獨立經濟學家謝國忠在接受理財一週報記者採訪時表示，由於受政府信貸調控影響，今年金融、房地產、IT、鋼鐵四大行業可能遭遇寒流。但使用率較高的能源、能夠抵禦通脹的黃金則將成為今年的投資熱點。
中國經濟的兩大問題：地產過大和產能過剩
理財一週報：2010年您對中國經濟發展勢頭怎麼看？
謝國忠：經濟增長應該還可以，出口也會有所反彈，但投資這一塊，就不會像去年那麼快了；房地產也不會快。
總體來說，今年出口這塊會稍微好些，從經濟層面來說，相對穩定。
理財一週報：中國經濟目前的主要問題出在哪？
謝國忠：我覺得，現在最大的問題是出現在經濟結構上，這是一個很大的問題。我們國家的很多問題都跟結構有關係，一個是房地產過大，一個是行業生產能力過剩，這兩個問題都還是比較明顯的。
我經常說中國的經濟增長，其實就意味著把銀行裏的錢扔出去，但是還要看結果是否有效。去年房地產銷售過熱，整個GDP都增加了。
現在的問題是，你談什麼都不重要，重要的是，我們的錢從哪來？針對這個問題，我認為，無非就是房地產過大、過熱了。國家於是就開始調控地產，因為中國房地產裏的資金都是流動的，你要是調控房地產的話，錢就不流動了。
經濟結構本來就有問題，現在政府這樣一調控，如果能夠維持一年的話，政府對房地產的調控可能又會變化。這個誰都說不準。
理財一週報：如果信貸這一塊持續收緊的話，資本市場流動性將會受到哪些影響？
謝國忠：因為錢都是從房地產市場流出來的，房地產一調控，市場需求馬上就沒有了。然後呢，銀行的錢就轉不出來了。最終的結果就是，開發商還有底下很多的關聯公司大家都等著，等著政策再作新的調整。
而且，國內的房地產開發商已經習慣了這樣的日子——基本上就是，輪到政府調控前夕，他就拼命賣房子，收攏資金。過去兩年就是這樣的，所以大家都不信政府調控是真心的。
中國的房地產市場也不像美國，美國的房價在漲得很高的時候，可以通過增值的部分拿去銀行抵押借錢，但在中國還沒有出現這樣的情況。
中國的房地產就是炒，說白了，就是把銀行的錢卷出來，卷到地產市場，然後再卷到地方政府，最後變成地方政府的財政收入。地方房地產市場的存在，就是為政府融資的，在中國買房子，跟繳稅沒啥區別。
股市短期好不了
理財一週報：2010年資本市場更趨複雜，您對於整年的資本市場如何展望？
謝國忠：我覺得短期內好不了。因為中國的股市不是基本面決定的，它是由銀根來決定的。銀根一旦收緊的話，股市就不好了。
目前國內的銀根還沒有收得很緊，但是今年至今中國的信貸還是增長了很多。以前銀行放貸比現在少很多，所以看到現在這麼龐大的信貸數字，政府開始緊張了。就是因為信貸盤子做得太大，房地產市場也顯得過大了。房地產市場去年全年就投資了4萬億元左右，漲了70%，撐得太大了，你說這樣的盤子還怎麼撐呢？
如果房地產市場調控政策能夠維持一年左右的時間，那它的銷售就可能掉一半左右。我統計了一下，掉一半銷售額的話，那這個數字就是在2萬多億元，你想想看，這會掉多少？！
理財一週報：除了房地產之外，出口這一塊會拉動中國的經濟嗎？
謝國忠：這個應該比較難，現在美國失業率這麼高，日本的也不好，歐洲現在又出現危機。出口會很火嗎？我覺得不太可能低位反彈。美國去年下滑了6000多億美元的出口額，縮得很緊，今年要反彈的話也是理所應當。但是，出口數據再怎麼反彈，也彈不到原來的那個高位。
理財一週報：那就您來看，中國未來經濟增長的突破口在哪？
謝國忠：現在中國經濟有一個突破結構的問題，老是出事兒。出事兒之後，就是讓政府出手相救。所以，結構問題不解決，中國經濟也就只能這麼維持，最近這幾年就是這樣子。
理財一週報：今年初始，股指期貨等新金融業務宣佈推出，從您的個人角度來看，這對股市投資會產生哪些影響？
謝國忠：如果股市的股指期貨是政府想把錢朝裏面砸，搞個基金什麼的，我認為這是有可能的。但是，總的來說，股指期貨的推出應該對股市投資不會產生太大的影響。因為中國股市的核心問題，還是銀根。銀根收緊的話，整體股市就好不了。因為中國的股市跟銀根連得非常緊。
我覺得，中國經濟到了今年第二季度，就是明顯不好的時候。因為房子賣不出去，一連串的問題都會出來。可能去年地方政府還藏了不少錢，能夠混個幾個月。但是，過段時候投資一熱，這些錢又沒了，政府壓力也就來了。
反正，房地產一松的話，你就應該知道股市要漲了，因為這牽涉到信貸的投放量問題。
看空四大行業
理財一週報：去年您自己投資了哪些領域，今年還會投資哪些板塊？
謝國忠：我有投過能源，比較看好它。也想投黃金，但是最終沒有投資它。因為黃金就是通脹的概念，既有通脹，又有短缺。大部分的情況下，像石油這種能源是天天要用的，還比較實用。黃金是貨幣的替代品，可能就不像能源這樣靠得住。
總的來說，貨幣政策還是很寬鬆的，通貨膨脹會來。黃金的話，兩年內還是不錯的。黃金會炒起來，也容易炒起來，但不一定像能源那麼好。
理財一週報：今年您看好哪些領域的投資？
謝國忠：我覺得今年股市會來來回回波動，因為A股從6000多點掉到1600點，然後反彈至3000點左右，一直在曲線波動。現在也還沒有脫離這樣的局面。
我原來比較看好能源和黃金，中國的黃金過去很貴，都是在海外購買。因為概念好，很多國內投資者就炒作這些了。我是看中了能源和黃金，但是香港這邊很貴，價格高一倍左右。
水泥的成長性也已經不錯了，但是前段時間因為產能過剩很嚴重，今年可能也還可以，但是明後年肯定會有問題的。
理財一週報：那您今年不看好的是哪些領域？
謝國忠：今年的金融業肯定不好，銀行業是金融巨頭，今年肯定要大量配股補充資本金，再加上信貸投放的速度要放慢，成本又大幅上升，所以，今年的金融業不會很好。
成本大幅上升是因為中國勞動力短缺，雖然金融行業的薪水很高，但是它要慣性地增長。成本要繼續大幅的上升，今年肯定會上升20%左右。另外，銀行息差還會繼續收窄，信貸速度也不會超過20%。再加上要配那麼多新股，今年銀行不會太好。
保險公司也跟股市連得很緊，股市不好的話，保險公司也會受影響。因為國內保險公司是從股市裏投資賺錢的，今年可能會受壓。
今年，地產也會受壓。去年地產市場漲得那麼高，地皮比較貴，現在房價肯定要往下掉。目前來看，二級市場的房價已經在開始往下掉了。
如果國家再不改政策的話，房地產市場會出問題。本來房地產商是預期房價漲四成，但是現在房價不漲反跌的話，那他們豈不是會很慘。去年買了很多地的開發商，今年的問題就會很大。
IT的話，雖然科技對經濟的影響很大，但是我不看好IT，大多都是炒一把，然後賺了就跑。像物聯網，成功的話就變得很大，不成功的話，就變得很糟糕。科技行業的公司，即使一家公司做得再好，總有另一家公司會比你做得更好。
像微軟做得這麼成功的公司，現在也開始有倒的趨勢了。科技股的話，只能炒一把。如果是製造硬體產品的公司股，就更不能進去了，有些就是搞晶片很難長久賺錢，短期內一會兒賺錢，一會兒虧錢，通過波動吸引大家。
另外，鋼鐵業面臨產能過剩的問題，鋼鐵業今年很難好。我看到建築鋼就是這樣的局面，一般的板材生產能力都是過剩的。鐵礦石的價格又相對較高，而且澳大利亞必和必拓和力拓又合併了，鐵礦石的價格要上漲的可能性要比下降的可能性大很多。這些我都不看好。
Sunday, February 28, 2010
Dividends
Stocks that pay dividends, or will eventually pay dividends, make perfect sense to me. I pay some money to gain partial ownership of this company, which will in turn share its profits with me in the form of dividends. If the company is doing well, other people will want to buy in, and as a result, the share price will increase. Now I can sell my shares for a profit.
If the company isn't paying dividends now, but chooses to reinvest its money, this is fine; it only means that the dividends in the future will be even larger. I might not stick around with the company long enough to receive any of those dividends. But because of the company's growth, people realize that the eventual dividends will be even larger, and demand for the stock goes up, resulting in a higher share price. Now I can sell my stock to somebody else, who will eventually sell it to somebody else, and so on, and so forth, until somebody gets the dividends. It might be 25, 50, or 100 years from now, but as long as somebody eventually gets dividends, it makes sense to me, because the shares have an intrinsic value: present or future profit from the company itself.
Now, suppose we take dividends out entirely. This is how I see it. Suppose companies are actually sealed boxes with cash inside of them. These boxes have the magic power of generating money at varying rates. The boxes are indestructible, so there is no way of breaking them open and getting the money. The magic boxes, just like companies, have their IPO and people can put money into the box to buy shares of stock, which represent partial ownership of everything in the box. The only catch is that you can't actually use the cash that you own, since it's sealed inside the box.
Every year, Box A spits out (just for you) a portion of the money it generated that year, based on how much of the box you own. Since the boxes are always guaranteed to generate money, other people are interested in buying shares, and as a result of high demand, you can sell your shares to them for a profit.
Box B generates money faster than box A, but it won't spit out any money for the next ten years. This is OK, because by the time it spits out money, it'll spit out way more money than box A will. So there's still demand for the stock, and shares appreciate in value.
Box C generates money even faster than box B, but it will never, ever spit out any money to anyone for the rest of eternity. Again, you have no way of breaking open this box and getting the cash that you supposedly own. The cash is legally yours, but you can't use it. Your only hope of making any usable money is selling off your shares to somebody else. The amount of cash each share represents goes up a tremendous amount every day, but again, there is no way of actually getting that cash.
Now, why on earth would anyone put money into box C in the first place, and why would anyone in their right mind want to buy shares of box C?! Do shares of box C have any intrinsic value beyond the paper they're printed on?! If there's never any chance of getting any REAL money from box C, then are the shares really worth anything? Why are people willing to trade with each other for a piece of the pie that nobody will actually get? What happens when the company gets so big that they just can't grow anymore, no matter how much they reinvest?
If the company isn't paying dividends now, but chooses to reinvest its money, this is fine; it only means that the dividends in the future will be even larger. I might not stick around with the company long enough to receive any of those dividends. But because of the company's growth, people realize that the eventual dividends will be even larger, and demand for the stock goes up, resulting in a higher share price. Now I can sell my stock to somebody else, who will eventually sell it to somebody else, and so on, and so forth, until somebody gets the dividends. It might be 25, 50, or 100 years from now, but as long as somebody eventually gets dividends, it makes sense to me, because the shares have an intrinsic value: present or future profit from the company itself.
Now, suppose we take dividends out entirely. This is how I see it. Suppose companies are actually sealed boxes with cash inside of them. These boxes have the magic power of generating money at varying rates. The boxes are indestructible, so there is no way of breaking them open and getting the money. The magic boxes, just like companies, have their IPO and people can put money into the box to buy shares of stock, which represent partial ownership of everything in the box. The only catch is that you can't actually use the cash that you own, since it's sealed inside the box.
Every year, Box A spits out (just for you) a portion of the money it generated that year, based on how much of the box you own. Since the boxes are always guaranteed to generate money, other people are interested in buying shares, and as a result of high demand, you can sell your shares to them for a profit.
Box B generates money faster than box A, but it won't spit out any money for the next ten years. This is OK, because by the time it spits out money, it'll spit out way more money than box A will. So there's still demand for the stock, and shares appreciate in value.
Box C generates money even faster than box B, but it will never, ever spit out any money to anyone for the rest of eternity. Again, you have no way of breaking open this box and getting the cash that you supposedly own. The cash is legally yours, but you can't use it. Your only hope of making any usable money is selling off your shares to somebody else. The amount of cash each share represents goes up a tremendous amount every day, but again, there is no way of actually getting that cash.
Now, why on earth would anyone put money into box C in the first place, and why would anyone in their right mind want to buy shares of box C?! Do shares of box C have any intrinsic value beyond the paper they're printed on?! If there's never any chance of getting any REAL money from box C, then are the shares really worth anything? Why are people willing to trade with each other for a piece of the pie that nobody will actually get? What happens when the company gets so big that they just can't grow anymore, no matter how much they reinvest?
The Importance of Dividends
Dividends are very important to the investor. Every young investment student learns of the "greater fool theory" when their professor or mentor asks whether dividends are important. If the answer is "not really, if the share price increases", the professor then goes on to explain that without eventual dividends to the investor, the share is worthless. Consider, in the extreme, the purchase of a share that guaranteed not to pay any dividends or other payouts to the holder. What would be the worth of this share to the holder? Simply, it would be a "promise not to pay". Ever. The holder might get some psychographic thrill from saying they owned the share, but they would in reality have the same claim to its assets and cashflows as anyone else. Their claim would be worthless, except if they sold it to someone who hadn't figured this out. Hence the "greater fool theory".
The annualized dividend divided by the market price of a common share is called the "dividend yield" and forms an important component of the valuation process. Even though many companies don't pay dividends, they have the potential to pay dividends in the future. If they invest their earnings in new assets which will earn future cashflows, we have a claim on these future cashflows. This is why many "growth companies" in an expanding phase don't pay dividends. The shareholders hope the company reinvests their share of profits at a high return. If the company fails to make profits on these reinvestments, they would be better to pay out the profits as dividends to shareholders who could do a better job of reinvestment on their own.
Long term studies have shown that reinvested dividends are very important to the returns that investors make. They form a very important component in securities valuation and should have a very important place in the investor's analysis of a company. Well managed and excellent companies like General Electric have a history of increasing dividends. An investor should be very wary of a company that doesn't seem to want to pay dividends. If the analysis shows the earnings are reinvested in profitable projects rather than paid in dividends, this is a very good thing. If the analysis shows the projects are unprofitable or that excessive corporate expenses have eaten up the potential dividends, this is a very bad sign. Absence of a corporate dividend with stories of the corporate jet flying the President's poodle around the globe should not be taken lightly.
High dividends is not always a sign of good management. A company that needs to reinvest should not pay out all of its accounting profits in dividends. This will cause the productive capacity of the company to diminish and the company to eventually fall into bankruptcy. This actually is a technique of "corporate vultures". They buy a large controlling position in a fine company and purposefully pay far more dividends than they should. This causes the competitive position and productive capacity of the company to falter. This all takes a long time to happen and the company can rest on its laurels for a while. It takes outside analysts a long time to figure all this out. Accounting rules offer lots of scope to obscure what's going on The company is usually able to borrow money to pay dividends for quite a while before the market refuses to offer more credit. Then the inevitable day
The annualized dividend divided by the market price of a common share is called the "dividend yield" and forms an important component of the valuation process. Even though many companies don't pay dividends, they have the potential to pay dividends in the future. If they invest their earnings in new assets which will earn future cashflows, we have a claim on these future cashflows. This is why many "growth companies" in an expanding phase don't pay dividends. The shareholders hope the company reinvests their share of profits at a high return. If the company fails to make profits on these reinvestments, they would be better to pay out the profits as dividends to shareholders who could do a better job of reinvestment on their own.
Long term studies have shown that reinvested dividends are very important to the returns that investors make. They form a very important component in securities valuation and should have a very important place in the investor's analysis of a company. Well managed and excellent companies like General Electric have a history of increasing dividends. An investor should be very wary of a company that doesn't seem to want to pay dividends. If the analysis shows the earnings are reinvested in profitable projects rather than paid in dividends, this is a very good thing. If the analysis shows the projects are unprofitable or that excessive corporate expenses have eaten up the potential dividends, this is a very bad sign. Absence of a corporate dividend with stories of the corporate jet flying the President's poodle around the globe should not be taken lightly.
High dividends is not always a sign of good management. A company that needs to reinvest should not pay out all of its accounting profits in dividends. This will cause the productive capacity of the company to diminish and the company to eventually fall into bankruptcy. This actually is a technique of "corporate vultures". They buy a large controlling position in a fine company and purposefully pay far more dividends than they should. This causes the competitive position and productive capacity of the company to falter. This all takes a long time to happen and the company can rest on its laurels for a while. It takes outside analysts a long time to figure all this out. Accounting rules offer lots of scope to obscure what's going on The company is usually able to borrow money to pay dividends for quite a while before the market refuses to offer more credit. Then the inevitable day
Saturday, February 27, 2010
股票投资 快进快出赚钱更少
买入并持有的方式最近不太管用，但频繁交易也不比它好。
股票比以前流动地更快也更便宜了。只要7.95美元甚至更少，你就能上网进行交易。据Rosenblatt Securities公司称，纽约证券交易所每天的交易量近20亿股，这还不包括竞争市场中的交易。全都算上，交易量有如滔天巨浪，2月份迄今为止平均达94亿股，比1月份的91亿股有所上升。
冲进股市之前先暂停一下。交易耗费资金，增加纳税额，并能助长不良习惯。正如格雷厄姆(Benjamin Graham)所述，投资需要全面分析并保证本金的安全和充足的回报。基于传言、预感或恐惧的交易与投资的含义有天壤之别。
格雷厄姆坚持认为普通的个人投资者与大型机构相比有一个巨大的优势。主要是个人与机构不同，不需要进行荒谬的短期业绩评测。因此，交易越频繁，就越浪费这一优势。
咨询公司Mercer和投资智库IRRC Institute进行的最新调查中询问了800多家机构基金的经理的交易频率。
三分之二的人的交易量高于预期；他们的交易率平均被自己低估了26%。尽管大多数人的业绩均以三年为周期进行评判，但他们的平均持股时间约为17个月，其中19%的基金经理一般持股时间仅为一年或更短。
一位基金经理强烈否认自己过于关注短期业务，抱怨说对冲基金导致市场流通量增加，散户倾向于关注短期业绩，并且过快的买进和卖出基金。
自身有短，莫笑他人；据Mercer公司调查显示，这名基金经理一般每次持股时间约为27周。
这些专家们一边抱怨市场过于以短期为导向，一边又认为他们自己能够通过更为短期的方式跑赢市场。该研究报告的合着者盖耶特(Danyelle Guyatt)说，这是非常严重的过于自负的表现。
更多的交易并不确保更高的回报，这对个人和专业投资者都一样。
对折扣经纪券商客户近200万笔交易进行分析后发现，交易最频繁者所赚取的收益并不比交易最少者的收益高。扣除经纪业务成本后，交易最快者远远落后于交易最慢者。
据晨星公司(Morningstar)称，投资组合交易率最高的共同基金在过去十年间的年平均业绩比交易最慢的基金低1.8个百分点。对退休基金股票投资组合的研究发现，平均而言，如果基金经理休假12个月、不做一单交易，基金年回报率将增加近一个百分点。
这可能是因为许多投资者倾向于过快地卖出赚钱的股票，直到后来才发现用不太好的股票代替了赚钱的股票。同时，锁定收益让人有一种成就感。
Mercer/IRRC研究的合着者卢孔尼克(Jon Lukomnik)说，不采取行动就很难证明一位资金管理人存在的正当性。他还说，如果市场上下波动，要很有把握的人才敢说，我用不着交易。
巴菲特的话仍然值得记取：1992年2月道指位于3200点时，他写道，股市就是一个再交换中心，资金从积极人士之手流向有耐心之人手中。
股票比以前流动地更快也更便宜了。只要7.95美元甚至更少，你就能上网进行交易。据Rosenblatt Securities公司称，纽约证券交易所每天的交易量近20亿股，这还不包括竞争市场中的交易。全都算上，交易量有如滔天巨浪，2月份迄今为止平均达94亿股，比1月份的91亿股有所上升。
冲进股市之前先暂停一下。交易耗费资金，增加纳税额，并能助长不良习惯。正如格雷厄姆(Benjamin Graham)所述，投资需要全面分析并保证本金的安全和充足的回报。基于传言、预感或恐惧的交易与投资的含义有天壤之别。
格雷厄姆坚持认为普通的个人投资者与大型机构相比有一个巨大的优势。主要是个人与机构不同，不需要进行荒谬的短期业绩评测。因此，交易越频繁，就越浪费这一优势。
咨询公司Mercer和投资智库IRRC Institute进行的最新调查中询问了800多家机构基金的经理的交易频率。
三分之二的人的交易量高于预期；他们的交易率平均被自己低估了26%。尽管大多数人的业绩均以三年为周期进行评判，但他们的平均持股时间约为17个月，其中19%的基金经理一般持股时间仅为一年或更短。
一位基金经理强烈否认自己过于关注短期业务，抱怨说对冲基金导致市场流通量增加，散户倾向于关注短期业绩，并且过快的买进和卖出基金。
自身有短，莫笑他人；据Mercer公司调查显示，这名基金经理一般每次持股时间约为27周。
这些专家们一边抱怨市场过于以短期为导向，一边又认为他们自己能够通过更为短期的方式跑赢市场。该研究报告的合着者盖耶特(Danyelle Guyatt)说，这是非常严重的过于自负的表现。
更多的交易并不确保更高的回报，这对个人和专业投资者都一样。
对折扣经纪券商客户近200万笔交易进行分析后发现，交易最频繁者所赚取的收益并不比交易最少者的收益高。扣除经纪业务成本后，交易最快者远远落后于交易最慢者。
据晨星公司(Morningstar)称，投资组合交易率最高的共同基金在过去十年间的年平均业绩比交易最慢的基金低1.8个百分点。对退休基金股票投资组合的研究发现，平均而言，如果基金经理休假12个月、不做一单交易，基金年回报率将增加近一个百分点。
这可能是因为许多投资者倾向于过快地卖出赚钱的股票，直到后来才发现用不太好的股票代替了赚钱的股票。同时，锁定收益让人有一种成就感。
Mercer/IRRC研究的合着者卢孔尼克(Jon Lukomnik)说，不采取行动就很难证明一位资金管理人存在的正当性。他还说，如果市场上下波动，要很有把握的人才敢说，我用不着交易。
巴菲特的话仍然值得记取：1992年2月道指位于3200点时，他写道，股市就是一个再交换中心，资金从积极人士之手流向有耐心之人手中。
不合时宜且老掉牙的花旗故事－－－丑即美
温莎基金管理人聂夫的忍耐力（聂夫自传中的一段）
花旗再度粉碎了我们的希望。1991年温莎投资的银行股票中，只有花旗的盈利不如预期。我们做了一些似乎很有道理的事，我们买进花旗银行的平均持股成本是33美元／股，而当时花旗的股价是14美元／股，因此我们又买进了更多的花旗股票。1991年，股价继续下跌，媒体一再痛责花旗。《商业周刊》（Business Week）1991年10月号一则刺眼的标题说，“花旗的噩梦愈来愈糟”。12月，《机构投资人》（Instiutional Investor）杂志用一篇特别报道配上全页的死鱼照片，表达出华尔街的感受。不少人认为花旗即将破产，据说罗斯·裴洛(Ross Perot)正在放空花旗股票。市场上传说的实际情况比花旗的财务报表所呈现的更糟，这引起了新闻媒体的恐慌性骚动。为了平息谣言，花旗银行不得不公开宣布：主管机关还没有判它死刑。
温莎此时持有2,300万股花旗，受益人的资产有5亿美元身置险境。与此同时，众议院银行委员会主席约翰·丁格尔（John Dingle）暗示花旗可能会技术性破产，花旗一家亚洲分行遭挤兑的报道也在传开。1991年年底，花旗股价一路下滑到8美元／股左右。
我不能说这是叫人欢欣鼓舞的时光，但我们坚持自己的信念，我压根没想过在报酬率令人满意之前卖出股票。即使在大量失血之后，我们仍然觉得这家公司的价值大致上毫发无损。由于成本大幅下降，盈利转好的画面清楚地呈现在我们眼前。依我们的看法，随着不动产问题烟消云散，1991年之后盈利将止跌回升。我们发现花旗的处境和1987年的美国银行（America Bank）有些相似。美国银行后来枯木逢春，股价涨了8倍以上。
我们忍受着枪林弹雨的袭击，最后终于尝到了甜美的果实，获得了非常高的报酬。1992年年初，花旗盈利和股价都明显回升，这一年结束之前，我们的持股已经获得了利润，温莎敢于为人不敢为的做法终有所获，值得等待那么长的时间。
温莎投资花旗忽上忽下的经验说明了很重要的一点：投资要成功，不需靠光彩夺目的股票和多头市场，正确判断和坚持信念是我们之所以获胜的先决条件。利用判断力，可以找到好机会；坚持信念，可以在别人争先恐后往某个方向跑时毫不动摇。花旗的例子生动地证明了这一点。对我们来说，丑股票往往是美丽的。
花旗再度粉碎了我们的希望。1991年温莎投资的银行股票中，只有花旗的盈利不如预期。我们做了一些似乎很有道理的事，我们买进花旗银行的平均持股成本是33美元／股，而当时花旗的股价是14美元／股，因此我们又买进了更多的花旗股票。1991年，股价继续下跌，媒体一再痛责花旗。《商业周刊》（Business Week）1991年10月号一则刺眼的标题说，“花旗的噩梦愈来愈糟”。12月，《机构投资人》（Instiutional Investor）杂志用一篇特别报道配上全页的死鱼照片，表达出华尔街的感受。不少人认为花旗即将破产，据说罗斯·裴洛(Ross Perot)正在放空花旗股票。市场上传说的实际情况比花旗的财务报表所呈现的更糟，这引起了新闻媒体的恐慌性骚动。为了平息谣言，花旗银行不得不公开宣布：主管机关还没有判它死刑。
温莎此时持有2,300万股花旗，受益人的资产有5亿美元身置险境。与此同时，众议院银行委员会主席约翰·丁格尔（John Dingle）暗示花旗可能会技术性破产，花旗一家亚洲分行遭挤兑的报道也在传开。1991年年底，花旗股价一路下滑到8美元／股左右。
我不能说这是叫人欢欣鼓舞的时光，但我们坚持自己的信念，我压根没想过在报酬率令人满意之前卖出股票。即使在大量失血之后，我们仍然觉得这家公司的价值大致上毫发无损。由于成本大幅下降，盈利转好的画面清楚地呈现在我们眼前。依我们的看法，随着不动产问题烟消云散，1991年之后盈利将止跌回升。我们发现花旗的处境和1987年的美国银行（America Bank）有些相似。美国银行后来枯木逢春，股价涨了8倍以上。
我们忍受着枪林弹雨的袭击，最后终于尝到了甜美的果实，获得了非常高的报酬。1992年年初，花旗盈利和股价都明显回升，这一年结束之前，我们的持股已经获得了利润，温莎敢于为人不敢为的做法终有所获，值得等待那么长的时间。
温莎投资花旗忽上忽下的经验说明了很重要的一点：投资要成功，不需靠光彩夺目的股票和多头市场，正确判断和坚持信念是我们之所以获胜的先决条件。利用判断力，可以找到好机会；坚持信念，可以在别人争先恐后往某个方向跑时毫不动摇。花旗的例子生动地证明了这一点。对我们来说，丑股票往往是美丽的。
股市真正的赢家是谁？
中国今天的股市又变成了一个世界上最大的赌场，真正的赢家是政府、证券公司、机构和庄家及跑的快的散户。因此，对于自己不会办企业也没有投资入股机会的人而言，在选购上市公司的股票时应该慎之又慎。
鉴于中国的股市还很不成熟，在我国还没有像美国那样严格保护中小投资者利益的法律，对违规者的惩处力度还过于疲软，有法不依的状况还很严重。需要国家不断完善法律，加强监管力度，才能使股市的信息逐渐趋于公开、公正和透明。所以在当前的情况下，一般的中小投资者在中国参与炒股是非常危险的（尤其是在3000点以上时）。为了尽量减少风险并且不因购买股票而耽误自己太多的时间和精力，最好的方式就是理性地选购股票进行“价值投资”。
股票投资有可能获得利润，但利润决不是炒出来的。股票的利润来自两个方面：一是企业当前可以分给股东的红利，这部分利润的高低取决于该企业的经营业绩；二是来自对企业前景的正确判断（未来的利润）。
比方说有一家资源稀缺型企业，由于管理不善造成当前盈利水平很低，因而股票价格很低。但它的产品销路很好，而且预计到价格会因资源的进一步稀缺而越来越高。所以，只要改善管理，盈利水平很快就可以上去。如果基于这种对企业前景的正确判断而买进它的股票，以后就很可能实现较高的利润。如果股票价格真的上升，股民就可以真的得到更多的利润。除了上面这两个利润来源，再也没有别的因素可以为整个股市的股民提供利润了。所以，理智的股民要作“价值投资”，要去关心企业经营的实际业绩和未来的发展前景，从而决定去买哪些企业的股票。
股票的合理价格由三部分组成：上市公司的每股净资产、现实收益水平和未来预期的收益水平的贴现。超过这个合理的价值水平的股价，就是泡沫。
当然，股市是允许有一定的泡沫存在的。如果企业未来经营得很好，泡沫就会慢慢被充实。但如果没有任何理由能估计到企业泡沫被充实的迹象，那参与炒股就相当于赌博。虽然赌博也有赢家，但他赢的钱就等于另一部分人输的钱减去交易费用，并且赌博浪费的时间也是没有人给你付工资的。所以，赌博只能使社会的财富越来越少。
当然，影响股市的原因还有很多，能否在股票市场获利，另一个根本的因素在于对信息的掌握是否及时和充分，因为股市的交易本身就是围绕着信息展开的。但目前的信息对于机构和散户来说是严重不对称的。比方说，许多上市公司在限售股解禁前后突然出台利好消息，以便让自己手中的股票卖个好价钱；有些机构收买某些股评家按自己的愿望做股评或者推荐个股，引诱散户进入圈套；而散户却没有这种制造虚假信息左右股价走势的能力。许多散户亏钱往往都是亏在股评家的嘴上。
以2007年和2008年的中国股市为例，上市公司能分给流通股股民的利润还不足以交纳交易费用。但很多股评家天天在喊“中国股市还会牛下去”，导致很多小股民血本无归。所以大家最好不要相信股评家的荐股，既然在股市是充满竞争的，人家凭什么把好股票推荐给你呢？也许有人会说，有些股评家有时也说对了。其实这不是他说对了，而是如果多数人上当受骗去跟风购买，就会造成这只股票真的上涨甚至涨停，结果大家误以为他说对了。只要大家误以为他说对了，就对他下次骗人形成“利好”。但只要企业没有利润，即使股票价格被哄抬，也一定是要跌下去的。
所以就股票投资而言，理性地选择股票是第一位的。只要你选择的股票是真正有投资价值的，它总会给你带来利润。如果在持有的过程中运气很好遇到特别的“牛市”，你在高点抛出的话还有意外收获。但如果盲目地选购股票去炒作，即使赚了钱也是其他股民亏的钱。并且，谁又能保证自己不会成为最大的傻瓜呢？如果只做“价值投资”，不因股市的大起大落而随波逐流，虽然很难获得暴利，但收益是比较安全稳健的。因为即使在大跌势中依然有股票保持强势，大涨势中依然有股票持续下跌。如果你决定入市，最重要的是选股，而选股最重要的是看价格。因为任何好东西只要价格太高就不算好东西。如果选对了股，就用不着天天去盯盘看股市行情。
按著名财经评论家时寒冰的话说：“除了职业炒股的投机家，他们才有精力有必要天天去盯着股市行情。否则，天天盯盘是非常愚蠢的做法。因为，盘面所有的陷阱都是机构和庄家给盯盘者量身定做的，机构最不喜欢那些买了股票就去干他自己的正事的人，因为他们很多招儿都用不上了！另外，无论盈亏，如果你天天浪费那么多时间和精力本身就已经是亏了！倘若因亏损而动怒，因盈利而狂喜，那么，你亏得就更大了，因为你把健康也陪进去了！倘若因亏损而把怒火释放在家人或同事身上，那么，你已经亏得血本无归了，因为你连家庭、单位的和睦都葬送了！”
要做好“价值投资”，就应该多花点时间去选择有投资价值的股票，而不是天天去盯着股市行情和胡乱听消息。只要选好了一只股票，买好放在那里等待着
企业给你去分享红利，它几乎是没有多大风险的。万一整个股市行情差，你照样能得到利润；万一股市行情特别好，你就可以乘机抛掉获得额外的投机收益。好股票就是你可以长时间持有的股票。
在目前这样一个信息严重不对称的市场上，机构和庄家不仅能看着散户的牌博弈，甚至在某种程度上还可以决定散户能拿什么牌。散户唯有做“价值投资”才能最大限度地规避风险，否则除了极少数人因运气好而获利外，大部分人将被玩弄于股掌之中。
做“价值投资”要看重的是企业过去和现在的盈利水平、在同行业的竞争力、国家政策对企业未来的潜在影响、企业的品牌和市场占有率以及企业的发展前景等。考虑这些因素去买它的股票，投资的安全性就相对有保障了。
如果兼职股民实在不知道如何选股，就要么离开股市，要么参考一些值得信赖的炒股行家的理性选择。
国外和国内的股票投资经验告诉我们，市场的唯一主旋律就是“价值投资”。但股市也有其自身的规律，同一只股票在不同的时期往往存在着价值低估、价值挖掘、价值实现和价值高估（过度投机）四个阶段的周而复始。“价值投资”指的是投资于目前已具有投资价值，或者目前价值尚被低估、但已经体现出成长性，在可预期的时间里将实现业绩增长的投资对象。
兼职股民要做好“价值投资”，以下的几点经验可供参考：
1.买股票一定要有充分的理由，决不要做没有道理的交易。任何时候都不要用“或许”作为你选择股票的理由。
2、绝大多数有关股票的小道消息都是不可信的。“价值投资”是你真正的朋友，思考一下每一笔交易的“风险收益比”是很有必要的。
3、不要一路追涨杀跌，贪婪与恐惧等于死亡。
4、你不需要每天都炒股，不要像嫁给股票似的粘住不肯离场，不要因为炒股而严重影响你正常的工作和生活。
5、注意大势，要顺势而为，不要逆势而行，控制你的“博傻”心理，进行有效的风险管理。
6、当今中国股市真正的赢家是政府、证券公司、机构和庄家及少部分经验丰富的老股民，如果你今天才开始学炒股，我建议你远离股市，否则绝大部分是没有好下场的。
鉴于中国的股市还很不成熟，在我国还没有像美国那样严格保护中小投资者利益的法律，对违规者的惩处力度还过于疲软，有法不依的状况还很严重。需要国家不断完善法律，加强监管力度，才能使股市的信息逐渐趋于公开、公正和透明。所以在当前的情况下，一般的中小投资者在中国参与炒股是非常危险的（尤其是在3000点以上时）。为了尽量减少风险并且不因购买股票而耽误自己太多的时间和精力，最好的方式就是理性地选购股票进行“价值投资”。
股票投资有可能获得利润，但利润决不是炒出来的。股票的利润来自两个方面：一是企业当前可以分给股东的红利，这部分利润的高低取决于该企业的经营业绩；二是来自对企业前景的正确判断（未来的利润）。
比方说有一家资源稀缺型企业，由于管理不善造成当前盈利水平很低，因而股票价格很低。但它的产品销路很好，而且预计到价格会因资源的进一步稀缺而越来越高。所以，只要改善管理，盈利水平很快就可以上去。如果基于这种对企业前景的正确判断而买进它的股票，以后就很可能实现较高的利润。如果股票价格真的上升，股民就可以真的得到更多的利润。除了上面这两个利润来源，再也没有别的因素可以为整个股市的股民提供利润了。所以，理智的股民要作“价值投资”，要去关心企业经营的实际业绩和未来的发展前景，从而决定去买哪些企业的股票。
股票的合理价格由三部分组成：上市公司的每股净资产、现实收益水平和未来预期的收益水平的贴现。超过这个合理的价值水平的股价，就是泡沫。
当然，股市是允许有一定的泡沫存在的。如果企业未来经营得很好，泡沫就会慢慢被充实。但如果没有任何理由能估计到企业泡沫被充实的迹象，那参与炒股就相当于赌博。虽然赌博也有赢家，但他赢的钱就等于另一部分人输的钱减去交易费用，并且赌博浪费的时间也是没有人给你付工资的。所以，赌博只能使社会的财富越来越少。
当然，影响股市的原因还有很多，能否在股票市场获利，另一个根本的因素在于对信息的掌握是否及时和充分，因为股市的交易本身就是围绕着信息展开的。但目前的信息对于机构和散户来说是严重不对称的。比方说，许多上市公司在限售股解禁前后突然出台利好消息，以便让自己手中的股票卖个好价钱；有些机构收买某些股评家按自己的愿望做股评或者推荐个股，引诱散户进入圈套；而散户却没有这种制造虚假信息左右股价走势的能力。许多散户亏钱往往都是亏在股评家的嘴上。
以2007年和2008年的中国股市为例，上市公司能分给流通股股民的利润还不足以交纳交易费用。但很多股评家天天在喊“中国股市还会牛下去”，导致很多小股民血本无归。所以大家最好不要相信股评家的荐股，既然在股市是充满竞争的，人家凭什么把好股票推荐给你呢？也许有人会说，有些股评家有时也说对了。其实这不是他说对了，而是如果多数人上当受骗去跟风购买，就会造成这只股票真的上涨甚至涨停，结果大家误以为他说对了。只要大家误以为他说对了，就对他下次骗人形成“利好”。但只要企业没有利润，即使股票价格被哄抬，也一定是要跌下去的。
所以就股票投资而言，理性地选择股票是第一位的。只要你选择的股票是真正有投资价值的，它总会给你带来利润。如果在持有的过程中运气很好遇到特别的“牛市”，你在高点抛出的话还有意外收获。但如果盲目地选购股票去炒作，即使赚了钱也是其他股民亏的钱。并且，谁又能保证自己不会成为最大的傻瓜呢？如果只做“价值投资”，不因股市的大起大落而随波逐流，虽然很难获得暴利，但收益是比较安全稳健的。因为即使在大跌势中依然有股票保持强势，大涨势中依然有股票持续下跌。如果你决定入市，最重要的是选股，而选股最重要的是看价格。因为任何好东西只要价格太高就不算好东西。如果选对了股，就用不着天天去盯盘看股市行情。
按著名财经评论家时寒冰的话说：“除了职业炒股的投机家，他们才有精力有必要天天去盯着股市行情。否则，天天盯盘是非常愚蠢的做法。因为，盘面所有的陷阱都是机构和庄家给盯盘者量身定做的，机构最不喜欢那些买了股票就去干他自己的正事的人，因为他们很多招儿都用不上了！另外，无论盈亏，如果你天天浪费那么多时间和精力本身就已经是亏了！倘若因亏损而动怒，因盈利而狂喜，那么，你亏得就更大了，因为你把健康也陪进去了！倘若因亏损而把怒火释放在家人或同事身上，那么，你已经亏得血本无归了，因为你连家庭、单位的和睦都葬送了！”
要做好“价值投资”，就应该多花点时间去选择有投资价值的股票，而不是天天去盯着股市行情和胡乱听消息。只要选好了一只股票，买好放在那里等待着
企业给你去分享红利，它几乎是没有多大风险的。万一整个股市行情差，你照样能得到利润；万一股市行情特别好，你就可以乘机抛掉获得额外的投机收益。好股票就是你可以长时间持有的股票。
在目前这样一个信息严重不对称的市场上，机构和庄家不仅能看着散户的牌博弈，甚至在某种程度上还可以决定散户能拿什么牌。散户唯有做“价值投资”才能最大限度地规避风险，否则除了极少数人因运气好而获利外，大部分人将被玩弄于股掌之中。
做“价值投资”要看重的是企业过去和现在的盈利水平、在同行业的竞争力、国家政策对企业未来的潜在影响、企业的品牌和市场占有率以及企业的发展前景等。考虑这些因素去买它的股票，投资的安全性就相对有保障了。
如果兼职股民实在不知道如何选股，就要么离开股市，要么参考一些值得信赖的炒股行家的理性选择。
国外和国内的股票投资经验告诉我们，市场的唯一主旋律就是“价值投资”。但股市也有其自身的规律，同一只股票在不同的时期往往存在着价值低估、价值挖掘、价值实现和价值高估（过度投机）四个阶段的周而复始。“价值投资”指的是投资于目前已具有投资价值，或者目前价值尚被低估、但已经体现出成长性，在可预期的时间里将实现业绩增长的投资对象。
兼职股民要做好“价值投资”，以下的几点经验可供参考：
1.买股票一定要有充分的理由，决不要做没有道理的交易。任何时候都不要用“或许”作为你选择股票的理由。
2、绝大多数有关股票的小道消息都是不可信的。“价值投资”是你真正的朋友，思考一下每一笔交易的“风险收益比”是很有必要的。
3、不要一路追涨杀跌，贪婪与恐惧等于死亡。
4、你不需要每天都炒股，不要像嫁给股票似的粘住不肯离场，不要因为炒股而严重影响你正常的工作和生活。
5、注意大势，要顺势而为，不要逆势而行，控制你的“博傻”心理，进行有效的风险管理。
6、当今中国股市真正的赢家是政府、证券公司、机构和庄家及少部分经验丰富的老股民，如果你今天才开始学炒股，我建议你远离股市，否则绝大部分是没有好下场的。
Citigroup: The New Greatest Trade Ever?
John Paulson, the subject of Gregory Zuckerman’s recently published book, “The Greatest Trade Ever” (see my recent review of the book) posted his new 13F filing on Friday. The 13F filing is the listing of all of the firm’s stocks that it owns as of the most recent quarter-end. I’ve traded very successfully for hedge funds based on the idea of buying positions that the super-investors own - but, ideally, at discounts to where they bought their positions.
It’s important to point out that Paulson not only guessed way in advance that the housing boom was going to completely implode but he invested billions of dollars on that thesis despite the fact that most of the investment community was laughing at him — including me, I might add (and as mentioned in Greg Zuckerman’s book). I met with his firm but declined to invest in the Paulson Fund despite the enormous evidence it presented that the housing bubble was about to go bust.
Should I make the mistake again? Or follow the new positions listed in the recent filing?
Paulson’s newest position is in Citigroup, the largest bank on the planet. A few months ago, Citigroup share price had fallen to less than a dollar when investors were making the bet that the bank was insolvent. He bought 300 million shares in the last quarter. That’s not chump change even though the stock, at $4.05 as of the close Friday, is more than 90% off of its June 2007 high of $54.75. This is not a standalone bet but part of a broader bet on the return of the banking industry. For instance, he also started a new position in JP Morgan. He sold his 2 million-share stake in Goldman Sachs but I don’t think this is a bet against the broker-dealer model but more of a reflection that he’s probably taking profits on significant gains and reallocating into the banks that haven’t moved as fast as Goldman.
New positions in Cemex (a bet that the housing industry is coming back, not to mention infrastructure build-up triggered by the stimulus package) and Starwood Hotels, Starwood Property Trust, Ashford Hospitality Trust, and Felcor Lodging Trust. (all bets on real estate and the hotel industry) all reflect bets that Paulson thinks the worst is behind us and the economy is going to roar back.
With a roaring economy and money flooding the system, one thing worth being wary about is a weakening dollar. Paulson’s largest position: GLD, the ETF that tracks the price of gold.
I’ve made the mistake once before not to bet on Paulson. I’m probably not going to do it again.
It’s important to point out that Paulson not only guessed way in advance that the housing boom was going to completely implode but he invested billions of dollars on that thesis despite the fact that most of the investment community was laughing at him — including me, I might add (and as mentioned in Greg Zuckerman’s book). I met with his firm but declined to invest in the Paulson Fund despite the enormous evidence it presented that the housing bubble was about to go bust.
Should I make the mistake again? Or follow the new positions listed in the recent filing?
Paulson’s newest position is in Citigroup, the largest bank on the planet. A few months ago, Citigroup share price had fallen to less than a dollar when investors were making the bet that the bank was insolvent. He bought 300 million shares in the last quarter. That’s not chump change even though the stock, at $4.05 as of the close Friday, is more than 90% off of its June 2007 high of $54.75. This is not a standalone bet but part of a broader bet on the return of the banking industry. For instance, he also started a new position in JP Morgan. He sold his 2 million-share stake in Goldman Sachs but I don’t think this is a bet against the broker-dealer model but more of a reflection that he’s probably taking profits on significant gains and reallocating into the banks that haven’t moved as fast as Goldman.
New positions in Cemex (a bet that the housing industry is coming back, not to mention infrastructure build-up triggered by the stimulus package) and Starwood Hotels, Starwood Property Trust, Ashford Hospitality Trust, and Felcor Lodging Trust. (all bets on real estate and the hotel industry) all reflect bets that Paulson thinks the worst is behind us and the economy is going to roar back.
With a roaring economy and money flooding the system, one thing worth being wary about is a weakening dollar. Paulson’s largest position: GLD, the ETF that tracks the price of gold.
I’ve made the mistake once before not to bet on Paulson. I’m probably not going to do it again.
John Paulson Buys Citigroup Inc., Varian Inc., Cemex, Sells Centex Corp., State Street Corp., Goldman Sachs
Hedge fund giant John Paulson made money shorting financials in 2007 and 2008. Now he is buying heavily into the big banks. He also bought a lot of hotels. This is his Q3 portfolio update.
John Paulson buys Citigroup Inc., Varian Inc., Cemex S.a.b. De C.v., Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide Inc., The Hartford Financial Services Group In, Sunstone Hotel Investors Inc., Starwood Property Trust Inc., Conseco Inc., Old National Bancorp, Felcor Lodging Trust Inc., Ashford Hospitality Trust Inc., sells Centex Corp., State Street Corp., Petrocanada, Kimco Realty Corp., Humana Inc., Goldman Sachs Group Inc. The, Market Vectors - Gold Miners Etf, Data Domain, Inc., Centennial Communications Corp., At&t Inc. during the 3-months ended 09/30/2009, according to the most recent filings of his investment company, Paulson & Co.. John Paulson owns 39 stocks with a total value of $20.5 billion. These are the details of the buys and sells.
New Purchase: Citigroup Inc. (C)
John Paulson initiated holdings in Citigroup Inc.. His purchase prices were between $2.59 and $5.23, with an estimated average price of $3.85. The impact to his portfolio due to this purchase was 7.1%. His holdings were 300,000,000 shares as of 09/30/2009.
Citigroup Inc. has a market cap of $92.6 billion; its shares were traded at around $4.05 with and P/S ratio of 1.8. Citigroup Inc. had an annual average earning growth of 5.1% over the past 10 years.
John Paulson buys Citigroup Inc., Varian Inc., Cemex S.a.b. De C.v., Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide Inc., The Hartford Financial Services Group In, Sunstone Hotel Investors Inc., Starwood Property Trust Inc., Conseco Inc., Old National Bancorp, Felcor Lodging Trust Inc., Ashford Hospitality Trust Inc., sells Centex Corp., State Street Corp., Petrocanada, Kimco Realty Corp., Humana Inc., Goldman Sachs Group Inc. The, Market Vectors - Gold Miners Etf, Data Domain, Inc., Centennial Communications Corp., At&t Inc. during the 3-months ended 09/30/2009, according to the most recent filings of his investment company, Paulson & Co.. John Paulson owns 39 stocks with a total value of $20.5 billion. These are the details of the buys and sells.
New Purchase: Citigroup Inc. (C)
John Paulson initiated holdings in Citigroup Inc.. His purchase prices were between $2.59 and $5.23, with an estimated average price of $3.85. The impact to his portfolio due to this purchase was 7.1%. His holdings were 300,000,000 shares as of 09/30/2009.
Citigroup Inc. has a market cap of $92.6 billion; its shares were traded at around $4.05 with and P/S ratio of 1.8. Citigroup Inc. had an annual average earning growth of 5.1% over the past 10 years.
What Does John Paulson See in Citigroup?
It is likely that one metric in John Paulson’s analysis of the financial sector in 2008, and his decision to bet against it, had much to do with his recent $1.4 billion Q-3 investment in Citigroup (C). In his 2008 end of the year letter to investors Paulson said that “the problem with many banks is that they don’t have enough tangible common equity to absorb anticipated losses.”
Tangible common equity is a subset of shareholder equity that does not include preferred shares or intangible managed assets. It is a measure of what common shareholders would receive if the company were liquidated. A similar metric is tier one common equity. It is a more arbitrary figure and is calculated using risk weighted assets.
There is a difficulty in interpreting bank evaluations of shareholder equity. The Federal Reserve used tier one common equity in their stress test analysis and many of the money center banks now highlight a tier one common ratio in their reporting. That metric, as we have said, is open to interpretation and does allow banks wiggle room to write down asset value. The basic tangible common equity ratio is the best indicator of shareholder value but banks have their own way of computing that ratio. (TCE, as defined by Citigroup, represents Common equity less goodwill and intangible assets, excluding mortgage servicing revenue, net of related deferred tax liabilities.)
In February of this year Citigroup C.E.O. Vikram Pandit said that his goal was to increase the company’s tangible common equity by an exchange of preferred shares for common stock. He hoped to increase TCE in the 4th quarter from $29.7 billion to $81 billion with the exchange of 27.5 billion preferred shares. He has achieved his goal and then some with TCE in the 3rd quarter reported at $100 billion and the TCE ratio at 10.3%. The third quarter ratio number is a substantial gain over a previously reported 2nd quarter TCE ratio of 2.2%.
The Paulson team has to have looked carefully at this metric and arrived at their independent estimation of Citigroup tangible common equity. They are, no doubt, in some agreement with the company’s impressive 3rd quarter figure.
An equally important issue for Citigroup is their “off balance sheet” assets and this is another area that Paulson and Company must have given very close attention.
In May of 2008 C.E.O. Pandit said that trimming the company’s $2.2 trillion in assets was a priority. At the time it was speculated that Citigroup had another trillion dollars in “Qualifying Special Purpose Entities” (QSPE’s). These are the trusts and financing vehicles that are home to the “shadow assets” and are not subject to capital reserve requirements. This releases funds and allows the banks to put more money to work. It is a way of leveraging their capital. The Federal Accounting Standards Board (FASB) wants these “shadow assets” to be properly accounted for and has set and, subsequently, extended several deadlines for the banks to meet new and more transparent standards. The next deadline is January of 2010 but the banks may, as they have in the past, protest and FASB may give them a Christmas present in the form of another extension.
Citigroup has been the most vocal protester regarding the implementation of the new FASB requirements. It holds securitized credit card debt estimated at $92 billion and that debt is the most likely to suffer delinquencies. The addition of any assets to the balance sheet, however, whether toxic or not, would require increased loan loss provisions.
It follows that Citigroup will be faced with loan losses and increased loan reserve requirements in the future and, considering the amount of repatriated assets, may require an infusion of additional capital. This would dilute shareholder value. Potential dilution of share value is an important issue when considering the purchase of 300 million shares only one quarter before the new FASB rules are to go into effect. The fact that the shares were purchased implies that the Paulson team believes that Citigroup has had some success in liquidating, selling or transferring those “off balance sheet” assets.
The two issues we highlighted are important ones but it is speculation as to their priority in the Paulson and Company due diligence process. The money center bank balance sheets and earnings reports, no doubt, hold many interesting secrets revealed to only the most heroic in the “grail quest” that is, understanding the workings of the financial sector.
(Citigroup has lagged the performance of its peers since the March 2009 low in the stock market).
Tangible common equity is a subset of shareholder equity that does not include preferred shares or intangible managed assets. It is a measure of what common shareholders would receive if the company were liquidated. A similar metric is tier one common equity. It is a more arbitrary figure and is calculated using risk weighted assets.
There is a difficulty in interpreting bank evaluations of shareholder equity. The Federal Reserve used tier one common equity in their stress test analysis and many of the money center banks now highlight a tier one common ratio in their reporting. That metric, as we have said, is open to interpretation and does allow banks wiggle room to write down asset value. The basic tangible common equity ratio is the best indicator of shareholder value but banks have their own way of computing that ratio. (TCE, as defined by Citigroup, represents Common equity less goodwill and intangible assets, excluding mortgage servicing revenue, net of related deferred tax liabilities.)
In February of this year Citigroup C.E.O. Vikram Pandit said that his goal was to increase the company’s tangible common equity by an exchange of preferred shares for common stock. He hoped to increase TCE in the 4th quarter from $29.7 billion to $81 billion with the exchange of 27.5 billion preferred shares. He has achieved his goal and then some with TCE in the 3rd quarter reported at $100 billion and the TCE ratio at 10.3%. The third quarter ratio number is a substantial gain over a previously reported 2nd quarter TCE ratio of 2.2%.
The Paulson team has to have looked carefully at this metric and arrived at their independent estimation of Citigroup tangible common equity. They are, no doubt, in some agreement with the company’s impressive 3rd quarter figure.
An equally important issue for Citigroup is their “off balance sheet” assets and this is another area that Paulson and Company must have given very close attention.
In May of 2008 C.E.O. Pandit said that trimming the company’s $2.2 trillion in assets was a priority. At the time it was speculated that Citigroup had another trillion dollars in “Qualifying Special Purpose Entities” (QSPE’s). These are the trusts and financing vehicles that are home to the “shadow assets” and are not subject to capital reserve requirements. This releases funds and allows the banks to put more money to work. It is a way of leveraging their capital. The Federal Accounting Standards Board (FASB) wants these “shadow assets” to be properly accounted for and has set and, subsequently, extended several deadlines for the banks to meet new and more transparent standards. The next deadline is January of 2010 but the banks may, as they have in the past, protest and FASB may give them a Christmas present in the form of another extension.
Citigroup has been the most vocal protester regarding the implementation of the new FASB requirements. It holds securitized credit card debt estimated at $92 billion and that debt is the most likely to suffer delinquencies. The addition of any assets to the balance sheet, however, whether toxic or not, would require increased loan loss provisions.
It follows that Citigroup will be faced with loan losses and increased loan reserve requirements in the future and, considering the amount of repatriated assets, may require an infusion of additional capital. This would dilute shareholder value. Potential dilution of share value is an important issue when considering the purchase of 300 million shares only one quarter before the new FASB rules are to go into effect. The fact that the shares were purchased implies that the Paulson team believes that Citigroup has had some success in liquidating, selling or transferring those “off balance sheet” assets.
The two issues we highlighted are important ones but it is speculation as to their priority in the Paulson and Company due diligence process. The money center bank balance sheets and earnings reports, no doubt, hold many interesting secrets revealed to only the most heroic in the “grail quest” that is, understanding the workings of the financial sector.
(Citigroup has lagged the performance of its peers since the March 2009 low in the stock market).
What John Paulson could teach us
Risk, but potential reward, comes from breaking away from the herd mentality that surrounds Wall Street.
If it wasn't clear already that John Paulson had reached the zenith of his hedge fund profession, one only had to watch how fervently the media and blogosphere digested the news of Paulson & Co.'s quarterly holdings which was released last Friday.
Market commentators immediately pounced on how the one-time housing bear had loaded up on 300 million shares in Citigroup (C-N3.400.010.29%) during the quarter, while dumping his entire holdings in Goldman Sachs (GS-N156.35-0.09-0.06%). Similar 13-F holdings of other hedge fund managers like David Einhorn and George Soros filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission in recent days have been summarily ignored compared to the reaction to Paulson's. (Citi shares jumped 3.2 per cent the day after Paulson's announcement, far outpacing the S&P and Financial index that day.)
As far as hedge fund managers go today, John Paulson is the man. Ken Griffin, Stevie Cohen, and Eddie Lampert and others are afterthoughts.
In Gregory Zuckerman's new book, The Greatest Trade Ever, the Wall Street Journal reporter chronicles how Paulson mounted his ascent from nobody to this industry's seer of the moment.
Seven years ago, Mr. Paulson was relatively unknown. He was a merger-arbitrage guy running $300-million (U.S.). The former Baker Scholar from Harvard Business School couldn't help but feel that - in his mid-40s - he had under-achieved his career potential.
“ As a fund manager, I often ponder the challenge of balancing between (1) trusting yourself and your investment thesis completely even when no one else does and (2) being aware enough to know when you're being too stubborn and 'not seeing the facts' or when the trade is going against you. ”
A key analyst alongside Mr. Paulson was Paolo Pellegrini. A failed Lazard banker with two divorces and zero net worth at the time he joined Paulson, Mr. Pellegrini had to make this last career chance work.
He lived in a one bedroom apartment up in Westchester and would arrive at work at 6:30 am in order to get the cheapest parking lot rate nearby. No one seemed to like him at first. He was a bit of a hot-head and talked too much. Yet, eventually he helped identify the housing bubble that Mr. Paulson would turn into a $16-billion winning trade for his firm and $4-billion for Mr. Paulson.
Beyond the interesting outsider-type characters working at Paulson, Mr. Zuckerman's book offers many lessons for small and large investors. One is the risk, but potential reward, that comes from breaking away from the herd mentality that surrounds Wall Street.
Nobody on Wall Street gave these guys a chance, when they started betting against housing. In fact, Mr. Paulson was routinely laughed at. Because the banking infrastructure was making so much money off of housing in 2004 - 2006, there was no reason for so many people to imagine it would end.
“ For Mr. Paulson, it all boiled down to one chart which Mr. Pellegrini produced showing the inflation-adjusted growth in housing prices over time divided by wage growth. The data clearly showed a rapid explosion upward away from the general trend starting in 2000. ”
Even among hedge funds -- who are paid handsomely to anticipate and invest in where the puck is going, not where it's been -- precious few made this bearish trade. At the time, wise managers saw only the obstacles to the trade working out (like the federal government bailing out sub-prime borrowers and "containing" the problem from other parts of housing) and they clung to a misplaced blind trust in "their models" which showed housing couldn't decrease in value.
For Mr. Paulson, it all boiled down to one chart which Mr. Pellegrini produced showing the inflation-adjusted growth in housing prices over time divided by wage growth. The data clearly showed a rapid explosion upward away from the general trend starting in 2000.
Even after he makes the bet, Mr. Zuckerman points out how there are so many times that people tell Mr. Paulson to take the bet off or cash in his profits too early. His own investors complained. Complaints also came from brokers from Bear Stearns and others who helped sell him the credit default swaps on the toxic tranches of mortgage bonds, as well as the most troubled sub-prime lenders and banks holding the troubled securities.
Even his own staff complained that he wasn't taking money off the table. They told him to sell when he was down in his trade and they told him to sell when he was up on the trade after New Century reported its first blown quarter in early 2007. Through it all, Mr. Paulson stuck to his guns because he foresaw even bigger profits ahead - and he was proved right.
As a fund manager, I often ponder the challenge of balancing between (1) trusting yourself and your investment thesis completely even when no one else does and (2) being aware enough to know when you're being too stubborn and "not seeing the facts" or when the trade is going against you.
In Mr. Paulson's case, every new bit of data which came to light and possibly contradicted his investment thesis was always scrutinized by him and his team to see if they had "missed something." He always stuck with the trade because he felt confident in the depth of research they had invested in understanding the problem/investment opportunity.
“ There are several lessons in The Greatest Trade Ever for investors: believe in yourself, be skeptical of others' free opinions and assumptions, persist, and take the long view and don't take profits too early. ”
For Mr. Paulson, it all boiled down to one chart which Mr. Pellegrini produced showing the inflation-adjusted growth in housing prices over time divided by wage growth. The data clearly showed a rapid explosion upward away from the general trend starting in 2000. He assumed this trend would not continue indefinitely and revert (even overshoot). He was right.
The Greatest Trade Ever isn't just about John Paulson. It describes some smaller players who also bet against housing. Their stories are also very interesting and some of the characters are really colorful and interesting. Some run into the problem of not having enough capital to implement the trade to the degree they want to. Some wait too long.
One investor, Michael Burry, got his break as a fund manager when well-known value investor Joel Greenblatt made a big investment in him. Later, after taking a big bet against housing early on, Mr. Burry faced Mr. Greenblatt's wrath. In no uncertain terms, Mr. Greenblatt told him to get out of the trade. Mr. Burry didn't, but taking a huge mental and physical toll on himself. Put yourself in Mr. Burry's shoes. What must it have felt like to tell your maker to take a hike?
There are several lessons in The Greatest Trade Ever for investors: believe in yourself (assuming you've done your homework), be skeptical of others' free opinions and assumptions, persist, and take the long view and don't take profits too early. Every investor involved in this bearish housing trade early on referred to it as their potential "Soros trade" - referring to the famous 1992 bet against the British pound which netted George Soros' fund $1-billion.
Mr. Paulson used this line himself, but he also remembered another Soros comment that stuck in his mind as he executed his trade. When you see the perfect trade set-up in front of you, Mr. Soros advised to "go for the jugular." Mr. Paulson did and it paid off big-time. Some of us will never see a trade like that for the rest of our lives. When opportunity knocks, you have to answer.
If it wasn't clear already that John Paulson had reached the zenith of his hedge fund profession, one only had to watch how fervently the media and blogosphere digested the news of Paulson & Co.'s quarterly holdings which was released last Friday.
Market commentators immediately pounced on how the one-time housing bear had loaded up on 300 million shares in Citigroup (C-N3.400.010.29%) during the quarter, while dumping his entire holdings in Goldman Sachs (GS-N156.35-0.09-0.06%). Similar 13-F holdings of other hedge fund managers like David Einhorn and George Soros filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission in recent days have been summarily ignored compared to the reaction to Paulson's. (Citi shares jumped 3.2 per cent the day after Paulson's announcement, far outpacing the S&P and Financial index that day.)
As far as hedge fund managers go today, John Paulson is the man. Ken Griffin, Stevie Cohen, and Eddie Lampert and others are afterthoughts.
In Gregory Zuckerman's new book, The Greatest Trade Ever, the Wall Street Journal reporter chronicles how Paulson mounted his ascent from nobody to this industry's seer of the moment.
Seven years ago, Mr. Paulson was relatively unknown. He was a merger-arbitrage guy running $300-million (U.S.). The former Baker Scholar from Harvard Business School couldn't help but feel that - in his mid-40s - he had under-achieved his career potential.
“ As a fund manager, I often ponder the challenge of balancing between (1) trusting yourself and your investment thesis completely even when no one else does and (2) being aware enough to know when you're being too stubborn and 'not seeing the facts' or when the trade is going against you. ”
A key analyst alongside Mr. Paulson was Paolo Pellegrini. A failed Lazard banker with two divorces and zero net worth at the time he joined Paulson, Mr. Pellegrini had to make this last career chance work.
He lived in a one bedroom apartment up in Westchester and would arrive at work at 6:30 am in order to get the cheapest parking lot rate nearby. No one seemed to like him at first. He was a bit of a hot-head and talked too much. Yet, eventually he helped identify the housing bubble that Mr. Paulson would turn into a $16-billion winning trade for his firm and $4-billion for Mr. Paulson.
Beyond the interesting outsider-type characters working at Paulson, Mr. Zuckerman's book offers many lessons for small and large investors. One is the risk, but potential reward, that comes from breaking away from the herd mentality that surrounds Wall Street.
Nobody on Wall Street gave these guys a chance, when they started betting against housing. In fact, Mr. Paulson was routinely laughed at. Because the banking infrastructure was making so much money off of housing in 2004 - 2006, there was no reason for so many people to imagine it would end.
“ For Mr. Paulson, it all boiled down to one chart which Mr. Pellegrini produced showing the inflation-adjusted growth in housing prices over time divided by wage growth. The data clearly showed a rapid explosion upward away from the general trend starting in 2000. ”
Even among hedge funds -- who are paid handsomely to anticipate and invest in where the puck is going, not where it's been -- precious few made this bearish trade. At the time, wise managers saw only the obstacles to the trade working out (like the federal government bailing out sub-prime borrowers and "containing" the problem from other parts of housing) and they clung to a misplaced blind trust in "their models" which showed housing couldn't decrease in value.
For Mr. Paulson, it all boiled down to one chart which Mr. Pellegrini produced showing the inflation-adjusted growth in housing prices over time divided by wage growth. The data clearly showed a rapid explosion upward away from the general trend starting in 2000.
Even after he makes the bet, Mr. Zuckerman points out how there are so many times that people tell Mr. Paulson to take the bet off or cash in his profits too early. His own investors complained. Complaints also came from brokers from Bear Stearns and others who helped sell him the credit default swaps on the toxic tranches of mortgage bonds, as well as the most troubled sub-prime lenders and banks holding the troubled securities.
Even his own staff complained that he wasn't taking money off the table. They told him to sell when he was down in his trade and they told him to sell when he was up on the trade after New Century reported its first blown quarter in early 2007. Through it all, Mr. Paulson stuck to his guns because he foresaw even bigger profits ahead - and he was proved right.
As a fund manager, I often ponder the challenge of balancing between (1) trusting yourself and your investment thesis completely even when no one else does and (2) being aware enough to know when you're being too stubborn and "not seeing the facts" or when the trade is going against you.
In Mr. Paulson's case, every new bit of data which came to light and possibly contradicted his investment thesis was always scrutinized by him and his team to see if they had "missed something." He always stuck with the trade because he felt confident in the depth of research they had invested in understanding the problem/investment opportunity.
“ There are several lessons in The Greatest Trade Ever for investors: believe in yourself, be skeptical of others' free opinions and assumptions, persist, and take the long view and don't take profits too early. ”
For Mr. Paulson, it all boiled down to one chart which Mr. Pellegrini produced showing the inflation-adjusted growth in housing prices over time divided by wage growth. The data clearly showed a rapid explosion upward away from the general trend starting in 2000. He assumed this trend would not continue indefinitely and revert (even overshoot). He was right.
The Greatest Trade Ever isn't just about John Paulson. It describes some smaller players who also bet against housing. Their stories are also very interesting and some of the characters are really colorful and interesting. Some run into the problem of not having enough capital to implement the trade to the degree they want to. Some wait too long.
One investor, Michael Burry, got his break as a fund manager when well-known value investor Joel Greenblatt made a big investment in him. Later, after taking a big bet against housing early on, Mr. Burry faced Mr. Greenblatt's wrath. In no uncertain terms, Mr. Greenblatt told him to get out of the trade. Mr. Burry didn't, but taking a huge mental and physical toll on himself. Put yourself in Mr. Burry's shoes. What must it have felt like to tell your maker to take a hike?
There are several lessons in The Greatest Trade Ever for investors: believe in yourself (assuming you've done your homework), be skeptical of others' free opinions and assumptions, persist, and take the long view and don't take profits too early. Every investor involved in this bearish housing trade early on referred to it as their potential "Soros trade" - referring to the famous 1992 bet against the British pound which netted George Soros' fund $1-billion.
Mr. Paulson used this line himself, but he also remembered another Soros comment that stuck in his mind as he executed his trade. When you see the perfect trade set-up in front of you, Mr. Soros advised to "go for the jugular." Mr. Paulson did and it paid off big-time. Some of us will never see a trade like that for the rest of our lives. When opportunity knocks, you have to answer.
巴菲特、索羅斯持股大公開
股神巴菲特旗下投資公司波克夏向美國證券主管機關申報最新持股顯示，去年第四季持股加碼富國銀行、Wal-Mart等公司的股票，同時減持康菲石油和艾克森美孚石油等能源股的股票，顯示巴菲特看好美國經濟景氣復甦，同時看淡未來能源股後市表現。
另一位投資大師索羅斯透過索羅斯基金公司加碼ＳＰＤＲ黃金信託基金，看好未來黃金漲勢，卻也暗示索羅斯看空美元後市，但索羅斯大幅加碼花旗銀行、ＳＰＤＲ的金融信託基金、孟山都和福特汽車等股票。
巴菲特看好美國景氣復甦
從巴菲特加碼最多的股票看來，巴菲特對今年美國經濟景氣復甦有很大的信心。他同時加碼Wal-Mart一二０萬股，持股超過三九０萬股。去年第三季波克夏即大幅買進Wal-Mart股票，第四季持續加碼，顯示看好未來Wal-mart的獲利成長。
波克夏去年第四季大幅加碼的股票，還包括廢棄物處理公司的Public Services，文字儲存媒體的Iron Mountain，和南韓浦項鋼鐵等股票，浦項鋼鐵也是波克夏持股中唯一的鋼鐵股。
波克夏減碼能源、醫療股
巴菲特大幅減碼能源股，卻持續看好鐵路股。過去一直都是巴菲特大量持有的北方柏靈頓鐵路公司，波克夏在二月十二日完成對該公司股權的收購，並納入巴菲特旗下子公司，是不是意味著歐巴馬政府為了振興美國經濟要興建高速鐵路，而讓巴菲特看好鐵路股後市，值得玩味。
波克夏減碼醫療相關廠商的寶鹼公司、嬌生公司、健保福利公司的Wellpoint和UnitedHealth集團，減碼張數從二０五萬股到超過八、九百萬股都有，這可能和歐巴馬總統目前正大幅推動健保改革政策有關。
投資大師索羅斯透過旗下投資公司索羅斯基金公司，在去年第四季加碼ＳＰＤＲ的黃金信託基金ＥＴＦ三七三萬股，ＳＰＤＲ黃金信託基金的持股市值增加到六．七六億美元，是索羅斯基金公司旗下最高市值的持股，比第三季結束時僅持有二五０萬股的數量相比增加超過一倍。
索羅斯增持黃金ＥＴＦ
美元指數從去年十一月底的七四．一七點觸底反彈，目前已經反彈到八０．八四點，這波行情市場普遍以反彈波視之，是否會從反彈變成回升行情目前還很難論斷。索羅斯仍持續看空美元的後市，預期美元在短暫反彈後便會回跌，所以利用美元指數反彈與黃金呈現弱勢格局期間，回頭加碼黃金ＥＴＦ，以因應未來美元可能的貶值與黃金的漲勢。
雖然看空美元後市，但索羅斯卻看好美國金融股表現，利用去年第四季花旗銀行股價回檔時，大幅加碼九四七０萬股，讓該基金公司持有花旗銀行的持股市值上揚到三．二四億美元，是索羅斯基金公司第二大持股市值。去年第三季結束時，索羅斯基金公司並未持有花旗銀行的股票。
加碼金融股有志一同
索羅斯基金公司同時加碼ＳＰＤＲ的金融信託基金一一九八萬股，持股市值也上揚到一．七四億美元。不僅索羅斯看好美國金融股後市，這和波克夏去年第四季持續加碼富國銀行股票的情況雷同。在金融海嘯放空大賺二００億美元的華爾街避險基金經理人鮑爾森和明迪奇，也都在去年第四季透過旗下對沖基金買進五億股的花旗銀行股票。市場分析師認為，從巴菲特、索羅斯和其他知名基金經理人透過旗下投資公司買進金融股股票，凸顯美國金融股已經走出金融風暴的陰霾，長期投資金融股未來有利可圖。
索羅斯基金公司去年第四季增加持有全球最大種子與農藥公司孟山都持股二七五萬股，總股數增加到將近三九０萬股，持股市值也上揚到三．０二億美元。有別於巴菲特減碼醫藥股，索羅斯基金公司去年第四季增加輝瑞藥廠九０九萬股，加碼幅度相對偏多，持股市值增加到二．０八億美元。再者，索羅斯加碼綜合性能源開發商Suncor能源公司，並增加持股四五二萬股，這也和巴菲特大砍能源股的操作策略不同。
另一位投資大師索羅斯透過索羅斯基金公司加碼ＳＰＤＲ黃金信託基金，看好未來黃金漲勢，卻也暗示索羅斯看空美元後市，但索羅斯大幅加碼花旗銀行、ＳＰＤＲ的金融信託基金、孟山都和福特汽車等股票。
巴菲特看好美國景氣復甦
從巴菲特加碼最多的股票看來，巴菲特對今年美國經濟景氣復甦有很大的信心。他同時加碼Wal-Mart一二０萬股，持股超過三九０萬股。去年第三季波克夏即大幅買進Wal-Mart股票，第四季持續加碼，顯示看好未來Wal-mart的獲利成長。
波克夏去年第四季大幅加碼的股票，還包括廢棄物處理公司的Public Services，文字儲存媒體的Iron Mountain，和南韓浦項鋼鐵等股票，浦項鋼鐵也是波克夏持股中唯一的鋼鐵股。
波克夏減碼能源、醫療股
巴菲特大幅減碼能源股，卻持續看好鐵路股。過去一直都是巴菲特大量持有的北方柏靈頓鐵路公司，波克夏在二月十二日完成對該公司股權的收購，並納入巴菲特旗下子公司，是不是意味著歐巴馬政府為了振興美國經濟要興建高速鐵路，而讓巴菲特看好鐵路股後市，值得玩味。
波克夏減碼醫療相關廠商的寶鹼公司、嬌生公司、健保福利公司的Wellpoint和UnitedHealth集團，減碼張數從二０五萬股到超過八、九百萬股都有，這可能和歐巴馬總統目前正大幅推動健保改革政策有關。
投資大師索羅斯透過旗下投資公司索羅斯基金公司，在去年第四季加碼ＳＰＤＲ的黃金信託基金ＥＴＦ三七三萬股，ＳＰＤＲ黃金信託基金的持股市值增加到六．七六億美元，是索羅斯基金公司旗下最高市值的持股，比第三季結束時僅持有二五０萬股的數量相比增加超過一倍。
索羅斯增持黃金ＥＴＦ
美元指數從去年十一月底的七四．一七點觸底反彈，目前已經反彈到八０．八四點，這波行情市場普遍以反彈波視之，是否會從反彈變成回升行情目前還很難論斷。索羅斯仍持續看空美元的後市，預期美元在短暫反彈後便會回跌，所以利用美元指數反彈與黃金呈現弱勢格局期間，回頭加碼黃金ＥＴＦ，以因應未來美元可能的貶值與黃金的漲勢。
雖然看空美元後市，但索羅斯卻看好美國金融股表現，利用去年第四季花旗銀行股價回檔時，大幅加碼九四七０萬股，讓該基金公司持有花旗銀行的持股市值上揚到三．二四億美元，是索羅斯基金公司第二大持股市值。去年第三季結束時，索羅斯基金公司並未持有花旗銀行的股票。
加碼金融股有志一同
索羅斯基金公司同時加碼ＳＰＤＲ的金融信託基金一一九八萬股，持股市值也上揚到一．七四億美元。不僅索羅斯看好美國金融股後市，這和波克夏去年第四季持續加碼富國銀行股票的情況雷同。在金融海嘯放空大賺二００億美元的華爾街避險基金經理人鮑爾森和明迪奇，也都在去年第四季透過旗下對沖基金買進五億股的花旗銀行股票。市場分析師認為，從巴菲特、索羅斯和其他知名基金經理人透過旗下投資公司買進金融股股票，凸顯美國金融股已經走出金融風暴的陰霾，長期投資金融股未來有利可圖。
索羅斯基金公司去年第四季增加持有全球最大種子與農藥公司孟山都持股二七五萬股，總股數增加到將近三九０萬股，持股市值也上揚到三．０二億美元。有別於巴菲特減碼醫藥股，索羅斯基金公司去年第四季增加輝瑞藥廠九０九萬股，加碼幅度相對偏多，持股市值增加到二．０八億美元。再者，索羅斯加碼綜合性能源開發商Suncor能源公司，並增加持股四五二萬股，這也和巴菲特大砍能源股的操作策略不同。
投資豈能無所求？
話說日前在一次演講會後，我碰到個慈眉善目的太太，拉著我，悄悄問了個問題：「我們投資股票，一定是有所求的，這樣以有所求的心態來投資股市，好嗎？對嗎？不會有煩惱嗎？」
嘿！這位朋友真是說中了許多良善投資人的大問題。
許許多多有宗教信仰的人，不論是學佛的、信基督的、一貫道的、法輪功的與回教徒等等，內心都會有一個想法，人生應該越單純越好，何必去股票市場裡攪動那一團渾水，去祈求那自私自利的金錢回報，最後卻換來一場虛空呢？
嘿！誰說宗教有禁絕人們去賺取正當財富呢？任何一個宗教的經典，都沒告訴我們，不該正當營生吧？所以，以有所求之心去賺取錢財，有何不對呢？
我多年來不斷的寫文章、分享正確的投資觀念，正是想要幫助這群在社會上兢兢業業工作，但卻常不善理財的一群善良人。我很希望這些朋友能與時俱進，內心不但要有正確信仰之餘，在投資理財的領域裡，也請down-load一套正確的理財觀念，以正確的有所求之心來創造個人應得的財富。
正確的有所求之心是什麼呢？
我認為是既能獨善其身，又能兼善天下的錢財。
當股市跌至谷底時，眾股民們哀號遍野，企業家因股價重挫而對公司經營哀愁不已時，投資人如果能以有所求之心，拿出一筆錢來，好好幫助這些企業家走出谷底，正是大功德一件。只要投資對象正確，則日後股市上漲，這個投資人能獲得股價價差或股利盈餘的回報，絕對獲利不菲。這個日後回報，一開始絕對是有所求的，不是無所求的。
但個人有所求的小利，若卻也能兼善其他股民、企業家與整個經濟社會，這豈非所求乎大的美事一樁呢？
當然，換個角度來說，當股市眾生都起貪念時，許多人爭相拿著現金要進入股市錦上添花時，一個心地善良的投資人卻不應該起大貪婪心，而應該是順勢拿回應得的利潤，退出這個喧囂的市場，好好享受手握現金之樂。這個現金，是要幫助家人生活更好的現金，也是持盈保泰，以備將來能逢低入市的下一輪投資準備金。
許多良善投資人不明白的道理是，在股票市場上要能立於不敗之地，不是無求，而是無貪。
求，是求一個正確的投資報酬率，一旦預設報酬率已經達到了，則落袋為安，這個有所求的獲利主控權將是落在我手上。
貪，則是隨著眾人的腳步一起執著，所以預設報酬率達到了仍不滿足，總希望再跟著眾人一起去撈一票、賺一把。這個獲利主控權，就因為這一念貪心而不知不覺跑到市場手上了。
沒人能知道股票市場會漲多久的，也沒人知道會跌多深。所以，與其將獲利希望寄託於市場的浮沉，不如寄託於自己的安步當車。
既然要寄託獲利於自己，則必然有所求。一個無所求的人，又何必泛舟而行，冒險到海上打魚呢？
投資絕對要有所求，但「求」字與「貪」字，一線之隔，卻決定了投資層次的高低之別與長期獲利能否保守之別。這個慈眉善目的太太，真的是問了一個好問題，我希望她聽了我的分析後，將能小舟從此去，股海上從此都有豐富的正財收入。
嘿！這位朋友真是說中了許多良善投資人的大問題。
許許多多有宗教信仰的人，不論是學佛的、信基督的、一貫道的、法輪功的與回教徒等等，內心都會有一個想法，人生應該越單純越好，何必去股票市場裡攪動那一團渾水，去祈求那自私自利的金錢回報，最後卻換來一場虛空呢？
嘿！誰說宗教有禁絕人們去賺取正當財富呢？任何一個宗教的經典，都沒告訴我們，不該正當營生吧？所以，以有所求之心去賺取錢財，有何不對呢？
我多年來不斷的寫文章、分享正確的投資觀念，正是想要幫助這群在社會上兢兢業業工作，但卻常不善理財的一群善良人。我很希望這些朋友能與時俱進，內心不但要有正確信仰之餘，在投資理財的領域裡，也請down-load一套正確的理財觀念，以正確的有所求之心來創造個人應得的財富。
正確的有所求之心是什麼呢？
我認為是既能獨善其身，又能兼善天下的錢財。
當股市跌至谷底時，眾股民們哀號遍野，企業家因股價重挫而對公司經營哀愁不已時，投資人如果能以有所求之心，拿出一筆錢來，好好幫助這些企業家走出谷底，正是大功德一件。只要投資對象正確，則日後股市上漲，這個投資人能獲得股價價差或股利盈餘的回報，絕對獲利不菲。這個日後回報，一開始絕對是有所求的，不是無所求的。
但個人有所求的小利，若卻也能兼善其他股民、企業家與整個經濟社會，這豈非所求乎大的美事一樁呢？
當然，換個角度來說，當股市眾生都起貪念時，許多人爭相拿著現金要進入股市錦上添花時，一個心地善良的投資人卻不應該起大貪婪心，而應該是順勢拿回應得的利潤，退出這個喧囂的市場，好好享受手握現金之樂。這個現金，是要幫助家人生活更好的現金，也是持盈保泰，以備將來能逢低入市的下一輪投資準備金。
許多良善投資人不明白的道理是，在股票市場上要能立於不敗之地，不是無求，而是無貪。
求，是求一個正確的投資報酬率，一旦預設報酬率已經達到了，則落袋為安，這個有所求的獲利主控權將是落在我手上。
貪，則是隨著眾人的腳步一起執著，所以預設報酬率達到了仍不滿足，總希望再跟著眾人一起去撈一票、賺一把。這個獲利主控權，就因為這一念貪心而不知不覺跑到市場手上了。
沒人能知道股票市場會漲多久的，也沒人知道會跌多深。所以，與其將獲利希望寄託於市場的浮沉，不如寄託於自己的安步當車。
既然要寄託獲利於自己，則必然有所求。一個無所求的人，又何必泛舟而行，冒險到海上打魚呢？
投資絕對要有所求，但「求」字與「貪」字，一線之隔，卻決定了投資層次的高低之別與長期獲利能否保守之別。這個慈眉善目的太太，真的是問了一個好問題，我希望她聽了我的分析後，將能小舟從此去，股海上從此都有豐富的正財收入。
John Paulson, Carl Icahn, George Soros and Eddie Lampert ups Financial Stocks
John Paulson, Edward Lampert and Carl Icahn were among those who raised their bets on financial stocks during the last three months of 2009, regulatory filings released on Tuesday and last week show.
Large investors are required to report holdings of U.S.-listed equities at the end of each quarter, but not short positions or holdings of other securities like bonds and over-the-counter derivatives contracts. Investors are also allowed to file some holdings on confidential reports if they are trading into or out of a position at the end of a quarter.
The reports, issued by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, are studied by investors for tips on how some of the savviest minds see the investment horizon.
CIT Group Inc, a provider of loans to small businesses and middle market companies, received a vote of confidence from several hedge fund managers for its emergence from bankruptcy in December.
Lampert’s RBS Partners LP reported a holding of 4.5 million shares in CIT as of December 31, and Paulson held 4.4 million shares at the end of the quarter.
CIT appointed John Thain, who helped engineer Merrill Lynch’s sale to Bank of America and then lost his job, as its new chief executive last week.
Paulson, the fund manager who made billions betting against the U.S. housing industry shortly before its collapse, now counts Citigroup and Bank of America among his largest holdings.
In the fourth quarter alone Paulson bought more than 200 million shares in Citi, raising his stake to $1.67 billion from $954 million, or about 8 percent of the fund’s total value.
Large stakes in Citi and Bank of America account for about 11 percent of almost $20 billion Paulson reported.
In the quarter, Paulson’s New York-based firm made fresh bets or raised existing ones on a number of financial firms, from JPMorgan Chase to Marshall & Isley, headquartered in Milwaukee.
Edward Lampert, long considered a savvy investor, has been a long-time holder of Citigroup. In the fourth quarter he significantly raised his stake in the bank to 31.3 million shares from the 18.8 million owned at the end of the third quarter.
Lampert’s Greenwich, Connecticut-based fund firm also placed new bets on Bank of America by buying 453,512 shares. He bought 1.5 million shares of Wells Fargo & Co during the fourth quarter as well.
Billionaire hedge fund manager George Soros also bought almost 95 million shares of Citigroup during the quarter, worth $313 million at year-end. Soros had reported no holdings in the troubled bank at the end of Q3.
Large investors are required to report holdings of U.S.-listed equities at the end of each quarter, but not short positions or holdings of other securities like bonds and over-the-counter derivatives contracts. Investors are also allowed to file some holdings on confidential reports if they are trading into or out of a position at the end of a quarter.
The reports, issued by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, are studied by investors for tips on how some of the savviest minds see the investment horizon.
CIT Group Inc, a provider of loans to small businesses and middle market companies, received a vote of confidence from several hedge fund managers for its emergence from bankruptcy in December.
Lampert’s RBS Partners LP reported a holding of 4.5 million shares in CIT as of December 31, and Paulson held 4.4 million shares at the end of the quarter.
CIT appointed John Thain, who helped engineer Merrill Lynch’s sale to Bank of America and then lost his job, as its new chief executive last week.
Paulson, the fund manager who made billions betting against the U.S. housing industry shortly before its collapse, now counts Citigroup and Bank of America among his largest holdings.
In the fourth quarter alone Paulson bought more than 200 million shares in Citi, raising his stake to $1.67 billion from $954 million, or about 8 percent of the fund’s total value.
Large stakes in Citi and Bank of America account for about 11 percent of almost $20 billion Paulson reported.
In the quarter, Paulson’s New York-based firm made fresh bets or raised existing ones on a number of financial firms, from JPMorgan Chase to Marshall & Isley, headquartered in Milwaukee.
Edward Lampert, long considered a savvy investor, has been a long-time holder of Citigroup. In the fourth quarter he significantly raised his stake in the bank to 31.3 million shares from the 18.8 million owned at the end of the third quarter.
Lampert’s Greenwich, Connecticut-based fund firm also placed new bets on Bank of America by buying 453,512 shares. He bought 1.5 million shares of Wells Fargo & Co during the fourth quarter as well.
Billionaire hedge fund manager George Soros also bought almost 95 million shares of Citigroup during the quarter, worth $313 million at year-end. Soros had reported no holdings in the troubled bank at the end of Q3.
晉身富豪的最後機會 35歲學投資
35 歲是人生分水嶺——35 歲以後想轉職，可能沒公司要你；想生小孩變得很吃力；自由了幾十年，單身的人更懶得嫁娶；沒買房子難免感到壓力；爬樓梯開始喘到不行。最可怕的是，工作應該滿10 年了，但存款數字卻可能讓人感到同情。
35 歲的各種難題，也許都有補救之道，但是只有財富沒辦法走捷徑。調查了周遭朋友一輪，希望什麼時候擁有財富自由，不再被工作壓得喘不過氣來？答案普遍落在50 ? 55 歲。我們知道，投資需要一段時間的複利累積，如果是個收入一般的上班族，想要達到所謂的財富自由，至少要花上15 ?20年。
所以，答案很明顯。35歲之後，生理上的優勢開始往下降，心理上的壓力卻開始往上增加，時間更是現實的提醒：只剩20 年了，如果不把握最後時機好好學投資，想要在55 歲時到處遊山玩水，或是希望妥善照顧家人，隨心所欲享受人生，根本不可能。
最長的青春期 35歲繼續「啃老」
台灣的6 年級生（30 ? 40 歲）不是很早熟、就是很晚熟。早熟的6 年級生，有人危機意識強，從學生時代就急著學習投資賺錢或創業，35 歲時已有千萬身價。但是更多的人則是晚熟一族，因此6年級生也被形容為「青春期最長的一個世代」——因為有超過三分之一的人不結婚，結婚了也不想生小孩，外表看起來遠比實際年輕，父母還健在，甚至還供應吃住，心態上仍把自己當個大孩子，沒什麼責任感，所以經常被形容為「啃老族」或「尼特族」（指無所事事的年輕人）。
但是同樣的世代，在一切向「錢」看的中國社會，卻是另一種景況。根據統計，中國擁有100 萬美元資產以上的富人，平均年齡僅34 歲，換句話說，這群人在35 歲之前已經取得富豪門票；而資產在1000 萬美元以上的富豪，平均年齡僅39 歲。中國的崛起，和人民追求財富的企圖心密不可分。
其實只要懷抱企圖心，35歲才開始想學投資並不晚，因為比起社會新鮮人，應該已經有機會存下第1 桶金在手，這第1 桶金的複利威力無窮。而就算還沒有第1 桶金，只要願意開始，都還來得及當上富豪。再晚，恐怕就只能平庸過一生。
大環境給壓力 35歲變成關卡
即使自己不給壓力，外在大環境也會很自然的讓人感覺35歲是個「關卡」。
根據人力銀行調查，近幾年經濟不景氣，不但新鮮人起薪到退回10 年前水準，失業率逐年攀升，許多企業更表示，錄用一般員工的年齡上限平均僅38歲，高達4成6的企業將上限定在35歲以下。如果35 歲前沒有在職場上站穩一席之地，隨著年齡漸長，要面對競爭力下降的問題，甚至淪為「窮忙族」，很忙，但很窮。
35歲也是離開固定職，出走創業的高峰期。經濟部中小企業處創業諮詢服務中心統計過，創業者平均年齡層介於31 ? 35 歲之間；美國哈佛商學院也做過調查，能夠建立高潛力企業的創業者，平均年齡就落在35歲。
此外，35歲同樣是生理與心理的關卡。根據醫學統計，大家知道女性過35 歲就是高齡產婦，台中榮總婦產部生殖醫學科主任陳明哲強調，男性也一樣。過了35 歲還想「做人」，精子已經開始有稀少和游不動的跡象，身體會自動發出提醒：「快喔，你要老化了。」
而荷蘭菲力普斯健康福祉中心最近剛做完研究，結果發現，35 歲的受訪者中，將近80% 擔心經濟狀況，75% 有健康保險方面的煩惱，這些壓力使原本40 歲才該有的中年危機，提前在35 歲到來。也就是現代人壽命雖長，卻又流失了5年的「青春」。
中年想過得好 35歲時要突破
星座專家星星王子表示，就星象的角度來看，35 歲會感到「該做什麼突破」的壓力，確實事出有因。「在星座命盤中，每隔12 年是一個大轉折，所以24 歲、36 歲、48 歲是關鍵數字。青年時代想過得好，要看24 歲時做到了什麼；中年時代想過得好，要看36 歲時做到了什麼；晚年時代想過的好，是看48歲時做到了什麼。」
在36 歲轉折年來臨之前，35 歲的人會不由自主感覺躁動，因為若沒在此時準備好、或是突破原來的窠臼，那中年時代可能就很普通了。這樣的說法，與日本管理學大師大前研一在《後50 歲的選擇》這本書中，描繪的如出一轍。
大前研一主要是針對日本高齡化社會來臨，大量人口年齡已經來到50 歲，之後還有很長的歲月要過，該怎麼過得精彩、甚至再度創造高峰？提出必須要看35 歲到50 歲之間，是否做出突破和創新的看法。根據大前延一的說法，35 歲到50 歲這15年，稱之為「魔?時期」。
這「魔?時期」中，習慣用傳統模式上班、過生活，卻無法創新的人，到了50 歲會發覺沒有任何成就，不知要怎麼面對剩下約30年的歲月。
累積財富亦是如此！願意開始的人，將享有財富不斷累加的「魔?時期」，等你到50 歲的時候，會發現可以達到的成果、可以享受的事物，遠比年輕時多太多。
如果35歲時有100萬元，假設每年報酬率20%，22 年後就能達到5000 萬元；如果35 歲時有300 萬元，同樣以每年報酬率20% 計算，20 年後就能有1 億元；如果35 歲時什麼積蓄都沒有，報酬率也不敢要求這麼高，沒關係，只要願意每個月扣3 萬元，每年報酬率有9%，20年後也有2000萬元。
提高財富自覺 搶領富豪門票
再從置產來看，由於房價拼命漲，全台灣的平均購屋年齡已是往上提高的趨勢，2008 年全台平均購屋年齡37.7歲，台北市為39.2歲，比起上一代多半工作幾年就買房，現在35 歲買得起房子的人，已愈來愈少。
我們要闡述的，不是一個「愈來愈難致富」的現象，相反的，我們認為現代人並非缺乏累積財富的能力，而是因為從小生活較優渥，比上一輩缺少累積財富的動力，最後輸給了時間。
後續篇章有侯秀靜、陳揚明、陳聖儀3 人的現身說法，他們開始學投資的時間，都超過35 歲，陳聖儀甚至遲至46 歲才開始投資，但是憑著工作、投資雙管齊下的努力，有人退休時，累積資產已經達到1.5億元！
他們的故事，想必能帶給讀者許多啟發與鼓勵，35歲開始學投資，有錢人俱樂部的最後門票等著發給你。如果超過35 歲的人也不需要氣餒，就算不當富豪，也絕對有機會達到安穩退休的門檻。
你，35歲了嗎？走吧，一起去領門票！
35 歲的各種難題，也許都有補救之道，但是只有財富沒辦法走捷徑。調查了周遭朋友一輪，希望什麼時候擁有財富自由，不再被工作壓得喘不過氣來？答案普遍落在50 ? 55 歲。我們知道，投資需要一段時間的複利累積，如果是個收入一般的上班族，想要達到所謂的財富自由，至少要花上15 ?20年。
所以，答案很明顯。35歲之後，生理上的優勢開始往下降，心理上的壓力卻開始往上增加，時間更是現實的提醒：只剩20 年了，如果不把握最後時機好好學投資，想要在55 歲時到處遊山玩水，或是希望妥善照顧家人，隨心所欲享受人生，根本不可能。
最長的青春期 35歲繼續「啃老」
台灣的6 年級生（30 ? 40 歲）不是很早熟、就是很晚熟。早熟的6 年級生，有人危機意識強，從學生時代就急著學習投資賺錢或創業，35 歲時已有千萬身價。但是更多的人則是晚熟一族，因此6年級生也被形容為「青春期最長的一個世代」——因為有超過三分之一的人不結婚，結婚了也不想生小孩，外表看起來遠比實際年輕，父母還健在，甚至還供應吃住，心態上仍把自己當個大孩子，沒什麼責任感，所以經常被形容為「啃老族」或「尼特族」（指無所事事的年輕人）。
但是同樣的世代，在一切向「錢」看的中國社會，卻是另一種景況。根據統計，中國擁有100 萬美元資產以上的富人，平均年齡僅34 歲，換句話說，這群人在35 歲之前已經取得富豪門票；而資產在1000 萬美元以上的富豪，平均年齡僅39 歲。中國的崛起，和人民追求財富的企圖心密不可分。
其實只要懷抱企圖心，35歲才開始想學投資並不晚，因為比起社會新鮮人，應該已經有機會存下第1 桶金在手，這第1 桶金的複利威力無窮。而就算還沒有第1 桶金，只要願意開始，都還來得及當上富豪。再晚，恐怕就只能平庸過一生。
大環境給壓力 35歲變成關卡
即使自己不給壓力，外在大環境也會很自然的讓人感覺35歲是個「關卡」。
根據人力銀行調查，近幾年經濟不景氣，不但新鮮人起薪到退回10 年前水準，失業率逐年攀升，許多企業更表示，錄用一般員工的年齡上限平均僅38歲，高達4成6的企業將上限定在35歲以下。如果35 歲前沒有在職場上站穩一席之地，隨著年齡漸長，要面對競爭力下降的問題，甚至淪為「窮忙族」，很忙，但很窮。
35歲也是離開固定職，出走創業的高峰期。經濟部中小企業處創業諮詢服務中心統計過，創業者平均年齡層介於31 ? 35 歲之間；美國哈佛商學院也做過調查，能夠建立高潛力企業的創業者，平均年齡就落在35歲。
此外，35歲同樣是生理與心理的關卡。根據醫學統計，大家知道女性過35 歲就是高齡產婦，台中榮總婦產部生殖醫學科主任陳明哲強調，男性也一樣。過了35 歲還想「做人」，精子已經開始有稀少和游不動的跡象，身體會自動發出提醒：「快喔，你要老化了。」
而荷蘭菲力普斯健康福祉中心最近剛做完研究，結果發現，35 歲的受訪者中，將近80% 擔心經濟狀況，75% 有健康保險方面的煩惱，這些壓力使原本40 歲才該有的中年危機，提前在35 歲到來。也就是現代人壽命雖長，卻又流失了5年的「青春」。
中年想過得好 35歲時要突破
星座專家星星王子表示，就星象的角度來看，35 歲會感到「該做什麼突破」的壓力，確實事出有因。「在星座命盤中，每隔12 年是一個大轉折，所以24 歲、36 歲、48 歲是關鍵數字。青年時代想過得好，要看24 歲時做到了什麼；中年時代想過得好，要看36 歲時做到了什麼；晚年時代想過的好，是看48歲時做到了什麼。」
在36 歲轉折年來臨之前，35 歲的人會不由自主感覺躁動，因為若沒在此時準備好、或是突破原來的窠臼，那中年時代可能就很普通了。這樣的說法，與日本管理學大師大前研一在《後50 歲的選擇》這本書中，描繪的如出一轍。
大前研一主要是針對日本高齡化社會來臨，大量人口年齡已經來到50 歲，之後還有很長的歲月要過，該怎麼過得精彩、甚至再度創造高峰？提出必須要看35 歲到50 歲之間，是否做出突破和創新的看法。根據大前延一的說法，35 歲到50 歲這15年，稱之為「魔?時期」。
這「魔?時期」中，習慣用傳統模式上班、過生活，卻無法創新的人，到了50 歲會發覺沒有任何成就，不知要怎麼面對剩下約30年的歲月。
累積財富亦是如此！願意開始的人，將享有財富不斷累加的「魔?時期」，等你到50 歲的時候，會發現可以達到的成果、可以享受的事物，遠比年輕時多太多。
如果35歲時有100萬元，假設每年報酬率20%，22 年後就能達到5000 萬元；如果35 歲時有300 萬元，同樣以每年報酬率20% 計算，20 年後就能有1 億元；如果35 歲時什麼積蓄都沒有，報酬率也不敢要求這麼高，沒關係，只要願意每個月扣3 萬元，每年報酬率有9%，20年後也有2000萬元。
提高財富自覺 搶領富豪門票
再從置產來看，由於房價拼命漲，全台灣的平均購屋年齡已是往上提高的趨勢，2008 年全台平均購屋年齡37.7歲，台北市為39.2歲，比起上一代多半工作幾年就買房，現在35 歲買得起房子的人，已愈來愈少。
我們要闡述的，不是一個「愈來愈難致富」的現象，相反的，我們認為現代人並非缺乏累積財富的能力，而是因為從小生活較優渥，比上一輩缺少累積財富的動力，最後輸給了時間。
後續篇章有侯秀靜、陳揚明、陳聖儀3 人的現身說法，他們開始學投資的時間，都超過35 歲，陳聖儀甚至遲至46 歲才開始投資，但是憑著工作、投資雙管齊下的努力，有人退休時，累積資產已經達到1.5億元！
他們的故事，想必能帶給讀者許多啟發與鼓勵，35歲開始學投資，有錢人俱樂部的最後門票等著發給你。如果超過35 歲的人也不需要氣餒，就算不當富豪，也絕對有機會達到安穩退休的門檻。
你，35歲了嗎？走吧，一起去領門票！
Rules That Warren Buffett Lives By
Warren Buffett is arguably the world's greatest stock investor. He's also a bit of a philosopher. He pares down his investment ideas into simple, memorable sound bites. Do you know what his homespun sayings really mean? Does his philosophy hold up in today's difficult environment? Find out below.
"Rule No. 1: Never Lose Money. Rule No. 2: Never Forget Rule No. 1."
Buffett personally lost about $23 billion in the financial crisis of 2008, and his company, Berkshire Hathaway, lost its revered AAA ratings. So how can he tell us to never lose money?
He's referring to the mindset of a sensible investor. Don't be frivolous. Don't gamble. Don't go into an investment with a cavalier attitude that it's OK to lose. Be informed. Do your homework. Buffett invests only in companies he thoroughly researches and understands. He doesn't go into an investment prepared to lose, and neither should you.
Buffett believes the most important quality for an investor is temperament, not intellect. A successful investor doesn't focus on being with or against the crowd.
The stock market will swing up and down. But in good times and bad, Buffett stays focused on his goals. So should we. (This esteemed investor rarely changes his long-term investing strategy no matter what the market does.
"If The Business Does Well, the Stock Eventually Follows"
The Intelligent Investor by Benjamin Graham convinced Buffett that investing in a stock equates to owning a piece of the business. So when he searches for a stock to invest in, Buffett seeks out businesses that exhibit favorable long-term prospects. Does the company have a consistent operating history? Does it have a dominant business franchise? Is the business generating high and sustainable profit margins? If the company's share price is trading below expectations for its future growth, then it's a stock Buffett may want to own.
Buffett never buys anything unless he can write down his reasons why he'll pay a specific price per share for a particular company. Do you do the same?
"It's Far Better to Buy a Wonderful Company at a Fair Price Than a Fair Company at a Wonderful Price"
Buffett is a value investor who likes to buy quality stocks at rock-bottom prices. His real goal is to build more and more operating power for Berkshire Hathaway by owning stocks that will generate solid profits and capital appreciation for years to come. When the markets reeled during the recent financial crisis, Buffett was stockpiling great long-term investments by investing billions in names like General Electric and Goldman Sachs.
To pick stocks well, investors must set down criteria for uncovering good businesses, and stick to their discipline. You might, for example, seek companies that offer a durable product or service and also have solid operating earnings and the germ for future profits. You might establish a minimum market capitalization you're willing to accept, and a maximum P/E ratio or debt level. Finding the right company at the right price -- with a margin for safety against unknown market risk -- is the ultimate goal.
Remember, the price you pay for a stock isn't the same as the value you get. Successful investors know the difference.
"Our Favorite Holding Period Is Forever"
How long should you hold a stock? Buffett says if you don't feel comfortable owning a stock for 10 years, you shouldn't own it for 10 minutes. Even during the period he called the "Financial Pearl Harbor," Buffett loyally held on to the bulk of his portfolio.
Unless a company has suffered a sea change in prospects, such as impossible labor problems or product obsolescence, a long holding period will keep an investor from acting too human. That is, being too fearful or too greedy can cause investors to sell stocks at the bottom or buy at the peak -- and destroy portfolio appreciation for the long run.
You may think the recent financial meltdown changed things, but don't be fooled: those unfussy sayings from the Oracle of Omaha still RULE!
"Rule No. 1: Never Lose Money. Rule No. 2: Never Forget Rule No. 1."
Buffett personally lost about $23 billion in the financial crisis of 2008, and his company, Berkshire Hathaway, lost its revered AAA ratings. So how can he tell us to never lose money?
He's referring to the mindset of a sensible investor. Don't be frivolous. Don't gamble. Don't go into an investment with a cavalier attitude that it's OK to lose. Be informed. Do your homework. Buffett invests only in companies he thoroughly researches and understands. He doesn't go into an investment prepared to lose, and neither should you.
Buffett believes the most important quality for an investor is temperament, not intellect. A successful investor doesn't focus on being with or against the crowd.
The stock market will swing up and down. But in good times and bad, Buffett stays focused on his goals. So should we. (This esteemed investor rarely changes his long-term investing strategy no matter what the market does.
"If The Business Does Well, the Stock Eventually Follows"
The Intelligent Investor by Benjamin Graham convinced Buffett that investing in a stock equates to owning a piece of the business. So when he searches for a stock to invest in, Buffett seeks out businesses that exhibit favorable long-term prospects. Does the company have a consistent operating history? Does it have a dominant business franchise? Is the business generating high and sustainable profit margins? If the company's share price is trading below expectations for its future growth, then it's a stock Buffett may want to own.
Buffett never buys anything unless he can write down his reasons why he'll pay a specific price per share for a particular company. Do you do the same?
"It's Far Better to Buy a Wonderful Company at a Fair Price Than a Fair Company at a Wonderful Price"
Buffett is a value investor who likes to buy quality stocks at rock-bottom prices. His real goal is to build more and more operating power for Berkshire Hathaway by owning stocks that will generate solid profits and capital appreciation for years to come. When the markets reeled during the recent financial crisis, Buffett was stockpiling great long-term investments by investing billions in names like General Electric and Goldman Sachs.
To pick stocks well, investors must set down criteria for uncovering good businesses, and stick to their discipline. You might, for example, seek companies that offer a durable product or service and also have solid operating earnings and the germ for future profits. You might establish a minimum market capitalization you're willing to accept, and a maximum P/E ratio or debt level. Finding the right company at the right price -- with a margin for safety against unknown market risk -- is the ultimate goal.
Remember, the price you pay for a stock isn't the same as the value you get. Successful investors know the difference.
"Our Favorite Holding Period Is Forever"
How long should you hold a stock? Buffett says if you don't feel comfortable owning a stock for 10 years, you shouldn't own it for 10 minutes. Even during the period he called the "Financial Pearl Harbor," Buffett loyally held on to the bulk of his portfolio.
Unless a company has suffered a sea change in prospects, such as impossible labor problems or product obsolescence, a long holding period will keep an investor from acting too human. That is, being too fearful or too greedy can cause investors to sell stocks at the bottom or buy at the peak -- and destroy portfolio appreciation for the long run.
You may think the recent financial meltdown changed things, but don't be fooled: those unfussy sayings from the Oracle of Omaha still RULE!
Think Like Warren Buffett
Back in 1999, Robert G. Hagstrom wrote a book about the legendary investor Warren Buffett, entitled "The Warren Buffett Portfolio". What's so great about the book, and what makes it different from the countless other books and articles written about the "Oracle of Omaha" is that it offers the reader valuable insight into how Buffett actually thinks about investments. In other words, the book delves into the psychological mindset that has made Buffett so fabulously wealthy.
Although investors could benefit from reading the entire book, we've selected a bite-sized sampling of the tips and suggestions regarding the investor mindset and ways that an investor can improve their stock selection that will help you get inside Buffett's head.
1. Think of Stocks as a Business
Many investors think of stocks and the stock market in general as nothing more than little pieces of paper being traded back and forth among investors, which might help prevent investors from becoming too emotional over a given position but it doesn't necessarily allow them to make the best possible investment decisions.
That's why Buffett has stated he believes stockholders should think of themselves as "part owners" of the business in which they are investing. By thinking that way, both Hagstrom and Buffett argue that investors will tend to avoid making off-the-cuff investment decisions, and become more focused on the longer term. Furthermore, longer-term "owners" also tend to analyze situations in greater detail and then put a great eal of thought into buy and sell decisions. Hagstrom says this increased thought and analysis tends to lead to improved investment returns.
2. Increase the Size of Your Investment
While it rarely - if ever - makes sense for investors to "put all of their eggs in one basket," putting all your eggs in too many baskets may not be a good thing either. Buffett contends that over-diversification can hamper returns as much as a lack of diversification. That's why he doesn't invest in mutual funds. It's also why he prefers to make significant investments in just a handful of companies.
Buffett is a firm believer that an investor must first do his or her homework before investing in any security. But after that due diligence process is completed, an investor should feel comfortable enough to dedicate a sizable portion of assets to that stock. They should also feel comfortable in winnowing down their overall investment portfolio to a handful of good companies with excellent growth prospects.
Buffett's stance on taking time to properly allocate your funds is furthered with his comment that it's not just about the best company, but how you feel about the company. If the best business you own presents the least financial risk and has the most favorable long-term prospects, why would you put money into your 20th favorite business rather than add money to the top choices?
3. Reduce Portfolio Turnover
Rapidly trading in and out of stocks can potentially make an individual a lot of money, but according to Buffett this trader is actually hampering his or her investment returns. That's because portfolio turnover increases the amount of taxes that must be paid on capital gains and boosts the total amount of commission dollars that must be paid in a given year.
The "Oracle" contends that what makes sense in business also makes sense in stocks: An investor should ordinarily hold a small piece of an outstanding business with the same tenacity that an owner would exhibit if he owned all of that business.
Investors must think long term. By having that mindset, they can avoid paying huge commission fees and lofty short-term capital gains taxes. They'll also be more apt to ride out any short-term fluctuations in the business, and to ultimately reap the rewards of increased earnings and/or dividends over time.
4. Develop Alternative Benchmarks
While stock prices may be the ultimate barometer of the success or failure of a given investment choice, Buffett does not focus on this metric. Instead, he analyzes and pores over the underlying economics of a given business or group of businesses. If a company is doing what it takes to grow itself on a profitable basis, then the share price will ultimately take care of itself.
Successful investors must look at the companies they own and study their true earnings potential. If the fundamentals are solid and the company is enhancing shareholder value by generating consistent bottom-line growth, the share price, in the long term, should reflect that.
5. Learn to Think in Probabilities
Bridge is a card game in which the most successful players are able to judge mathematical probabilities to beat their opponents. Perhaps not surprisingly, Buffett loves and actively plays the game, and he takes the strategies beyond the game into the investing world.
Buffett suggests that investors focus on the economics of the companies they own (in other words the underlying businesses), and then try to weigh the probability that certain events will or will not transpire, much like a Bridge player checking the probabilities of his opponents' hands. He adds that by focusing on the economic aspect of the equation and not the stock price, an investor will be more accurate in his or her ability to judge probability.
Thinking in probabilities has its advantages. For example, an investor that ponders the probability that a company will report a certain rate of earnings growth over a period of five or 10 years is much more apt to ride out short-term fluctuations in the share price. By extension, this means that his investment returns are likely to be superior and that he will also realize fewer transaction and/or capital gains costs.
6. Recognize the Psychological Aspects of Investing
Very simply, this means that individuals must understand that there is a psychological mindset that the successful investor tends to have. More specifically, the successful investor will focus on probabilities and economic issues and let decisions be ruled by rational, as opposed to emotional, thinking.
More than anything, investors' own emotions can be their worst enemy. Buffett contends that the key to overcoming emotions is being able to "retain your belief in the real fundamentals of the business and to not get too concerned about the stock market."
Investors should realize that there is a certain psychological mindset that they should have if they want to be successful and try to implement that mindset.
7. Ignore Market Forecasts
There is an old saying that the Dow "climbs a wall of worry". In other words, in spite of the negativity in the marketplace, and those who perpetually contend that a recession is "just around the corner", the markets have fared quite well over time. Therefore, doomsayers should be ignored.
On the other side of the coin, there are just as many eternal optimists who argue that the stock market is headed perpetually higher. These should be ignored as well.
In all this confusion, Buffett suggests that investors should focus their efforts of isolating and investing in shares that are not currently being accurately valued by the market. The logic here is that as the stock market begins to realize the company's intrinsic value (through higher prices and greater demand), the investor will stand to make a lot of money.
8. Wait for the Fat Pitch
Hagstrom's book uses the model of legendary baseball player Ted Williams as an example of a wise investor. Williams would wait for a specific pitch (in an area of the plate where he knew he had a high probability of making contact with the ball) before swinging. It is said that this discipline enabled Williams to have a higher lifetime batting average than the average player.
Buffett, in the same way, suggests that all investors act as if they owned a lifetime decision card with only 20 investment choice punches in it. The logic is that this should prevent them from making mediocre investment choices and hopefully, by extension, enhance the overall returns of their respective portfolios.
Bottom Line
"The Warren Buffett Portfolio" is a timeless book that offers valuable insight into the psychological mindset of the legendary investor Warren Buffett. Of course, if learning how to invest like Warren Buffett were as easy as reading a book, everyone would be rich! But if you take that time and effort to implement some of Buffett's proven strategies, you could be on your way to better stock selection and greater returns.
Although investors could benefit from reading the entire book, we've selected a bite-sized sampling of the tips and suggestions regarding the investor mindset and ways that an investor can improve their stock selection that will help you get inside Buffett's head.
1. Think of Stocks as a Business
Many investors think of stocks and the stock market in general as nothing more than little pieces of paper being traded back and forth among investors, which might help prevent investors from becoming too emotional over a given position but it doesn't necessarily allow them to make the best possible investment decisions.
That's why Buffett has stated he believes stockholders should think of themselves as "part owners" of the business in which they are investing. By thinking that way, both Hagstrom and Buffett argue that investors will tend to avoid making off-the-cuff investment decisions, and become more focused on the longer term. Furthermore, longer-term "owners" also tend to analyze situations in greater detail and then put a great eal of thought into buy and sell decisions. Hagstrom says this increased thought and analysis tends to lead to improved investment returns.
2. Increase the Size of Your Investment
While it rarely - if ever - makes sense for investors to "put all of their eggs in one basket," putting all your eggs in too many baskets may not be a good thing either. Buffett contends that over-diversification can hamper returns as much as a lack of diversification. That's why he doesn't invest in mutual funds. It's also why he prefers to make significant investments in just a handful of companies.
Buffett is a firm believer that an investor must first do his or her homework before investing in any security. But after that due diligence process is completed, an investor should feel comfortable enough to dedicate a sizable portion of assets to that stock. They should also feel comfortable in winnowing down their overall investment portfolio to a handful of good companies with excellent growth prospects.
Buffett's stance on taking time to properly allocate your funds is furthered with his comment that it's not just about the best company, but how you feel about the company. If the best business you own presents the least financial risk and has the most favorable long-term prospects, why would you put money into your 20th favorite business rather than add money to the top choices?
3. Reduce Portfolio Turnover
Rapidly trading in and out of stocks can potentially make an individual a lot of money, but according to Buffett this trader is actually hampering his or her investment returns. That's because portfolio turnover increases the amount of taxes that must be paid on capital gains and boosts the total amount of commission dollars that must be paid in a given year.
The "Oracle" contends that what makes sense in business also makes sense in stocks: An investor should ordinarily hold a small piece of an outstanding business with the same tenacity that an owner would exhibit if he owned all of that business.
Investors must think long term. By having that mindset, they can avoid paying huge commission fees and lofty short-term capital gains taxes. They'll also be more apt to ride out any short-term fluctuations in the business, and to ultimately reap the rewards of increased earnings and/or dividends over time.
4. Develop Alternative Benchmarks
While stock prices may be the ultimate barometer of the success or failure of a given investment choice, Buffett does not focus on this metric. Instead, he analyzes and pores over the underlying economics of a given business or group of businesses. If a company is doing what it takes to grow itself on a profitable basis, then the share price will ultimately take care of itself.
Successful investors must look at the companies they own and study their true earnings potential. If the fundamentals are solid and the company is enhancing shareholder value by generating consistent bottom-line growth, the share price, in the long term, should reflect that.
5. Learn to Think in Probabilities
Bridge is a card game in which the most successful players are able to judge mathematical probabilities to beat their opponents. Perhaps not surprisingly, Buffett loves and actively plays the game, and he takes the strategies beyond the game into the investing world.
Buffett suggests that investors focus on the economics of the companies they own (in other words the underlying businesses), and then try to weigh the probability that certain events will or will not transpire, much like a Bridge player checking the probabilities of his opponents' hands. He adds that by focusing on the economic aspect of the equation and not the stock price, an investor will be more accurate in his or her ability to judge probability.
Thinking in probabilities has its advantages. For example, an investor that ponders the probability that a company will report a certain rate of earnings growth over a period of five or 10 years is much more apt to ride out short-term fluctuations in the share price. By extension, this means that his investment returns are likely to be superior and that he will also realize fewer transaction and/or capital gains costs.
6. Recognize the Psychological Aspects of Investing
Very simply, this means that individuals must understand that there is a psychological mindset that the successful investor tends to have. More specifically, the successful investor will focus on probabilities and economic issues and let decisions be ruled by rational, as opposed to emotional, thinking.
More than anything, investors' own emotions can be their worst enemy. Buffett contends that the key to overcoming emotions is being able to "retain your belief in the real fundamentals of the business and to not get too concerned about the stock market."
Investors should realize that there is a certain psychological mindset that they should have if they want to be successful and try to implement that mindset.
7. Ignore Market Forecasts
There is an old saying that the Dow "climbs a wall of worry". In other words, in spite of the negativity in the marketplace, and those who perpetually contend that a recession is "just around the corner", the markets have fared quite well over time. Therefore, doomsayers should be ignored.
On the other side of the coin, there are just as many eternal optimists who argue that the stock market is headed perpetually higher. These should be ignored as well.
In all this confusion, Buffett suggests that investors should focus their efforts of isolating and investing in shares that are not currently being accurately valued by the market. The logic here is that as the stock market begins to realize the company's intrinsic value (through higher prices and greater demand), the investor will stand to make a lot of money.
8. Wait for the Fat Pitch
Hagstrom's book uses the model of legendary baseball player Ted Williams as an example of a wise investor. Williams would wait for a specific pitch (in an area of the plate where he knew he had a high probability of making contact with the ball) before swinging. It is said that this discipline enabled Williams to have a higher lifetime batting average than the average player.
Buffett, in the same way, suggests that all investors act as if they owned a lifetime decision card with only 20 investment choice punches in it. The logic is that this should prevent them from making mediocre investment choices and hopefully, by extension, enhance the overall returns of their respective portfolios.
Bottom Line
"The Warren Buffett Portfolio" is a timeless book that offers valuable insight into the psychological mindset of the legendary investor Warren Buffett. Of course, if learning how to invest like Warren Buffett were as easy as reading a book, everyone would be rich! But if you take that time and effort to implement some of Buffett's proven strategies, you could be on your way to better stock selection and greater returns.
Friday, February 26, 2010
高盛与希腊政府对赌合同曝光 曾建议中国救急
虽然市场传闻德国正在考虑要求欧元区政府帮助希腊提供价值200亿-250亿欧元（340亿美元）贷款和担保，德国也将提供20%的援助。但2月20日，德国财长表示，没有具体救助希腊的计划。
这让绵延数月的希腊政府债务危机还将雾里看花——2月16日，欧洲曾开会，给希腊政府债务危机一个月时间周旋。
如果欧洲也不是那么善于遗忘的话，他们或许还曾记得，造成希腊这次可能动摇欧洲的债务危机，正是9年前高盛掀起的那场“影子业务”所赐。
它将不动用高盛资产负债表，仅以一张张合同形式存在的衍生品交易，互换这些希腊债务中获利。
这些本质上就是一份份“对赌合同”。在金融市场发生波动的时候，可能会给高盛集团带来超高的“意外收益”。但是也有可能给高盛带来超高的“意外损失”。
对于高盛来说，这笔新的国家生意似乎志在必得。但对于关系世界时局的公众来说，还有些容易被忽视的细节，对未来中国的选择具有意义。
欧洲影子帝国
2月18日，希腊财政部宣布克里斯特多罗（Petros Christodoulou）将取代帕帕尼科拉乌(Spyros Papanicolaou)成为新的希腊公共债务管理局局长。
这位新上任的“救火队员”迅速引起外界关注，原因是他过去的工作经历里有着一个显赫的名字——高盛。在1998年加入希腊国民银行之前，克里斯特多罗曾为瑞信、高盛以及JP摩根这些国际金融巨头效力。
希腊财政部宣布这次人事调动的时机也很耐人寻味，根据欧盟的要求，希腊政府需要在2月19日之前解释希腊政府和高盛集团之间曾经作出的货币互换交易。
在这场舆论漩涡中，任何一个和高盛沾上关系的欧洲财政官员都被不可避免地接受了舆论的审查。2005年12月底接受任命担任意大利央行行长的德拉吉(Mario Draghi)，也因为曾经是高盛副总裁的身份而遭到了质疑。
在希腊公债局换帅前一天，2月17日，意大利央行发言人不得不为德拉吉辩护，“德拉吉获高盛任命是在高盛与希腊达成互换协议之前，他和这些交易毫无关系。”
但是高盛在这场债务风波中的身份已经掀起波澜。法国、意大利都加入到了希腊人的队伍里，把指责的枪口对准了高盛以及在他们国家身居要位的“高盛毕业生”。
英国的《每日电 信报》甚至刊登文章，表示意大利人已经怀疑高盛才是这个国家的真正统治者——因为意大利前总理罗马诺·普罗迪(Romano Prodi)，央行行长德拉吉，前副财长托诺尼（Massimo Tononi.）都曾经是高盛的员工。
而这一次，正在崛起的中国，出现在高盛和希腊的视线里。
根据《金融时报》的消息，高盛集团首席运营官盖瑞·柯恩于去年11月和今年1月两次前往希腊会见希腊总理乔治·帕潘德里欧和其他希腊高级官员，而他将代表希腊政府向中国政府和中国国家外汇管理局推介大约250亿欧元的希腊债券，希望能依靠中国的资金为希腊解债务之急。
此前高盛曾建议中国银行入股希腊国民银行，并对中投公司也提出过类似的建议。
债务加减法：互换魔术
当希腊债务危机爆发，有席卷欧元区之势时，欧洲才猛然想起9年前高盛在希腊的那笔国家生意。
2001年，希腊加入欧元区之后不久，高盛和希腊政府进行了一系列货币互换协议来帮助希腊掩盖其日益增长的赤字问题。
事实上，希腊并不是唯一一个这么做的国家，意大利也是其中之一。
在2001年至2002年之间，高盛给希腊政府献出了“货币互换”的计策：高盛通过货币掉期交易，替希腊政府借到了数10亿美元。
这个消息并没有对外公布，这个款项也没有列入到希腊的主权债务表上。
从技术层面上说，高盛的这种做法并不违法。希腊政府采取了高盛的建议。但两者间的协议并没有向投资者公布。
根据彭博社对希腊债券发行公开说明书的审查，高盛在给希腊政府安排货币互换交易之后，为希腊政府承销了10次债券发行，但至少6次都未提及该互换事宜。欧盟金融监管机构对此表示一无所知，直到最近才有所了解。
希腊政府只是在2002年之前采用过互换的方法减少债务。就这样时间就静悄悄地过去了，直到最近希腊债务危机爆发，很快希腊政府和高盛当年的协议成为所有人关注的焦点。
影子业务
在做希腊的这笔国家生意时，这项业务也同样难以在高盛的报告中寻觅踪影。
“谁也无法估量这一块处于监管之外的‘影子业务’，会给高盛，以及其它华尔街的其它投行，带来多大的风险。”
这些不动用高盛资产负债表，仅以一张张合同形式存在的衍生品交易，本质上就是一份份“对赌合同”。在金融市场发生波动的时候，可能会给高盛集团带来超高的“意外收益”。但是也有可能给高盛带来超高的“意外损失”。
“其实高盛以及其它投行最大的问题，还在那些非现金的衍生品交易合同上”，一位高盛内部人士这样告诉记者。
仅信用违约互换产品（CDS）一项产品，据衍生品交易游说机构ISBA统计，仅美国市场上CDS名义交易量就已经高达15..5万亿美元之巨。如果按实际交易仅占名义交量额1%估计，实际交易额也高达1550亿美元左右。
这一块“影子业务”所带来的潜在巨大风险或者巨大利润，带给高盛和华尔街大行的，是一个充满不确定性的未来。
作为全球大行，高盛并非只主导了美国的市场。在远在欧洲的希腊，高盛也深深的卷入这场主权债务中。
直至现在，希腊债务危机带来的漩涡里，发现了高盛的影子。
等待中国？
希腊债务危机已经引发欧洲列国复杂的政治较量。
拯救一个国家的支付危机本应是国际货币基金组织。在本轮经济危机中，国际货币基金组织已经为45个深陷危机的国家提供了贷款。但在希腊一案，欧洲大陆国家却强力阻拦国际货币基金组织插手。德国财政部长Wolfgang Schaeuble上周表示：“希腊显然不是国际货币基金组织的问题。”
德国是欧洲最大的经济体和鼎力支持欧盟的国家。希腊危机爆发以后，德国总理默克尔（Angela Markel）俨然担起保护欧元免遭市场狙击的责任。
而欧盟中的非欧元成员国则更愿意看到IMF向希腊伸出援手。瑞典就是其中典型。瑞典财政部长Ander Borg日前针锋相对地指出：“在希腊债务问题上谈IMF不应该被视作禁语。”瑞典至今没有加入欧元区。
让形势变得更加复杂的是法国政局。如今的国际货币基金组织总裁卡恩是法国最受欢迎的政治家之一，被认为有希望在2012年竞选法国总统。他本人曾在2007年法国总统选举中挑战过萨科齐。“如由IMF出手救助希腊，将增加卡恩的政治资本。”路透社驻华盛顿记者Lesley Wroughton写道。
希腊债务危机也牵扯着美国总统的神经。据白宫新闻发言人吉布斯透露，2月16日，奥巴马总统在例行经济工作会议上，要求财政部长盖特纳等人向他汇报了希腊支付危机的最新情况。
吉布斯表示十分支持欧洲对希腊展开救援。
但对于关系世界时局的公众来说，还有些容易被忽视的细节。
2月11日夜晚，雅典虽然仍有寒意，希腊总统帕普利亚斯亲自到中国驻希腊大使官邸做客，与中国朋友一起庆祝中国农历新年。他说，在现在这样一个需要平衡的社会里，他非常看重中国在当今世界上的重要作用。
在希腊债务危局还进行时，这似乎耐人寻味。希腊财政部曾经发表声明，否认试图向中国出售债券。但是，希腊财长乔治·帕帕康斯坦丁同时又表示将在今年2月将率团访问美国和亚洲，并在北京、上海和香港停留。
这让绵延数月的希腊政府债务危机还将雾里看花——2月16日，欧洲曾开会，给希腊政府债务危机一个月时间周旋。
如果欧洲也不是那么善于遗忘的话，他们或许还曾记得，造成希腊这次可能动摇欧洲的债务危机，正是9年前高盛掀起的那场“影子业务”所赐。
它将不动用高盛资产负债表，仅以一张张合同形式存在的衍生品交易，互换这些希腊债务中获利。
这些本质上就是一份份“对赌合同”。在金融市场发生波动的时候，可能会给高盛集团带来超高的“意外收益”。但是也有可能给高盛带来超高的“意外损失”。
对于高盛来说，这笔新的国家生意似乎志在必得。但对于关系世界时局的公众来说，还有些容易被忽视的细节，对未来中国的选择具有意义。
欧洲影子帝国
2月18日，希腊财政部宣布克里斯特多罗（Petros Christodoulou）将取代帕帕尼科拉乌(Spyros Papanicolaou)成为新的希腊公共债务管理局局长。
这位新上任的“救火队员”迅速引起外界关注，原因是他过去的工作经历里有着一个显赫的名字——高盛。在1998年加入希腊国民银行之前，克里斯特多罗曾为瑞信、高盛以及JP摩根这些国际金融巨头效力。
希腊财政部宣布这次人事调动的时机也很耐人寻味，根据欧盟的要求，希腊政府需要在2月19日之前解释希腊政府和高盛集团之间曾经作出的货币互换交易。
在这场舆论漩涡中，任何一个和高盛沾上关系的欧洲财政官员都被不可避免地接受了舆论的审查。2005年12月底接受任命担任意大利央行行长的德拉吉(Mario Draghi)，也因为曾经是高盛副总裁的身份而遭到了质疑。
在希腊公债局换帅前一天，2月17日，意大利央行发言人不得不为德拉吉辩护，“德拉吉获高盛任命是在高盛与希腊达成互换协议之前，他和这些交易毫无关系。”
但是高盛在这场债务风波中的身份已经掀起波澜。法国、意大利都加入到了希腊人的队伍里，把指责的枪口对准了高盛以及在他们国家身居要位的“高盛毕业生”。
英国的《每日电 信报》甚至刊登文章，表示意大利人已经怀疑高盛才是这个国家的真正统治者——因为意大利前总理罗马诺·普罗迪(Romano Prodi)，央行行长德拉吉，前副财长托诺尼（Massimo Tononi.）都曾经是高盛的员工。
而这一次，正在崛起的中国，出现在高盛和希腊的视线里。
根据《金融时报》的消息，高盛集团首席运营官盖瑞·柯恩于去年11月和今年1月两次前往希腊会见希腊总理乔治·帕潘德里欧和其他希腊高级官员，而他将代表希腊政府向中国政府和中国国家外汇管理局推介大约250亿欧元的希腊债券，希望能依靠中国的资金为希腊解债务之急。
此前高盛曾建议中国银行入股希腊国民银行，并对中投公司也提出过类似的建议。
债务加减法：互换魔术
当希腊债务危机爆发，有席卷欧元区之势时，欧洲才猛然想起9年前高盛在希腊的那笔国家生意。
2001年，希腊加入欧元区之后不久，高盛和希腊政府进行了一系列货币互换协议来帮助希腊掩盖其日益增长的赤字问题。
事实上，希腊并不是唯一一个这么做的国家，意大利也是其中之一。
在2001年至2002年之间，高盛给希腊政府献出了“货币互换”的计策：高盛通过货币掉期交易，替希腊政府借到了数10亿美元。
这个消息并没有对外公布，这个款项也没有列入到希腊的主权债务表上。
从技术层面上说，高盛的这种做法并不违法。希腊政府采取了高盛的建议。但两者间的协议并没有向投资者公布。
根据彭博社对希腊债券发行公开说明书的审查，高盛在给希腊政府安排货币互换交易之后，为希腊政府承销了10次债券发行，但至少6次都未提及该互换事宜。欧盟金融监管机构对此表示一无所知，直到最近才有所了解。
希腊政府只是在2002年之前采用过互换的方法减少债务。就这样时间就静悄悄地过去了，直到最近希腊债务危机爆发，很快希腊政府和高盛当年的协议成为所有人关注的焦点。
影子业务
在做希腊的这笔国家生意时，这项业务也同样难以在高盛的报告中寻觅踪影。
“谁也无法估量这一块处于监管之外的‘影子业务’，会给高盛，以及其它华尔街的其它投行，带来多大的风险。”
这些不动用高盛资产负债表，仅以一张张合同形式存在的衍生品交易，本质上就是一份份“对赌合同”。在金融市场发生波动的时候，可能会给高盛集团带来超高的“意外收益”。但是也有可能给高盛带来超高的“意外损失”。
“其实高盛以及其它投行最大的问题，还在那些非现金的衍生品交易合同上”，一位高盛内部人士这样告诉记者。
仅信用违约互换产品（CDS）一项产品，据衍生品交易游说机构ISBA统计，仅美国市场上CDS名义交易量就已经高达15..5万亿美元之巨。如果按实际交易仅占名义交量额1%估计，实际交易额也高达1550亿美元左右。
这一块“影子业务”所带来的潜在巨大风险或者巨大利润，带给高盛和华尔街大行的，是一个充满不确定性的未来。
作为全球大行，高盛并非只主导了美国的市场。在远在欧洲的希腊，高盛也深深的卷入这场主权债务中。
直至现在，希腊债务危机带来的漩涡里，发现了高盛的影子。
等待中国？
希腊债务危机已经引发欧洲列国复杂的政治较量。
拯救一个国家的支付危机本应是国际货币基金组织。在本轮经济危机中，国际货币基金组织已经为45个深陷危机的国家提供了贷款。但在希腊一案，欧洲大陆国家却强力阻拦国际货币基金组织插手。德国财政部长Wolfgang Schaeuble上周表示：“希腊显然不是国际货币基金组织的问题。”
德国是欧洲最大的经济体和鼎力支持欧盟的国家。希腊危机爆发以后，德国总理默克尔（Angela Markel）俨然担起保护欧元免遭市场狙击的责任。
而欧盟中的非欧元成员国则更愿意看到IMF向希腊伸出援手。瑞典就是其中典型。瑞典财政部长Ander Borg日前针锋相对地指出：“在希腊债务问题上谈IMF不应该被视作禁语。”瑞典至今没有加入欧元区。
让形势变得更加复杂的是法国政局。如今的国际货币基金组织总裁卡恩是法国最受欢迎的政治家之一，被认为有希望在2012年竞选法国总统。他本人曾在2007年法国总统选举中挑战过萨科齐。“如由IMF出手救助希腊，将增加卡恩的政治资本。”路透社驻华盛顿记者Lesley Wroughton写道。
希腊债务危机也牵扯着美国总统的神经。据白宫新闻发言人吉布斯透露，2月16日，奥巴马总统在例行经济工作会议上，要求财政部长盖特纳等人向他汇报了希腊支付危机的最新情况。
吉布斯表示十分支持欧洲对希腊展开救援。
但对于关系世界时局的公众来说，还有些容易被忽视的细节。
2月11日夜晚，雅典虽然仍有寒意，希腊总统帕普利亚斯亲自到中国驻希腊大使官邸做客，与中国朋友一起庆祝中国农历新年。他说，在现在这样一个需要平衡的社会里，他非常看重中国在当今世界上的重要作用。
在希腊债务危局还进行时，这似乎耐人寻味。希腊财政部曾经发表声明，否认试图向中国出售债券。但是，希腊财长乔治·帕帕康斯坦丁同时又表示将在今年2月将率团访问美国和亚洲，并在北京、上海和香港停留。
Thursday, February 25, 2010
Barry Ritholtz: Still Bullish After All These Gains
In his semi-annual monetary report to Congress Wednesday, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke reiterated the Fed's plans to keep interest rates low "for an extended period."
Investors responded by buying stocks: the Dow rose 0.9% Wednesday while the S&P and Nasdaq each climbed 1%.
Rallying was the right response, says FusionIQ CEO Barry Ritholtz: "As long as the Fed is going to make money free…it’s hard to find a short."
Though not as bullish as he was last March when he called the market bottom, Ritholtz is sticking with stocks. "The easy thing to do now would be to go to cash," he says, a reference to Robert Precther's recommendation here. "[But] I rarely find that the easy trade is the one that makes you money."
Instead the money manager and blogger has turned more bullish on the emerging market economies that have withstood a weak American economy. His favorites are South Korea, Brazil, Taiwan, and Singapore.
Investors responded by buying stocks: the Dow rose 0.9% Wednesday while the S&P and Nasdaq each climbed 1%.
Rallying was the right response, says FusionIQ CEO Barry Ritholtz: "As long as the Fed is going to make money free…it’s hard to find a short."
Though not as bullish as he was last March when he called the market bottom, Ritholtz is sticking with stocks. "The easy thing to do now would be to go to cash," he says, a reference to Robert Precther's recommendation here. "[But] I rarely find that the easy trade is the one that makes you money."
Instead the money manager and blogger has turned more bullish on the emerging market economies that have withstood a weak American economy. His favorites are South Korea, Brazil, Taiwan, and Singapore.
Wednesday, February 24, 2010
分享集:买油棕股留子孙
股票投资要成功，其中一个主要的因素，是对你所购买的股票，具有充足的信心。
有信心，你才有胆识买进；有信心，你才有胆识在股价大跌，股票价值被严重低估时买进更多，以拉低成本；有信心，你才会进行长期投资，惟有长期投资，才有可能取得丰厚的回酬。
股票企业股份证书
大量买进，股价暴跌时买进更多，加上长期持有，是累积财富的不二法门。
累积财富，使你在退休后财务自主，是投资股票的终极目标；累积财富不能靠投机达致，所以，戒绝投机！
信心，必须来自对有关股票的认识，有认识才有胆识。
对有关股票所代表的企业，有深入的认识，就是对你所持有的股票，有深入的认识。
因为股票就是企业股份的证书，买股票，不是买一张纸，而是购买一项企业的资产和业务，目的在於分享企业的盈利。
投资油棕业2途径
认识企业，必须始於认识有关企业所属的行业。如果这个行业是有前途的，从事这个行业的企业，就有前途。
你选购这个行业中管理良好的企业的股票，就能助你累积财富。
例如你想投资油棕种植业，首先你必须对棕油的前景有基本的认识。
有了认识，才有信心，而信心为成功之母。
投资油棕业，有两条途径。
一条是购买土地，亲力亲为，种植油棕。
作为受薪阶级，不易做到。因为土地难求，即使有，价格不菲，本大利小，不划算。你也没有种植和管理油棕园的知识技术和时间，也分身乏术。
所以，此路不通。
退而求其次，是购买上市油棕股。购买油棕股，就是购买油棕园的股份。
也就是投资於油棕业，惟一不同的是你把油棕园交给别人去管，你不过问，只分享油棕园的利润。
例如你买进IOI集团（IOICorp，1961，主板种植股）的股票，你其实是把油棕园交给丹斯里李深静所率领的团队去管，你不必去烦油棕园的事，只坐而分享利润。
这样，你可以继续做上班族，有固定的薪金收入，又可以分享IOI的盈利（股息），何等轻松写意？
但在买进IOI或其他油棕股之前，你必须做一点功课，认识棕油业。
这样，可以增加你对所持油棕股的信心，有了这份信心，就不会因油棕股价格的波动而担心，情绪不会受到影响，对太太孩子才会常挂笑脸。
棕油资料
要认识一个行业，需从大处着手：这个行业在世界经济中的地位。
让我们看一些有关棕油的资料：
●在2008年，世界植物油脂的总产量为1亿5970万公吨。棕油占4310万公吨，大豆油占3690万公吨，这两种油脂占世界产量的50%。
●棕油在2005年首次超越大豆油，跃居世界植物油脂第一位。
如果把棕仁油计算在内，棕油占世界总产量的30%。
●各国所产棕油，部份供国内消费（作为食油和工业用途），77%供出口，是有关国家的主要外汇来源，包括大马。
用途广市场大
●棕油的用途越来越广，市场在扩大中。
●世界油脂消耗量，25年来，年年增加。在过去5年，平均每年增加4.9%，在此之前的10年，每年增加3.9%。植物燃油采用植物油制造，是过去5年消耗量增长更快的主要原因。
增长在持续中。
●过去10年，世界人均油脂消耗量为
1999：每人18.1公斤。
2008：每人23.7公斤。
将来肯定会消耗得更多。
●人均收入，直接影响人均油脂消耗量，2008年各国油脂消耗量为：
美国：每人每年54公斤。
欧盟：每人每年59公斤。
印度：每人每年13公斤。
中国：每人每年22公斤。
消耗量将跟着人均收入的增加而上升。
●过去10年，世界植物油脂产量增加了56%。
但棕油增产：145%。
棕仁油增产：124%。
大豆油增产：63%。
这是棕油在2005年超越大豆油的原因。
●油棕业发展史：
油棕原产地为非洲。
荷兰人於1840年将4棵油棕苗移植至爪哇茂物植物园，这是油棕首次东渡。当时是作为观赏植物。
1870年，油棕植根於新加坡植物园。
1911年，比利时农业经济学家M. Adrian Hallet在苏门答腊开辟东方第一个油棕园丘。
1911至12年，法国人Henri Fauconnier由苏门答腊运来一批油棕苗，种在通往他在雪兰莪的咖啡园的道路两旁。
1917年，Fauconnier在雪兰莪八丁燕带开辟大马第1个油棕园。
1925年：大马油棕园面积为3,350公顷，第2次世界大战前增至 20,000公顷。
政府积极推广
60年代中期，大马政府积极推动以油棕代替树胶，从此油棕业突飞猛进。
现仍在扩大中。
在2008年时，大马拥有450万公顷油棕园，占大马土地面积的10%。年产量17万7000公吨，60%输往中国、印度、巴基斯坦、欧盟和美国。人口多国家是主要市场，不受经济强国操纵。
●大马油棕业直接雇用57万人，每年创汇500亿令吉。
● 过去40年，世界棕油产量增加近30倍。
1963年：150万公吨。
2008年：4,310万公吨。
在世界植物油总产量中，
1963年：棕油占4%。
2008年：棕油占30%。
棕油股前景亮丽
大马为世界提供了最优良最廉价的植物油，贡献最大。
油棕种植业，是大马一个成功的故事，我们应引以为荣。
作为大马公民，我们理应分享这成功的果实。
购买油棕股，就是购买油棕园。
购买油棕园，就是从事油棕业，就是分享这个黄金作物的成果。
购买油棕股，就是参与一个前途亮丽的行业。
购买油棕园，就是购买土地。
投资於油棕股，就是分享大马肥沃土地的恩赐。
这使我想起一则逸事：
25年前当我在《南洋商报》担任经济组主任的时候，常常出席重要上市公司的常年大会。
记得有一次，我出席哈里逊（牙直利种植公司的年会），该公司董事主席敦莫哈末阿里（即前国家银行总裁，退休后担任PNB主席，PNB控制哈里逊），他在会后举行记者招待会，说过几句话，至今仍不忘。
他说：“购买种植股，锁在保险箱，留给子孙。”
你也可以购买油棕股，分享股息，过有尊严的晚年，股票则不妨留给子孙。
有信心，你才有胆识买进；有信心，你才有胆识在股价大跌，股票价值被严重低估时买进更多，以拉低成本；有信心，你才会进行长期投资，惟有长期投资，才有可能取得丰厚的回酬。
股票企业股份证书
大量买进，股价暴跌时买进更多，加上长期持有，是累积财富的不二法门。
累积财富，使你在退休后财务自主，是投资股票的终极目标；累积财富不能靠投机达致，所以，戒绝投机！
信心，必须来自对有关股票的认识，有认识才有胆识。
对有关股票所代表的企业，有深入的认识，就是对你所持有的股票，有深入的认识。
因为股票就是企业股份的证书，买股票，不是买一张纸，而是购买一项企业的资产和业务，目的在於分享企业的盈利。
投资油棕业2途径
认识企业，必须始於认识有关企业所属的行业。如果这个行业是有前途的，从事这个行业的企业，就有前途。
你选购这个行业中管理良好的企业的股票，就能助你累积财富。
例如你想投资油棕种植业，首先你必须对棕油的前景有基本的认识。
有了认识，才有信心，而信心为成功之母。
投资油棕业，有两条途径。
一条是购买土地，亲力亲为，种植油棕。
作为受薪阶级，不易做到。因为土地难求，即使有，价格不菲，本大利小，不划算。你也没有种植和管理油棕园的知识技术和时间，也分身乏术。
所以，此路不通。
退而求其次，是购买上市油棕股。购买油棕股，就是购买油棕园的股份。
也就是投资於油棕业，惟一不同的是你把油棕园交给别人去管，你不过问，只分享油棕园的利润。
例如你买进IOI集团（IOICorp，1961，主板种植股）的股票，你其实是把油棕园交给丹斯里李深静所率领的团队去管，你不必去烦油棕园的事，只坐而分享利润。
这样，你可以继续做上班族，有固定的薪金收入，又可以分享IOI的盈利（股息），何等轻松写意？
但在买进IOI或其他油棕股之前，你必须做一点功课，认识棕油业。
这样，可以增加你对所持油棕股的信心，有了这份信心，就不会因油棕股价格的波动而担心，情绪不会受到影响，对太太孩子才会常挂笑脸。
棕油资料
要认识一个行业，需从大处着手：这个行业在世界经济中的地位。
让我们看一些有关棕油的资料：
●在2008年，世界植物油脂的总产量为1亿5970万公吨。棕油占4310万公吨，大豆油占3690万公吨，这两种油脂占世界产量的50%。
●棕油在2005年首次超越大豆油，跃居世界植物油脂第一位。
如果把棕仁油计算在内，棕油占世界总产量的30%。
●各国所产棕油，部份供国内消费（作为食油和工业用途），77%供出口，是有关国家的主要外汇来源，包括大马。
用途广市场大
●棕油的用途越来越广，市场在扩大中。
●世界油脂消耗量，25年来，年年增加。在过去5年，平均每年增加4.9%，在此之前的10年，每年增加3.9%。植物燃油采用植物油制造，是过去5年消耗量增长更快的主要原因。
增长在持续中。
●过去10年，世界人均油脂消耗量为
1999：每人18.1公斤。
2008：每人23.7公斤。
将来肯定会消耗得更多。
●人均收入，直接影响人均油脂消耗量，2008年各国油脂消耗量为：
美国：每人每年54公斤。
欧盟：每人每年59公斤。
印度：每人每年13公斤。
中国：每人每年22公斤。
消耗量将跟着人均收入的增加而上升。
●过去10年，世界植物油脂产量增加了56%。
但棕油增产：145%。
棕仁油增产：124%。
大豆油增产：63%。
这是棕油在2005年超越大豆油的原因。
●油棕业发展史：
油棕原产地为非洲。
荷兰人於1840年将4棵油棕苗移植至爪哇茂物植物园，这是油棕首次东渡。当时是作为观赏植物。
1870年，油棕植根於新加坡植物园。
1911年，比利时农业经济学家M. Adrian Hallet在苏门答腊开辟东方第一个油棕园丘。
1911至12年，法国人Henri Fauconnier由苏门答腊运来一批油棕苗，种在通往他在雪兰莪的咖啡园的道路两旁。
1917年，Fauconnier在雪兰莪八丁燕带开辟大马第1个油棕园。
1925年：大马油棕园面积为3,350公顷，第2次世界大战前增至 20,000公顷。
政府积极推广
60年代中期，大马政府积极推动以油棕代替树胶，从此油棕业突飞猛进。
现仍在扩大中。
在2008年时，大马拥有450万公顷油棕园，占大马土地面积的10%。年产量17万7000公吨，60%输往中国、印度、巴基斯坦、欧盟和美国。人口多国家是主要市场，不受经济强国操纵。
●大马油棕业直接雇用57万人，每年创汇500亿令吉。
● 过去40年，世界棕油产量增加近30倍。
1963年：150万公吨。
2008年：4,310万公吨。
在世界植物油总产量中，
1963年：棕油占4%。
2008年：棕油占30%。
棕油股前景亮丽
大马为世界提供了最优良最廉价的植物油，贡献最大。
油棕种植业，是大马一个成功的故事，我们应引以为荣。
作为大马公民，我们理应分享这成功的果实。
购买油棕股，就是购买油棕园。
购买油棕园，就是从事油棕业，就是分享这个黄金作物的成果。
购买油棕股，就是参与一个前途亮丽的行业。
购买油棕园，就是购买土地。
投资於油棕股，就是分享大马肥沃土地的恩赐。
这使我想起一则逸事：
25年前当我在《南洋商报》担任经济组主任的时候，常常出席重要上市公司的常年大会。
记得有一次，我出席哈里逊（牙直利种植公司的年会），该公司董事主席敦莫哈末阿里（即前国家银行总裁，退休后担任PNB主席，PNB控制哈里逊），他在会后举行记者招待会，说过几句话，至今仍不忘。
他说：“购买种植股，锁在保险箱，留给子孙。”
你也可以购买油棕股，分享股息，过有尊严的晚年，股票则不妨留给子孙。
Sunday, February 21, 2010
提升投資組合回報 股息潛力不容忽視
經濟下滑，利率長時間維持在極低水平，投資回報乏善足陳，許多投資者的一個共通問題是，怎樣才能提高投資收入？
說出來大家可能會感到詫異，原來不管市場狀況如何，每年企業向股東派發的股息，總額十分驚人。長線而言，股息有助增加股市的總回報，而實際派發股息的企業，其總回報也會獲得提升。所以，這個經常為人所忽略的財富來源，其實不單是一個穩定的收入來源，長線更扮演著十分重要的角色。
股息來自企業盈利，因此可以反映企業的財務狀況，特別是其穩定性和盈利能力的未來潛力。維持派息的企業一般資本結構良好，品牌為人熟知，有能力留著股東，業績也通常穩健和錄得盈利，有長時期保持良好表現的紀錄。
可是，不派息的企業卻不應被視作沒有盈利能力，例如是增長型企業，如果自信有能力改善或擴充業務，它們會選擇將盈利再投資於業務上。
股息的力量
一般來說，股息是能夠帶來穩定收入或增長的來源。除了是收取現金派息外，也可將股息用於再投資，從而穩定增持股份。能夠帶來股息收入的投資，往往有風險較低、回報較高的特質，是值得考慮納入投資策略的一個因素，特別是當市況不景時。在熊市時派發股息或增加定期股息，可就企業的財務狀況和盈利能力，向投資者發出一個正面訊息。
此外，因為派發的股息是來自確實盈利，派發股息的企業，虛構會計紀錄的機會也較低。
警告訊號
如果派息政策突然轉變，則可能預示負面消息。例如，降低股息率可能意味企業出現困難，或者企業估計將出現債務難關。股息率偏低，可能代表企業的增長前景已完全反映於股價，或是管理層不肯定盈利長線能夠維持較高的股息率。
整體回報
從投資角度考慮，股息可以增加投資的總回報。股息對投資組合價值的貢獻，在於它能帶來收入來源，股息也有機會隨著時間遞增，而證券本身的價格也可能會上升。
由於派息投資一般屬於保守型，較增長型投資風險較低，所以有助降低組合的波動幅度。
股息收入另一個好處，是在跌市時有助減低組合承受的衝擊，從而抵銷波動幅度和支持投資增長。在升市時，企業可就著盈利增加而提高派息，令您取得更高回報。企業派發股息，顯示其增長空間，意味財政一般屬穩健。當然，股息和資本增值都是推動長線投資增長的潛在因素。
股息再投資
大家可能都聽過DRIP這個名詞，它其實是股息再投資計劃 (Dividend Reinvestment Program) 的簡稱。要賺取股息，一個簡單的方法，是持有提供股息再投資計劃的派息互惠基金或股份。這個計劃運作簡單，當賺取股息後，收入會用作購買更多的互惠基金單位或股份，這樣一來可以減省交易成本，亦可透過逐步增持而減少在錯誤時機投資的情形。再投資讓您完全體驗複合增長的優點，因為將股息再投資，可以增加持有的基金單位或股份，令將來得到的股息增加，再投資的金額也隨之增加。在這個過程中，您會清楚發現股息複合增長對長線建立財富的重要性。
讓股息收入助您達成願望
許多投資者的目標，是要確保有足夠的財富，以便安心享受豐盛的退休生活。股息收入，是您達成這個理想的一個途徑。股息是穩定的收入來源，如上文提到，它可以幫助您減低投資組合的波動幅度。因此，如果您已經或準備退休，可考慮持有派發股息的投資，從而獲得穩定收入。
不管市況如何，股息都甚具吸引力。當固定收入投資的收益偏低時，股息便尤其顯得吸引。在適當情況下，您可考慮轉持派息投資，藉此提高收入水平。
擴大投資空間
在組合中加入環球股息投資，可藉著地理和行業分散投資而增加潛在回報。加拿大只佔環球經濟一小部分，而且高度集中在三個行業 (能源、原材料及金融)。由於市場極度集中，您不單會錯過全球眾多的增長潛力，而且所承受的風險可能高於您願意接受的水平。
將投資分散至加拿大以外市場，可減少資產集中在單一國家和貨幣及寥寥數個行業的問題。此外，環球派息投資的選擇眾多，它們的增長潛質、回報潛力和派息比率絕對不遜於加拿大本地投資。
當然大家要記著，環球投資涉及外匯風險，如果加元兌某外幣升值，匯率損失可能會抵銷國外投資的部分回報。因此，投資時您可考慮已作貨幣對沖的產品，以減低有關風險。此外，環球股息會被全額徵稅，不會享有加拿大的股息稅優惠，也可能會被徵收預扣稅。
股息有助揭示企業的財政狀況，長線則可提高投資組合的回報。有興趣持有派發股息的投資，方法之一是選擇道明互惠基金 (TD Mutual Funds) 旗下的股息基金，例如道明股息收入基金 (TD Dividend Income Fund) 、道明股息增值基金 (TD Dividend Growth Fund) 、道明環球股息基金 (TD Global Dividend Fund)、道明每月收入基金 (TD Monthly Income Fund)。這些基金一般投資在派發股息的環球企業或其他帶來收入的證券。投資組合經理的焦點，會放在高於平均的股息率，以及預期長線會提高派息的選擇，這樣您也可以同時受惠於派息投資的增長潛力。
說出來大家可能會感到詫異，原來不管市場狀況如何，每年企業向股東派發的股息，總額十分驚人。長線而言，股息有助增加股市的總回報，而實際派發股息的企業，其總回報也會獲得提升。所以，這個經常為人所忽略的財富來源，其實不單是一個穩定的收入來源，長線更扮演著十分重要的角色。
股息來自企業盈利，因此可以反映企業的財務狀況，特別是其穩定性和盈利能力的未來潛力。維持派息的企業一般資本結構良好，品牌為人熟知，有能力留著股東，業績也通常穩健和錄得盈利，有長時期保持良好表現的紀錄。
可是，不派息的企業卻不應被視作沒有盈利能力，例如是增長型企業，如果自信有能力改善或擴充業務，它們會選擇將盈利再投資於業務上。
股息的力量
一般來說，股息是能夠帶來穩定收入或增長的來源。除了是收取現金派息外，也可將股息用於再投資，從而穩定增持股份。能夠帶來股息收入的投資，往往有風險較低、回報較高的特質，是值得考慮納入投資策略的一個因素，特別是當市況不景時。在熊市時派發股息或增加定期股息，可就企業的財務狀況和盈利能力，向投資者發出一個正面訊息。
此外，因為派發的股息是來自確實盈利，派發股息的企業，虛構會計紀錄的機會也較低。
警告訊號
如果派息政策突然轉變，則可能預示負面消息。例如，降低股息率可能意味企業出現困難，或者企業估計將出現債務難關。股息率偏低，可能代表企業的增長前景已完全反映於股價，或是管理層不肯定盈利長線能夠維持較高的股息率。
整體回報
從投資角度考慮，股息可以增加投資的總回報。股息對投資組合價值的貢獻，在於它能帶來收入來源，股息也有機會隨著時間遞增，而證券本身的價格也可能會上升。
由於派息投資一般屬於保守型，較增長型投資風險較低，所以有助降低組合的波動幅度。
股息收入另一個好處，是在跌市時有助減低組合承受的衝擊，從而抵銷波動幅度和支持投資增長。在升市時，企業可就著盈利增加而提高派息，令您取得更高回報。企業派發股息，顯示其增長空間，意味財政一般屬穩健。當然，股息和資本增值都是推動長線投資增長的潛在因素。
股息再投資
大家可能都聽過DRIP這個名詞，它其實是股息再投資計劃 (Dividend Reinvestment Program) 的簡稱。要賺取股息，一個簡單的方法，是持有提供股息再投資計劃的派息互惠基金或股份。這個計劃運作簡單，當賺取股息後，收入會用作購買更多的互惠基金單位或股份，這樣一來可以減省交易成本，亦可透過逐步增持而減少在錯誤時機投資的情形。再投資讓您完全體驗複合增長的優點，因為將股息再投資，可以增加持有的基金單位或股份，令將來得到的股息增加，再投資的金額也隨之增加。在這個過程中，您會清楚發現股息複合增長對長線建立財富的重要性。
讓股息收入助您達成願望
許多投資者的目標，是要確保有足夠的財富，以便安心享受豐盛的退休生活。股息收入，是您達成這個理想的一個途徑。股息是穩定的收入來源，如上文提到，它可以幫助您減低投資組合的波動幅度。因此，如果您已經或準備退休，可考慮持有派發股息的投資，從而獲得穩定收入。
不管市況如何，股息都甚具吸引力。當固定收入投資的收益偏低時，股息便尤其顯得吸引。在適當情況下，您可考慮轉持派息投資，藉此提高收入水平。
擴大投資空間
在組合中加入環球股息投資，可藉著地理和行業分散投資而增加潛在回報。加拿大只佔環球經濟一小部分，而且高度集中在三個行業 (能源、原材料及金融)。由於市場極度集中，您不單會錯過全球眾多的增長潛力，而且所承受的風險可能高於您願意接受的水平。
將投資分散至加拿大以外市場，可減少資產集中在單一國家和貨幣及寥寥數個行業的問題。此外，環球派息投資的選擇眾多，它們的增長潛質、回報潛力和派息比率絕對不遜於加拿大本地投資。
當然大家要記著，環球投資涉及外匯風險，如果加元兌某外幣升值，匯率損失可能會抵銷國外投資的部分回報。因此，投資時您可考慮已作貨幣對沖的產品，以減低有關風險。此外，環球股息會被全額徵稅，不會享有加拿大的股息稅優惠，也可能會被徵收預扣稅。
股息有助揭示企業的財政狀況，長線則可提高投資組合的回報。有興趣持有派發股息的投資，方法之一是選擇道明互惠基金 (TD Mutual Funds) 旗下的股息基金，例如道明股息收入基金 (TD Dividend Income Fund) 、道明股息增值基金 (TD Dividend Growth Fund) 、道明環球股息基金 (TD Global Dividend Fund)、道明每月收入基金 (TD Monthly Income Fund)。這些基金一般投資在派發股息的環球企業或其他帶來收入的證券。投資組合經理的焦點，會放在高於平均的股息率，以及預期長線會提高派息的選擇，這樣您也可以同時受惠於派息投資的增長潛力。
股息再投资计划
股息再投资计划，是一种投资，使投资者逐步建立在一个特定的公司的股份大量的方法。您可以选择在吊盐水获得最容易如果您是公司的雇员参与，但你也可以选择在一个公司计划参加作为外来投资者-因为每个公司的程序都可以根据自己的条件来看，你应该公司直接联系。这些计划有明显的呼吁投资者，有几个原因：
你可以从一个非常小的股票，甚至只有1股在一家公司。
你通常有一个自动扣除成立，这意味着你购买定期对这些公司的股票价值定价。
当公司支付股息，这将重新投入到更多的股票。
对于参与者在吊盐水股票价格折扣，许多的公司在运行这些程序
既然你处理公司直接，没有任何佣金。
这一切听起来不错吧？那么这是因为它是！股息再投资是一个伟大的投资方式你的钱，并提供比通过经纪人购买，在许多情况下，同样数量的股票更好的价值。通过建立自动扣除，你强迫自己省钱-钱，你可能永远不会通知失踪。不过有一点，你需要考虑的是，这是非常重要的投资组合多样化。吊盐水只允许您在一个投资公司，因此，实现均衡的投资组合，你需要加入的公司，否则该程序的范围加入吊盐水，以补充您的其他投资策略。
你可以从一个非常小的股票，甚至只有1股在一家公司。
你通常有一个自动扣除成立，这意味着你购买定期对这些公司的股票价值定价。
当公司支付股息，这将重新投入到更多的股票。
对于参与者在吊盐水股票价格折扣，许多的公司在运行这些程序
既然你处理公司直接，没有任何佣金。
这一切听起来不错吧？那么这是因为它是！股息再投资是一个伟大的投资方式你的钱，并提供比通过经纪人购买，在许多情况下，同样数量的股票更好的价值。通过建立自动扣除，你强迫自己省钱-钱，你可能永远不会通知失踪。不过有一点，你需要考虑的是，这是非常重要的投资组合多样化。吊盐水只允许您在一个投资公司，因此，实现均衡的投资组合，你需要加入的公司，否则该程序的范围加入吊盐水，以补充您的其他投资策略。
Saturday, February 20, 2010
张化桥：投资的最高境界是无为
小时候, 我常听老师讲, “读书先要越读越厚, 然后要越读越薄” 。我当时不甚理解, 但印象深刻。上周我读了一本袖珍版的投资经典书, 爱不释手, 似有所悟。 这本书在几个星期以前刚出版, 叫”投资的要素” (The Elements of Investing) 。 作者是两位身价不菲的七十多岁的老人, Burton Malkiel 和Charles Ellis, 他们分别是普林斯顿和耶鲁大学的教授,在学界和商界均有建树。 他们联手把多年积累的投资智慧加以升华, 用最简练的语言献给了大众。
两位老人的投资理念实在是简单得无法再简单了。 比如,书中引用了巴菲特经常举的一个例子。如果你一辈子要经常吃汉堡包而又不养牛, 你是希望牛肉的价格不断上升呢, 还是希望它不断下降呢? 如果你每过几年就要买一辆汽车, 你是希望汽车的价格不断上升呢, 还是希望它不断下降呢? 对这两个问题, 每个人好象都能正确回答。 但是第三个问题就比较微妙: 未来五年如果你不断有储蓄需要投资, 你是希望股票的价格不断上升呢, 还是希望它不断下降呢? 大多数人会把这个问题答错。他们一买股票就希望股票开始涨, 而忘记了自己还要不断地储蓄, 不断地买股票。 股票价格上升会抬高自己的以后的购买成本, 所以, 股价上升对于长期投资者来说是坏消息,
就相当于牛肉和汽车价格的上升一样，当然对那些准备卖股票并且洗手不干的人有好处。反之, 股价下跌对于长期投资者来说是好消息, 你应该越买越欢才对。毕竟，买股票的最终意义在于分取公司长期发展的好处（包括股票价格上涨和每年的分红）, 因此,进入成本当然越低越好。
如果你是一个真正的长期投资者, 你就应该理解”投资额均衡控制的原则” (即, dollar cost averaging) 。 比如你每个月投资2000元在股票上。 在股价高的时候, 2000元只能买较少的股票; 而在股价低的时候, 2000元可以买很多的股票。从数学上可以证明，这样做的结果是，你的平均购股成本会低于你购股价格的均值。这不是玩绕口令，大家可以用实在的例子算一算。 从长期来看, 这种方法本身就是一种风险控制。 “买股不买市” 说的也许就是这个道理。不过，”投资的要素”这本书教导我们既不要买股，也不要买市。那怎么办？
关于投资， 此书的建议与Vanguard基金公司的创始人John Bogle有相类之处 (请参考本人在财经网的文章, “股民和基民的悲哀”, 2009年8月18日)。他们说投资首先要有长远打算。他们七十多岁也还在做长期投资。其次，一定不要以为自己有持续选择入市时机, 或持续选择好股票的能力，不要以为自己可以持续地跑赢大市。在买卖股票的过程中必然有费用，而费用会吃掉毛收益的很大一个比重。 此外，频繁交易有时正好错过市场（或个股）在几年甚至几十年才遇到一次的大幅上升的好处。大家记不记得刚刚卖掉某个股票或某个市场之后该股票或该市场便大涨的悔恨？ 即使不频繁交易，长期持有若干爱股也有很大的风险。它们会不会跑输大市？它们会不会成为下一个雷曼兄弟公司，贝尔斯登，通用汽车，或安然（即Enron）或北电？
该书对基金投资者也有劝慰：别徒劳了！找一个能长期持续跑赢大市的基金或基金经理比在稻草堆里找一根针还困难，为什么不把那个稻草堆买下来呢? 在各个基金中换来换去不仅有交易成本，而且事前预测某一个基金在明年或后年的表现比预测股价还难。 该书引用了大量历史数据证明，（１）绝大多数基金是长期跑输大市的，（２）常胜将军十分罕见; 过去的表现不代表未来的表现。
既然投资者费尽周折还不能跑赢大市，何不直接购买大市呢？长期持有指数基金，风险小，也可以避免绝大部分交易成本，而且可以心情平和，尽享经济成长所带来的投资收益。长期持有指数基金是最彻底的风险分散。 另外，在入市时机上，两位作者建议大家最好把自己当傻瓜, 假定自己完全不懂经济学或市场，分时段均衡入市，减少风险。两位作者也劝大家永远不要预测大盘走势，并且引用了J. P. Morgan先生的榜样。当别人问他如何看未来股市的走向时， 他总是回答：市场会波动 (it will fluctuate)。两个作者对技术分析(画图)不屑一顾, 认为那只是占星学(astrology)的小把戏而已。
现在的股民实在也是太忙碌了: 信息多,会议多,研究报告多,证券种类多, 应接不暇。 有的人抱怨, 一天12个小时坐在电脑面前, 甚至连处理电邮和阅读上市公司公告的时间都不够。我们的两位作者引用华尔街日报的资深记者Jason Zweig 的话来说, 你只有先向市场投降, 然后才能彻底解放自己, 并且最终征服市场。 那时, 你便可以潇洒地说, 对于大市或者个股的走势, 我既不知道, 也不关心 (I do not know, and I do not care)。而向市场投降就需要买入市场, 也就是买入内涵最广的指数基金(包括国内股票和海外股票), 并且长期持有。
这本书的另一个内容是坚持长期储蓄的重要性。这两位身价数亿的老人强调储蓄是投资的源泉和起点。他们用自己的经验提供了很多分毫必省的技巧, 从信用卡的使用到喝咖啡,买保险和上餐馆。但他们说,最重要的省钱技巧是避开要面子和消费攀比的困扰。 凑巧, 我前几天接到我在湖北某县城工作的侄子的电话, 他收入不高, 但很想买一辆广州本田的汽车, 我跟他好好讲了讲储蓄的多种意义。
两位作者认为, 大家对股市的回报期望太高, 也太短期。 他们认为中长期股市如果能够平均每年有4-5% 的真实回报(扣除通货膨胀), 已经相当不错。 其中的一个作者, Charles Ellis, 在另外一本书 (Winning the Loser's Game) 中谈到了几个发人深省的数字。 比如, 道琼斯指数在1968和1982年均为1,000 点; 在1964年底和1981年底均为875点。 也就是说, 在那漫长的17年里,虽然企业利润大增, 但股票的大市毫无进展。原因是由于通货膨胀, 利率从4%涨到了15%, 这使得市盈率大幅收窄。 当然, 投资者对经济前景的过度悲观也导致了股市低迷。 由此可见, 预测短期甚至中,长期股市的变化是完全不可能的一项徒劳。投资的最高境界是无为。
本人在投资银行做了十多年的证券分析师, 要完全接受两位作者的理论是不容易的, 但也许是明智的, 因为那意味着一种解放和超脱。
两位作者建议大家买全世界内涵最广的指数基金(包括国内股票和海外股票), 但我觉得既然从长远来看, 股票市场的表现取决于企业的盈利增长, 而企业的盈利增长又与GDP增长基本同步,因此,中港两地的投资者可以特别偏重当地的指数。还有一个更为激进的做法, 就是特别偏重成长性强的中小企业, 自己组建一个50或者70个不同行业的股票的十分稳定的资产组合。虽然这里面可能会有几个烂苹果, 但它们平均的高增长率也许完全可以超过以大股票为主的恒生指数或者其它指数。这里要强调长期持有, 和避免频繁的交易。这种策略也许是两个宗教的妥协?
两位老人的投资理念实在是简单得无法再简单了。 比如,书中引用了巴菲特经常举的一个例子。如果你一辈子要经常吃汉堡包而又不养牛, 你是希望牛肉的价格不断上升呢, 还是希望它不断下降呢? 如果你每过几年就要买一辆汽车, 你是希望汽车的价格不断上升呢, 还是希望它不断下降呢? 对这两个问题, 每个人好象都能正确回答。 但是第三个问题就比较微妙: 未来五年如果你不断有储蓄需要投资, 你是希望股票的价格不断上升呢, 还是希望它不断下降呢? 大多数人会把这个问题答错。他们一买股票就希望股票开始涨, 而忘记了自己还要不断地储蓄, 不断地买股票。 股票价格上升会抬高自己的以后的购买成本, 所以, 股价上升对于长期投资者来说是坏消息,
就相当于牛肉和汽车价格的上升一样，当然对那些准备卖股票并且洗手不干的人有好处。反之, 股价下跌对于长期投资者来说是好消息, 你应该越买越欢才对。毕竟，买股票的最终意义在于分取公司长期发展的好处（包括股票价格上涨和每年的分红）, 因此,进入成本当然越低越好。
如果你是一个真正的长期投资者, 你就应该理解”投资额均衡控制的原则” (即, dollar cost averaging) 。 比如你每个月投资2000元在股票上。 在股价高的时候, 2000元只能买较少的股票; 而在股价低的时候, 2000元可以买很多的股票。从数学上可以证明，这样做的结果是，你的平均购股成本会低于你购股价格的均值。这不是玩绕口令，大家可以用实在的例子算一算。 从长期来看, 这种方法本身就是一种风险控制。 “买股不买市” 说的也许就是这个道理。不过，”投资的要素”这本书教导我们既不要买股，也不要买市。那怎么办？
关于投资， 此书的建议与Vanguard基金公司的创始人John Bogle有相类之处 (请参考本人在财经网的文章, “股民和基民的悲哀”, 2009年8月18日)。他们说投资首先要有长远打算。他们七十多岁也还在做长期投资。其次，一定不要以为自己有持续选择入市时机, 或持续选择好股票的能力，不要以为自己可以持续地跑赢大市。在买卖股票的过程中必然有费用，而费用会吃掉毛收益的很大一个比重。 此外，频繁交易有时正好错过市场（或个股）在几年甚至几十年才遇到一次的大幅上升的好处。大家记不记得刚刚卖掉某个股票或某个市场之后该股票或该市场便大涨的悔恨？ 即使不频繁交易，长期持有若干爱股也有很大的风险。它们会不会跑输大市？它们会不会成为下一个雷曼兄弟公司，贝尔斯登，通用汽车，或安然（即Enron）或北电？
该书对基金投资者也有劝慰：别徒劳了！找一个能长期持续跑赢大市的基金或基金经理比在稻草堆里找一根针还困难，为什么不把那个稻草堆买下来呢? 在各个基金中换来换去不仅有交易成本，而且事前预测某一个基金在明年或后年的表现比预测股价还难。 该书引用了大量历史数据证明，（１）绝大多数基金是长期跑输大市的，（２）常胜将军十分罕见; 过去的表现不代表未来的表现。
既然投资者费尽周折还不能跑赢大市，何不直接购买大市呢？长期持有指数基金，风险小，也可以避免绝大部分交易成本，而且可以心情平和，尽享经济成长所带来的投资收益。长期持有指数基金是最彻底的风险分散。 另外，在入市时机上，两位作者建议大家最好把自己当傻瓜, 假定自己完全不懂经济学或市场，分时段均衡入市，减少风险。两位作者也劝大家永远不要预测大盘走势，并且引用了J. P. Morgan先生的榜样。当别人问他如何看未来股市的走向时， 他总是回答：市场会波动 (it will fluctuate)。两个作者对技术分析(画图)不屑一顾, 认为那只是占星学(astrology)的小把戏而已。
现在的股民实在也是太忙碌了: 信息多,会议多,研究报告多,证券种类多, 应接不暇。 有的人抱怨, 一天12个小时坐在电脑面前, 甚至连处理电邮和阅读上市公司公告的时间都不够。我们的两位作者引用华尔街日报的资深记者Jason Zweig 的话来说, 你只有先向市场投降, 然后才能彻底解放自己, 并且最终征服市场。 那时, 你便可以潇洒地说, 对于大市或者个股的走势, 我既不知道, 也不关心 (I do not know, and I do not care)。而向市场投降就需要买入市场, 也就是买入内涵最广的指数基金(包括国内股票和海外股票), 并且长期持有。
这本书的另一个内容是坚持长期储蓄的重要性。这两位身价数亿的老人强调储蓄是投资的源泉和起点。他们用自己的经验提供了很多分毫必省的技巧, 从信用卡的使用到喝咖啡,买保险和上餐馆。但他们说,最重要的省钱技巧是避开要面子和消费攀比的困扰。 凑巧, 我前几天接到我在湖北某县城工作的侄子的电话, 他收入不高, 但很想买一辆广州本田的汽车, 我跟他好好讲了讲储蓄的多种意义。
两位作者认为, 大家对股市的回报期望太高, 也太短期。 他们认为中长期股市如果能够平均每年有4-5% 的真实回报(扣除通货膨胀), 已经相当不错。 其中的一个作者, Charles Ellis, 在另外一本书 (Winning the Loser's Game) 中谈到了几个发人深省的数字。 比如, 道琼斯指数在1968和1982年均为1,000 点; 在1964年底和1981年底均为875点。 也就是说, 在那漫长的17年里,虽然企业利润大增, 但股票的大市毫无进展。原因是由于通货膨胀, 利率从4%涨到了15%, 这使得市盈率大幅收窄。 当然, 投资者对经济前景的过度悲观也导致了股市低迷。 由此可见, 预测短期甚至中,长期股市的变化是完全不可能的一项徒劳。投资的最高境界是无为。
本人在投资银行做了十多年的证券分析师, 要完全接受两位作者的理论是不容易的, 但也许是明智的, 因为那意味着一种解放和超脱。
两位作者建议大家买全世界内涵最广的指数基金(包括国内股票和海外股票), 但我觉得既然从长远来看, 股票市场的表现取决于企业的盈利增长, 而企业的盈利增长又与GDP增长基本同步,因此,中港两地的投资者可以特别偏重当地的指数。还有一个更为激进的做法, 就是特别偏重成长性强的中小企业, 自己组建一个50或者70个不同行业的股票的十分稳定的资产组合。虽然这里面可能会有几个烂苹果, 但它们平均的高增长率也许完全可以超过以大股票为主的恒生指数或者其它指数。这里要强调长期持有, 和避免频繁的交易。这种策略也许是两个宗教的妥协?
Friday, February 19, 2010
分享集：周期性股票投资法
有一些行业的业务，具有相当明显的周期性或循环性。
这些行业的公司景气与不景气，每隔数年就循环一次，周而复始，至于环绕一周的时间有多长，则视不同的行业而定。通常是上升期和下降期，分别是3至5年。
这类股票的股价是跟着公司业绩而起落的，通常也是跟着行业和公司的兴衰，3至5年大起大落一次。这类股票，最好是以企业的荣辱，作为买进卖出的标准。
要使你的资金发挥最大的作用，赚取最高的回酬，最有效的方法是将有关行业的景气与反向投资法结合——在有关行业的公司最低潮时买进，守至最高峰时抛出。
如果大众传媒对有关行业的报道，都是悲观的，而几乎所有有关行业的公司，都蒙受严重的亏蚀，这类公司的股票必然暴跌，这就是买进的良机。
当大众传媒所报道的都是好消息，大家对有关行业的前景感到乐观，这类公司盈利激增，股价狂升就是脱售的良机。
这类股票的买进和脱售的时机要拿捏得准确，从而充分应用机会，赚取最高回酬，必须注意以下各点：
1.采取长线投资法，切忌短线进出，最好是跟着有关行业的景气走。
当有关行业及公司处于景气最坏时，大胆低价买进，紧握不放，以等待景气回升；在回升期间不要理会股价之小波动，着眼在大势趋向，忽视短期之起落。
一直收藏至有关行业到达顶峰时，一肌脑儿抛出，一股也不留，一走了之。
这样你就可以保住你的盈利，资金也不会被困。
此类股票由最低至最高点，相差往往数百巴仙，上升期限由3年至5年不等。
不要贪小利
在这上升的途中，股价波动剧烈，往往在上升一段时间后出现套利，回调二、三十巴仙，是常见的事，也属正常。
假如你自作聪明，企图捕捉短期起落的时机以赚取小利的话，你会发现知易行难，事与愿违。
更糟糕的是在卖出后，股价不落反起，你不甘愿又买回来了，失去了以后的更厚利润，实得不偿失。大家立志赚大钱，不要贪小利。
在低价买进后就紧握不放，到有关行业登峰造极时才脱手，这样可获厚利，又不因股价之短期波动而烦恼及担心。
2.不要买得太早和卖得太迟。
如果当有关行业的不景气刚出现，股价开始下跌时就买进，还有巨大的下跌空间，你可能会蒙受亏蚀。如果当有关行业景气改善，股价回升了一截时就脱售，可能脱售得太早，错过了赚取巨利的机会，殊为可惜。所以买得太早和卖得太迟都是错的。这也表示，你的“反向”功力还不够火喉。
当然，在未跌到底时买进未到顶时卖出，还总比在底价时卖出顶价时买进高明。
一般人之所以会犯买得太早和卖得太迟的错误，是因为没有志气、贪图快钱小利；另一个原因是担心失去买进机会和担心失去既得的盈利，其实这是过虑。
通常一只股票跌至最低和涨至最高时，都会在谷底和峰顶徘徊三、五个月，有足够的时间让你以低价买进和在高价卖出。
你在谷底时不买进，不是时间不够，而是根本不要买进，不要买进是因为你恐惧，没有买进的胆识；在高价区时不肯卖出，也不是因为行动不够快捷，而是因为贪得无厌，贪婪使你失去理智。
贪婪会失理智
为了证明这一点，我翻查去年第一季的股价纪录，发现主要钢铁股的股价都在谷底徘徊了最少三个月。
在这三个月中，股价波动幅度不大，钢铁股是典型的周期性股票，如果你有信心的话，要在谷底时买进数百万股，易如反掌。大部分人错过了低价买进钢铁股，并非行动不快，而是根本不敢买进。
现在钢铁股在上升的途中，距离顶峰尚远，到达顶峰时一定会徘徊三、五个月，有足够的时间让你脱手。所以目前股价虽然已上升了一大截，脱售的时机尚未成熟，实际上，一些钢铁股仍有上升潜能。
OSK的研究员预测金狮工业今年每股净利为42.5仙，以目前1.60令吉上下的股价计算，本益比还不到四倍(首季每股净利9.78仙)，每股净有形资产价值为3.87令吉。丹斯里钟廷森以每股1令吉29仙买进1亿多股，不是没有理由的。
3. 注意到底和到顶的特征。这个特征就是“想法一致”。
在周期性股价跌到谷底时，投资大众对这类股票“一致”看坏，所有人——报纸、电台、电视台、杂志、股票分析师、图表师、经济学家，都“一致”看坏，认为最坏的情况尚未出现。“一致”就是大家想法相同，没有一个人有异议。这时要卖的已卖光，要买的不敢买进，股价在谷底徘徊长达二、三个月，这就是到底了。
同样的，当所有的人都“一致”看好，毫无异议，股价在狭幅徘徊二、三个月，就是到顶。
这“一致”是买进卖出的最可靠讯号。钢铁股尚未出现“一致”看法，故钢铁股仍处于“守”的时期。
4.在买进卖出时一定要与公司的基本面挂钩，以基本面为买进卖出的标准。
买进周期性股票，最好是根据公司在有关行业中的地位，5年盈利纪录及公司的财务状况。必须确保有关公司能生存下去，而且在景气回升时能复原。
更重要的是认识清楚有关行业在国家经济中的重要性。例如钢铁的需求永远存在，故跌得最惨时就是买进良机。
5.最好是在有关行业景气扭转之前买进，这样可以买得更低。
不要忘记股价通常是走在经济前头六个月，如果你在经济和行业景气回升迹象毕露，尽人皆知最坏时期已过时才买进，可能已太迟了。
正如我在《当知更鸟出现时》(2008年12月1日)一文中引述巴菲特之名言所指出的，当知更鸟出现时，春天已过去了。
在景气未有回升迹象时买进，也许要等待较长的时间才会等到股价回升，但买价可能是最低，风险也较低。既然是周期性企业，则景气必然会回来，只要有耐心，一定会有收获。故周期性股票，只适合长期投资——最好是持有3至5年。
木材股处谷底
钢铁股和木材股是典型的周期性股票。钢铁股已回升至中途，目前属“持有期”。木材股尚处于谷底，原因是木材价格根本没有回升，没有人知道何时会回升，大家不妨趁目前木材价格低沉时买进，长期持有，等待木材价格回升。
买木材股一定要记得一点，就是一定要买拥有大片森林的木材公司，大家不妨考虑常成控股（JAYA TIASA）和常丰控股(SUBUR TIASA)。此两公司分别拥有170万亩和100万亩可伐木森林。
这些行业的公司景气与不景气，每隔数年就循环一次，周而复始，至于环绕一周的时间有多长，则视不同的行业而定。通常是上升期和下降期，分别是3至5年。
这类股票的股价是跟着公司业绩而起落的，通常也是跟着行业和公司的兴衰，3至5年大起大落一次。这类股票，最好是以企业的荣辱，作为买进卖出的标准。
要使你的资金发挥最大的作用，赚取最高的回酬，最有效的方法是将有关行业的景气与反向投资法结合——在有关行业的公司最低潮时买进，守至最高峰时抛出。
如果大众传媒对有关行业的报道，都是悲观的，而几乎所有有关行业的公司，都蒙受严重的亏蚀，这类公司的股票必然暴跌，这就是买进的良机。
当大众传媒所报道的都是好消息，大家对有关行业的前景感到乐观，这类公司盈利激增，股价狂升就是脱售的良机。
这类股票的买进和脱售的时机要拿捏得准确，从而充分应用机会，赚取最高回酬，必须注意以下各点：
1.采取长线投资法，切忌短线进出，最好是跟着有关行业的景气走。
当有关行业及公司处于景气最坏时，大胆低价买进，紧握不放，以等待景气回升；在回升期间不要理会股价之小波动，着眼在大势趋向，忽视短期之起落。
一直收藏至有关行业到达顶峰时，一肌脑儿抛出，一股也不留，一走了之。
这样你就可以保住你的盈利，资金也不会被困。
此类股票由最低至最高点，相差往往数百巴仙，上升期限由3年至5年不等。
不要贪小利
在这上升的途中，股价波动剧烈，往往在上升一段时间后出现套利，回调二、三十巴仙，是常见的事，也属正常。
假如你自作聪明，企图捕捉短期起落的时机以赚取小利的话，你会发现知易行难，事与愿违。
更糟糕的是在卖出后，股价不落反起，你不甘愿又买回来了，失去了以后的更厚利润，实得不偿失。大家立志赚大钱，不要贪小利。
在低价买进后就紧握不放，到有关行业登峰造极时才脱手，这样可获厚利，又不因股价之短期波动而烦恼及担心。
2.不要买得太早和卖得太迟。
如果当有关行业的不景气刚出现，股价开始下跌时就买进，还有巨大的下跌空间，你可能会蒙受亏蚀。如果当有关行业景气改善，股价回升了一截时就脱售，可能脱售得太早，错过了赚取巨利的机会，殊为可惜。所以买得太早和卖得太迟都是错的。这也表示，你的“反向”功力还不够火喉。
当然，在未跌到底时买进未到顶时卖出，还总比在底价时卖出顶价时买进高明。
一般人之所以会犯买得太早和卖得太迟的错误，是因为没有志气、贪图快钱小利；另一个原因是担心失去买进机会和担心失去既得的盈利，其实这是过虑。
通常一只股票跌至最低和涨至最高时，都会在谷底和峰顶徘徊三、五个月，有足够的时间让你以低价买进和在高价卖出。
你在谷底时不买进，不是时间不够，而是根本不要买进，不要买进是因为你恐惧，没有买进的胆识；在高价区时不肯卖出，也不是因为行动不够快捷，而是因为贪得无厌，贪婪使你失去理智。
贪婪会失理智
为了证明这一点，我翻查去年第一季的股价纪录，发现主要钢铁股的股价都在谷底徘徊了最少三个月。
在这三个月中，股价波动幅度不大，钢铁股是典型的周期性股票，如果你有信心的话，要在谷底时买进数百万股，易如反掌。大部分人错过了低价买进钢铁股，并非行动不快，而是根本不敢买进。
现在钢铁股在上升的途中，距离顶峰尚远，到达顶峰时一定会徘徊三、五个月，有足够的时间让你脱手。所以目前股价虽然已上升了一大截，脱售的时机尚未成熟，实际上，一些钢铁股仍有上升潜能。
OSK的研究员预测金狮工业今年每股净利为42.5仙，以目前1.60令吉上下的股价计算，本益比还不到四倍(首季每股净利9.78仙)，每股净有形资产价值为3.87令吉。丹斯里钟廷森以每股1令吉29仙买进1亿多股，不是没有理由的。
3. 注意到底和到顶的特征。这个特征就是“想法一致”。
在周期性股价跌到谷底时，投资大众对这类股票“一致”看坏，所有人——报纸、电台、电视台、杂志、股票分析师、图表师、经济学家，都“一致”看坏，认为最坏的情况尚未出现。“一致”就是大家想法相同，没有一个人有异议。这时要卖的已卖光，要买的不敢买进，股价在谷底徘徊长达二、三个月，这就是到底了。
同样的，当所有的人都“一致”看好，毫无异议，股价在狭幅徘徊二、三个月，就是到顶。
这“一致”是买进卖出的最可靠讯号。钢铁股尚未出现“一致”看法，故钢铁股仍处于“守”的时期。
4.在买进卖出时一定要与公司的基本面挂钩，以基本面为买进卖出的标准。
买进周期性股票，最好是根据公司在有关行业中的地位，5年盈利纪录及公司的财务状况。必须确保有关公司能生存下去，而且在景气回升时能复原。
更重要的是认识清楚有关行业在国家经济中的重要性。例如钢铁的需求永远存在，故跌得最惨时就是买进良机。
5.最好是在有关行业景气扭转之前买进，这样可以买得更低。
不要忘记股价通常是走在经济前头六个月，如果你在经济和行业景气回升迹象毕露，尽人皆知最坏时期已过时才买进，可能已太迟了。
正如我在《当知更鸟出现时》(2008年12月1日)一文中引述巴菲特之名言所指出的，当知更鸟出现时，春天已过去了。
在景气未有回升迹象时买进，也许要等待较长的时间才会等到股价回升，但买价可能是最低，风险也较低。既然是周期性企业，则景气必然会回来，只要有耐心，一定会有收获。故周期性股票，只适合长期投资——最好是持有3至5年。
木材股处谷底
钢铁股和木材股是典型的周期性股票。钢铁股已回升至中途，目前属“持有期”。木材股尚处于谷底，原因是木材价格根本没有回升，没有人知道何时会回升，大家不妨趁目前木材价格低沉时买进，长期持有，等待木材价格回升。
买木材股一定要记得一点，就是一定要买拥有大片森林的木材公司，大家不妨考虑常成控股（JAYA TIASA）和常丰控股(SUBUR TIASA)。此两公司分别拥有170万亩和100万亩可伐木森林。
分享集:养兵千日·用在一朝
中国人民解放军的正规军人数为225万5000人，以中国13亿3000万的人口计算，每1千人拥有 1.7名正规军。
美国有正规军140万3900人。以美国3亿800万的人口计算，每1千人拥有4.8名正规军。
除了正规军外，中国有后备军80万人，美国有后备军145万8500人。
美国每年耗军费6000亿美元。占全球军费的41.5%。中国每年军费仅850亿美元，占全球军费的5.8%而已。
美国军费高居世界第一，是美国要成为“世界警察”所付出的代价，美国军费占其国民生产总值的 4.06%；中国解放军扮演的是自卫的角色，故军费仅占国民生产总值的1.7%而已。
平时耗费如此庞大的军费，是要“养兵千日，用在一朝”。而一个国家的命运，往往就决定于这“一朝”。
孙子曰：“兵者，国之大事，死生之地，存亡之道”(战争是国家的大事，关系到军民之生死，国家的存亡)，而战争之胜败，主要是决定于“兵众孰强？士卒孰练？”(那一方的军队较强？那一方的士卒训练有素？)(始计篇)，要有强大的军队，就必须“养兵”，而且是养兵要长达“千日”，也就是长期训练军队，随时准备那“一朝”的到来。
现在让我们把这“养兵千日，用在一朝”的概念，移用到股票投资上。
做功课就是养兵
我常常劝人做功课，做功课就是“养兵”。
有些人有一种错觉，以为随便翻阅一年的年报，就算做了功课，就可以在股市一显身手了。
这种草率的做法，认识肯定肤浅，不少人因而受到误导，买错股票，蒙受亏蚀。
这种情形，就好像训练不足的军队，以乌合之众投入战场，肯定会打败仗。
股票投资的功课，跟军队的训练一样，不能速成，必须长期下功夫，就好像军队要长期训练，才有可能战胜敌人。
要在股市长期生存，准备功夫必须到家，就好像军队必须“训练有素”才能投入战场，投资者也要做足功课，才有希望在股市打胜仗。
所谓做足功课，就是要长期阅读年报、季报、研究报告，以及财经讯息。
与股票长期相处
股票就好像你的朋友，要与他长期相处，才能深入了解。
要深入了解一只股票，不能单靠阅读一年的年报。最好是能详读十年、八年的年报，同时阅读有关公司的所有文告，以了解该公司历年的进展。
最好是从详读上市时的招股说明书开始，然后阅读历年的年报及公司断断续续发表的文告。这些资料都可以从马来西亚股票交易所的网站bursamalaysia.com中找到，而且都是免费的。
公司的营运风格，反映掌舵人的经营哲理，你必须长期观察，才有可能深入了解。这是你对有关股票作出正确判断的最佳依据。
三类买股人
买股票的人，可以分为三类：
第一类：根据谣言或别人的意见而买进；谣言就是不确实的情报。根据不确实的情报出兵，最易全军尽墨。
第二类：根据 “感觉”买进，只是直觉上认为有关股票值得投资就买进了，你问他，他也说不出买进的理由。这种情形，就好像一见钟情的男女朋友，就是喜欢对方，却说不出钟情的理由。
第三类：是根据事实作出买进的决定。巴菲特说：“你的决定是正确的，因为你所根据的事实是正确的。”这就是成功投资者的最佳写照。
假如你是属于第一类的话，你是一支根据假情报出击的军队，最易吃败仗。
假如你是属于第二类的话，你是一个盲侠，盲侠靠听觉出招，你是靠感觉出手。能否击中敌人，靠运气。很不幸的，靠运气的人很难在股市生存。
假如你是属于第三类的投资者，我恭喜你，因为成功率最高的就是这一类投资者。
但是，第三类投资者也是最辛苦的，因为惟有长期做功课的人，才有资格挤身于第三类。
长期做功课是艰辛的、寂寞的，只有有耐心、信心和兴趣的人，才不会半途而废。
有股市就有机会
那么，用什么来坚持长期做功课，数十年如一日，从不言倦？
答案是：你可能取得的巨大回报，是使你坚持的最大理由。
请你想像：你工作一辈子，薪金总收入不过100万令吉。
如果你功课做足，投资观念正确，你的投资回酬何止100万令吉。
这样的回报，值得你去全力以赴做功课吗？
大部分人对股票投资掉以轻心，抱着玩票的心态进场，因为他们看不到投资的最终回报有多大。如果他看到的话，就会同意投资其实比他的正业更重要，更值得他全力以赴做功课。
只有当你的功课做得够深时，你才有可能抓住投资机会，取得丰硕回报。
“养兵千日，用在一朝”。股票研究，不应只是“千日”，而应是“万日”的事(请计算一下，“万日”是多少年？)。
只要股市存在，机会就存在。但机会只会寻找长期研究的人；不做功课的人，就好像在原地踏步的士兵， 即使“一朝”的机会出现，也与他无缘。记住，天下没有免费的午餐，机会只属于对股票有研究者。
美国有正规军140万3900人。以美国3亿800万的人口计算，每1千人拥有4.8名正规军。
除了正规军外，中国有后备军80万人，美国有后备军145万8500人。
美国每年耗军费6000亿美元。占全球军费的41.5%。中国每年军费仅850亿美元，占全球军费的5.8%而已。
美国军费高居世界第一，是美国要成为“世界警察”所付出的代价，美国军费占其国民生产总值的 4.06%；中国解放军扮演的是自卫的角色，故军费仅占国民生产总值的1.7%而已。
平时耗费如此庞大的军费，是要“养兵千日，用在一朝”。而一个国家的命运，往往就决定于这“一朝”。
孙子曰：“兵者，国之大事，死生之地，存亡之道”(战争是国家的大事，关系到军民之生死，国家的存亡)，而战争之胜败，主要是决定于“兵众孰强？士卒孰练？”(那一方的军队较强？那一方的士卒训练有素？)(始计篇)，要有强大的军队，就必须“养兵”，而且是养兵要长达“千日”，也就是长期训练军队，随时准备那“一朝”的到来。
现在让我们把这“养兵千日，用在一朝”的概念，移用到股票投资上。
做功课就是养兵
我常常劝人做功课，做功课就是“养兵”。
有些人有一种错觉，以为随便翻阅一年的年报，就算做了功课，就可以在股市一显身手了。
这种草率的做法，认识肯定肤浅，不少人因而受到误导，买错股票，蒙受亏蚀。
这种情形，就好像训练不足的军队，以乌合之众投入战场，肯定会打败仗。
股票投资的功课，跟军队的训练一样，不能速成，必须长期下功夫，就好像军队要长期训练，才有可能战胜敌人。
要在股市长期生存，准备功夫必须到家，就好像军队必须“训练有素”才能投入战场，投资者也要做足功课，才有希望在股市打胜仗。
所谓做足功课，就是要长期阅读年报、季报、研究报告，以及财经讯息。
与股票长期相处
股票就好像你的朋友，要与他长期相处，才能深入了解。
要深入了解一只股票，不能单靠阅读一年的年报。最好是能详读十年、八年的年报，同时阅读有关公司的所有文告，以了解该公司历年的进展。
最好是从详读上市时的招股说明书开始，然后阅读历年的年报及公司断断续续发表的文告。这些资料都可以从马来西亚股票交易所的网站bursamalaysia.com中找到，而且都是免费的。
公司的营运风格，反映掌舵人的经营哲理，你必须长期观察，才有可能深入了解。这是你对有关股票作出正确判断的最佳依据。
三类买股人
买股票的人，可以分为三类：
第一类：根据谣言或别人的意见而买进；谣言就是不确实的情报。根据不确实的情报出兵，最易全军尽墨。
第二类：根据 “感觉”买进，只是直觉上认为有关股票值得投资就买进了，你问他，他也说不出买进的理由。这种情形，就好像一见钟情的男女朋友，就是喜欢对方，却说不出钟情的理由。
第三类：是根据事实作出买进的决定。巴菲特说：“你的决定是正确的，因为你所根据的事实是正确的。”这就是成功投资者的最佳写照。
假如你是属于第一类的话，你是一支根据假情报出击的军队，最易吃败仗。
假如你是属于第二类的话，你是一个盲侠，盲侠靠听觉出招，你是靠感觉出手。能否击中敌人，靠运气。很不幸的，靠运气的人很难在股市生存。
假如你是属于第三类的投资者，我恭喜你，因为成功率最高的就是这一类投资者。
但是，第三类投资者也是最辛苦的，因为惟有长期做功课的人，才有资格挤身于第三类。
长期做功课是艰辛的、寂寞的，只有有耐心、信心和兴趣的人，才不会半途而废。
有股市就有机会
那么，用什么来坚持长期做功课，数十年如一日，从不言倦？
答案是：你可能取得的巨大回报，是使你坚持的最大理由。
请你想像：你工作一辈子，薪金总收入不过100万令吉。
如果你功课做足，投资观念正确，你的投资回酬何止100万令吉。
这样的回报，值得你去全力以赴做功课吗？
大部分人对股票投资掉以轻心，抱着玩票的心态进场，因为他们看不到投资的最终回报有多大。如果他看到的话，就会同意投资其实比他的正业更重要，更值得他全力以赴做功课。
只有当你的功课做得够深时，你才有可能抓住投资机会，取得丰硕回报。
“养兵千日，用在一朝”。股票研究，不应只是“千日”，而应是“万日”的事(请计算一下，“万日”是多少年？)。
只要股市存在，机会就存在。但机会只会寻找长期研究的人；不做功课的人，就好像在原地踏步的士兵， 即使“一朝”的机会出现，也与他无缘。记住，天下没有免费的午餐，机会只属于对股票有研究者。
分享集: 不敢加码就别买
许多人想投资股票，但是没法决定要买什么股票。不能决定，是因为他没有可以依循的标准。
如果他心里有了标准，事情就简单得多了。
只要符合标准的就买，不符合标准的股票就不买。所以，制订一个标准，是投资者当务之急。
勿以业余态度对待
在制订标准之前，首先，让我们弄清楚：我们投资股票最终的目的是什么？
相信每一个人都会说：志在赚钱啰！
是的，没有错，志在赚钱。但是，要赚怎样的钱？
有人进入股市，胸无大志，但求赚点零用钱；有的甚至只想赚个丰富的午餐就心满意足；也有雄心较大的，想赚儿女的教育费。
这种想法，无所谓对或不对，只是目标不大，就不够认真；不够认真就难以深入，不够深入则难以升堂入室。厕身投市十数年，仍是门外汉，这种投资者数不胜数，鲜有成就者。
要升堂入室，就不能以玩票的态度对待你的投资。
对大部分上班族来说，职业还是他的“正业”，股票投资只是“业余”的事。作为一个职场过来人，我认为在时间上视股票投资为“业余事”，并没有错，错在以“业余”的态度对待股票投资。视为“业余”，则自然而然的不像对“正业”那么认真。既属“业余”，则难免产生可有可无的错觉。有了这种错觉，就不会以严肃的态度对待投资。不认真，不以严肃态度去从事某事某业，鲜有能成功者。
这是严肃投资者首先要纠正的弱点。
既然我们不能放弃职业，成为专职投资者，那么，视投资为“业余”是对的。但在态度上、心态上必须纠正。以业余的时间去从事投资，是可以的，但不能以业余的心态去对待投资。
孔子说：“行有余力，则以学文”。我们不妨“职有余力，则以学股”。
时间用在别的事上
有些人以没有时间为藉口，不下功夫学投资。实际上，这是时间分配的问题，并非“没有时间”，而是把时间用在别的事上了。把时间用在别的事上，是你认为别的事比投资更重要。这是你的选择，无所谓对或错。但是，既然不把时间交给“投资”，就最好不要期望“投资”把财富交给你。吝啬你的时间于投资，却希望“投资”给予你丰厚的回报，是不合理的期望。
累积财富态度进股市
我曾担任总编辑和上市公司的高级总经理，事情是够忙够烦的，但却能把所有的公司年报和文告读完。
此无它，我摒弃了所有与投资无关的活动，把业余的时间全部用在阅读公司年报与文告上，而且是“日日清”，数十年如一日。你的职业会比我更忙更烦吗？如果我能做到，你有什么理由做不到？
好了，扯得远了，让我们回到“要赚怎样的钱”这个问题上吧。
我老觉得，投资者一开始就必须抱着累积财富的态度进入股市。你的最终目的，是要累积一批股票，使你在退休后，有固定的股息收入，这个股息收入，足以代替你退休后的薪金收入，如此一来，你达到了财务自主的境地。
形式上，你是退休了，但收入上，并没“退”，也没有“休”。你不必因为没有薪金收入而降低你的生活素质。相反的，你的生活素质应该更高，因为退休后，开支减少了，但收入没有减少，在金钱上，你可以更“爽手”，到了“从心所欲，不逾距(限制开支)”的地步，不亦快哉？
所以，不要持有在股市赚一顿饭的态度，去对待投资。要以退休后财务自在为投资鹄的。这个“鹄的”，就好像马拉松的终点，在整个长跑中，道路或有不平，天气或许酷热，但你不忘“鹄的”，造次必于是，颠沛必于是。
选择正确的股票
不要被道路两旁的杂音分散了你的注意力，只忘我地，全力以赴地向前跑，不达目的誓不罢休，最后一定能冲线，到达“鹄的”。
但是，要达到财务自主的“鹄的”，不是单靠耐力就可以做到的，还要加上其他的条件，而选择正确的股票，就是重要条件之一。如果选错股票，不但不能累积财富，而且财富会如炽热铁板上的冰块，迅速融化。
要避免选错股票，就要在买进之前，问自己：“十年以后，这家公司会变成怎样？”
如果你有信心，这家公司在十年之后，会比现在更好，赚得更多，那么，股票的价值会更高，那就大胆买进吧。如果你不能肯定，十年之后这家公司会比现在更好，就千万不要买进。
如果你不理会这家公司将来会怎样，只因为有人告诉你这只股票会起就买进，那么，你是在投机。投机接近赌博，没有人靠赌博发达，因为十赌九输，我对“十赌九输”从不置疑。
我有一个朋友，趁去年股市大跌，将数亿令吉资金投入国内外股市，所买的都是世界级企业的股票。他说：“二十年之后，才论定我之成败。”
既然一买进就准备持有二十年，则买进之前，当然挖尽了有关企业的资料，对有关企业的前途信心十足，才敢投入巨资。他对待投资，何等认真，二十年之后富可敌国，不是梦想。
买进有信心股票
相形之下，我提出十年的投资期，已算“克己”。原因是我不认为，十年河东变河西，世事多变，企业易变，与企业同行十年，已足够论成败。
既然准备与企业厮守十年，则只能买你有充分信心的股票，否则，易于半途而废。
在你买进的时候，你问自己：“假如此股狂跌，我敢加码买进更多吗？”
如果你的答案是“不肯定”的话，就不要买，因为这表示你对有关企业了解不够；因为不了解，就没有信心，没有信心则不敢在股价大跌后买进更多；不敢在低价买进更多，就无法拉低成本；无法拉低成本，就表示你手头所持有的，永远是 “贵货”，“贵货”表示本大利小。做“本大利小”的生意，是谓“不智”，“不智”是致富之大忌。
要致富，宜本小利大；要本小利大，就要有低价买进更多的胆识；胆识来自认识，认识来自功课。功课在业余为之，时间是“业余”，但心态不可“业余”。
股价大跌是机会
所以，要破除买进还是不买进的疑惑，就是在买进时自问：“若此股股价大跌，我敢加码吗？”如果不敢就别买。
对于严肃的投资者来说，股价大跌不是危机，而是机会，是以低价买进好股的良机，是做“本小利大”生意的最佳时机。就好像此次的次贷金融海啸，是最好的买进机会一样。
我们根本不知道明天的股市会如何。买进股票之后，股价大跌，是再平常不过的事。如果在大跌之后，买进更多，平均价就会更低。
我一向坚持，只买价值被低估而又有前途的股票，如果以2令吉买进，价值已属低估，同一只股票企业没有多大变化，则跌到1令吉，价值不是被低估得更厉害吗？
为什么不敢加码？
所以，在买进时，请自问：“若此股大跌，我敢加码吗？”如果答案是：“不知道”，或是“不敢”的话，就不要买。惟有信心十足地说：“是的，我会买进更多。”，才放胆买进。
当然，你放胆买进的，还必须是价值被低估而又有前途的股票。
如果他心里有了标准，事情就简单得多了。
只要符合标准的就买，不符合标准的股票就不买。所以，制订一个标准，是投资者当务之急。
勿以业余态度对待
在制订标准之前，首先，让我们弄清楚：我们投资股票最终的目的是什么？
相信每一个人都会说：志在赚钱啰！
是的，没有错，志在赚钱。但是，要赚怎样的钱？
有人进入股市，胸无大志，但求赚点零用钱；有的甚至只想赚个丰富的午餐就心满意足；也有雄心较大的，想赚儿女的教育费。
这种想法，无所谓对或不对，只是目标不大，就不够认真；不够认真就难以深入，不够深入则难以升堂入室。厕身投市十数年，仍是门外汉，这种投资者数不胜数，鲜有成就者。
要升堂入室，就不能以玩票的态度对待你的投资。
对大部分上班族来说，职业还是他的“正业”，股票投资只是“业余”的事。作为一个职场过来人，我认为在时间上视股票投资为“业余事”，并没有错，错在以“业余”的态度对待股票投资。视为“业余”，则自然而然的不像对“正业”那么认真。既属“业余”，则难免产生可有可无的错觉。有了这种错觉，就不会以严肃的态度对待投资。不认真，不以严肃态度去从事某事某业，鲜有能成功者。
这是严肃投资者首先要纠正的弱点。
既然我们不能放弃职业，成为专职投资者，那么，视投资为“业余”是对的。但在态度上、心态上必须纠正。以业余的时间去从事投资，是可以的，但不能以业余的心态去对待投资。
孔子说：“行有余力，则以学文”。我们不妨“职有余力，则以学股”。
时间用在别的事上
有些人以没有时间为藉口，不下功夫学投资。实际上，这是时间分配的问题，并非“没有时间”，而是把时间用在别的事上了。把时间用在别的事上，是你认为别的事比投资更重要。这是你的选择，无所谓对或错。但是，既然不把时间交给“投资”，就最好不要期望“投资”把财富交给你。吝啬你的时间于投资，却希望“投资”给予你丰厚的回报，是不合理的期望。
累积财富态度进股市
我曾担任总编辑和上市公司的高级总经理，事情是够忙够烦的，但却能把所有的公司年报和文告读完。
此无它，我摒弃了所有与投资无关的活动，把业余的时间全部用在阅读公司年报与文告上，而且是“日日清”，数十年如一日。你的职业会比我更忙更烦吗？如果我能做到，你有什么理由做不到？
好了，扯得远了，让我们回到“要赚怎样的钱”这个问题上吧。
我老觉得，投资者一开始就必须抱着累积财富的态度进入股市。你的最终目的，是要累积一批股票，使你在退休后，有固定的股息收入，这个股息收入，足以代替你退休后的薪金收入，如此一来，你达到了财务自主的境地。
形式上，你是退休了，但收入上，并没“退”，也没有“休”。你不必因为没有薪金收入而降低你的生活素质。相反的，你的生活素质应该更高，因为退休后，开支减少了，但收入没有减少，在金钱上，你可以更“爽手”，到了“从心所欲，不逾距(限制开支)”的地步，不亦快哉？
所以，不要持有在股市赚一顿饭的态度，去对待投资。要以退休后财务自在为投资鹄的。这个“鹄的”，就好像马拉松的终点，在整个长跑中，道路或有不平，天气或许酷热，但你不忘“鹄的”，造次必于是，颠沛必于是。
选择正确的股票
不要被道路两旁的杂音分散了你的注意力，只忘我地，全力以赴地向前跑，不达目的誓不罢休，最后一定能冲线，到达“鹄的”。
但是，要达到财务自主的“鹄的”，不是单靠耐力就可以做到的，还要加上其他的条件，而选择正确的股票，就是重要条件之一。如果选错股票，不但不能累积财富，而且财富会如炽热铁板上的冰块，迅速融化。
要避免选错股票，就要在买进之前，问自己：“十年以后，这家公司会变成怎样？”
如果你有信心，这家公司在十年之后，会比现在更好，赚得更多，那么，股票的价值会更高，那就大胆买进吧。如果你不能肯定，十年之后这家公司会比现在更好，就千万不要买进。
如果你不理会这家公司将来会怎样，只因为有人告诉你这只股票会起就买进，那么，你是在投机。投机接近赌博，没有人靠赌博发达，因为十赌九输，我对“十赌九输”从不置疑。
我有一个朋友，趁去年股市大跌，将数亿令吉资金投入国内外股市，所买的都是世界级企业的股票。他说：“二十年之后，才论定我之成败。”
既然一买进就准备持有二十年，则买进之前，当然挖尽了有关企业的资料，对有关企业的前途信心十足，才敢投入巨资。他对待投资，何等认真，二十年之后富可敌国，不是梦想。
买进有信心股票
相形之下，我提出十年的投资期，已算“克己”。原因是我不认为，十年河东变河西，世事多变，企业易变，与企业同行十年，已足够论成败。
既然准备与企业厮守十年，则只能买你有充分信心的股票，否则，易于半途而废。
在你买进的时候，你问自己：“假如此股狂跌，我敢加码买进更多吗？”
如果你的答案是“不肯定”的话，就不要买，因为这表示你对有关企业了解不够；因为不了解，就没有信心，没有信心则不敢在股价大跌后买进更多；不敢在低价买进更多，就无法拉低成本；无法拉低成本，就表示你手头所持有的，永远是 “贵货”，“贵货”表示本大利小。做“本大利小”的生意，是谓“不智”，“不智”是致富之大忌。
要致富，宜本小利大；要本小利大，就要有低价买进更多的胆识；胆识来自认识，认识来自功课。功课在业余为之，时间是“业余”，但心态不可“业余”。
股价大跌是机会
所以，要破除买进还是不买进的疑惑，就是在买进时自问：“若此股股价大跌，我敢加码吗？”如果不敢就别买。
对于严肃的投资者来说，股价大跌不是危机，而是机会，是以低价买进好股的良机，是做“本小利大”生意的最佳时机。就好像此次的次贷金融海啸，是最好的买进机会一样。
我们根本不知道明天的股市会如何。买进股票之后，股价大跌，是再平常不过的事。如果在大跌之后，买进更多，平均价就会更低。
我一向坚持，只买价值被低估而又有前途的股票，如果以2令吉买进，价值已属低估，同一只股票企业没有多大变化，则跌到1令吉，价值不是被低估得更厉害吗？
为什么不敢加码？
所以，在买进时，请自问：“若此股大跌，我敢加码吗？”如果答案是：“不知道”，或是“不敢”的话，就不要买。惟有信心十足地说：“是的，我会买进更多。”，才放胆买进。
当然，你放胆买进的，还必须是价值被低估而又有前途的股票。
Sunday, February 14, 2010
爾虞我詐 立心不良
歐盟峰會舉行在即，市場憧憬會有救希臘的方案出台，歐元走勢亦告轉穩。歐洲多國財長於峰會舉行前，已透過多方電話會議(conference call)商討有關事宜，市場傳言早前一直認為希臘應自行解決財政問題的德國，取態來一個180度轉變，願意牽頭推動歐盟拯救入危機的希臘，發展頗為戲劇性。
有人指德國肯出手，主要是為了保障國內銀行的利益，但細看國際清算銀行的數據，截至去年第3季，德國銀行向希臘放貸總額為430億美元，數目雖不小，但仍遠遠不及法國銀行業向希臘放貸的750億。因此，另一個說法指德國是希望及早設立防火牆，避免希臘財政問題演變成為歐洲問題，似乎較為可信。
歐盟峰會將如何支援希臘，頗引人入勝，市場現時傳出的可行方法包括由歐洲財政較健全的國家向希臘等財困國家提供信貸擔保、直接向希臘提供貸款援助、承諾向希臘購買主權債券，又或者把個案轉介國基會提供協助。
歐盟內部對應否直接出手救希臘，存在了分歧，歐盟27國中，歐元區成員國只有16個，一些非歐元區成員國如英國和瑞典等皆不想捲入這趟渾水，主張應該由國基會提供支援，因為國基會在這方面有足夠的專業經驗，亦擁有充沛的資源。最大的好處是，由國基會出手，歐盟其他國家便毋須因為要替希臘作信貸擔保，風險提升而導致孳息上升，增加融資成本。
但其他國家不乏反對聲音，認為希臘財困問題是歐洲自家事，若要國基會介入，會有失面子。而從國基會昔日向陷入財政危機國家提供援助的紀錄看，國基會往往會提出苛刻的救助條件，較希臘自行提出的削赤方案更加難以令國民接受。另外，國基會是誰在幕後控制，大家心知肚明，故不希望給予美國機會乘虛而入，插手歐洲內部事務。
根據巴克萊資產提供的資料，美國金融機構在希臘的放貸數量僅180億美元，遠低於德法兩國，即使計入歐豬四國其他三個國家，美國十大銀行的放貸合共亦只是1810億美元，包括向愛爾蘭放貨860億和向西班牙放貸680億，向葡萄牙放貨更只有90億，佔其向國貨款組合的比重僅5%，美國會否真心襄助，亦頗成疑問。
事實上，歐豬四國的危機有否遭誇大，實在令人懷疑。紐約大學教授魯賓尼及基金大鱷索羅斯均相信希臘債務問題最終可以解決，希臘可繼續維持歐元區成員國的身分，評級機構穆迪亦認為葡萄牙及西班牙的債務問題不應與希臘相提並論，至現時為止亦沒有需要支援或拯救的迫切性。不過，歐洲主權債務問題並非短期內可望決，有陰謀論者指問題曝光，是有心人刻意暴露歐洲的弱點，削弱歐元的影響力，以保住美元作為儲備貨幣的王者地位，信焉？
有人指德國肯出手，主要是為了保障國內銀行的利益，但細看國際清算銀行的數據，截至去年第3季，德國銀行向希臘放貸總額為430億美元，數目雖不小，但仍遠遠不及法國銀行業向希臘放貸的750億。因此，另一個說法指德國是希望及早設立防火牆，避免希臘財政問題演變成為歐洲問題，似乎較為可信。
歐盟峰會將如何支援希臘，頗引人入勝，市場現時傳出的可行方法包括由歐洲財政較健全的國家向希臘等財困國家提供信貸擔保、直接向希臘提供貸款援助、承諾向希臘購買主權債券，又或者把個案轉介國基會提供協助。
歐盟內部對應否直接出手救希臘，存在了分歧，歐盟27國中，歐元區成員國只有16個，一些非歐元區成員國如英國和瑞典等皆不想捲入這趟渾水，主張應該由國基會提供支援，因為國基會在這方面有足夠的專業經驗，亦擁有充沛的資源。最大的好處是，由國基會出手，歐盟其他國家便毋須因為要替希臘作信貸擔保，風險提升而導致孳息上升，增加融資成本。
但其他國家不乏反對聲音，認為希臘財困問題是歐洲自家事，若要國基會介入，會有失面子。而從國基會昔日向陷入財政危機國家提供援助的紀錄看，國基會往往會提出苛刻的救助條件，較希臘自行提出的削赤方案更加難以令國民接受。另外，國基會是誰在幕後控制，大家心知肚明，故不希望給予美國機會乘虛而入，插手歐洲內部事務。
根據巴克萊資產提供的資料，美國金融機構在希臘的放貸數量僅180億美元，遠低於德法兩國，即使計入歐豬四國其他三個國家，美國十大銀行的放貸合共亦只是1810億美元，包括向愛爾蘭放貨860億和向西班牙放貸680億，向葡萄牙放貨更只有90億，佔其向國貨款組合的比重僅5%，美國會否真心襄助，亦頗成疑問。
事實上，歐豬四國的危機有否遭誇大，實在令人懷疑。紐約大學教授魯賓尼及基金大鱷索羅斯均相信希臘債務問題最終可以解決，希臘可繼續維持歐元區成員國的身分，評級機構穆迪亦認為葡萄牙及西班牙的債務問題不應與希臘相提並論，至現時為止亦沒有需要支援或拯救的迫切性。不過，歐洲主權債務問題並非短期內可望決，有陰謀論者指問題曝光，是有心人刻意暴露歐洲的弱點，削弱歐元的影響力，以保住美元作為儲備貨幣的王者地位，信焉？
Saturday, February 13, 2010
歐洲問題一點不嚴重
連續兩天，恒指都在跌破19500點後出現反彈，昨日的反彈更強，似乎，恒指有可能在我之前預測的支持位 19181點之上已找到支持，比較穩妥的做法是等待2日移動平均線升越19日線才入市。
近幾天，傳媒天天在談歐豬 5國的財赤問題，實際上，這個問題有多嚴重？我認為一點也不嚴重，與美國天文數字的赤字比較，這只是小兒科。美國如此巨大的赤字都沒問題，希臘等5國的赤字，哪會有問題？分別只是美國天文數字的赤字可以通過印鈔票來償還，而歐盟諸國卻沒有印鈔票的自主權。
但是，這些國家發行的歐元國庫債券不會沒有買家，利率可能高一點罷了。歐盟中的富國如德國不可能見死不救，不救的結果是歐盟解體。我認為，所有的所謂問題，只是來自美國狙擊手在利用傳媒誇張問題，再通過炒高CDS來製造人為的恐慌情景。
當然我無法估計狙擊手會在甚麼水平獲利平倉離場，但是我很有信心，狙擊手是會見好就收，他們是沒有能力製造金融海嘯第二波，也沒有能力將1997年至1998年的亞洲金融風暴搬到歐洲重演，因為這些狙擊手仍不是德國政府的對手。
近幾天，傳媒天天在談歐豬 5國的財赤問題，實際上，這個問題有多嚴重？我認為一點也不嚴重，與美國天文數字的赤字比較，這只是小兒科。美國如此巨大的赤字都沒問題，希臘等5國的赤字，哪會有問題？分別只是美國天文數字的赤字可以通過印鈔票來償還，而歐盟諸國卻沒有印鈔票的自主權。
但是，這些國家發行的歐元國庫債券不會沒有買家，利率可能高一點罷了。歐盟中的富國如德國不可能見死不救，不救的結果是歐盟解體。我認為，所有的所謂問題，只是來自美國狙擊手在利用傳媒誇張問題，再通過炒高CDS來製造人為的恐慌情景。
當然我無法估計狙擊手會在甚麼水平獲利平倉離場，但是我很有信心，狙擊手是會見好就收，他們是沒有能力製造金融海嘯第二波，也沒有能力將1997年至1998年的亞洲金融風暴搬到歐洲重演，因為這些狙擊手仍不是德國政府的對手。
周小川 & 伯南克
昨日原本要談商品，結果沒有談，那麼是否改在今天？答案是否定，因為商品市場本周消息不多，升跌主要看外匯市場的變化，美元超買回落，商品自然可以反彈，但油價似乎無力突破75美元，金價在1,080美 元已現阻力，由此可見商品的調整仍未完結，同時亦代表美元指數在80點關口爭持後，將會再度發力向上，最新目標為83點。
不談商品，今日想談一談內地及美國的貨幣政策，尤其是人民銀行行長周小川及聯儲局主席伯南克，在這兩日同時談到貨幣政策的問題，自然要解讀一下。不過在研究兩人之談話內容時，我想先解構一下昨日內地公布之通脹數據情況。
昨日內地公布之CPI數字，只有1.5%，遠低於市場預期，我亦感到有點驚訝，可是當我再看一看去年1月及2月份的CPI數據後，則發現原來基數及春節的問題影響了一切。去年1月時，由於春節的關係，所以雖然金融海嘯的問題剛剛開始浮現，但當時內地的CPI仍能按年上升1%，但到了2月份時，失去春節效應，當時的CPI即時出現負數，按年下跌1.6%。
以此推算，由於今年的春節在2月份，加上比較基數較高，所以令上月份的CPI數字錄得遠低於預期的升幅，可是當本月春節效應出現，加上比較基數較低，我大膽估計2月份內地的CPI將會按年上升超過2%，比12月份的情況嚴重。
有此想法，是否代表我想推翻人行短期不加息的想法？絕對不是，尤其是當周小川前日之言論，明顯暗示人行正希望維持利率的穩定，這反而更令我相信，內地加息的時間，會較市場預期為慢，同時人行只會繼續以調高存款準備金，及發行央票去抽走市場過盛的資金，而且更重要是人行現在已獲得銀監會的全力配合，這令人行有更多的條件，暫時不用加息去遏抑潛在通脹壓力。
「均衡放貸」成為銀監會對內地銀行新定調，除了反映1月份可能高達1.4萬億新增貸款令銀監會不安外，愈來愈多證據顯示，內地通脹及資產泡沫的問題，並不可以單靠人行的努力，因為調高存款準備金及發行央票，對資金仍然充裕的銀行而言，起不到阻嚇作用，同時亦令市場流動性過強的問題，難以真正解決，只有嚴格控制貸款，才是真正的治標方法。
解讀完內地的問題後，那麼聯儲局主席伯南克在國會聽證會上，提到退市之計劃又應該如何理解？答案是令人失望極了。首先從金融體系抽走資金，包括向金融機構售存款證，再而上調銀行儲備金利率，最後才考慮加息，不過總結是卻指現時非退市適當時機，偏低利率仍維持一段時間，如此官方的話，參考價值近乎零。
故此，我寧願繼續將聯儲局副主席科恩上月之言論，記於心上，尤其是他提到在目前情況下，利率走勢不能確定，收緊政策對不同期限利率會產生怎樣的影響，難以預測，言簡意賅，而且沒有半點掩飾，這才是值得參考的言論，尤其是3月底聯儲局將結束購買抵押證券和機構債券計劃，屆時對美國的按揭息率帶來怎樣的壓力？小心繼「歐盟五國」之危機後，成為另一個困擾市場的問題。
不談商品，今日想談一談內地及美國的貨幣政策，尤其是人民銀行行長周小川及聯儲局主席伯南克，在這兩日同時談到貨幣政策的問題，自然要解讀一下。不過在研究兩人之談話內容時，我想先解構一下昨日內地公布之通脹數據情況。
昨日內地公布之CPI數字，只有1.5%，遠低於市場預期，我亦感到有點驚訝，可是當我再看一看去年1月及2月份的CPI數據後，則發現原來基數及春節的問題影響了一切。去年1月時，由於春節的關係，所以雖然金融海嘯的問題剛剛開始浮現，但當時內地的CPI仍能按年上升1%，但到了2月份時，失去春節效應，當時的CPI即時出現負數，按年下跌1.6%。
以此推算，由於今年的春節在2月份，加上比較基數較高，所以令上月份的CPI數字錄得遠低於預期的升幅，可是當本月春節效應出現，加上比較基數較低，我大膽估計2月份內地的CPI將會按年上升超過2%，比12月份的情況嚴重。
有此想法，是否代表我想推翻人行短期不加息的想法？絕對不是，尤其是當周小川前日之言論，明顯暗示人行正希望維持利率的穩定，這反而更令我相信，內地加息的時間，會較市場預期為慢，同時人行只會繼續以調高存款準備金，及發行央票去抽走市場過盛的資金，而且更重要是人行現在已獲得銀監會的全力配合，這令人行有更多的條件，暫時不用加息去遏抑潛在通脹壓力。
「均衡放貸」成為銀監會對內地銀行新定調，除了反映1月份可能高達1.4萬億新增貸款令銀監會不安外，愈來愈多證據顯示，內地通脹及資產泡沫的問題，並不可以單靠人行的努力，因為調高存款準備金及發行央票，對資金仍然充裕的銀行而言，起不到阻嚇作用，同時亦令市場流動性過強的問題，難以真正解決，只有嚴格控制貸款，才是真正的治標方法。
解讀完內地的問題後，那麼聯儲局主席伯南克在國會聽證會上，提到退市之計劃又應該如何理解？答案是令人失望極了。首先從金融體系抽走資金，包括向金融機構售存款證，再而上調銀行儲備金利率，最後才考慮加息，不過總結是卻指現時非退市適當時機，偏低利率仍維持一段時間，如此官方的話，參考價值近乎零。
故此，我寧願繼續將聯儲局副主席科恩上月之言論，記於心上，尤其是他提到在目前情況下，利率走勢不能確定，收緊政策對不同期限利率會產生怎樣的影響，難以預測，言簡意賅，而且沒有半點掩飾，這才是值得參考的言論，尤其是3月底聯儲局將結束購買抵押證券和機構債券計劃，屆時對美國的按揭息率帶來怎樣的壓力？小心繼「歐盟五國」之危機後，成為另一個困擾市場的問題。
虎 年 大 吉
歡迎來到虎年，這是中國十二生肖當中最兇猛的動物，所以大家可以預期，來年必定相當刺激。
牛年是值得銘記的一年，因為去年真是名副其實的牛市。所以，今年在老虎這隻強壯而兇猛的野獸下，亞洲的經濟基石，包括香港，會否受惠呢？
虎年是入貨良機
根據歷史，虎年好壞參半。上一個虎年在九八年，是令亞洲投資者驚恐的一年，因為亞洲金融風暴在該年發生。首先由泰國開始，然後短短數月令整個東亞一片恐慌，迫使香港政府入市為恒生指數建立一個鐵底，令其不會再瀉。當時港府買入的股票，便是現時盈富基金的基礎。當年，任何人只要相信股票，並趁底吸納，現時肯定大賺。
再對上一個虎年，是一九八六年，那是一個好年，卻造成了八七股災。當年股市大瀉，政府不得不出手干預，把交易所關閉四天，但這不是老虎的責任，而是下一年兔仔要承擔的後果。恒生指數跌至低於一千點，實在是投資者入貨的大好良機。
更早的股災發生在一九七三年，之後的復甦在一九七四年開始，也是虎年，儘管股市仍然低沉。我認為當時的情況，比美國○八年的金融海嘯更嚴重。在七一至七四年間，我在倫敦，經濟氣氛一天比一天沮喪，二線銀行和地產公司骨牌般接連倒閉。但更重要的，是我在七四年回港，房屋平得不得了，對任何有勇氣投身股市或樓市的人來說，實在是絕佳好年。
我印象中，一九六二年也好像是一個好年，當時我在新加坡，橡膠和錫業泡沫爆破將近尾聲，但馬印對抗開始，印尼人攻擊馬來西亞人和新加坡人，到一九六五年，新加坡宣布獨立。可能六二年不是太好的一年，惟仍然是適合買股票的一年。
中美關係成陰霾
我認為一○年會是好年，美國由衰退中回復，中國則努力調控，避免經濟因過熱而造成泡沫爆破。在這樣的環境下，經濟會增長，但是否足以引領股市或樓市，則仍是未知之數，但我相信不會有嚴重下挫，除非出現大量超買。
中美之間的關係有些許危機，主要是因為一些小爭議：例如美國對台售武，雖然台灣沒有可能用這些武器對付中國；美國總統奧巴馬和達賴會面，當然奧巴馬可以和任何人見面，正如胡錦濤和金正日見面，也不容奧巴馬非議。至於貿易限制，這個問題則難以解決，但雙方要想辦法令衝突不要升溫；另一問題是美國經常要人民幣升值，但天知道真正的匯率應該多少，就連美國的批評者都不能定論。
無論如何，若今次虎年將按上述所指的先例而行，這將是適合入貨的好年，尤其是當股市繼續調整之時。未必有即時的顯著效果，但實際作用已能從前幾次的虎年證實。當然，任何在一九六二年前買了股票都是恩賜，因為派息已足以抵銷你的成本；甚至，現時一年的派息，已等如你當初股票買入價的五倍。
牛年是值得銘記的一年，因為去年真是名副其實的牛市。所以，今年在老虎這隻強壯而兇猛的野獸下，亞洲的經濟基石，包括香港，會否受惠呢？
虎年是入貨良機
根據歷史，虎年好壞參半。上一個虎年在九八年，是令亞洲投資者驚恐的一年，因為亞洲金融風暴在該年發生。首先由泰國開始，然後短短數月令整個東亞一片恐慌，迫使香港政府入市為恒生指數建立一個鐵底，令其不會再瀉。當時港府買入的股票，便是現時盈富基金的基礎。當年，任何人只要相信股票，並趁底吸納，現時肯定大賺。
再對上一個虎年，是一九八六年，那是一個好年，卻造成了八七股災。當年股市大瀉，政府不得不出手干預，把交易所關閉四天，但這不是老虎的責任，而是下一年兔仔要承擔的後果。恒生指數跌至低於一千點，實在是投資者入貨的大好良機。
更早的股災發生在一九七三年，之後的復甦在一九七四年開始，也是虎年，儘管股市仍然低沉。我認為當時的情況，比美國○八年的金融海嘯更嚴重。在七一至七四年間，我在倫敦，經濟氣氛一天比一天沮喪，二線銀行和地產公司骨牌般接連倒閉。但更重要的，是我在七四年回港，房屋平得不得了，對任何有勇氣投身股市或樓市的人來說，實在是絕佳好年。
我印象中，一九六二年也好像是一個好年，當時我在新加坡，橡膠和錫業泡沫爆破將近尾聲，但馬印對抗開始，印尼人攻擊馬來西亞人和新加坡人，到一九六五年，新加坡宣布獨立。可能六二年不是太好的一年，惟仍然是適合買股票的一年。
中美關係成陰霾
我認為一○年會是好年，美國由衰退中回復，中國則努力調控，避免經濟因過熱而造成泡沫爆破。在這樣的環境下，經濟會增長，但是否足以引領股市或樓市，則仍是未知之數，但我相信不會有嚴重下挫，除非出現大量超買。
中美之間的關係有些許危機，主要是因為一些小爭議：例如美國對台售武，雖然台灣沒有可能用這些武器對付中國；美國總統奧巴馬和達賴會面，當然奧巴馬可以和任何人見面，正如胡錦濤和金正日見面，也不容奧巴馬非議。至於貿易限制，這個問題則難以解決，但雙方要想辦法令衝突不要升溫；另一問題是美國經常要人民幣升值，但天知道真正的匯率應該多少，就連美國的批評者都不能定論。
無論如何，若今次虎年將按上述所指的先例而行，這將是適合入貨的好年，尤其是當股市繼續調整之時。未必有即時的顯著效果，但實際作用已能從前幾次的虎年證實。當然，任何在一九六二年前買了股票都是恩賜，因為派息已足以抵銷你的成本；甚至，現時一年的派息，已等如你當初股票買入價的五倍。
通縮猛於虎
2月11日，周四，預祝各位讀者新春大吉。去年1月起出現債券與股票最大的背馳，三十年期孳息率由2008年12月18日2.53厘升至2010年1月11日的4.74厘；反之，道指自去年3月到今年1月大幅上升。
歷史上最大債券牛市壽終
事實上，過去二十年亦曾出現類似情況，包括1987年、1994年秋季、98年夏季及2000年冬季。這一次結果如何？可能性有二：一、1981年10月開始的利率回落期（三十年期債息曾高見15.21厘）在2008年12月結束，歷史上最大的債券牛市於2009年1月壽終正寢，一旦4.74厘失守，意味長債孳息完成頭肩底，有機會高見7厘，將引發新一輪股樓回落期，即所謂「第二波」衰退由今年1月開始。二、通縮出現，令美國長債孳息在2.53厘到4.74厘之間上落，美國經濟正式陷入90年代日式衰退。
2009年3月至2010年1月納指升79％、標普五百指數升65％、道指升60％。但根據TrimTabs Investment Research向超過五千五百隻基金調查的結果，它們正面對120億美元資金淨流出（即沽出者較買入者多120億美元），尤其是今年1月基金持有人共提走34億美元；上述情況對美股後市極之不利。去年3月標普五百指數開始形成上升通道，成交額反而日漸減少；不過，今年1月19日見1150點後成交額回升，然後跌穿上升通道時成交額進一步增加，代表反彈市已於1月19日完成，跌市又再開始。
我老曹上周香港電台的新春金融節目，唔少聽眾問內地物業市場有冇泡沫成分？當然有。自1971年美元同黃金脫鈎後，過去四十年聯儲局便不斷製造泡沫。1989年起中國人民銀行亦加入（其他國家央行早於七、八十年代加入，1985年日本銀行更製造了戰後最大泡沫而不自知）。
不要逃避泡沫
泡沫是否如斯可怕？如你逃不過當然可怕。1971及74年我老曹經歷兩次泡沫洗禮，便發誓今後不再讓泡沫淹沒。近期的泡沫包括2000年科網股泡沫及2007年10月次按危機，如逃不過，你的一生已然改變，遑論1997年第三季開始的香港樓市泡沫爆破。不過，泡沫是否可愛？的確又幾可愛也。1971年至今，香港共經歷過七次泡沫。1971年那次，我老曹的身家由5000元變成20多萬元（上升四十多倍）；1973年那次，又再次有機會由8000元變成50萬元（上升六十多倍），黃金則在十年內上升三倍。可以說，泡沫既可愛又可怕，作為投資者，不要逃避泡沫，而是利用泡沫去壯大自己。
近年金價由去年4月17日864.97美元上升至12月3日1226.56美元，下調升幅50%可見1045.76美元，2月5日見1044.85美元，呢個位十分重要，守得住仍可看好，反之可能失守1000美元，見960美元（另一50%下調幅度）。
去年銅價升幅亦十分可人……。銅乃著名的「經濟博士」（銅價的預測能力較大部分經濟博士更好）。去年銅帶頭上升，我老曹亦曾大力推介江西銅業。不過，今年1月起銅價大跌，你又信不信「銅博士」的預測能力？
目前希臘財赤達GDP 12.7%，愛爾蘭11.7％、西班牙11.4%、葡萄牙9.3%，遠超歐羅區要求的3%。與美國、日本不同，美日可透過發債支付財赤，因美元乃世界流通貨幣，日本人則本身十分有錢。歐豬國必須歐州央行增加貸款或者停止支付利息（無力履行合約），因此十分痛苦。希臘正面對削減開支壓力，但由於其為歐盟成員，不能透過貨幣貶值去刺激經濟，看來希臘有排衰，只係銀碼不大，影響有限；反而葡萄牙、西班牙的2萬億歐羅債券信用降級，影響則較大，還有意大利及愛爾蘭……。老實講，即使美國政府現在亦發現進一步出售長期債券有困難，因為國會開始立法禁止金融機構自行買賣債券。
波羅的海老虎水深火熱
去年1月歐羅M3增長率6％，今年1月已降至0.2％（去年11月同12周更出現收縮），擔心歐洲今年進入通縮期。有「波羅的海老虎」之稱的愛沙尼亞、拉脫維亞、立陶苑等，在2003年至2007年GDP增長率達12％，但2009年GDP跌幅達5％至10％，可見三國經濟已陷入水深火熱中。在2003年至2007年信貸寬鬆期，這些國家樓價、工資大幅上升，刺激了CPI，而加入歐羅區則提供了一個滙價穩定及低利率的環境。2008年起情況剛剛相反，不但樓價及工資大跌，通脹率則繼續上升，引發大量資金外流，目前情況已十分嚴峻。整個歐羅區仍有經濟實力的國家只有德國，但單憑德國一國之力能否挽狂瀾於既倒？
假設1971年沒有美元危機，則今天一盎斯黃金仍兌35美元，那今天道指應是多少點？答案是350點，較1966年1月18日1000點回落65％！1982年8月至2007年10月長達二十五年的美股大牛市，其實是建基於貨幣大貶值（美元購買力自1966年至今失去96％購買力），恒生指數今天應是666點（甚至2007年高點32000點亦應改為1067點），即1973年至今恒生指數回落62％。今天香港樓價8000元一呎，相當於1971年前的266元購買力，當年樓價是100多元一呎，即樓價四十年內只上升一倍。過去四十年所謂經濟繁榮期，其實是來自貨幣購買力下降所產生的幻象，並不真實。
1990年起日圓購買力不再下跌，有如仙履奇緣中的灰姑娘，當時鐘敲響十二下，一切打回原形。二十年過去了，她仍在癡癡地等候王子的使者拿來玻璃鞋，把她變成皇妃（但使者至今仍未出現）。令人擔心的問題是，美國這位灰姑娘是否已面對時鐘敲響十二下的命運？
高儲蓄率將遏抑需求
今年1月初SEI Advisor Network向四百四十二位金融顧問發出問卷調查，其中23％極之樂觀、62％審慎樂觀、15％悲觀，結果如何？道指由1月19日起大跌，證明85％金融顧問在今年1月初睇錯市。今天仍有不少金融顧問在宣揚「惡性通脹」；他們知不知道，2009年8月日本出現近三十八年來最大的單月通縮，2009年11月起政府第二次推出量化寬鬆政策？自1994年起至今，日本向全球提供大量資金，利率平均只有1.31厘，才令日圓滙價由79日圓跌至90日圓（貶14％），即扣除滙率後，接近毋須利息成本便可借到日圓。
日本的困境已屬舊聞，法國過去十六個月儲蓄率急升至17％的二十七年新高，法國政府財赤更達GDP 8％，如何拯救其他成員國？歐羅區國家的財赤已十分高，今年起歐洲各國進入大慳特慳期，未來歐洲人必須節衣縮食，又何來高通脹？高儲蓄率將令需求下降，如此形勢下，CPI又怎能大升？
美國情況亦差不多，截至去年9月止政府負債11.9萬億美元，其中4.3萬億美元由政府其他機構持有（例如社會保障計劃），7.5萬億美元由其他人或國家持有，即美國負債佔GDP 83％（如不計政府其他機構持有則為53％），估計到2020年政府負債將達GDP 107％（如不計政府其他機構持有為77％），處境類同今天日本政府。
美元自去年12月起止跌回升。在去年歐羅上升時，歐洲人大幅增加儲蓄率，看來今年美國人的儲蓄率亦將急升，意味今年第四季美國通縮又重臨的機會很大，小心通縮猛於虎！翻查美國立國二百六十多年，通脹（尤其惡性通脹）的日子不多，通常同戰爭有關。和平期唯一高通脹及維持最長的日子是由1966年開始到1980年，去年如沒有量化寬鬆政策，相信美國已陷入通縮期。至於去年下半年開始的通脹期，到底是大趨勢（通縮）中的小反彈，還是步入惡性通脹的開始？今年下半年將清晰。
2007年10月起美國經濟進入去槓桿化時代，估計需多年才完成。今天在美國賣出一間住宅平均需十三點九個月（較一年前多50％）。去年3月政府透過增加開支撑起的美股，今年1月19日起再次進入調整期。最近政府除宣布削減軍費支出、節省450億美元外，亦減少對原油、天然氣及煤炭企業的補助，未來十年可節省400億美元。2008年底聯儲局將美元利率降至接近零，去年3月更推出量化寬鬆政策，但今年已無能為力矣（They can talk, but they cannot walk!）。2008年第一季開始的美國經濟衰退去年第二季結束（長達十八個月），去年第三季開始的經濟復蘇可維持多久？這次美國經濟復蘇，既不是1982年8月，甚至不是2002年10月，可能只是一次熊市中的大反彈，而這個大反彈已在今年1月19日完成，因為不少金融機構再次變成投機分子，投機風險由股東（或政府）承擔，利潤卻歸其高管所有。
新增貨幣多用作減債
如果冇去年3月開始的量化寬鬆政策，估計美股反彈期只有五至六個月；這次美股上升能保持超過十個月，動力來自政府開支大增，令過去兩年美國的貨幣基礎由8270億美元升至近期的1.93萬億美元。貨幣基礎並沒有令通脹惡化，理由是新增貨幣沒有用作增加消費，只用作減債。美國亦有些地方與日本不同，日本政府是向人民借錢增加開支，因此過去二十年日圓滙價仍可企穩；美國政府則向全球借錢，形成美元滙價自去年3月起回落。
2007年10月開始至今，聯儲局的資產負債表已擴大三倍，包括動用1萬億美元購入有問題資產及證券，另為11.6萬億美元貸款提供保證（估計已出現1萬億美元虧損）。若美國今年4月起真的開始退市，影響如何？大淡友麥嘉華認為，標普五百指數由去年3月到今年1月19日上升70％，見1150點後下調20％，見920點。
GMO策略師Jeremy Grantham認為，從1970年起，用GDP增長率計算，標普五百合理指數應在850點。去年大幅上升來自政府刺激經濟計劃，一旦退市，標普指數應重返850點。
標普五百200天線或短期失守
如兩位仁兄估計正確，標普五百指數200天線短期內將失守。去年年初我老曹估計美股熊市反彈短而急；至今為止道指上升超過十個月，超過1930年那次美股反彈（從1929年11月開始到1930年4月結束，共六個月；然後回落到1932年6月結束整個熊市）。這次美股反彈由去年3月開始，至今年1月19日結束，升幅65.7％。令這次美國經濟衰退是1990年代日式──即資產價格由泡沫水平回落至理性水平機會較大，因此需要極長時間完成；因為人們必須找尋新工種（因舊工種早已消失），企業必須重組重整去適應新局面，家庭則必須減少消費去清還過去欠債……上述過程所需時間十分長，導致今次美國經濟衰退有異於戰後任何一次經濟衰退，因為改變習慣不是一朝一夕的事。
歷史上最大債券牛市壽終
事實上，過去二十年亦曾出現類似情況，包括1987年、1994年秋季、98年夏季及2000年冬季。這一次結果如何？可能性有二：一、1981年10月開始的利率回落期（三十年期債息曾高見15.21厘）在2008年12月結束，歷史上最大的債券牛市於2009年1月壽終正寢，一旦4.74厘失守，意味長債孳息完成頭肩底，有機會高見7厘，將引發新一輪股樓回落期，即所謂「第二波」衰退由今年1月開始。二、通縮出現，令美國長債孳息在2.53厘到4.74厘之間上落，美國經濟正式陷入90年代日式衰退。
2009年3月至2010年1月納指升79％、標普五百指數升65％、道指升60％。但根據TrimTabs Investment Research向超過五千五百隻基金調查的結果，它們正面對120億美元資金淨流出（即沽出者較買入者多120億美元），尤其是今年1月基金持有人共提走34億美元；上述情況對美股後市極之不利。去年3月標普五百指數開始形成上升通道，成交額反而日漸減少；不過，今年1月19日見1150點後成交額回升，然後跌穿上升通道時成交額進一步增加，代表反彈市已於1月19日完成，跌市又再開始。
我老曹上周香港電台的新春金融節目，唔少聽眾問內地物業市場有冇泡沫成分？當然有。自1971年美元同黃金脫鈎後，過去四十年聯儲局便不斷製造泡沫。1989年起中國人民銀行亦加入（其他國家央行早於七、八十年代加入，1985年日本銀行更製造了戰後最大泡沫而不自知）。
不要逃避泡沫
泡沫是否如斯可怕？如你逃不過當然可怕。1971及74年我老曹經歷兩次泡沫洗禮，便發誓今後不再讓泡沫淹沒。近期的泡沫包括2000年科網股泡沫及2007年10月次按危機，如逃不過，你的一生已然改變，遑論1997年第三季開始的香港樓市泡沫爆破。不過，泡沫是否可愛？的確又幾可愛也。1971年至今，香港共經歷過七次泡沫。1971年那次，我老曹的身家由5000元變成20多萬元（上升四十多倍）；1973年那次，又再次有機會由8000元變成50萬元（上升六十多倍），黃金則在十年內上升三倍。可以說，泡沫既可愛又可怕，作為投資者，不要逃避泡沫，而是利用泡沫去壯大自己。
近年金價由去年4月17日864.97美元上升至12月3日1226.56美元，下調升幅50%可見1045.76美元，2月5日見1044.85美元，呢個位十分重要，守得住仍可看好，反之可能失守1000美元，見960美元（另一50%下調幅度）。
去年銅價升幅亦十分可人……。銅乃著名的「經濟博士」（銅價的預測能力較大部分經濟博士更好）。去年銅帶頭上升，我老曹亦曾大力推介江西銅業。不過，今年1月起銅價大跌，你又信不信「銅博士」的預測能力？
目前希臘財赤達GDP 12.7%，愛爾蘭11.7％、西班牙11.4%、葡萄牙9.3%，遠超歐羅區要求的3%。與美國、日本不同，美日可透過發債支付財赤，因美元乃世界流通貨幣，日本人則本身十分有錢。歐豬國必須歐州央行增加貸款或者停止支付利息（無力履行合約），因此十分痛苦。希臘正面對削減開支壓力，但由於其為歐盟成員，不能透過貨幣貶值去刺激經濟，看來希臘有排衰，只係銀碼不大，影響有限；反而葡萄牙、西班牙的2萬億歐羅債券信用降級，影響則較大，還有意大利及愛爾蘭……。老實講，即使美國政府現在亦發現進一步出售長期債券有困難，因為國會開始立法禁止金融機構自行買賣債券。
波羅的海老虎水深火熱
去年1月歐羅M3增長率6％，今年1月已降至0.2％（去年11月同12周更出現收縮），擔心歐洲今年進入通縮期。有「波羅的海老虎」之稱的愛沙尼亞、拉脫維亞、立陶苑等，在2003年至2007年GDP增長率達12％，但2009年GDP跌幅達5％至10％，可見三國經濟已陷入水深火熱中。在2003年至2007年信貸寬鬆期，這些國家樓價、工資大幅上升，刺激了CPI，而加入歐羅區則提供了一個滙價穩定及低利率的環境。2008年起情況剛剛相反，不但樓價及工資大跌，通脹率則繼續上升，引發大量資金外流，目前情況已十分嚴峻。整個歐羅區仍有經濟實力的國家只有德國，但單憑德國一國之力能否挽狂瀾於既倒？
假設1971年沒有美元危機，則今天一盎斯黃金仍兌35美元，那今天道指應是多少點？答案是350點，較1966年1月18日1000點回落65％！1982年8月至2007年10月長達二十五年的美股大牛市，其實是建基於貨幣大貶值（美元購買力自1966年至今失去96％購買力），恒生指數今天應是666點（甚至2007年高點32000點亦應改為1067點），即1973年至今恒生指數回落62％。今天香港樓價8000元一呎，相當於1971年前的266元購買力，當年樓價是100多元一呎，即樓價四十年內只上升一倍。過去四十年所謂經濟繁榮期，其實是來自貨幣購買力下降所產生的幻象，並不真實。
1990年起日圓購買力不再下跌，有如仙履奇緣中的灰姑娘，當時鐘敲響十二下，一切打回原形。二十年過去了，她仍在癡癡地等候王子的使者拿來玻璃鞋，把她變成皇妃（但使者至今仍未出現）。令人擔心的問題是，美國這位灰姑娘是否已面對時鐘敲響十二下的命運？
高儲蓄率將遏抑需求
今年1月初SEI Advisor Network向四百四十二位金融顧問發出問卷調查，其中23％極之樂觀、62％審慎樂觀、15％悲觀，結果如何？道指由1月19日起大跌，證明85％金融顧問在今年1月初睇錯市。今天仍有不少金融顧問在宣揚「惡性通脹」；他們知不知道，2009年8月日本出現近三十八年來最大的單月通縮，2009年11月起政府第二次推出量化寬鬆政策？自1994年起至今，日本向全球提供大量資金，利率平均只有1.31厘，才令日圓滙價由79日圓跌至90日圓（貶14％），即扣除滙率後，接近毋須利息成本便可借到日圓。
日本的困境已屬舊聞，法國過去十六個月儲蓄率急升至17％的二十七年新高，法國政府財赤更達GDP 8％，如何拯救其他成員國？歐羅區國家的財赤已十分高，今年起歐洲各國進入大慳特慳期，未來歐洲人必須節衣縮食，又何來高通脹？高儲蓄率將令需求下降，如此形勢下，CPI又怎能大升？
美國情況亦差不多，截至去年9月止政府負債11.9萬億美元，其中4.3萬億美元由政府其他機構持有（例如社會保障計劃），7.5萬億美元由其他人或國家持有，即美國負債佔GDP 83％（如不計政府其他機構持有則為53％），估計到2020年政府負債將達GDP 107％（如不計政府其他機構持有為77％），處境類同今天日本政府。
美元自去年12月起止跌回升。在去年歐羅上升時，歐洲人大幅增加儲蓄率，看來今年美國人的儲蓄率亦將急升，意味今年第四季美國通縮又重臨的機會很大，小心通縮猛於虎！翻查美國立國二百六十多年，通脹（尤其惡性通脹）的日子不多，通常同戰爭有關。和平期唯一高通脹及維持最長的日子是由1966年開始到1980年，去年如沒有量化寬鬆政策，相信美國已陷入通縮期。至於去年下半年開始的通脹期，到底是大趨勢（通縮）中的小反彈，還是步入惡性通脹的開始？今年下半年將清晰。
2007年10月起美國經濟進入去槓桿化時代，估計需多年才完成。今天在美國賣出一間住宅平均需十三點九個月（較一年前多50％）。去年3月政府透過增加開支撑起的美股，今年1月19日起再次進入調整期。最近政府除宣布削減軍費支出、節省450億美元外，亦減少對原油、天然氣及煤炭企業的補助，未來十年可節省400億美元。2008年底聯儲局將美元利率降至接近零，去年3月更推出量化寬鬆政策，但今年已無能為力矣（They can talk, but they cannot walk!）。2008年第一季開始的美國經濟衰退去年第二季結束（長達十八個月），去年第三季開始的經濟復蘇可維持多久？這次美國經濟復蘇，既不是1982年8月，甚至不是2002年10月，可能只是一次熊市中的大反彈，而這個大反彈已在今年1月19日完成，因為不少金融機構再次變成投機分子，投機風險由股東（或政府）承擔，利潤卻歸其高管所有。
新增貨幣多用作減債
如果冇去年3月開始的量化寬鬆政策，估計美股反彈期只有五至六個月；這次美股上升能保持超過十個月，動力來自政府開支大增，令過去兩年美國的貨幣基礎由8270億美元升至近期的1.93萬億美元。貨幣基礎並沒有令通脹惡化，理由是新增貨幣沒有用作增加消費，只用作減債。美國亦有些地方與日本不同，日本政府是向人民借錢增加開支，因此過去二十年日圓滙價仍可企穩；美國政府則向全球借錢，形成美元滙價自去年3月起回落。
2007年10月開始至今，聯儲局的資產負債表已擴大三倍，包括動用1萬億美元購入有問題資產及證券，另為11.6萬億美元貸款提供保證（估計已出現1萬億美元虧損）。若美國今年4月起真的開始退市，影響如何？大淡友麥嘉華認為，標普五百指數由去年3月到今年1月19日上升70％，見1150點後下調20％，見920點。
GMO策略師Jeremy Grantham認為，從1970年起，用GDP增長率計算，標普五百合理指數應在850點。去年大幅上升來自政府刺激經濟計劃，一旦退市，標普指數應重返850點。
標普五百200天線或短期失守
如兩位仁兄估計正確，標普五百指數200天線短期內將失守。去年年初我老曹估計美股熊市反彈短而急；至今為止道指上升超過十個月，超過1930年那次美股反彈（從1929年11月開始到1930年4月結束，共六個月；然後回落到1932年6月結束整個熊市）。這次美股反彈由去年3月開始，至今年1月19日結束，升幅65.7％。令這次美國經濟衰退是1990年代日式──即資產價格由泡沫水平回落至理性水平機會較大，因此需要極長時間完成；因為人們必須找尋新工種（因舊工種早已消失），企業必須重組重整去適應新局面，家庭則必須減少消費去清還過去欠債……上述過程所需時間十分長，導致今次美國經濟衰退有異於戰後任何一次經濟衰退，因為改變習慣不是一朝一夕的事。
Friday, February 12, 2010
Teachings from an investment legend – Bernard Baruch
Courtesy Charles Kirk (The Kirk Report), I have just been reminded of the rich legacy of Bernard Baruch’s investment wisdom. After graduating from college in New York in 1889, Baruch worked as an office boy in a linen business and later in Wall Street broking houses. Over the years he amassed a fortune as a stock market speculator, in addition to being an advisor to Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt.
Baruch was recognized as one of Wall Street’s financial leaders and his teachings are as valuable today as decades ago. These are well documented in his book Baruch: My Own Story (1957) in which, among others, he said: “I have heard many men talk intelligently, even brilliantly, about something – only to see them proven powerless when it comes to acting on what they believe.”
I am grateful to Charles Kirk for having taken the trouble of summarizing Baruch’s pertinent words of wisdom – sage advice that we can all do with to guide us to correct investment decisions – reported verbatim in the paragraphs below.
• Baruch started out as most traders do – i.e. losing lots of money because he lacked the knowledge, experience and discipline. “You have to lose money in order to better yourself.”
• Real success in the market takes time and money. Unfortunately “most people view the market as the place where the miracle of great and quick riches can be performed with little effort”.
• Overtrading and holding too many positions in his early years caused Baruch to go broke many times before he developed the discipline to succeed.
• A successful speculator is “a man who observes the future and acts before it occurs”. Acting swiftly in the market is important.
• After losing money as a result of the recommendation of others, Baruch focused on the facts. “One must search through a maze of complex and contradictory details to get to the significant facts … Then he must be able to operate coldly, clearly, and skilfully on the basis of those facts.” The challenge for the successful speculator is “how to disentangle the cold hard facts from the rather warm feelings of the people dealing with the facts.” Moreover, “if you get all the facts, your judgment can be right; if you don’t get all the facts, it can’t be right”.
• Be honest with yourself and expect to be wrong as many times as you are right. “If a speculator is correct half of the time, he is hitting a good average. Even being right 3 or 4 times out of 10 should yield a person a fortune if he has the sense to cut his losses quickly on the ventures where he is wrong.” Cutting losses quickly was THE most important trading rule.
• Don’t underestimate the power of thinking. “During my eighty-seven years I have witnessed a whole succession of technological revolutions. But none of them has done away with the need for character in the individual or the ability to think.”
• If your stocks are keeping you awake a night worrying about them, you should sell them to a “sleeping point”.
• The way to truly succeed in the market is to devote oneself full-time to the task. “Because of the extreme challenge, one must commit full attention to it.” Market speculation is “no different than trying to be a successful doctor or lawyer … you simply must devote yourself full-time to the study of your craft”.
• Through experience, Baruch learned the golden rule - never take stock tips from others. Self-reliance and “doing one’s own thinking” are a must.
• Baruch found it best to keep silent about his positions and trades and he believed it was “best to trade alone”. When he retired from A.A. Housman & Company and went on his own, Baruch did so because he thought it was best to trade independently and remain focused in order to achieve the greatest profits. “Most of the successful people I’ve known are the ones who do more listening than talking.”
• According to Baruch, the stock market does not determine the health of the economy but “rather reflects it”. The ability to understand this is an important skill.
• Baruch would often trade both sides of the market – long and short. “Having flexibility should not be underestimated.”
• About risk, he said: There is no investment which does not involve some risk and is not something of a gamble.” Moreover, “what we can try to do perhaps is to come to a better understanding of how to reduce the element of risk in whatever we undertake”.
• Baruch did not believe in diversification, but that it was “better to have a few stocks and to watch them carefully”.
• Having a “good supply of cash on hand at all times in reserve is important” to take advantage of market declines and major crashes.
• He believed that traders should focus on one thing at a time. He thought no one could be an expert at too many things. He liked to focus on “one thing at a time, perfect it, and do it well”.
• Baruch believed the two main mistakes that contributed to his early losses were the same mistakes most investors make, namely 1) “They know too little about the company’s management, earnings, prospects, and possibility for future growth” and 2) “They tend to trade beyond their financial capital capacity”.
• Baruch was a fundamentalist versus technical focused investor. In essence he required strong real assets of the company (cash and properties), that the company produced or performed something that is needed and valued, and that it had good management.
• “Successful speculation requires staying on top of changes in industries and companies that either create new industries or improve on existing industries. The majority of your profits will come from these two … The shrewdest traders throughout history all adapted the skill of reactionary change, as the market constantly presents new and different opportunities.”
• What drives stock prices is human reactions. Ironically, the key to successful speculation is to remove our decisions from our emotions. “Without control over your emotions, there is very little chance for profitable success in the stock market.”
• Baruch often described the market as a thermometer and the economic environment as the fever. “The market does not cause economic cycles but merely reflects them and the judgments of what traders believe business and the future will be like.”
• He believed no one could sell at the top and buy at the bottom (both for stocks and the market itself). “Don’t try to buy at the bottom and sell at the top. It can’t be done except by liars.” That said, Baruch said that through all of his time and research, he would develop a “feel” for when it was time to reduce positions. “I made my money by selling too soon.” While he didn’t have sell rules per se, he developed more of a sense that one gets when one trades for many years and follows the market with intense study.
• “It is much harder to sell stocks correctly than to buy them correctly.” Because of the emotional aspect of trading, if a “stock went up, the average investor would hold because he wants more gains – he’s exhibiting greed. If the stock declines, he also holds on and hopes the stock will come back so he can at least sell and break even - he’s hoping against hope”. Baruch worked hard to avoid these emotions by recognizing mistakes early and taking immediate action to own up to his mistakes quickly.
• Baruch believed that you had to take responsibility for your decisions. “Do not blame anybody for your mistakes and failures.” In addition, he blamed most of his losses on the failure of judgment and taking time to think. “Whatever failures I have known, whatever errors I have committed, whatever follies I have witnessed in private and public life have been the consequence of action without thought.”
• It is important to “follow what the market is currently doing as opposed to following what one might personally think the market should do.” As he said, “Every man has a right to his opinion, but no man has a right to be wrong in his facts.”
• Knowing your biases and weaknesses is important. “Only as you do know yourself can your brain serve you as a sharp and efficient tool. Know your own failings, passions and prejudices so you can separate them from what you see.”
• Baruch was highly regarded and well-respected, but he frequently practised humility and understood the challenges of the market. He is often credited with the saying “The main purpose of the stock market is to make fools of as many men as possible”.
• Taking time away from the market is necessary. He took many vacations and used the downtime to “reflect on past transactions”. For Baruch, this time away was important so he could have the peace of mind and concentration to reflect and improve his abilities. He devoted lots of hours and effort to examining past trades to find out why he lost money
Baruch was recognized as one of Wall Street’s financial leaders and his teachings are as valuable today as decades ago. These are well documented in his book Baruch: My Own Story (1957) in which, among others, he said: “I have heard many men talk intelligently, even brilliantly, about something – only to see them proven powerless when it comes to acting on what they believe.”
I am grateful to Charles Kirk for having taken the trouble of summarizing Baruch’s pertinent words of wisdom – sage advice that we can all do with to guide us to correct investment decisions – reported verbatim in the paragraphs below.
• Baruch started out as most traders do – i.e. losing lots of money because he lacked the knowledge, experience and discipline. “You have to lose money in order to better yourself.”
• Real success in the market takes time and money. Unfortunately “most people view the market as the place where the miracle of great and quick riches can be performed with little effort”.
• Overtrading and holding too many positions in his early years caused Baruch to go broke many times before he developed the discipline to succeed.
• A successful speculator is “a man who observes the future and acts before it occurs”. Acting swiftly in the market is important.
• After losing money as a result of the recommendation of others, Baruch focused on the facts. “One must search through a maze of complex and contradictory details to get to the significant facts … Then he must be able to operate coldly, clearly, and skilfully on the basis of those facts.” The challenge for the successful speculator is “how to disentangle the cold hard facts from the rather warm feelings of the people dealing with the facts.” Moreover, “if you get all the facts, your judgment can be right; if you don’t get all the facts, it can’t be right”.
• Be honest with yourself and expect to be wrong as many times as you are right. “If a speculator is correct half of the time, he is hitting a good average. Even being right 3 or 4 times out of 10 should yield a person a fortune if he has the sense to cut his losses quickly on the ventures where he is wrong.” Cutting losses quickly was THE most important trading rule.
• Don’t underestimate the power of thinking. “During my eighty-seven years I have witnessed a whole succession of technological revolutions. But none of them has done away with the need for character in the individual or the ability to think.”
• If your stocks are keeping you awake a night worrying about them, you should sell them to a “sleeping point”.
• The way to truly succeed in the market is to devote oneself full-time to the task. “Because of the extreme challenge, one must commit full attention to it.” Market speculation is “no different than trying to be a successful doctor or lawyer … you simply must devote yourself full-time to the study of your craft”.
• Through experience, Baruch learned the golden rule - never take stock tips from others. Self-reliance and “doing one’s own thinking” are a must.
• Baruch found it best to keep silent about his positions and trades and he believed it was “best to trade alone”. When he retired from A.A. Housman & Company and went on his own, Baruch did so because he thought it was best to trade independently and remain focused in order to achieve the greatest profits. “Most of the successful people I’ve known are the ones who do more listening than talking.”
• According to Baruch, the stock market does not determine the health of the economy but “rather reflects it”. The ability to understand this is an important skill.
• Baruch would often trade both sides of the market – long and short. “Having flexibility should not be underestimated.”
• About risk, he said: There is no investment which does not involve some risk and is not something of a gamble.” Moreover, “what we can try to do perhaps is to come to a better understanding of how to reduce the element of risk in whatever we undertake”.
• Baruch did not believe in diversification, but that it was “better to have a few stocks and to watch them carefully”.
• Having a “good supply of cash on hand at all times in reserve is important” to take advantage of market declines and major crashes.
• He believed that traders should focus on one thing at a time. He thought no one could be an expert at too many things. He liked to focus on “one thing at a time, perfect it, and do it well”.
• Baruch believed the two main mistakes that contributed to his early losses were the same mistakes most investors make, namely 1) “They know too little about the company’s management, earnings, prospects, and possibility for future growth” and 2) “They tend to trade beyond their financial capital capacity”.
• Baruch was a fundamentalist versus technical focused investor. In essence he required strong real assets of the company (cash and properties), that the company produced or performed something that is needed and valued, and that it had good management.
• “Successful speculation requires staying on top of changes in industries and companies that either create new industries or improve on existing industries. The majority of your profits will come from these two … The shrewdest traders throughout history all adapted the skill of reactionary change, as the market constantly presents new and different opportunities.”
• What drives stock prices is human reactions. Ironically, the key to successful speculation is to remove our decisions from our emotions. “Without control over your emotions, there is very little chance for profitable success in the stock market.”
• Baruch often described the market as a thermometer and the economic environment as the fever. “The market does not cause economic cycles but merely reflects them and the judgments of what traders believe business and the future will be like.”
• He believed no one could sell at the top and buy at the bottom (both for stocks and the market itself). “Don’t try to buy at the bottom and sell at the top. It can’t be done except by liars.” That said, Baruch said that through all of his time and research, he would develop a “feel” for when it was time to reduce positions. “I made my money by selling too soon.” While he didn’t have sell rules per se, he developed more of a sense that one gets when one trades for many years and follows the market with intense study.
• “It is much harder to sell stocks correctly than to buy them correctly.” Because of the emotional aspect of trading, if a “stock went up, the average investor would hold because he wants more gains – he’s exhibiting greed. If the stock declines, he also holds on and hopes the stock will come back so he can at least sell and break even - he’s hoping against hope”. Baruch worked hard to avoid these emotions by recognizing mistakes early and taking immediate action to own up to his mistakes quickly.
• Baruch believed that you had to take responsibility for your decisions. “Do not blame anybody for your mistakes and failures.” In addition, he blamed most of his losses on the failure of judgment and taking time to think. “Whatever failures I have known, whatever errors I have committed, whatever follies I have witnessed in private and public life have been the consequence of action without thought.”
• It is important to “follow what the market is currently doing as opposed to following what one might personally think the market should do.” As he said, “Every man has a right to his opinion, but no man has a right to be wrong in his facts.”
• Knowing your biases and weaknesses is important. “Only as you do know yourself can your brain serve you as a sharp and efficient tool. Know your own failings, passions and prejudices so you can separate them from what you see.”
• Baruch was highly regarded and well-respected, but he frequently practised humility and understood the challenges of the market. He is often credited with the saying “The main purpose of the stock market is to make fools of as many men as possible”.
• Taking time away from the market is necessary. He took many vacations and used the downtime to “reflect on past transactions”. For Baruch, this time away was important so he could have the peace of mind and concentration to reflect and improve his abilities. He devoted lots of hours and effort to examining past trades to find out why he lost money
Bernard Baruch
Bernard Mannes Baruch (August 19, 1870 – June 20, 1965) was an American financier, stock-market speculator, statesman, and political consultant. After his success in business, he devoted his time toward advising Democratic U.S. Presidents Woodrow Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt on economic matters.
Early life, education, and career
Bernard Baruch was born in Camden, South Carolina to Simon and Belle Baruch. He was the second of four sons. His father Dr. Simon Baruch (1840–1921) was a German immigrant of Jewish ethnicity who came to the United States in 1855. He became a surgeon on the staff of Confederate general Robert E. Lee during the American Civil War and a pioneer in physical therapy. His mother's Sephardic Jewish ancestors came to New York as early as the 1690s and were in the shipping business. In 1881 the family moved to New York City, and Bernard Baruch graduated from the City College of New York eight years later. He eventually became a broker and then a partner in A. A. Housman and Company. With his earnings and commissions he bought a seat on the New York Stock Exchange for $18,000 ($425000 in today's dollars). There he amassed a fortune before the age of thirty via speculation in the sugar market. In 1903 he had his own brokerage firm and gained the reputation of "The Lone Wolf on Wall Street" because of his refusal to join any financial house. By 1910, he had become one of Wall Street's best known financiers. Baruch College (part of the City University of New York) was named after him as well as a residential building on the Stony Brook University campus.
Presidential Adviser: First World War
During World War I he advised President Woodrow Wilson on national defense, during which time he became the chairman of the War Industries Board. (His stenographer was the then-unknown teenager Billy Rose). Baruch played a major role in turning American industry to full-scale war production. At the war's conclusion, he was seen with President Wilson at the Versailles Peace Conference. He never competed for elective office. He supported numerous Democratic congressmen with $1000 annual campaign donations, and became a popular figure on Capitol Hill. Every election season he would contribute from $100 to $1000 to numerous Democratic candidates.
During President Roosevelt's "New Deal" program, Baruch was a member of the "Brain Trust" and helped form the National Recovery Administration (NRA).
Other Accomplishments
Baruch was instrumental in starting the Council on Foreign Relations along with the Rockefellers, Morgans, and Warburgs.
Presidential Adviser: Second World War
Baruch argued that in modern warfare there was little use for free enterprise. He said Washington should control all aspects of the economy and that both business and unions should be subservient to the nation's security interest. Furthermore, price controls were essential to prevent inflation and to maximize military power per dollar. He wanted labor to be organized to facilitate optimum production. Baruch believed labor should be cajoled, coerced, and controlled as necessary: a central government agency would orchestrate the allocation of labor. He supported what was known as a "work or fight" bill. Baruch advocated the creation of a permanent superagency similar to his old Industries Board. His theory enhanced the role of civilian businessmen and industrialists in determining what was needed and who would produce it. Baruch's ideas were largely adopted, with James Byrnes appointed to carry them out. During the war Baruch remained a trusted advisor and confidant of President Roosevelt, and the President spent an entire month as a guest at Baruch's South Carolina estate, in 1944.
In 1946 he was appointed the United States representative to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC) by President Harry S. Truman. As a member of the newly created UNAEC, Baruch suggested the elimination of nuclear weapons after implementation of a system of international controls, inspections, and punishment for violations.
On Friday, June 14, 1946, Baruch - widely seen by many scientists and some members of Truman's administration as unqualified for the task - presented his Baruch Plan, a modified version of the Acheson-Lilienthal plan, to the UNAEC, which proposed international control of then-new atomic energy.
The Soviet Union rejected Baruch's proposal as unfair given the fact that the U.S. already had nuclear weapons, instead proposing that the U.S. eliminate its nuclear weapons before a system of controls and inspections was implemented. A stalemate ensued.
Park bench statesman
Baruch was well-known, and often walked or sat in Washington D.C's Lafayette Park and in New York City's Central Park. It was not uncommon for him to discuss government affairs with other people while sitting on a park bench: he became known for this.
In 1960, on his ninetieth birthday, a commemorative park bench in Lafayette Park across from the White House was dedicated to him. He continued to advise on international affairs until his death on Sunday, June 20, 1965, in New York City, at the age of ninety-four.
Trivia
Baruch's faith helped him make his fortune. During his Wall Street days, Baruch sold short, to the limit of his resources, a stock he believed to be overvalued. He expected a quick profit on the next business day, believing the directors would not declare the regular dividend since the company could not afford it. He knew, however, that if the directors bluffed and declared a dividend, the stock could rise, and he would have to cover instantly or lose everything. The day before the dividend declaration day, his mother reminded him that the next day was the Jewish holiday Yom Kippur, and he had promised to maintain the solemnity of the annual occasion and "keep" the holiday holy. Keeping his promise, Baruch ignored the multiple phone calls and telegrams from his friends who urged him to take his profit and cover. After Yom Kippur had passed, he read the telegrams and learned that, indeed, the dividend had passed. Rather than rising as a result, however, the stock had fallen precipitiously.
Keeping his promise, he had become a millionaire.
In his teenage and college years, Baruch was quite good at sports, especially baseball and there was the possibility of his playing baseball professionally. But during a game for City College, he suffered an ear injury that impaired his hearing, taking away any possibility of playing in the majors
His winter residence was his 17,500 acres (71 km2) Hobcaw Barony on the coast of South Carolina, which he purchased between 1905 and 1910. At Hobcaw House he was host to such world leaders as Winston Churchill. Other guests included General Pershing and Edith Bolling Wilson wife of Woodrow Wilson.
Early life, education, and career
Bernard Baruch was born in Camden, South Carolina to Simon and Belle Baruch. He was the second of four sons. His father Dr. Simon Baruch (1840–1921) was a German immigrant of Jewish ethnicity who came to the United States in 1855. He became a surgeon on the staff of Confederate general Robert E. Lee during the American Civil War and a pioneer in physical therapy. His mother's Sephardic Jewish ancestors came to New York as early as the 1690s and were in the shipping business. In 1881 the family moved to New York City, and Bernard Baruch graduated from the City College of New York eight years later. He eventually became a broker and then a partner in A. A. Housman and Company. With his earnings and commissions he bought a seat on the New York Stock Exchange for $18,000 ($425000 in today's dollars). There he amassed a fortune before the age of thirty via speculation in the sugar market. In 1903 he had his own brokerage firm and gained the reputation of "The Lone Wolf on Wall Street" because of his refusal to join any financial house. By 1910, he had become one of Wall Street's best known financiers. Baruch College (part of the City University of New York) was named after him as well as a residential building on the Stony Brook University campus.
Presidential Adviser: First World War
During World War I he advised President Woodrow Wilson on national defense, during which time he became the chairman of the War Industries Board. (His stenographer was the then-unknown teenager Billy Rose). Baruch played a major role in turning American industry to full-scale war production. At the war's conclusion, he was seen with President Wilson at the Versailles Peace Conference. He never competed for elective office. He supported numerous Democratic congressmen with $1000 annual campaign donations, and became a popular figure on Capitol Hill. Every election season he would contribute from $100 to $1000 to numerous Democratic candidates.
During President Roosevelt's "New Deal" program, Baruch was a member of the "Brain Trust" and helped form the National Recovery Administration (NRA).
Other Accomplishments
Baruch was instrumental in starting the Council on Foreign Relations along with the Rockefellers, Morgans, and Warburgs.
Presidential Adviser: Second World War
Baruch argued that in modern warfare there was little use for free enterprise. He said Washington should control all aspects of the economy and that both business and unions should be subservient to the nation's security interest. Furthermore, price controls were essential to prevent inflation and to maximize military power per dollar. He wanted labor to be organized to facilitate optimum production. Baruch believed labor should be cajoled, coerced, and controlled as necessary: a central government agency would orchestrate the allocation of labor. He supported what was known as a "work or fight" bill. Baruch advocated the creation of a permanent superagency similar to his old Industries Board. His theory enhanced the role of civilian businessmen and industrialists in determining what was needed and who would produce it. Baruch's ideas were largely adopted, with James Byrnes appointed to carry them out. During the war Baruch remained a trusted advisor and confidant of President Roosevelt, and the President spent an entire month as a guest at Baruch's South Carolina estate, in 1944.
In 1946 he was appointed the United States representative to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC) by President Harry S. Truman. As a member of the newly created UNAEC, Baruch suggested the elimination of nuclear weapons after implementation of a system of international controls, inspections, and punishment for violations.
On Friday, June 14, 1946, Baruch - widely seen by many scientists and some members of Truman's administration as unqualified for the task - presented his Baruch Plan, a modified version of the Acheson-Lilienthal plan, to the UNAEC, which proposed international control of then-new atomic energy.
The Soviet Union rejected Baruch's proposal as unfair given the fact that the U.S. already had nuclear weapons, instead proposing that the U.S. eliminate its nuclear weapons before a system of controls and inspections was implemented. A stalemate ensued.
Park bench statesman
Baruch was well-known, and often walked or sat in Washington D.C's Lafayette Park and in New York City's Central Park. It was not uncommon for him to discuss government affairs with other people while sitting on a park bench: he became known for this.
In 1960, on his ninetieth birthday, a commemorative park bench in Lafayette Park across from the White House was dedicated to him. He continued to advise on international affairs until his death on Sunday, June 20, 1965, in New York City, at the age of ninety-four.
Trivia
Baruch's faith helped him make his fortune. During his Wall Street days, Baruch sold short, to the limit of his resources, a stock he believed to be overvalued. He expected a quick profit on the next business day, believing the directors would not declare the regular dividend since the company could not afford it. He knew, however, that if the directors bluffed and declared a dividend, the stock could rise, and he would have to cover instantly or lose everything. The day before the dividend declaration day, his mother reminded him that the next day was the Jewish holiday Yom Kippur, and he had promised to maintain the solemnity of the annual occasion and "keep" the holiday holy. Keeping his promise, Baruch ignored the multiple phone calls and telegrams from his friends who urged him to take his profit and cover. After Yom Kippur had passed, he read the telegrams and learned that, indeed, the dividend had passed. Rather than rising as a result, however, the stock had fallen precipitiously.
Keeping his promise, he had become a millionaire.
In his teenage and college years, Baruch was quite good at sports, especially baseball and there was the possibility of his playing baseball professionally. But during a game for City College, he suffered an ear injury that impaired his hearing, taking away any possibility of playing in the majors
His winter residence was his 17,500 acres (71 km2) Hobcaw Barony on the coast of South Carolina, which he purchased between 1905 and 1910. At Hobcaw House he was host to such world leaders as Winston Churchill. Other guests included General Pershing and Edith Bolling Wilson wife of Woodrow Wilson.
Wednesday, February 10, 2010
Paul Krugman:The heart of the eurozone crisis is in Spain
Most press coverage of the eurozone troubles has focused on Greece, which is understandable: Greece is up against the wall to a greater extent than anyone else. But the Greek economy is also very small; in economic terms the heart of the crisis is in Spain, which is much bigger. And as I’ve tried to point out in a number of posts, Spain’s troubles are not, despite what you may have read, the result of fiscal irresponsibility. Instead, they reflect “asymmetric shocks” within the eurozone, which were always known to be a problem, but have turned out to be an even worse problem than the euroskeptics feared.
So I thought it might be useful to lay out, in a handful of pictures, how Spain got into its current state. (All of the data come from the IMF World Economic Outlook Database). There’s a kind of classic simplicity about the story — it’s almost like a textbook example. Unfortunately, millions of people are suffering the consequences.
The story begins with the Spanish real estate bubble. In Spain, as in many countries including our own, real estate prices soared after 2000. This brought massive inflows of capital; within Europe, Germany moved into huge current account surplus while Spain and other peripheral countries moved into huge deficit:
These big capital inflows produced a classic transfer problem: they raised demand for Spanish goods and services, leading to substantially higher inflation in Spain than in Germany and other surplus countries. Here’s a comparison of GDP deflators (remember, both countries are on the euro, so the divergence reflects a rise in Spain’s relative prices):
But then the bubble burst, leaving Spain with much reduced domestic demand — and highly uncompetitive within the euro area thanks to the rise in its prices and labor costs. If Spain had had its own currency, that currency might have appreciated during the real estate boom, then depreciated when the boom was over. Since it didn’t and doesn’t, however, Spain now seems doomed to suffer years of grinding deflation and high unemployment.
Where are budget deficits in all this? Spain’s budget situation looked very good during the boom years. It is running huge deficits now, but that’s a consequence, not a cause, of the crisis: revenue has plunged, and the government has spent some money trying to alleviate unemployment. Here’s the picture:
So, whose fault is all this? Nobody’s, in one sense. In another sense, Europe’s policy elite bears the responsibility: it pushed hard for the single currency, brushing off warnings that exactly this sort of thing might happen (although, as I said, even euroskeptics never imagined it would be this bad).
Am I calling, then, for breakup of the euro. No: the costs of undoing the thing would be immense and hugely disruptive. I think Europe is now stuck with this creation, and needs to move as quickly as possible toward the kind of fiscal and labor market integration that would make it more workable.
So I thought it might be useful to lay out, in a handful of pictures, how Spain got into its current state. (All of the data come from the IMF World Economic Outlook Database). There’s a kind of classic simplicity about the story — it’s almost like a textbook example. Unfortunately, millions of people are suffering the consequences.
The story begins with the Spanish real estate bubble. In Spain, as in many countries including our own, real estate prices soared after 2000. This brought massive inflows of capital; within Europe, Germany moved into huge current account surplus while Spain and other peripheral countries moved into huge deficit:
These big capital inflows produced a classic transfer problem: they raised demand for Spanish goods and services, leading to substantially higher inflation in Spain than in Germany and other surplus countries. Here’s a comparison of GDP deflators (remember, both countries are on the euro, so the divergence reflects a rise in Spain’s relative prices):
But then the bubble burst, leaving Spain with much reduced domestic demand — and highly uncompetitive within the euro area thanks to the rise in its prices and labor costs. If Spain had had its own currency, that currency might have appreciated during the real estate boom, then depreciated when the boom was over. Since it didn’t and doesn’t, however, Spain now seems doomed to suffer years of grinding deflation and high unemployment.
Where are budget deficits in all this? Spain’s budget situation looked very good during the boom years. It is running huge deficits now, but that’s a consequence, not a cause, of the crisis: revenue has plunged, and the government has spent some money trying to alleviate unemployment. Here’s the picture:
So, whose fault is all this? Nobody’s, in one sense. In another sense, Europe’s policy elite bears the responsibility: it pushed hard for the single currency, brushing off warnings that exactly this sort of thing might happen (although, as I said, even euroskeptics never imagined it would be this bad).
Am I calling, then, for breakup of the euro. No: the costs of undoing the thing would be immense and hugely disruptive. I think Europe is now stuck with this creation, and needs to move as quickly as possible toward the kind of fiscal and labor market integration that would make it more workable.
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