast Asia and the transhipment and transit hub of resurgent Asia. Ditto its refining hub; add to that its positioning along the entire value chain from research to services to alternative fuels to trading, plus the abundant resources from its neighbours and you have the makings of an Asian Houston in the future.
You have a domestic reflation story, fuelled by government commitment to a rising population, new massive investments (two spanking new casinos) and a likely multi-decade remaking (together with associated investments) of the country towards services and away from manufacturing, and you have what you could call a country PE re-rating (upwards).
Currently it is a developed country growing at developing country pace (5-7%). It might be volatile, but that's not a problem with you, I would imagine, you of the Mr Market and his crazy moods analogy. That's the fundamental story for you.
You were recently quoted as saying that you don't believe a credit crunch will happen, and on this point I agree. There is plenty of cheap money around. Much of the current ready-to-invest money, however, resides in Asia's reserves and the Arabs' petro dollars, as evidenced by the sources of the buying sprees in the recent recapitalisation exercises of your US banks.
In the wake of the US financial problems which are leading to downward pressure on both US equities and bonds alike, and given the long-term falling US dollar which reduces attractiveness of treasuries, I would imagine (as you might have done so ten steps in advance of me) these money would go towards building up their own domestic economies (to cushion export stagnation) AND towards investing in still-buoyant themes --- which is of course Asia as a whole.
What Mr Market will not pay in these current times, way-above-market-valuation M&A deals will: just look at the tussle for Rio Tinto (or even Yahoo! in the US). Check out the Middle-East funds and how they're moving acquisition targets from the traditional West to Southeast Asia, China, India.
The general point in this is that Asia is the destination of significant liquidity in the absence of credible substitutes (since developed world equities and bonds have become risky), and there're still not many liquid and deep equities markets in Asia which thus limits their options.
That's where Singapore comes in, long-term liquidity-wise. And sentiment is depression-like, which must surely complete the holy triumvirate of favourable investment criteria in your eyes.
I can tell you from Ground Zero that the spectre of the Asian crisis ten years ago still weighs heavy on the guts of many who still want to wait for stock prices to hit rock-bottom before they want to buy.
My reading is that should the stock prices hit their predefined level, they will again find excuses not to buy. Thus it is the mirror image of the "buy high, sell higher" mentality in bull markets; now we have the "sell low, buy lower" hope. It would be impolite to brand both as "greater fool" behaviour, though I am tempted. I will instead call it "a decoupling of the right and left brains".
Local blue-chips have generally corrected 25% off their highs and now trade at 13-14X PE (historically 15-16X), while smaller companies have probably dropped 40-50% on average, in anticipation of a US recession.
Among them are China-linked stocks of which about half or more trade at single-digit PEs, even as their Shanghai or HK-listed counterparts continue to trade at three times that PE, and even as we await a wave of Chinese QDII funds fanning out to invest outside China.
The mouth-watering proposition here is that the earnings of most of these companies are not leverage-enhanced. They are funded mostly by equity, unlike many US companies which often jazz up asset ownership and profits with debt and financial restructuring. There is capacity for growth with such balance sheet cushion, as you obviously would understand. That is a cross-sectional view of the Ground Zero sentiment and valuation picture. It brings to mind one of your sayings: "Be fearful when others are greedy and greedy only when others are fearful".
Economic bailout necessary ?
There has been many recessions in the past. Stock investors are not fools especially American fund managers with their long experience. There is a price at which stocks take into account.
The Fed rate cuts will give the banks a profit boost to overcome the subprime losses by Q3-Q4. Even Buffett believes buying them now and holding for a few years will be profitable - he is not buying because he sees more value else where. Buffett has been buying healthcare. You can even emulate his moves in Singapore, with escalating healthcare cost you don't expect the profits of our healthcare providers to come down.
After the horrific ISM numbers on Monday that all but confirms recession, Wall Street has been "bumping around" at the bottom and if you look carefully, there is selective buying in the tech stocks & commodies sector. Investors are starting to differentiate instead of dumping across the board.
I believe investors will also start to differentiate among Asian countries. Malaysia I believe will continue to go up as it is a commodities producer & has oil. Thailand which missed out on the rally last year will move up as the govt stimulate the domestic economy. Singapore will have a harder time but certain sectors will do okay like construction.
Are Asian economies decoupled or coupled with the US economy? ...Of course in a globalised world there is no such thing as decoupling. The question to ask is how bad affected are Asian economies - India whose growth is infrastructure driven will be unaffected, China whose economy is too hot will cool to 9% growth a figure that its govt is comfortable with - of course the export companies there will suffer somewhat but those that cater to domestic demand will continue to do well. Right now one can debunk the recent "recoupling theory" - this theory that if US sneezes everyone get pnemonia. This recoupling effect as seen in stock market plunges is caused by risk avoidance and flight to quality is a market event rather than an economic event. If you wake up and the DOW fell 400pts, you will somehow get the urge to dump your Singapore stocks no matter what. As the US market fall heavily on recession fears, Asian markets will fall due to fear and panic. Once the US market discounted the US recession and move with less volatility, Asian markets will begin to differentiate and its moves will be linked more to the fundamentals of the companies on the index and the economy.
I believe the Malaysian & Thai market will begin to clearly outperform in the coming weeks. One still have to be very selective on the Singapore market.
As for the depth and length of the US economy one has to be very careful not to be too pessimistic or optimistic:
1. The US is in a serious situation given 70% of its economy is dependent on the consumer who "appears to be maxed out".
2. There are serious threats of an Asian Crisis type situation occuring due to systematic failures - collapse of bond insurers.
3. The housing bubble looks like it is only half way through its deflation.
4. There are however silver linings. American firms did not add jobs or expand capacity too aggressively throughout the expansion. This means that except for banks & retailers, the loss of jobs will be gradual.
5. The housing bubble was primarily in US & US, while Asia will be affected there is alot of momentum in Asian economies to keep growing unless the US recession is very long. Remember how the Asian economies were retooled after Asian crisis, it was not a worthless exercise you will see some resilence as the US slows.
6. The aggressive Fed cuts will directly translated to bank earnings this will offset their losses in subprime. However, the other shoe - bad debts due to credit cards will keep growing in the coming months.
7. Inflation threatens to grow into a monster and if it escalates, the situation will deteriorate.
While everyone is so pessimistic about the US economy including myself, nothing is certain in this world and the stock market is very good at discounting the economy, that is why Buffett never decide on his investments based on the US economy - if anything, he buys more when everyone is bearish. Right now there are savvy real estate investors hunting for bargains in California, bargains only appear when everything looks bad and uncertain. You know why most investors miss out on bargains? When bargains appear, they always expect prices to go lower because everything looks so bleak.
The Fed rate cuts will give the banks a profit boost to overcome the subprime losses by Q3-Q4. Even Buffett believes buying them now and holding for a few years will be profitable - he is not buying because he sees more value else where. Buffett has been buying healthcare. You can even emulate his moves in Singapore, with escalating healthcare cost you don't expect the profits of our healthcare providers to come down.
After the horrific ISM numbers on Monday that all but confirms recession, Wall Street has been "bumping around" at the bottom and if you look carefully, there is selective buying in the tech stocks & commodies sector. Investors are starting to differentiate instead of dumping across the board.
I believe investors will also start to differentiate among Asian countries. Malaysia I believe will continue to go up as it is a commodities producer & has oil. Thailand which missed out on the rally last year will move up as the govt stimulate the domestic economy. Singapore will have a harder time but certain sectors will do okay like construction.
Are Asian economies decoupled or coupled with the US economy? ...Of course in a globalised world there is no such thing as decoupling. The question to ask is how bad affected are Asian economies - India whose growth is infrastructure driven will be unaffected, China whose economy is too hot will cool to 9% growth a figure that its govt is comfortable with - of course the export companies there will suffer somewhat but those that cater to domestic demand will continue to do well. Right now one can debunk the recent "recoupling theory" - this theory that if US sneezes everyone get pnemonia. This recoupling effect as seen in stock market plunges is caused by risk avoidance and flight to quality is a market event rather than an economic event. If you wake up and the DOW fell 400pts, you will somehow get the urge to dump your Singapore stocks no matter what. As the US market fall heavily on recession fears, Asian markets will fall due to fear and panic. Once the US market discounted the US recession and move with less volatility, Asian markets will begin to differentiate and its moves will be linked more to the fundamentals of the companies on the index and the economy.
I believe the Malaysian & Thai market will begin to clearly outperform in the coming weeks. One still have to be very selective on the Singapore market.
As for the depth and length of the US economy one has to be very careful not to be too pessimistic or optimistic:
1. The US is in a serious situation given 70% of its economy is dependent on the consumer who "appears to be maxed out".
2. There are serious threats of an Asian Crisis type situation occuring due to systematic failures - collapse of bond insurers.
3. The housing bubble looks like it is only half way through its deflation.
4. There are however silver linings. American firms did not add jobs or expand capacity too aggressively throughout the expansion. This means that except for banks & retailers, the loss of jobs will be gradual.
5. The housing bubble was primarily in US & US, while Asia will be affected there is alot of momentum in Asian economies to keep growing unless the US recession is very long. Remember how the Asian economies were retooled after Asian crisis, it was not a worthless exercise you will see some resilence as the US slows.
6. The aggressive Fed cuts will directly translated to bank earnings this will offset their losses in subprime. However, the other shoe - bad debts due to credit cards will keep growing in the coming months.
7. Inflation threatens to grow into a monster and if it escalates, the situation will deteriorate.
While everyone is so pessimistic about the US economy including myself, nothing is certain in this world and the stock market is very good at discounting the economy, that is why Buffett never decide on his investments based on the US economy - if anything, he buys more when everyone is bearish. Right now there are savvy real estate investors hunting for bargains in California, bargains only appear when everything looks bad and uncertain. You know why most investors miss out on bargains? When bargains appear, they always expect prices to go lower because everything looks so bleak.
Friday, February 22, 2008
如何选择好股票？
股市是一个喧嚣嘈杂的地方，很多在生活中比较明白的人一进股市便耳目失聪；股市又是一个充满诱惑的地方，很多在工作中较为理性的人一进股市便方寸大乱；股市更是一个不确定性很大的地方，这个世界的变数和搏弈太多太多。
因此，投资股票需要独立思考，沉着镇定；需要化繁为简，弃小就大，抓住主要矛盾；需要耐心持有，“以不变应万变”，达到“不战而胜”的至高境界。
人性是有弱点的，我也走过很长一段弯路，属于比较愚笨之人。总结自己的投资过程，1999年到2002年期间特别重要。为了清算1999年前因盲目投机几乎导致破产的错误,连续三年读了几百本书，上千份财务报表，重点调查了十几家上市公司，在对投资的思考上可谓绞尽脑汁，几经痛苦，然而几番实践后“柳暗花明”，发现投资的道理其实非常简单。
概括起来，就是四条经验，即：
投资要大气，
选股要严格，
买股要随时，
持股要耐心。
投资要大气
股票投资应大气。在市场价格潮起潮落、涨跌不定的氛围之中，在牛市、熊市更迭交替、利多利空层出不穷的环境之下，应该高屋建瓴，抓住核心问题，以此为指导，就容易解决赚钱的一切问题。核心问题是，从长期而言，社会是不断进步的，经济是不断发展的，股市是永远向上的。不管经历多少风风雨雨，都改变不了股市长期向上的本质。美国道琼斯工业指数上个世纪初是100点，现在已经超过了13000点；上证指数1990年是100点，现在已经跃过了5000点。作为一个投资者，只需要严格的选股，简单的买入并持有就行了。
具体而言，投资要大气包括以下几点：
一是思想上不要计较小的利益。比如一截波段，一点差价，甚至买入卖出时讲究挂低挂高几分钱等等。关注蝇头小利而成天炒来炒去的人难以成就大事业。有些股民尽管也知道某个股票有极为良好的成长性和发展前景，十年能涨十倍，但却在买入后老是盯着起起落落，计较几块钱的差价，倒来倒去，结果，捡了芝麻丢了西瓜，再也买不回来了，因小而失大。比如贵州茅台、中国石油、招商银行，很多股友都跟着我在极为低廉的价格买到过，但一直持有到现在的人却极少。事实上，世界顶尖的投资大师没有一个是炒短线的。认真思考一下就会知道，既然股市总体趋势永远向上，投资者就应有远大的目标，牢牢抱住优秀公司的股票不为所动，立志赚足利润，依靠时间最终成为亿万富翁。
二是操作中不要讲究小的技巧。比如高抛低吸、止损、底部顶部、金字塔结构、时间之窗、黄金分割位、包括所谓的牛市策略、熊市策略等等都不外乎是技巧方面的东西，而不是智慧方面的东西。在技术分析中有100多种令人眼花缭乱的技术指标，里面充满着各类看似精妙的技巧，就象赌场里的《21点必胜法一样》，其实都是一些雕虫小技,以此操作成功的能有几人？其中波浪理论最为典型，大浪里面有小浪，小浪下面有细浪，走向永远有无数种可能，你怎么操作？我后来投资股票，自定“五不主义”（曾经讲过三不主义）：不依大盘，不听消息，不作预测，不重技巧，不信技术。技术分析最致命的问题是脱离公司的基本面,空对空地以价格变化去解释一切，也就是本质和现象相脱离，或者是离开本质谈现象。投资者应该摈弃一切技巧。这并不是说过头话,而是重要的理念问题。古代项羽说过:“学剑，一人敌；学书，万人敌！”将军可以不是神枪手，但能指挥千军万马。真正的盖世高手是不要任何武器，空手就能致胜。买入并且长期持有虽然简单，却是智慧层面的东西。智慧高于技巧。人的一生当中其实只要长期拥有极为优秀的几只好股票，就享用不尽了,就象香港持有万科18年而成为巨富的刘元生那样。
三是心态稳。不去理会大盘的波动涨跌，也不要害怕类似“9?11”、金融危机以及最近的美国次级债券危机等等这类突发性事件。心态不稳是长期投资的大敌。健全稳定的神经系统是投资制胜的一个重要条件。同时也不要去预测短期的走势而自寻烦恼，那其实是为股市算命。股民一预测，上帝就发笑。我一直主张不要看盘，不要去看价格的红绿跳跃，只要关心上市公司的基本面就行了。1999年前我做了5年技术分析，下的功夫远超过当年读大学，最后得出的结论就是短期走势无法预测，也不用去作短期预测。要说底部顶部，改革开放前就是中国经济最大的“底部”，而“顶部”这辈子是看不到的。我们只应关心是不是优秀的公司，着眼的是公司的未来，选择的是长期持有，注重的是长期回报。
四是眼界高。气魄大，眼界就高，就不会老盯着平庸的和失败的公司,也就是不会去买垃圾股,就会下决心只拥有最优秀公司的股票,就会努力提高自身的素质和本领,磨练出一双鹰一般锐利的眼睛,去辨别各种各样的公司。我们要挑选的应该是极优秀的公司，不只是在行业中最佳，而且要在国内市场中最佳，最好还要将它们放在世界的大舞台上考察比较。要把时间和精力都放在选择公司上面，要尽力使自己股票品种全是最好的，打开帐户，鲜花盛开，而不是杂草丛生。
投资要大气很重要，否则学价值投资就学不到精华。学价值投资当然比学技术分析和听小道消息好得多,但并不等于就是学巴菲特，学巴菲特是要在价值投资的基础上追求卓越，追求大气，有了大气的思维，在思想意识上才有远大目标，目光才可能长远，思想才可能崇高。做好人，买好股，把资金投到对社会有积极影响的公司中去。荣毅仁先生的家训中有一句话很值得我们效仿：“发上等愿，结中等缘，享下等福”，首先强调的也是立志要远大。这是指导思想和投资理念中很重要的东西。
选股要严格
严格挑选股票是股票投资中的主要矛盾。投资的核心问题是如何用较低的风险取得较高的回报，要解决这一问题就必须选好股票。什么是投资哲学？这就是投资哲学。
回顾历史，在所有传统的股票投资理论中，最基本的理论就是“长期好友理论”了。这一理论有句名言：“随便买，随时买，不要卖”。它抓住了股市永远向上这一关键问题，但可惜方法不够严谨，思想不够卓越。我主张批判继承这一经典：反对“随便买”，因为“随便买”会影响长期的收益水平，流于平庸；有些赞同“随时买”，因为“随时买”适合大多数人；完全赞同“不要卖”，因为“不要卖”抓住了投资的大方向。我的格言是“严格选，随时买，不要卖”。 世界上许多投资大师的辉煌业绩证明，严格选股是极为重要的。下面着重谈“严格选”的问题。 这就不得不提一下“随机漫步理论”，这种理论莫名其妙的非常出名，它为了证明市场是有效的、投资者的选股功课是徒劳的，经常举出猴子掷飞镖的例子来说明买股票用不着花工夫去认真选择，选择的结果与猴子乱掷的结果也差不了多少。这实验虽然非常有趣，却并不科学，并不能证明“随便买”正确。因为大部分人的注意力被实验者引向了猴子，却忘了与猴子做类比的投资者是些平庸的投资者（准确地说是些华尔街的股评家）。因此，巴菲特严肃地指出，如果市场总是有效的话，我们这些人只有去喝西北风了。 要成为一个卓越的投资者，就必须严格挑选极为优秀的公司。我曾对采访我的记者反复说过，投资者要有“股不惊人誓不休”的精神。 那么，什么样的股票才是惊人的呢？主要有两层意思，一是在有生之年能拥有几只涨幅达到100倍的股票。我已经用五年时间拥有了几只涨幅十几倍的股票，相信能有那么一天，某只股票在我的珍藏下涨幅能超过100倍。我已年过50，深感觉悟太晚，所以只敢提100倍。我对女儿的要求就不一样了，是要在有生之年拥有几只涨幅超过300倍的股票。第二层意思是选择的股票必须要“万千宠爱在一身”，就是要拥有多种独一无二的竞争优势。无论从哪个方面来考察公司，无论怎么苛刻，都挑不出影响公司长期成长和收益的毛病来，它是那样地卓越和超群。 很多人一听100倍会有些吃惊，其实稍微举几个例子就能说明这并不罕见。比如沃尔玛和微软公司上市也不过20~30年，股价都已涨了500~600倍之多，我们身边的万科按1990年的原始股股价一元计算，则已涨了1400多倍。
具体应该怎么来选择这样的优秀上市公司或股票呢？是不是要多看财务报表呢？我要强调阅读财务报表只是价值投资的一个基础方面。我自己就走过一段弯路，还差点钻进牛角尖。注意研读财务报表只是表明关心基本面，这与专看K线图和听小道消息确实不一样，但这还不算是价值投资，更不等于是学巴菲特。我认为,调查和思考企业的重大问题,比如持续竞争优势问题,盈利模式问题,自主定价权问题，未来利润增长点问题,行业特点问题，管理层问题,市场价格和内在价值的差异问题等等,才是价值投资的首要步骤和关键内容。这些问题财务报表上没有，或者说不直接反映。阅读财务报表含在调查里面。要通过阅读财务报表去思考企业的重大问题。“我思故我赚”，思考的重要性就在这里。因为要选择极为优秀的公司，光阅读财务报表是远远不够的。好的投资者应该是董事长，而不是会计。 要从大处着手，首先考虑公司有没有独一无二的竞争优势。这个“独一无二”极其重要，你会一下子就把优势公司和一般公司筛选出来。我有个习惯，如果用半个小时都找不出一个“独一无二”出来，我就要放弃它了，尽管它可能看起来股价较低。如果有人问我某只股票怎么样，我先会反问：“它有什么独一无二的优势？” 说到独一无二的竞争优势，很多人会以为这就是常说的核心竞争力。其实，它包括核心竞争力，但不光是核心竞争力。严格说，核心竞争力是管理科学的概念，这个概念是两个美国管理科学家在1990年提出来的，主要是指企业的研究开发能力、生产制造能力和市场营销能力，是在产品创新的基础上，把产品推向市场的能力。它强调的是核心能力和技能。这种能力，只属于我所说的独一无二的竞争优势的一种，仅以此来作为评判企业优劣的标准是远远不够的。管理学是科学，投资则是科学与艺术的结合。在投资学上，独一无二的竞争优势含义要丰富得多。否则就无法理解什么是“傻瓜都能赚钱”的公司了。?
独一无二的竞争优势有很多种，为了更加易于理解“什么是好股”，我归纳了主要的六种，可能互相之间会有点重合或者互为因果。
第一，垄断优势。按照经济学上的“垄断”的含义，是指单一的出卖人或少数几个出卖人控制着某一个行业的生产或销售。我用自己的话说，就是独家生意。或者说得长一点，是独家经营，或者重要产品、服务的最先推出和独家拥有。香港交易所和澳大利亚交易所就是独家生意，在本地区本国独此一家，别无竞争。美国辉瑞药厂的伟哥刚推出来的时候，也是独霸天下。当然，垄断除了独家生意以外，还有一种叫寡头垄断，我们在市场上经常能发现，80%的市场和利润被两至三家最大的生产组织所拥有。银行信用卡大部分必须通过万事达或维萨两家国际组织的网络,世界上的碳酸性饮料的市场基本上就被可口可乐和百事可乐所垄断。国内牛奶的市场最大的两家是蒙牛和伊利。不过，我更推崇的是独家垄断。
第二，资源优势。资源就是与人类社会发展有关的、能被利用来产生使用价值并影响劳动生产率的诸要素。很多公司都拥有各自的资源。资源的关键在于稀缺，按照稀缺的程度可以分成不同的等级。比如江西铜业拥有铜矿，但却还不具备独占的优势，因为很多铜业公司也有铜矿，不能算是最高等级。中国石油的等级就要高一些，南非的黄金钻石等级更高一些，而盐湖钾肥所拥有的钾盐矿，则占全国总量的近90%，这种资源的优势就具有独一无二的性质。又比如离开了茅台镇就生产不了茅台酒，那么茅台酒厂资源优势就具有独占性质。我最喜欢的是具有独占性质的资源优势的公司。
第三，品牌优势。有品牌的企业很多，有了品牌并不等于有了独一无二的优势。品牌优势的独一无二简单地说就是要强大，强大到行业第一。茅台号称国酒，同仁堂号称国药，耐克公司那简单的一勾，就是世界最好的体育用品公司和运动产品的标识，已深深为全世界特别是年轻一代消费者所喜爱。这种优势也是巴菲特的最爱，他叫做消费独占，我有时把它叫做消费者心理霸占，就是把消费者的魂勾去了。比如同样的产品，人家就要买这个牌子的,哪怕这个牌子贵了一大截。
第四，能力技术优势。也就是大家讲得最多的核心竞争力。能力指的是公司团队在决策、研发、生产、管理、营销等方面的技能，比如万科公司，它在品牌强大之前，主要是管理团队极为优秀，能力太强，堪称地产界第一。烟台万华的MDI制造技术独家拥有。微软的技术优势简直是世界老大，任何软件产品不适用WENDOWS系统，你就麻烦了。1997年我第一次接触到招商银行的一卡通时，就深为他们的专业能力、创新能力和服务能力所震动。一张卡片，居然可以活期定期本币外币全包含，而且比存折易带，又不暴露存款数字。这在当时可是全国领先。其后他们还不断推出金融服务创新品种，一直在同业中处于领先地位，这就是能力技术优势最直观的例证。
第五，政策优势。政策优势主要是指政府为加强相关产业的战略位置，制订有利于发展的行业政策与法规，使相关产业形成某种具有限制意义的优势。除了专利保护和减免税优惠政策外，有个原产地域保护政策也很有意思。例如香槟酒。香槟是法国一个地方，只有这个地方生产的气泡酒才能叫香槟，别的地方就不行。政策优势，就是指这种具有限制性质的优势。云南白药，片仔癀，马应龙三个公司的产品被列为国家一类中药保护品种，在很长时间内别人都不能生产，甚至也不能叫这个名字。茅台镇上也有别的酒厂，但只有茅台酒厂的酒才能叫茅台这个名字。
最后，行业优势。行业分析是投资者作出投资抉择很重要的一步，有时甚至是投资成功的先决条件。因为有些行业牛股成群,投资的赢面高;有些行业却牛股稀少,投资获胜的概率低。这是因为基本面确实如此：有些行业就是有先天优势，有些行业注定要吃亏。有些行业就是稳定增长，没有周期性，比如食品饮料业；有些行业就是门槛高，大部分企业进不来，比如航天业；有些行业就是有提价能力，不会你杀价我也杀价，比如奢侈品行业；有些行业的产品就是不怕积压，甚至越积压越值钱，比如白酒葡萄酒；有些行业就是集中度高，它们的优势就是竞争对手少，比如银行业、保险业，更不要说交易所和银行卡国际组织。有专家喜欢用行业利润永远趋向平均化的经济学理论与我辩论，意思是当一个行业拥有暴利的时候必然会引起更多的人和企业进入，从而带来行业利润最后平均化。其实这只是一般而论，很多情况并不如此，因为行业壁垒是客观存在的。
当然，拥有其中一种独一无二的竞争优势，还不能构成买入这家公司的充分条件。有了其中一种独一无二的竞争优势就有了关注的前提。接下来要考虑的是这种优势能不能形成极强的赢利能力？比如自来水、电力、燃气、桥梁、高速公路、铁路等公用事业公司，虽然具有明显的垄断优势，可是价格受管制，没有自主定价权，能赚大钱的不多。在美国上市的中国公司中，广深铁路表现不佳，11年只涨了一倍多。铁路是高度垄断行业，业务好的不能再好，它不太赚钱就是因为事关民生票价不能乱提。张小泉是著名的剪刀品牌，当没有能干的管理层去经营去继续开发的时候，它根本就赢不了利。很多公司拥有资源优势，但当国际商品资源价格处于低潮时，它也是一筹莫展。我们投资股票，最重要的一点就是看它有没有良好的收益，所有的优势最终也还得落实在收益上。 那么，极为优秀的公司平均每年的利润增长率至少应该是多少呢？我前面说过要“股不惊人誓不休”。好股票应该具有数十倍的成长潜力和前景，平均每年的利润增长率不能低于20%，当然，能超过30%就更好。茅台，招商银行，万科就超过了30%。蒙牛在前几年甚至达到了惊人的90%。 有了某种独一无二的竞争优势，又有极强的赢利能力，是不是够条件了呢？还是不够，还要看它的优势和盈利能力能不能长期保持。也就是通常所说的持续竞争优势。这一点难度更高，更有技术含量。买股票就是买未来，长寿的企业价值高。一个公司在某一年赚钱不难，难的是一辈子赚钱。BB机刚出来的时候风光无限，但没几年就不行了。柯达、乐凯等生产胶卷的公司由于数码相机的出现变得非常被动。这就需要我们的眼光更为长远，思想更为深刻。这就需要这个公司“万千宠爱在一身”,也就是多种竞争优势都具有。 可能会有人说，您说的公司近乎完美，好像很难寻觅。其实在我的持股名单中符合的就不止一个，有兴趣的读者不妨用条件套一套。要做到“股不惊人誓不休”，当然不会是一件轻而易举的事。但你发了上等愿，至少能结中等缘吧。我主要是提供一个严格的思路，在挑选股票方面要精益求精，锦上添花，没有止境。这才是追求卓越，这才是无懈可击。
谈了这么多，一直没有谈到价格，价格不太重要吗？不是的，价格当然重要，“安全空间”这个词简直是价值投资者的口头禅。好公司加上好价格才是好股票。我曾经把巴菲特的投资策略概括为十二个字：好股，好价，长期持有，适当分散。就已经把好价包括在内了。但我们谈的主要问题是优秀公司的问题。同时我认为，相对价格来说，好股是第一位的。先好股，再好价；先定性，再定量。这也是一种投资哲学。
买股要随时
买股要随时，就是主张“随时买”。必须申明，这是针对大多数人尤其是有稳定后续资金的工薪阶层而言的。 经常有人面容严峻地向我提出：“随时买，价格不用管了吗？万一买到高价的怎么办？”其实，提问题的朋友没有深思熟虑过，价格问题是个复杂的问题，在实践中甚至是可遇不可求的问题，能力圈之外的问题。你如果有幸常能在入市时遇到“9?11”或者金融危机之后这样的大机会，当然是件美事，然而股市牛熊难测，风云莫辨，不确定性是主流，必须“以不变应万变”来对付。我的经验是，努力捕捉机会也会丧失机会，放弃这样努力也许就逮住了更多机会。多想想方法，而不要动太多的脑筋去想买入时机的问题，也不要成天去盘算市赢率的高低。不同的人参加工作有先后，入市时间有早晚，一旦决定投资，难免会买到高点低点，但有了严格选和不要卖，即使是不那么幸运，最终还是会大获全胜。 有的股友引用巴菲特先生坐拥几百亿现金不出手，并表示愿意一直等下去（等到合适价格）的例子，来反驳我的“随时买”，甚至指责我有背离巴菲特的嫌疑。然而我经过再三思考，坚信这并无大错，尤其是这么多年，眼见很多朋友一再等待贵州茅台、招商银行、港交所等股票的价格跌到他们的心理价位，结果或者是永远无法买到，或者是失去耐心买得更高的事例，更能感受到学习巴菲特不能教条的重要意义。不要忘了，在美国投资界百万富翁和千万富翁组成人员状况的调查中，尽管顶尖的往往是职业投资者，但人数比例最高的恰恰是在二战以后简单买入并且长期持有的普通投资者。
大史学家司马迁在《史记———货殖列传》中说过一段精辟的话：“无财作力，少有斗智，既饶争时。”就是“没钱靠体力，钱少靠智力，钱多靠掌握时机”。坐拥几百亿现金的巴菲特已经取得了巨大成功，属于世界顶尖“钱多”的那一类。我的这个“随时买”不包括拥有大资金的投资者和专业投资机构，只是针对大多数普通投资者而言。大多数人属于“钱少”的工薪阶层，每月有固定的工资奖金收入，“随时买”就是每个月都用工资奖金的剩余部分买，这种固定的买法最终能使买到的股票成本平均化，既不会太高，也不会太低，但由于严格挑选，买到的基本上是优秀公司的股票，长期来看，收益率还是极为可观。这是靠智力的买法，只要实施，可以说人人都可以成为亿万富翁。不信的话，看看我给出的这个方法： 深圳的年轻人如果月薪在3000元左右，那么一对情侣如有毅力又有恒心，每月拿出收入的20%，即每个月各拿出600元来进行投资，按月买进那些平均利润递增在20%以上的公司股票，无论如何都不再卖出。40年后，就轻松成为亿万富翁了。有兴趣的朋友不妨计算一下。 当然，选到平均每年不低于20%增长的优秀股票有一定难度。但工资奖金是会不断增加的，如果把增加部分中的20%再追加投资，不就好事易成了吗？
持股要耐心
投资的辩证法在于：该复杂的复杂，该简单的简单。“选股要严格”，属于复杂的范围，但“买股要随时”和“持股要耐心”则格外简单，就象风暴之后天空特别碧蓝一样。 在中国古代哲学中，有很多极具智慧的话语，如“不战而胜”，“无为而无不为”，“不战而屈人之兵”，等等。特别是“大道至简”和“以不变应万变”这两句话。把这些用来指导投资，就成了轻松赚钱的学问。也就是说，精选了好股以后，把好股简单的留起来就行了。我曾经说过:“象集邮一样收藏好公司的股票”，更爱说的是：“做好股收藏家”。
经常有人问我，你是不是一个特别有耐心的人？你的一些股票五年多没动一下，你怎么能守得住？其实我在生活中是个很急躁的人。只是投资股票和其他事情不一样，你不长期持有就很难稳赚不赔，很难成就一番事业。发财要有耐心，这是千真万确的。赌场和摸彩票能提供一夜暴富的机会，但概率才多少？收藏的发财概率比赌博和摸彩要高一点，但收藏到珍品真迹的不多，大部分是收了假古董赝品什么的；做期货、买权证的发财概率比收藏的又高一点，但长期成功的实在太少；短线炒作股票成功概率又要高一些，但总体而言，失败多于成功。可是你放眼世界，多少人通过长期持有股票和房地产成为亿万富翁。这些认识在前面说过，也是经过惨痛的失败才换来的东西。这个东西叫“定力”，我把它看得很重，仅次于“眼力”。我经常建议朋友，在你的投资字典里删掉那个“卖”字。 没有丰富投资实践的人大多会想，如果结合短线，不是赚得更多吗？这是不知道鱼和熊掌不可兼得的道理。有一定经验的股民往往会问：“难道涨的太高也不卖吗？” 我的回答是不要卖。因为有些东西说说容易，就像低买高卖，实际操作时很难判断什么是高，什么是低。就象无法判断明天是涨还是跌一样。很多短线利润是要放弃的，因为放弃你才能得到更多。有舍才能有得，这就是辩证法。我和很多股友有充分的实践证明，判断高低涨跌这些东西太复杂了，这是自己能力圈之外的东西，也是害人的东西，它让我们只见树木不见森林，只拣芝麻不抱西瓜。如贵州茅台、招商银行、万科哪天卖合适？哪天卖都不合适。从长期趋势看，任何卖出好公司的行为都是愚蠢的，逆经济发展潮流的行为。其结果都不理想。最多在一个局部战役中获胜，而在全局上落败。股市上流传着很多似是而非的东西，有些东西的影响还非常之大，比如“高抛低吸”就是一例。我们看到的是绝大多数人恰恰相反，低抛高吸，大盘一向上就追涨，大盘一下跌就斩仓；上证指数跌到1000点时，每日成交量只有几十个亿，可见大多数人没有“低吸”，上证指数涨到5000点时，每日成交量高达两三千亿，可见大多数人没有“高抛”。再说，判断高低也是个技术层面的东西，不是智慧层面的东西。小赚靠技巧，大赚靠智慧。为什么股市中最后总是赚钱的人少呢？这和过度操作有关。许多人基本上每天都盯住股市行情不放，不停地在捕捉所谓的时机，不停地想低吸高抛。但真有几个人成功？还是举大家都知道的刘元生先生长期持有万科公司股票的例子，就是简单持有，买了就不卖。其实这18年中万科股票有无数次下跌，要是他老想着高抛低吸，能从几百万变成几个亿吗？技巧层面的东西，不但把人弄得非常辛苦，而且并没有给很多人带来可观的收益，至少在电脑房里炒得昏天黑地的股民情况大致是这样。人们经常会忽视：最好的往往是最简单的。
谈到这里，或会有股民质疑：“难道公司的基本面严重变坏，你也坚持不卖吗？”我的回答一如既往。即便不能排除这种情况，还是可以坚持不卖。这似乎不太符合巴菲特的思想。但我仍然认为这是对的，而且这是经过认真思考和实践过的。我很喜欢彼得林奇的看法，假如你有十个股票的长期投资组合，中间有一个股票出了问题，由于选的都是极为优秀的公司，那么我们持有的其他九个股票还是在给你赚大钱，几十年后，也就是一个亿和九千万的差别而已。何况那只股票也不会跌到零。就算你在某个优秀公司基本面出问题之后成功卖出，只是在策略上对了，战略上你却错了。你可能失去获得将来长期收益的大好机会，你也可能在心理上由于变得过于关心，由藏家变成了炒家，因小失大。在这个问题上我们要有一点哲学思维。进一步说，一个优秀公司的基本面出了问题，你可能事后才知道，而这时股价已经下跌了不少，这时卖出很难说是正确的行动。也许，情况又是恰恰相反，你要继续买进了。有几个例子很说明问题。一个是沙特王子阿瓦立德的“花旗之战”。1990年前后，花旗银行因房贷和拉美业务的拖累而陷入困境，当时许多人疯狂出逃，股价掉得一塌糊涂。这个时候阿瓦立德反而不断注资增持。4年之后，花旗银行终于渡过难关，有着坚定信念的阿瓦立德成为最大的单一股东，十几年后又成了最大赢家，一举收获近百亿美元！占他全部身家的一半。阿瓦立德说他总是在寻找同样的东西，那就是国际上知名的公司，它们拥有健康稳固的根基，但却陷入了暂时的困难之中。另一个例子是2004年底伊利股份公司的董事长郑俊怀被抓，基本面出现了问题，股价从14元掉到9元。我身边的一些朋友有些惊慌，我则劝他们在9元时再买进并一直持有，现在听我建议的朋友都取得了很好的收益。深发展也是如此，它在1997年后基本面不佳，但从1990年就开始一直持有的人还是大大的赢家。 可能还有人会问：“如果我需要用钱也不卖吗？”这个严格地说是个投资以外的问题。需要用钱有很多种情况，除非牵涉到极其巨大的家庭或个人的剧变，需要大笔的钱来救急和转危为安，比如家人患病急需用钱，你还坚持不卖，那就失去了投资的意义。投资就是要让自己和家人幸福安乐。一般情况下，要学会坚持不卖，否则我们就很容易找到各种借口把优秀的好股票卖出去。等到赚了大钱之后，就能体会到那种意义了。到那时对资产结构进行一点调整，都是很简单很自然的事。对于投资者来说，首要考虑的是怎么赚，而不是怎么花。而一直持有就是最好的赚钱方法。
还会有人问到：“当我们发现了更好的公司股票，可不可以卖呢？”我的回答是，这种情况不叫卖，叫换股，因为总的投资数量和投资金额没有变，还是在收藏好公司的股票。只要不是太频繁，这是可以考虑的。对于非职业投资者，我还是倾向于不卖先前的股票，而是用后来的收入再买进。因为深思熟虑的人不多，很容易把换股变成炒来炒去。 在这里，我想再举一个深圳人有亲身感受的例子来说明为什么要长期持有。大多数深圳人既买房又炒股，这几年房市、股市都是大牛市，按说两个市场的赢输概率应该差不多。然而统计数据表明，买房赚钱的高达98%以上，而在今年五月的统计中，在股市牛气冲天时居然有30%的人亏损。什么原因？买房的人很少频繁地“炒短线”，而炒股的人却不少有“手痒症”或“多动症”。
在现实生活中，确实是关心卖的人多，而想当收藏家的不多。其实，卖掉好公司的股票才是最大的风险。“炒”是投机者心中的魔鬼。澳门赌王何鸿燊在回答记者有关什么是赌博赢钱的诀窍时，说的是“不赌”。如果有人问我炒股赚钱的诀窍，我的回答是“不炒”。
我们买的是极为优秀的企业，它们是最有活力的公司，有最为宝贵的资源、最有前途的产品，处在最好的行业中，也有最能干的经营管理者，你可以心安理得地坐享其成，一劳永逸。
股市其实是一个“乌龟”打败“兔子”、“懒人”战胜“忙人”、“笨人”战胜“聪明人”的地方。
因此，投资股票需要独立思考，沉着镇定；需要化繁为简，弃小就大，抓住主要矛盾；需要耐心持有，“以不变应万变”，达到“不战而胜”的至高境界。
人性是有弱点的，我也走过很长一段弯路，属于比较愚笨之人。总结自己的投资过程，1999年到2002年期间特别重要。为了清算1999年前因盲目投机几乎导致破产的错误,连续三年读了几百本书，上千份财务报表，重点调查了十几家上市公司，在对投资的思考上可谓绞尽脑汁，几经痛苦，然而几番实践后“柳暗花明”，发现投资的道理其实非常简单。
概括起来，就是四条经验，即：
投资要大气，
选股要严格，
买股要随时，
持股要耐心。
投资要大气
股票投资应大气。在市场价格潮起潮落、涨跌不定的氛围之中，在牛市、熊市更迭交替、利多利空层出不穷的环境之下，应该高屋建瓴，抓住核心问题，以此为指导，就容易解决赚钱的一切问题。核心问题是，从长期而言，社会是不断进步的，经济是不断发展的，股市是永远向上的。不管经历多少风风雨雨，都改变不了股市长期向上的本质。美国道琼斯工业指数上个世纪初是100点，现在已经超过了13000点；上证指数1990年是100点，现在已经跃过了5000点。作为一个投资者，只需要严格的选股，简单的买入并持有就行了。
具体而言，投资要大气包括以下几点：
一是思想上不要计较小的利益。比如一截波段，一点差价，甚至买入卖出时讲究挂低挂高几分钱等等。关注蝇头小利而成天炒来炒去的人难以成就大事业。有些股民尽管也知道某个股票有极为良好的成长性和发展前景，十年能涨十倍，但却在买入后老是盯着起起落落，计较几块钱的差价，倒来倒去，结果，捡了芝麻丢了西瓜，再也买不回来了，因小而失大。比如贵州茅台、中国石油、招商银行，很多股友都跟着我在极为低廉的价格买到过，但一直持有到现在的人却极少。事实上，世界顶尖的投资大师没有一个是炒短线的。认真思考一下就会知道，既然股市总体趋势永远向上，投资者就应有远大的目标，牢牢抱住优秀公司的股票不为所动，立志赚足利润，依靠时间最终成为亿万富翁。
二是操作中不要讲究小的技巧。比如高抛低吸、止损、底部顶部、金字塔结构、时间之窗、黄金分割位、包括所谓的牛市策略、熊市策略等等都不外乎是技巧方面的东西，而不是智慧方面的东西。在技术分析中有100多种令人眼花缭乱的技术指标，里面充满着各类看似精妙的技巧，就象赌场里的《21点必胜法一样》，其实都是一些雕虫小技,以此操作成功的能有几人？其中波浪理论最为典型，大浪里面有小浪，小浪下面有细浪，走向永远有无数种可能，你怎么操作？我后来投资股票，自定“五不主义”（曾经讲过三不主义）：不依大盘，不听消息，不作预测，不重技巧，不信技术。技术分析最致命的问题是脱离公司的基本面,空对空地以价格变化去解释一切，也就是本质和现象相脱离，或者是离开本质谈现象。投资者应该摈弃一切技巧。这并不是说过头话,而是重要的理念问题。古代项羽说过:“学剑，一人敌；学书，万人敌！”将军可以不是神枪手，但能指挥千军万马。真正的盖世高手是不要任何武器，空手就能致胜。买入并且长期持有虽然简单，却是智慧层面的东西。智慧高于技巧。人的一生当中其实只要长期拥有极为优秀的几只好股票，就享用不尽了,就象香港持有万科18年而成为巨富的刘元生那样。
三是心态稳。不去理会大盘的波动涨跌，也不要害怕类似“9?11”、金融危机以及最近的美国次级债券危机等等这类突发性事件。心态不稳是长期投资的大敌。健全稳定的神经系统是投资制胜的一个重要条件。同时也不要去预测短期的走势而自寻烦恼，那其实是为股市算命。股民一预测，上帝就发笑。我一直主张不要看盘，不要去看价格的红绿跳跃，只要关心上市公司的基本面就行了。1999年前我做了5年技术分析，下的功夫远超过当年读大学，最后得出的结论就是短期走势无法预测，也不用去作短期预测。要说底部顶部，改革开放前就是中国经济最大的“底部”，而“顶部”这辈子是看不到的。我们只应关心是不是优秀的公司，着眼的是公司的未来，选择的是长期持有，注重的是长期回报。
四是眼界高。气魄大，眼界就高，就不会老盯着平庸的和失败的公司,也就是不会去买垃圾股,就会下决心只拥有最优秀公司的股票,就会努力提高自身的素质和本领,磨练出一双鹰一般锐利的眼睛,去辨别各种各样的公司。我们要挑选的应该是极优秀的公司，不只是在行业中最佳，而且要在国内市场中最佳，最好还要将它们放在世界的大舞台上考察比较。要把时间和精力都放在选择公司上面，要尽力使自己股票品种全是最好的，打开帐户，鲜花盛开，而不是杂草丛生。
投资要大气很重要，否则学价值投资就学不到精华。学价值投资当然比学技术分析和听小道消息好得多,但并不等于就是学巴菲特，学巴菲特是要在价值投资的基础上追求卓越，追求大气，有了大气的思维，在思想意识上才有远大目标，目光才可能长远，思想才可能崇高。做好人，买好股，把资金投到对社会有积极影响的公司中去。荣毅仁先生的家训中有一句话很值得我们效仿：“发上等愿，结中等缘，享下等福”，首先强调的也是立志要远大。这是指导思想和投资理念中很重要的东西。
选股要严格
严格挑选股票是股票投资中的主要矛盾。投资的核心问题是如何用较低的风险取得较高的回报，要解决这一问题就必须选好股票。什么是投资哲学？这就是投资哲学。
回顾历史，在所有传统的股票投资理论中，最基本的理论就是“长期好友理论”了。这一理论有句名言：“随便买，随时买，不要卖”。它抓住了股市永远向上这一关键问题，但可惜方法不够严谨，思想不够卓越。我主张批判继承这一经典：反对“随便买”，因为“随便买”会影响长期的收益水平，流于平庸；有些赞同“随时买”，因为“随时买”适合大多数人；完全赞同“不要卖”，因为“不要卖”抓住了投资的大方向。我的格言是“严格选，随时买，不要卖”。 世界上许多投资大师的辉煌业绩证明，严格选股是极为重要的。下面着重谈“严格选”的问题。 这就不得不提一下“随机漫步理论”，这种理论莫名其妙的非常出名，它为了证明市场是有效的、投资者的选股功课是徒劳的，经常举出猴子掷飞镖的例子来说明买股票用不着花工夫去认真选择，选择的结果与猴子乱掷的结果也差不了多少。这实验虽然非常有趣，却并不科学，并不能证明“随便买”正确。因为大部分人的注意力被实验者引向了猴子，却忘了与猴子做类比的投资者是些平庸的投资者（准确地说是些华尔街的股评家）。因此，巴菲特严肃地指出，如果市场总是有效的话，我们这些人只有去喝西北风了。 要成为一个卓越的投资者，就必须严格挑选极为优秀的公司。我曾对采访我的记者反复说过，投资者要有“股不惊人誓不休”的精神。 那么，什么样的股票才是惊人的呢？主要有两层意思，一是在有生之年能拥有几只涨幅达到100倍的股票。我已经用五年时间拥有了几只涨幅十几倍的股票，相信能有那么一天，某只股票在我的珍藏下涨幅能超过100倍。我已年过50，深感觉悟太晚，所以只敢提100倍。我对女儿的要求就不一样了，是要在有生之年拥有几只涨幅超过300倍的股票。第二层意思是选择的股票必须要“万千宠爱在一身”，就是要拥有多种独一无二的竞争优势。无论从哪个方面来考察公司，无论怎么苛刻，都挑不出影响公司长期成长和收益的毛病来，它是那样地卓越和超群。 很多人一听100倍会有些吃惊，其实稍微举几个例子就能说明这并不罕见。比如沃尔玛和微软公司上市也不过20~30年，股价都已涨了500~600倍之多，我们身边的万科按1990年的原始股股价一元计算，则已涨了1400多倍。
具体应该怎么来选择这样的优秀上市公司或股票呢？是不是要多看财务报表呢？我要强调阅读财务报表只是价值投资的一个基础方面。我自己就走过一段弯路，还差点钻进牛角尖。注意研读财务报表只是表明关心基本面，这与专看K线图和听小道消息确实不一样，但这还不算是价值投资，更不等于是学巴菲特。我认为,调查和思考企业的重大问题,比如持续竞争优势问题,盈利模式问题,自主定价权问题，未来利润增长点问题,行业特点问题，管理层问题,市场价格和内在价值的差异问题等等,才是价值投资的首要步骤和关键内容。这些问题财务报表上没有，或者说不直接反映。阅读财务报表含在调查里面。要通过阅读财务报表去思考企业的重大问题。“我思故我赚”，思考的重要性就在这里。因为要选择极为优秀的公司，光阅读财务报表是远远不够的。好的投资者应该是董事长，而不是会计。 要从大处着手，首先考虑公司有没有独一无二的竞争优势。这个“独一无二”极其重要，你会一下子就把优势公司和一般公司筛选出来。我有个习惯，如果用半个小时都找不出一个“独一无二”出来，我就要放弃它了，尽管它可能看起来股价较低。如果有人问我某只股票怎么样，我先会反问：“它有什么独一无二的优势？” 说到独一无二的竞争优势，很多人会以为这就是常说的核心竞争力。其实，它包括核心竞争力，但不光是核心竞争力。严格说，核心竞争力是管理科学的概念，这个概念是两个美国管理科学家在1990年提出来的，主要是指企业的研究开发能力、生产制造能力和市场营销能力，是在产品创新的基础上，把产品推向市场的能力。它强调的是核心能力和技能。这种能力，只属于我所说的独一无二的竞争优势的一种，仅以此来作为评判企业优劣的标准是远远不够的。管理学是科学，投资则是科学与艺术的结合。在投资学上，独一无二的竞争优势含义要丰富得多。否则就无法理解什么是“傻瓜都能赚钱”的公司了。?
独一无二的竞争优势有很多种，为了更加易于理解“什么是好股”，我归纳了主要的六种，可能互相之间会有点重合或者互为因果。
第一，垄断优势。按照经济学上的“垄断”的含义，是指单一的出卖人或少数几个出卖人控制着某一个行业的生产或销售。我用自己的话说，就是独家生意。或者说得长一点，是独家经营，或者重要产品、服务的最先推出和独家拥有。香港交易所和澳大利亚交易所就是独家生意，在本地区本国独此一家，别无竞争。美国辉瑞药厂的伟哥刚推出来的时候，也是独霸天下。当然，垄断除了独家生意以外，还有一种叫寡头垄断，我们在市场上经常能发现，80%的市场和利润被两至三家最大的生产组织所拥有。银行信用卡大部分必须通过万事达或维萨两家国际组织的网络,世界上的碳酸性饮料的市场基本上就被可口可乐和百事可乐所垄断。国内牛奶的市场最大的两家是蒙牛和伊利。不过，我更推崇的是独家垄断。
第二，资源优势。资源就是与人类社会发展有关的、能被利用来产生使用价值并影响劳动生产率的诸要素。很多公司都拥有各自的资源。资源的关键在于稀缺，按照稀缺的程度可以分成不同的等级。比如江西铜业拥有铜矿，但却还不具备独占的优势，因为很多铜业公司也有铜矿，不能算是最高等级。中国石油的等级就要高一些，南非的黄金钻石等级更高一些，而盐湖钾肥所拥有的钾盐矿，则占全国总量的近90%，这种资源的优势就具有独一无二的性质。又比如离开了茅台镇就生产不了茅台酒，那么茅台酒厂资源优势就具有独占性质。我最喜欢的是具有独占性质的资源优势的公司。
第三，品牌优势。有品牌的企业很多，有了品牌并不等于有了独一无二的优势。品牌优势的独一无二简单地说就是要强大，强大到行业第一。茅台号称国酒，同仁堂号称国药，耐克公司那简单的一勾，就是世界最好的体育用品公司和运动产品的标识，已深深为全世界特别是年轻一代消费者所喜爱。这种优势也是巴菲特的最爱，他叫做消费独占，我有时把它叫做消费者心理霸占，就是把消费者的魂勾去了。比如同样的产品，人家就要买这个牌子的,哪怕这个牌子贵了一大截。
第四，能力技术优势。也就是大家讲得最多的核心竞争力。能力指的是公司团队在决策、研发、生产、管理、营销等方面的技能，比如万科公司，它在品牌强大之前，主要是管理团队极为优秀，能力太强，堪称地产界第一。烟台万华的MDI制造技术独家拥有。微软的技术优势简直是世界老大，任何软件产品不适用WENDOWS系统，你就麻烦了。1997年我第一次接触到招商银行的一卡通时，就深为他们的专业能力、创新能力和服务能力所震动。一张卡片，居然可以活期定期本币外币全包含，而且比存折易带，又不暴露存款数字。这在当时可是全国领先。其后他们还不断推出金融服务创新品种，一直在同业中处于领先地位，这就是能力技术优势最直观的例证。
第五，政策优势。政策优势主要是指政府为加强相关产业的战略位置，制订有利于发展的行业政策与法规，使相关产业形成某种具有限制意义的优势。除了专利保护和减免税优惠政策外，有个原产地域保护政策也很有意思。例如香槟酒。香槟是法国一个地方，只有这个地方生产的气泡酒才能叫香槟，别的地方就不行。政策优势，就是指这种具有限制性质的优势。云南白药，片仔癀，马应龙三个公司的产品被列为国家一类中药保护品种，在很长时间内别人都不能生产，甚至也不能叫这个名字。茅台镇上也有别的酒厂，但只有茅台酒厂的酒才能叫茅台这个名字。
最后，行业优势。行业分析是投资者作出投资抉择很重要的一步，有时甚至是投资成功的先决条件。因为有些行业牛股成群,投资的赢面高;有些行业却牛股稀少,投资获胜的概率低。这是因为基本面确实如此：有些行业就是有先天优势，有些行业注定要吃亏。有些行业就是稳定增长，没有周期性，比如食品饮料业；有些行业就是门槛高，大部分企业进不来，比如航天业；有些行业就是有提价能力，不会你杀价我也杀价，比如奢侈品行业；有些行业的产品就是不怕积压，甚至越积压越值钱，比如白酒葡萄酒；有些行业就是集中度高，它们的优势就是竞争对手少，比如银行业、保险业，更不要说交易所和银行卡国际组织。有专家喜欢用行业利润永远趋向平均化的经济学理论与我辩论，意思是当一个行业拥有暴利的时候必然会引起更多的人和企业进入，从而带来行业利润最后平均化。其实这只是一般而论，很多情况并不如此，因为行业壁垒是客观存在的。
当然，拥有其中一种独一无二的竞争优势，还不能构成买入这家公司的充分条件。有了其中一种独一无二的竞争优势就有了关注的前提。接下来要考虑的是这种优势能不能形成极强的赢利能力？比如自来水、电力、燃气、桥梁、高速公路、铁路等公用事业公司，虽然具有明显的垄断优势，可是价格受管制，没有自主定价权，能赚大钱的不多。在美国上市的中国公司中，广深铁路表现不佳，11年只涨了一倍多。铁路是高度垄断行业，业务好的不能再好，它不太赚钱就是因为事关民生票价不能乱提。张小泉是著名的剪刀品牌，当没有能干的管理层去经营去继续开发的时候，它根本就赢不了利。很多公司拥有资源优势，但当国际商品资源价格处于低潮时，它也是一筹莫展。我们投资股票，最重要的一点就是看它有没有良好的收益，所有的优势最终也还得落实在收益上。 那么，极为优秀的公司平均每年的利润增长率至少应该是多少呢？我前面说过要“股不惊人誓不休”。好股票应该具有数十倍的成长潜力和前景，平均每年的利润增长率不能低于20%，当然，能超过30%就更好。茅台，招商银行，万科就超过了30%。蒙牛在前几年甚至达到了惊人的90%。 有了某种独一无二的竞争优势，又有极强的赢利能力，是不是够条件了呢？还是不够，还要看它的优势和盈利能力能不能长期保持。也就是通常所说的持续竞争优势。这一点难度更高，更有技术含量。买股票就是买未来，长寿的企业价值高。一个公司在某一年赚钱不难，难的是一辈子赚钱。BB机刚出来的时候风光无限，但没几年就不行了。柯达、乐凯等生产胶卷的公司由于数码相机的出现变得非常被动。这就需要我们的眼光更为长远，思想更为深刻。这就需要这个公司“万千宠爱在一身”,也就是多种竞争优势都具有。 可能会有人说，您说的公司近乎完美，好像很难寻觅。其实在我的持股名单中符合的就不止一个，有兴趣的读者不妨用条件套一套。要做到“股不惊人誓不休”，当然不会是一件轻而易举的事。但你发了上等愿，至少能结中等缘吧。我主要是提供一个严格的思路，在挑选股票方面要精益求精，锦上添花，没有止境。这才是追求卓越，这才是无懈可击。
谈了这么多，一直没有谈到价格，价格不太重要吗？不是的，价格当然重要，“安全空间”这个词简直是价值投资者的口头禅。好公司加上好价格才是好股票。我曾经把巴菲特的投资策略概括为十二个字：好股，好价，长期持有，适当分散。就已经把好价包括在内了。但我们谈的主要问题是优秀公司的问题。同时我认为，相对价格来说，好股是第一位的。先好股，再好价；先定性，再定量。这也是一种投资哲学。
买股要随时
买股要随时，就是主张“随时买”。必须申明，这是针对大多数人尤其是有稳定后续资金的工薪阶层而言的。 经常有人面容严峻地向我提出：“随时买，价格不用管了吗？万一买到高价的怎么办？”其实，提问题的朋友没有深思熟虑过，价格问题是个复杂的问题，在实践中甚至是可遇不可求的问题，能力圈之外的问题。你如果有幸常能在入市时遇到“9?11”或者金融危机之后这样的大机会，当然是件美事，然而股市牛熊难测，风云莫辨，不确定性是主流，必须“以不变应万变”来对付。我的经验是，努力捕捉机会也会丧失机会，放弃这样努力也许就逮住了更多机会。多想想方法，而不要动太多的脑筋去想买入时机的问题，也不要成天去盘算市赢率的高低。不同的人参加工作有先后，入市时间有早晚，一旦决定投资，难免会买到高点低点，但有了严格选和不要卖，即使是不那么幸运，最终还是会大获全胜。 有的股友引用巴菲特先生坐拥几百亿现金不出手，并表示愿意一直等下去（等到合适价格）的例子，来反驳我的“随时买”，甚至指责我有背离巴菲特的嫌疑。然而我经过再三思考，坚信这并无大错，尤其是这么多年，眼见很多朋友一再等待贵州茅台、招商银行、港交所等股票的价格跌到他们的心理价位，结果或者是永远无法买到，或者是失去耐心买得更高的事例，更能感受到学习巴菲特不能教条的重要意义。不要忘了，在美国投资界百万富翁和千万富翁组成人员状况的调查中，尽管顶尖的往往是职业投资者，但人数比例最高的恰恰是在二战以后简单买入并且长期持有的普通投资者。
大史学家司马迁在《史记———货殖列传》中说过一段精辟的话：“无财作力，少有斗智，既饶争时。”就是“没钱靠体力，钱少靠智力，钱多靠掌握时机”。坐拥几百亿现金的巴菲特已经取得了巨大成功，属于世界顶尖“钱多”的那一类。我的这个“随时买”不包括拥有大资金的投资者和专业投资机构，只是针对大多数普通投资者而言。大多数人属于“钱少”的工薪阶层，每月有固定的工资奖金收入，“随时买”就是每个月都用工资奖金的剩余部分买，这种固定的买法最终能使买到的股票成本平均化，既不会太高，也不会太低，但由于严格挑选，买到的基本上是优秀公司的股票，长期来看，收益率还是极为可观。这是靠智力的买法，只要实施，可以说人人都可以成为亿万富翁。不信的话，看看我给出的这个方法： 深圳的年轻人如果月薪在3000元左右，那么一对情侣如有毅力又有恒心，每月拿出收入的20%，即每个月各拿出600元来进行投资，按月买进那些平均利润递增在20%以上的公司股票，无论如何都不再卖出。40年后，就轻松成为亿万富翁了。有兴趣的朋友不妨计算一下。 当然，选到平均每年不低于20%增长的优秀股票有一定难度。但工资奖金是会不断增加的，如果把增加部分中的20%再追加投资，不就好事易成了吗？
持股要耐心
投资的辩证法在于：该复杂的复杂，该简单的简单。“选股要严格”，属于复杂的范围，但“买股要随时”和“持股要耐心”则格外简单，就象风暴之后天空特别碧蓝一样。 在中国古代哲学中，有很多极具智慧的话语，如“不战而胜”，“无为而无不为”，“不战而屈人之兵”，等等。特别是“大道至简”和“以不变应万变”这两句话。把这些用来指导投资，就成了轻松赚钱的学问。也就是说，精选了好股以后，把好股简单的留起来就行了。我曾经说过:“象集邮一样收藏好公司的股票”，更爱说的是：“做好股收藏家”。
经常有人问我，你是不是一个特别有耐心的人？你的一些股票五年多没动一下，你怎么能守得住？其实我在生活中是个很急躁的人。只是投资股票和其他事情不一样，你不长期持有就很难稳赚不赔，很难成就一番事业。发财要有耐心，这是千真万确的。赌场和摸彩票能提供一夜暴富的机会，但概率才多少？收藏的发财概率比赌博和摸彩要高一点，但收藏到珍品真迹的不多，大部分是收了假古董赝品什么的；做期货、买权证的发财概率比收藏的又高一点，但长期成功的实在太少；短线炒作股票成功概率又要高一些，但总体而言，失败多于成功。可是你放眼世界，多少人通过长期持有股票和房地产成为亿万富翁。这些认识在前面说过，也是经过惨痛的失败才换来的东西。这个东西叫“定力”，我把它看得很重，仅次于“眼力”。我经常建议朋友，在你的投资字典里删掉那个“卖”字。 没有丰富投资实践的人大多会想，如果结合短线，不是赚得更多吗？这是不知道鱼和熊掌不可兼得的道理。有一定经验的股民往往会问：“难道涨的太高也不卖吗？” 我的回答是不要卖。因为有些东西说说容易，就像低买高卖，实际操作时很难判断什么是高，什么是低。就象无法判断明天是涨还是跌一样。很多短线利润是要放弃的，因为放弃你才能得到更多。有舍才能有得，这就是辩证法。我和很多股友有充分的实践证明，判断高低涨跌这些东西太复杂了，这是自己能力圈之外的东西，也是害人的东西，它让我们只见树木不见森林，只拣芝麻不抱西瓜。如贵州茅台、招商银行、万科哪天卖合适？哪天卖都不合适。从长期趋势看，任何卖出好公司的行为都是愚蠢的，逆经济发展潮流的行为。其结果都不理想。最多在一个局部战役中获胜，而在全局上落败。股市上流传着很多似是而非的东西，有些东西的影响还非常之大，比如“高抛低吸”就是一例。我们看到的是绝大多数人恰恰相反，低抛高吸，大盘一向上就追涨，大盘一下跌就斩仓；上证指数跌到1000点时，每日成交量只有几十个亿，可见大多数人没有“低吸”，上证指数涨到5000点时，每日成交量高达两三千亿，可见大多数人没有“高抛”。再说，判断高低也是个技术层面的东西，不是智慧层面的东西。小赚靠技巧，大赚靠智慧。为什么股市中最后总是赚钱的人少呢？这和过度操作有关。许多人基本上每天都盯住股市行情不放，不停地在捕捉所谓的时机，不停地想低吸高抛。但真有几个人成功？还是举大家都知道的刘元生先生长期持有万科公司股票的例子，就是简单持有，买了就不卖。其实这18年中万科股票有无数次下跌，要是他老想着高抛低吸，能从几百万变成几个亿吗？技巧层面的东西，不但把人弄得非常辛苦，而且并没有给很多人带来可观的收益，至少在电脑房里炒得昏天黑地的股民情况大致是这样。人们经常会忽视：最好的往往是最简单的。
谈到这里，或会有股民质疑：“难道公司的基本面严重变坏，你也坚持不卖吗？”我的回答一如既往。即便不能排除这种情况，还是可以坚持不卖。这似乎不太符合巴菲特的思想。但我仍然认为这是对的，而且这是经过认真思考和实践过的。我很喜欢彼得林奇的看法，假如你有十个股票的长期投资组合，中间有一个股票出了问题，由于选的都是极为优秀的公司，那么我们持有的其他九个股票还是在给你赚大钱，几十年后，也就是一个亿和九千万的差别而已。何况那只股票也不会跌到零。就算你在某个优秀公司基本面出问题之后成功卖出，只是在策略上对了，战略上你却错了。你可能失去获得将来长期收益的大好机会，你也可能在心理上由于变得过于关心，由藏家变成了炒家，因小失大。在这个问题上我们要有一点哲学思维。进一步说，一个优秀公司的基本面出了问题，你可能事后才知道，而这时股价已经下跌了不少，这时卖出很难说是正确的行动。也许，情况又是恰恰相反，你要继续买进了。有几个例子很说明问题。一个是沙特王子阿瓦立德的“花旗之战”。1990年前后，花旗银行因房贷和拉美业务的拖累而陷入困境，当时许多人疯狂出逃，股价掉得一塌糊涂。这个时候阿瓦立德反而不断注资增持。4年之后，花旗银行终于渡过难关，有着坚定信念的阿瓦立德成为最大的单一股东，十几年后又成了最大赢家，一举收获近百亿美元！占他全部身家的一半。阿瓦立德说他总是在寻找同样的东西，那就是国际上知名的公司，它们拥有健康稳固的根基，但却陷入了暂时的困难之中。另一个例子是2004年底伊利股份公司的董事长郑俊怀被抓，基本面出现了问题，股价从14元掉到9元。我身边的一些朋友有些惊慌，我则劝他们在9元时再买进并一直持有，现在听我建议的朋友都取得了很好的收益。深发展也是如此，它在1997年后基本面不佳，但从1990年就开始一直持有的人还是大大的赢家。 可能还有人会问：“如果我需要用钱也不卖吗？”这个严格地说是个投资以外的问题。需要用钱有很多种情况，除非牵涉到极其巨大的家庭或个人的剧变，需要大笔的钱来救急和转危为安，比如家人患病急需用钱，你还坚持不卖，那就失去了投资的意义。投资就是要让自己和家人幸福安乐。一般情况下，要学会坚持不卖，否则我们就很容易找到各种借口把优秀的好股票卖出去。等到赚了大钱之后，就能体会到那种意义了。到那时对资产结构进行一点调整，都是很简单很自然的事。对于投资者来说，首要考虑的是怎么赚，而不是怎么花。而一直持有就是最好的赚钱方法。
还会有人问到：“当我们发现了更好的公司股票，可不可以卖呢？”我的回答是，这种情况不叫卖，叫换股，因为总的投资数量和投资金额没有变，还是在收藏好公司的股票。只要不是太频繁，这是可以考虑的。对于非职业投资者，我还是倾向于不卖先前的股票，而是用后来的收入再买进。因为深思熟虑的人不多，很容易把换股变成炒来炒去。 在这里，我想再举一个深圳人有亲身感受的例子来说明为什么要长期持有。大多数深圳人既买房又炒股，这几年房市、股市都是大牛市，按说两个市场的赢输概率应该差不多。然而统计数据表明，买房赚钱的高达98%以上，而在今年五月的统计中，在股市牛气冲天时居然有30%的人亏损。什么原因？买房的人很少频繁地“炒短线”，而炒股的人却不少有“手痒症”或“多动症”。
在现实生活中，确实是关心卖的人多，而想当收藏家的不多。其实，卖掉好公司的股票才是最大的风险。“炒”是投机者心中的魔鬼。澳门赌王何鸿燊在回答记者有关什么是赌博赢钱的诀窍时，说的是“不赌”。如果有人问我炒股赚钱的诀窍，我的回答是“不炒”。
我们买的是极为优秀的企业，它们是最有活力的公司，有最为宝贵的资源、最有前途的产品，处在最好的行业中，也有最能干的经营管理者，你可以心安理得地坐享其成，一劳永逸。
股市其实是一个“乌龟”打败“兔子”、“懒人”战胜“忙人”、“笨人”战胜“聪明人”的地方。
Thursday, February 21, 2008
買股唔係睇息率
2002年起弱勢美元為全球製造過量資金（各國銀行為吸收美元，被迫加入印刷鈔票行列），流動性過剩推動樓價及股價上升。去年8月次按危機爆發，雖然各國聯手注入資金，但注入資金速度唔及信貸收縮速度來得快，去年11月起出現全球信貸緊縮（credit crunch），令去年11月起美元止跌（雖然未回升）。各國央行仍在增加貨幣供應，但信貸緊縮力量更大（呢方面可參考1990至2003年日本情況）。2003至07年經濟繁榮係建基於流動性過剩，隨次按危機爆發，一切都將倒轉，包括美元止跌回升，股市反覆向下。Never argue with the market（有智慧不如趁勢）。
股息論早1971年破產，估唔到2008年今天仍可殭屍復活！1971年我老曹《明報晚報》時代曾同當年《華僑日報》著名評論家打筆戰，爭拗點係「買股票目的係賺價還是收息」？老一代人仍停留買股收息思想因此推介當年電車公司（當年係上市公司）、會德豐（因為有6厘息）。
我老曹認為買股票目的係賺價，因而提倡「O論」，否決「股息論」，推介新上市公司如長實、新地 等，因睇好未來房地產業務市道。到今天人人只講O，已好少人講息率，證明買股票目的係賺價唔係收息（買債券目的才係收息）估唔到老掉大牙謬論，今天仍可死灰復燃。股息靠唔住，因為企業純利可升可跌（只有公用股例外）。1987年股災之後，美股只有2厘息，十年期債券10厘息，你話買乜？到2007年望番轉頭已有答案，就係股票大大跑贏債券！只要前景好，我老曹唔怕五年唔派息公司股份（如該公司每年純利升幅30％以上）；如果前景差，即使有6厘息股份都唔買，因為明年純利跌50％後減息率50％，便只有3厘息，後年冇純利，公司隨時宣布唔派息！歷史證明息率唔重要，PEG（純利增長率）才最重要。
股票市場常有謬論，例如留意大戶動態。一般人以為大戶贏梗！瑞銀、瑞信、花旗、大摩係咪超級大戶？去年成績又點？投資市場冇大戶散戶之分，只有smart money與stupid money，醒目資金永遠贏愚蠢資金（無論你係大戶或散戶）。如果你仍信大戶動態，只證明你stupid！
敏感三角形之戰
冇人能預知將來，利用分析或可猜測到未來三個月情況（超過三個月無人能知，呢方面唔少大學已做唔少實驗證明）。美股熊市2007年已開始，相信唔會三個月內結束。港股熊市仍未確認，牛熊仍在爭持中。
去年3月估計標普五百2007年每股獲利92.3美元，去年年底已改為83.98美元，今年年初改為79.2美元，由此可見預測幾難，而且一旦經濟轉差，企業純利消失速度係幾咁快。上述已係美國五百大企業情況，至於中小企抗衰退能力更差，部分可能捱唔過去而破產。
再睇睇納指正在形成敏感三角形；三角形走勢出現代表好淡爭持。恒指情況亦一樣，21700至25700點之間好淡爭持……。呢個三角形走勢結果係偷襲珍珠港事件抑或係是中途島一役？從過去走勢睇，如三角形底部出現，應係「偷襲珍珠港」（即好友勝利）；反之，如從高位回落75％，則係「中途島戰役」（即淡友獲勝）。
英樓市可能較美國更脆弱
後市展望，呢次由美國房地產回落所引發次按危機，造成美股熊市恐怕日子唔會短，整個熊市過程中將不斷出現中期反彈（請參考2月6日刊出日股走勢）。聯儲局已盡最大努力去reflate房地產及股市，市場反應唔係房地產及股市上升，有D嚇親債券投資者，擔心出現短息跌、長息升現象（因擔心通脹率上升）。美國已有二千萬個家庭進入負資產期，雖然唔少仍未斷供，情況幾令人擔憂，好多問題仍未浮面，熊市又點能了結?!
去年7月美國股票孖展金額3810億美元，去年12月已降至600億美元，即大量trader減倉。trader係春江鴨，佢地大量平倉，代表2008年股市好難炒。美國佔全球三分一經濟活動，有邊D國家或地區可以同美國兩不相干（decoupled只係廢話）？你信唔信美股熊市，而港股仲係牛市？
由樓價回落到消費減少需時兩年。2006年8月美國樓價回落到今年8月，美國消費才會大幅下降。熊市中博反彈低回報高風險，非智者所為。Keep your feet wet仍然需要，因此只宜動用30％資本做投資，因為係熊市。
畢非德認為，投資成功只需極之普通智慧，以及超乎一般人情緒控制。請好好控制閣下情緒。
根據《金融時報》研究結果，1899至1985年投資英國股票扣除通脹後係蝕本！因為英國擴張期1900年見頂，美國GDP1900年首次超過英國。至於英鎊購買力1899年至今回落99.3％，但1985年1英鎊兌1美元；二十二年後1英鎊兌2美元，而且英國股市由1985年回升。上述係英國「百年歷史」。
如果畢非德正確，唔通2000年美國經濟已見頂，2100年美國係咪會變成今天英國？美元購買力下降99％？二十世紀世界經濟中心由英國移到美國；二十一世紀世界經濟中心會否由美國東移？到2100年中國GDP會否超過美國，成為世界經濟中心？未來日子會否見到1美元兌1元人民幣？一如1900年英國人又點會相信未來世界將以美國為核心一樣，1990年豐銀行居然可以收購英國米特蘭銀行！人們就係唔明白時移世易道理。1980年美國人發現自己收入停滯不前，但樓價卻升完可以再升，因此將層樓按去消費。2007年美國人發現不但收入仍然停滯不前，連樓價亦唔再上升，再不能透過加按去改善生活，你說怎麼辦？七十年代開始，美國製造業工人發現工序流失；2001年唔少電腦科學系畢業生發現無法搵到工作，理由係電腦公司將工序搬到印度，2000年起美國連高科技工作亦面對流失。2006年美國GDP 80％來自服務業，2007年起不但收入扣除通脹冇升過，連樓價亦停止上升，信貸市場2008年起更急速萎縮；加上美國步入人口老化期，過去二十五年利用資產升值製造出來消費上升期，開始面對退潮。
格蛇認為英國房地產可能較美國更脆弱，因英國有更多利率可變按揭貸款。英國機構估計，去年英國有一萬九千個家庭因無法償還貸款而被銀行收樓，今年將增至四萬五千個；不過，英國冇次按貸款，相信影響較美國細。倫敦政治經濟學院教授John Van Reenen估計，未來英國樓價可下跌20％。
股息論早1971年破產，估唔到2008年今天仍可殭屍復活！1971年我老曹《明報晚報》時代曾同當年《華僑日報》著名評論家打筆戰，爭拗點係「買股票目的係賺價還是收息」？老一代人仍停留買股收息思想因此推介當年電車公司（當年係上市公司）、會德豐（因為有6厘息）。
我老曹認為買股票目的係賺價，因而提倡「O論」，否決「股息論」，推介新上市公司如長實、新地 等，因睇好未來房地產業務市道。到今天人人只講O，已好少人講息率，證明買股票目的係賺價唔係收息（買債券目的才係收息）估唔到老掉大牙謬論，今天仍可死灰復燃。股息靠唔住，因為企業純利可升可跌（只有公用股例外）。1987年股災之後，美股只有2厘息，十年期債券10厘息，你話買乜？到2007年望番轉頭已有答案，就係股票大大跑贏債券！只要前景好，我老曹唔怕五年唔派息公司股份（如該公司每年純利升幅30％以上）；如果前景差，即使有6厘息股份都唔買，因為明年純利跌50％後減息率50％，便只有3厘息，後年冇純利，公司隨時宣布唔派息！歷史證明息率唔重要，PEG（純利增長率）才最重要。
股票市場常有謬論，例如留意大戶動態。一般人以為大戶贏梗！瑞銀、瑞信、花旗、大摩係咪超級大戶？去年成績又點？投資市場冇大戶散戶之分，只有smart money與stupid money，醒目資金永遠贏愚蠢資金（無論你係大戶或散戶）。如果你仍信大戶動態，只證明你stupid！
敏感三角形之戰
冇人能預知將來，利用分析或可猜測到未來三個月情況（超過三個月無人能知，呢方面唔少大學已做唔少實驗證明）。美股熊市2007年已開始，相信唔會三個月內結束。港股熊市仍未確認，牛熊仍在爭持中。
去年3月估計標普五百2007年每股獲利92.3美元，去年年底已改為83.98美元，今年年初改為79.2美元，由此可見預測幾難，而且一旦經濟轉差，企業純利消失速度係幾咁快。上述已係美國五百大企業情況，至於中小企抗衰退能力更差，部分可能捱唔過去而破產。
再睇睇納指正在形成敏感三角形；三角形走勢出現代表好淡爭持。恒指情況亦一樣，21700至25700點之間好淡爭持……。呢個三角形走勢結果係偷襲珍珠港事件抑或係是中途島一役？從過去走勢睇，如三角形底部出現，應係「偷襲珍珠港」（即好友勝利）；反之，如從高位回落75％，則係「中途島戰役」（即淡友獲勝）。
英樓市可能較美國更脆弱
後市展望，呢次由美國房地產回落所引發次按危機，造成美股熊市恐怕日子唔會短，整個熊市過程中將不斷出現中期反彈（請參考2月6日刊出日股走勢）。聯儲局已盡最大努力去reflate房地產及股市，市場反應唔係房地產及股市上升，有D嚇親債券投資者，擔心出現短息跌、長息升現象（因擔心通脹率上升）。美國已有二千萬個家庭進入負資產期，雖然唔少仍未斷供，情況幾令人擔憂，好多問題仍未浮面，熊市又點能了結?!
去年7月美國股票孖展金額3810億美元，去年12月已降至600億美元，即大量trader減倉。trader係春江鴨，佢地大量平倉，代表2008年股市好難炒。美國佔全球三分一經濟活動，有邊D國家或地區可以同美國兩不相干（decoupled只係廢話）？你信唔信美股熊市，而港股仲係牛市？
由樓價回落到消費減少需時兩年。2006年8月美國樓價回落到今年8月，美國消費才會大幅下降。熊市中博反彈低回報高風險，非智者所為。Keep your feet wet仍然需要，因此只宜動用30％資本做投資，因為係熊市。
畢非德認為，投資成功只需極之普通智慧，以及超乎一般人情緒控制。請好好控制閣下情緒。
根據《金融時報》研究結果，1899至1985年投資英國股票扣除通脹後係蝕本！因為英國擴張期1900年見頂，美國GDP1900年首次超過英國。至於英鎊購買力1899年至今回落99.3％，但1985年1英鎊兌1美元；二十二年後1英鎊兌2美元，而且英國股市由1985年回升。上述係英國「百年歷史」。
如果畢非德正確，唔通2000年美國經濟已見頂，2100年美國係咪會變成今天英國？美元購買力下降99％？二十世紀世界經濟中心由英國移到美國；二十一世紀世界經濟中心會否由美國東移？到2100年中國GDP會否超過美國，成為世界經濟中心？未來日子會否見到1美元兌1元人民幣？一如1900年英國人又點會相信未來世界將以美國為核心一樣，1990年豐銀行居然可以收購英國米特蘭銀行！人們就係唔明白時移世易道理。1980年美國人發現自己收入停滯不前，但樓價卻升完可以再升，因此將層樓按去消費。2007年美國人發現不但收入仍然停滯不前，連樓價亦唔再上升，再不能透過加按去改善生活，你說怎麼辦？七十年代開始，美國製造業工人發現工序流失；2001年唔少電腦科學系畢業生發現無法搵到工作，理由係電腦公司將工序搬到印度，2000年起美國連高科技工作亦面對流失。2006年美國GDP 80％來自服務業，2007年起不但收入扣除通脹冇升過，連樓價亦停止上升，信貸市場2008年起更急速萎縮；加上美國步入人口老化期，過去二十五年利用資產升值製造出來消費上升期，開始面對退潮。
格蛇認為英國房地產可能較美國更脆弱，因英國有更多利率可變按揭貸款。英國機構估計，去年英國有一萬九千個家庭因無法償還貸款而被銀行收樓，今年將增至四萬五千個；不過，英國冇次按貸款，相信影響較美國細。倫敦政治經濟學院教授John Van Reenen估計，未來英國樓價可下跌20％。
Monday, February 18, 2008
红周一几成定局
证监会再批两只股票型新基，这不仅是心理层面的意思了，而是意味着态度根本性变化。也该出手了，再往下跌后面的很多事不太好办。
周五提示机会正在到来，现在看来的确是到来了。
从技术面上来看，MACD即将向上打金叉，光头长影阴K线并站立在10日均线之上，周线“身怀六甲”，地量震荡并拒绝回补缺口，连续四日K线都在节前大阳实体之内，短线指标30分钟60均线仍然是运行平台，这些指标都指向大盘向上反弹的趋势。
中石油底部“三鸦”，平安突破均线压制，传递的是主要利空打压力量正在变成做多力量的信息。联通、宝钢发力，二三线蓝筹将开始表现。
雪灾之后开始重建，利空消退的同时，带来了投资机会。2350多亿电力基础设施重建大单，不是一个小数字，而且是个挺急的事。
周边股市的影响从来都不是决定性的，现在也没什么可利用的了。空方唯一可利用的打压中石油和平安的手段，即将成为多方强力的上攻工具。
周五的走势，14：00以后震荡上行，不理会压力，意味着先知先觉资金正在入场。大盘没有表现出更强的走势，说明此次消息封闭的相对较好。和节前那次公布新基发行一样，都会起到良好的刺激效果。周五介入正当其时，早了晚了都不行。都看明白或看错的时候，就不是机会。
技术面的积极因素需要基本面进一步确认促进转化，想什么来什么，再批两只新基，加上节前开闸的两只新基18日可以动手，下周一大盘收红几成定局。所以不说肯定收红，是因为近期市场反技术操作太明显。本博也想给自己留点余地，判断股市还是把各种可能性都想到为好。
操作上周一要看量能，不放量要考虑短线逢高减磅，回调再进；放量了就再拿到周二，那时再看情况定夺。
红周一也不能太乐观，二月份还有两个星期。主力战略布局还要花点时间，肯定还要再折腾几下，使基础更扎实。新一轮行情很可能即将到来，二月份调整越充分，三月份会越红。前期恶意打压大盘的主力，很可能就此踏空。
周五提示机会正在到来，现在看来的确是到来了。
从技术面上来看，MACD即将向上打金叉，光头长影阴K线并站立在10日均线之上，周线“身怀六甲”，地量震荡并拒绝回补缺口，连续四日K线都在节前大阳实体之内，短线指标30分钟60均线仍然是运行平台，这些指标都指向大盘向上反弹的趋势。
中石油底部“三鸦”，平安突破均线压制，传递的是主要利空打压力量正在变成做多力量的信息。联通、宝钢发力，二三线蓝筹将开始表现。
雪灾之后开始重建，利空消退的同时，带来了投资机会。2350多亿电力基础设施重建大单，不是一个小数字，而且是个挺急的事。
周边股市的影响从来都不是决定性的，现在也没什么可利用的了。空方唯一可利用的打压中石油和平安的手段，即将成为多方强力的上攻工具。
周五的走势，14：00以后震荡上行，不理会压力，意味着先知先觉资金正在入场。大盘没有表现出更强的走势，说明此次消息封闭的相对较好。和节前那次公布新基发行一样，都会起到良好的刺激效果。周五介入正当其时，早了晚了都不行。都看明白或看错的时候，就不是机会。
技术面的积极因素需要基本面进一步确认促进转化，想什么来什么，再批两只新基，加上节前开闸的两只新基18日可以动手，下周一大盘收红几成定局。所以不说肯定收红，是因为近期市场反技术操作太明显。本博也想给自己留点余地，判断股市还是把各种可能性都想到为好。
操作上周一要看量能，不放量要考虑短线逢高减磅，回调再进；放量了就再拿到周二，那时再看情况定夺。
红周一也不能太乐观，二月份还有两个星期。主力战略布局还要花点时间，肯定还要再折腾几下，使基础更扎实。新一轮行情很可能即将到来，二月份调整越充分，三月份会越红。前期恶意打压大盘的主力，很可能就此踏空。
帮你度过最黑暗时刻 炒股遇跌十二杀招
一、某只股票的股价从高位下来后，如果连续三天未收复5日均线，稳妥的做法是退出来。
二、某只股票的股价破20日、60日均线或号称生命线的120日线、250日线时，一般尚有8%至15%左右的跌幅，先退出来观望较妥。
三、日线图上留下从上至下突然击发出大黑棒或槌形并破重要平台时，无论如何都应该出货。
四、遇重大利好想第二天高开卖出，或许能获取较多收益，但也存在一定的风险。
五、重大节日前一个星期左右，开始调整手中的筹码，乃至清空股票，静待观望。
六、政策面通过相关媒体明示或暗示要出整顿“金牌”告示后，应战略性撤离。
七、市场大底形成后，个股通常只会有30%至35%左右的涨幅。记着，不要贪心，见好就收。
八、国家出现社会、政治、经济形势趋向恶劣的问题或不明朗或停滞不前时，能出多少就出多少，资金不要在股市上停留。
九、同类(行业、流通股数接近、地域板块、发行时间上靠拢等情况下)股票中某只有影响的股票率先大跌的话，先出来再说。
十、股价反弹未达前期制高点或成交无量达前期高点时，不宜留着该股票。
十一、新股上市尽量在早上交易时间的10：30至11：20分左右卖出。
十二、雪崩的股票什么时候出来都是对的。大市持续下跌中，手中持有的股票不跌或微跌，一定不要太过侥幸，先出来为好。
二、某只股票的股价破20日、60日均线或号称生命线的120日线、250日线时，一般尚有8%至15%左右的跌幅，先退出来观望较妥。
三、日线图上留下从上至下突然击发出大黑棒或槌形并破重要平台时，无论如何都应该出货。
四、遇重大利好想第二天高开卖出，或许能获取较多收益，但也存在一定的风险。
五、重大节日前一个星期左右，开始调整手中的筹码，乃至清空股票，静待观望。
六、政策面通过相关媒体明示或暗示要出整顿“金牌”告示后，应战略性撤离。
七、市场大底形成后，个股通常只会有30%至35%左右的涨幅。记着，不要贪心，见好就收。
八、国家出现社会、政治、经济形势趋向恶劣的问题或不明朗或停滞不前时，能出多少就出多少，资金不要在股市上停留。
九、同类(行业、流通股数接近、地域板块、发行时间上靠拢等情况下)股票中某只有影响的股票率先大跌的话，先出来再说。
十、股价反弹未达前期制高点或成交无量达前期高点时，不宜留着该股票。
十一、新股上市尽量在早上交易时间的10：30至11：20分左右卖出。
十二、雪崩的股票什么时候出来都是对的。大市持续下跌中，手中持有的股票不跌或微跌，一定不要太过侥幸，先出来为好。
Sunday, February 17, 2008
防守反击的投资战术
投资中最无敌的战术偏偏也就是防守反击。投资中防守就是强调资金的安全。这是所有投资大师极力强调的原则，格雷厄姆曾经谆谆教导巴菲特：“投资有两条最重要的规则：第一条是不要亏钱，第二条就是不要忘记第一条。”
强调安全边际是价值投资的第一原则，其重要性置于一切投资原则之上。价值投资者在投资中往往要计算投资证券的安全边际，这个安全边际就犹如足球比赛中的后防线，是否足够坚强决定了投资的最终成败。巴菲特在伯克希尔1992年年报中指出：“我们相信这种‘安全边际’原则，格雷厄姆尤其强调这一点是投资成功的基石。”正是永恒不变的安全边际原理，使价值投资超越了其他任何投资策略，成为一门真正的投资科学，有关价值投资的学说是一门真正的防守反击的战术教科书。遵守这一原则的投资者哪怕资质平庸也有可能获得不错的收益。
沃特·斯科劳斯在20世纪30年代末期在纽约证券交易学院师从格雷厄姆，从1955年开始经营自己的基金，在此后的45年间，他只有很简陋的办公室，从不访问客户，很少与分析师交谈，也不上网。他只相信自己的判断，并且遵守格雷厄姆的投资原则：购买便宜的股票。他关注公司的业务，集中精力研究上市公司每个季度的财务报表，寻找那些股票价格低于账面净资产的股票。他实现了年均15.3%的复合收益率，这个收益水平在格雷厄姆的弟子中实在算不上高，但已经远远超过了道琼斯平均指数。
投资中的进攻就是选出具有持续竞争优势的超级明星企业。防守是成功的前提，但并非充分条件，反击是制胜的关键，只守不攻成就不了冠军。意大利队的锋线足够犀利，法国队也有享利和齐达内这样的进攻大师。具有突出竞争优势的企业如同足球队中的超级前锋，拥有超出行业平均水平的超强盈利能力，长期来说一定会拥有远远高于一般企业的价值增值。
巴菲特选择超级企业的标准是：
1、业绩是能够了解并理解的；
2、有长期良好发展前景；
3、由诚实和正直的人经营管理；
4、能以有吸引力的价格买入。
防守，然后进攻。道理非常简单，正是这种简单的不能再简单的投资方法成就了许多非凡的投资大师，以至于巴菲特说：“由于价值投资非常简单，所以没有教授愿意教授它。如果你已经取得博士学位，而且用很多年学习运用数学模型进行复杂的计算，然后你再来学习价值投资，这就好像一个佛教徒去西天取经，却发现只要懂得多行善事就足够了。”
简单的东西往往让人厌烦而不愿意遵守。在世界杯比赛中，大多数足球迷认为防守反击是一种“丑陋”的足球，富有激情、赏心悦目和行云流水的足球才是好看的足球，因此巴西、阿根廷、德国这些失败的球队拥有更多的球迷。但在参赛球队看来，目标却只有一个：大力神杯，因此世界杯比赛中，大打攻势足球的荷兰队向来被人看好，却总在小组赛中回家，而意大利队大打防守反击反而屡次进入决赛圈，甚至获得冠军，就是防守战略的最好证明。
而投资从来就是为了功利而来，防守反击这个最成功的无敌利器没有理由弃而不用。虽然在一些投资客眼里，价值投资让人们长期守着少数几只股票，也是一种“丑陋”的投资，远比不过追逐波段、频繁交易更让人有一种难以抑制的快感，但这种快感往往却导致投资结果大败亏输。
因此，投资者永远不应该忘记：投资的第一目标是获利。如同足球队员捧起大力神杯的感觉，有什么能比获利更能让投资者拥有心旷神怡般美妙的感觉呢？
在下跌趋势中，一定要象巴菲特一样，守住你的成本，这是你东山再起的本钱；如果你拿不住现金，总想买股票，那么你就买封闭式基金，对于10-30亿规模的封闭基金来说，翻倍是很容易的事情，而对于动则400-500亿的巨无霸式开放式基金来讲，翻倍的概率性太少，亏损的概率在增加。我的道理是，你有1万变2万很容易，400亿变800亿太难，而且即使发生了翻倍，在大跌中开放基金根本来不及出货，他如果在短时间内出货，谁来接盘？那只股票不连续跌停？
当然，既然大家以做趋势投资为主，价值投资为辅助，那么在工作线下，大盘处于不稳定的下跌趋势中，就是保持现金休息，耐心等待机会，休息也是最好的防守手段！
强调安全边际是价值投资的第一原则，其重要性置于一切投资原则之上。价值投资者在投资中往往要计算投资证券的安全边际，这个安全边际就犹如足球比赛中的后防线，是否足够坚强决定了投资的最终成败。巴菲特在伯克希尔1992年年报中指出：“我们相信这种‘安全边际’原则，格雷厄姆尤其强调这一点是投资成功的基石。”正是永恒不变的安全边际原理，使价值投资超越了其他任何投资策略，成为一门真正的投资科学，有关价值投资的学说是一门真正的防守反击的战术教科书。遵守这一原则的投资者哪怕资质平庸也有可能获得不错的收益。
沃特·斯科劳斯在20世纪30年代末期在纽约证券交易学院师从格雷厄姆，从1955年开始经营自己的基金，在此后的45年间，他只有很简陋的办公室，从不访问客户，很少与分析师交谈，也不上网。他只相信自己的判断，并且遵守格雷厄姆的投资原则：购买便宜的股票。他关注公司的业务，集中精力研究上市公司每个季度的财务报表，寻找那些股票价格低于账面净资产的股票。他实现了年均15.3%的复合收益率，这个收益水平在格雷厄姆的弟子中实在算不上高，但已经远远超过了道琼斯平均指数。
投资中的进攻就是选出具有持续竞争优势的超级明星企业。防守是成功的前提，但并非充分条件，反击是制胜的关键，只守不攻成就不了冠军。意大利队的锋线足够犀利，法国队也有享利和齐达内这样的进攻大师。具有突出竞争优势的企业如同足球队中的超级前锋，拥有超出行业平均水平的超强盈利能力，长期来说一定会拥有远远高于一般企业的价值增值。
巴菲特选择超级企业的标准是：
1、业绩是能够了解并理解的；
2、有长期良好发展前景；
3、由诚实和正直的人经营管理；
4、能以有吸引力的价格买入。
防守，然后进攻。道理非常简单，正是这种简单的不能再简单的投资方法成就了许多非凡的投资大师，以至于巴菲特说：“由于价值投资非常简单，所以没有教授愿意教授它。如果你已经取得博士学位，而且用很多年学习运用数学模型进行复杂的计算，然后你再来学习价值投资，这就好像一个佛教徒去西天取经，却发现只要懂得多行善事就足够了。”
简单的东西往往让人厌烦而不愿意遵守。在世界杯比赛中，大多数足球迷认为防守反击是一种“丑陋”的足球，富有激情、赏心悦目和行云流水的足球才是好看的足球，因此巴西、阿根廷、德国这些失败的球队拥有更多的球迷。但在参赛球队看来，目标却只有一个：大力神杯，因此世界杯比赛中，大打攻势足球的荷兰队向来被人看好，却总在小组赛中回家，而意大利队大打防守反击反而屡次进入决赛圈，甚至获得冠军，就是防守战略的最好证明。
而投资从来就是为了功利而来，防守反击这个最成功的无敌利器没有理由弃而不用。虽然在一些投资客眼里，价值投资让人们长期守着少数几只股票，也是一种“丑陋”的投资，远比不过追逐波段、频繁交易更让人有一种难以抑制的快感，但这种快感往往却导致投资结果大败亏输。
因此，投资者永远不应该忘记：投资的第一目标是获利。如同足球队员捧起大力神杯的感觉，有什么能比获利更能让投资者拥有心旷神怡般美妙的感觉呢？
在下跌趋势中，一定要象巴菲特一样，守住你的成本，这是你东山再起的本钱；如果你拿不住现金，总想买股票，那么你就买封闭式基金，对于10-30亿规模的封闭基金来说，翻倍是很容易的事情，而对于动则400-500亿的巨无霸式开放式基金来讲，翻倍的概率性太少，亏损的概率在增加。我的道理是，你有1万变2万很容易，400亿变800亿太难，而且即使发生了翻倍，在大跌中开放基金根本来不及出货，他如果在短时间内出货，谁来接盘？那只股票不连续跌停？
当然，既然大家以做趋势投资为主，价值投资为辅助，那么在工作线下，大盘处于不稳定的下跌趋势中，就是保持现金休息，耐心等待机会，休息也是最好的防守手段！
Wednesday, February 13, 2008
巴菲特：美国不存在信贷紧缩 美元或再贬10年
美国投资大师沃伦·巴菲特在加拿大多伦多参加一个会议时说，美国并不存在信贷紧缩。他还表示，如果美国政府不改变现行政策，未来10年美元很可能继续贬值。
美联储官员4日曾经表示，过去3个月，80％的美国银行提高了信贷门槛。市场担心，次贷危机导致银行惜贷，从而造成信贷危机。不过，巴菲特认为，不能说美国目前已经出现信贷紧缩，企业融资其实并不困难，而且融资成本仍很低。
巴菲特还认为，美元的持续贬值主要归咎于美国巨额的经常项目赤字。他说，如果美国政府不改变目前的政策，未来10年美元还将贬值。巴菲特透露，他目前在外汇市场上直接持有的货币只有巴西的雷亚尔。
美联储官员4日曾经表示，过去3个月，80％的美国银行提高了信贷门槛。市场担心，次贷危机导致银行惜贷，从而造成信贷危机。不过，巴菲特认为，不能说美国目前已经出现信贷紧缩，企业融资其实并不困难，而且融资成本仍很低。
巴菲特还认为，美元的持续贬值主要归咎于美国巨额的经常项目赤字。他说，如果美国政府不改变目前的政策，未来10年美元还将贬值。巴菲特透露，他目前在外汇市场上直接持有的货币只有巴西的雷亚尔。
巴菲特救市措施过于苛刻 交易恐难完成
这一再保险交易对巴菲特来说很好，但是Ambac和MBIA的管理层并不会喜欢，因为这将把这些公司最好的业务剥离，使这些公司在面对信贷衍生品投资组合产生的亏损时能够调动的资源更少。
分析认为，巴菲特的措施对于这些公司来说过于苛刻，这些公司的股东并不是很愿意完成交易。
巴菲特旗下的伯克希尔-哈撒韦公司周二提出，愿意向MBIA、Ambac和FGIC等三家债券保险商提供再保险，为这三家公司总价值8000亿美元的市政债券进行担保。
根据交易提议，伯克希尔-哈撒韦公司将获得价值60亿美元的预收保险费和30亿美元的已收保险费。实际上，伯克希尔-哈撒韦公司要求获得相当于150%未满期保费准备的保费支付。
评论认为，伯克希尔-哈撒韦公司要求支付的金额过高。不过，该公司再保险部门主管Ajit Jain表示，由于这些债券保险商目前在维持“AAA”评级时存在困难，因此即使这一交易价格对债券保险商来说过高，但仍然是值得的。
不过到目前为止，MBIA的所有者仍未看到该交易将带来什么样的利益。该公司股价在2月12日下午的交易中下跌11%，投资者对于MBIA和Ambac是否会接受伯克希尔-哈撒韦的提议表示怀疑。巴菲特在信中表示，伯克希尔-哈撒韦接触了三家债券保险商，不过已有一家拒绝，另两家的消息仍不明朗。
独立研究机构CreditSights保险业分析师Rob Haines表示，他认为已经表示拒绝的公司是MBIA，该公司今年已筹集到超过20亿美元的新资本。他说：“MBIA努力使自己成为危机中的幸存者，因此他们不会对这个提议有太大兴趣。”
一些投资者也认为这些债券保险商不会对伯克希尔-哈撒韦的提议感兴趣。Ambac的股东Evercore资产管理公司首席投资官Andrew Moloff认为，伯克希尔-哈撒韦的提议并不令人吃惊。他指出，债券保险商与巴菲特之间的谈判已经持续了几个月，但是由于巴菲特要价过高，谈判迟迟没有进展。
Moloff表示，巴菲特很喜欢市政债券业务，因为这一业务利润很高，并且还贷风险很低。
这一再保险交易对巴菲特来说很好，但是Ambac和MBIA的管理层并不会喜欢，因为这将把这些公司最好的业务剥离，使这些公司在面对信贷衍生品投资组合产生的亏损时能够调动的资源更少。
分析认为，巴菲特的措施对于这些公司来说过于苛刻，这些公司的股东并不是很愿意完成交易。
巴菲特旗下的伯克希尔-哈撒韦公司周二提出，愿意向MBIA、Ambac和FGIC等三家债券保险商提供再保险，为这三家公司总价值8000亿美元的市政债券进行担保。
根据交易提议，伯克希尔-哈撒韦公司将获得价值60亿美元的预收保险费和30亿美元的已收保险费。实际上，伯克希尔-哈撒韦公司要求获得相当于150%未满期保费准备的保费支付。
评论认为，伯克希尔-哈撒韦公司要求支付的金额过高。不过，该公司再保险部门主管Ajit Jain表示，由于这些债券保险商目前在维持“AAA”评级时存在困难，因此即使这一交易价格对债券保险商来说过高，但仍然是值得的。
不过到目前为止，MBIA的所有者仍未看到该交易将带来什么样的利益。该公司股价在2月12日下午的交易中下跌11%，投资者对于MBIA和Ambac是否会接受伯克希尔-哈撒韦的提议表示怀疑。巴菲特在信中表示，伯克希尔-哈撒韦接触了三家债券保险商，不过已有一家拒绝，另两家的消息仍不明朗。
独立研究机构CreditSights保险业分析师Rob Haines表示，他认为已经表示拒绝的公司是MBIA，该公司今年已筹集到超过20亿美元的新资本。他说：“MBIA努力使自己成为危机中的幸存者，因此他们不会对这个提议有太大兴趣。”
一些投资者也认为这些债券保险商不会对伯克希尔-哈撒韦的提议感兴趣。Ambac的股东Evercore资产管理公司首席投资官Andrew Moloff认为，伯克希尔-哈撒韦的提议并不令人吃惊。他指出，债券保险商与巴菲特之间的谈判已经持续了几个月，但是由于巴菲特要价过高，谈判迟迟没有进展。
Moloff表示，巴菲特很喜欢市政债券业务，因为这一业务利润很高，并且还贷风险很低。
这一再保险交易对巴菲特来说很好，但是Ambac和MBIA的管理层并不会喜欢，因为这将把这些公司最好的业务剥离，使这些公司在面对信贷衍生品投资组合产生的亏损时能够调动的资源更少。
股市成功是一种习惯
股市里成功并不需要你去做多么惊天动地的大事，而是需要把好的小事坚定不移、乐此不疲地做下去，形成好习惯，成功就离你不远了。同样，股民的亏钱与赚钱也是来源于自己的交易习惯。下面各提供个4种亏钱与赚钱的习惯，看看它们价值多少钱。
让您消除Ｋ线波动的好习惯,选择股票的诀窍：
第一，去学会计，做一个聪明的投资人，而不要做一个冲动的投资人。因为会计是一种通用的商务语言，通过会计财务报表，聪明的投资人会发现企业的内部价值，而冲动的投资人看重的只是股票的外部价格。
第二是阅读技能，只投资自己看得明白的公司，如果一个公司的年报让你看不明白，很自然就会怀疑这家公司的诚信度，或者该公司在刻意掩藏什么信息，故意不让投资者明白。
第三是耐心等待，一个人一生中真正投资的股票也就四五只，一旦发现了，就要大量买入，
第四,持有股票,直到他的价格超过合理估值。
亏钱的习惯
不割肉:不怕开水烫的一定就是死猪肉，越不割，越套你，直到肉烫烂成了人家的美味。情况不对，立即撤退，这才是生存之本。这条习惯带来的收益是－20％。想想，如果有1万元就价值2000元，有这条习惯的股民亏损是否超过20％啊。
勤割肉:周一买了周二割，还恨不能做T＋0交易，真想时刻做交易。这类股民的笔记本上是血淋
淋的誓言：割出去的是肉，下次买进来的是金子。结果是金子也真买到过，不过也给割了，肉嘛割得更多。这条习惯带来的收益是－30％。
常满仓:在股市里最大的风险就是时刻满仓，没有树立空仓几个月的意识，甚至没有空仓几周的经历。亏损者对满仓尤其是一年365天满仓更是情有独钟。要知道，在中国股市只有做多才能赚钱，但也只有满仓才能导致最大的风险。这条习惯带来的收益是－20％.
过多地接受股票信息:坐在交易大厅里或者是电脑前面，每天4小时交易时间要盯盘240分钟，舍不得喝水，舍不得上厕所，更舍不得午休。还不时地查看几分钟涨幅排名。而平时更是看电视股评，与股友探讨股票小道消息，过多的信息让自己没有了主见，亏损就成了家常便饭。这条习惯带来的收益是－10％。
赚钱的习惯
空仓:空仓最大的好处有两点：一是不会赔钱；二是用钱的时候随便你取钱。也就是说，那账户上的钱是真正属于你的。无论是否是股民，都要记住中国老百姓那句名谚语：“饭到口，钱到手。”何况，在“一赚二平七亏”的股市里，只要不亏损你就位居前三啊。这条习惯带来的收益是30％。
盈利才加仓:买一只股票，第一笔交易赚了钱，才能加仓，这说明你对趋势的判断是正确的，加仓也就顺理成章。第三笔交易如果亏损，连同前面的交易一同卖出。不要相信直觉，要相信现实，一旦交易亏损，要么是市场出了问题，要么是你出了问题，都需要你清仓。这条习惯带来的收益是20％。
独来独往:少数人赚钱的定律让我们不得不保持与众不同的思路。买别人不屑于买的股票或者是不敢买的股票才能成为赢家，大众情人成不了明星。
休息:休息不一定就是睡觉啊，但休息一定是要你卖出股票停止交易，远离股市一个阶段，可以去学习，可以去娱乐，也可以去做别的事业。要知道，距离产生的不仅仅是美，还有冷静和理智。一个成功的股民的角色绝对不仅仅是个股民，在别的舞台上你也一定翩翩起舞啊。这条习惯带来的收益是20％左右。
数一数你有亏钱的习惯多少条，有赚钱的习惯多少条，再计算一下，看看是否与你的实际收益相关联。
让您消除Ｋ线波动的好习惯,选择股票的诀窍：
第一，去学会计，做一个聪明的投资人，而不要做一个冲动的投资人。因为会计是一种通用的商务语言，通过会计财务报表，聪明的投资人会发现企业的内部价值，而冲动的投资人看重的只是股票的外部价格。
第二是阅读技能，只投资自己看得明白的公司，如果一个公司的年报让你看不明白，很自然就会怀疑这家公司的诚信度，或者该公司在刻意掩藏什么信息，故意不让投资者明白。
第三是耐心等待，一个人一生中真正投资的股票也就四五只，一旦发现了，就要大量买入，
第四,持有股票,直到他的价格超过合理估值。
亏钱的习惯
不割肉:不怕开水烫的一定就是死猪肉，越不割，越套你，直到肉烫烂成了人家的美味。情况不对，立即撤退，这才是生存之本。这条习惯带来的收益是－20％。想想，如果有1万元就价值2000元，有这条习惯的股民亏损是否超过20％啊。
勤割肉:周一买了周二割，还恨不能做T＋0交易，真想时刻做交易。这类股民的笔记本上是血淋
淋的誓言：割出去的是肉，下次买进来的是金子。结果是金子也真买到过，不过也给割了，肉嘛割得更多。这条习惯带来的收益是－30％。
常满仓:在股市里最大的风险就是时刻满仓，没有树立空仓几个月的意识，甚至没有空仓几周的经历。亏损者对满仓尤其是一年365天满仓更是情有独钟。要知道，在中国股市只有做多才能赚钱，但也只有满仓才能导致最大的风险。这条习惯带来的收益是－20％.
过多地接受股票信息:坐在交易大厅里或者是电脑前面，每天4小时交易时间要盯盘240分钟，舍不得喝水，舍不得上厕所，更舍不得午休。还不时地查看几分钟涨幅排名。而平时更是看电视股评，与股友探讨股票小道消息，过多的信息让自己没有了主见，亏损就成了家常便饭。这条习惯带来的收益是－10％。
赚钱的习惯
空仓:空仓最大的好处有两点：一是不会赔钱；二是用钱的时候随便你取钱。也就是说，那账户上的钱是真正属于你的。无论是否是股民，都要记住中国老百姓那句名谚语：“饭到口，钱到手。”何况，在“一赚二平七亏”的股市里，只要不亏损你就位居前三啊。这条习惯带来的收益是30％。
盈利才加仓:买一只股票，第一笔交易赚了钱，才能加仓，这说明你对趋势的判断是正确的，加仓也就顺理成章。第三笔交易如果亏损，连同前面的交易一同卖出。不要相信直觉，要相信现实，一旦交易亏损，要么是市场出了问题，要么是你出了问题，都需要你清仓。这条习惯带来的收益是20％。
独来独往:少数人赚钱的定律让我们不得不保持与众不同的思路。买别人不屑于买的股票或者是不敢买的股票才能成为赢家，大众情人成不了明星。
休息:休息不一定就是睡觉啊，但休息一定是要你卖出股票停止交易，远离股市一个阶段，可以去学习，可以去娱乐，也可以去做别的事业。要知道，距离产生的不仅仅是美，还有冷静和理智。一个成功的股民的角色绝对不仅仅是个股民，在别的舞台上你也一定翩翩起舞啊。这条习惯带来的收益是20％左右。
数一数你有亏钱的习惯多少条，有赚钱的习惯多少条，再计算一下，看看是否与你的实际收益相关联。
巴菲特向债券保险商援手 一家公司不领情
有“股神”之称的美国投资大师沃伦巴菲特12日表示，其领导的伯克希尔哈撒韦公司已向美国最大3家债券保险商Ambac、MBIA和FGIC提出愿为它们承保的市政债券提供再保险，但不包括其他复杂的高风险金融工具。
同时，这些保险商还需向巴菲特支付其所收到保费的1．5倍作为回报。
巴菲特表示，其中一家公司已经对其援助计划予以回绝，其余两家尚未作出回复。
债券保险商的作用是在债券发行商失去偿债能力时代其承担责任。自次贷危机爆发以来，抵押贷款债券违约率持续攀升，债券保险商面临巨额索赔。全球最大债券保险商MBIA公司日前宣布，其2007年第四季度出现公司历史上最严重的单季亏损。Ambac、FGIC则未能保住对债券保险商至关重要的3A信用评级。
业内人士指出，巴菲特提出的援助计划貌似雪中送炭，但其实对保险商来说没有多大实质意义。
原因是巴菲特提供的再保险对象仅限于各大保险商违约风险最小、最优质的资产--市政债券.
而真正的烫手山芋,各种高风险的结构性融资工具（如担保债权凭证等）则被排除在外，因此并没有从根本上解决保险商们面临的难题。
与此同时，将优质资产进行再保险后，剩余资产组合的风险等级实际上有增无减，保险商评级被下调的压力丝毫得不到缓解。
同时，这些保险商还需向巴菲特支付其所收到保费的1．5倍作为回报。
巴菲特表示，其中一家公司已经对其援助计划予以回绝，其余两家尚未作出回复。
债券保险商的作用是在债券发行商失去偿债能力时代其承担责任。自次贷危机爆发以来，抵押贷款债券违约率持续攀升，债券保险商面临巨额索赔。全球最大债券保险商MBIA公司日前宣布，其2007年第四季度出现公司历史上最严重的单季亏损。Ambac、FGIC则未能保住对债券保险商至关重要的3A信用评级。
业内人士指出，巴菲特提出的援助计划貌似雪中送炭，但其实对保险商来说没有多大实质意义。
原因是巴菲特提供的再保险对象仅限于各大保险商违约风险最小、最优质的资产--市政债券.
而真正的烫手山芋,各种高风险的结构性融资工具（如担保债权凭证等）则被排除在外，因此并没有从根本上解决保险商们面临的难题。
与此同时，将优质资产进行再保险后，剩余资产组合的风险等级实际上有增无减，保险商评级被下调的压力丝毫得不到缓解。
逐利本性依旧- 巴菲特援助保险商并非“雪中送炭”
亿万富翁巴菲特提出为8,000亿美元市政债券提供再保险，并非“雪中送炭”，更不是他在将85%的身家拿出来做慈善事业之後的又一个无私举措。
巴菲特之所以这麽做，是为了帮助其掌控的保险和投资公司Berkshire Hathaway聚敛更多钱财。 巴菲特在CNBC电视台说，“我们这麽做是为了赚钱...你要是拿出50亿美元，就应该赚些利润。”
巴菲特称上周提出以50亿美元为MBIA、Ambac Financial Group和FGIC担保的市政债券提供再保险，不过他收取的保费要比这些保险商从债券发行人处得到的保费高出50%。分析师认为这个价格有点高。
巴菲特的提议之所以"引人瞩目"还有一个原因，就是它将高风险债券--包括次优抵押贷款相关证券--排除在外。
巴菲特称，有一家保险商拒绝了他的提议，但没有指明是哪一家。
如果巴菲特介入，可能有助于稳定信贷市场。如今市场很担心债券保险商的“AAA”评级被调降。如果评级被调降，他们想再揽取业务就很困难，并会市政债被全面抛售，进而推高州和市政府的举债成本，最终损伤到纳税人。
T2 Partners合伙人Whitney Tilson说，“巴菲特在机遇到来时赚取大笔钱财...我认为他这次跑到‘台前’的原因是，他为社会和金融体系提供了一个非常好的交易，但对MBIA和Ambac来说这买卖却着实糟糕。”
Tilson说T2在“卖空”MBIA和Ambac，押注它们将进一步恶化。
巴菲特之所以这麽做，是为了帮助其掌控的保险和投资公司Berkshire Hathaway聚敛更多钱财。 巴菲特在CNBC电视台说，“我们这麽做是为了赚钱...你要是拿出50亿美元，就应该赚些利润。”
巴菲特称上周提出以50亿美元为MBIA、Ambac Financial Group和FGIC担保的市政债券提供再保险，不过他收取的保费要比这些保险商从债券发行人处得到的保费高出50%。分析师认为这个价格有点高。
巴菲特的提议之所以"引人瞩目"还有一个原因，就是它将高风险债券--包括次优抵押贷款相关证券--排除在外。
巴菲特称，有一家保险商拒绝了他的提议，但没有指明是哪一家。
如果巴菲特介入，可能有助于稳定信贷市场。如今市场很担心债券保险商的“AAA”评级被调降。如果评级被调降，他们想再揽取业务就很困难，并会市政债被全面抛售，进而推高州和市政府的举债成本，最终损伤到纳税人。
T2 Partners合伙人Whitney Tilson说，“巴菲特在机遇到来时赚取大笔钱财...我认为他这次跑到‘台前’的原因是，他为社会和金融体系提供了一个非常好的交易，但对MBIA和Ambac来说这买卖却着实糟糕。”
Tilson说T2在“卖空”MBIA和Ambac，押注它们将进一步恶化。
Tuesday, February 12, 2008
曾渊沧@股友通讯录
美国联邦储备局终于决定再减息0.5%。这是符合市场的预期。会后，联储局发表声明，说还会再积极地减息。不过，下一次议息会议还得等到三月十八日。在这个日子之前，除非美国经济出现重大的滑坡、崩溃。否则应该不会如1 月22 日那样突然减息。现在联邦利率是3%，算是低过长期平均数。但仍然不足以减轻企业的负担，不足以遭银行存户将钱提出来。存户们宁可收很低的利息也不敢冒险。因此，短期而言依然不乐观。现在唯一的希望是企业的业绩，业绩好的企业，股价依然是有支持的。
有股友问我，根据我自创的利用对数及线性回归法的方法，去年10 月海峡时报指数已经达到95%的过度乐观线，现在是不是该等到海峡时报指数跌到最底层的95%过度悲观线才入市？
答案是不一定。大家留意我的直线回归图, 94 年初，海峡时报指数往上接触到95%乐观线后，大幅下跌，但是不久就反弹，然后在95%过度乐观线与75%乐观线之间徘徊。一直到1997 年才一举大幅下跌。因此，不能肯定的说海峡时报指数一定会从一个极端走到另一个极端。只能说：每次来到95%过度乐观与过度悲观线时，我们就得准备减持股票或积极买入股票。
我不建议卖掉所有的股票，我自己也从来没有卖掉所有的股票。目前我的现金与股票的比例大约是70%对0%。现金的大量增加也不是因为我卖掉70%的股票，我没有卖掉这么多的股票，现金的增加是因为我最近以集体出售的方式卖掉新加坡一个物业，而且，2007 年基本上我已经不再投入新的资金于股市。2007 年工作赚到的钱、股息、租金的收入都存起来。
为什么我见到海峡时报指数与香港恒生指数同时上越95%过度乐观线后不大量抛售股票，全身而退？
原因是每个人在手上只有现金而没有股票时，会有两种可能发生的错误行为。
一是高价追货，二是低价没行动。
当你手上没股票时，一见股价反弹，你会很紧张，担心买不到，结果是高价追入。追入后，股价可能马上又下跌，你一怕，又卖掉，如此数次错误又买又卖、又卖又买，最后是自己对自己失去信心。
当你手上完全没有股票时，你也可能完全脱离股市。自己当前轻松，但也往往错失低价买入优质股的机会，要知道，熊市不是一跌就跌到底，而是会出现一个相当可观的大反弹，当你完全离开股市，你可能错失大反弹，更可能在大反弹的尾声错误地以为新的牛市来了而高价追货。
现在，最重要的事是保持自己身心轻松，只有EQ 高的人才能真正在股市赚到钱。
有股友问我，根据我自创的利用对数及线性回归法的方法，去年10 月海峡时报指数已经达到95%的过度乐观线，现在是不是该等到海峡时报指数跌到最底层的95%过度悲观线才入市？
答案是不一定。大家留意我的直线回归图, 94 年初，海峡时报指数往上接触到95%乐观线后，大幅下跌，但是不久就反弹，然后在95%过度乐观线与75%乐观线之间徘徊。一直到1997 年才一举大幅下跌。因此，不能肯定的说海峡时报指数一定会从一个极端走到另一个极端。只能说：每次来到95%过度乐观与过度悲观线时，我们就得准备减持股票或积极买入股票。
我不建议卖掉所有的股票，我自己也从来没有卖掉所有的股票。目前我的现金与股票的比例大约是70%对0%。现金的大量增加也不是因为我卖掉70%的股票，我没有卖掉这么多的股票，现金的增加是因为我最近以集体出售的方式卖掉新加坡一个物业，而且，2007 年基本上我已经不再投入新的资金于股市。2007 年工作赚到的钱、股息、租金的收入都存起来。
为什么我见到海峡时报指数与香港恒生指数同时上越95%过度乐观线后不大量抛售股票，全身而退？
原因是每个人在手上只有现金而没有股票时，会有两种可能发生的错误行为。
一是高价追货，二是低价没行动。
当你手上没股票时，一见股价反弹，你会很紧张，担心买不到，结果是高价追入。追入后，股价可能马上又下跌，你一怕，又卖掉，如此数次错误又买又卖、又卖又买，最后是自己对自己失去信心。
当你手上完全没有股票时，你也可能完全脱离股市。自己当前轻松，但也往往错失低价买入优质股的机会，要知道，熊市不是一跌就跌到底，而是会出现一个相当可观的大反弹，当你完全离开股市，你可能错失大反弹，更可能在大反弹的尾声错误地以为新的牛市来了而高价追货。
现在，最重要的事是保持自己身心轻松，只有EQ 高的人才能真正在股市赚到钱。
Monday, February 11, 2008
Market Volatility and Time Invested in the Markets
IT’S ALL ABOUT TIME IN THE MARKET NOT TIMING THE MARKET, SAYS FIDELITY INTERNATIONAL
Investors who missed the best 40 trading days over the past 6 years have reduced gains or even losses.
As the world’s equity markets continue to experience volatility, Fidelity International, one of the world’s oldest, largest and leading fund managers, highlights the risk to local investors trying to time their stock market investments.
Analysis of performance across Asia Pacific equity markets over the past 6 years* reveals that relatively few trading days contribute to overall performance. Investors who missed the best 40 days during this period have much reduced gains or, in some countries, hefty losses – as below.
As shown above, a stake of $US10,000 invested in the equivalent of the MSCI AC Asia ex Japan Index in January 2002 would have been worth $US31,406 at 23 January 2008, including the reinvestment of dividends, if left untouched**. Strip out the best 10 days and the investment would be worth just $US21,192. Miss the best 40 days and the stake would today be worth $US9,696, less than initially invested.
The dangers of trying to time the market are even more pronounced in various countries. Missing the best 40 days over this 6 year period would lead to losses in Australia, China, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea and Singapore, as shown below.
It can be tempting during times of stock market uncertainty to delay making investment decisions or to sell existing holdings in the hope of buying back in when values are lower. In theory this is an attractive idea, but it seldom works in practice. Just as the sharp falls in stock markets tend to occur over short periods of time, the best gains are similarly concentrated. Because these gains often occur just before, or after, a market fall - an investor who tries to avoid falls is highly likely to miss the best gains.
When markets fall, understandably investors lose confidence and either stop investing new money or redeem their holdings. But the clear lesson from history is that if investors persevere, they should reap the rewards in the long term. As we at Fidelity are fond of saying: it’s time in the market, not timing the market that counts."
For investors who are concerned about market volatility, investors could consider a regular savings plan. By investing a consistent amount at regular intervals, investors can gradually ‘drip-feed’ into the market regardless of the price on any given day. This strategy is known as cost averaging and will help smooth out the effect of market changes on the value of investments.
There are always going to be market peaks and troughs and unpredictable events that will affect market conditions. We believe the key to investing is to wait these tumultuous periods out and think about the long term rather than the short term.
Investors who missed the best 40 trading days over the past 6 years have reduced gains or even losses.
As the world’s equity markets continue to experience volatility, Fidelity International, one of the world’s oldest, largest and leading fund managers, highlights the risk to local investors trying to time their stock market investments.
Analysis of performance across Asia Pacific equity markets over the past 6 years* reveals that relatively few trading days contribute to overall performance. Investors who missed the best 40 days during this period have much reduced gains or, in some countries, hefty losses – as below.
As shown above, a stake of $US10,000 invested in the equivalent of the MSCI AC Asia ex Japan Index in January 2002 would have been worth $US31,406 at 23 January 2008, including the reinvestment of dividends, if left untouched**. Strip out the best 10 days and the investment would be worth just $US21,192. Miss the best 40 days and the stake would today be worth $US9,696, less than initially invested.
The dangers of trying to time the market are even more pronounced in various countries. Missing the best 40 days over this 6 year period would lead to losses in Australia, China, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea and Singapore, as shown below.
It can be tempting during times of stock market uncertainty to delay making investment decisions or to sell existing holdings in the hope of buying back in when values are lower. In theory this is an attractive idea, but it seldom works in practice. Just as the sharp falls in stock markets tend to occur over short periods of time, the best gains are similarly concentrated. Because these gains often occur just before, or after, a market fall - an investor who tries to avoid falls is highly likely to miss the best gains.
When markets fall, understandably investors lose confidence and either stop investing new money or redeem their holdings. But the clear lesson from history is that if investors persevere, they should reap the rewards in the long term. As we at Fidelity are fond of saying: it’s time in the market, not timing the market that counts."
For investors who are concerned about market volatility, investors could consider a regular savings plan. By investing a consistent amount at regular intervals, investors can gradually ‘drip-feed’ into the market regardless of the price on any given day. This strategy is known as cost averaging and will help smooth out the effect of market changes on the value of investments.
There are always going to be market peaks and troughs and unpredictable events that will affect market conditions. We believe the key to investing is to wait these tumultuous periods out and think about the long term rather than the short term.
投资股票不需要太聪明
长期以来，在我们媒体上一直有一种倾向，就是把股票投资说得太玄乎，似乎做一个成功的投资者，一定要学会ABCD、甲乙丙丁，还要眼观六路，耳听八方，把投资者弄得晕晕乎乎的，好像一个成功的投资者，非得有经济学家兼会计师兼心理学大师兼统计专家兼政治家然后还要有军事家与谋略家的脑袋不可。
而实际上股票投资却并不是这么回事，彼德·泰纳斯--美国林克斯投资顾问公司总裁，一位投资基金与投资理论研究专家，通过对全美投资基金的调查访问，得出的一个基本结论是：大多数大师所以会成为大师，并不是因为他们有过人之处与独门暗器，而仅仅是因为他们有一个相对固定的投资风格、一套简单有效的投资原则以及坚定地按此去做的严明纪律。为此，彼德·泰纳斯深有感触地说：既然所有的大师都只有一种适合于他们的投资风格，为什么作为普通人的你，却偏要去学那么多的东西呢？
因此，他对投资者的忠告便是：投资股票不需要太聪明 ，但是要寻找到你的投资风格。
一个普通投资者的成功案例 有一位个人投资者，入市4年，最低一年的回报率是80％，而其投资秘诀却十分简单，四条基本原则：
1、买进的股票不要太差；
2、价格要比较合理；
3、买进以后不要轻易割肉；
4、涨一两块钱不要抛，宁可跌下来后再走。
这四个原则之所以管用，是因为它符合且包含了一些基本的投资准则与市场定理。
一、它符合长期好友理论。在所有的股票理论中，最基本的理论就是长期好友理论。在这里，时间就像酵母菌，常常会把一个非常简单的投资行为酿成一个非凡的奇迹。因此，只要股票不太烂，价格不过高，买进，然后耐心持有，通常是最简单又最有效的投资方法。
二、它符合"股市风水轮流转"的基本定律。股票上涨是要有时间的，有许多股票所以不涨，一个很重要的原因是时间未到：有的是暂时地被人遗忘了，有的是不符合当前的市场潮流，有的是价格还没有真正调整到位，有的是盘整的时间还不够长。而一旦各方条件具备，通常只要有一点点催化剂就会涨起来。而且，股市中常有"咸鱼翻身"现象，一些过去的烂股和冷门股会突然成为耀眼的明星，在短期内上涨几倍甚至十几倍。这种现象我们在过去曾多次见过，它实际所反映的是股市能量的转换和平衡规律。不要以为这是一种不成熟的表现，"上一年的烂股很可能是今年的明星股"，这是欧尼尔在总结美国股市近50年历程时说过的一句话。
三、它符合市场选择原则。在聪明的市场面前，任何人的智慧都是有限的，尤其是想凭借个人的聪明才智去发现黑马，并一口咬定说它就是黑马，更是愚蠢而且危险的。因此，最好的方法就是"让市场去决定"。
上述第四点贯彻的就是这样一个原则，它同时也符合90％与10％的定理。所谓90％与10％，用在股票投资中就是：尽管你曾买过100个股票，但最终你投资收益的90％将来自于其中的10个，为了不漏掉这宝贵的10个，有必要舍弃一些蝇头小利，好让市场来检验一下，到底哪个股票会成为其中的1个。这一如欧尼尔所说，"做股票不一定要全对，而是在做对时要赚到大钱"。对这一点，有兴趣的读者不妨做一个实验，把当初买过的所有股票计算一遍，按这种方法，你的总收益是否会比现在增加。应该说，大多数人是会增加的。 市场不会变得太多
在讲完上述故事后，我突然想起一位经济学家对经济学的评述。他说，经济学实际上一门把简单常识用种种复杂的术语包装起来的学科。那么"股票投资学"是不是也是这样？看来也是的，因为许许多多的方法、理论、技巧都各有相应的用处与相应的道理，但要真正取得成功，却并不需要这些，尤其是不需要那么多的东西。一套简单的投资原则，一种相对固定的投资风格，再加上一点基本的常识和严明的操作纪律就足够了，而上面所介绍的只是无数成功的个人投资者中的一个。
事实上，还有许多人在用各不相同的原则、方法和风格在从事着他们的投资或投机活动。尽管他们的做法会有所不同，但"幸福的家庭总是相同的"--他们都各有自己的投资风格。也许有人会认为，市场是会变的，过去适用的未来不一定行得通。对此，一位投资大师说得好："经验告诉我，这个市场变得不多。循环一次又一次，重要的投资原则依然适用；不同的只是参与的群众换了一批又一批。"难道不是吗？ 希望你能了解我这篇所讲的是什么，当然，这种方式未必会让你认同，不过我想告诉你的是：做股票不需要态聪明，定位好自己的风格不必懂太多。
而实际上股票投资却并不是这么回事，彼德·泰纳斯--美国林克斯投资顾问公司总裁，一位投资基金与投资理论研究专家，通过对全美投资基金的调查访问，得出的一个基本结论是：大多数大师所以会成为大师，并不是因为他们有过人之处与独门暗器，而仅仅是因为他们有一个相对固定的投资风格、一套简单有效的投资原则以及坚定地按此去做的严明纪律。为此，彼德·泰纳斯深有感触地说：既然所有的大师都只有一种适合于他们的投资风格，为什么作为普通人的你，却偏要去学那么多的东西呢？
因此，他对投资者的忠告便是：投资股票不需要太聪明 ，但是要寻找到你的投资风格。
一个普通投资者的成功案例 有一位个人投资者，入市4年，最低一年的回报率是80％，而其投资秘诀却十分简单，四条基本原则：
1、买进的股票不要太差；
2、价格要比较合理；
3、买进以后不要轻易割肉；
4、涨一两块钱不要抛，宁可跌下来后再走。
这四个原则之所以管用，是因为它符合且包含了一些基本的投资准则与市场定理。
一、它符合长期好友理论。在所有的股票理论中，最基本的理论就是长期好友理论。在这里，时间就像酵母菌，常常会把一个非常简单的投资行为酿成一个非凡的奇迹。因此，只要股票不太烂，价格不过高，买进，然后耐心持有，通常是最简单又最有效的投资方法。
二、它符合"股市风水轮流转"的基本定律。股票上涨是要有时间的，有许多股票所以不涨，一个很重要的原因是时间未到：有的是暂时地被人遗忘了，有的是不符合当前的市场潮流，有的是价格还没有真正调整到位，有的是盘整的时间还不够长。而一旦各方条件具备，通常只要有一点点催化剂就会涨起来。而且，股市中常有"咸鱼翻身"现象，一些过去的烂股和冷门股会突然成为耀眼的明星，在短期内上涨几倍甚至十几倍。这种现象我们在过去曾多次见过，它实际所反映的是股市能量的转换和平衡规律。不要以为这是一种不成熟的表现，"上一年的烂股很可能是今年的明星股"，这是欧尼尔在总结美国股市近50年历程时说过的一句话。
三、它符合市场选择原则。在聪明的市场面前，任何人的智慧都是有限的，尤其是想凭借个人的聪明才智去发现黑马，并一口咬定说它就是黑马，更是愚蠢而且危险的。因此，最好的方法就是"让市场去决定"。
上述第四点贯彻的就是这样一个原则，它同时也符合90％与10％的定理。所谓90％与10％，用在股票投资中就是：尽管你曾买过100个股票，但最终你投资收益的90％将来自于其中的10个，为了不漏掉这宝贵的10个，有必要舍弃一些蝇头小利，好让市场来检验一下，到底哪个股票会成为其中的1个。这一如欧尼尔所说，"做股票不一定要全对，而是在做对时要赚到大钱"。对这一点，有兴趣的读者不妨做一个实验，把当初买过的所有股票计算一遍，按这种方法，你的总收益是否会比现在增加。应该说，大多数人是会增加的。 市场不会变得太多
在讲完上述故事后，我突然想起一位经济学家对经济学的评述。他说，经济学实际上一门把简单常识用种种复杂的术语包装起来的学科。那么"股票投资学"是不是也是这样？看来也是的，因为许许多多的方法、理论、技巧都各有相应的用处与相应的道理，但要真正取得成功，却并不需要这些，尤其是不需要那么多的东西。一套简单的投资原则，一种相对固定的投资风格，再加上一点基本的常识和严明的操作纪律就足够了，而上面所介绍的只是无数成功的个人投资者中的一个。
事实上，还有许多人在用各不相同的原则、方法和风格在从事着他们的投资或投机活动。尽管他们的做法会有所不同，但"幸福的家庭总是相同的"--他们都各有自己的投资风格。也许有人会认为，市场是会变的，过去适用的未来不一定行得通。对此，一位投资大师说得好："经验告诉我，这个市场变得不多。循环一次又一次，重要的投资原则依然适用；不同的只是参与的群众换了一批又一批。"难道不是吗？ 希望你能了解我这篇所讲的是什么，当然，这种方式未必会让你认同，不过我想告诉你的是：做股票不需要态聪明，定位好自己的风格不必懂太多。
股票买卖的不败法则
事实证明，如果遵循正确的原则和买卖纪律，高收益和低风险是可以并存的。
大盘原则：大盘下跌时尽量空仓或轻仓，大盘盘整时不贪，有10%或以下的利润就考虑平仓，大盘上攻时选择最强势的个股持有。
板块原则：大盘上攻时，个股呈现板块轮涨的特征，判断某一时期的主流板块，选择板块中的龙头追入。记住，资金有获利回吐的特性，没有永远的热点，努力寻求新的热点，在启动时迅速介入。
价值原则：选择未来两年价值增长的股票，至少未来一年价值增长。记住价格围绕价值波动的价值规律，它和波浪理论和江恩理论等同是自然法则。
资金流原则：资金流入该股票，慎防股票的获利回吐
趋势原则：股价呈现向上波动的趋势。
资金管理：现金永远是最安全的，定期清仓，保障资金的主动性，等待机会，选择合适的时机重新建仓。
共振原理：价值趋势向上，价格趋势向上，股票价格短线、中线、长线趋势向上。基本面和技术面都无可挑剔的股票是最好的股票。
努力避免浮亏：被套是痛苦的事情，即使暂时被套也令人难以忍受。正确地选择买点和卖点是避免被套的良方，写下买进和卖出的原因，严格地遵守买卖纪律，就能保障资金的主动性，虽然有时侯要付出微亏的代价。具体来说，长线投资的理论依据是价格围绕价值波动，价值引导资金和决定股价长远走势。应判断股票的价值及成长性，选择交易冷淡的底部介入，跟踪个股的价值变化情况，耐心等待，以时间换取空间；短线投资注重趋势，如果趋势改变，就要止损，切忌把短线做成长线，让亏损无限制扩大。中线应在20日或30日均线介入，当均线系统破坏时就出局。
进攻性波段投资：努力寻找更好的股票，以替代手中的持股。
选股如选美，满足以上所有条件的股票是很难找的，正是这种难度性导致了最优秀的股票的出现，买入这样的股票，你就可以享受安全安心快速的股票增值了！
大盘原则：大盘下跌时尽量空仓或轻仓，大盘盘整时不贪，有10%或以下的利润就考虑平仓，大盘上攻时选择最强势的个股持有。
板块原则：大盘上攻时，个股呈现板块轮涨的特征，判断某一时期的主流板块，选择板块中的龙头追入。记住，资金有获利回吐的特性，没有永远的热点，努力寻求新的热点，在启动时迅速介入。
价值原则：选择未来两年价值增长的股票，至少未来一年价值增长。记住价格围绕价值波动的价值规律，它和波浪理论和江恩理论等同是自然法则。
资金流原则：资金流入该股票，慎防股票的获利回吐
趋势原则：股价呈现向上波动的趋势。
资金管理：现金永远是最安全的，定期清仓，保障资金的主动性，等待机会，选择合适的时机重新建仓。
共振原理：价值趋势向上，价格趋势向上，股票价格短线、中线、长线趋势向上。基本面和技术面都无可挑剔的股票是最好的股票。
努力避免浮亏：被套是痛苦的事情，即使暂时被套也令人难以忍受。正确地选择买点和卖点是避免被套的良方，写下买进和卖出的原因，严格地遵守买卖纪律，就能保障资金的主动性，虽然有时侯要付出微亏的代价。具体来说，长线投资的理论依据是价格围绕价值波动，价值引导资金和决定股价长远走势。应判断股票的价值及成长性，选择交易冷淡的底部介入，跟踪个股的价值变化情况，耐心等待，以时间换取空间；短线投资注重趋势，如果趋势改变，就要止损，切忌把短线做成长线，让亏损无限制扩大。中线应在20日或30日均线介入，当均线系统破坏时就出局。
进攻性波段投资：努力寻找更好的股票，以替代手中的持股。
选股如选美，满足以上所有条件的股票是很难找的，正是这种难度性导致了最优秀的股票的出现，买入这样的股票，你就可以享受安全安心快速的股票增值了！
股票操作的一大技巧：反大众心理
在股票操作的领域里，有一个相当重要的原则———要实行与一般大众心理相违背的反向操作，即在大众一片乐观声中应该警惕，在大众一片悲观时要勇于承接。这是因为大众大都是“追涨杀跌”的。
从炒股理论上说，股价愈涨，风险愈高，然而大众却愈有信心；股价愈跌，风险愈低，但一般投资者却愈来愈担心 。对投资者而言，如何在投机狂热高涨时保持理智的研判以及在大众恐惧害怕时仍保持足够的信心，对投资能否获利关系甚大。
在股市波动幅度比较小的时候，更可显示出反大众心理操作的重要性。例如在1987年年初，台湾地区的许多经济学者或经济专家均认为台币升值，以出口为导向的台湾经济势必会受到拖累，间接地使经济增长减缓，反映在股市中，将会一季比一季淡，一季比一季差。然而结果是股市连创新高，到了9月份更加狂涨不止，就在这大众一片看好、股市眼看就要将突破5000点之际，厄运降临，股市大幅挫落，加上美国股市暴跌的影响，台湾股市跌幅超过50％。1989年年初，一些专家学者预测经济成长率将减缓，股市将仅是跌深反弹而已，没想到股市却再创新高。这些现象均显示股市的走向往往与大众的心理背道而驰。
主力往往采取与一般大众心理相反的操作方式，例如在技术面显示大盘破底、大众一片悲观而杀出时，主力却大力买进，在技术上穿过头部；大众一片乐观而抢进时，主力又大举卖出，以此进行调节。
既然要与一般大众反向操作，就必须了解大众的心理，下列指标可供参考：
投资顾问的意见。大多数投资顾问都鼓励客户逢低买进，、逢高卖出，然而，现实中许多例子都显示，投资顾问经常作出相反的建议，因此，当大多数投资顾问对后市看法乐观时，行情往往临近顶峰，大多数投资顾问看法悲观时，行情往往接近谷底。
共同基金持有现金的比例。共同基金的投资组合中持有现金增多，表明股价要下跌，持有现金减少，表明股价要上涨。因此基金持有现金的比例可作为一个指标，当现金持有比例非常高时，往往股价已接近谷底，反之，现金持有比例非常低时，股价常接近顶点。另外，共同基金中的现金持有量与前三个月累积赎回数之比例亦可作为参考，基金在股价下跌时有赎回的压力，因此若现金持有量与前三个月累积要求赎回数比例大于8倍时，基金赎回的压力较小，当此比例小于或等于8倍时，少量的现金（购买能力较小）与较大的卖压常常会导致股价下挫。
券商营业部中的人气是否兴旺。如果券商营业部以往沸腾不已，如今门可罗雀，且投资客无视行情好坏，漠不关心股价的开跌，在下棋聊天。书报摊上有关股票操作方面的书籍卖不出去，此时股价通常已跌至谷底。反之，当人气沸腾、一开盘股票便全面出现涨停的情况，此时股价通常接近高峰，宜减少持股或退出观望。有两句股市俗语“人弃我取，人取我予” 乃最佳的写照。大众不凑热闹时，才是购买的时机。
总而言之，投资股票除了要了解基本分析及K 线分析之外，大众的心理亦须加以研究，成功的投资者通常是特立独行、行事固执的投资人。
从炒股理论上说，股价愈涨，风险愈高，然而大众却愈有信心；股价愈跌，风险愈低，但一般投资者却愈来愈担心 。对投资者而言，如何在投机狂热高涨时保持理智的研判以及在大众恐惧害怕时仍保持足够的信心，对投资能否获利关系甚大。
在股市波动幅度比较小的时候，更可显示出反大众心理操作的重要性。例如在1987年年初，台湾地区的许多经济学者或经济专家均认为台币升值，以出口为导向的台湾经济势必会受到拖累，间接地使经济增长减缓，反映在股市中，将会一季比一季淡，一季比一季差。然而结果是股市连创新高，到了9月份更加狂涨不止，就在这大众一片看好、股市眼看就要将突破5000点之际，厄运降临，股市大幅挫落，加上美国股市暴跌的影响，台湾股市跌幅超过50％。1989年年初，一些专家学者预测经济成长率将减缓，股市将仅是跌深反弹而已，没想到股市却再创新高。这些现象均显示股市的走向往往与大众的心理背道而驰。
主力往往采取与一般大众心理相反的操作方式，例如在技术面显示大盘破底、大众一片悲观而杀出时，主力却大力买进，在技术上穿过头部；大众一片乐观而抢进时，主力又大举卖出，以此进行调节。
既然要与一般大众反向操作，就必须了解大众的心理，下列指标可供参考：
投资顾问的意见。大多数投资顾问都鼓励客户逢低买进，、逢高卖出，然而，现实中许多例子都显示，投资顾问经常作出相反的建议，因此，当大多数投资顾问对后市看法乐观时，行情往往临近顶峰，大多数投资顾问看法悲观时，行情往往接近谷底。
共同基金持有现金的比例。共同基金的投资组合中持有现金增多，表明股价要下跌，持有现金减少，表明股价要上涨。因此基金持有现金的比例可作为一个指标，当现金持有比例非常高时，往往股价已接近谷底，反之，现金持有比例非常低时，股价常接近顶点。另外，共同基金中的现金持有量与前三个月累积赎回数之比例亦可作为参考，基金在股价下跌时有赎回的压力，因此若现金持有量与前三个月累积要求赎回数比例大于8倍时，基金赎回的压力较小，当此比例小于或等于8倍时，少量的现金（购买能力较小）与较大的卖压常常会导致股价下挫。
券商营业部中的人气是否兴旺。如果券商营业部以往沸腾不已，如今门可罗雀，且投资客无视行情好坏，漠不关心股价的开跌，在下棋聊天。书报摊上有关股票操作方面的书籍卖不出去，此时股价通常已跌至谷底。反之，当人气沸腾、一开盘股票便全面出现涨停的情况，此时股价通常接近高峰，宜减少持股或退出观望。有两句股市俗语“人弃我取，人取我予” 乃最佳的写照。大众不凑热闹时，才是购买的时机。
总而言之，投资股票除了要了解基本分析及K 线分析之外，大众的心理亦须加以研究，成功的投资者通常是特立独行、行事固执的投资人。
Sunday, February 10, 2008
分红派息前后投资技巧
股份公司经营一段时间后(一般为一年)，如果营运正常，产生了利润，就要向股东分配股息和红利。其交付方式一般有三种：一种以现金的形式向股东支付。这是最常见、最普通的形式。二是向股东配股，采取这种方式主要是为了把资金留在公司里扩大经营，以追求公司发展的远期利益和长远目标。第三种形式是实物分派，即是把公司的产品作为股息和红利分派给股东。
在分红派息前夕，持有股票的股东一定要密切关注与分红派息有关的4个日期，这4个日期是：
1.股息宣布日，即公司董事会将分红派息的消息公布于众的时间。
2.派息日，即股息正式发放给股东的日期。
3.股权登记日，即统计和 认参加期股息红利分配的股东的日期。
4.除息日，即不再亨有本期股息的日期。
在这4个日期中，尤为重要的是股权登记日和除息日。由于每日有地数的投资者在股票市场上买进或卖出，公司的股票不断易手。这就意味着 股东也在不断变化之中。因此，公司董事会在决定分红派息时，必须明确公布股权登记日，派发股息就以股权登记日这一天的公司名册为准。凡在这一天的股东名册上记录在案的投资者，公司承认为股东，有权享受本期派发的股息与红利。如果股票持有者在股权登记日之前没有登记过户，那么其股票出售者的姓名仍保留在股东名册上，这样公司仍承认其为股东，期股息仍会按照规定分派给股票的出售者而不是现在的持有者。由此可见，购买了股票并不一定就能得到股息红利，只有在股权登记日以前到登记公司办理了登记过户手续，才能获取正常的股息红利收入。
至于除息日的把握，对于投资者也至关重要，由于投资者在除息日当天以后购买的股票，已无权参加此期的股息红利分配。因此，除息日当天的价格会与除息日前的股价有所变化。一般来讲，除息日当天的股市报价就是除息参考价，也即是除息日前一天的收盘价减去每股股息后的价格。例如，某种股票计划生股派发2元的股息，如除息日前的价格为每股11元，则除息日这天的参考报价应是9元(11元—2元)。掌握除息日前后股价的这种变化规律，有利于投资者在购买时填报适当的委托价，以有效降低其购股成本，减少不必要的损失。
对于有中、长线投资打算的投资者来说，还可趁除息前夕的股价偏低时，买入股票过户，以享受股息收入。出现有时在除息前夕价偏弱的原因，主要在这时投资者较多。因为短期投资者一般倾向不过户、不收息，故在除息前夕多半设法将股票脱手，甚至价位低一些也在所不惜。因此，有中、长期投资计划的人，如果趁短线投资者回吐的时候入市，即可买到一些相对廉价的股份，又可获取股息收入。至于在除息前夕的哪一具体时点买入，则是一个十分复杂的技巧问题。一般来讲，在截止过户时，当大市尚未明朗时，短线投资者较多，因而在截止过户前，那些不想过户的短线客，就得交所有的股份卖出，越接近过户期，卖出的短线客就越多，故原则上在截止客户的1～2天，可买到相对适宜价位的股票，但切不可将这种情形绝对化。因为如果大家都看好某种股票，或者某种股票的股息十分诱人，也可能会出现“抢息”的现象。即越接近过户期，购买该种股票的投资者越多，因而，股价的涨升幅度也就越大，投资者必须对具体情况进行具体分析，以恰当地在分红派息期掌握买卖火候。
在分红派息前夕，持有股票的股东一定要密切关注与分红派息有关的4个日期，这4个日期是：
1.股息宣布日，即公司董事会将分红派息的消息公布于众的时间。
2.派息日，即股息正式发放给股东的日期。
3.股权登记日，即统计和 认参加期股息红利分配的股东的日期。
4.除息日，即不再亨有本期股息的日期。
在这4个日期中，尤为重要的是股权登记日和除息日。由于每日有地数的投资者在股票市场上买进或卖出，公司的股票不断易手。这就意味着 股东也在不断变化之中。因此，公司董事会在决定分红派息时，必须明确公布股权登记日，派发股息就以股权登记日这一天的公司名册为准。凡在这一天的股东名册上记录在案的投资者，公司承认为股东，有权享受本期派发的股息与红利。如果股票持有者在股权登记日之前没有登记过户，那么其股票出售者的姓名仍保留在股东名册上，这样公司仍承认其为股东，期股息仍会按照规定分派给股票的出售者而不是现在的持有者。由此可见，购买了股票并不一定就能得到股息红利，只有在股权登记日以前到登记公司办理了登记过户手续，才能获取正常的股息红利收入。
至于除息日的把握，对于投资者也至关重要，由于投资者在除息日当天以后购买的股票，已无权参加此期的股息红利分配。因此，除息日当天的价格会与除息日前的股价有所变化。一般来讲，除息日当天的股市报价就是除息参考价，也即是除息日前一天的收盘价减去每股股息后的价格。例如，某种股票计划生股派发2元的股息，如除息日前的价格为每股11元，则除息日这天的参考报价应是9元(11元—2元)。掌握除息日前后股价的这种变化规律，有利于投资者在购买时填报适当的委托价，以有效降低其购股成本，减少不必要的损失。
对于有中、长线投资打算的投资者来说，还可趁除息前夕的股价偏低时，买入股票过户，以享受股息收入。出现有时在除息前夕价偏弱的原因，主要在这时投资者较多。因为短期投资者一般倾向不过户、不收息，故在除息前夕多半设法将股票脱手，甚至价位低一些也在所不惜。因此，有中、长期投资计划的人，如果趁短线投资者回吐的时候入市，即可买到一些相对廉价的股份，又可获取股息收入。至于在除息前夕的哪一具体时点买入，则是一个十分复杂的技巧问题。一般来讲，在截止过户时，当大市尚未明朗时，短线投资者较多，因而在截止过户前，那些不想过户的短线客，就得交所有的股份卖出，越接近过户期，卖出的短线客就越多，故原则上在截止客户的1～2天，可买到相对适宜价位的股票，但切不可将这种情形绝对化。因为如果大家都看好某种股票，或者某种股票的股息十分诱人，也可能会出现“抢息”的现象。即越接近过户期，购买该种股票的投资者越多，因而，股价的涨升幅度也就越大，投资者必须对具体情况进行具体分析，以恰当地在分红派息期掌握买卖火候。
股市不需要勤奋
涨涨跌跌指数，犹犹豫豫头绪，进进出出操作，亏亏赢赢财富，忙忙碌碌何苦。
不少投资者也许会对上述说法感到可笑和不解，股市难道不需要勤奋吗？但如果你是一个价值投资者，就会对笔者所说的不需要勤奋深有感触，在充满博弈的资本市场上，需要的是对价值的发现并分享它的成长，如果你认为自己能够战胜市场或者所谓的庄家，你就落进了一个圈套 。
有位朋友发来对我很有启发的一段话：“作为一个散户，不必急于求成赚钱，到这个市场来的人都是想赚钱的，没有一个人是为了亏钱而来的。但为何亏钱的总是你，是因为庄家的一举一动都是冲着让散户来的，只是你不知道罢了。其实庄家才不会怕你哭闹呢，这里原本就是一个合法的财富再分配市场”。
“庄家最怕你不看他。因为庄家深知你的贪婪与恐惧，庄家的阴谋通过操盘手传递给你，他让盘口别有洞天风起云涌，他让k线图青面獠牙天花乱坠，只要你睁开眼睛看，你就会患得患失，你就会神魂颠倒……”
“庄家就这样征服了你，因为他把这个交易市场当作戏院，将自己看成是卖座的大明星，而你心甘情愿做个忠实的观众，他就没天没日地尽情表演。当你不看他的时候，当他没有观众的时候，当他对牛弹琴的时候，他真的好怕，因为他的钱是贷款，他要付操盘手的工资，面对一个不看不闻不问不急的人，面对一个无知无欲无畏无惧的人，他的一切表演都是徒劳的，这就是庄家的死穴，这样的股民是庄家永远不可战胜的”。
其实从这段话中我们感受到什么呢？尤其是在目前这种市场环境整体向好的背景下，选择值得投资的品种好好地放着，如果实在害怕被套，可以不要满仓，留点钱在外面，遭遇到突然的利空时，顺便在自己持有的股票上补仓摊低成本。关心市场宏观面和趋势，少盯着自己手里的股票，需要每天看牢的股票值得投资吗？这从另一个角度告诉我们价值投资的重要性。
任何领域中都需要努力，唯独在股市上就怕你勤奋，在一个牛市中，操作得越多就越容易失误。
不少投资者也许会对上述说法感到可笑和不解，股市难道不需要勤奋吗？但如果你是一个价值投资者，就会对笔者所说的不需要勤奋深有感触，在充满博弈的资本市场上，需要的是对价值的发现并分享它的成长，如果你认为自己能够战胜市场或者所谓的庄家，你就落进了一个圈套 。
有位朋友发来对我很有启发的一段话：“作为一个散户，不必急于求成赚钱，到这个市场来的人都是想赚钱的，没有一个人是为了亏钱而来的。但为何亏钱的总是你，是因为庄家的一举一动都是冲着让散户来的，只是你不知道罢了。其实庄家才不会怕你哭闹呢，这里原本就是一个合法的财富再分配市场”。
“庄家最怕你不看他。因为庄家深知你的贪婪与恐惧，庄家的阴谋通过操盘手传递给你，他让盘口别有洞天风起云涌，他让k线图青面獠牙天花乱坠，只要你睁开眼睛看，你就会患得患失，你就会神魂颠倒……”
“庄家就这样征服了你，因为他把这个交易市场当作戏院，将自己看成是卖座的大明星，而你心甘情愿做个忠实的观众，他就没天没日地尽情表演。当你不看他的时候，当他没有观众的时候，当他对牛弹琴的时候，他真的好怕，因为他的钱是贷款，他要付操盘手的工资，面对一个不看不闻不问不急的人，面对一个无知无欲无畏无惧的人，他的一切表演都是徒劳的，这就是庄家的死穴，这样的股民是庄家永远不可战胜的”。
其实从这段话中我们感受到什么呢？尤其是在目前这种市场环境整体向好的背景下，选择值得投资的品种好好地放着，如果实在害怕被套，可以不要满仓，留点钱在外面，遭遇到突然的利空时，顺便在自己持有的股票上补仓摊低成本。关心市场宏观面和趋势，少盯着自己手里的股票，需要每天看牢的股票值得投资吗？这从另一个角度告诉我们价值投资的重要性。
任何领域中都需要努力，唯独在股市上就怕你勤奋，在一个牛市中，操作得越多就越容易失误。
判断股市大趋势的八大要素
根据国外经济与金融的研究分析，判断股市多空走向，把握其发展趋势至少有下列征兆可供参考：
(1)据政府有关部门所发布的各项经济指标与景气对策信号，分析经济成长是否趋于衰退
如政府有关部门发表的经济成长预测、工业生产月增率、失业率以及各项领先指标等，无不透露重要讯息。倘若经济呈现衰退迹象，股市便缺实力支撑，纵有所谓“资金行情”，亦难望其持久。
(2)通货膨胀有无上升趋势
通货膨胀不仅使企业因物价与工资上升，成本升高，同时亦使多数低收入与固定收入者的购买力降低，间接也会影响企业获利。固然通货膨胀初期，企业因拥有低价库存原料与成品以及房地产等优势可保赢利不衰，甚且有过之，但毕竟为时甚短。一旦通胀恶化，股市必然陷于空头走势。
(3)利率是否大幅扬升
当国际间利率大幅扬升，各国为防止其本国资金大量外流，亦必被迫采取提高利率的做法。前些年由于美国联邦储备理事会提高重贴现率0.5个百分点，由原先的6.5%，提高至7%，美国各大银行随即调升其利率至11%以上，以致欧洲各工业国家亦均在考虑调高其重贴现率。若欧洲各国跟进，则全球利率势必攀升，影响全球经济发展乃可预见。
此外，如果通货膨胀持续上升，则政府为安定民生，遏阻金融投机，亦必采取紧缩金融措施，迫使利率上升。利率上升，企业经营成本上扬，获利能力相对削弱，股市当然蒙受不利，这也就是当美国联邦储备理事会宣布调高重贴现率，华尔街股市立即大幅挫落的道理。
(4)房地产景气是否呈现衰退
通常房地产景气与股市盛衰几近同步运行。若是房地产景气活络，股市亦必活络，反之，若房地产景气呈现衰退，则股市亦难保繁荣。
房地产业，前几年随同股市繁荣而大幅上扬。上涨幅度以倍数计，但近年来已呈下挫，不论预售房销售率或房屋中介业业绩均呈下降，值得投资大众密切注意。
(5)股市是否出现脱序性飙涨
股市一旦出现脱序性飙涨，必有几项特色：
1多数股票“本益比”偏高，与上市公司实际获利能力显然不相称。
2小型股、投机股股价连续飙升。
3价涨量缩，甚至呈现无量上涨。
4股场内人潮汹涌，充满乐观气氛，显示股市“过热”。
5各项技术分析指标显示股市严重“超买”。
检讨过去每次股市“崩盘”，股市由多头市场转入空头市场，莫不经历此一脱序性飙涨阶段。因此，一旦有个风吹草动，或是做手已经捞饱开溜，势必引发恐慌性大卖出，股价遽挫，从些转入空头市场。
(6)国际原油价格是否大幅上扬
截至目前为止，尚无更经济有效的能源足以取代石油的地位。一旦石油价格大幅上扬，则整个世界经济势必受到重大影响。
目前国际石油价格，由于产油国组织与非产油国组织之各产油国家步调渐趋一致，油价可望持稳，但如国际原油价格脱序上扬，则情况或有改变，对全球股市势必产生重大冲击，两次中东石油危机足为殷鉴。
(7)劳动力与环保问题是否日益恶化
劳动力与环保两大问题纠结，确足已挫伤经济发展，并降低企业界投资意愿。
(8)政治与社会是否持续稳定与安定
繁荣的股市有赖稳定的政治与安定的社会以为支撑，倘若政局动荡不安，经济发展必受影响，社会秩序混乱，则必降低企业投资意愿，股市转入空头市场亦属势所必然。
(1)据政府有关部门所发布的各项经济指标与景气对策信号，分析经济成长是否趋于衰退
如政府有关部门发表的经济成长预测、工业生产月增率、失业率以及各项领先指标等，无不透露重要讯息。倘若经济呈现衰退迹象，股市便缺实力支撑，纵有所谓“资金行情”，亦难望其持久。
(2)通货膨胀有无上升趋势
通货膨胀不仅使企业因物价与工资上升，成本升高，同时亦使多数低收入与固定收入者的购买力降低，间接也会影响企业获利。固然通货膨胀初期，企业因拥有低价库存原料与成品以及房地产等优势可保赢利不衰，甚且有过之，但毕竟为时甚短。一旦通胀恶化，股市必然陷于空头走势。
(3)利率是否大幅扬升
当国际间利率大幅扬升，各国为防止其本国资金大量外流，亦必被迫采取提高利率的做法。前些年由于美国联邦储备理事会提高重贴现率0.5个百分点，由原先的6.5%，提高至7%，美国各大银行随即调升其利率至11%以上，以致欧洲各工业国家亦均在考虑调高其重贴现率。若欧洲各国跟进，则全球利率势必攀升，影响全球经济发展乃可预见。
此外，如果通货膨胀持续上升，则政府为安定民生，遏阻金融投机，亦必采取紧缩金融措施，迫使利率上升。利率上升，企业经营成本上扬，获利能力相对削弱，股市当然蒙受不利，这也就是当美国联邦储备理事会宣布调高重贴现率，华尔街股市立即大幅挫落的道理。
(4)房地产景气是否呈现衰退
通常房地产景气与股市盛衰几近同步运行。若是房地产景气活络，股市亦必活络，反之，若房地产景气呈现衰退，则股市亦难保繁荣。
房地产业，前几年随同股市繁荣而大幅上扬。上涨幅度以倍数计，但近年来已呈下挫，不论预售房销售率或房屋中介业业绩均呈下降，值得投资大众密切注意。
(5)股市是否出现脱序性飙涨
股市一旦出现脱序性飙涨，必有几项特色：
1多数股票“本益比”偏高，与上市公司实际获利能力显然不相称。
2小型股、投机股股价连续飙升。
3价涨量缩，甚至呈现无量上涨。
4股场内人潮汹涌，充满乐观气氛，显示股市“过热”。
5各项技术分析指标显示股市严重“超买”。
检讨过去每次股市“崩盘”，股市由多头市场转入空头市场，莫不经历此一脱序性飙涨阶段。因此，一旦有个风吹草动，或是做手已经捞饱开溜，势必引发恐慌性大卖出，股价遽挫，从些转入空头市场。
(6)国际原油价格是否大幅上扬
截至目前为止，尚无更经济有效的能源足以取代石油的地位。一旦石油价格大幅上扬，则整个世界经济势必受到重大影响。
目前国际石油价格，由于产油国组织与非产油国组织之各产油国家步调渐趋一致，油价可望持稳，但如国际原油价格脱序上扬，则情况或有改变，对全球股市势必产生重大冲击，两次中东石油危机足为殷鉴。
(7)劳动力与环保问题是否日益恶化
劳动力与环保两大问题纠结，确足已挫伤经济发展，并降低企业界投资意愿。
(8)政治与社会是否持续稳定与安定
繁荣的股市有赖稳定的政治与安定的社会以为支撑，倘若政局动荡不安，经济发展必受影响，社会秩序混乱，则必降低企业投资意愿，股市转入空头市场亦属势所必然。
Friday, February 8, 2008
Macroeconomic Arbitrage in Global Markets
Macro Trading and Investment Strategies is the first thorough examination of one of the most proficient and enigmatic trading strategies in use today - global macro. More importantly, it introduces an innovative strategy to this popular hedge fund investment style - global macroeconomic arbitrage.
Dr. Burstein, an ex-Goldman Sachs macro proprietary trader who now heads a hedge funds-dedicated equity sales group at Daiwa Europe, proposes a new global macro strategy that is nondirectional and more objective.
The classic global macro strategy utilizes macroeconomic information to anticipate market direction through subjective views. As a result, global macro has a strong subjective-directional component.
Based on objective mispricings of macroeconomic information in stock market index and stock sector index spreads, a new long/short arbitrage strategy is presented here that capitalizes on the correction of objective macroeconomic mispricings.
These macro arbitrage strategies are evaluated and tested in volatile markets such as the "domino effect" of the global financial crises of 1997-1998 that led to a hedge fund crisis.
In fact, the book shows how global financial crises create strong macro arbitrage opportunities while also being a catalyst for correcting preexistent macro mispricings.
Dr. Burstein, an ex-Goldman Sachs macro proprietary trader who now heads a hedge funds-dedicated equity sales group at Daiwa Europe, proposes a new global macro strategy that is nondirectional and more objective.
The classic global macro strategy utilizes macroeconomic information to anticipate market direction through subjective views. As a result, global macro has a strong subjective-directional component.
Based on objective mispricings of macroeconomic information in stock market index and stock sector index spreads, a new long/short arbitrage strategy is presented here that capitalizes on the correction of objective macroeconomic mispricings.
These macro arbitrage strategies are evaluated and tested in volatile markets such as the "domino effect" of the global financial crises of 1997-1998 that led to a hedge fund crisis.
In fact, the book shows how global financial crises create strong macro arbitrage opportunities while also being a catalyst for correcting preexistent macro mispricings.
Global macroeconomic arbitrage
Some of the most successful and well-known hedge funds have long profited from a trading strategy that applies macroeconomic views to global markets: global macro.
Pioneered by hedge fund managers such as George Soros and Julian Robertson, this strategy has led to enormous profits. By placing directional bets on liquid assets, it is particularly suited for trending markets.
In Macro Trading and Investment Strategies: Macroeconomic Arbitrage in Global Markets, Gabriel Burstein defines and rigorously analyzes this investment style. He then proposes macro arbitrage as an original alternative to trading subjective macroeconomic views at times when markets are either trending or are extremely volatile, lacking direction, and in crisis, such as during the Asian, Russian, and Latin American economic and financial collapses of the late 1990s.
Macro arbitrage is introduced as a new, lower-risk, long/short macro strategy that is based on detect ing objective macroeconomic mispricings in global markets. Burstein shows how this strategy works in stock market sector spreads (food retailers/general retailers, banks/utilities), stock index spreads (Italy/Spain, Sweden/Finland), and with the European Monetary Union (EMU) ahead of its 1999 single-currency final stage.
In Macro Trading and Investment Strategies, Dr. Burstein presents, with examples, the framework for traditional global macro strategies, then shows how to use macroeconomic mispricings in global financial markets to design innovative global macroeconomic arbitrage strategies for trading and investing.
Packed with revealing trading case studies, examples, explanations, and definitions, this comprehensive work covers:
1. Global directional macro, long/short macro, and macroeconomic arbitrage trading and
investment strategies
2.Causes of macroeconomic mispricings in markets; tackling secondary macroeconomic variables in trades
3.The importance of technical timing in macro arbitrage
4.Volatility of macro arbitrage strategies versus volatility of relative-value strategies
5.Mispricing opportunities due to the effect of the Asian crisis on global markets
6.Macro arbitrage of the EMU convergence mispricing in equity markets
7.Mispricings of retail sales, GDP, industrial production, interest rates, and exchange rates in stock markets
In-depth and timely, Macro Trading and Investment Strategies covers an area of intense interest to today's trading and investment community and shows new opportunities. It is invaluable reading for those seeking new ways to tackle today's volatile global markets.
Pioneered by hedge fund managers such as George Soros and Julian Robertson, this strategy has led to enormous profits. By placing directional bets on liquid assets, it is particularly suited for trending markets.
In Macro Trading and Investment Strategies: Macroeconomic Arbitrage in Global Markets, Gabriel Burstein defines and rigorously analyzes this investment style. He then proposes macro arbitrage as an original alternative to trading subjective macroeconomic views at times when markets are either trending or are extremely volatile, lacking direction, and in crisis, such as during the Asian, Russian, and Latin American economic and financial collapses of the late 1990s.
Macro arbitrage is introduced as a new, lower-risk, long/short macro strategy that is based on detect ing objective macroeconomic mispricings in global markets. Burstein shows how this strategy works in stock market sector spreads (food retailers/general retailers, banks/utilities), stock index spreads (Italy/Spain, Sweden/Finland), and with the European Monetary Union (EMU) ahead of its 1999 single-currency final stage.
In Macro Trading and Investment Strategies, Dr. Burstein presents, with examples, the framework for traditional global macro strategies, then shows how to use macroeconomic mispricings in global financial markets to design innovative global macroeconomic arbitrage strategies for trading and investing.
Packed with revealing trading case studies, examples, explanations, and definitions, this comprehensive work covers:
1. Global directional macro, long/short macro, and macroeconomic arbitrage trading and
investment strategies
2.Causes of macroeconomic mispricings in markets; tackling secondary macroeconomic variables in trades
3.The importance of technical timing in macro arbitrage
4.Volatility of macro arbitrage strategies versus volatility of relative-value strategies
5.Mispricing opportunities due to the effect of the Asian crisis on global markets
6.Macro arbitrage of the EMU convergence mispricing in equity markets
7.Mispricings of retail sales, GDP, industrial production, interest rates, and exchange rates in stock markets
In-depth and timely, Macro Trading and Investment Strategies covers an area of intense interest to today's trading and investment community and shows new opportunities. It is invaluable reading for those seeking new ways to tackle today's volatile global markets.
Sunday, February 3, 2008
Allco Reit
The heavy correction has punished a lot of stocks, but one of those most heavily punished is Allco REIT.It has fallen more than 50% from $1.40 in May 06 to $0.67 currently.
At $0.67, Allco REIT is trading at an amazing 50% below its NAV of $1.34, offering a yield of 8.93% based on FY2006 payout of $0.0598.Its yield is set to rise because its FY2007 net income is expected to reach at least $0.10 per share based on its 3Q results thus far.
As such, I am placing Allco REIT on the stock alert with a buy at $0.67 at 50% below NAV.That said, I want to add that Allco REIT has been falling on very heavy volume recently, which is not a good technical indication - thus I would prefer to stagger my buys just to be on the safe side.
It means that based on TA, Allco has been under a lot of selling pressure recently and its price MAY go down further.
There is another stock also went down heavily, CitySpring, from 1.60 to 0.78 now with NAV 0.80.
A lot of selling have been from JP Morgan, whom are the representing Allco Financial of Aus. (Owner of Allco Reit)Allco F is trying to get some fund as there is $1.1 billion short term loan needed. Allco F share have drop 40% in 1 day before recovering to AUS$3.10. I believe Allco Reit is a good long term bet. A lot of bad news in the market have open up opportunity for us to enter at an attractive price.
Like Warren B says "It is safer to buy stocks when they are cheap, and not when they are more expensive.""I love the bear that give away shares for close to nothing.""Do not treat shares like Jewelry, only buy shares when they are undervalue."
On Cityspring:Based on the fact that there are other business trusts (e.g. Allco, K-Reit) available at 50% below NAV, don't you think it is logical to only buy Citypsring if it falls to that valuation?
However, the annual report of Allco clearly shows some weak points...
620mn $ of refinancings to be done this year, with the credit crunch going on, it's not a great environment for it. However, assume ultimately they wont have a problem getting the funds refinanced as the asset backing looks ok.Gearing is more of a problem - 43% sounds fine, but keep in mind that their Australia and Singapore properties have been revalued upwards by 30-ish percent in 2007 alone. Recent transactions here point towards an end of the boom, and lots of supply coming up from 2010onwards. If there was a correction in property values of, say, just 20-25 percent (not a big deal considering how much properties gained in just one year) and debt stays unchanged, their gearing would come close to the maximum 60% allowable.
Latest at that point they may be forced to raise new equity (or sell assets) to pay down debt, something they decided not to do in November when units were trading above 90c. Raising equity when the unit price is low can strongly dilute net asset value and distribution per unit. Current debt levels would also make it difficult to buy more properties financed by debt.So - Allco Reit seems at least to a considerable part a play on the property market holding up very well. In order to grow further, at some point either new equity has to be issued, or property prices must race up further (how likely is that in the short term?) to reduce gearing and allow room for debt expansion. Unfortunately difficult to imagine their shares staging a quick run-up to much higher prices in the short- to medium term.
I will continue to take interest in office trusts, for eg. ALLCO for a few reasons:
1. Consistent income distribution to unit holders (though not guranteed).
2. Distribution yield is looking more attractive as we experience declining interest rates.
3. For investors adopting a longer term outlook, in my view, I see strong demand for office space in the years ahead.
4. Government commitment to make S'pore a global / regional financial hub.
5. Strategic move by Temasek & GIC to invest in big banks hit by credit crunch could (in my own opinion) aid in drawing these banks into relocating some operations to S'pore in the future, thus boosting demand for office space.
6. Perhaps or maybe, we'll witness some mergers / takeovers among trusts given the recent declining unit prices.
7. Agree that given the current credit mess, properties expansion for trust would be hindered. However, if I am an investor looking for defensive play amid the current market turmoil, trusts shld be what I wld look into.
8. I am not a speculator looking for short term gain.
9. Why not enjoy consistent income payout now and at the same time adopt long term view to take advantage of capital gain (hopefully) in the future when the next boom cycle is back.
At $0.67, Allco REIT is trading at an amazing 50% below its NAV of $1.34, offering a yield of 8.93% based on FY2006 payout of $0.0598.Its yield is set to rise because its FY2007 net income is expected to reach at least $0.10 per share based on its 3Q results thus far.
As such, I am placing Allco REIT on the stock alert with a buy at $0.67 at 50% below NAV.That said, I want to add that Allco REIT has been falling on very heavy volume recently, which is not a good technical indication - thus I would prefer to stagger my buys just to be on the safe side.
It means that based on TA, Allco has been under a lot of selling pressure recently and its price MAY go down further.
There is another stock also went down heavily, CitySpring, from 1.60 to 0.78 now with NAV 0.80.
A lot of selling have been from JP Morgan, whom are the representing Allco Financial of Aus. (Owner of Allco Reit)Allco F is trying to get some fund as there is $1.1 billion short term loan needed. Allco F share have drop 40% in 1 day before recovering to AUS$3.10. I believe Allco Reit is a good long term bet. A lot of bad news in the market have open up opportunity for us to enter at an attractive price.
Like Warren B says "It is safer to buy stocks when they are cheap, and not when they are more expensive.""I love the bear that give away shares for close to nothing.""Do not treat shares like Jewelry, only buy shares when they are undervalue."
On Cityspring:Based on the fact that there are other business trusts (e.g. Allco, K-Reit) available at 50% below NAV, don't you think it is logical to only buy Citypsring if it falls to that valuation?
However, the annual report of Allco clearly shows some weak points...
620mn $ of refinancings to be done this year, with the credit crunch going on, it's not a great environment for it. However, assume ultimately they wont have a problem getting the funds refinanced as the asset backing looks ok.Gearing is more of a problem - 43% sounds fine, but keep in mind that their Australia and Singapore properties have been revalued upwards by 30-ish percent in 2007 alone. Recent transactions here point towards an end of the boom, and lots of supply coming up from 2010onwards. If there was a correction in property values of, say, just 20-25 percent (not a big deal considering how much properties gained in just one year) and debt stays unchanged, their gearing would come close to the maximum 60% allowable.
Latest at that point they may be forced to raise new equity (or sell assets) to pay down debt, something they decided not to do in November when units were trading above 90c. Raising equity when the unit price is low can strongly dilute net asset value and distribution per unit. Current debt levels would also make it difficult to buy more properties financed by debt.So - Allco Reit seems at least to a considerable part a play on the property market holding up very well. In order to grow further, at some point either new equity has to be issued, or property prices must race up further (how likely is that in the short term?) to reduce gearing and allow room for debt expansion. Unfortunately difficult to imagine their shares staging a quick run-up to much higher prices in the short- to medium term.
I will continue to take interest in office trusts, for eg. ALLCO for a few reasons:
1. Consistent income distribution to unit holders (though not guranteed).
2. Distribution yield is looking more attractive as we experience declining interest rates.
3. For investors adopting a longer term outlook, in my view, I see strong demand for office space in the years ahead.
4. Government commitment to make S'pore a global / regional financial hub.
5. Strategic move by Temasek & GIC to invest in big banks hit by credit crunch could (in my own opinion) aid in drawing these banks into relocating some operations to S'pore in the future, thus boosting demand for office space.
6. Perhaps or maybe, we'll witness some mergers / takeovers among trusts given the recent declining unit prices.
7. Agree that given the current credit mess, properties expansion for trust would be hindered. However, if I am an investor looking for defensive play amid the current market turmoil, trusts shld be what I wld look into.
8. I am not a speculator looking for short term gain.
9. Why not enjoy consistent income payout now and at the same time adopt long term view to take advantage of capital gain (hopefully) in the future when the next boom cycle is back.
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